Article

Nehru Report, Muslim Indian Journal of Public

Administration
Demands and the Hindu 66(4) 534–551, 2020
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Constitution

Bhuwan Kumar Jha1

Abstract
The Nehru Report of August 1928 presented the blueprint of a Swaraj Constitution.
Encapsulating the demands of the Indians to the colonial government as opposed
to the latter’s insistence on seeking opinion through an all-whites commission,
the report also presents the historical roots of our present Constitution. Amid
opposing claims, consensus over the communal issues in the report, which
appeared possible until late 1928, became elusive from the end of December
1928. It was mainly due to the closing of the ranks of significant Muslim leadership
behind Jinnah, and an ever-increasing vigilant attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha in
not allowing any change beyond what had already been agreed upon. The failure
of the report meant an end to the hope of finding a consensual solution to a future
Indian Constitution made by the Indians and for the Indians. This, in turn, pro-
vided the colonial government with an excuse to impose its scheme through the
Communal Award, White Paper and subsequently the Government of India Act
of 1935. So, the most elaborate constitutional framework prepared by the leading
nationalist leaders during the pre-Independence era finally crumbled under the
weight of communal deadlock. This article studies the processes through which
the differences over communal representation became so overpowering that they
rocked the entire boat. The widening of communal fault lines precipitated by
contesting claims over the recommendations of the Nehru Report left serious
repercussions over the trajectory of future Indian politics.

Keywords
Nehru Report, Hindu Mahasabha, Muslim League, Motilal Nehru, Jinnah, Moonje

1
Satyawati College, University of Delhi, Delhi, India.

Corresponding author:
Bhuwan Kumar Jha, Department of History, Satyawati College (University of Delhi), Ashok Vihar,
Delhi 110052, India.
E-mail: [email protected]
Jha 535

Introduction
The Nehru Report was an exceptional document through its early envisioning of
social and economic rights (Jayal, 2013, p. 139), a ‘close precursor’ of the
Fundamental Rights of the Indian Constitution (Austin, 1966, p. 55),1 envisaging
a parliamentary system, recommending dominion status to secure a lowest
common measure of agreement among groups (Nanda, 2010, p. 127) and standing
out as the first major national initiative towards constitutionalising India
(Chakrabarty, 2018, pp. 164–167). However, as Coupland points out, the ‘frankest
attempt’ by Indians to wriggle out of the difficulties of communalism failed
mainly due to the Hindu–Muslim split and the ‘painstaking efforts of the Nehru
Committee to close the communal breach seemed to have widened it’ (Coupland,
1944). Though there were sufficient safeguards for protection of the rights of the
minorities to prevent one community domineering over another, the report, posit-
ing the widest possible nationalist consensus, did not endorse either the idea of
separate electorates or the set of communal demands of the Muslim leadership as
an alternative to separate electorates. A close examination of the course of politics
after October 1928 reveals Muslim leadership of significance falling for Jinnah’s
sudden demand for expanding the scope of the report on communal representa-
tion, with equally intense opposition from the Hindu Mahasabha leadership. By
mid-1929, all hopes of a consensus had almost disappeared, leaving the field wide
open for the colonial government to mediate and decide.

Hindu Mahasabha’s Growing Intervention in Politics

Many leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha had graduated to constitutional politics
through the Swarajist, and later, the Responsivist route. This witnessed, in the fol-
lowing years, the organisation’s increasing intervention in the debates on consti-
tutional programme and progress. This became conspicuous during the period
1927–1929 when the leaders of the party grew extremely vigilant about these
developments vis-à-vis the demands raised by the Muslim leadership, in general,
and the Muslim League, in particular. The Nehru Report onwards, it was aptly
clear that the organisation had adopted a largely uncompromising posture on
issues involving constitutional progress and the more intricate issue of representa-
tion of various communities in the legislatures.
The schism within the Swaraj Party came out in the open during 1925–1926
led chiefly by Moonje, Jayakar, Kelkar and Aney from Maharashtra who styled
themselves as Responsivists, advocating acceptance of office if they were offered
one on honourable terms. From the North, these leaders received support from
Malaviya and Lajpat Rai, both prominent leaders of the Congress as well as of
the Hindu Mahasabha. These ruptures within the Swarajist rank had deeper roots,
as the Responsivists, who had drifted more towards the Mahasabha, increasingly
made their displeasure clear on any constitutional arrangement likely to give in to
the communal demands of the Muslim leadership. The Punjab provincial Hindu
Sabha, as compared to the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, had all along presented
a more distinct anti-Congress approach. It strongly resented the Lucknow Pact
536 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

describing its impact on the province as anti-Hindu and did not participate in the
anti-Rowlatt Satyagraha and the Non-Cooperation Movement (Tuteja & Grewal,
1992). Bhai Parmanand decided to cooperate with the Simon Commission on
behalf of the Punjab Hindu Sabha (Prakash, 1996, p. 36). However, leaders such
as Moonje, Jayakar, Malaviya and Lajpat Rai prevailed upon the Mahasabha to
fall in line with the boycott of the Simon Commission. A special meeting of the
Mahasabha, held in the Congress pandal (pavilion) on 29 December 1927, and
presided over by Malaviya, called for a boycott of the Commission ‘at every stage
and in every manner’ (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 332–334).

Delhi Proposals of Muslim Leaders, March 1927

Thirty prominent Muslim leaders including Jinnah, Shafi Daudi, Mohammad Ali,
Mohammad Shafi, Raja of Mahmudabad, Abdullah Suhrawardy and Ansari met
in Delhi on 20 March 1927 and agreed in principle to give up separate electorates
if four specific demands were accepted:

1. Representation of Bengali and Punjabi Muslims in the legislatures accord-

ing to their population;
2. Reservation of one- third seats in the central legislature for Muslims;
3. Separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency;
4. Extension of reforms to the Frontier Province and Baluchistan so that these
two provinces were treated on the same footing as other provinces (Hasan,
1980; Mitra, 1928, p. 11; Shakir, 1985).

However, as Irwin noted, this manifesto in favour of joint electorate was given to
the Associated Press by Jinnah without any vote, as he (Jinnah) possibly expected
this to enable him to re-establish his old Independent Party. Also, the Punjab
Muslims were greatly upset about the manifesto (Nehru Memorial Museum &
Library [NMML], 1927). Speaking later, Jinnah called these proposals the ‘out-
comes of many heads’ and ‘just and fair to both communities’ (Mitra, 1927, Vol.
II, p. 449).2 The very next day, the Congress Working Committee (CWC), while
appreciating Muslim conference decision to accept joint electorates, hoped that a
satisfactory settlement would be arrived at based on these proposals (All India
Congress Committee [AICC], 1928 p.18; Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 4, 34).
This approval by the Congress upset some sections of the Mahasabha. On 23
March 1927, the Punjab Hindu Sabha resolved to deny the Congress any locus
standi to represent the Hindu community in negotiations with Muslim organisa-
tions as the Mahasabha, it emphasised, was the only proper body to deal with such
matters (Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 4, 35). On the same day, the Hindu members of
the Central Assembly, meeting under Malaviya’s presidentship, outlined impor-
tant principles to act as the basis of discussion between the two communities:

1. Joint electorate for all legislatures.

2. Reservation of seats on the basis of population.
3. Safeguards for the protection of religious and quasi-judicial rights.
Jha 537

4. Question of redistribution of provinces on linguistic and other essential

bases to be left open for consideration (Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, p. 34).

Moonje criticised Congressmen for encouraging Muslim communalism through

their utterances and called the Hindu–Muslim relation of the day a ‘perpetual civil
war’. If the Muslims were left ‘severely alone’, Moonje underlined, they would
themselves realise the ‘folly of separation and communalism’ and merge into
Indian nationalism (Mitra, 1927, Vol. I, pp. 417–419).3 Inside Bengal, wrote
Padmaraj Jain (secretary, Hindu Mahasabha), there was a strong feeling that
Hindus should not yield (National Archives of India, 1927).

The Congress and the League Sessions, December 1927

The Congress at its Madras session on 26–28 December 1927 agreed on joint
electorate with reservation of seats based on population in every province and the
Central legislature (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 397–398). Responding to the appoint-
ment of Simon Commission, it called for the drafting of a Swaraj Constitution
based on a ‘declaration of rights’ and to bring it for consideration and approval
before a special convention consisting of AICC, leaders of other organisations,
and elected members of the central and provincial legislatures (Mitra, 1927, Vol.
II, pp. 417–418). However, serious dissensions existed in the ranks of the Muslim
League on both—the Delhi proposals and the boycott of the Simon Commission—
prompting Irwin to happily note that the Muslim opinion was ‘tending to swing
more and more our way’ (NMML, 1927). But to Birkenhead, the situation pre-
sented a ‘sufficiently complicated appearance’ (NMML, 1928a). Though a section
of the League under Mohammad Shafi voted for cooperation with the Simon
Commission (Moore, 1974, p. 34), the main faction of the League met in Calcutta
to oppose the Commission. On the issue of the joint electorate, it adopted the
Delhi proposals and the Congress settlement subject to separation of Sind and
reforms in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and added
that in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP,

the Muslim majority shall make the same concessions concerning the proportion of
seats reserved for the Hindu minority that the Hindu majority in other provinces would
make to Muslim minorities over and above the proportion of the population of the
provinces which shall be the minimum basis (Mitra, 1927, Vol. II, pp. 443, 447–448).

Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha: Growing Distrust

As a follow-up to the decision taken at the Madras Congress, the All-Parties
Conference, including leaders of the League, the Mahasabha and the Liberal
Party, met in Delhi on 12–22 February 1928. Jairamdas Daulatram, Moonje and
Lajpat Rai voiced their opposition to the Congress resolution on the separation of
Sind. The Mahasabha delegates also opposed reservation of seats for Muslim
538 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

majorities in Punjab and Bengal. This objection was also backed by Motilal,
Jawaharlal, as well as by Sardar Mangal Singh, the Sikh delegate. Jinnah,
Mohammad Ali and Hasrat Mohani protested (Hasan, 1980). While Jinnah agreed
to the joint electorate only if it was based on the conditions laid down in the Delhi
proposals, the Mahasabha underlined that it would rather stick to the communal
electorate than agree to a redistribution of provinces (NMML, 1928b). The con-
ference met again on 8–11 March 1928, but differences on the issue of separation
of Sind and reservation of seats for majorities soared up once again (AICC, 1928,
p. 22). The conference now stood adjourned.
Amid growing distrust, the Mahasabha held its annual session at Jabalpur on 8
April 1928, where Kelkar, in his presidential address, accused Jinnah of present-
ing the compromised formula in a ‘solid block’, to be accepted or rejected ‘as a
whole’ which, he felt, had created an impasse. He underlined that seeking reserva-
tion of seats for a ‘majority’ population in any province was an absurd demand as
it struck at the very root of the fusion of interests to be secured by the natural oper-
ation of joint electorates. Demand for separation of Sind was also opposed with
Kelkar alleging that this demand had been raised to secure an additional hostage
in Muslim hands as against the advantage which the Hindus had over the Muslim
minorities in other provinces (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 424–425). This resolution
against the separation of Sind overlooked Malaviya’s request to the party not to
take the ‘odium’ upon itself of making a settlement impossible, but to wait for the
outcome of the efforts initiated by the Madras Congress (Ketkar, 1941).

Formation of the Nehru Committee

The All Parties Conference met again on 19 May 1928 in Bombay and appointed
a subcommittee under Motilal Nehru to draft a Constitution. However, a fortnight
before this meeting, Jinnah had sailed for Europe. Motilal anxiously sent him a
telegram with the request to nominate someone to act on his behalf in the subcom-
mittee. He received no response (Nanda, 2010, p. 110). With organisations pulling
in different directions, the task before the Nehru Committee was by no means
easy. On the one hand, Motilal was disturbed by the Jabalpur resolution of the
Mahasabha, and on the other hand, the League appeared to him ‘a very tangible
body’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 308–309).4 Jawaharlal argued that the real
difficulty would arise on the issue of reservation of seats for a majority, especially
in Punjab, as both the Sikhs and the Hindu Sabha were violently opposed to it and
‘all constitutional and democratic theory’ was with them in this regard (Gopal,
1972, pp. 50–51).5 Motilal felt that for the committee to work properly, it had to
be a small one, but an endeavour was made to have ‘spokesmen of some impor-
tant viewpoints’ (AICC, 1928, p. 23). Ali Imam and Shuaib Qureshi were sup-
posed to express the Muslim point of view; Aney and Jayakar, the Mahasabha’s
attitude; G.R. Pradhan, the non-Brahmin view; Mangal Singh, the Sikh League;
Tej Bahadur Sapru presented the liberal viewpoint; and N.M. Joshi presented the
interest of the Labour (AICC, 1928, pp. 17, 23, 124).6
Jha 539

Separation of Sind
The demand for separation of Sind from Bombay threatened to turn the Hindu
population into a minority in the new province. Inclusion of this demand in the
Delhi proposals and its acceptance by the Congress led to massive protests organ-
ised jointly by the Sind Provincial Hindu Sabha, the Sind Hindu Association and
the Sind Zamindar Association (Hasan, 1979, p. 268). All-Sind Hindu Association
stated that the move for separation was inspired by a ‘dangerous communal men-
tality’ (Indian Statutory Commission, 1930, pp. 228–247). These protests found
support from the local Hindu Sabhas outside Sind and from the Mahasabha’s
Jabalpur resolution in April 1928. The Nehru Report noted that by a strange suc-
cession of events, Sind had become a major problem. There had been a ‘sudden
and inexplicable change of opinion’ as people in favour and opposition of separa-
tion of Sind, only a few years ago, had now swapped their positions which dem-
onstrated how ‘communal considerations warp and twist our judgement’. The
report suspected that the real opposition to separation was due to the fear of the
Hindus that their economic position might suffer as Muslims could take charge of
affairs in the new province (AICC, 1928, pp. 31–32). Therefore, it recommended
the separation of Sind and its elevation as a full province, subject to ‘such enquiry
about the financial position as may be considered necessary’ (AICC, 1928,
p. 124). Aney and Mangal Singh, representing the Mahasabha and the Sikh
League, respectively, were persuaded to agree to the separation of Sind and eleva-
tion of N.W.F. Province to the status of full province (Hasan, 1979, pp. 275–276).

Reservation of Seats
In the deliberations, the report questioned the very idea of reservation of seats for
communities but recalled that ‘for various reasons of expediency’, such reserva-
tion was recommended for a time to serve as a ‘transitional stage’ between com-
munal electorates and general mixed electorates. However, the expectation, that
during this interval the distrust of one community of the other would be substan-
tially reduced, had been belied (AICC, 1928, p. 38). ‘If communal protection was
necessary for any group’, the report noted, ‘it was not for the two major communi-
ties—the Hindus and the Muslims’:

The only methods of giving a feeling of security are safeguards and guarantees and the
grant, as far as possible, of cultural autonomy. The clumsy and objectionable methods
of separate electorates and reservations of seats do not give this security. They only
keep up an armed truce. (AICC, 1928, p. 28)

However, as a way forward, the committee while rejecting the principle of sepa-
rate electorate allowed reservation of seats for a fixed period of ten years. A com-
munity could contest for more seats in addition to the ones reserved for it.
Reservation for the House of Representatives would be for Muslims in provinces
where they were in a minority and for non-Muslims in the Frontier Province, in
540 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

strict proportion to their population in the province concerned (AICC, 1928,

pp. 123–124). The demand for one-third reservation of seats in the central legisla-
ture was rejected on the logic that the Muslims formed less than one-fourth of the
total population of British India. Inside the committee, only Sapru was ready to
accept this demand (Hasan, 1979, p. 277). Inside the Punjab and Bengal legisla-
tures, the committee rejected reservation for any community, while in other pro-
vincial legislatures, it accepted reservation for Muslim minorities on a population
basis, and similar reservation for non-Muslims in the Frontier Province (AICC,
1928, pp. 123–124).

All-Parties Conference, Lucknow, August 1928

The crucial meeting of the All Parties Conference to consider the Nehru Report
was held at Lucknow in August 1928. Jinnah’s arrival in India, however, had been
delayed. Motilal lamented: ‘We have therefore to do without him. This means
more trouble but I am afraid it cannot be helped’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993,
pp. 348–349).7 Presiding over the conference, Ansari saw the report as the first
and rare example of representatives of all schools of political thought coming
together to draw up a definite scheme of the Constitution. It was the ‘last hope’ of
300 million human beings and, therefore, the representatives assembled, he under-
lined, held the key to India’s happiness (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 62–63).
The conference accepted Sind’s separation with provisos that after enquiry
the new province was found to be financially viable and that the Hindu minority
acquired the same weightage in the province as Muslims enjoyed in their minority
provinces (Moore, 1974, p. 36). The Punjab delegates reached an agreement to
accept the committee’s recommendation for the province, provided the franchise
was based on adult suffrage. This agreement was signed, among others, by Lajpat
Rai, Duni Chand, Satyapal, Kitchlew, Zafar Ali Khan and Abdur Rahman and was
received with applause. Annie Besant enthusiastically declared that Indian unity
and freedom had triumphed over communalism and sectarianism (Mitra, 1928,
Vol. I, p. 66). The clause of the report relating to Bengal was formally accepted by
Akram Khan and J.M. Sen Gupta.
The conference, thus, closed on a positive note, approving major recommenda-
tions of the report related to communal questions. The amended report was signed
by all the previous signatories (except Shuaib Qureshi and G.R. Pradhan) and by
the new members—Malaviya, Besant, Ansari, Jayakar, Vijiaraghavachariar and
Abdul Kadir Kasuri (Coupland, 1944, p. 95). Ansari happily concluded that his
life’s work, that is, unifying people, had been achieved (Nanda, 2010, p. 115).
M.C. Chagla, a prominent Muslim leader in this conference, told Hindustan Times
that the decisions were more comprehensive than those of the Lucknow Pact of
1916 (where only the Congress and the League had been parties) since the con-
ference had been of ‘an extraordinary and unusually representative character’ in
which Congress, Mahasabha, Sikh League, Muslim League and Khilafat organi-
sations—all had participated and ‘unanimously adopted and approved of various
decisions reached’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1996, p. 232). However, many Muslim
Jha 541

leaders, across provinces and beyond this conference, were not precisely on the
same footing. And very soon, voices of dissent started pouring out.

Response of the Muslim Leadership

The immediate response of the Muslim leadership to the report was by no means
uniform. Provincial circumstances also influenced it. While in Punjab and Bengal,
it was welcomed for some time, the UP leaders rallied the Muslim opposition.
Abdur Rahim maintained that after the introduction of adult suffrage, Muslim
representation in the legislature would be either equal to, or above, their popula-
tion. Barkat Ali, vice-president of Punjab Muslim League argued on similar lines.
The report was also supported by the Raja of Mahmudabad, Ali Imam, Akram
Khan, Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, Abdul Karim, Ansari and Azad. Inside
Bengal, the provincial Muslim League and the provincial Khilafat Committee
stood in support (Hasan, 1979, pp. 283–284, 292). However, Shafi Daudi, Hasrat
Mohani, Azad Sobhani, the Ali brothers, and inside Punjab, the Shafi group stood
in stiff opposition. Shaukat Ali was even ‘obliged’ to make it clear that ‘he did not
agree to the joint electorate unconditionally’ (NMML, 1928c). The Ali brothers
accused the Hindu Congressmen of succumbing to the pressure of the Mahasabha,
which, they alleged, had resulted in the reversal of their previous stand that had
been in consonance with the Delhi proposals (Hasan, 1979, p. 292). Referring to
opposition by Mohammad Ali, Jawaharlal characterised him as suffering from the
‘Mahasabha Complex’ for he saw ‘the evil hand of the Hindu Mahasabha every-
where and its tainted mark on every forehead’ (Gopal, 1973, pp. 98–99).8
In the central legislature, most Muslim leaders were united to oppose any
move to introduce the Nehru Report for adoption. Irwin reported that the leaders
of the Mahasabha had fallen ‘significantly silent’ for the moment, and Motilal
restrained some members of his party who were eager to move a resolution in
the Assembly about the decisions of the All Parties Conference at Lucknow. The
viceroy also apprehended that from then onwards, the ‘hostile criticisms’ of the
conference proceedings would ‘become more and more frequent and important’
(NMML, 1928c). On his arrival in Simla on 5 September 1928, Motilal made it
clear that he would not allow any resolution to be moved in the House from his
side on the question of proceedings of the All Parties Conference. Irwin wrote that
it had become quite obvious within just two to three days of the opening of the
Assembly that practically all Muslims in the House, even those in the Congress,
were going to oppose any resolution recommending the adoption of the Nehru–
Sapru Constitution or the acceptance of the Lucknow resolution (NMML, 1928d).
A fortnight later, Irwin noted the impermeability of this opposition, ‘I suspect
that, like many we have seen in the hunting field, they (the All Parties Report
people) will find that some of the worst falls come from trying to rush fences
that are more solid than they look’ (NMML, 1928e). A month after this commu-
nication, the viceroy wrote that the reactions to the report were ‘exercising some
discouragement on the minds of its authors’, especially the ‘Liberal friends’ who
had joined hands with the Congressmen in the formulation of the Constitution
(NMML, 1928f).
542 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

Mahasabha’s Response to the Nehru Report

All through the Mahasabha leaders were keeping a close watch on the Muslim
quarters and also on developments within the Congress. Initially, there was
support in favour of the report. Moonje tried to win support for the report to which
his fellow Maharashtrian Aney was a signatory (Cleghorn, 1977). Narendra Nath
and Gulshan Rai also endorsed the report. Jayakar’s support was based on the
logic that its recommendations were ‘more beneficial to the Hindus than any
scheme so far suggested on the Congress side’ (Hasan, 1979, pp. 278–279). Kelkar
later referred to the report as the ‘greatest common agreement’ between the differ-
ent progressive political parties in the country (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, p. 346).9 But
no sooner than the suspicion gained ground about the likelihood of it being modi-
fied to accommodate Muslim demands or the possibility of its rejection by the
Muslim leaders, the Mahasabha coined its recommendations on communal issues
as the maximum of what they could accept. Lajpat Rai commended the ‘memora-
ble work’ of the committee (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 351–352).10 Presiding at
the Etawah Conference of the Agra Hindu Sabha in October 1928, he sought to
mobilise opinion in favour of the report (Chand, 1978, p. 538) but rejected any
move to change it:

In the matter of communal representation, the Hindus have accepted the recommenda-
tions of the Nehru Report as the maximum of what they can swallow. They shall not be
a party to any tampering with the same. Retention of the separate electorate is altogether
out of question. (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, p. 345)11

Pronounced Opposition of the Muslim Leadership

As the year 1928 drew to a close, the opposition to the report by the League and
other such groups became pronounced. In the report, Motilal wrote to Gandhi on
2 October 1928, the seeds of Hindu–Muslim unity were so interdependent upon
one another that the ‘least change’ endangered the ‘safety of the whole’. Then, he
very rightly assessed his worries about Jinnah:

There is only one man about whom I am very anxious and that is Jinnah. He has not yet
returned from England and has not expressed himself one way or the other. But for one
weakness, he (Jinnah) is thoroughly sound. He is always afraid of losing his leadership
and avoids taking any risks in the matter. This weakness often drives him to support the
most reactionary proposals. (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 368–370)

Motilal understood the significance of Jinnah’s opinion and requested

Purushottamdas to rope him in the moment he arrived in India. He suspected that
Shafi Daudi, Shaukat Ali and other ‘reactionaries’ would attack Jinnah the moment
he landed: ‘So much depends on Jinnah that I have a mind to go to Bombay to
receive him’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 363). Jinnah returned on 26 October
1928 after a gap of nearly six months. Motilal wrote to him on 28 October, under-
lining that the report had not taken the view of any party in toto and it was ‘nothing
Jha 543

more than the maximum agreement between the parties’ and invited him to a
meeting of his (Motilal’s) committee, in which Jinnah had also been co-opted,
scheduled for 5 November (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 385–386). Jinnah seemed
to be least interested in Motilal’s overtures. On 25 November, Motilal informed
Gandhi that the Muslim members of the Assembly belonging to Jinnah’s party
(numbering just eight or nine) were bitterly opposed to the report and the Lucknow
decision, and it was ‘in his anxiety to keep his hold on these people’ that Jinnah was
‘playing into their hands’: ‘The game is to put off the consideration of the Report
by the Muslim League at its annual Session which means a protracted controversy
during the whole year 1929’ (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 397–398).
The Bombay Presidency Muslim League in its meeting on 27 November 1928,
in the presence of Jinnah and Shaukat Ali, rejected the report for ignoring Muslim
interests. These ‘interests’, it was noted, were ‘essential at least as long as the
present state of communalism that is being felt more and more keenly every day
by the Muslim community is not rooted out’ (NMML, 1928g). This meeting, Irwin
rightly remarked, was the most important pronouncement until then on the report
by any political body, one which could influence the outcome of the forthcom-
ing meetings of the League at Calcutta and the Muslims All Parties Conference
at Delhi. Attacks on Shaukat Ali in the press also influenced the opinion of the
Bombay Muslim League. At the time of the All Parties Conference, Shaukat
Ali had objected to certain portions of the Nehru Report, but now his objec-
tions ‘got the added strength of personal annoyance and desire for revenge’.12
The League demanded substantial modification in certain particulars of the report
or else threatened to abandon it virtually. Irwin expected some changes to be
devised in the report to ‘satisfy some Muhammadans whilst not antagonising the
Mahasabha’, but such attempts, he fancied, were ‘not likely to be successful’.13

The Final Showdown, December 1928

Motilal suspected that efforts were on to close the ranks of Muslims against the
report and the Lucknow decisions (Kumar & Sharma, 1993, pp. 393–395).14 The
crucial All Parties convention began in Calcutta on 22 December 1928. However,
a day before, the Mahasabha’s working committee insisted that the agreements on
communal issues in the report arrived at Lucknow ‘should not be reopened for
revision’ (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 92–93). Therefore, no sooner had the conven-
tion begun than the Mahasabha delegates got busy distributing pamphlets against
any revision of the settlement on the report. The League’s annual session which
also began in Calcutta around this time appointed a delegation consisting of the
Maharaja of Mahmudabad, Jinnah, Kitchlew, Chagla, Barkat Ali and others to
represent its views before the convention (Mitra, 1928, Vol. II, p. 397). The con-
vention also appointed a subcommittee consisting of Gandhi, Sapru, Malaviya,
Ansari, Azad, Motilal, Moonje, Jayakar, Aney, Padmaraj Jain, Ali Imam, Besant
and others to meet the delegates from the Khilafat Committee and the League
(Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 121). The two groups met on the night of 27 December but
failed to arrive at any consensus.
544 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

In his speech in the convention on 28 December, Jinnah insisted on one-third

reservation in the central legislature, reservation in Punjab and Bengal based on
the Muslim population in the absence of adult suffrage, residuary powers with
the provinces, and separation of Sind not to be made contingent upon the estab-
lishment of the system of government as outlined in the Nehru Report (Mitra,
1928, Vol. I, pp. 122–125). Sapru, associated closely with the report, clarified
that the Nehru committee adopted adult franchise so that each community could
stand on a perfect equality with the other. Therefore, it followed that the Muslim
community should get representation in the central legislature in proportion to
its numerical strength in the whole of India: ‘That was a logical position and we
adopted logically’. However, for the sake of settlement, they could agree to Jinnah
on this issue: ‘If he is a spoilt child, a naughty child I am prepared to say, give
him what he wants and be finished with it’. However, on the issue of reservation
of seats in Punjab and Bengal, he hoped Jinnah would reconsider his position.
He also warned against advocacy of residuary powers with the provinces as the
Constitution devised by the report was neither federal nor unitary, it was both
(Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 125–127).
Jayakar, the signatory to the report, delineated ‘the four pillars’ of communal
compromise on which the evidence of the report stood: (a) no other community
except Mussulmans to have representation by reservation (b) representation based
on adult suffrage (c) no majorities to have reservation and (d) minorities to be
recognised only in the provinces of North-West Frontier (NWF) and Sind. Even
if one brick out of these four pillars was taken away, he insisted, the whole struc-
ture would collapse. He had no objection if Muslims got a few more seats, but
it was only with difficulty that he was keeping back the disturbers in his camp
‘who might break away if any violent departure from the pact was attempted’
(Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, pp. 128–129). Jinnah replied that minorities would support
a Constitution only when they feel secure in it— ‘The security of the minority
was the test’ (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I, p. 130). Amendments moved by him were put
to vote and the three major ones were lost by a majority (Mitra, 1928, Vol. I,
p. 131). However, Jinnah’s demand seeking reservation of seats in Punjab and
Bengal brought him the support of many Muslim leaders of these provinces who
had earlier stood with the report. During the following weeks, many prominent
Muslim leaders closed their ranks. December 1928, Jinnah is reported to have
remarked later, marked the ‘turning of the ways’ with the Hindus (Moore, 1974,
p. 38).

The Continuing Downslide

The failure of the convention at Calcutta was followed by a hitherto unseen display
of unity among Muslim organisations. The Muslim All Parties Conference which
was held in Delhi from 31 December 1928 to 1 January 1929 now demanded sepa-
rate electorate. This meeting, presided over by Aga Khan, was a widely representa-
tive meeting of the Muslims. Mohammad Shafi (Punjab), Ibrahim Rahimtullah
(Independent Party in the Assembly), A.H. Ghaznavi (Bengal) and Shafat Ahmad
Khan (UP) were the prime movers. Mohammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohani,
Jha 545

Azad Sobhani, Shafi Daudi and Mohammad Yakub were also present (Mitra, 1928,
Vol. II, p. 409). Mohammad Ali and Mohammad Shafi, always maintaining dis-
tance, now sat and deliberated together. Mohammad Ali strongly reprehended the
Nehru Report which, though intending that ‘the universe may belong to God and
the country to the British’ ensured, nonetheless, that ‘it was the Mahasabha who
should rule’. He asked Muslims not to be afraid of the Hindu majority, and until
they got freedom, the separate electorate was the only effective device to keep
them alive (Mitra, 1928, Vol. II, p. 417). As Motilal and some other Congressmen
made ‘desperate attempt’ to save the report from ‘total destruction’, Irwin noted
that it was ‘no longer an agreed solution’ as practically the whole Muslim com-
munity was ‘raised solid against it’ (NMML, 1929a, 1929b).15
In March 1929, Jinnah delivered his ‘fourteen points’, which packaged pri-
marily the demands raised in the Delhi proposals. While the Jamiat-Ulema-i-
Hind endorsed it, the Congress Muslims, the Shafi faction of the League and the
Khilafatists were not forthcoming (Moore, 1974, pp. 38–39). However, in the
Central Assembly, in a tactical move, Jinnah rallied his Muhammadan Independent
followers behind the Opposition during the voting on the ‘National Demand’.
This development, Irwin concluded, was because Motilal, Malaviya and Jayakar
(the three important Opposition leaders in the Assembly) were ‘likely to get some
accommodation with the Muhammadans’ (NMML, 1929c).16 He, however, appre-
hended that the Mahasabha’s stiffening attitude towards the Muslim claims, and
the somewhat intransigent attitude of the orthodox Muslims, could prove to be a
major hurdle.17
This tactical move in the Central Assembly notwithstanding, the Muslim
League in its long-drawn meeting in Delhi at the end of March 1929, presided
over by Jinnah, conveyed its unequivocal opposition to the Nehru Report. Jinnah
recalled the attitude of the Mahasabha representatives at the All Parties Convention
which, he claimed, was ‘nothing short of an ultimatum, that, if a single word
in the Nehru Report in respect of the communal settlement was changed, they
would immediately withdraw their support to it’. The proposals of the report,
concluded Jinnah, could therefore be treated only as ‘counter Hindu proposals to
Moslem proposals’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 363–365, 367).18 Finally, after much
discussion, the subjects committee of the League accepted the decisions of the
All Parties Convention (by a majority of eighty-four to seven votes), but put
such conditions which made this acceptance almost infructuous. These condi-
tions were reserving one-third seats in both the Houses at the centre, the voting
ratio of Muslims in Bengal and Punjab to be in accordance with their population,
and to make the provinces as fully autonomous as possible (Mitra, 1929, Vol.
I, p. 369). Azad, who attended this session, explained to the Free Press that Jinnah
and Mohammad Ali would not agree to any resolution which did not reject the
Nehru Report. Therefore, the resolution passed by the subjects committee was
carefully drafted to be acceptable to the largest majority (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I,
pp. 370–372).
In response to the developments at the All-Parties Moslem Conference and
Jinnah’s subsequent demands, the Hindu Mahasabha in its Surat session from 30
March to 1 April 1929 rejected the Nehru Report altogether. The specific resolu-
tion moved by Moonje and seconded by Parmanand stated that the Mahasabha
546 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

would have favourably considered the report as amended and adopted by the
All Parties Convention, but in the face of its rejection by the All-Parties Moslem
Conference, it was compelled not to do so. Therefore, it called upon all Hindus to
support the principles propounded by the Jabalpur session of 1928 that was now
‘slightly amended to suit the present circumstances’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, pp. 359–
360). Going back, it rejected reservation of seats on communal consideration in
any elective bodies and educational institutions and reiterated its opposition to the
separation of Sind (ibid.).19 Moonje’s remark at this session, that if at any moment
Jinnah consented to accept the Nehru Report then he would also be immediately
prepared to do so, was an unmistaken admission of the fact that, by this time,
the Mahasabha’s position vis-à-vis constitutional developments could ill-afford
to ignore the stand taken by the Muslim leadership (Mitra, 1929, Vol. I, p. 361).
The Surat resolutions of the Mahasabha came under heavy criticism. Jayakar had
wired a draft (the outcome of a joint conference with Motilal) to Moonje on the
eve of the Surat session. He felt unhappy that this draft was ignored by Moonje.
This ‘unfortunate error’ on Moonje’s part, he argued, had given a potent weapon
in the hands of some Muslim leaders who were out to attack the Mahasabha. If the
resolution on Nehru Report would have been passed in the form in which he had
wished then, Jayakar argued, Motilal’s adherence to ‘our view’ could have been
secured (NAI, 1929g). The ‘bulk of Moslem opinion’ was ‘pretty solid against’
the Congress Muslims supporting the Nehru Report, and with the Mahasabha,
through ‘the mouthpiece’ of Moonje, with a ‘pretty uncompromising statement
of their position on the other side’, the ‘communal feeling in the political field’,
Irwin noted, showed ‘signs of becoming more acute’ (NMML, 1929d).

Resisting Moves at Modification of the Nehru Report

During July–August 1929, Moonje and some other leaders of the Mahasabha
grew extremely anxious at the moves in certain quarters to bring around negotia-
tions between Jinnah and leaders of the Congress and creating nationalist Muslim
organisations, some functioning within the Congress. Moonje suspected Bombay
Muslims, ‘under instruction behind the scene’ of Jinnah, of facilitating the forma-
tion of a Moslem Congress Party under the ‘apparent presidentship’ of Brelvi
(editor of Bombay Chronicle) to get Motilal and the Congress to accept reserva-
tion of one-third seats at the centre and unconditional separation of Sind. The final
objective of the whole endeavour, Moonje concluded, was to isolate the Mahasabha
by getting the Congress and the Liberal Federation to agree to concede the Muslim
demands (NAI, 1929a). The Mahasabha, should, therefore, re-state its position as
early as possible, and let Gandhi also ‘know that the Hindus would not support
him or rather would oppose him if he were to yield to the Musalman’ (NAI,
1929b). Moonje also wrote a long letter to Malaviya explaining how Motilal had
fallen a victim to ‘the intrigues carried on by the Moslems under the able and
skillful guidance, from behind the scene, of Mr. Jinnah to get the Nehru Report
amended by accepting the Moslem demands’. He also informed Malaviya about
Jayakar’s advice that he (Malaviya) should tell Gandhi: (a) not to open up nego-
tiations with Jinnah for amendment of the Nehru Report, and (b) that if he (Gandhi)
Jha 547

were to yield on these points then he (Malaviya) would be painfully obliged to

lead the opposition on behalf of Hindus against him, Jinnah and Motilal combined
(NAI, 1929c). Jayakar advised Moonje not to show ‘over anxiety’ at the likely
meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah, since he felt that Gandhi would not ‘commit
the mistake of capitulating to Jinnah without feeling sure that the Hindus will
stand by him’ (NAI, 1929d). But the need of the hour, he stressed, was to tread
cautiously. Therefore, referring to the likely meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah,
he immediately advised Malaviya that if he (Malaviya) was against the Hindus
‘making any further concessions’ to the Muslims beyond the Nehru Report, then
he should openly state so (NAI, 1929e).20
Amid reports that Sarojini Naidu was persuading Gandhi to act as an interme-
diary between Jinnah and Motilal, Moonje advised Gandhi to take a firm stand on
the Nehru Report and shared that he was alarmed because his (Gandhi’s) remarks
made to him (Moonje), at the night-meeting of the subcommittee of the All Parties
convention held at Calcutta during the previous Congress week, kept ringing
at the back of his mind. Gandhi had then, according to Moonje, remarked as
follows: ‘Let us agree to give all that Musalmans demand and be satisfied with the
crumbs that shall remain behind’ (NAI, 1929f). Kelkar reminded Motilal that the
Mahasabha had agreed to the un-tampered Nehru Report as a matter of compro-
mise. Therefore, any attempt to ‘unsettle’ the report would force the Mahasabha
to reconsider its position.21
A public meeting of the Bombay Muslims was held on 11 August 1929 with
the Ali brothers in a leading role. Speaking on the occasion, Mohammad Ali came
down heavily on the ‘Hindu’ and the ‘nationalist press’ for depicting Muslims as
‘shirkers’ of their duty and responsibility and emphasised that the Nehru Report
was only meant to ‘perpetuate slavery and Hindu domination’: ‘We cannot
accept the Nehru Report. Let them come forward and meet us in an honourable
way, and they will find Muslims ready to work with them’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II,
pp. 351–353). In the midst of news about the proposed moves to modify the Nehru
Report, Kelkar emphasised that he would ‘never agree to “the heads I win and tails
you lose” policy that seems to be now pursued by the Mahomedan community’
(Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 337–338).22 Presiding at the Andhra Hindu Conference
on 7 November 1929, Moonje made a point-to-point rebuttal of Jinnah’s ‘fourteen
points’ and reiterated that the recommendations of the Nehru Report constituted
the upper limit of giving in to the demands of the Muslim leaders: ‘Let the Hindus
be firm and stern in their opposition to the introduction of communalism in the
Constitution of the country beyond what has already been conceded in the Nehru
Report’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, 340–342).
So, by the end of 1929, the line of division between the Mahasabha and the
League, and other organisations including those led by the ‘nationalist Muslims’,
on every major constitutional question involving communal issues, had become
acute. Speaking in December 1929, N.C. Kelkar accused the Congress of being
‘overshadowed and overpowered by the Khilafat’ between 1921 and 1928
and said that though ‘its anti-communalism’ was ‘grand and glorious’ it was
nonetheless ‘partial and one-sided’ (Mitra, 1929, Vol. II, pp. 347–348). Given the
548 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

Nehru Report being rejected by a large body of the Muslim leadership, Congress
stepped up efforts to mobilise more and more Muslims in favour of its programme.
However, beyond the ambit of the Congress party, most Muslim conferences con-
tinued their protest against the arrangement envisaged in the Nehru Report. The
leaders of the Mahasabha were no less critical about these ‘nationalist’ Muslim
leaders as they were of the orthodox and die-hard Muslim groups. Therefore,
from 1929 onwards, we find increasing attacks on these ‘nationalist’ groups from
the Mahasabha camp. Moonje claimed, in no uncertain terms, that these Muslim
leaders, masquerading as nationalists, were attempting to infiltrate the Congress
in large numbers to exercise pressure from within (Hasan, 1987).

Concluding Remarks
From the beginning of 1927 to the finalisation of the Nehru Report to the round
table conferences in 1930–1932, the political climate of the country had metamor-
phosed critically. In this process, the Hindu Mahasabha made its presence felt in
significant and critical ways. Entering the political domain in subtle ways through
the Responsivist route, the party had now intensified the ambit of its intervention.
Its entry into political negotiations seeking to protect the ‘Hindu interest’ also
posed the vital question of defining its relationship with the Congress. The varying
shades of opinion within the Mahasabha became more glaring on this issue. In this
respect, Malaviya, on the one hand, and Moonje and Parmanand, on the other
hand, represented two different positions within the organisation. Jinnah’s intran-
sigent attitude, influenced primarily by his effort to regain a place of prominence
within the Muslim leadership, played a crucial role in dampening the spirit of
bonhomie generated around the report in initial months. His inflexible demand for
one-third reservation for Muslims in the Central legislature, reservation for them
in Punjab and Bengal, as well as seeking residuary powers for provinces—all
these after the report had been accepted at the Lucknow meet of the All Parties
Conference, made the meeting ground look remote, and possibly beyond reach.
The leaders of the Mahasabha, more prominently Moonje, Jayakar, Kelkar and
Parmanand, played an important role in thwarting attempts at expanding the scope
of reservation for Muslims in legislatures beyond the Nehru Report, or beyond
what had been accepted at the Lucknow meet in August 1928. By the end of 1929,
the Mahasabha and the League had arrayed themselves in sharp opposition to
each other. And with the Congress, increasingly losing ground in securing the
dominant Muslim opinion in favour of its attitude on communal matters, the stage
was set for a perennial logjam in Indian politics.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, author-
ship and/or publication of this article.
Jha 549

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Notes
1. According to Austin, ten of the nineteen subclauses reappear, materially unchanged,
and three of the Nehru Rights are included in the Directive Principles in the Indian
Constitution.
2. Jinnah’s speech in the All-India Muslim League session, 31 December 1927.
3. Presidential address at the annual session of the Hindu Mahasabha, Patna, 16–18 April
1927.
4. Motilal Nehru to Gandhi, 3 May 1928.
5. Jawaharlal Nehru to Syed Mahmud, 30 June 1928.
6. Subhas Chandra Bose was also a member. Of the ten members of the committee,
Jayakar expressed his inability to act on it because of ill health, and N.M. Joshi stated
that he could only take part when the rights of labour were being considered. He did
not attend any meeting.
7. Motilal Nehru to Jayakar, 17 August 1928.
8. Statement to the press, 21 March 1929.
9. Presidential address at the Punjab and Frontier Hindu Conference at Lahore,
25 December 1929.
10. Motilal referred to Lajpat Rai’s response in his letter to Aney. See Motilal Nehru to
M.S. Aney, 18 August 1928.
11. Jagat Narain Lal, presiding at the C.P. Provincial Hindu Conference at Pendra Road
(21 December 1929) referred to this statement of Lajpat Rai.
12. Halifax Papers, Roll No. 2.
13. Halifax Papers, Roll No. 2.
14. Motilal to Members, All Parties Conference Committee, 16 November 1928.
15. In his next communication to the secretary of state, Irwin noted an increase in the feel-
ing of suspicion between Hindus and Muslims.
16. Irwin reported as follows: ‘Jinnah has, I understand, come down definitely on the side
of the Muhammadans in the matter of the Nehru Report and the debate clearly proved
that the Nehru Report, as it stands is not accepted by Muhammadans in general.’
17. Irwin was informed that a day or two after the debate on the ‘National Demand’ in the
Assembly, Moonje told a member of the Assembly that he would not have the Nehru
Report, as it stood then, ‘altered by a single comma’.
18. Jinnah’s statement and draft resolution at the meeting of the council of the Muslim
League, Delhi, 28 March 1929. There were strong differences among various factions
within the League over Jinnah’s draft resolutions. In fact, the meetings which dragged
for four days, that is, from 28 March to 31 March, witnessed separate deliberations
among different groups, coupled with several adjournments, compelling Jinnah to
plead for a united Muslim opinion, to be recorded through the Muslim League: ‘Let
our dominant note be to act in the best interests of the community and the country’.
19. It supported the principle of mixed electorate and rejected the proposal for one-third
reservation of seats for Muslims in the Central Assembly.
20. Jayakar impressed upon Malaviya the urgency of the situation and hence the need to
be unequivocal:
550 Indian Journal of Public Administration 66(4)

  Last time my coming forward at Calcutta, with you sitting silent, created a wrong
feeling that you differed from the views of the younger men. It is unfortunate that such
a feeling should have been created. Now is a more critical time, and I want to know
what you propose to do.
21. Kelkar in an interview on the proposed Jinnah–Gandhi–Motilal conference, Poona, 5
August 1929, Bombay Chronicle, 6 August 1929. Jayakar Papers, File No. 437.
22. Presidential address at the Dacca session of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Sabha con-
ference, 27 August 1929.

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