Lectures 1 and 2 a Diagnostic Approach to Growth Drivers APPP July Aughust 2023
Lectures 1 and 2 a Diagnostic Approach to Growth Drivers APPP July Aughust 2023
ApplicationsLectures 1 and 2
By
Mukul Asher
[email protected]
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Accessed on 6 October 2021
what are the drivers of long-term growth? Productivity—the ability to create more
outputs with the same inputs—is an important one. In our latest
World Economic Outlook, we emphasize the role of innovation in stimulating long-
term productivity growth. Surprisingly, productivity growth has been declining for
decades in advanced economies despite steady increases in research and
development (R&D), a proxy for innovation effort.
Our analysis suggests that the composition of R&D matters for growth. We find
that basic scientific research affects more sectors, in more countries and for a longer
time than applied research (commercially oriented R&D by firms), and that for
emerging market and developing economies, access to foreign research is especially
important. Easy technology transfer, cross-border scientific collaboration and policies
that fund basic research can foster the kind of innovation we need for long-term
growth.
Why Basic Science Matters for Economic Growth By Philip Barrett,
Niels-Jakob Hansen, Jean-Marc Natal and Diaa Noureldin
Basic research is not tied to a particular product or country and can be combined in
unpredictable ways and used in different fields. This means that it spreads more widely
and remains relevant for a longer time than applied knowledge. This is evident from
the difference in citations between scientific articles used for basic research, and
patents (applied research). Citations for scientific articles peak at about eight years
versus three years for patents
Spillovers are important for emerging markets and
developing economies
Why Basic Science Matters for Economic Growth By Philip Barrett,
Niels-Jakob Hansen, Jean-Marc Natal and Diaa Noureldin
While the bulk of basic research is conducted in advanced economies, our analysis
suggests that knowledge transfer between countries is an important driver of
innovation, especially in emerging market and developing economies.
Emerging market and developing economies rely much more on foreign than
homegrown research (basic and applied) for innovation and growth. In countries where
education systems are strong and financial markets deep, the estimated effect of
foreign technology adoption on productivity growth—through trade, foreign direct
investment or learning-by-doing—is particularly large. As such, emerging market and
developing economies may find that policies to adapt foreign knowledge to local
conditions are a better avenue for development than investing directly in homegrown
basic research.
Why does patenting matter? It’s a proxy for measuring innovation. An increase in the
stock of patents by 1 percent can increase productivity per worker by 0.04 percent.
That may not sound like much, but it adds up. Small increases over time improve living
standards.
Basic science also plays a larger role in green innovation (including renewables) than
in dirty technologies (such as gas turbines), suggesting that policies to boost basic
research can help tackle climate change.
Why Basic Science Matters for Economic Growth By Philip Barrett,
Niels-Jakob Hansen, Jean-Marc Natal and Diaa Noureldin
Because private firms can only capture a small part of the uncertain financial reward of engaging in
basic research, they tend to underinvest in it, providing a strong case for public policy intervention.
But designing the right policies—including determining how you fund research—can be tricky. For
example, funding basic research only at universities and public labs could be inefficient. Potentially
important synergies between the private and public sector would be lost. It may also be difficult to
disentangle basic and applied private research for the sake of subsidizing only the former.
Our analysis shows that an implementable hybrid policy that doubles subsidies to private research
(basic and applied alike) and boosts public research expenditure by a third could increase productivity
growth in advanced economies by 0.2 percentage point a year. Better targeting of subsidies to basic
research and closer public‑private cooperation could boost this even further, at lower cost for public
finances.
These investments would start to pay for themselves within about a decade and would have a
sizeable impact on incomes. We estimate that per capita incomes would be about 12 percent higher
than they are now had these investments been made between 1960 and 2018.
Finally, because of important spillovers to emerging markets, it is also key to ensure the free
flow of ideas and collaboration across borders.
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
The literature usually classified main drivers of
growth as follows:
Quantity and quality of labor
Capital
Land and natural resources
Managerial and organizational capabilities
Entrepreneurship
Knowledge (its generation, adaptation, and diffusion)
Knowledge explosion in many areas, most notably in IT,
telecommunication, biological sciences, and energy has
increased the knowledge-intensity of human activities in
general. Those countries and organizations which are not
currently fully utilizing the existing stock of knowledge can
progress rapidly if they develop appropriate capacities and
mindsets.
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
During the first wave of the Industrial Revolution, water power was instrumental in
manufacturing paper, textiles, and iron goods. Unlike the mills of the past, full-sized
dams fed turbines through complex belt systems. Advances in textiles brought the first
factory, and cities expanded around them.
With the second wave, between about 1845 and 1900, came significant rail, steam,
and steel advancements. The rail industry alone affected countless industries, from
iron and oil to steel and copper. In turn, great railway monopolies were formed.
The emergence of electricity powering light and telephone communication through
the third wave dominated the first half of the 1900s. Henry Ford introduced the
Model T, and the assembly line transformed the auto industry. Automobiles became
closely linked with the expansion of the American metropolis. Later, in the fourth
wave, aviation revolutionized travel.
After the internet emerged by the early 1990s, barriers to information were upended.
New media changed political discourse, news cycles, and communication in the fifth
wave. The internet ushered in a new frontier of globalization, a borderless landscape
of digital information flow
Traditional Growth Drivers: A Summary and Insights
The sixth wave, marked by artificial intelligence and digitization across information
of things (IoT), robotics, and drones, will likely paint an entirely new picture. Namely,
the automation of systems, predictive analytics, and data processing could make an
impact. In turn, physical goods and services will likely be digitized. The time to
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Application of knowledge economy is essential to shift from point A to point B.
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This will not only enhance growth rate, but will also increase availability of both
public and private goods, with given resources and technology. This is the
sustainable way of improving living standards. To move to point C, increased
resources ,
Particularly capital (both human and physical), plus technological progress will
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
66
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
Knowledge Economy and Knowledge
Management
67
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
Source:Hax, Arnoldo C. and Nicholas S. Majluf. 1982. “Competitive Cost Dynamics: The Experience Curve,” Interfaces, Vol. 12, no. 5, pp: 50-61
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
78
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
Knowledge Economy and Knowledge
Management
80
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
81
Traditional Growth Drivers: A
Summary and Insights
Impact Of Learning, On Performance Need For Accelerating Curve
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Source: Reg Revans
Source: By
V.Ram
Covid -19 Pandemic: Insights for
Growth
The Pandemic has accelerated the shift in focus on just growth strategies but also on public
health, health infrastructure, including adapting research and being relatively diversified in
obtaining key medicines and medical equipment, education, social protection systems, food
security, and science and technology policies.
Managing both demand and supply side of macro , sectoral balances, , and micro aspects,
including motivational, behavioral, and sustaining of social trust and social capital have
become even more essential.
The importance of ensuring that basic social and physical amenities, and daily food supply
are available throughout the country has also become more prominent due to the
Pandemic.
Currency management and supply/logistics management have acquired greater
prominence
Friend-Shoring is more prevalent since the pandemic as compared to earlier phase of
globalization when cheapest sourcing predominated even when it led to excessive
dependence on one country, particularly a country which wants to disrupt the current geo
political arrange ments
Limitations of the Conventional Approaches
Source: Adapted and modified by the Author based on Dani Rodrik (2010) Diagnostics
before Prescription. Journal of Economic Perspective, Vol. 24 (3). Pp. 33-44
A Case for Growth Diagnostics Approach/3
Source: Hausmann R., Rodrik D., Velasco A. (2005). “Growth Diagnostics”. Retrived from http://
Transformative Infrastructure Investment: An
Example
Private property is not secure: There is weak enforcement of the rule of law and of
contracts, or expropriation either by criminal elements or by government bodies.
Markets are not competitive: They fail to offer the carrots and wield the sticks that
make a capitalist economy dynamic.
Firms are owned and managed by people who survive because of their connections
to government or their privileged birth: They did not become owners or managers
because they were good at delivering high-quality goods and services at a
competitive price. The other two failures would make this more likely to occur.
Combinations of failures of the three basic institutions of capitalism mean that
individuals and groups often have more to gain by spending time and resources in
lobbying, criminal activity, and other ways of shifting the distribution of income in
their favour. They have less to gain from the direct creation of economic value.14
httml#110-varieties-of-capitalism-institutions-government-and-the-economy
https://www.core-econ.org/the-economy/book/text/01.
These are relative, and so is the notion of failure. In answering the question
the book distinguishes between “extractive” and “inclusive” economic
institutions which are over the long –term co-related with “extractive” and
“inclusive” political institutions. The two aspects of economic and political
institutions impact each other.
Brief Comments on Why Nations (or
Regions) May Regress
The correlation is not exact, not even in the medium term. But
over long term the co-relation is likely to be highly probable.
However, there are always chances of regress, such as crony
capitalism or money politics in successful high income
economies. China’s case remains an interesting one as its
astonishing growth for over three decades for a country of its
size is unprecedented.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Southeast-Asia-risks-stumbling-toward-a-South-Ame
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Accessed on 1 December 2021
Case Study: Southeast Asia
It is easy to forget that it was South America, not Asia, that was once seen as the world's emerging
economic hot spot.
Many of the region's countries were relatively prosperous in the first half of the 20th
century. Argentina, for example, was then one of the world's richest countries. They also achieved
impressive growth rates in the immediate aftermath of World War II.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Southeast-
But South America has fallen far since those halcyon days. The region's combined gross domestic
Asia-risks-stumbling-toward-a-South-Amer
product, in constant dollar terms, was 22% of the U.S.'s in 1980 but just 17% in 2020. This relative
ican-future
decline is even more stark on a per capita basis.
Accessed on 1 December 2021
Brazil's GDP per capita was 22% of the U.S.'s in 1980 but only 14% in 2020, while Mexico's fell from
25% to 15% over the same period.
This underperformance, and the subsequent inability of many South American countries to escape
the middle-income trap, has been explained by a number of broad but interrelated factors.
The first was their failure to upgrade their economic structures, develop internationally competitive
industries and reduce their reliance on primary exports. The second was their ineffectiveness at
addressing widening income and social inequalities and the third was the region's political instability
which resulted in more short-term populism than long-term economic thinking.
Case Study: Southeast Asia
South America may be geographically distant from Southeast Asia, but there are now
many existing and emerging similarities between the two regions.
"Like South America, Southeast Asian countries, with the notable exception of
Singapore, are struggling to develop the more advanced industries so necessary to
transition from simple employment-led economic expansion to more sustainable
productivity-led growth," writes Bratton. "The fundamental problem is that if
Southeast Asia cannot develop more advanced industries, then it will not escape a
future in which it specializes in the exports of raw materials, agricultural products,
lower-order goods and tourism."
It is true that there are pockets of manufacturing excellence within the region, but
these are geographically concentrated and often not at the scale to be internationally
competitive. The region's manufacturers are instead generally low-order and
domestically-orientated, despite numerous but frequently futile efforts to develop
more advanced sectors.
Case Study: Southeast Asia
In fact, many Southeast Asian countries have experienced premature
deindustrialization given their positions in the development cycle.
And it may now be too late to reverse this trend. In the same way,
South America failed to develop their manufacturing sectors in the
face of American and European competition, Southeast Asia's
producers will almost certainly struggle against hypercompetitive
Chinese imports.
The fundamental problem is that if Southeast Asia cannot develop
more advanced industries, then it will not escape a future in which it
specializes in the exports of raw materials, agricultural products,
lower-order goods and tourism, while relying on more advanced
manufactured imports from the region's dominant economy just like
South America. And if this geographic division of labor and trade
emerges, then the long-term consequences will be the same.
Such an outcome is looking increasingly likely, though, because many
of the necessary ingredients for such productivity-led economic
development are missing across much of the region
Case Study: Southeast Asia
Not only is there a lack of regionally coordinated industrial policies
-- important if Southeast Asian countries are to develop
complementary rather than competitive industrial structures -- but
there is a widespread reluctance to invest in the necessary human
capital. Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, for example, all
spend significantly less on education, as a proportion of GDP, than
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico.
That feeds through to a lack of innovation and technological
advances. This reality may seem at odds with the current excitement
over the emergence of various regional internet platforms, which
are often presented as examples of Southeast Asia's advances, but
these are the exceptions rather than the general rule.
Over the last three years, Southeast Asian entities secured just 19,300 patent
grants, not much more than Australia's 17,300 over the same period and significantly
fewer than South Korea's 424,600. Furthermore, much of Southeast Asia's innovation is
concentrated in Singapore and, to a lesser extent, Malaysia. There is little evidence that
the rest of the region, especially Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, have the
innovation capabilities required for longer-term growth.
Case Study: Southeast Asia
These dynamics will also have a more insidious outcome: widening social and income
inequalities. This will not just constrain the region's economic outlook. It also
increases the risk of political instability over time.
Political instability would not be new to Southeast Asia, of course. After all, many
countries across the region, Singapore again being the notable exception, are already
typified by short-term populism, patronage and weak institutions.
The problem, however, is that the region's current economic trajectory is likely to
make its political environments worse. And, as South America has already
demonstrated, political instability is rarely conducive to the longer-term thinking
needed to sustain development.
There are, therefore, important lessons for Southeast Asia from South America's
difficulties, especially as the similarities between the two regions are increasing. The
fundamental question is whether the Southeast Asian countries will address their
industrial structures, widening inequalities and unstable political environments more
successfully than their South American peers
Case Study: Southeast Asia
As of now, the evidence is not promising, especially as certain
trends are becoming more entrenched. In the same way South
America struggled in the shadow of the U.S., Southeast Asia faces
a difficult outlook as China's economic edge. This is already being
reflected in differing economic performances. Indonesia's GDP per
capita, in constant dollar terms, was 87% of China's in 2000 but
just 37% in 2020, while Thailand's fell from 164% to 61% over the
same period.
This is not to say that the region will not achieve economic
growth. On current trajectories, though, it will continue to
underperform China and will struggle to achieve the necessary
economic momentum to escape the middle-income trap over the
longer term.
If such a fate is to be avoided, countries across the region need to
learn from South America and take action now.
Case Study: Laos
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rs-toward-default?utm_campaign=IC_asia_daily_free&utm_medium=email&utm
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In June, international ratings agencies raised the ante in a warning that the Laotian economy, already saddled with
fiscal and current-account deficits for years and grappling with a liquidity and solvency crisis, is being fingered for
potential default. It immediately drew parallels with the economic meltdown in Sri Lanka, the South Asian nation
that announced in April that it had run out of dollars to meet its foreign debts this year.
The government's response to public frustration has been as revealing, with leading officials admitting to the crisis
in the $20 billion economy. Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh is among them. During the latest session of Laos'
National Assembly, which convened last week, he revealed in a moment of candor that he was aware of the
criticism on social media.
Finance Minister Bounchorn Oubonpaseth has been equally candid about mounting pressures in the impoverished
country of 7.5 million people. On Monday, he told the members of the National Assembly that the country has
amassed huge debt because of "massive loans borrowed for national development from 2010 and 2016." The
annual foreign debt servicing had grown from $1.2 billion in 2018 to $1.4 billion in 2022, he said. "In 2010, our
external debt-service payments amounted to just $160 million, which could be paid for out of domestic revenue."
Case Study: Laos
Similar openness was evident in May, when senior officials at the Central
Bank of Laos said that only 33% of the country's export earnings had
reentered local banks by the end of April, depriving the country of building
sufficient foreign reserves to pay for imports and service foreign debt. The
main foreign exchange earners are energy sales to neighbors from
hydropower projects, the extraction industry and agriculture products.
Tokyo University professor Toshiro Nishizawa believes this official candor is
being done selectively in the wake of financial challenges that he describes
as "tremendous and worrying." But Nishizawa, who formerly served as a
policy adviser to the Laotian government, said the official warnings are
"formulaic, preset and generalized." He is not expecting an immediate
disclosure of key economic and financial indicators, "due partly to political
sensitivities and capacity constraints.“
Analysts say the economic crisis threatening to rattle the entrenched communist order comes in the wake of
back-to-back external crises: COVID-19 in 2020, which drained foreign earnings from a lucrative tourism
sector; the Russia-Ukraine war, which has increased oil prices; and the increase in U.S. interest rates, which
is weakening local currencies against the dollar to make imports pricier.
This week's firing of Bank of Lao Gov. Sonexay Sitphaxay hints at the panic that has set in. He has been
replaced by Bonleua Sinxayvoravong, the former deputy finance minister.
But signs of an economic downturn had already been evident. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund
and other international agencies had warned Laos before the pandemic that it was headed toward an
external debt crisis because of depleted foreign reserves.
Case Study: Laos
"A large current-account deficit, low level of reserves, a high level of debt,
managed exchange rate, and a dollarized banking system amplify macro-
vulnerabilities," the IMF noted in August 2019 following its Article IV
consultation of the Laotian economy.
According to the World Bank, by the end of 2021 the country's public debt
had skyrocketed to 88% of gross domestic product, with foreign debt at an
estimated $14.5 billion. The country's list of foreign lenders included Chinese
creditors, who accounted for a 47% share, reflecting Laos' close ties with
China, which in the past decade has become Laos' largest lender, investor
and trading partner. In addition, Laos owes 11% of its debt to China from
bilateral loans.
The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank account for a combined
17%, international sovereign bonds 17%, and non-concessional loans 8%.
Some of the bonds are in Thai baht -- after Laos tapped the Thai capital
market in 2013 -- and in U.S. dollars.
Case Study Of Magnolia
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semiconductor-subsidies?
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Accessed on 29 April 2023
"We will strengthen our domestic manufacturing base and strive for a
carbon-neutral society," said Osamu Murao, GS Yuasa's president and CEO.
Seven other Japanese companies involved in battery materials are set to
receive subsidies. These include Panasonic's automotive battery unit,
Panasonic Energy.
Other candidates include Kureha -- which develops and produces binders,
an essential part of lithium-ion batteries -- and Asahi Kasei, a producer of
separators, which isolate anodes and cathodes.
Japan's second supplementary budget for fiscal 2022 allocated over 1
trillion yen to bolster production and expand stockpiles in 11 areas
designated as strategically critical products. Around 331.6 billion yen was
allocated for storage batteries and 368.6 billion yen for semiconductors.
In the new round of subsidies, the industry ministry doled out up
to 184.6 billion yen for storage batteries and up to 56.4 billion yen
for semiconductors from the budget .
Japan: Industrial policy
McKinsy Global Institute, “Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life,
business, and the global economy’”, May 2013, available at
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Hausmann R., Rodrik D., Velasco A. (2005). “Growth Diagnostics”. Retrived from
http://www6.iadb.org/WMSFiles/products/research/files/pubS-852.pdf .
Romer, P. M. “Which Parts Of Globalization Matter For Catch-Up Growth?” , National Bureau
of Economic Research Working Paper 15755, February 2010, available at:
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Sealy W. “Additive Manufacturing As a Disruptive Technology: How to Avoid the Pitfall”, US,
American Journal of Engineering and Technology Research, Vol 12, 2012.