C1: Legitimacy

Atrocities are worse than ever in the squo

O'Donohue 18 [Jonathan O'Donohue, "The ICC must become a champion of justice
over abuse of power", 02/23/2018,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/the-icc-must-become-a-champion-of-ju
stice-over-abuse-of-power/]

The Statute adopted in Rome would not see the light of day if the negotiations took
place now. Armed conflicts are as prevalent as ever, with civilians continuing to
experience the brunt of the violence. “Wars” on terror and drugs, as well as repression
and exploitation by state and non-state actors, including corporations, have escalated in
almost all corners of the globe. Extremist politics advocating religious and racial hatred,
misogyny and persecution of marginalized groups have gained traction in a disturbing
number of states. Abuse of power has been exposed almost everywhere that power
exists. In this context, the system of international justice developed in Rome should
stand as a beacon of hope for accountability – the ICC [is] a powerful mechanism to
hold abuse of power in check.

The ICC faces existential threats in the squo

Joseph 24 [James Joseph, "International Criminal Court faces critical challenges at
annual meeting in The Hague", 12/02/2024, - JURIST - News,
https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/12/international-criminal-court-faces-critical-challenges
-at-annual-meeting-in-the-hague/]
President Tomoko Akane delivered a stirring address to mark the opening ceremony,
framing the current moment as a “turning point in history.” She warned about “existential
threats of sanctions” that could lead to the collapse of ongoing investigations and leave
victims without recourse to justice. The implications of this collapse, according to Akane,
would extend beyond the ICC, marking a serious setback for the rule of law globally and
jeopardizing the fight against impunity for international crimes. Akane’s remarks have
resonated strongly among member states and civil society organizations, emphasizing
the importance of unwavering support for the ICC’s mandate in upholding justice for
victims of atrocities. “The ICC’s fall will be the fall of the Rule of Law,” she stated
emphatically, calling on all member states to stand united in protecting this critical
institution. The ICC’s chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, reported a significant increase in
evidence gathered by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), stating that the amount of
evidence collected since 2021 is double what had been accumulated in the previous
two decades. This surge is indicative of the ICC’s commitment to addressing
international crimes, yet the lingering issue of outstanding arrest warrants remains a
pressing concern. Of the 30 outstanding warrants, 18 were issued in recent years, with
arrest warrants for officials in Russia, Myanmar, Israel, and Hamas officials emphasizing
the ICC’s ongoing struggle to enforce its mandates effectively. Khan highlighted a
remarkable 150 percent increase in Article 15 communications—reports from third
parties about potential crimes—received over the past year, underscoring both the
growing demand for justice and the court’s heightened activity. However, the prosecutor
cautioned that the issuance of warrants alone is insufficient. The persistent backlog of
warrants shows the ICC’s challenges in operationalizing its authority in politically volatile
contexts. Notably, a segment of the assembly has voiced discontent regarding the
court’s decisions, particularly concerning the Israeli officials’ warrants. Akane
emphasized the integrity of judicial processes, stating, “We find it appalling when certain
states are scandalized when independent judges issue decisions in accordance with
evidence and the law.” This statement reflects the broader tensions between national
interests and international legal obligations, particularly concerning state sovereignty
and accountability for war crimes. Additionally, the shadow of the sexual harassment
allegations against the ICC’s chief prosecutor introduces further complications into the
court’s already precarious position. As discussions at the ASP evolve, the ICC will need
to address these internal issues to maintain credibility and trust in its operations. The
message from ICC officials at the opening of the 23rd session of the Assembly of State
parties is clear: It is now up to member states to take on the crucial role of safeguarding
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and preserving the integrity of the system as a
whole, lest the entire framework crumble. This comes as The United Nations reports
2024 as the deadliest year on record for humanitarians, with conflicts raging across the
world including in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Ukraine, Myanmar, Ethiopia, and
Sudan to name a few.

ICC struggles to function efficiently in the squo

Riera Li 20 [Marina Riera, "Q&A: The International Criminal Court and the United
States", 09/02/2020,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/02/qa-international-criminal-court-and-united-states]

The court also faces steep challenges in carrying out its mandate. Without a police
force, it relies on states for cooperation in arrests, and that cooperation has been
inadequate. Arrest warrants remain outstanding against 14 individuals. ICC member
states have also held back on necessary budget increases even as the court’s workload
has grown. The court certainly needs to continue to learn lessons, correct mistakes, and
improve its work. But an effective ICC backed by the strong support of the international
community is needed more than ever to send the message that impunity for mass
atrocities will not be tolerated.

All is not lost, however - the ICC is still in the game

Goodman 20 [Goodman, "International Law and Human Rights", 2020, University of
Pennsylvania, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4228603]

Gegout discusses the problems of the ICC but also its inherent potential72. For many
states, it is perceived that Court lacks credibility73. However, the ICC has a lot of
potential and can be a legitimate force in the international order. She argues that the
ICC depends on the support it receives from states and on the way it is perceived by the
world74 . In other words, it is influenced by state perceptions and biases, as well as
state support and cooperation75. I think that these two areas have potentially the
largest impact on the ICC. Gegout does a qualitative analysis of the ICC and its
cases76. While her research is limited, it raised important points that were confirmed in
my own research. The ICC is directly impacted by state biases and cooperation, as if
states do not comply or have a negative view of the ICC, it is less likely that the ICC will
be successful in achieving the Confirmation of Charges Hearing

US key to legitimacy
Columbia Review 21 [Columbia Review, "The Promises and Problems of the
International Criminal Court", 1/9/21, Columbia Undergraduate Law Review,
https://www.culawreview.org/roundtable-1/roundtable-discussion-the-promises-and-prob
lems-of-the-international-criminal-court]

Bolstering both the ICC's legitimacy and efficacy also necessitates that the United
States, China, and Russia officially become signatories to the Rome Statute. As
permanent members of the UNSC, these three states have the power to veto any of its
resolutions. Because these countries have not signed the Rome Statute themselves,
however, their own citizens are largely insulated from the jurisdiction of the ICC. If these
countries subject themselves to the same scrutiny that they themselves place upon
other nations, some African leaders may retract, or at least soften their accusations that
their states are unfairly pursued by the Court. In the long run, such a boost in the ICC’s
legitimacy may help keep states from threatening to leave the Court altogether. [7]
Some have concerns that even as members of the ICC, the United States, China, and
Russia could still block cases involving their own citizens in an effort to shield
themselves from prosecution. The ICC’s referral system, however, accounts for the
requests of other member states and, with proper evidence, referrals from the Office of
the Prosecutor itself, which in turn would mitigate such conflicts of interest. [8] In other
words, numerous methods exist to refer cases to the ICC over which the United States,
China, and Russia would not have control. This ensures that those countries cannot
escape ICC investigations and prosecution of their citizens. Pressuring the United
States, China, and Russia to assume official membership would not only uphold the
legitimacy of the ICC but also give it greater jurisdiction to prosecute more human rights
violations.

Ratification shows the US taking initiative and dedication to human rights law, bolstering
international law legitimacy
Norton 16 [Hugo Norton, Africa Policy Analyst and Advisor at an economic consultancy
firm, 7-19-2016, "It's Time for America to Join the ICC", Fair Observer,
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/its-time-america-join-icc-00164/#]/K
ankee
Nevertheless, there are means to address these issues in a meaningful way. In order to
dispel fears of an “African bias,” the ICC chief prosecutor, Gambian lawyer Fatou
Bensouda, has sought to broaden the court’s scope by exploring alleged crimes in
Palestine, opening an initial inquiry in Ukraine and requesting the ICC to commence a
formal investigation into the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, while investigations relating to
Afghanistan, Colombia and Iraq are ongoing. Truly reforming the ICC, however, will only
be achieved once the US joins its ranks. From the outset, Washington’s refusal to ratify
the Rome Statute sabotaged the ICC’s legitimacy and reach, condemning the court to
run on one engine. While President Bill Clinton signed the statute in 2000, in 2002 the
Bush administration “unsigned” it out of fear that US nationals, particularly military
personnel, could be put on trial before the ICC. At a time when the war in Afghanistan
was raging and the Pentagon was drawing up plans to oust Saddam Hussein from Iraq,
the administration’s fears were fully warranted. Next, the administration went one step
further and signed into law the American Service-Members’ Protection Act (ASPA),
which explicitly protects US military personnel and government officials of any rank
“against criminal prosecution by an international criminal court to which the United
States is not party.” Numerous technicalities have also been invoked for the US’
defiance, such as Article 1, Section 8 and Article 3, Section 1 of the Constitution
regarding the establishment of courts. Both sections can be interpreted as an explicit
ban on international legal jurisdictions. Naturally, the US could resort to other legal
instruments to arrest individuals such as Bashir. Washington could call for a UNSC
resolution obligating all member states of the United Nation (UN) to arrest Bashir and
submit him to the ICC’s jurisdiction; or invoke the 1948 UN Genocide Convention, which
obligates member states to prosecute perpetrators of genocide, as well as the
Nuremberg Charter which established that heads of states indicted by international
courts no longer enjoy immunity. America’s role as self-proclaimed primary supporter of
human rights makes it essentially unavoidable for the US to join the ICC. If the US
insists on leading, then joining the ICC would show that it is serious in doing so. This
move would represent the strengthening of the institution as well as of human rights in
general. Thus, the US should at least embark on a course of legal convergence with the
Rome Statute’s provisions by removing obstacles in domestic law and paving the way
for full ratification

The US would contribute needed funding to the ICC

Wiebelhaus-Brahm 23 [Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm, "The evolution of funding for the
International Criminal Court: Budgets, donors and gender justice", 01/31/2023,
Routledge,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14754835.2022.2156276#d1e257]

However, assessed contributions for the Court are calculated in the same way as for the
United Nations. Per Article 117 of the Rome Statute, “contributions of States Parties
shall be assessed in accordance with an agreed scale of assessment, based on the
scale adopted by the United Nations for its regular budget and adjusted in accordance
with the principles on which that scale is based.” In other words, states are assigned a
proportion of the overall budget that is essentially based on the size of their economies.
As such, our data available on the Harvard Dataverse site show that the ICC’s largest
funders are large European economies, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Brazil.

Spillover effect
Drake 19 [Michael Drake, "They Hate U.S. for Our War Crimes: An Argument for U.S.
Ratification of the Rome Statute in Light of the Post-Human", 2019, UIC Law,
https://repository.law.uic.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2806&context=lawreview]

Second, it shows that U.S. leaders who oppose ratification do so in the interest of
self-preservation. Therefore, U.S. ratification would be a gesture of good faith that
would, ideally, lead other nonmember states to ratify the Rome Statute

Affirming solves for millions of global abuses currently and prevents future atrocities
through deterrence
UN 24 [UN, "Global Trends", 6/25/24, UNHCR US,
https://www.unhcr.org/us/global-trends#:~:text=At%20the%20end%20of%202023,seriou
sly%20disturbing%20the%20public%20order.]

At the end of 2023, an estimated 117.3 million people worldwide were forcibly displaced
due to persecution, conflict, violence, human rights violations and events seriously
disturbing the public order.
Ratifying deters future atrocities
Romero Philips 16 [Christen Romero Philips, "The International Criminal Court &
Deterrence", 6/2016, Stanford Law School: Law & Policy Lab,
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Philips-The-International-Criminal-
Court-and-Deterrence-A-Report-to-the-U.S.-Department-of-State.pdf]

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the emerging empirical
evidence; while this research does not support an “all-or-nothing” deterrent effect by the
ICC in all situations, it does give support[s] to a conditional deterrence theory that is
affected by the type of actor, the type of conflict, and the type of intervention. First,
ratification of the ICC alone exerts a deterrent effect on both government actors and
secessionist rebels. Second, an increase in ICC involvement in a situation country,
including a signal[s] that it is willing to prosecute, can have a greater deterrent effect
even on rebel groups that are otherwise hard to deter, but may be sensitive to local
conditions and politics. Third, the ICC has a positive impact on domestic governments
and practices, especially regarding vulnerable governments that use ratification of the
ICC as a way to self-bind. Last, the peace versus justice argument against the ICC is
likely a false dichotomy, and is not supported empirically in the context of Latin America

82% success rate in decreasing human rights abuses

Romero Philips 16 [Christen Romero Philips, "The International Criminal Court &
Deterrence", 6/2016, Stanford Law School: Law & Policy Lab,
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Philips-The-International-Criminal-
Court-and-Deterrence-A-Report-to-the-U.S.-Department-of-State.pdf]

They attribute this finding to something they call “credible commitment theory,” which
explains why governments with such low accountability voluntarily chose to subject
themselves to ICC jurisdiction.19 This theory posits that ratification of the ICC can be
used as a form of self-binding by states that are most vulnerable to ICC prosecution and
least able to commit credibly to domestic alternatives, by essentially tying their hands as
they work toward conflict resolution.20 Furthermore, even in countries that are able to
commit credibly to domestic alternatives, there is evidence that avoiding ICC jurisdiction
by conducting domestic prosecutions has positive effects on human rights practices. For
example, research by Sikkink and Walling in 2007 found that “in 14 of the 17 cases of
Latin American countries that have chosen trials, human rights seem to have
improved.”21 In response to critics of trials who argue that judicial processes
exacerbate conflict (discussed more fully below), Sikkink and Walling conclude that
“there is not a single transitional trial case in Latin America where it can be reasonably
argued that the decision to undertake trials extended or exacerbated conflict.”22
Although the ICC did not intervene in any of these cases, the act of conducting
domestic prosecutions, consistent with the ICC’s complementarity provision, had a
positive effect on human rights practices throughout the region.
C2: Intervention

The US is out of control.

To 23 [Continuing To, "U.S. Foreign Policy Increasingly Relies on Military Interventions",
10/16/2023, Tufts Now,
https://now.tufts.edu/2023/10/16/us-foreign-policy-increasingly-relies-military-interventio
ns]

According to the project’s data, the U.S. has been involved in 393 military interventions
in other nations since 1776. More than 200 of those have been since 1945, and 114 in
the post-Cold War era (after 1989). Just since the year 2000, the project documents 72
interventions. And in one region of the world, the Middle East and North Africa, the U.S.
has been involved in 77 military interventions, mostly since the 1940s. Intervention
means more than boots on the ground. The project uses the term military intervention to
refer to both the threat of use of force and the actual deployment of troops and materiel
into another country. “More often than not we display the use of force,” Toft says. That
might involve sending a U.S. carrier group to the Mediterranean or the Caribbean, for
example. “Actually using force, interstate wars, are quite rare,” according to the
analysis, Toft says, although “some academics might say we are under counting, given
the way the United States doesn’t officially declare war often.” Over the entire span of
U.S. history, the display of force has been more common than the use of force.
However, in more recent years, the use of force has become more common than the
display, Toft says. The stakes are changing—and so are the odds. Toft also argues that
the U.S. is engaging in military actions that are not as central to its national interest, with
lower odds of winning, than it did before. Since the start of the twentieth century, the
strongest nations in the world—known as major and great powers—have been fighting
harder and winning less often, she says. “In the nineteenth century, they had a 9 in 10
chance of prevailing. And then by 1950, it's 50/50.” Pointing to U.S. involvements in
Vietnam and Afghahanistan, neither of which ended in victory, she says, “It's much more
difficult today.” That’s another argument for reconsidering the increased reliance on
military intervention.

They have blood on their hands

University 23 [Brown University, "Civilians Killed & Wounded", 10/07/2023, Watson
Institute for International & Public Affairs - Brown University,
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20po
st%2D9%2F11,died%20directly%20from%20war%20violence.]

The U.S. post-9/11 wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen, and Somalia
have taken a tremendous human toll. The total death toll in these war zones, including
direct and indirect deaths, is at least 4.5-4.7 million and counting. Of these, an
estimated 408,000 civilians died directly from war violence. Precise mortality figures
remain unknown.

Affirming is the only way to prevent these deaths

Ruys 18 (Tom, Professor of International Law, Ghent Rolin-Jaequemyns International
Law Institute, Ghent University, Belgium. “Criminalizing Aggression: How the Future of
the Law on the Use of Force Rests in the Hands of the ICC” European Journal of
International Law, Volume 29, Issue 3, August 2018, Pages 887–917, November 9,
2018) // RKE
It is clear that the expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction to crimes of aggression, as defined
in Article 8bis of the Rome Statute,6 is inspired by the determination ‘to put an end to
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of
such crimes’.7 In other words, it is inspired in part by the idea that the prospect of ICC
prosecution will serve as a deterrent vis-à-vis (some) potential aggressors and make
them think twice before embarking upon military adventures abroad. At the same time,
several scholars have warned that there is a downside to all of this, in that the risk of
prosecution by the ICC could actually deter political and military leaders from launching
military interventions serving a legitimate goal and promoting community interests. In
particular, a number of scholars have argued that it may produce a ‘chilling effect’
vis-à-vis (unilateral but) ‘genuinely humanitarian’ interventions and could lead states to
stand aside and allow horror to unfold.8 Thus, in the run-up to the Kampala Review
Conference, several scholars insisted that states parties to the Rome Statute ought to
agree on an exception for those engaged in bone fide unilateral humanitarian
interventions.9
During the conference, the USA effectively put forward a draft ‘understanding’ that held
that ‘an act cannot be considered to be a manifest violation of the [UN] Charter unless it
would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance
with normal practice and in good faith, and thus an act undertaken in connection with an
effort to prevent the commission of any of the crimes contained in Articles 6, 7 or 8 of
the Statute would not constitute an act of aggression’.10 The proposal failed to garner
sufficient support. In the wake of the conference, several scholars have continued to call
for additional guarantees that leaders will not be prosecuted for launching (genuine)
humanitarian interventions, occasionally insisting – in vain – that further negotiations
ought to be held on the matter prior to the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction.11 One
suggestion that has surfaced in scholarly debate, and which remains relevant, is the
possibility for states to declare a partial ‘opt-out’ from the ICC’s jurisdiction under Article
15bis(4) of the Rome Statute with regard to humanitarian interventions.12
As a preliminary remark, it is probably safe to say that the risk of being found
responsible for a breach of the prohibition on the use of force by an international court
or tribunal has not played a determining role in state decisions pertaining to military
operations abroad. Thus, it is doubtful that in the run-up to Operation Allied Force in
1999 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were heavily
preoccupied with the prospect that Serbia might hire the late Ian Brownlie and institute
proceedings in The Hague. This is related to the fact that there have been few
proceedings in which states were found responsible for breaches of the jus contra
bellum and to the consensual nature of interstate judicial dispute settlement.13 In all,
the ‘legal exposure’ at the state level is probably less of a factor inducing compliance
than other elements, such as the concern with world public opinion and the desire to be
perceived as a rule-abiding member of the international community, the likelihood of
sanctions or the risk of a downturn in diplomatic relations with other states.
Of course, state responsibility is one thing, individual criminal responsibility is quite
another. In particular, fears of being individually held liable for the crime of aggression
may weigh more heavily in the hearts and minds of leading government figures than the
mere prospect of state responsibility.14 There has so far been limited research into the
deterrent impact of the ICC.15 As for the crime of aggression, it is all the more difficult to
foretell what its deterrent impact will be. It would certainly be interesting to conduct a
survey with legal advisers at the national level to inquire about the (potential) deterrent
effect of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute. In the meantime, it appears at least plausible
that, following the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC will occasionally be
dealing with allegations of aggression. At the same time, notwithstanding the theoretical
possibility of a United Nations (UN) Security Council referral,16 the deterrent impact of
the ICC17 remains a priori limited to nationals of states that have ratified the Kampala
Amendments.18 It is no secret that some countries with a historical record of military
intervention abroad are unlikely to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression or have no intention of ratifying the Rome Statute in the first place.

Deecreasing intervention encourages the US to look inward.

The US is in disarray, as drone strikes are eminent with Trump’s second term
Khan 24, Aysha Khan, 11-15-2024, [Aysha Khan is the deputy managing editor at
Analyst News. Her reporting has been published in dozens of news outlets including the
Washington Post, the Associated Press, the Boston Globe and Religion News Service,
where she was formerly a staff reporter. She’s now the managing editor at the nonprofit
news outlet Next City. Aysha holds degrees from the University of Maryland and
Harvard Divinity School, and has been a fellow with organizations including the
Solutions Journalism Network, International Center for Journalists and GroundTruth
Project], "There will be no peace in the Middle East under Trump, either", Analyst News,
https://www.analystnews.org/posts/trump-no-wars-peace-middle-east-palestine-yemen-
saudi-drones//
. Yet in just the first two years of Trump’s previous presidency, he launched 2,243 drone
strikes. That’s compared with 1,878 during Obama’s entire eight years in office. Trump’s
first presidency saw far more drone strikes and even less transparency than Obama’s
notoriously drone-happy administration

Strikes are worse than they seem, encouraging attacks and recruitment
IL: 19% of ALL terrorist attacks are directly caused by unrestricted US drone strikes
Jetter 22, Michael Jetter, 10-7-2022, [Michael works at the University of Western
Australia in Perth. Being originally from Germany, he received both his B.A. (2007) and
his Ph.D. (2011) in Economics from the University of Memphis (USA). From 2011 to
2015, he worked at the Universidad EAFIT in Medellin, Colombia, first as an Assistant
Professor and then as a Full Professor], "Gone with the wind: The consequences of US
drone strikes in Pakistan", OUP Academic,
https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/133/650/787/6751902?redirectedFrom=fullt
ext//mattli Employing day-to-day wind conditions as an identification strategy, we
explore the consequences of the 420 US drone strikes in Pakistan between 2006 and
2016. Results suggest that drone strikes encourage terrorism over the upcoming days
and weeks, causing up to 19% of all terror attacks with more than 3,000 terror deaths in
Pakistan during that period. Studying a leading Pakistani newspaper, we identify a
polarised response to drone strikes as negative emotions and anger, but also positive
emotions, in drone-related articles increase. Finally, anti-US protests and online
searches exhibiting radical Islamist concepts increase as a consequence of drone
strikes.

Do i need another card here (come back to this)

Eradicating terrorism is key to preventing a conondrum of deaths
Berger 23 [Miriam Berger (Berger is a staff writer with The Washington Post's foreign
news desk in Washington, D.C. She was previously based in Jerusalem and Cairo and
has freelance reported around the Middle East, as well as parts of Africa and Central
Asia. She has a master's degree in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from Oxford
University and is a former Fulbright research fellow in Egypt.), 5-15-2023, "Post-9/11
wars have contributed to some 4.5 million deaths, report suggests", The Washington
Post, https://archive.is/L7IYN] //viv The full death toll of violence in theU.S.-led invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq, let alone of the broader globalwar on terrorism, remains difficult
to determine. But it has long been surpassed by an even larger and more opaque
figure: the indirect count of people who have died as a result of post-9/11 conflicts’
far-reaching ripple effects, such as ensuing waves of violence, hunger, the devastation
of public services and the spread of disease. Brown University researchers, in a report
released Monday, draw on U.N. data and expert analyses to attempt to calculate the
minimum number of excess deaths attributable to the war on terrorism, across conflicts
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen — impacts “so vast and
complex that” ultimately, “they are unquantifiable,” the researchers acknowledge. The
accounting, so far as it can be measured, puts the toll at 4.5 million to 4.6 million — a
figure that continues to mount as the effects of conflict reverberate. Of those fatalities,
the report estimates, some 3.6 million to 3.7 million were “‘indirect deaths” caused by
the deterioration of economic, environmental, psychological and health conditions. More
than 7,000 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with more than 8,000
contractors, according to Brown’s Costs of War project. And U.S. forces have suffered
cascading effects of their own, including rates of suicide among veterans outpacing the
general population. But the vast majority of those killed in the fighting were locals: more
than 177,000 uniformed Afghans, Pakistanis and Iraqis and Syrian allies had died as of
2019, according to the Costs of War project, alongside a vast count of opposing
combatants and a disputed civilian toll.
Luckily, Affirming ensures international law violating strikes will be eliminated
Saul 22, Neil Saul, 1-14-2022, [Before joining Eradicate Hate, he worked as the senior
program coordinator for preventing targeted violence at the McCain Institute, where he
worked to grow the Prevention Practitioners Network and other preventing targeted
violence programs.], "The ICC’s Potential to Check US Warmongering", Inkstick,
https://inkstickmedia.com/the-iccs-potential-to-check-us-warmongering/
. The final, and probably most common criticism against the ICC is that it does not have
the ability to enforce its decisions. Like all international bodies, the ICC is constrained
by resources and relies on member-state cooperation. However, a lengthy list of arrests
and convictions isn’t necessarily a measure of success either. Human rights scholars
Geoff Dancy and Kathryn Sikkink have found evidence thatstate parties who sign on to
the Rome Statute are much more likely to adopt atrocity laws into their own domestic
penal codes with the technical assistance of the ICC, resulting in more domestic
prosecutions. Therefore, individual states that are able and willing to conduct their own
trials and hold their own officials accountable is a better indicator of an effective
institution than trials and convictions by the ICC. What’s more, the ICC only prosecutes
those top-level officials most responsible for gross atrocity crimes, not low-level
offenders who carry out orders. Therefore, it isn’t US soldiers who would be at risk of
prosecution, but US administration officials and policymakers. And those who make
decisions and wield power, in fact, are the very persons who most need to be
constrained by law. Furthermore, it would raise the stakes and change the calculations
made by the executive when initiating military conflicts. COMMITTING TO
ACCOUNTABILITY Those who advocate cooperation with the ICC share the same
goals proclaimed by those seeking to constrain US military actions. For instance, the
unfettered use of drone strikes through unilateral executive action, the repeal of both
AUMFs, unilateral military intervention and state building, and the use of torture in
Guantánamo. Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, scholars on each side of the political
spectrum, point out in their book “Means to an End” that cooperation doesn’t entail or
require the use of military action. It encompasses intelligence sharing, logistical and
security assistance for investigators, judicial assistance and capacity-building for foreign
domestic court systems, and more robust domestic laws against gross atrocity crimes,
all of which are tools that serve to reinforce US commitment toward accountability and
to deter the perpetration of such crimes in the future. That, at least, should be lauded by
advocates for military restraint. It is a central tenet of the rule of law that if state officials
engage in atrocious crimes and gross human rights abuses, they should be prosecuted
and held accountable. Impunity to commit these crimes is incompatible with basic
principles of constitutional government and is offensive to every principle of the
American founding. To take seriously commitments to restrain the executive and to
uphold human rights, the US has two choices:Join the ICC or create laws that will hold
its officials and armed services accountable to war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and aggression overseas. The best option, however, is to do both.

Weiner 21 confirms
Weiner 21, Allen Weiner, 5-24-2021, [Allen S. Weiner is Senior Lecturer in Law at
Stanford Law School, where he serves as Director of the Program in International and
Comparative Law], "A Strategic American Commitment to Accountability and the Rule of
Law Includes the International Criminal Court", International Criminal Justice Today,
https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/a-strategic-american-com
mitment-to-accountability-and-the-rule-of-law-includes-the-international-c riminal-court//
In considering what relationship the US government should have with the ICC, it’s worth
engaging in the thought exercise of imagining how events might have turned out
different if the United States had become a party to the Rome Statute of the ICC prior to
the 9/11 attacks. When CIA operators were devising their enhanced interrogation
techniques, and Justice Department lawyers were providing their blessing for those
techniques, would being a party to the Rome Statute have serve[s]d as a check on the
US government’s embrace of acts of torture and cruelty? Would those actors have been
forced to confront the specious nature of some of the legal guidance proffered by the
Office of the Legal Counsel, knowing that the conduct of US officials could be subjected
to review by an international criminal court? This thought experiment highlights that the
US government, instead of seeing the ICC as a threat to US military personnel,should
welcome it as an institution that can strengthen the norm against torture and other
international humanitarian law violations. It is a reminder of how embracing a strategic
commitment to international justice and accountability – and not merely a case-by-case
strategy driven by tactical considerations – would be good not only for America abroad,
but also for America at home
extra

2] Second - Deterring Chinese revisionism. Vindman 21 argues- Signatories see the US absence
as hypocrisy. If the ICC is ignored, preventing illegal warfare fails, and aggressors take note. Assil
21 furthers nations will take seriously the threats of the ICC. By nonparticipation, the US loses a
valuable deterrent and sets a dangerous precedent for nations seeking hedge support with
China. Indeed, China would be responsive to ICC criticism of its actions as Zhu 20 furthers -
even more so modern the risk to China has come to realize the importance of global governance
institutions, especially regarding the ICC’s jurisdiction. The risk the ICC poses may be higher
than originally anticipated, and it would trigger China’s sensitivities about exposing itself.
Absent this deterrent, tensions in Taiwan can only escalate through war. Allison 22 writes that
Chinese-US tensions through war would escape local conflict as the US would escalate to not
risk losing.

Rebuttal:
Barely read any evidence 90% analytics

IL: 19% of ALL terrorist attacks are directly caused by unrestricted US drone strikes Jetter 22,
Michael Jetter, 10-7-2022, [Michael works at the University of Western Australia in Perth. Being
originally from Germany, he received both his B.A. (2007) and his Ph.D. (2011) in Economics
from the University of Memphis (USA). From 2011 to 2015, he worked at the Universidad EAFIT
in Medellin, Colombia, first as an Assistant Professor and then as a Full Professor], "Gone with
the wind: The consequences of US drone strikes in Pakistan", OUP Academic,
https://academic.oup.com/ej/article-abstract/133/650/787/6751902?redirectedFrom=fulltext//
mattli drone strikes encourage
Employing day-to-day wind conditions as an identification strategy, we explore the consequences of the 420 US drone strikes in Pakistan between 2006 and 2016. Results suggest that

terrorism s, causing up to 19% of all terror attacks

over the upcoming days and week with more than 3,000 terror deaths in Pakistan during that period. Studying a leading Pakistani

anti-US protests and online searches

newspaper, we identify a polarised response to drone strikes as negative emotions and anger, but also positive emotions, in drone-related articles increase. Finally,

exhibiting radical Islamist concepts increase as a consequence of drone strikes.

Do i need another card here (come back to this)

Eradicating terrorism is key to preventing a conondrum of deaths
Berger 23 [Miriam Berger (Berger is a staff writer with The Washington Post's foreign news desk
in Washington, D.C. She was previously based in Jerusalem and Cairo and has freelance
reported around the Middle East, as well as parts of Africa and Central Asia. She has a master's
degree in Modern Middle Eastern Studies from Oxford University and is a former Fulbright
research fellow in Egypt.), 5-15-2023, "Post-9/11 wars have contributed to some 4.5 million
deaths, report suggests", The Washington Post, https://archive.is/L7IYN] //viv The full death toll of violence in theU.S.-led invasions

of Afghanistan and Iraq, let alone of the broader globalwar on terrorism, remains difficult to determine. But it has long been surpassed by an even larger and more opaque figure: the indirect count of people who have died as a result of post-9/11 conflicts’ far-reaching ripple effects, such

. Brown University researchers,

as ensuing waves of violence, hunger, the devastation of public services and the spread of disease in a report released Monday, draw on U.N. data and expert analyses to attempt to

calculate the minimum number of excess death to the war on terrorism

s attributable , across conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and Yemen — impacts “so vast and

at 4.5 million to 4.6 million

complex that” ultimately, “they are unquantifiable,” the researchers acknowledge. The accounting, so far as it can be measured, puts the toll — a figure that continues to mount as the effects of conflict

reverberate. Of those fatalities, the report estimates, some 3.6 million to 3.7 million were “‘indirect deaths” caused by the deterioration of economic, environmental, psychological and health conditions. More than 7,000 U.S. troops were killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with more than
8,000 contractors, according to Brown’s Costs of War project. And U.S. forces have suffered cascading effects of their own, including rates of suicide among veterans outpacing the general population. But the vast majority of those killed in the fighting were locals: more than 177,000
uniformed Afghans, Pakistanis and Iraqis and Syrian allies had died as of 2019, according to the Costs of War project, alongside a vast count of opposing combatants and a disputed civilian toll.

Luckily, Affirming ensures international law violating strikes will be eliminated

Saul 22, Neil Saul, 1-14-2022, [Before joining Eradicate Hate, he worked as the senior program coordinator for preventing targeted violence at
the McCain Institute, where he worked to grow the Prevention Practitioners Network and other preventing targeted violence programs.], "The
ICC’s Potential to Check US Warmongering", Inkstick, https://inkstickmedia.com/the-iccs-potential-to-check-us-warmongering/
. The final, and probably most common criticism against the ICC is that it does not have the ability to enforce its decisions. Like all international
bodies, the ICC is constrained by resources and relies on member-state cooperation. However, a lengthy list of arrests and convictions isn’t
necessarily a measure of success either. Human rights scholars Geoff Dancy and Kathryn Sikkink have
found evidence thatstate
parties who sign on to the Rome Statute are much more likely to adopt atrocity laws into their own
domestic penal codes with the technical assistance of the ICC, resulting in more domestic prosecutions. Therefore,
individual states that are able and willing to conduct their own trials and hold their own officials accountable is a better indicator of an effective
institution than trials and convictions by the ICC. What’s more, the ICC only prosecutes those top-level officials most responsible for gross
atrocity crimes, not low-level offenders who carry out orders. Therefore, it isn’t US soldiers who would be at risk of prosecution, but US
administration officials and policymakers. And those who make decisions and wield power, in fact, are the very persons who most need to be
constrained by law. Furthermore, it would raise the stakes and change the calculations made by the executive when initiating military conflicts.
cooperation with the ICC share the same goals proclaimed by those
COMMITTING TO ACCOUNTABILITY Those who advocate

seeking to constrain US military actions. For instance, the unfettered use of drone strikes through

unilateral executive action, the repeal of both AUMFs, unilateral military intervention and state building, and the use of torture in
Guantánamo. Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, scholars on each side of the political spectrum, point out in their book “Means to an End” that
cooperation doesn’t entail or require the use of military action. It encompasses intelligence sharing, logistical and security assistance for
investigators, judicial assistance and capacity-building for foreign domestic court systems, and more robust domestic laws against gross atrocity
crimes, all of which are tools that serve to reinforce US commitment toward accountability and to deter the perpetration of such crimes in the
future. That, at least, should be lauded by advocates for military restraint. It is a central tenet of the rule of law that if state officials engage in
atrocious crimes and gross human rights abuses, they should be prosecuted and held accountable. Impunity to commit these crimes is
incompatible with basic principles of constitutional government and is offensive to every principle of the American founding. To take seriously
commitments to restrain the executive and to uphold human rights, the US has two choices:Join the ICC or create laws that will hold its officials
and armed services accountable to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression overseas. The best option, however, is to do
both.