FMDS07112
FMDS07112
October 2024
Page 1 of 33
Table of Contents
Page
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Company.
7-112 Lithium-Ion Battery Manufacturing and Storage
Page 2 FM Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets
List of Figures
Fig. 2.4.2.2.1-1. Single-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries ........................... 8
Fig. 2.4.2.2.1-2. Double-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries .......................... 9
Fig. 2.4.5.4. Example of solid-pile and palletized storage arrangement ...................................................... 15
Fig. 2.4.5.6. Multi-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries .................................. 16
Fig. 3.1. Cell manufacturing process ............................................................................................................ 20
Fig. 3.4.1.1. Lithium-ion 18650 cylindrical cells ........................................................................................... 21
Fig. 3.4.1.2. Lithium-ion polymer cells ......................................................................................................... 22
Fig. 3.4.1.3. Lithium-ion power tool packs ................................................................................................... 22
Fig. C.2.1.1. Cylindrical cell form ................................................................................................................. 27
Fig. C.2.1.2. Prismatic cell form .................................................................................................................. 27
Fig. C.2.1.3. Pouch cell form ....................................................................................................................... 27
Fig. C.2.2-A. Module configuration .............................................................................................................. 28
Fig. C.2.2-B. Typical modules within a battery pack for an electric vehicle ................................................. 28
Figure D.1. Example Manufacturing Facility layout ...................................................................................... 30
List of Tables
Table 2.1.3. Manufacturing Hazards and Applicable Data Sheets ................................................................ 5
Table 2.4.3.2. Sprinkler Protection for Low-Piled Storage of Lithium-ion Batteries in Plastic Containers ... 12
Table 2.4.5.1-1. Protection Guidelines for Lithium-Ion Cells/Modules/Batteries in Solid-Piled or
Palletized Storage Arrangements ...................................................................................... 13
Table 2.4.5.1-2. Protection Guidelines for Lithium-Ion Cells/Modules/Batteries in Open-Frame Rack
Storage Arrangements ........................................................................................................ 14
1.0 SCOPE
This property loss prevention data sheet provides loss prevention guidance for liquid electrolyte-based
lithium-ion batteries (cell/module/battery). The guidance covers cell manufacturing, assembly, testing,
finishing, storage, and end use product assembly and storage. This data sheet references other FM Property
Loss Prevention Data Sheets that address various fire and explosion hazards in this occupancy, but which
are not unique to the lithium-ion cell manufacturing process.
This data sheet does not apply to:
• Energy storage systems (see Data Sheet 5-33, Lithium-Ion Battery Energy Storage Systems)
• Battery backup units (see Data Sheet 5-32, Data Centers and Related Facilities)
• Finished products in use where the lithium-ion cells or modules are actively being charged and/or
discharged, including electric vehicles (see Data Sheet 3-26, Fire Protection for Nonstorage
Occupancies, for level 1 and 2 chargers; see Data Sheet 5-33, Lithium-Ion Battery Energy Storage
Systems, for level 3 chargers; since they typically have energy storage systems.)
• Lithium-ion cell recycling
• Manufacturing and storage occupancies that repurpose or provide a second use for lithium-ion cells
• Lithium-metal batteries
1.1 Hazards
Hazards present in the manufacturing of lithium-ion cells are driven by the various manufacturing processes.
The primary hazard is fire, involving combustible materials or ignitable liquids. The manufacturing process
may consist of ignitable liquid mixing and filling, the use of heated rolls and the hydraulics involved to press
materials, cutting and the dust it produces, as well as ovens and solvent recovery. Beyond ignitable liquids,
most of the hazards will be tied to concealed areas with combustibles, the need for environmentally
controlled areas for cell assembly, and the potential to create room or equipment explosion hazards with the
use of ovens and solvent recovery operations.
Once a cell is finished, the fire hazard is then driven by the chemical energy stored in the cell. While some
cell chemistries may have a reduced propensity to enter thermal runaway, they all have an ignitable liquid
electrolyte and can still enter thermal runaway. Therefore, this data sheet does not differentiate fire hazard and
protection guidance based on cell chemistry.
1.1.2 Abuse
Three abuse conditions can potentially lead to thermal runaway or fire in lithium-ion cells: 1) electrical, 2)
thermal and 3) mechanical.
1. Electrical abuse: Cell damage sustained when operating outside the electrical specifications of the cell.
This type of abuse is caused by improper charging or discharging.
2. Thermal abuse: Cell damage sustained due to increased cell temperature outside of normal operating
conditions. This type of abuse can be initiated by electrical abuse or by exposure to high temperatures.
3. Mechanical abuse: Cell damage sustained by physical impact.
Additionally, an internal short circuit (ISC) can occur due to any of these three abuse conditions or from a
manufacturing defect. An ISC can initiate thermal runaway or a fire. It occurs when the separator fails, allowing
contact between the cathode and anode. An external short circuit can occur if the cell/module/battery is
exposed to wet conditions, when it is not designed for that exposure.
1.1.3 Fire
When a cell in thermal runaway begins to vent, the vented flammable gas can ignite due to sparking from
the cell, open flames or exposure to nearby electrical equipment. Collections of cells are frequently
encountered in manufacturing and storage. The cells can be enclosed in a module or pack (e.g., collection
of modules) or can be found individually stored in trays. Where the cells are enclosed in a module or pack,
combustion in one cell will likely spread fire until all charged cells are consumed. To date, no testing shows
that active fire protection can stop this process when the cells are enclosed. Automatic sprinklers can provide
cooling to structures, combustibles and even adjacent modules/packs to help limit the fire spread. A limited
amount of large-scale testing has been conducted; and where adequate cooling can be provided in a timely
manner, spread to adjacent cells/modules/batteries can be prevented.
1.1.4 Reignition
Fires involving lithium-ion batteries are known to reignite. However, a lithium-ion cell cannot reignite. Once
the thermal runaway process has started, a cell will continue to burn until it has been consumed. A fire event
can thermally abuse adjacent cells to the point at which they enter thermal runaway, or to a lesser extent—in
which case they may end up in thermal runaway later. When viewed as an entire system, lithium-ion battery
modules and packs can reignite due to the delayed ignition of some of the cells within. Lithium-ion batteries
involved in or exposed to fires need to be adequately cooled to prevent additional thermal abuse and moved
to a safe location to limit overall exposure.
1.1.5 Explosion
If cells/modules are in thermal runaway, but the vented, hot, flammable gases do not ignite; the gases can
accumulate in a closed module, piece of equipment, cabinet or room. Depending on the amount of time before
ignition occurs, the accumulated gas can deflagrate—resulting in a very fast pressure rise within the
enclosure —and ultimately explode.
1.2 Changes
October 2024. This is the first publication of this document.
2.1 Introduction
Use FM Approved equipment, materials, and services whenever they are applicable. For a list of products
and services that are FM Approved, see the Approval Guide, an online resource of FM Approvals.
2.1.1 Apply principles of inherent safety wherever possible when designing or improving processes. Inherent
safety includes the following general principles:
A. Using smaller amounts of hazardous substances
B. Replacing a hazardous chemical with a non-hazardous or less hazardous one
C. Using less-hazardous process conditions or a less-hazardous form of material
D. Designing a facility to minimize the impact of a release of hazardous material or energy (e.g. by sufficient
spacing or more-resistant construction)
E. Designing a facility so operating errors are less likely, or the process is more forgiving if errors are
made
2.1.2 Implement programs to manage process safety per Data Sheet 7-43, Process Safety. Pay particular
attention to the process hazard analysis/review (PHA) of routine and non-routine operations.
2.1.3 Use Table 2.1.3 to determine the appropriate FM Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets to address
hazards in the manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries, many of which are not unique to this occupancy.
The lithium-ion battery manufacturing process is similar to other manufacturing processes in terms of hazard
evaluation. Each cell type and manufacturer have unique aspects to their manufacturing process. This data
sheet intentionally does not attempt to cover each manufacturing process step in detail from a hazard
evaluation standpoint but provides data sheets to consider for each process step. Section 3.1 and Appendix
D provide more details on each process step.
2.1.4 Treat storage and use of N-Methyl-2 Pyrrolidone (NMP/CAS 872-50-4 /C5H9NO) as a Group 3 water
miscible liquid for concentrations greater than 85% by volume. Treat mixtures less than or equal to 85%
by volume in water as Group 5 water miscible liquids.
2.2.2.1 Where a high potential exists for nonthermal damage (i.e. areas having a large number of finished
cells or clean rooms), subdivide areas with noncombustible walls to limit the exposure.
2.2.3 Install normally closed or automatic-closing, FM Approved fire doors in fire-rated walls.
2.2.4 Seal any penetrations caused by piping, electrical cables, etc. in fire-rated floors and walls with FM
Approved penetration seals.
2.2.5 Design and construct environmentally controlled areas/cleanroom areas in accordance with Data Sheet
1-56, Cleanrooms.
2.2.6 Locate any quality control testing of cells/modules/batteries that involve charging and discharging
operations inside ventilated hoods or enclosures.
2.3 Occupancy
2.3.1 General
2.3.1.1 Establish and implement a housekeeping program to minimize accumulations of dust and other
combustible materials.
The fire protection recommended in this data sheet assumes no major housekeeping deficiencies.
Combustible materials such as dust may increase the fire hazard to the extent that the recommended
protection is ineffective.
2.3.1.2 Provide an appropriate gas detection system inside any ventilated hoods or enclosures to provide
remote notification if cell testing or charging is performed during non-occupied hours. Arrange the system to
send an alarm upon gas detection.
2.3.1.3 Develop a documented procedure for handling damaged or off-specification cells/modules/batteries.
See Section 2.4.6 for protection of damaged or off-specification units.
2.3.1.4 Develop a documented procedure for responding to a thermal runaway event in the formation, aging
or finished cell storage areas.
2.3.2 Ventilation
The goal of this section is to provide guidance to limit the amount of nonthermal damage in the event of a
thermal runaway or fire. Therefore, keep the ventilation system on for testing enclosures or hoods that do not
have their own fire protection and where charging operations occur, and shut it down in manufacturing areas.
2.4 Protection
2.4.1 General
To date, limited publicly-available fire test data exists that confirms the effectiveness of any active fire
protection for lithium-ion batteries. Automatic sprinkler protection is recommended to limit fire spread to the
surrounding structure, equipment and building contents.
2.4.1.1 Protect manufacturing areas in accordance with the appropriate FM Property Loss Prevention Data
Sheet based on the hazards present.
2.4.1.1.1 Protect cell electrode and assembly manufacturing areas with an automatic sprinkler system using
a minimum HC-3 design in accordance with Data Sheet 3-26.
2.4.1.1.2 Protect Formation and Aging areas per Section 2.4.2.
2.4.1.1.3 FM Approved HC-3 water mist systems can be used to protect the occupancy, subject to the
recommendations for their use in Data Sheet 3-26, if all concealed spaces are adequately protected.
2.4.1.2 Install sprinklers throughout the facility in accordance with FM Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet
2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers.
2.4.1.2.1 In addition to automatic sprinklers or FM Approved water-mist at the ceiling, provide automatic
sprinklers or FM Approved water-mist in the following areas:
A. Under any obstructions or mezzanines that exceed 3 ft (0.9 m) in width or diameter or 10 ft2
(0.9 m2) in area
B. Within enclosed equipment (e.g., ovens, hoods or test enclosures) when constructed of combustible
materials or within obstructed areas containing combustibles
C. Within enclosures around production equipment if the ceiling protection is not designed for HC-3
occupancies or if higher-hazard processes take place inside such as electrolyte filling, cell charging/
discharging etc.
2.4.2.1.7 Provide a water supply capable of meeting the sprinkler design flow and hose stream demand for
a minimum of two hours.
2-5 ft.
(0.6-1.5m)
6 ft. (1.8 m)
Maximum
6 ft. (1.8 m)
Maximum
6 ft. (1.8 m)
Maximum
6 ft. (1.8 m)
Maximum
Fig. 2.4.2.2.1-1. Single-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries
4 - 10 ft.
(1.2 - 3 m)
2 - 5 ft.
(0.6 - 1.5 m)
6
18
6
18
6
18
6
18
Fig. 2.4.2.2.1-2. Double-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries
C. At every transverse flue on a maximum horizontal spacing of 5 ft (1.5 m) and a minimum horizontal
spacing of 2 ft (0.6 m).
2.4.2.2.1.2 Locate face sprinklers as follows:
A. Within the rack storage structure
B. No more than 18 in. (450 mm) horizontally from the face of the storage rack
C. At every other transverse flue on a maximum horizontal spacing of 10 ft (3.0 m) and a minimum
horizontal spacing of 4 ft (1.2 m)
2.4.2.2.2 Locate in-rack sprinkler piping behind horizontal rack members to minimize the potential for damage.
2.4.2.2.3 Install in-rack sprinklers at a maximum vertical distance of 6 ft (1.8 m) between each level.
2.4.2.2.4 Install a horizontal barrier above each level of in-rack sprinklers as follows:
A. Construct horizontal barriers of plywood (minimum 3/8 in. [10 mm]) or sheet metal (minimum 22 ga.
[0.7 mm]).
B. Design barriers without gaps in longitudinal flue spaces. A maximum gap of 3 in. (75 mm) between
each barrier is permitted at the rack uprights (transverse flue) for single and double row racks.
2.4.2.2.5 Design the in-rack sprinkler to provide a minimum flow of 60 gpm (227 L/min) out of the hydraulically
most remote six (6) sprinklers (e.g., three face sprinklers and three flue sprinklers in a double-row rack) if
one barrier is provided, or the most remote eight (8) sprinklers (e.g., two face sprinklers and two flue sprinklers
on two levels in a double-row rack) if two or more barrier levels are provided.
2.4.2.2.5.1 Provide a minimum discharge pressure of 10 psi (0.7 bar) for in-rack sprinkler designs where
the in-rack sprinkler has a K-factor greater than or equal to 11.2 (K160).
2.4.2.2.5.2 Provide a minimum discharge pressure of 7 psi (0.5 bar) for in-rack sprinkler designs where the
in-rack sprinkler has a K-factor less than 11.2 (K160).
2.4.2.2.6 Do not include ceiling sprinkler demand in the hydraulic calculations for in-rack sprinklers.
Page 12
7-112
Max Ceiling Quick-Response Standard-Response
Height, K11.2 K14.0 K16.8 K22.4 K25.2 K25.2EC K11.2 K14.0 K19.6 K25.2 K25.2EC
Commodity ft (m) (K160) (K200) (K240) (K320) (K360) (K360EC) (K160) (K200) (K280) (K360) (K360EC)
Wet System, Pendent Sprinklers, 160ºF (70ºC), Number of AS @ psi (bar)
UUP 30 (9) 25 @ 10 @ 10 @ 43(3) 14 @ 14 @ 12 @ 25 @ 25 @ 25 @ 25 @ 25 @
50(3.4) 62(4.3) 24(1.7) 19(1.3) 38(2.6) 50(3.4) 32(2.2) 16(1.1) 10(0.7) 50(3.4)
45 (14) 10 @ 10 @ 43(3) 14 @ 14 @
62(4.3)11 24(1.7) 19(1.3)
60 (18) 10 @ 10 @
50(3.4) 40(2.8)
2.4.3.3 When battery storage exceeds the criteria in Section 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 or the packaging classifies
the storage as an expanded plastic commodity per Data Sheet 8-1, design the fire protection in accordance
with Section 2.4.5 of this data sheet.
2.4.3.4 Provide a hose stream allowance of 500 gpm (1,900 L/min).
2.4.3.5 Provide a water supply capable of meeting the sprinkler design flow and hose stream demand for a
minimum of one hour.
Table 2.4.5.1-1. Protection Guidelines for Lithium-Ion Cells/Modules/Batteries in Solid-Piled or Palletized Storage
Arrangements
Maximum
Lithium-ion
Cell/Module Maximum
State of Ceiling Storage Protection
Charge Height Height Packaging (QR Sprinklers only)
Wood crate, metal encased or corrugated CUP per Data Sheet 8-9
carton with cellulosic and/or unexpanded (Note 1)
plastic internal packaging only
Corrugated carton with expanded plastic CEP per Data Sheet 8-9
40 ft 15 ft
60% internal packaging (Note 1)
(12 m) (4.5 m)
UUP per Data Sheet 8-9
Unexpanded Plastic external packaging
(Note 1)
Unexpanded Plastic external packaging with > UEP per Data Sheet 8-9
40% expanded plastic (by volume) inside (Note 1)
Note 1. Use the Data Sheet 8-9 protection table based upon the storage configuration (solid-pile or palletized) and the protection option
based on the ceiling height.
Table 2.4.5.1-2. Protection Guidelines for Lithium-Ion Cells/Modules/Batteries in Open-Frame Rack Storage Arrangements
Lithium-ion
Cell/Module Maximum Maximum
State of Ceiling Storage Ceiling Protection (QR In-Rack
Charge Height Height Packaging sprinklers only) Protection
≤ 60% 40 ft 15 ft Wood crate, metal CUP per Data Sheet NA
(12 m) (4.5 m) encased or corrugated 8-9 (Note 1)
(Maximum of carton with cellulosic
3 tiers) and/or unexpanded plastic
internal packaging only
Corrugated carton with
CEP per Data Sheet
expanded plastic internal NA
8-9 (Note 1)
packaging
Unexpanded plastic
external packaging with ≤ UUP per Data Sheet
NA
40% expanded plastic (by 8-9 (Note 1)
volume) inside
Unexpanded plastic
external packaging with >
40% expanded plastic (by UEP per Data Sheet
NA
volume) inside; or 8-9 (Note 1)
expanded plastic external
packaging
See Section
Per surrounding 2.4.2.2,
Uncartoned
occupancy 2.4.5.5, and
2.4.5.6.
See Section
Per surrounding 2.4.2.2,
> 40 ft Cartoned or uncartoned
occupancy 2.4.5.5, and
(12 m) 2.4.5.6
NA
See Section
Per surrounding 2.4.2.2,
Cartoned or uncartoned
occupancy 2.4.5.5, and
> 60% NA
2.4.5.6
Note 1. Use the Data Sheet 8-9 protection table based upon the storage configuration (open-frame rack, solid-pile or palletized) and the
protection option based on the ceiling height.
2.4.5.1.1 Use the Data Sheet 8-9 protection table based upon the storage configuration (solid-pile, palletized
or rack) and the protection option based on the ceiling height. Ceiling only as well as combination in-rack
and ceiling designs can be used.
2.4.5.2 Do not allow storage above the batteries for ceiling-only protection options.
2.4.5.3 Provide a minimum of 10 ft (3.0 m) space separation between storage of lithium-ion cells/modules/
batteries and other combustibles.
2.4.5.4 Provide minimum 10 ft (3.0 m) wide aisle spaces within solid-pile and palletized storage such that
the maximum contiguous width of abutted storage does not exceed 15 ft (4.6 m).
15 ft. (4.6 m)
maximum
10 ft. (3.0 m)
minimum
15 ft. (4.6 m)
maximum
10 ft. (3.0 m)
minimum
15 ft. (4.6 m)
maximum
2.4.5.5 Protect open-frame single and double-row rack storage of cells/modules/batteries that require in-rack
sprinkler protection per Table 2.4.5.1-2 using Section 2.4.2.2 with the following changes:
A. Install in-rack sprinklers at a maximum vertical distance of 12 ft (3.7 m) between each level.
2.4.5.6 Protect multi-row rack storage of cells/modules/batteries that require in-rack sprinkler protection per
Table 2.4.5.1-2 using Section 2.4.2.2 with the following changes and Figure 2.4.5.6.
A. Install in-rack sprinklers at a maximum vertical distance of 12 ft (3.7 m) between each level.
B. Provide vertical barriers constructed of plywood (minimum 3/8 in. [10 mm]) or sheet metal (minimum
22 ga. [0.7 mm]) at vertical uprights, approximately 20 ft (6.1 m) apart, to limit horizontal fire spread.
2 - 5 ft.
(0.6 - 1.5 m)
LQ PP
Fig. 2.4.5.6. Multi-row rack in-rack sprinkler layout for li-ion cells/modules/batteries
2.4.5.7 Provide a hose stream demand and water supply duration in accordance with Data Sheet 8-9 for
all ceiling only designs not using in-rack sprinkler protection per Section 2.4.2.2.
2.4.5.8 Provide a hose stream demand and water supply duration in accordance with Section 2.4.2.2.6 and
2.4.2.2.7 for all designs using in-rack sprinkler protection per Section 2.4.2.2.
2.7 Training
2.7.1 Create a training program for all employees (including operators, emergency response team members
and security personnel) who work in or have access to production, testing or storage areas.
2.7.1.1 Design and supervise the training program to address the complexity of process operations and the
hazard level present at a facility.
2.7.1.2 Provide training for all new employees, as well as refresher programs, as needed, for current
employees.
2.7.1.3 At a minimum, include the following topics in the program:
A. The fire hazards created by the materials in use i.e. ignitable liquids (NMP), plastics etc.
B. The increased fire hazards of finished cells/modules/batteries with stored electrical energy
C. The proper operation and shutdown of the equipment under normal and emergency conditions. Print
and post critical procedures for convenient reference.
D. Proper material handling procedures
E. Ignitable liquid piping system operation and shutdown, including the location of all local and remote
shutoff valves
F. Proper ignitable liquid transfer procedures
G. The operation and function of fixed extinguishing systems
2.7.2 Implement operator training programs per Data Sheet 10-8, Operators.
ELECTRODE MANUFACTURING
CELL ASSEMBLY
Electrolyte Stacking
Enclosing Filling Welding or Winding Separation
CELL FINISHING
++ -- ++ --
Formation
Formation Aging
Aging Testing
Packaging Packaging
Storage Storage
Testing
During the manufacturing process, the introduction of raw materials and the manufacturing processes
themselves create the actual hazards, which include ignitable liquid hazards (due to the electrolyte, typically
a low-flashpoint ignitable liquid) as well as process and ignition source hazards. Heaters are present during
the drying stages and potentially during calendering, which could also provide an ignition source for the
ignitable components. An overview of the manufacturing process hazards and applicable FM Property Loss
Prevention Data Sheets is provided in Table 2.1.3.
cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) with more being introduced through innovation and new technologies. While
some chemistries may have a reduced propensity to enter thermal runaway, they all have an ignitable liquid
electrolyte and possess the ability to trigger thermal runaway. Therefore, regardless of the chemistry,
lithium-ion cells are a fire hazard; and the protection guidance provided in this data sheet does not differentiate
based on cell chemistry.
60% are generally intended for immediate use rather than indefinite storage. The higher the state of charge,
the more reactive a battery is in a fire scenario. At a minimum, the fire severity and duration could be
increased. The impact of SOC also varies for different cell chemistries and can even vary for different cells
of the same chemistry.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM
Data Sheet 1-56, Cleanrooms
Data Sheet 2-0, Installation Guidelines for Automatic Sprinklers
Data Sheet 3-26, Fire Protection for Nonstorage Occupancies
Data Sheet 5-1, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous (Classified) Locations
Data Sheet 5-8, Static Electricity
Data Sheet 5-20, Electrical Testing
Data Sheet 5-32, Data Centers and Related Facilities
Data Sheet 5-33, Lithium-Ion Battery Energy Storage Systems
Data Sheet 6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers
Data Sheet 7-2, Waste Solvent Recovery
Data Sheet 7-9, Dip Tanks, Flow Coaters and Roll Coaters
Data Sheet 7-11, Conveyors
Data Sheet 7-14, Fire Protection for Chemical Plants
Data Sheet 7-29, Ignitable Liquid Storage in Portable Containers
Data Sheet 7-32, Ignitable Liquid Operations
Data Sheet 7-43, Process Safety
Data Sheet 7-45, Safety Controls, Alarms, and Interlocks (SCAI)
Data Sheet 7-46, Chemical Reactors and Reactions
4.2 Other
California Fire Code (CFC). 2022. Section 322
International Fire Code (IFC). 2024. Section 321
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). NFPA 855, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Energy
Storage Systems.
Siemens AG; TUV SUD Industrie Service GmbH. 2021. Principles for Risk-Based Fire Protection Strategies
for Lithium-ion Battery Cell Production.
PEM of RWTH Aachen; VDMA. 2018. Lithium-ion Battery Cell Production Process.
EPRI. The Difference Between Thermal Runaway and Ignition of a Lithium Ion Battery. December 2022.
Cut-off Room: A space within a building, which is intended for a specific storage purpose and has physical
walls separating it from other areas in a building.
Electric vehicle battery: Any size energy storage system mounted or to be mounted onto mobile equipment
or consumer vehicles.
Electrolyte: The medium that provides the ion transportation mechanism between the cathode and anode
of a cell. The electrolyte in lithium-ion cells is an ignitable liquid.
Energy storage system (ESS): Any system through which electrical energy can be stored and reused when
needed. An electrochemical device that collects energy from the grid or from a power plant and then
discharges that energy at a later time to provide electricity or other grid services when needed.
Finished product: A consumer item that has completed the manufacturing process and is ready to be sold
to the end user.
Fire wall: A wall assembly that is designed to contain an uncontrolled fire to the side of fire origin.
Horizontal barriers: A solid barrier installed on a horizontal plane within a rack, beneath which in-rack
sprinklers are installed. Their purpose is to impede vertical fire spread by blocking off normally open flue
spaces, while also helping to achieve prompt in-rack sprinkler operation by banking heat down to the in-rack
sprinklers that must be installed under each barrier.
Incidental storage: Solid-pile, palletized, rack, shelf, or bin-box storage that is normal for an occupancy
(e.g., small amounts of packaging, raw materials, or the products being made). This is likely to be at the start
or end of a production line.
In-rack sprinklers: Sprinklers that are installed within the footprint of a storage rack to provide fire control
(balanced with the ceiling sprinkler system) or fire suppression (not balanced with the ceiling sprinkler system).
LCO: Lithium cobalt oxide battery chemistry.
LFP: Lithium iron phosphate battery chemistry.
LMO: Lithium manganese oxide battery chemistry.
Long duration fire: A fire with manual intervention that may exceed the recommended water supply duration.
LTO: Lithium titanate battery chemistry.
Module: A combination of cells electrically arranged in series, parallel, or a combination of both. Modules
may also be provided with a smaller version of the BMS to control the cells within and communicate with a
system BMS.
NCA: Lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide battery chemistry.
NMC: Lithium nickel manganese cobalt oxide chemistry.
Nonthermal damage: Damage that results from a fire event but is not caused by the heat of the fire.
Examples of nonthermal damage include but are not limited to smoke, corrosive byproducts, water, chemical
release, etc. Nonthermal damage can be reduced by physical features in a building such as drainage and
walls.
Open-frame rack storage: Rack storage that is void of any solid shelves within the storage array and that
has adequate flue spaces in accordance with Data Sheet 8-9 to (1) allow rapid vertical fire growth (minimizing
horizontal fire spread) and (2) allow downward sprinkler water penetration throughout the height of the rack.
Solid electrolyte interphase (SEI): A passive, stabilizing layer formed over the anode surface due to
electrochemical incompatibility between the anode and electrolyte.
Separator: A type of polymeric membrane that separates the anode and cathode to prevent electrical short
circuiting and facilitates ion transport in the cell.
State of charge (SOC): The real-time amount of energy stored in a system, compared to the rated capacity.
A function of voltage. The SOC could be expressed as a percentage value. Thus, a fully charged battery
would have 100% SOC, and a fully discharged battery would have 0% SOC.
State of health (SOH): A quantitative value (expressed in percentage) depicting the current condition of
the battery compared to its condition when new. The SOH is evaluated by the battery management system
(BMS), which monitors operational variables such as voltage, current, temperature and internal resistance.
Since a battery’s performance degrades with time, the SOH value starts at 100% for a new battery and
reduces with time. This indication is critical to evaluation and monitoring.
Thermal runaway: The irreversible failure mode of a lithium-ion battery where an exothermic reaction occurs
and flammable gas is produced.
C.1 Introduction
C.2.1 Cells
Lithium-ion cells are constructed similar to other battery cells, consisting of an anode, a cathode, electrolyte,
insulators, terminals, pressure vent and a container sometimes called a ′case’ or ′can’.
Each cell consists of a cathode and an anode separated by a thin dielectric layer called the ′separator’. A
lithium-ion cell uses the movement of lithium-ions between positive and negative electrodes for energy
storage. Lithium never exists in metallic form in lithium-ion battery cells, so the inherent instability of metallic
lithium is mitigated. A typical lithium-ion cell operates in the range of 3.6 (fully discharged) to 4.2 (fully
charged) VDC. Outside of this range instabilities can occur that result in failures. See Section C.3 for additional
information. Also, the solid electrolyte interphase layer (SEI), which forms on the anode surfaces is an
ionically conductive and electronically insulating layer. This layer facilitates the working of lithium-ion
technology. Failure of the SEI leads to heat generation and thermal runaway.
Lithium-ion cells include a wide variety of chemistries related to the chemical composition of the anode and
cathode that affect performance and cost. For cathode composition, li-nickel manganese cobalt oxide (NCM)
and li-nickel cobalt aluminum oxide (NCA) chemistries are known to be very stable while providing high
energy density. The most popular chemistry for anode composition is partially graphitized carbon. Lithium
titanate (LTO) cells have approximately 30% lower energy density values compared to other compositions.
The term ″cell″ is often interchangeable with ′battery’ when talking about small-format applications. For
example, a cylindrical cell with a top positive terminal and bottom negative terminal is used in many
applications and called a battery. Cells actually come in a variety of forms. The three most common forms
are cylindrical cell, prismatic cell, and pouch cell.
Positive terminal
Cover
Insulating Anode
ring (negative plate)
Positive
tab
Case
Separator
Cathode
Negative tab (positive plate)
Positive terminal
Anode
Top plate
Anode tab
Pressure vent
Separator
Cathode
Can case
Anode tab
Cathode tab
Top insulator
Cathode
Anode
Aluminum
laminate film
C.2.2 Modules
The next order of structure is the lithium-ion module or pack, shown in Figures C.2.2-A and C.2.2-B. It is
an assembly of multiple cells that are electrically arranged in series, parallel, or a combination of both to meet
the output voltage and amperage necessary for the installation.
Heatsink plates
Fig. C.2.2-B. Typical modules within a battery pack for an electric vehicle
This section describes the failure modes for lithium-ion cells. These failure modes can be split into four broad
categories, depending on the critical variable triggering the failure: voltage, temperature, mechanical fatigue
and cycling/aging.
C.3.1 Overvoltage
If the charging voltage is increased beyond the recommended upper cell voltage, excessive current could
flow, giving rise to two problems:
1. Lithium plating (dendrite growth): Lithium-ions accumulate on the surface of the anode where they are
deposited as metallic lithium. This is known as lithium plating. The consequence is an irreversible
capacity loss; and since the plating occurs in dendritic form, it can ultimately result in a short circuit
between the electrodes. The quantity of lithium available is not sufficient to present a water reactivity
hazard; therefore, lithium plating is not typically considered a concern for lithium-ion batteries, while
dendrite growth is considered a short circuit hazard.
2. Overheating: Excessive current also causes increased Joule heating of the cell, accompanied by an
increase in temperature.
C.3.2 Undervoltage/Over-discharge
Allowing the cell voltage to fall below about 2 V by over-discharging or storage for an extended period results
in progressive breakdown of the electrode materials.
• Anodes: At low voltage, the anode copper current collector dissolves into the electrolyte. As the
voltage is increased (by charging), the copper ions which are dispersed throughout the electrolyte are
precipitated as metallic copper wherever they happen to be, not necessarily back on the current
collector foil. This situation is dangerous and can ultimately cause a short circuit between the
electrodes.
• Cathodes: Keeping the cells at voltages below 2 V for prolonged periods results in the gradual
breakdown of the cathode over many cycles through the release of oxygen by the lithium cobalt oxide
and lithium manganese oxide cathodes and a consequent permanent capacity loss. With lithium
iron phosphate cells, this breakdown can happen over a few cycles.
C. Separator melting. At elevated temperature, the polymer separator melts, allowing short circuits between
electrodes.
D. Cathode breakdown. Heat from the electrolyte breakdown causes breakdown of the metal oxide cathode
material, releasing oxygen, which enables burning of both the electrolyte and the gases inside the cell.
Note that several studies have been undertaken to evaluate the prevention of thermal runaway by adequate
thermal management. This research is critical, because it forms the basis of mitigation measures against
thermal runaway propagation.
D.1 INTRODUCTION
Every battery manufacturer will have their own proprietary lithium-ion battery chemistry and manufacturing
process. However, regardless of the chemistry and the exact details of how certain processes are completed,
fundamental process steps can be applied to lithium-ion battery manufacturing in general. This section will
expand on each process step, describing its purpose as well as the inherent hazards present, see Figure 1.1
for the overall manufacturing process. Figure D.1 shows an example manufacturing facility layout.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
17
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
D.2.1 Mixing
The mixing step produces two slurries, one for the cathode and one for the anode. The slurries are formed
by mixing active materials, carbon black, solvent, binders and additives to meet the chemistry specifications
of the cathode and anode.
The mixing process can take approximately 30 minutes to five hours. Once complete, the slurries are
transported to the coating area via pipelines or sealed tanks. The hazards for this step are tied to the chemicals
being used. The production of the cathode slurry involves ignitable liquids, whereas the production of anode
slurry usually does not.
D.2.2 Coating
During the coating process the slurry is applied to a foil material (aluminum for the cathode and copper for
the anode) and continuously fed to the dryer. Again, the hazards are tied to the chemicals and process
equipment being used.
D.2.3 Drying
The drying process removes the solvent from the slurries by applying heat. The flammable solvent used in
the cathode manufacturing process is typically recovered. Transport of the foils through the dryer is
accomplished by either a roller system or floatation air streams, depending on whether single- or double-sided
application of the slurry is being performed. After passing through the dryer, the coated foil is cooled and
rewound or fed through the system again to coat the second side if needed. Hazards include the heaters and
flammable solvent vapor in the ducts.
D.2.4 Calendering
After the cathode and anode coils are cooled, they are compressed during calendering to obtain the desired
porosity. The rollers used can be heated and present a fire hazard.
D.2.5 Slitting
The wide electrode coil produced thus far, sometimes referred to as the mother coil, is divided into several
smaller electrode coils or daughter coils and rewound into smaller rolls. Flammable dusts and vapors can
be produced during the slitting process.
D.2.6 Notching
After the slitting process, electrode coils undergo notching where a V-shaped notch and tabs are made to
form the positive and negative terminals. The uncoated parts of the coil are cut off leaving the corners in order
to ground the tabs.
D.3.1 Separation
The separation process is only needed for the assembly of pouch or stacked prismatic cells. During this
assembly stage, the daughter coils are cut into their final format using laser cutting or punching methods.
The hazards associated with this process step are due to the activities being conducted, and the risk of fire
is low.
D.3.3 Welding
During welding, the contacts are welded to the cell stack or jelly roll and the stack or jelly roll is placed into
the cell housing (pouch, can, or case). The cell housing is then sealed on three sides, leaving one side open
to fill the cell with electrolyte in the next step.
D.3.5 Enclosing
Once the cell is filled with electrolyte, the cell housing is fully sealed under vacuum during the enclosing
process. For pouch cells, another step known as roll pressing may then take place. Roll pressing involves
applying a defined pressure to the pouch cells in order to achieve optimum distribution and absorption of the
electrolyte throughout the cell.
D.4.1 Formation
Formation is where the manufactured cells first undergo charging and discharging to form the SEI layer.
The exact process parameters and steps will vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and are often
proprietary due to the high impact this process step has on the final cell performance. Generally, the cells
undergo an initial pre-charge that is followed by cycles of discharging and charging. During formation, the cells
are placed in specially designed pallets and stored in a high-bay storage system. The entire process can
last up to 15 days.
This process step is one of the most hazardous in terms of fire risk due to the large quantity of cells in close
proximity, as well as from the initial charge taking place. Any production defects introduced during earlier
process steps can increase the hazard here.
After formation, a process step known as degassing must take place for pouch and prismatic cells prior to
aging. For these cells, the gas produced during the formation process is collected in a disposable bag or dead
space within the cell. Degassing removes the gases under a vacuum, along with the disposable bag if
needed, and applies the final seal to the cell housing.
D.4.2 Aging
Aging is the final cell production step to stabilize the cell properties and SEI film. It involves monitoring each
cell’s parameters for quality assurance. During this process, the cells are typically charged 80-100% and
placed in high-bay, rack storage to rest for an extended period. The exact amount of time is dependent on
the cell chemistry and manufacturer specifications. Some manufacturers will continually monitor each cell
during the aging process, while others may take the needed measurements at the start and end of aging.
Voltage and impedance are the parameters typically monitored. The aging process is completed in multiple
steps with the cells resting at different temperatures, usually at a high temperature followed by ambient
temperature.
D.4.3 Testing
Once the aging process is complete, each finished cell will undergo testing. The exact testing is up to the
manufacturer but could include pulse tests, internal resistance measurements, optical inspections, open circuit
voltage tests and leakage tests. Based on each cell’s performance data, a battery grade is assigned, grade
A, B or C. The cell will be discharged to the shipping state of charge and released for final packaging.
D.4.4 Packaging
Depending on the extent of manufacturing, the cells are either packaged in plastic or cardboard containers
to be shipped or assembled into modules that are then packaged for shipment.
D.4.5 Storage
Packaged cells or modules are generally found in either palletized, solid-pile or rack storage arrangements.
Rack storage used in the highly automated manufacturing process tends to be high-bay ASRS.