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Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality
Psychology 2nd Edition Harry Reis Digital Instant
Download
Author(s): Harry Reis, Charles M. Judd
ISBN(s): 9782013024730, 2013024738
Edition: 2
File Details: PDF, 22.25 MB
Year: 2014
Language: english
 Handbook of Research Methods in
Social and Personality Psychology

Second Edition
This indispensable sourcebook covers conceptual and practical issues in
research design in the field of social and personality psychology. Key
experts address specific methods and areas of research, contributing to a
comprehensive overview of contemporary practice. This updated and
expanded second edition offers current commentary on social and
personality psychology, reflecting the rapid development of this dynamic
area of research over the past decade. With the help of this up-to-date text,
both seasoned and beginning social psychologists will be able to explore the
various tools and methods available to them in their research as they craft
experiments and imagine new methodological possibilities.
HARRY T. REIS is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Clinical
and Social Sciences, University of Rochester. He is the coauthor of An Atlas
of Interpersonal Situations and the coeditor of The Encyclopedia of Human
Relationships.
CHARLES M. JUDD is College Professor of Distinction in the Department
of Psychology and Neuroscience at the University of Colorado at Boulder.
He is the author of Data Analysis: A Model Comparison Approach and
Research Methods in Social Relations.
Handbook of Research Methods in
Social and Personality Psychology

Second Edition

Edited by

Harry T. Reis
University of Rochester

Charles M. Judd
University of Colorado at Boulder
32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the
pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international
levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107600751
© Cambridge University Press 2000, 2014
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the
provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of
any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge
University Press.

First published 2000

Reprinted 2009, 2010, 2011
Second edition 2014
Printed in the United States of America
A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data
Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology /
[edited by] Harry T. Reis, University of Rochester,
Charles M. Judd, University of Colorado at Boulder. – Second edition.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 978-1-107-01177-9 (hardback : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-107-60075-
1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Social psychology – Research – Methodology. 2. Personality – Research
– Methodology. I. Reis, Harry T.
II. Judd, Charles M.
HM1019.H36 2013
302.07ʹ2–dc23 2013024738
ISBN 978-1-107-01177-9 Hardback
ISBN 978-1-107-60075-1 Paperback
Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or
accuracy of URLs for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to
in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web
sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 Contents
Contributors
Introduction to the Second Edition
Introduction to the First Edition
Harry T. Reis and Charles M. Judd

1 Scratch an Itch with a Brick: Why We Do Research

Susan T. Fiske

Part one. Design and Inference Considerations

2 Research Design and Issues of Validity
Marilynn B. Brewer and William D. Crano
3 Research Design
Eliot R. Smith
4 Causal Inference and Generalization in Field Settings: Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs
Stephen G. West, Heining Cham, and Yu Liu
5 Field Research Methods
Elizabeth Levy Paluck and Robert B. Cialdini

Part two. Procedural Possibilities

6 Using Physiological Indexes in Social Psychological Research
Jim Blascovich
7 Research Methods in Social and Affective Neuroscience
Elliot T. Berkman, William A. Cunningham, and Matthew D.
Lieberman
8 Behavior Genetic Research Methods: Testing Quasi-Causal Hypotheses
Using Multivariate Twin Data
Eric Turkheimer and K. Paige Harden
9 Methods of Small Group Research
Norbert L. Kerr and R. Scott Tindale
10 Inducing and Measuring Emotion and Affect: Tips, Tricks, and Secrets
Karen S. Quigley, Kristen A. Lindquist, and Lisa Feldman
Barrett
11 Complex Dynamical Systems in Social and Personality Psychology:
Theory, Modeling, and Analysis
 Michael J. Richardson, Rick Dale, and Kerry L. Marsh
12 Implicit Measures in Social and Personality Psychology
Bertram Gawronski and Jan De Houwer
13 The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide to Priming and
Automaticity Research
John A. Bargh and Tanya L. Chartrand
14 Behavioral Observation and Coding
Richard E. Heyman, Michael F. Lorber, J. Mark Eddy, and
Tessa V. West
15 Methods for Studying Everyday Experience in Its Natural Context
Harry T. Reis, Shelly L. Gable, and Michael R. Maniaci
16 Survey Research
Jon A. Krosnick, Paul J. Lavrakas, and Nuri Kim
17 Conducting Research on the Internet
Michael R. Maniaci and Ronald D. Rogge

Part three. Data Analytic Strategies

18 Measurement: Reliability, Construct Validation, and Scale
Construction
Oliver P. John and Veronica Benet-MartÍnez
19 Exploring Causal and Noncausal Hypotheses in Nonexperimental Data
Leandre R. Fabrigar and Duane T. Wegener
20 Advanced Psychometrics: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Item
Response Theory, and the Study of Measurement Invariance
Keith F. Widaman and Kevin J. Grimm
21 Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling
Alexander M. Schoemann, Mijke Rhemtulla, and Todd D.
Little
22 The Design and Analysis of Data from Dyads and Groups
David A. Kenny and Deborah A. Kashy
23 Nasty Data: Unruly, Ill-Mannered Observations Can Ruin Your
Analysis
Gary H. McClelland
24 Missing Data Analysis
Gina L. Mazza and Craig K. Enders
25 Mediation and Moderation
Charles M. Judd, Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, and Dominique Muller
26 Meta-Analysis of Research in Social and Personality Psychology
Blair T. Johnson and Alice H. Eagly

Author Index
Subject Index
 Contributors

John A. Bargh
Yale University

Lisa Feldman Barrett

Northeastern University and Harvard Medical School

Veronica Benet-Martínez
Pompeu Fabra University

Elliot T. Berkman
University of Oregon

Jim Blascovich
University of California

Marilynn B. Brewer
University of New South Wales

Heining Cham
Fordham University

Tanya L. Chartrand
Duke University

Robert B. Cialdini
Arizona State University

William D. Crano
Claremont Graduate University

William A. Cunningham
University of Toronto

Rick Dale
University of California

Jan De Houwer
Ghent University

Alice H. Eagly
Northwestern University

J. Mark Eddy
University of Washington

Craig K. Enders
Arizona State University

Leandre R. Fabrigar
Queen's University

Susan T. Fiske
Princeton University

Shelly L. Gable
University of California

Bertram Gawronski
University of Texas at Austin

Kevin J. Grimm
University of California

K. Paige Harden
University of Texas at Austin

Richard E. Heyman
New York University

Oliver P. John
University of California

Blair T. Johnson
University of Connecticut

Charles M. Judd
University of Colorado at Boulder

Deborah A. Kashy
Michigan State University

David A. Kenny
University of Connecticut

Norbert L. Kerr
Michigan State University

Nuri Kim
Stanford University

Jon A. Krosnick
Stanford University

Paul J. Lavrakas
Northern Arizona University

Matthew D. Lieberman
University of California

Kristen A. Lindquist
University of North Carolina

Todd D. Little
Texas Tech University

Yu Liu
Arizona State University

Michael F. Lorber
New York University

Michael R. Maniaci
University of Rochester

Kerry L. Marsh
University of Connecticut

Gina L. Mazza
Arizona State University

Gary H. McClelland
University of Colorado

Dominique Muller
Pierre Mendes France University at Grenoble, University Institute of
France

Elizabeth Levy Paluck

Princeton University

Karen S. Quigley
Northeastern University and Edith Nourse Rogers Memorial (Bedford)
VA Hospital

Harry T. Reis
University of Rochester

Mijke Rhemtulla
University of Amsterdam

Michael J. Richardson
University of Cincinnati

Ronald D. Rogge
University of Rochester

Alexander M. Schoemann
East Carolina University

Eliot R. Smith
Indiana University

R. Scott Tindale
Loyola University Chicago

Eric Turkheimer
University of Virginia

Penny S. Visser
University of Chicago

Duane T. Wegener
The Ohio State University

Stephen G. West
Arizona State University

Tessa V. West
New York University

Keith F. Widaman
University of California

Vincent Y. Yzerbyt
Université catholique de Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve
 Introduction to the Second Edition

When we put together the first edition of this Handbook, published in 2000,
we scarcely could have imagined the pace with which methodological
innovation would occur in social and personality psychology. To be sure,
we hoped that the field's relentless pursuit of ever-more creative and precise
methods would continue – a pursuit that the book was intended to
encourage. Our expectation was that a new edition would be needed
somewhere in the far distant future. A mere 13 years later, that time has
come. Social-personality psychologists have advanced the frontiers of
methodology at a far faster rate than we anticipated, so much so that the
prior volume of this Handbook no longer did justice to the diverse
approaches and methods that define the field's cutting-edge research. With
these advances in mind, we set out to provide under a single cover a
compendium of the most important and influential research methods of
contemporary social-personality psychology.
Our goal for this volume is the same as it was for the prior edition: to
inform and inspire young researchers to broaden their research practices in
order to ask and answer deeper, more finely grained questions about social
life. One sometimes hears that methodological innovation provides little
more than an incremental gain on what is already known. In our opinion,
this view is short-sighted. As Greenwald (2012) observed, the great
majority of Nobel Prizes in the sciences have been awarded for
methodological advances rather than for theoretical contributions. This, he
reasons, is because of the synergy between methodology and theory:
Existing theories point to the need for new methods, which then suggest
questions that could not have been envisioned, much less investigated, with
older methods. In this way, new methods open the door to better
understanding of phenomena.
Social-personality psychologists have always been quick to capitalize on
new methods and technical innovations to further their exploration of the
processes that govern social behavior. Although the field continues to be
criticized for overrelying on laboratory experiments conducted with college
student samples, we believe that this criticism is short-sighted. As this
volume illustrates, social-personality psychologists conduct research using
diverse approaches, ranging from neuroscientific methods to observational
coding of live interaction, from implicit assessments to everyday experience
studies, and from priming outside of awareness to population-based
surveys. Furthermore, the Internet has made possible access to diverse and
specialized samples, an opportunity that social-personality psychologists
have eagerly embraced. Add to this the sophisticated insights afforded by
new or improved statistical innovations such as dyadic data analysis,
mediation analysis, and multilevel models, and it is readily apparent that
our theories are built on a rich, complex, and mature empirical foundation.
We suspect that our receptivity to innovation is one reason for the
growing popularity and influence of social-personality psychology.
Membership in the Society for Personality and Social Psychology has more
than doubled since 2000, and social-personality psychologists are now often
found in schools of business, medicine, and law. The influence of our work
extends well beyond the field's traditional borders, so much so that Yang
and Chiu (2009), in an analysis of citation patterns in APA journals,
identified social psychology as being positioned at the center of the
psychological sciences. We believe that this influence is at least partly
attributable to our leadership in championing methodological innovation.
For example, Baron and Kenny's classic paper on moderation and
mediation, published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in
1986, is the most cited article of all time in scientific psychology, with more
than 34,000 citations at the time of this writing.
Changes in the field's methodology do not occur in a vacuum, of course.
Two important developments have been the rapid increase in digital
technology and miniaturization, which have led directly to implicit
methods, fMRI, and portable devices for recording details of everyday
behavior, as well as in the accessibility of the Internet, which has opened
the door to a broader pool of research participants. Other kinds of changes
have also been influential. For example, the past decade has seen
impressive gains in statistical methods. Although many of these methods
are computationally complex, they encourage researchers to ask far more
intricate and revealing questions than could be asked with t-tests, ANOVAs,
and correlations. These changes notwithstanding, careful readers will note
that our approach to the research process is still grounded in the basics: a
concern for internal validity, an appreciation for the complexity of
generalizability, and the realization that the most useful and accurate
insights will come from programs of research that incorporate multiple,
diverse methods.
An easy way to see the rapid pace of methodological innovation in social-
personality methods is to compare this edition of the Handbook to its
predecessor. The roster of chapters in the current edition represents an
extensive revision from the earlier volume. Twelve chapters are entirely
new to this volume, discussing topics whose particulars or importance have
emerged since publication of the prior volume. These include treatments of
field research, implicit methods, methods for social neuroscience and
behavior genetics, research on the Internet, methods for studying emotion
and dynamical systems, multilevel models, advanced psychometrics,
missing data, and mediation and moderation. An additional introductory
chapter presents a compelling picture of why we do research. Readers of the
first edition will notice that six chapters have been dropped, not because of
diminished relevance but rather because there was no way to include them
and still have the space necessary to describe newer methods. The
remaining chapters have been, in most cases, thoroughly revamped to
reflect recent developments in method or application. We believe that the
result depicts state-of-the-art methods in social-personality psychology, at
least (we feel compelled to point out) for today.
When the two of us entered the field, in the 1970s, a young social-
personality psychologist could be considered well trained after taking two
courses in statistics and measurement and one in methods. Fortunately, that
is no longer the case; methodological training in most graduate programs is
far more extensive and continues for the duration of one's career. Although
some may see this as a daunting challenge, we prefer to see it as a sign of
the health and vigor of our discipline. Social-personality psychologists are
dedicated to obtaining the most enlightening, accurate, and useful
understanding of the social world in which we live. Taking advantage of
methodological innovation to imagine and address newer, more informative
questions is the surest way we know to continue the progress of the past
few decades. We hope this volume serves as a springboard for the next
generation of theoretical advances in social and personality psychology.
 Our every expectation is that the methodological advances in the years
since the first edition of this volume will only continue to accumulate in the
years ahead. We have little doubt that the future promises more appropriate
and sophisticated models of data, greater attention to process and
mechanisms, increased insights from neuroscientific explorations, greater
attention to data from diverse samples and settings, and increased insights
in the measurement of automatic responses. And we have no doubt that
there are further advances lurking down the road that will come with some
surprise. Accordingly, in another dozen years (or perhaps sooner), we
suspect it will be time for a third edition of this volume. One certain
prediction that we make is that we will not be the editors of that edition. But
we trust that others will realize the excitement of witnessing the
methodological vitality of the field by preparing that next edition.
Throughout this volume we have loved providing witness to the advances in
research methods mentioned earlier in this paragraph.

References
Greenwald, A. G. (2012). There is nothing so theoretical as a good method.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(2), 99–108.
Yang, Y. J., & Chiu, C. Y. (2009). Mapping the structure and dynamics of
psychological knowledge: Forty years of APA journal citations (1970–
2009). Review of General Psychology, 13(4), 349–356.
 Introduction to the First Edition
Harry T. Reis and Charles M. Judd

It is no accident, we believe, that many of the most influential

methodologists in the behavioral sciences happen to identify themselves as
social-personality psychologists. Throughout the methodological literature
in psychology, citations to Robert Abelson, Donald Campbell, Thomas
Cook, Donald Fiske, David Kenny, and Robert Rosenthal, to name just a
few, are ubiquitous. The reason we believe that this is not an accident is that
social-personality psychologists have set for themselves a particularly
challenging methodological task. Their domain of inquiry concerns all of
social behavior, from intergroup relations and large-scale social conflict to
dyadic interaction and close relationships. They study individual judgments,
cognitions, and affects about social phenomena as well as the evolution of
social norms and interdependent behaviors at the level of societies. Most
recently, entire cultures, and the belief systems associated with them, have
become a major area of interest. And, in the tradition of Kurt Lewin, social-
personality psychologists are firmly committed to a rigorous empirical
approach to whatever they study. They are convinced that a strong and
reciprocal relationship between theory and evidence is fundamental to the
acquisition of knowledge: that data demand good theories and that theories
demand quality data.
As a result, social-personality psychologists have developed and made
use of an extensive array of methodological tools. Although the field is
sometimes criticized for an overreliance on laboratory experimentation, in
fact the diversity of methodological approaches represented in the leading
journals is impressive. From surveys to simulations, from laboratory
experiments to daily event recordings, from response latency and
physiological measures to think-aloud protocols, and from the Internet and
palmtop computers to paper-and-pencil reports, the diversity of research
designs and procedures, measurement methods, and analytic strategies that
social psychologists employ is, in our view, extraordinary.
Our goal in putting together this Handbook was to provide a series of
state-of-the-art presentations spanning both traditional and innovative
methods that have moved and continue to move the discipline forward. The
product, we believe, documents the incredible wealth of methodological
tools that social-personality psychologists have at their disposal.
Intentionally, we sought to include chapters that might strike some readers
as a bit unusual in a book devoted to research methods. Certainly, some of
these topics would not have been included in a book of this sort 20, or
perhaps even 10, years ago. So, for example, chapters by Hastie and Stasser
on simulation, Collins on studying growth and change, McClelland on
transformations and outliers, Bargh and Chartrand on cognitive mediation,
Reis and Gable on daily experience methods, and Blascovich on
psychophysiological measures are a far cry from the traditional chapters on
design, measurement, and analysis that one might routinely expect in a
research methods textbook. Several statistics chapters are included because
we believe that new developments in statistical methodology make it
possible to extract valuable insights about social psychological phenomena
from data collected with diverse methods in many different settings.
But then, it was not our goal to provide yet another research methods
textbook cataloging standard procedures and principles. Many excellent
textbooks serving this function are already available. Although this
Handbook might well be used as a textbook, our goal was more ambitious
than teaching the field's traditional core. Rather, we sought to demonstrate
and highlight the tremendous methodological richness and innovativeness
to be found in social psychological research, and additionally, to provide
social-personality psychologists with resources for expanding the
methodological diversity employed in their research.
Such innovation is central to the legacy we have inherited from the field's
founders. Social-personality psychologists value their reputation as both
rigorous and clever methodologists; indeed, among the behavioral sciences,
social psychologists are notorious for their exacting methodological
standards and for the pinpoint precision with which the fit of evidence to
theory is scrutinized. These practices reflect two considerations: the growth
of a cumulative literature, which allows researchers to ask ever-finer
questions about phenomena and their mediators and moderators, and the
availability of new technologies capable of providing information not even
imagined a generation or two ago. For example, researchers rarely
investigated questions of mediation in the 1960s. With the advent of
computerized tests of cognitive mediation, sophisticated measures of
physiological mediation, and co-variance structure methods for evaluating
mediational models, these questions have become commonplace. A guiding
principle in preparing this volume was that theoretical and methodological
questions are not independent. Theory leads us to choose and extend
existing methods and search for new tools; methods get us thinking about
new ways to test and refine our constructs.
One of Donald Campbell's seminal and lasting contributions is the notion
that validity is achieved only through triangulation, by using a variety of
methodological approaches and procedures. In its original formulation, this
argument primarily addressed the validity and reliability of measurement:
through multiple diverse indicators one could eliminate both random and
systematic measurement errors and arrive at more accurate appraisals of
underlying constructs (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959). We, as researchers,
were taught that such a multifaceted measurement approachought to be
employed in each and every study that we conducted.
The discipline is coming to realize that this sort of triangulation is
fundamental not simply in measurement but in all aspects of methodology.
In this sense, then, it is fitting that the first chapter in this Handbook, by one
of Donald Cambell's students, Marilynn Brewer, sets the tone for the entire
volume. Brewer argues that only through the use of multifaceted research
strategies, adopted not only within individual studies but also, and much
more important, across an entire program of research, is research validity in
its broadest sense achieved. All the diversity that is represented in this
volume, and the diversity of methods and approaches yet to be developed,
is essential if social-personality research is to produce valid findings,
defining validity in its most comprehensive sense: that our conclusions and
theories ultimately provide accurate understandings of the social world that
we inhabit.
Putting together this volume has inspired in us great pride in social-
personality psychology's commitment to methodological rigor and
innovation, as well as in the methodological richness of contemporary
social psychology. Our hope is that this volume will similarly inspire both
new and established researchers alike to broaden and enhance their
methodological practices. Additionally, we hope the volume will serve as a
stimulus for yet unknown approaches and procedures that further contribute
to the validity of the research we conduct. Our legacy as social-personality
psychologists mandates that we continue to capitalize on methodological
and technological innovations in the service of ever more informative and
useful theories and knowledge.

Reference
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant
validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin,
56, 81–105.
 Chapter one Scratch an Itch with a Brick
Why We Do Research
Susan T. Fiske

What do mosquitoes, bricks, and research have in common? Both

mosquitoes and research motivate us by bugging us, and both bricks and
research build things. But bricks and mosquitoes? Let's see.…
Start with the first pair, mosquitoes and research: Both make us itch.
Most relevant here, we do research to scratch a mental itch. This is not
trivial. Research is challenging; indeed, some would say that personality
and social psychology are the really hard sciences, so this handbook
provides guidance in doing them right and managing the setbacks. With so
much grief (data can be so uncooperative, and reviewers almost always
are), you have to have a real itch to do the science, to persist. If research is
so tough, we as scientists have to be compelled, have to really want to do it.
This chapter explores why and how we bother, brick by brick. So in effect,
we are scratching the research itch with a research brick.
When researchers explain how they got involved with particular lifelong
projects, they usually answer with some version of, “What really bugged
me was this.…” Gaps, mysteries, and inconsistencies all drive regular
people as much as researchers. Witness the popularity of mystery series,
Sudoku puzzles, and suspense genres. People are wired to detect
discrepancies and want to resolve them. One prime way to start a program
of research is precisely to mind the cognitive gap. That is, scientists
especially notice theoretical discrepancies, empirical inconsistencies,
missing links in evidence, counterintuitive patterns, and all manner of
knowledge that just does not fit (Fiske, 2004a). Noticing discrepancies
could be indexed by the still, small buzz at the back of the mind, which
interrupts the flow of reading, listening, watching, and synthesizing science.
Focusing on the discrepancies is the first step to noticing an unsolved
problem. If the discrepancy matters to scientists (for reasons we explore
next), they itch to resolve it. And we scratch it by building science, laying
the bricks.
 This chapter argues that we do research partly to represent our own new
perspective on what's missing and what needs to be done. We do this gap-
filling empirically, not just theoretically, because we are a science that does
not separate theory and research as much as, for example, theoretical and
applied physics or economics. Hence, social and personality scientists
mostly do not entertain theoretical contributions without empirical
evidence; we are not satisfied until we do the research. As we will see,
another separate and not as noble, but very human, motivation for research
is that, for those in the field, research is pragmatic in several respects, as
people forward their careers. But the most important reasons are intellectual
and scientific, so the chapter turns to those first.

Represent New Perspectives

Researchers make discoveries; we create new knowledge. What we bring to
our work is our own unique perspective, whether intellectual, personal,
identity-based, or even ideological. Some are more conventional sources of
science than others, but all form parts of the picture; let's examine each in
turn.

Intellectual Puzzles
If science starts with an itch, a discrepancy, or a discontent, we build or use
a theory to test explanations. We may detect gaps in existing theory, and
this is the platonic ideal for science, as many chapters in this volume
illustrate.
Alternatively, researchers may pit two theories against each other,
sometimes supporting one to the exclusion of the other, but more often
determining the conditions under which each is true. For example, in close
relationships research, one might pit attachment theories (Shaver &
Mikulincer, 2010) against interdependence theories (Rusbult, Drigotas, &
Verette, 1994), but in fact both can operate simultaneously, one at an
individual-difference level and the other at a situational level. Still, to the
extent that two theories make distinct predictions, the suspense often
captures a researcher's (and a reader's) imagination.
 Some researchers commit to a meta-perspective, such as evolutionary or
functional explanations, and apply them to the problem at hand, building
support for that perspective. For example, an evolutionary approach might
argue that people mistrust out-groups because it has often been adaptive to
stick with your own kind (Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008), and specific research
questions follow from these prin- ciples.
Another intellectual strategy borrows a neighboring field's theories and
methods, applying them to social and personality phenomena. For example,
social cognition research originally began by applying nonsocial models of
attention, memory, and inference to social settings, discovering where
common principles did and did not apply (see Fiske & Taylor, 2013 for
more specific examples). For instance, attention is captured by novel social
stimuli, just as by novel nonsocial stimuli (Taylor & Fiske, 1978; McArthur
& Post, 1977). However, attention is also captured by information about
another's intention (Jones & Davis, 1965), so uniquely social principles
sometimes apply to other people, versus things, as objects of perception. So,
borrowing from an adjoining field can illuminate what is unique about
personality and social approaches.
Still another intellectual strategy of research ideas is going back in time
to the earliest psychological writings. Some reread Aristotle (e.g., regarding
social animals; Aronson, 2004); some like the French National Archives
(e.g., regarding emotion theory; Zajonc, 1985). Myself, I like William
James (Fiske, 1992).
Scientists also construct theories from scratch, sometimes going from the
top down with a metaphor that seems to capture an important reality, such
as depicting willpower as a muscle that can get fatigued (Baumeister &
Alquist, 2009). Sometimes theories follow from the bottom up, beginning
with data, where a systematic program of research consistently yields
particular patterns that demand a systematic explanation. For example,
neural responses to face perception suggest that trustworthiness is the first
and primary dimension that emerges, and theory then describes why that
might be the case (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008). All these then are
intellectual motivators of research.

Personal Experiences
We don't often admit this outside the family, but psychological scientists do
often get ideas from personal experience. We are after all part of our own
subject matter. Informal sources of formal theory are legitimate, as long as
the informal insights are then stated in a systematic and testable form
(Fiske, 2004b). Not all theory has to be expressed in mathematical form –
indeed, in social and personality psychology, most is not – but it does have
to be logical, parsimonious, and falsifiable, unlike common sense. That is,
even theory that derives from personal experience has to be accountable to
empirical tests.
Being keenly interested in human behavior gives us an advantage in
drawing ideas from experience. As trained social observers, we notice
behavioral patterns that others miss. Indeed, McGuire (1973) exhorted
graduate students to observe the real, not just what others have said or what
the sanitized data say.
Within this approach, the trick is, as Lee Ross puts it, to “run the
anecdote” (personal communication, October 12, 2011). If a story, a hunch,
or even fiction seems to capture an important human truth, social and
personality psychologists can design studies that simulate that phenomenon,
to see if it survives the transition from imagination to a reality that
replicates reliably. This volume provides instructions for how to do exactly
that.
One caveat: New investigators sometimes fall into the trap of doing me-
search – that is, studying their own thorny psychological issues, their own
in-group's preoccupations, or some intense idiosyncratic experience. The
problem here is that, although highly motivated, one may not be the most
objective judge of an issue that is too close to home. At worst, one may be
too invested in a certain result, and equally bad, one might have no insight
at all. At a minimum, the motivational biases we investigate might also bias
our interpretation of our results (Kahneman, 2011). At best, one has some
relevant insights and an open mind about whether these testable ideas
produce interpretable data. Only then is one really ready to learn something
scientifically new and reliable, as a result of personal experience.

Group Identities
Many of us go into social psychology because it focuses on the variance
explained by situations, and situations can be changed, to benefit people's
well-being. If you think a social problem is caused by context, that is
potentially a social policy issue, but if you think the social problem has
genetic causes, that does not lend itself to easy societal solutions. One
important social issue in today's multicultural, globalizing world is
intergroup relations – by the author's estimates from conference talk titles,
representing the preoccupation of about a quarter to a third of social
psychology. As our field itself becomes more heterogeneous, more of us are
thinking about various phenomena related to ethnic, racial, cultural, gender,
sexual, age, disability, and other diverse identities.
On the principle of “nothing about us without us,” many of the
researchers studying these issues come from the affected groups. This
presents both opportunities and challenges. The opportunities come in our
field's chance finally to represent the underrepresented. Prejudice research,
for example, has gone from merely studying the perpetrators to studying the
targets, and target-perpetrator interaction (e.g., Richeson & Shelton, 2007),
enriching the science of intergroup interaction, as well as the broader field,
with new more widely applicable insights and methods.
The group-identity research faces challenges parallel to the me-search
challenges, in what might be viewed as we-search. Besides the perils of
lacking objectivity, one is also accountable to a larger identity group, whom
one certainly does not wish to alienate with findings that might cast the
group in a poor light. This issue arises even more for outsiders studying
issues relevant to traditionally oppressed groups, for example, men studying
gender and white people studying black experience. Ultimately,
membership is not required to conduct good group-related science, but
insights do derive from lived experience, and collaboration is one solution
to keeping identity-relevant research both sensitive to politics and respectful
to lived experience. However, even in these cross-identity collaborations,
one must consider whether foregrounding one colleague gains credibility
with one audience (e.g., subordinates), and foregrounding the other gains
credibility with another audience (e.g., dominants). Peter Glick and I
considered this issue in our ambivalent sexism research (e.g., Glick &
Fiske, 1996), deciding for this reason, among others (including who
ultimately did more work), to foreground the male member of our
collaborative team.

Worldview Defense
Even more fraught but also honestly inspiring is research conducted to
examine one's own worldview, whether religious, political, or moral. But
ideology and science make uncomfortable bedfellows, so this is an
enterprise to enter only with both eyes wide open. One has to go into it with
the goal of testing cherished assumptions and being willing to find them
wanting. For example, liberals and conservatives emphasize distinct moral
bases of judgment (Haidt, 2007), and the role of each may unsettle both
ends of the spectrum. The inquiry is permissible if one agrees to play by the
rules of science. Fortunately, reviewers and editors keep us honest, with no
axe-grinding permitted in the ideal case.

Comment
Sources of ideas are as varied as scientists, and we can cluster these sources
in various ways. For example, in a classic exhortation to the field, McGuire
(1973) listed creative sources as including: paradoxical incident, analogy,
hypothetico-deductive method, functional analysis, rules of thumb,
conflicting results, accounting for exceptions, and straightening out
complex relationships. I do not disagree, and the interested reader is
referred to that earlier account.

Why Run the Study?

All these sources of inspiration are good, but why do research and not just
theory? In our field, other scientists will mostly ignore your armchair ideas
unless you arrive with evidence in hand. We are trained to be skeptics
because ideas are easy; evidence is harder, so it is more precious. What is
more, this is science, and when we joined up, we agreed to adhere to the
epistemological rule-book. But we also do the studies because research is
fun. Let's have a closer look at these motivations to walk the talk, going
beyond ideas to research.
Because This Is Science
We do the research because this is science, not theater, law, or car repair.
Our rules of evidence appear throughout this volume. When we join a
graduate program, we sign on to the scientific norms current in the
community of scholars. Reliable evidence that meets shared standards is the
coin of the realm.
Social and behavioral sciences might just be, as noted, the truly “hard”
sciences, for a variety of reasons. First is measurement: Human reactions
are difficult to record because most depend on human observers, whether
self-reports on Likert scales or coders of nonverbal behavior, and humans
are notoriously unreliable (D. W. Fiske, 1971). As observers of self and
other, people are both biased (e.g., prefer to accentuate the positive) and
prone to random error (e.g., variable over time, place, modality). Granted,
we can use measurements that avoid the human reporter (e.g., reaction time,
physiological measures), but these still entail a human judge. Even
astronomy recognizes the “personal equation” in observing heavenly bodies
(Schaffer, 1988), as apart from human ones. But the celestial stars
ultimately submit to more exact measures than the human ones, so finding
results in our science – despite the bias, despite the error – is really hard.
Science is all about discovery. Face it, we're geeks; we like making
measures, analyzing data, learning stuff. All this is a quest for truth and
maybe even wisdom (Brickman, 1980).

Hitting the Sweet Spot Is Fun

The most exciting science finds phenomena of important everyday interest
but connects to old problems for social and personality psychology, which
allows well-grounded theory, not just flash-in-the-pan findings popular
today but gone tomorrow. Hitting the sweet spot that includes both
everyday interest and scientific advance is tricky but fun.
Some advice comes from Stanley Schachter, who reportedly urged his
students to craft subtle, seemingly small independent variables that create
large, undeniable effects on important dependent variables. For example,
handing people a hot rather than iced coffee makes them more generous to
strangers (Williams & Bargh, 2008); the warmth variable dates back to
early childhood experiences of comfort and safety close to caretakers. What
a nifty finding. As another example, making people think about professors
makes them better at Trivial Pursuit (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998). This uses everyday materials to make an original point about the
power of priming (Bargh & Chartrand, Chapter 13 in this volume).
To hit the sweet spot, another social psychologist, Robert Abelson,
counseled young researchers to capture the spirit of the times but before
others notice it. Watching trends to get ahead of the curve allows a
researcher to anticipate what the field will find interesting next. One does
not want to jump on the bandwagon, but rather to drive it, or better yet, to
design it. Creating clever, realistic, innovative procedures, which also meet
all the criteria of methodological rigor and theory relevance, is indeed fun
and motivating. Hitting the sweet spot should make you feel like shouting,
“Woo-hoo!”

Solving the Puzzle Is Satisfying

Just as we are bugged by discrepancies and gaps, we like cognitive closure,
especially when we have to think a bit to get there. Solving the puzzle is
satisfying. Indeed, George Mandler's (1982) theory of aesthetic pleasure
posits that people most prefer small discrepancies easily resolved. Musical
themes and variations do this. Crossword puzzles do this, if one hits the
right level of difficulty. It follows the Goldilocks principle: Not too hard to
resolve, not too easy, but moderately challenging seems to work best. One
can recognize the right level of difficulty when one notices that time has
passed without one being aware of it. Becoming optimally absorbed in the
process of puzzle-solving creates the feeling of “flow,” which combines
both challenge and skill, resulting in total involvement and complete
concentration (Csikszentmihalyi & LeFevre, 1989). This happens more
often at work than at leisure, and it makes many of us feel lucky to be paid
for what we enjoy most.
Our contributions to the field also are satisfying because they fit previous
work, making notable progress, adding to human knowledge, a brick at a
time. Both resolving discrepancies and filling the gaps create the “Aha!”
experience that keeps problem-solvers going.
Being Right Is Fun
Besides the “woo-hoo” and “aha” experiences, many scientists relish the
“gotcha” moment, when they are right about a contested issue. Fun as it is
to win a competition, scientists must absolutely fight fair – that is, hurling
data, not insults. We all agree to abide by publicly replicable results,
although of course interpreting them can remain contentious. In general, in
my opinion, picking on other people's results does not usually make the
most impact, especially if it is nitpicking. Sometimes, of course, identifying
a confounding issue in the established paradigm can release a flood of
useful research. Today's methodological side effect can be tomorrow's main
effect of interest. This can create cumulative science.
Choosing and framing are essential here. Choose battles carefully: Is the
end-result of winning worth making enemies? And if people are
challenging your data, try to be a good sport. We are obliged to share our
data and any unpublished details of our methods; we must strive to view the
challenge as advancing science, to respond vigorously but respectfully to
the challengers, who may just improve your work. Keep in mind that they
would not be pursuing your findings if they did not consider them
important.
If your view ultimately prevails, do not gloat. Apply all the rules of being
a good competitive player who respects the other team. These are your
colleagues for life, after all. Still, we cannot help rooting for our favored
interpretation.

Telling Good Stories Is Entertaining

Good storytellers attract an audience, and our studies are our stories, as
witnessed by the popularity of our field with science reporters, best-selling
authors, and media moguls. Social and personality psychology can be
entertaining, as when our research creates nuggets to share. Although a
good science story may sometimes enliven dinner conversation, reciting
factoids is probably not a good pick-up strategy. (One might earn the
nickname PsycInfo®.) But with a light touch, and presented to the right
audience, one might also hear an admiring “Wow!”
Promoting Evidence Is Important
Society needs science. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan reportedly said,
“Everyone's entitled to [his] own opinion, not [his] own facts.” Science can
inform policy, and if taxpayers foot the bill for our science, we owe them
some facts.
What is more, many of us went into the field to try to improve the human
condition. We want to identify principles and possibly specific interventions
that enhance people's lives. The current federal emphasis on translational
research reflects this priority. Our science can improve – or at least inform –
social policy. And this too is satisfying.

Sideshows: Pragmatic Reasons for Research

“Is this too idealistic?” you might shrug. We do not just do research because
it is exciting, useful, and fun, but also because we have committed to it as a
career. Let's acknowledge some practical motivations.

Publish or Perish
We do research partly to get a job. Even if we are hired to teach certain
classes, covering certain areas, we are promoted for research published in
refereed journals, preferably high-impact ones. Quality, not just quantity,
counts here. For example, many tenure, promotion, and award committees
consult the h-index (Harzing, 2007), which calculates an author's number of
citations relative to the number of total publications, thereby balancing
quality and quantity. Journals can also be evaluated this way, to calculate
their impact factor, although many journals now use sheer number of
downloads, as well as citations, to gauge their status. These indices all tend
to converge, which is reassuring for measurement reliability and validity.

Collaborate
Some of the more people-oriented among us do research partly for the
rewards of collaboration. When we team up to do science, synergy arrives,
joy happens, and companionship shares the inevitable tribulations of the
research enterprise. In my humble opinion, cooperation is conducive to
good science.
From these teams, we develop networks to connect for friendship and
consultation through a career's lifetime. Interdisciplinary collaborative
research in particular often creates the leading edge in science; ideas catch
fire when fields rub up against each other, creating the future networks of
our sciences. The more social and behavioral scientists learn about the
strength of weak ties and the importance of support systems, the more we
should seek these linkages in our professional lives. Joint research is one
way to do this.

Get Rich (or at Least Get Funding)

Researchers have many intrinsic reasons to seek research funding, not least
because it enables them to get their work done. Many schools also
emphasize funding as a criterion for promotion because national panels of
colleagues have endorsed your research plans. On the pragmatic side, one
must have done research to get funding to do research; that is, one must
establish a track record. This prior research not only adds credibility, but it
also organizes the next steps.
An underappreciated aspect of grant writing is that, even if unfunded,
grant proposals organize research. Spending thoughtful effort on a program
of research helps one prioritize and manage the ensuing studies, even in the
midst of a busy, distracted semester, when the big-picture perspective tends
to recede.

Teach
We also do research, among other pragmatic reasons, to inform and
motivate our teaching. Contrary to popular belief, teaching and research
complement each other. In teaching ratings, research productivity correlates
with the professor's rated knowledge, commitment, enthusiasm, and
organization (Feldman, 1987). Admittedly, research does not correlate with
rated time spent on teaching, there being only so many hours in a day. But
students are evidently energized by a teacher who researches.

Serve
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
however their brain works, their pulse beats neither faster nor slower
for the common accidents of life. There is, therefore, something cold
and repulsive in the air that is about them—like that of marble. In a
word, they are modern philosophers; and the modern philosopher is
what the pedant was of old—a being who lives in a world of his own,
and has no correspondence with this. It is not that such persons have
not done you services—you acknowledge it; it is not that they have
said severe things of you—you submit to it as a necessary evil: but it
is the cool manner in which the whole is done that annoys you—the
speculating upon you, as if you were nobody—the regarding you,
with a view to experiment in corpore vili—the principle of dissection
—the determination to spare no blemishes—to cut you down to your
real standard;—in short, the utter absence of the partiality of
friendship, the blind enthusiasm of affection, or the delicacy of
common decency, that whether they ‘hew you as a carcase fit for
hounds, or carve you as a dish fit for the gods,’ the operation on your
feelings and your sense of obligation is just the same; and, whether
they are demons or angels in themselves, you wish them equally at
the devil!
Other persons of worth and sense give way to mere violence of
temperament (with which the understanding has nothing to do)—are
burnt up with a perpetual fury—repel and throw you to a distance by
their restless, whirling motion—so that you dare not go near them, or
feel as uneasy in their company as if you stood on the edge of a
volcano. They have their tempora mollia fandi; but then what a stir
may you not expect the next moment! Nothing is less inviting or less
comfortable than this state of uncertainty and apprehension. Then
there are those who never approach you without the most alarming
advice or information, telling you that you are in a dying way, or that
your affairs are on the point of ruin, by way of disburthening their
consciences; and others, who give you to understand much the same
thing as a good joke, out of sheer impertinence, constitutional
vivacity, and want of something to say. All these, it must be
confessed, are disagreeable people; and you repay their overanxiety
or total forgetfulness of you, by a determination to cut them as
speedily as possible. We meet with instances of persons who
overpower you by a sort of boisterous mirth and rude animal spirits,
with whose ordinary state of excitement it is as impossible to keep up
as with that of any one really intoxicated; and with others who seem
scarce alive—who take no pleasure or interest in any thing—who are
born to exemplify the maxim,
‘Not to admire is all the art I know
To make men happy, or to keep them so,—

and whose mawkish insensibility or sullen scorn are equally

annoying. In general, all people brought up in remote country places,
where life is crude and harsh—all sectaries—all partisans of a losing
cause, are discontented and disagreeable. Commend me above all to
the Westminster School of Reform, whose blood runs as cold in their
veins as the torpedo’s, and whose touch jars like it. Catholics are,
upon the whole, more amiable than Protestants—foreigners than
English people. Among ourselves, the Scotch, as a nation, are
particularly disagreeable. They hate every appearance of comfort
themselves, and refuse it to others. Their climate, their religion, and
their habits are equally averse to pleasure. Their manners are either
distinguished by a fawning sycophancy (to gain their own ends, and
conceal their natural defects), that makes one sick; or by a morose
unbending callousness, that makes one shudder. I had forgot to
mention two other descriptions of persons who fall under the scope
of this essay:—those who take up a subject, and run on with it
interminably, without knowing whether their hearers care one word
about it, or in the least minding what reception their oratory meets
with—these are pretty generally voted bores (mostly German ones);
—and others, who may be designated as practical paradox-mongers—
who discard the ‘milk of human kindness,’ and an attention to
common observances, from all their actions, as effeminate and
puling—who wear a white hat as a mark of superior understanding,
and carry home a handkerchief-full of mushrooms in the top of it as
an original discovery—who give you craw-fish for supper instead of
lobsters; seek their company in a garret, and over a gin-bottle, to
avoid the imputation of affecting genteel society; and discard them
after a term of years, and warn others against them, as being honest
fellows, which is thought a vulgar prejudice. This is carrying the
harsh and repulsive even beyond the disagreeable—to the hateful.
Such persons are generally people of common-place understandings,
obtuse feelings, and inordinate vanity. They are formidable if they
get you in their power—otherwise, they are only to be laughed at.
 There are a vast number who are disagreeable from meanness of
spirit, from downright insolence, from slovenliness of dress or
disgusting tricks, from folly or ignorance: but these causes are
positive moral or physical defects, and I only meant to speak of that
repulsiveness of manners which arises from want of tact and
sympathy with others. So far of friendship: a word, if I durst, of love.
Gallantry to women (the sure road to their favour) is nothing but the
appearance of extreme devotion to all their wants and wishes—a
delight in their satisfaction, and a confidence in yourself, as being
able to contribute towards it. The slightest indifference with regard
to them, or distrust of yourself, are equally fatal. The amiable is the
voluptuous in looks, manner, or words. No face that exhibits this
kind of expression—whether lively or serious, obvious or suppressed,
will be thought ugly—no address, awkward—no lover who
approaches every woman he meets as his mistress, will be
unsuccessful. Diffidence and awkwardness are the two antidotes to
love.
To please universally, we must be pleased with ourselves and
others. There should be a tinge of the coxcomb, an oil of self-
complacency, an anticipation of success—there should be no gloom,
no moroseness no shyness—in short, there should be very little of an
Englishman, and a good deal of a Frenchman. But though, I believe,
this is the receipt, we are none the nearer making use of it. It is
impossible for those who are naturally disagreeable ever to become
otherwise. This is some consolation, as it may save a world of useless
pains and anxiety. ‘Desire to please, and you will infallibly please,’ is
a true maxim; but it does not follow that it is in the power of all to
practise it. A vain man, who thinks he is endeavouring to please, is
only endeavouring to shine, and is still farther from the mark. An
irritable man, who puts a check upon himself, only grows dull, and
loses spirit to be any thing. Good temper and a happy spirit (which
are the indispensable requisites) can no more be commanded than
good health or good looks; and though the plain and sickly need not
distort their features, and may abstain from success, this is all they
can do. The utmost a disagreeable person can do is to hope to be less
disagreeable than with care and study he might become, and to pass
unnoticed in society. With this negative character he should be
contented, and may build his fame and happiness on other things.
 I will conclude with a character of men who neither please nor
aspire to please anybody, and who can come in nowhere so properly
as at the fag-end of an essay:—I mean that class of discontented but
amusing persons, who are infatuated with their own ill success, and
reduced to despair by a lucky turn in their favour. While all goes well,
they are like fish out of water. They have no reliance on or sympathy
with their good fortune, and look upon it as a momentary delusion.
Let a doubt be thrown on the question, and they begin to be full of
lively apprehensions again: let all their hopes vanish, and they feel
themselves on firm ground once more. From want of spirit or of
habit, their imaginations cannot rise above the low ground of
humility—cannot reflect the gay, flaunting tints of the fancy—flag
and droop into despondency—and can neither indulge the
expectation, nor employ the means of success. Even when it is within
their reach, they dare not lay hands upon it; and shrink from
unlooked-for bursts of prosperity, as something of which they are
both ashamed and unworthy. The class of croakers here spoken of
are less delighted at other people’s misfortunes than their own. Their
neighbours may have some pretensions—they have none. Querulous
complaints and anticipations of discomfort are the food on which
they live; and they at last acquire a passion for that which is the
favourite theme of their thoughts, and can no more do without it
than without the pinch of snuff with which they season their
conversation, and enliven the pauses of their daily prognostics.
 ON MEANS AND ENDS

The Monthly Magazine.]

[September, 1827.
‘We work by wit, and not by witchcraft.’—Iago.

It is impossible to have things done without doing them. This

seems a truism; and yet what is more common than to suppose that
we shall find things done, merely by wishing it? To put the will for
the deed is as usual in practice as it is contrary to common sense.
There is, in fact, no absurdity, no contradiction, of which the mind is
not capable. This weakness is, I think, more remarkable in the
English than in any other people, in whom (to judge by what I
discover in myself) the will bears great and disproportioned sway.
We desire a thing: we contemplate the end intently, and think it
done, neglecting the necessary means to accomplish it. The strong
tendency of the mind towards it, the internal effort it makes to give
birth to the object of its idolatry, seems an adequate cause to produce
the wished-for effect, and is in a manner identified with it. This is
more particularly the case in what relates to the Fine Arts, and will
account for some phenomena in the national character.
The English style is distinguished by what are called ébauches[38]—
rude sketches, or violent attempts at effect, with a total inattention to
the details or delicacy of finishing. Now this, I apprehend, proceeds
not exactly from grossness of perception, but from the wilfulness of
our characters, our determination to have every thing our own way
without any trouble, or delay, or distraction of mind. An object
strikes us: we see and feel the whole effect at once. We wish to
produce a likeness of it; but we wish to transfer the impression to the
canvas as it is conveyed to us, simultaneously and intuitively—that is,
to stamp it there at a blow—or, otherwise, we turn away with
impatience and disgust, as if the means were an obstacle to the end,
and every attention to the mechanical process were a deviation from
our original purpose. We thus degenerate, by repeated failures, into a
slovenly style of art; and that which was at first an undisciplined and
irregular impulse, becomes a habit, and then a theory. It seems a
little strange that the zealous devotion to the end should produce
aversion to the means; but so it is: neither is it, however irrational,
altogether unnatural. That which we are struck with, which we are
enamoured of, is the general appearance or result; and it would
certainly be most desirable to produce the effect we aim at by a word
or wish, if it were possible, without being taken up with the
mechanical drudgery or pettiness of detail, or dexterity of execution,
which, though they are essential and component parts of the work,
do not enter into our thoughts, or form any part of our
contemplation. In a word, the hand does not keep pace with the eye;
and it is the desire that it should, that causes all the contradiction
and confusion. We would have a face to start out from the canvas at
once—not feature by feature, or touch by touch; we would be glad to
convey an attitude or a divine expression to the spectator by a stroke
of the pencil, as it is conveyed by a glance of the eye, or by the magic
of feeling, independently of measurements, and distances, and
foreshortening, and numberless minute particulars, and all the
instrumentality of the art. We may find it necessary, on a cool
calculation, to go through and make ourselves masters of these; but,
in so doing, we submit only to necessity, and they are still a diversion
to, and a suspension of, our favourite purpose for the time—at least
unless practice has given that facility which almost identifies the two
together, and makes the process an unconscious one. The end thus
devours up the means; or our eagerness for the one, where it is
strong and unchecked, renders us in proportion impatient of the
other. So we view an object at a distance, which excites in us an
inclination to visit it: this, after many tedious steps and intricate
windings, we do; but, if we could fly, we should never consent to go
on foot. The mind, however, has wings, though the body has not;
and, wherever the imagination can come into play, our desires
outrun their accomplishment. Persons of this extravagant humour
should addict themselves to eloquence or poetry, where the thought
‘leaps at once to its effect,’ and is wafted, in a metaphor or an
apostrophe, ‘from Indus to the Pole;’ though even there we should
find enough, in the preparatory and mechanical parts of those arts,
to try our patience and mortify our vanity! The first and strongest
impulse of the mind is to achieve any object, on which it is set, at
once, and by the shortest and most decisive means; but, as this
cannot always be done, we ought not to neglect other more indirect
and subordinate aids; nor should we be tempted to do so, but that
the delusions of the will interfere with the convictions of the
understanding, and what we ardently wish, we fancy to be both
possible and true. Let us take the instance of copying a fine picture.
We are full of the effect we intend to produce; and so powerfully does
this prepossession affect us, that we imagine we have produced it, in
spite of the evidence of our senses and the suggestions of friends. In
truth, after a number of violent and anxious efforts to strike off a
resemblance which we passionately long for, it seems an injustice not
to have succeeded; it is too late to retrace our steps, and begin over
again in a different method; we prefer even failure to arriving at our
end by petty, mechanical tricks and rules; we have copied Titian or
Rubens in the spirit in which they ought to be copied; though the
likeness may not be perfect, there is a look, a tone, a something,
which we chiefly aimed at, and which we persuade ourselves, seeing
the copy only through the dazzled, hectic flush of feverish
imagination, we have really given; and thus we persist, and make
fifty excuses, sooner than own our error, which would imply its
abandonment; or, if the light breaks in upon us, through all the
disguises of sophistry and self-love, it is so painful that we shut our
eyes to it. The more evident our failure, the more desperate the
struggles we make to conceal it from ourselves, to stick to our
original determination, and end where we began.
What makes me think that this is the real stumbling-block in our
way, and not mere rusticity or want of discrimination, is that you will
see an English artist admiring and thrown into downright raptures
by the tucker of Titian’s Mistress, made up of an infinite number of
little delicate folds; and, if he attempts to copy it, he proceeds
deliberately to omit all these details, and dash it off by a single smear
of his brush. This is not ignorance, or even laziness, I conceive, so
much as what is called jumping at a conclusion. It is, in a word, an
overweening presumption. ‘A wilful man must have his way.’ He sees
the details, the varieties, and their effect: he sees and is charmed
with all this; but he would reproduce it with the same rapidity and
unembarrassed freedom that he sees it—or not at all. He scorns the
slow but sure method, to which others conform, as tedious and
inanimate. The mixing his colours, the laying in the ground, the
giving all his attention to a minute break or nice gradation in the
several lights and shades, is a mechanical and endless operation,
very different from the delight he feels in studying the effect of all
these, when properly and ably executed. Quam nihil ad tuum,
Papiniane, ingenium! Such fooleries are foreign to his refined taste
and lofty enthusiasm; and a doubt crosses his mind, in the midst of
his warmest raptures, how Titian could resolve upon the drudgery of
going through them, or whether it was not rather owing to extreme
facility of hand, and a sort of trick in laying on the colours, abridging
the mechanical labour! No one wrote or talked more eloquently
about Titian’s harmony and clearness of colouring than the late Mr.
Barry—discoursing of his greens, his blues, his yellows, ‘the little red
and white of which he composed his flesh-colour,’ con amore; yet his
own colouring was dead and dingy, and, if he had copied a Titian, he
would have made it a mere daub, leaving out all that caused his
wonder or admiration, or that induced him to copy it after the
English or Irish fashion. We not only grudge the labour of beginning,
but we stop short, for the same reason, when we are near touching
the goal of success, and, to save a few last touches, leave a work
unfinished and an object unattained. The immediate steps, the daily
gradual improvement, the successive completion of parts, give us no
pleasure; we strain at the final result; we wish to have the whole
done, and, in our anxiety to get it off our hands, say it will do, and
lose the benefit of all our pains by stinting a little more, and being
unable to command a little patience. In a day or two, we will
suppose, a copy of a fine Titian would be as like as we could make it:
the prospect of this so enchants us, that we skip the intervening
space, see no great use in going on with it, fancy that we may spoil it,
and, in order to put an end to the question, take it home with us,
where we immediately see our error, and spend the rest of our lives
in regretting that we did not finish it properly when we were about it.
We can execute only a part; we see the whole of nature or of a picture
at once. Hinc illæ lachrymæ. The English grasp at this whole—
nothing less interests or contents them; and, in aiming at too much,
they miss their object altogether.
 A French artist, on the contrary, has none of this uneasy, anxious
feeling—of this desire to master the whole of his subject, and
anticipate his good fortune at a blow—of this massing and
concentrating principle. He takes the thing more easy and rationally.
He has none of the mental qualms, the nervous agitation, the wild,
desperate plunges and convulsive throes of the English artist. He
does not set off headlong without knowing where he is going, and
find himself up to the neck in all sorts of difficulties and absurdities,
from impatience to begin and have the matter off his mind (as if it
were an evil conscience); but takes time to consider, arranges his
plans, gets in his outline and his distances, and lays a foundation
before he attempts a superstructure which he may have to pull in
pieces again, or let it remain—a monument of his folly. He looks
before he leaps, which is contrary to the true blindfold English rule;
and I should think that we had invented this proverb from seeing so
many fatal examples of the violation of it. Suppose he undertakes to
make a copy of a picture: he first looks at it, and sees what it is. He
does not make his sketch all black or all white, because one part of it
is so, and because he cannot alter an idea he has once got into his
head and must always run into extremes, but varies his tints (strange
as it may seem) from green to red, from orange-tawny to yellow,
from grey to brown, according as they vary in the original. He sees no
inconsistency, no forfeiture of a principle, in this (any more than Mr.
Southey in the change of the colours of his coat), but a great deal of
right reason, and indeed an absolute necessity for it, if he wishes to
succeed in what he is about. This is the last thing in an Englishman’s
thoughts: he only wishes to have his own way, though it ends in
defeat and ruin—strives hard to do what he is sensible he cannot—or,
if he finds he can, gives over and leaves the matter short of a
triumphant conclusion, which is too flattering an idea for him to
indulge in. The French artist proceeds with due deliberation, and bit
by bit. He takes some one part—a hand, an eye, a piece of drapery, an
object in the back-ground—and finishes it carefully; then another,
and so on to the end. When he has gone through every part, his
picture is done: there is nothing more that he can add to it; it is a
numerical calculation, and there are only so many items in the
account. An Englishman may go on slobbering his over for the
hundredth time, and be no nearer than when he began. As he tries to
finish the whole at once, and as this is not possible, he always leaves
his work in an imperfect state, or as if he had begun on a new canvas
—like a man who is determined to leap to the top of a tower, instead
of scaling it step by step, and who is necessarily thrown on his back
every time he repeats the experiment. Again, the French student
does not, from a childish impatience, when he is near the end,
destroy the effect of the whole, by leaving some one part eminently
deficient, an eye-sore to the rest; nor does he fly from what he is
about, to any thing else that happens to catch his eye, neglecting the
one and spoiling the other. He is, in our old poet’s phrase,
‘constrained by mastery,’ by the mastery of common sense and
pleasurable feeling. He is in no hurry to get to the end; for he has a
satisfaction in the work, and touches and retouches perhaps a single
head, day after day and week after week, without repining,
uneasiness, or apparent progress. The very lightness and buoyancy of
his feeling renders him (where the necessity of this is pointed out)
patient and laborious. An Englishman, whatever he undertakes, is as
if he was carrying a heavy load that oppresses both his body and
mind, and that he is anxious to throw down as soon as possible. The
Frenchman’s hopes and fears are not excited to a pitch of intolerable
agony, so that he is compelled, in mere compassion to himself, to
bring the question to a speedy issue, even to the loss of his object. He
is calm, easy, collected, and takes his time and improves his
advantages as they occur, with vigilance and alacrity. Pleased with
himself, he is pleased with whatever occupies his attention nearly
alike. He is never taken at a disadvantage. Whether he paints an
angel or a joint-stool, it is much the same to him: whether it is
landscape or history, still it is he who paints it. Nothing puts him out
of his way, for nothing puts him out of conceit with himself. This self-
complacency forms an admirable ground-work for moderation and
docility in certain particulars, though not in others.
I remember an absurd instance enough of this deliberate mode of
setting to work in a young French artist, who was copying the Titian’s
Mistress in the Louvre, some twenty years ago. After getting in his
chalk-outline, one would think he might have been attracted to the
face—that heaven of beauty (as it appears to some), clear,
transparent, open, breathing freshness, that ‘makes a sunshine in the
shady place’; or to the lustre of the golden hair; or some part of the
poetry of the picture (for, with all its materiality, this picture has a
poetry about it); instead of which he began to finish a square he had
marked out in the right-hand corner of the picture, containing a
piece of board and a bottle of some kind of ointment. He set to work
like a cabinet-maker or an engraver, and appeared to have no
sympathy with the soul of the picture. On a Frenchman (generally
speaking), the distinction between the great and the little, the
exquisite and the indifferent, is in a great measure lost: his self-
satisfied egotism supplies whatever is wanting up to a certain point,
and neutralizes whatever goes beyond it. Another young man, at the
time I speak of, was for eleven weeks daily employed in making a
black-lead pencil drawing of a small Leonardo: he sat with his legs
balanced across a rail to do it, kept his hat on, every now and then
consulted with his friends about his progress, rose up, went to the
fire to warm himself, talked of the styles of the different masters—
praising Titian pour les coloris, Raphael pour l’expression, Poussin
pour la composition—all being alike to him, provided they had each
something to help him on in his harangue (for that was all he
thought about),—and then returned to perfectionate (as he called it)
his copy. This would drive an Englishman out of his senses,
supposing him to be ever so stupid. The perseverance and the
interruptions, the labour without impulse, the attention to the parts
in succession, and disregard of the whole together, are to him utterly
incomprehensible. He wants to do something striking, and bends all
his thoughts and energies to one mighty effort. A Frenchman has no
notion of this summary proceeding, exists mostly in his present
sensations, and, if he is left at liberty to enjoy or trifle with these,
cares about nothing farther, looking neither backwards nor forwards.
They forgot the reign of terror under Robespierre in a month; they
forgot that they had ever been called the great nation under
Buonaparte in a week. They sat in chairs on the Boulevards (just as
they do at other times), when the shots were firing into the next
street, and were only persuaded to quit them when their own soldiers
were seen pouring down all the avenues from the heights of
Montmartre, crying ‘Sauve qui peut!’ They then went home and
dressed themselves to see the Allies enter Paris, as a fine sight, just
as they would witness a procession at a theatre. This is carrying the
instinct of levity as far as it will go. With all their affectation and
want of sincerity, there is, on the principle here stated, a kind of
simplicity and nature about them after all. They lend themselves to
the impression of the moment with good humour and good will,
making it not much better nor worse than it is: the English
constantly over-do or under-do every thing, and are either mad with
enthusiasm or in despair. The extreme slowness and regularity of the
French school have then arisen, as a natural consequence, out of
their very fickleness and frivolity (their severally supposed national
characteristics); for, owing to the last, their studious exactness costs
them nothing; and, again, they have no headstrong impulses or
ardent longings that urge them on to the violation of rules, or hurry
them away with a subject or with the interest belonging to it. All is
foreseen and settled beforehand, so as to assist the fluttering and
feeble hold they have of things. When they venture beyond the literal
and formal, and (mistaking pedantry and bombast for genius)
attempt the grand and the impressive style, as in David’s and
Girodet’s pictures, the Lord deliver us from sublimity engrafted on
insipidity and petit maître-ism! You see a solitary French artist in
the Louvre copying a Raphael or a Rubens, standing on one leg, not
quite sure of what he is about: you see them collected in groupes
about David’s, elbowing each other, thinking them even finer than
Raphael, more truly themselves, a more perfect combination of all
that can be taught by the Greek sculptor and the French posture-
master! Is this patriotism, or want of taste? If the former, it is
excusable, and why not, if the latter?
Even should a French artist fail, he is not disconcerted—there is
something else he excels in: ‘for one unkind and cruel fair, another
still consoles him.’ He studies in a more graceful posture, or pays
greater attention to his dress; or he has a friend, who has beaucoup
du talent, and conceit enough for them both. His self-love has always
a salvo, and comes upon its legs again, like a cat or a monkey. Not so
with Bruin the Bear. If an Englishman (God help the mark!) fails in
one thing, it is all over with him; he is enraged at the mention of any
thing else he can do, and at every consolation offered him on that
score; he banishes all other thoughts, but of his disappointment and
discomfiture, from his breast—neither eats nor sleeps (it is well if he
does not swallow down double ‘potations, pottle-deep,’ to drown
remembrance)—will not own, even to himself, any other thing in
which he takes an interest or feels a pride; and is in the horrors till he
recovers his good opinion of himself in the only point on which he
now sets a value, and for which his anxiety and disorder of mind
incapacitate him as effectually as if he were drunk with strong liquor
instead of spleen and passion. I have here drawn the character of an
Englishman, I am sure; for it is a portrait of myself, and, I am sorry
to add, an unexaggerated one. I intend these Essays as studies of
human nature; and as, in the prosecution of this design, I do not
spare others, I see no reason why I should spare myself. I lately tried
to make a copy of a portrait by Titian (after several years’ want of
practice), with a view to give a friend in England some notion of the
picture, which is equally remarkable and fine. I failed, and
floundered on for some days, as might be expected. I must say the
effect on me was painful and excessive. My sky was suddenly
overcast. Every thing seemed of the colour of the paints I used.
Nature in my eyes became dark and gloomy. I had no sense or feeling
left, but of the unforeseen want of power, and of the tormenting
struggle to do what I could not. I was ashamed ever to have written
or spoken on art: it seemed a piece of vanity and affectation in me to
do so—all whose reasonings and refinements on the subject ended in
an execrable daub. Why did I think of attempting such a thing
without weighing the consequences of exposing my presumption and
incapacity so unnecessarily? It was blotting from my mind, covering
with a thick veil all that I remembered of these pictures formerly—
my hopes when young, my regrets since, one of the few consolations
of my life and of my declining years. I was even afraid to walk out of
an evening by the barrier of Neuilly, or to recall the yearnings and
associations that once hung upon the beatings of my heart. All was
turned to bitterness and gall. To feel any thing but the consciousness
of my own helplessness and folly, appeared a want of sincerity, a
mockery, and an insult to my mortified pride! The only relief I had
was in the excess of pain I felt: this was at least some distinction. I
was not insensible on that side. No French artist, I thought, would
regret not copying a Titian so much as I did, nor so far shew the same
value for it, however he might have the advantage of me in drawing
or mechanical dexterity. Besides, I had copied this very picture very
well formerly. If ever I got out of my present scrape, I had at any rate
received a lesson not to run the same risk of vexation, or commit
myself gratuitously again upon any occasion whatever. Oh! happy
ought they to be, I said, who can do any thing, when I feel the misery,
the agony, the dull, gnawing pain of being unable to do what I wish
in this single instance! When I copied this picture before, I had no
other resource, no other language. My tongue then stuck to the roof
of my mouth: now it is unlocked, and I have done what I then
despaired of doing in another way. Ought I not to be grateful and
contented? Oh, yes!—and think how many there are who have
nothing to which they can turn themselves, and fail in every object
they undertake. Well, then, Let bygones be bygones (as the Scotch
proverb has it); give up the attempt, and think no more of Titian, or
of the portrait of a Man in black in the Louvre. This would be very
well for any one else; but for me, who had nearly exhausted the
subject on paper, that I should take it into my head to paint a libel of
what I had composed so many and such fine panegyrics upon—it was
a fatality, a judgment upon me for my vapouring and conceit. I must
be as shy of the subject for the future as a damned author is of the
title of his play or the name of his hero ever after. Yet the picture
would look the same as ever. I could hardly bear to think so: it would
be hid or defaced to me as ‘in a phantasma or a hideous dream.’ I
must turn my thoughts from it, or they would lead to madness! The
copy went on better afterwards, and the affair ended less tragically
than I apprehended. I did not cut a hole in the canvas, or commit any
other extravagance: it is now hanging up very quietly facing me; and
I have considerable satisfaction in occasionally looking at it, as I
write this paragraph.
Such are the agonies into which we throw ourselves about trifles—
our rage and disappointment at want of success in any favourite
pursuit, and, our neglect of the means to ensure it. A Frenchman,
under the penalty of half the chagrin at failure, would take just twice
the pains and consideration to avoid it: but our morbid eagerness
and blundering impetuosity, together with a certain concreteness of
imagination which prevents our dividing any operation into steps
and stages, defeat the very end we have in view. The worst of these
wilful mischiefs of our own making is, that they admit of no relief or
intermission. Natural calamities or great griefs, as we do not bring
them upon ourselves, so they find a seasonable respite in tears or
resignation, or in some alleviating contrast or reflection: but pride
scorns all alliance with natural frailty or indulgence; our wilful
purposes regard every relaxation or moment’s ease as a compromise
of their very essence, which consists in violence and effort: they turn
away from whatever might afford diversion or solace, and goad us on
to exertions as painful as they are unavailable, and with no other
companion than remorse,—the most intolerable of all inmates of the
breast; for it is constantly urging us to retrieve our peace of mind by
an impossibility—the undoing of what is past. One of the chief traits
of sublimity in Milton’s character of Satan is this dreadful display of
unrelenting pride and self-will—the sense of suffering joined with the
sense of power and ‘courage never to submit or yield’—and the
aggravation of the original purpose of lofty ambition and opposition
to the Almighty, with the total overthrow and signal punishment,—
which ought to be reasons for its relinquishment. ‘His thoughts burn
like a hell within him!’ but he gives them ‘neither truce nor rest,’ and
will not even sue for mercy. This kind of sublimity must be thrown
away upon the French critic, who would only think Satan a very
ridiculous old gentleman for adhering so obstinately to his original
pretensions, and not making the most of circumstances, and giving
in his resignation to the ruling party! When Buonaparte fell, an
English editor (of virulent memory) exhausted a great number of the
finest passages in Paradise Lost, in applying them to his ill-fated
ambition. This was an equal compliment to the poet and the
conqueror: to the last, for having realized a conception of himself in
the mind of his enemies on a par with the most stupendous creations
of imagination; to the first, for having embodied in fiction what bore
so strong a resemblance to, and was constantly brought to mind by,
the fearful and imposing reality! But to return to our subject.
It is the same with us in love and literature. An Englishman makes
love without thinking of the chances of success, his own
disadvantages, or the character of his mistress—that is, without the
adaptation of means to ends, consulting only his own humour or
fancy;[39] and he writes a book of history or travels, without
acquainting himself with geography, or appealing to documents or
dates; substituting his own will or opinion in the room of these
technical helps or hindrances, as he considers them. It is not right. In
business it is not by any means the same; which looks as if, where
interest was the moving principle, and acted as a counterpoise to
caprice and will, our headstrong propensity gave way, though it
sometimes leads us into extravagant and ruinous speculations. Nor is
it a disadvantage to us in war; for there the spirit of contradiction
does every thing, and an Englishman will go to the devil sooner than
yield to any odds. Courage is nothing but will, defying consequences;
and this the English have in perfection. Burns somewhere calls out
lustily, inspired by rhyme and usquebaugh,—
 ‘Set but a Scotsman on a hill;
Say such is royal George’s will,
And there’s the foe:-
His only thought is how to kill
Twa at a blow.’

I apprehend, with his own countrymen or ours, all the love and
loyalty would come to little, but for their hatred of the army opposed
to them. It is the resistance, ‘the two to kill at a blow,’ that is the
charm, and makes our fingers’-ends tingle. The Greek cause makes
no progress with us for this reason: it is one of pure sympathy, but
our sympathies must arise out of our antipathies; they were devoted
to the Queen to spite the King. We had a wonderful affection for the
Spaniards—the secret of which was that we detested the French. Our
love must begin with hate. It is so far well that the French are
opposed to us in almost every way; for the spirit of contradiction
alone to foreign fopperies and absurdities keeps us within some
bounds of decency and order. When an English lady of quality
introduces a favourite by saying, ‘This is his lordship’s physician, and
my atheist,’ the humour might become epidemic; but we can stop it
at once by saying, ‘That is so like a Frenchwoman!’—The English
excel in the practical and mechanic arts, where mere plodding and
industry are expected and required; but they do not combine
business and pleasure well together. Thus, in the Fine Arts, which
unite the mechanical with the sentimental, they will probably never
succeed; for the one spoils and diverts them from the other. An
Englishman can attend but to one thing at a time. He hates music at
dinner. He can go through any labour or pain with prodigious
fortitude; but he cannot make a pleasure of it, or persuade himself he
is doing a fine thing, when he is not. Again, they are great in original
discoveries, which come upon them by surprise, and which they
leave to others to perfect. It is a question whether, if they foresaw
they were about to make the discovery, at the very point of projection
as it were, they would not turn their backs upon it, and leave it to
shift for itself; or obstinately refuse to take the last step, or give up
the pursuit, in mere dread and nervous apprehension lest they
should not succeed. Poetry is also their undeniable element; for the
essence of poetry is will and passion, ‘and it alone is highly
fantastical.’ French poetry is verbiage or dry detail.
 I have thus endeavoured to shew why it is the English fail as a
people in the Fine Arts, because the idea of the end absorbs that of
the means. Hogarth was an exception to this rule; but then every
stroke of his pencil was instinct with genius. As it has been well said,
that ‘we read his works,’ so it might be said he wrote them. Barry is
an instance more to my purpose. No one could argue better about
gusto in painting, and yet no one ever painted with less. His pictures
were dry, coarse, and wanted all that his descriptions of those of
others indicate. For example, he speaks of ‘the dull, dead, watery
look’ of the Medusa’s head of Leonardo, in a manner that conveys an
absolute idea of the character: had he copied it, you would never
have suspected any thing of the kind. His pen grows almost wanton
in praise of Titian’s nymph-like figures. What drabs he has made of
his own sea-nymphs, floating in the Thames, with Dr. Burney at their
head, with his wig on! He is like a person admiring the grace of an
accomplished rope-dancer; place him on the rope himself, and his
head turns;—or he is like Luther’s comparison of Reason to a
drunken man on horseback—‘set him up on one side, and he tumbles
over on the other.’ Why is this? His mind was essentially ardent and
discursive, not sensitive or observant; and though the immediate
object acted as a stimulus to his imagination, it was only as it does to
the poet’s—that is, as a link in the chain of association, as implying
other strong feelings and ideas, and not for its intrinsic beauty or
individual details. He had not the painter’s eye, though he had the
painter’s general knowledge. There is as great a difference in this
respect between our views of things as between the telescope and
microscope. People in general see objects only to distinguish them in
practice and by name—to know that a hat is black, that a chair is not
a table, that John is not James; and there are painters, particularly of
history in England, who look very little farther. They cannot finish
any thing, or go over a head twice: the first coup-d’œil is all they ever
arrive at, nor can they refine on their impressions, soften them down,
or reduce them to their component parts, without losing their spirit.
The inevitable result of this is grossness, and also want of force and
solidity; for, in reality, the parts cannot be separated without injury
from the whole. Such people have no pleasure in the art as such: it is
merely to astonish or to thrive that they follow it; or, if thrown out of
it by accident, they regret it only as a bankrupt tradesman does a
business which was a handsome subsistence to him. Barry did not
live, like Titian, on the taste of colours (there was here, perhaps—and
I will not disguise it—in English painters in general, a defect of
organic susceptibility); they were not a pabulum to his senses; he did
not hold green, blue, red, and yellow for ‘the darlings of his precious
eye.’ They did not, therefore, sink into his mind with all their hidden
harmonies, nor nourish and enrich it with material beauty, though
he knew enough of them to furnish hints for other ideas and to
suggest topics of discourse. If he had had the most enchanting object
in nature before him in his painting-room at the Adelphi, he would
have turned from it, after a moment’s burst of admiration, to talk of
the subject of his next composition, and to scrawl in some new and
vast design, illustrating a series of great events in history, or some
vague moral theory. The art itself was nothing to him, though he
made it the stalking-horse to his ambition and display of intellectual
power in general; and, therefore, he neglected its essential qualities
to daub in huge allegories, or carry on cabals with the Academy, in
which the violence of his will and the extent of his views found
proper food and scope. As a painter, he was tolerable merely as a
draftsman, or in that part of the art which may be best reduced to
rules and precepts, or to positive measurements. There is neither
colouring, nor expression, nor delicacy, nor striking effect in his
pictures at the Adelphi. The group of youths and horses, in the
representation of the Olympic Games, is the best part of them, and
has more of the grace and spirit of a Greek bas-relief than any thing
of the same kind in the French school of painting. Barry was, all his
life, a thorn in the side of Sir Joshua, who was irritated by the temper
and disconcerted by the powers of the man; and who, conscious of
his own superiority in the exercise of his profession, yet looked
askance at Barry’s loftier pretensions and more gigantic scale of art.
But he had no more occasion to be really jealous of him than of an
Irish porter or orator. It was like Imogen’s mistaking the dead body
of Cloten for her lord’s—‘the jovial thigh, the brawns of Hercules’: the
head, which would have detected the cheat, was missing!
I might have gone more into the subject of our apparent
indifference to the pleasure of mere imitation, if I had had to run a
parallel between English and Italian or even Flemish art; but really,
though I find a great deal of what is finical, I find nothing of the
pleasurable in the details of French more than of English art. The
English artist, it is an old and just complaint, can with difficulty be
prevailed upon to finish any part of a picture but the face, even if he
does that any tolerable justice: the French artist bestows equal and
elaborate pains on every part of his picture—the dress, the carpet,
&c.; and it has been objected to the latter method, that it has the
effect of making the face look unfinished; for as this is variable and
in motion, it can never admit of the same minuteness of imitation as
objects of still-life, and must suffer in the comparison, if these have
the utmost possible degree of attention bestowed on them, and do
not fall into their relative place in the composition from their natural
insignificance. But does not this distinction shew generally that the
English have no pleasure in art, unless there is an additional interest
beyond what is borrowed from the eye, and that the French have the
same pleasure in it, provided the mechanical operation is the same—
like the fly that settles equally on the face or dress, and runs over the
whole surface with the same lightness and indifference? The collar of
a coat is out of drawing: this may be and is wrong. But I cannot say
that it gives me the same disturbance as if the nose was awry. A
Frenchman thinks that both are equally out of drawing, and sets
about correcting them both with equal gravity and perseverance. A
part of the back-ground of a picture is left in an unfinished state: this
is a sad eye-sore to the French artist or connoisseur. We English care
little about it: if the head and character are well given, we pass it over
as of small consequence; and if they are failures, it is of even less. A
French painter, after having made you look like a baboon, would go
on finishing the cravat or the buttons of your coat with all the nicety
of a man milliner or button-maker, and the most perfect satisfaction
with himself and his art. This with us would be quite impossible.
‘They are careful after many things: with us, there is one thing
needful’—which is effect. We certainly throw our impressions more
into masses (they are not taken off by pattern, every part alike): there
may be a slowness and repugnance at first; but, afterwards, there is
an impulse, a momentum acquired—one interest absorbing and
being strengthened by several others; and if we gain our principal
object, we can overlook the rest, or at least cannot find time to attend
to them till we have secured this. We have nothing of the petit
maître, of the martinet style about us: we run into the opposite fault.
If we had time, if we had power, there could be no objection to giving
every part with the utmost perfection, as it is given in a looking-glass.
But if we have only a month to do a portrait in, is it not better to give
three weeks to the face and one to the dress, than one week to the
face and three to the dress. How often do we look at the face
compared to the dress? ‘On a good foundation,’ says Sancho Panza, ‘a
good house may be built’; so a good picture should have a good back-
ground, and be finished in every part. It is entitled to this mark of
respect, which is like providing a frame for it, and hanging it in a
good light. I can easily understand how Rubens or Vandyke finished
the back grounds and drapery of their pictures:—they were worth the
trouble; and, besides, it cost them nothing. It was to them no more
than blowing a bubble in the air. One would no doubt have every
thing right—a feather in a cap, or a plant in the foreground—if a
thought or a touch would do it. But to labour on for ever, and labour
to no purpose, is beyond mortal or English patience. Our clumsiness
is one cause of our negligence. Depend upon it, people do with
readiness what they can do well. I rather wonder, therefore, that
Raphael took such pains in finishing his draperies and back grounds,
which he did so indifferently. The expression is like an emanation of
the soul, or like a lamp shining within and illuminating the whole
face and body; and every part, charged with so sacred a trust as the
conveying of this expression (even to the hands and feet), would be
wrought up to the highest perfection. But his inanimate objects must
have cost him some trouble; and yet he laboured them too. In what
he could not do well, he was still determined to do his best; and that
nothing should be wanting in decorum and respect to an art that he
had consecrated to virtue, and to that genius that burnt like a flame
upon its altars! We have nothing that for myself I can compare with
this high and heroic pursuit of art for its own sake. The French fancy
their own pedantic abortions equal to it, thrust them into the Louvre,
‘and with their darkness dare affront that light!’—thus proving
themselves without the germ or the possibility of excellence—the
feeling of it in others. We at least claim some interest in art, by
looking up to its loftiest monuments—retire to a distance, and
reverence the sanctuary, if we cannot enter it.
‘They also serve who only stare and wait.’[40]
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