16 INTERNATIONAL IDEA

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Democracy is on trial in the climate crisis. It is charged with having

Democracy is on trial failed—and with continuing to fail—to prevent dangerous climate
in the climate crisis. change. It is indicted on a fundamental breach of a key obligation
of legitimate government—to ensure the safety and survival of the
people to whom democracies owe their allegiance. Its accusers go so
far as to attribute these failures to congenital defects in democracy.
To its critics, the very same features of democracy lauded as
its defining virtues—popular sovereignty, the accountability and
responsiveness of elected officials, public debate and deliberation—
are handicaps that fatally impede effective climate action, leading
to inexpert and ineffectual judgements, short-termism, and
cumbersome and dilatory policy processes. Critically, democracy is
damned as a fair-weather regime that is unable to navigate crises—
particularly existential crises such as climate change. For some,
‘[d]emocracy is the planet’s biggest enemy’ (Runciman 2019).

This is undoubtedly a trial by fire. It has been strongly argued that

authoritarian regimes are needed for the climate crisis. This is a
double-barrelled argument as authoritarian regimes are said to be
necessary both to effectively mitigate the risks of climate change,
and to adapt to its disruptive impacts. Thus, even if humanity survives
the climate crisis, the fate of democracies is deeply uncertain. Most
clearly, the legitimacy of democracy as a form of government is at
stake.

However, this trial is not over and it would not be safe to deliver a
verdict at this stage. For one, the case for authoritarian regimes is
flawed in both theory and practice (see below) and while the hour
 1. INTRODUCTION 17

is late for preventing the worst impacts of climate change, there is

still a narrowing window—with this decade being the critical one—to
provide a climate-safe future (IPCC 2018). Here, it is overwhelmingly
democratic nations that are taking the lead (Burck et al. 2021).

This urgent time calls not for pessimism—let alone fatalism—

about democracy, but for a deepening of the democratic impulse; The climate crisis
specifically, a grounded affirmation of the strengths of democratic will be a defining
institutions that is framed within a clear-eyed view of the enormity challenge for and
and complexity of the challenges posed by the climate crisis, to democracy for
including to democracy itself. In other words, the climate crisis decades to come.
should be grasped fully as a turning point and as a moment of truth
that presents extreme dangers but also significant opportunities—
for humanity generally and democracy more specifically (Diamond
2019). This is all the more the case since this is clearly not a short-
term crisis but a ‘long emergency’ (Wiseman 2021). The climate
crisis will be a defining, perhaps the defining, challenge for and to
democracy for decades to come. As Figueres and Rivett-Carnac
(2021) argue, ‘[i]f democracy is to survive and thrive into the twenty-
first century, climate change is the one big test that it cannot fail’.

With this in mind, this Report focuses on democracy and the

climate crisis in the Asia-Pacific region. A regional approach based
on detailed case studies has been chosen to contextualize the
challenges to democracy arising from this crisis. The Asia-Pacific
region is significant for various reasons—it is the most populous in
the world; it is a region that will be disproportionately affected by
climate change and where many countries are considered highly
vulnerable; and, as this Report makes clear, it is also a place where
there have been vibrant innovations to democratic institutions and
practices for dealing with the climate crisis.

Two challenges frame this Report (see Casas-Zamora 2022):

• How can democracy effectively address the climate crisis?

• How can democracy effectively address the threats it faces from

the climate crisis?
18 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Box 1.1. Meaning of democracy

This Report adopts the conceptual and Participatory Engagement. In addition to

framework of International IDEA’s this framework, International IDEA stipulates
Global State of Democracy Indices. This eight mediating values for democracy:
framework defines the core of democracy Participation, Authorization, Legitimacy,
as comprising popular control and political Representation, Accountability, Transparency,
equality. It elaborates on this core meaning Responsiveness and Solidarity. In sum, this
through five attributes: Representative Report understands democracy as having
Government, Fundamental Rights, Checks a core definition elaborated through values,
on Government, Impartial Administration institutions, laws and practice.

The remainder of this chapter maps out these challenges and

explains the case study methodology used in the Report.

1.1. HOW CAN DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS

THE CLIMATE CRISIS?

1.1.1. Democracy against a safe climate?

Climate change is a particularly wicked problem for humanity (Dovers
1996; see also Lindvall 2021) because of its:

• Long-term frames. The temporal distance between greenhouse

gas emissions and climate change, as well as between measures
taken and their effects, together with the level of urgency, given
that dangerous climate change is already occurring and will
intensify if sufficient action is not taken.

• Spatial scale. The disjuncture between a global problem that

transcends national boundaries and an international system based
on nation states, and also between the causes (responsibility for)
and effects of (vulnerability to) climate change.

• Limits to human activity. The recognition that planetary

boundaries place limits on economic and demographic growth
(Stockholm Resilience Centre n.d.).
 1. INTRODUCTION 19

• Connectivity and complexity. Due to the interaction with and

interdependence of natural and human systems that frame the
imperative and the difficulty of global collective action.

• Moral and ethical issues. Such as intergenerational equity, equity

between developed and developing countries and equity within
countries.

1.1.2. Can democracy address climate change in its full

complexity? Short-termism works
Held and Fane-Hervey (2009) argue that four structural against the long-term
characteristics obstruct the liberal democracies of nation states from frames required to
effectively addressing climate change. First, short-termism attributed address the crisis
to the electoral cycle, as political parties seek re-election every few and provides a moral
years and competitive party politics focuses on short-term electoral outlook that is too
gain and the immediate interests of voters, and political processes narrow to capture
are too responsive to the media cycle. Short-termism works against intergenerational
the long-term frames required to address the crisis and provides a equity.
moral outlook that is too narrow to capture intergenerational equity.

Second, self-referring decision making is said to arise from

democratic mechanisms, particularly elections, that are underpinned
by accountability to the constituents of a nation state and
accountability to current voters—a section of the present generation.
To this can also be added the politics of self-interest (both sectional
and individual). Such processes militate against proper consideration
of the interdependence between natural and human systems, equity
between countries and intergenerational equity. They may also run
counter to fully recognizing the limits to human activity and be linked
to weak multilateralism, due to the emphasis placed on national
interests. In some contexts, populism will exacerbate these effects
(Huber 2020), as populists tend to treat the views of the public as
self-vindicating, regardless of their merit, and as opposed to those of
the elite, including scientific experts.

Third, weak multilateralism is traced to the self-referring

decision making of states based on national interest, as well as
disagreements between developed and developing countries and
opposition from fossil-fuel-dependent nations (Fiorino 2018). Weak
multilateralism most obviously undermines the effectiveness of
20 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

necessary global action. This fact is reflected in the commitments

made under the 2015 Paris Agreement, a binding treaty agreed
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), which fell far short of its goal of limiting global warming
to well below 2°C (preferably to 1.5°C) compared to pre-industrial
levels (UNEP 2020), even after the UN Secretary-General sounded a
‘code red for humanity’ on the climate crisis (UN Secretary-General
2021). According to the Climate Action Tracker (2021), the Nationally
Determined Contributions (pledges made by nations under the
Paris Agreement) at the 2021 Glasgow Conference of Parties (COP)
would set the planet on a catastrophic pathway to an increase in
temperature of 2.1°C by the end of the century, while the dismal
current status of policies against pledges would produce an even
more disastrous scenario of a 2.7°C increase (Climate Action Tracker
2021). Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg was unequivocal in
her condemnation of the Glasgow COP as a ‘failure’ (BBC News 2021;
see also Hales and Mackey 2021).

Finally, there is capture by vested interests, which is described by

Held and Fane-Hervey (2009) as interest group concentration—
specifically, commercial interests. Capture of the policymaking
process is enabled by the structural dependence of governments
on business for economic growth—what Lindblom (1977) famously
characterized as ‘the privileged position of business’. This is brought
about directly through lobbying by business interests, and their
funding of political parties and election campaigns. Capture by, for
example, fossil fuel businesses invariably means the delay—and
at times defeat—of the measures required to address the crisis,
including the uncoupling of economic growth from increases in
greenhouse gas emissions and the use of fossil fuels.

There is no doubt that there has been a concerted effort by fossil

fuel companies to bring about such capture. Building on their
already considerable economic and political power in many states
worldwide, these companies have funded key political parties and
organizations in order to obstruct climate action (Holden 2020).
A central strategy has been the decades-long campaign by these
companies to deny the existence of climate change, principally by
sowing doubt about the underlying science (Oreskes and Conway
2010), while internal research dating back at least as far as the 1970s
 1. INTRODUCTION 21

clearly demonstrated the seriously damaging effects of fossil fuel

use (McGreal 2021). The influence of fossil fuel interests was also
obvious at the Glasgow COP, and the Climate Pact almost collapsed
due to last-minute opposition from China and India to the original
draft, which called for a ‘phase-out of unabated coal power’. This
opposition succeeded in diluting the text to ‘phasedown’ (see Arima
2021). Not surprisingly, David Attenborough (2020) has suggested
that vested interests are ‘the most formidable obstacle’ to the switch
to clean energy.

These circumstances of democratic debilitation are compounded

by the speed and scale of the changes now needed to effectively
address the climate crisis. According to the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), ‘rapid, far-reaching and unprecedented
changes in all aspects of society’ are required (IPCC 2018) (see
Table 1.1).

There is now a critical need to move beyond the predominant view

of societal progress as based on continuous economic growth as There is now a critical
measured by gross domestic product. A view that treats the economy need to move beyond
as an open system with limitless resources (e.g. capitalism with the predominant view
perpetual growth) will inevitably collide with a global ecosystem of societal progress as
enclosed by planetary boundaries (Montt, Fraga and Harsdorff 2018). based on continuous
In the words of the UNFCCC Secretariat, ‘a growth-oriented economy economic growth as
may not be compatible with a climate-safe economy’ (UNFCCC measured by gross
Secretariat 2020). Living in the safe and just space of the ‘doughnut’ domestic product.
between a social foundation that meets the needs of humanity
and ecological limits will require a different and more holistic
understanding of societal progress (Raworth 2017), such as the one
embodied in the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) (UN DESA n.d.; United Nations General Assembly 2015).

1.1.3. The flawed preference for authoritarian regimes

Can democracy deal effectively with the complexity of the climate
crisis as a policy problem, enacting the scale and depth of societal
change required, given the compelling circumstances of democratic
debilitation? The answer, according to one school of thought, is an
emphatic ‘no’. Since at least the 1970s, democracy has been said to
be inherently incapable of addressing environmental problems such
as climate change. Rather than democratic regimes based on popular
22 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Table 1.1. Climate change, mitigation and adaptation

Climate change Mitigation of climate Adaptation to climate

Changes in the climate change change
attributable in part/directly Human interventions to reduce The process of adjustment to
to human activity that alters emissions or enhance the sinks actual or expected climate and
the composition of the global of greenhouse gases. its effects in order to moderate
atmosphere and which is in harm or exploit beneficial
addition to natural climate opportunities.
variability observed over
comparable time periods. Systemic changes for 1.5˚C—Consistent Pathways
• Energy system transitions
• Land and ecosystem transitions
• Urban and infrastructure system transitions
• Industrial systems transitions

Source: UNFCCC Secretariat, Just Transition of the Workforce, and the Creation of Decent Work and
Quality Jobs, Technical Paper, 21 April 2020, <https://unfccc.int/documents/226460>, accessed
8 September 2022; IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5˚C, Chapter 4 and Glossary, 2018, <https://doi.
org/10.1017/9781009157940>.

rule, it has been claimed that authoritarian regimes are required

based on the rule of experts—what Ophuls termed ‘ecological
mandarins’ (Ophuls 1977; see also Heilbroner 1974). Such thinking
has proved persistent, as illustrated by the publication of The Climate
Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy (Shearman and Smith
2007), which calls for governance by experts in order to deal with the
climate crisis.

Such authoritarian sentiments have increased in appeal as the

climate crisis has been likened to a war. James Lovelock, the
distinguished scientist who developed the Gaia theory of Earth
as a giant, self-regulating organism, stated that: ‘Even the best
democracies agree that when a major war approaches, democracy
must be put on hold for the time being. I have a feeling that climate
change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessary to
put democracy on hold for a while’ (quoted in Hickman 2010). Others
have gone further and likened the climate crisis to World War III
(McKibben 2016; Stiglitz 2019; Blair, Treagust and McCulloch 2020).

The argument that authoritarian regimes are needed to deal with

the climate crisis, however, is flawed in both practice and theory.
 1. INTRODUCTION 23

Box 1.2. The case of China

There may be some attraction to treating the USA languishes in 55th spot on the
China, the world’s largest emitter of Climate Change Performance Index, China
greenhouse gases, as the poster child for an is ranked 38th, which is five places below its
effective authoritarian climate regime. In the previous ranking. The Index’s report on China
past decade, China’s leaders have committed states that it ‘receives a low rating overall,
the country to a more environmentally but with mixed ratings across categories—
and economically sustainable mode of very low for GHG Emissions and Energy Use,
development (Henderson and Joffe 2016), medium for Renewable Energy, and high
while also positioning China as a global for Climate Policy’. The low score on GHG
climate leader (Hurri 2020; Wunderlich 2020). Emissions and Energy Use is due to China’s
China ranked significantly higher than the high levels of emissions: ‘its coal phase-out
United States, the world’s second largest [being] too slow’, and its ‘plans to continue
emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG), in the building coal-fired power stations because
2022 Climate Change Performance Index of energy supply concerns’ (Climate Change
(Burck et al. 2021). On closer inspection, Performance Index 2022).
however, the attraction is superficial. While

In practice, democracies consistently out-perform authoritarian

regimes in terms of climate change mitigation policies (Bättig and The argument that
Bernauer 2009; Lindvall 2021). For instance, the climate performance authoritarian regimes
of China is far from compelling (see Box 1.2). Indeed, increased are needed to deal
quality of democracy corresponds with stronger climate policies with the climate crisis,
and, to a lesser extent, climate outcomes (Hanusch 2017). These however, is flawed
studies align with strong findings that increasing democracy reduces in both practice and
environmental degradation and improves environmental performance theory.
(Li and Reuveny 2006).

Likening the climate crisis to a war is false and dangerous (see

Box 1.3). More fundamentally, there are fatal difficulties with the
arguments in favour of expert rule. These arguments are a potent
threat to the legitimacy of democracy and constitute a contemporary
version of an argument for a guardianship regime (Holden 2002).
Dahl (1989) has observed that a regime that rests on the idea that
‘[r]ulership should be entrusted to a minority of persons who are
specially qualified to govern by reason of their superior knowledge
and virtue’ has been a ‘perennial alternative to democracy’. As Dahl
convincingly argues, however, this places ‘extraordinary demands on
 24 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

the knowledge and virtue of guardians [that] are all but impossible to
satisfy in practice’ (Dahl 1989).

This applies as much if not more to the climate crisis, which will see
an expansion of the power of the state. No credible answer has been
provided regarding how the abuse of such power could be prevented
in authoritarian regimes based on expert rule, where the mechanisms
of public accountability that apply in democracies are absent. Lord
Acton’s aphorism that power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely remains unanswered.

It is not just virtue that is wanting but also knowledge. A deeply

mistaken assumption underlying calls for expert rule to address the
climate crisis is the characterization of the crisis as a set of technical
problems that require technical solutions. This is an illustration of
what Pope Francis has characterized as the ‘technocratic paradigm’,
or ‘the tendency, at times unconscious, to make the method and
aims of science and technology an epistemological paradigm which
shapes the lives of individuals and the workings of society’ (Pope
Francis 2015).

This paradigm seriously distorts any understanding of the climate

Given the scale and crisis: it is not simply—or even predominantly—a technical crisis. It
complexity of the is true that technical expertise, including scientific and technological
climate crisis, it is expertise, is central but other dimensions of the crisis are as
absurd to believe that salient, particularly its moral complexity, its risks and the trade-
a small minority of offs, including from uncertainties in scientific modelling. These
guardians, experts or interacting dimensions will traverse the profound political, social and
ecological mandarins economic changes that are necessary to address the crisis. All of
will have sufficient this, moreover, will have to be negotiated and addressed in diverse
knowledge to address national and cultural contexts. Given the scale and complexity of
it. the climate crisis, it is absurd to believe that a small minority of
guardians, experts or ecological mandarins will have sufficient
knowledge to address it.

1.1.4. Innovation borne of crisis

The true value of the argument for authoritarian regimes lies, perhaps,
in the exposure of key deficiencies in contemporary democracies
that adversely affect how the climate crisis is addressed; that is, the
circumstances of democratic debilitation. Taking these deficiencies
 1. INTRODUCTION 25

Box 1.3. War as a false and dangerous metaphor

Comparing the climate crisis to war making to be completely entrusted to a select

resonates because both involve urgent group of experts. As Georges Clemenceau
and existential threats, and both require observed, war is too important to be left to
large-scale societal transformation and the generals (paraphrased in Dahl 1989).
mobilization. Yet war as a metaphor fails
because there is no enemy to be defeated. This is not a harmless falsehood. The
It is not the climate that is to be defeated, metaphor of war is positively dangerous.
as it is part of our living world; nor is it other It not only has strong authoritarian
nations, as global cooperation is essential to tendencies and distorts the nature of the
address this planetary challenge. crisis to be addressed, but also paves
the way for militarization of the crisis,
A war metaphor implies that the climate including through the use of armed and
crisis should be treated as a problem to security forces, and a reliance on coercive
be resolved by experts (see Section 1.3), measures, the concomitant reduction of
although even war as a conflict between protections for freedoms and liberties, as
nations is not understood in this way, given well as a demonization of the ‘other’ through
its obvious moral dimensions. In such distinctions between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’,
situations, there is no warrant for decision and ‘us’ and ‘them’.

seriously reminds us that winning the argument against authoritarian

regimes is not the same as succeeding in the climate crisis.

A key challenge and opportunity for democracy is to innovate by

imagining and implementing a vision of democracy for a safe climate
that deepens democracy by disavowing corrosive tendencies. This
vision should be based on four pillars—a democratic planning state,
a solidaristic ethos, an invigorated multilateralism, and fair and
inclusive politics.

Pillar 1. A democratic planning state

The periodic mechanisms of accountability provided by elections
do not necessarily have to result in short-termism. There is no
democratic reason why those who stand for office cannot be judged
on their ability to attend to the long-term goals of a country, including
addressing climate change. A solidaristic ethos among the public
(see below), for instance, could anchor electoral accountability in the
needs of future generations.
 26 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Effectively addressing climate change should also involve significant

Effectively addressing changes to the role of the state, including countering short-termism.
climate change should The nation state is a critical actor and, in many respects, the critical
also involve significant actor tasked with implementing the necessary and unprecedented
changes to the role transitions required by the climate crisis. As the International Energy
of the state, including Agency (IEA) has noted, ‘[u]nderpinning all of these changes [to net
countering short- zero emissions] are decisions taken by governments’ (IEA 2021: 153).
termism. Giddens (2011) has convincingly argued that short-termism can be
addressed by a nation state that takes the lead responsibility on:

• Planning. In terms of both mitigation and adaptation.

• Regulation of the economy. Including instituting the ‘polluter pays’

principle and establishing an economic framework for a low-
carbon economy.

• Coordination and integration. Between government, the private

sector and citizens, as well as different levels of government.

• Holistic risk mitigation. Addressing the risks of the climate crisis

together with other risks experienced by contemporary societies,
including through social protection.

Giddens has stressed that a planning state understood in this way,

or a Green State as characterized by Eckersley (2004), will call for
more democracy not less. While centrally informed by expert opinion,
it will not be a technocratic state but one based on a vision of a
climate-safe society that engages with the complex dimensions of
the climate crisis, including its moral complexity. It be will neither
centralized nor ‘top-down’ in its processes; it will involve various
levels of government and different sectors of society; it will include
the setting of targets and the determination of means, and the
implementation and review of all these aspects will have a strong
basis in popular involvement. The IEA has underlined that, ‘[c]itizens
must be active participants in the entire process, making them feel
part of the transition and not simply subject to it’ (IEA 2021: 4).

Falling squarely within the scope of the democratic planning state is

the role of technology. Technological innovations will be significant in
the climate crisis (Gates 2021), but technological changes should not
 1. INTRODUCTION 27

be seen as a politics-free zone exempt from democratic principles.

Rather, the aspiration should be for ‘a process of technological
change disciplined by the political wisdom of democracy’ (Winner
2020).

Pillar 2. A solidaristic ethos

Democratic accountability, including elections, does not necessarily
have to produce a politics based mainly on the interests of voters,
let alone their individual interests. Much depends on the moral and
political outlook of voters—a politics of self-interest can be countered
by a solidaristic ethos.

A solidaristic ethos should be broad and inclusive, encompassing,

as Pope Francis (2015) has reasoned, both intergenerational and It is vital to recognize
intra-generational solidarity, as well as solidarity with nature. It is vital that solidarity is a
to recognize that solidarity is a democratic principle. As International democratic principle.
IDEA has explained, solidarity ‘refers to the ties in a society that bind
different people to one another, expressing social bonds rather than
autonomous individual ties’ (International IDEA n.d.). Viewed from
this perspective, voters are not just protectors of their own interests,
but also trustees of the public interest (broadly conceived).

This stems from a fundamental truth that democracies are by nature

communities. They are not random collections of individuals, but
a ‘we’ that considers itself ‘a people’. Democracy is the process
of collective self-determination. It is through solidarity that fuller
meaning is given to the third, neglected principle of the French
Revolution—fraternity. As the Dalai Lama has stressed, fraternity
should be at the heart of our response to the climate crisis (Dalai
Lama and Stril-Rever 2018). Learning from Indigenous peoples is vital
to a solidaristic ethos. As the IPCC puts it:

Indigenous Peoples around the world often hold unique

worldviews that link today’s generations with past
generations. In particular, many Indigenous Peoples consider
concepts of responsibility through intergenerational equity,
thereby honouring both past and future generations.
(IPCC 2022a: Chapter 18)
 28 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Institutions specifically dedicated to the interests of future

generations, such as the Hungarian Ombudsman for Future
Generations, the Israeli Knesset Commissioner for Future
Generations and the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales,
might be able to play a role.

Arguably, a positive-sum orientation is integral to a solidaristic

ethos on the climate crisis. This entails framing issues in a way that
promotes ‘win-win’ situations to address the climate crisis alongside
other policy goals, as well as the needs of current and future
generations and of the various groups within the current generation,
especially those particularly affected by climate change and climate
action. An orientation of this nature would be a launch pad for finding
policies that can provide synergies between the complex dimensions
of the climate crisis, such as through the creation of ‘green’ jobs for
those employed in fossil fuel industries (ILO n.d.b). In the words of
the IPCC, ‘[c]limate governance is most effective when it integrates
across multiple policy domains, helps realize synergies and minimize
trade-offs, and connects national and sub-national policymaking
levels’ (IPCC 2022b).

Mechanisms that institutionalize solidarity are essential. Central

Central to this to this proposition is that nation states plan democratically for
proposition is that the future, including for the needs of coming generations, and
nation states plan address the risks of the climate crisis together with other risks
democratically for the experienced by contemporary societies (see above). Mechanisms
future, including for for deliberative democracy—both specific initiatives such as
the needs of coming citizens’ assemblies (Devaney et al. 2020) and initiatives for the
generations. political system as a whole (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012),
including elections (Thompson 2002)—are also likely to assist in
cultivating a solidaristic ethos. By emphasizing the deliberation of
matters of common concern, based on reason-giving, reciprocity
(mutually justifiable reasons) and equality of recognition and voice,
deliberative democracy is centrally focused on recognition of other
affected interests (Bächtiger et al. 2018), including those of future
generations.

Also vital in terms of solidarity is social dialogue—one of the four

pillars of the Decent Work Agenda promulgated by the International
Labour Organization (ILO) (ILO n.d.a). Social dialogue is integral to
 1. INTRODUCTION 29

‘the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce’, as stipulated

in the 2015 Paris Agreement. In its 2015 guidelines, the ILO states
that, ‘[s]ocial dialogue has to be an integral part of the institutional
framework for policymaking and implementation at all levels’,
which requires that ‘[a]dequate, informed and ongoing consultation
... take[s] place with all relevant stakeholders’ (ILO 2015: 5). The
European Commission’s European Green Deal similarly emphasizes
that, ‘[f]or companies and their workers, an active social dialogue
helps to anticipate and successfully manage change’, thereby
justifying ‘the role of social dialogue committees’ (European
Commission 2019: 21). Policies that reinforce social dialogue
‘work to empower regional and local communities, including energy
communities’ (European Commission 2019: 32).

Social dialogue in this context is emphatically democratic. It seeks

to give effect to a fundamental principle of the ILO’s Declaration of
Philadelphia, which calls for processes by which ‘representatives
of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of
governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic
decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare’ (ILO
1944: Annex, emphasis added). This is consistent with long-standing
arguments for economic democracy (Dahl 1986) and research
findings that consensus-based (corporatist) democracies are more
effective at shifting to cleaner forms of energy (Matthews 2001), due
to their ability to integrate various policy goals and interests.

Furthermore, a particular imperative should be to ensure a voice

for communities vulnerable to climate change and action. The US
Green New Deal Bill (US Congress 2019), for instance, mandates
that a Green New Deal ‘be developed through transparent and
inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline
and vulnerable communities’. This emphasis dovetails with recent
research that more egalitarian democracies have higher levels of
climate ambition than other democratic types (Povitkina and Jagers
2021).

Pillar 3. Invigorated multilateralism

The obstacles to stronger multilateralism are certainly formidable,
as evidenced by the grievously inadequate level of global action
to date, but all is not lost. There are silver linings in the outcome
30 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

of the 2021 COP 26. Important steps have been taken in relation
to climate finance for developing countries (Arora and Mishra
2021). Significantly, the Glasgow Climate Pact recognized, ‘that
limiting global warming to 1.5°C requires rapid, deep and sustained
reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, including reducing
global carbon dioxide emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 relative
to the 2010 level and to net zero around mid-century, as well as
deep reductions in other greenhouse gases’ (UNFCCC 2022). It
called on countries to submit strengthened Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) before COP 27, which was held in Egypt in
November 2022 (UNFCCC 2022). The hope was that countries would
ratchet up their pledges. As Alok Sharma, President of COP 26, noted:

The 1.5°C limit lives. We brought it back from the brink,

but its pulse remains weak. We must steer it to safety by
ensuring countries deliver on the promises they have made,
and on the expectations set out in this pact to increase
climate ambition to 2030 and beyond.
(Sharma 2021)

Democracy has a role to play here. Countering the self-referring

mechanisms of nation state democracy facilitates stronger
multilateralism. While electoral accountability does not currently
apply to global institutions, democratization is possible by giving
fuller effect to the principles of deliberative democracy in global
climate governance (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014), including
deliberative multilateral forums and mechanisms of deliberative
accountability—the latter of which includes empowered civil society
organizations such as the ‘climate action army’, with which UN
Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has associated himself (United
Nations 2021).

Pillar 4. Fair and inclusive politics

Although capture by vested interests is a stark feature of
contemporary democracies, it is a distortion of democracy not a
result of it. This is most clearly reflected in the use of money by
such interests to disproportionately influence politics. As the Global
Commission on Elections, Democracy & Security (2012), chaired
by the late Kofi Annan, stated, ‘[t]he rise of uncontrolled political
finance threatens to hollow out democracy everywhere in the world,
 1. INTRODUCTION 31

and rob democracy of its unique strengths—political equality, the

empowerment of the disenfranchised, and the ability to manage
societal conflicts peacefully’.

There are established policy options for dealing with capture by

vested interests. The Council of Europe (2003) has recommended a
whole series of measures to regulate the funding of political parties
and election campaigns. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development has made a list of recommendations aimed at
preventing policy capture (OECD 2017), including through regulation
of political finance and lobbying.

Ensuring an adequate voice for Indigenous peoples is essential. As

the IPCC states:

Climate change assessment and adaptation should be self-

determined and led by Indigenous Peoples, acknowledge
the importance of developing genuine partnerships,
respect Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing, and
acknowledge Indigenous Peoples as stewards of their
environment.
—(IPCC 2022a: Chapter 18)

Providing adequate resources and robust freedoms for civil society

will be essential for raising awareness of the urgency of climate Providing adequate
action, and for reducing the disproportionate influence of vested resources and
interests, as has been powerfully illustrated by the youth climate robust freedoms
strikes. These strikes also highlight another reform that should be for civil society will
considered in order to broaden representation in democracies— be essential for
lowering the voting age. The democratic argument here is two-fold— raising awareness
younger people will disproportionately bear the burden of the climate of the urgency of
crisis; and their leadership in the crisis makes it more vital to have climate action, and
their input into political decision making (Laybourn-Langton, Emden for reducing the
and Rankin 2019). disproportionate
influence of vested
The most comprehensive survey conducted in relation to public interests.
opinion on climate change and action makes it clear that there is
‘widespread recognition of climate change as a global emergency
in every country surveyed’ (UNDP and University of Oxford 2021: 7).
 32 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

A key democratic priority is to ensure that there are no blockages to

this recognition being given effect.

1.2. HOW CAN DEMOCRACY EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS

THE THREATS IT FACES FROM THE CLIMATE CRISIS?

1.2.1. The threats to democracy from the climate crisis

The analysis here runs in the opposite direction. Rather than focusing
on the impact of democracy on the climate crisis, it is the impact of
the climate crisis on democracy that is centre stage. The research
in this area is asymmetrical; there has been less examination of the
impact of climate crisis on democracy than the other way around
(Javeline 2014). The threats to democracy result from a cascading
series of risks arising from the climate crisis (Wallace-Wells 2019;
Lindvall 2021), as risks to natural systems give rise to risks to human
systems, which entail risks to democracy (see Figure 1.1).

The risks to democracy are defined as the 3Is—insecurity, inequality

The risks to and instability. Insecurity will result from climate disruptions and their
democracy are defined impact on lives, livelihoods (jobs), homes, food and water supply.
as the 3Is—insecurity, According to Lindvall, food insecurity will fuel public discontent,
inequality and nationalism and authoritarian populism, and emerge as the ‘one
instability. single consequence of the climate crisis that represents the biggest
threat to democracy in the future’ (Lindvall 2020).

The climate crisis will also heighten the dynamics of inequality

through the uneven impact of climate disruption, the unequal ability
and resources to take climate action (mitigation and adaptation),
and possibly through climate action itself. This inequality threatens
democracy both directly and indirectly—directly where it entails
political inequality, and indirectly through a reduction in democratic
participation and faith in democracy and solidarity (International IDEA
2017).

Instability will result from climate disruptions. Insecurity and

inequality might also contribute to conflicts within and between
nations while large increases in forced migration (climate refugees)
might also be an acute source of instability. The speed and scale of
the transitions necessary to address the climate crisis could also be
a source of instability.
 1. INTRODUCTION 33

Figure 1.1. Cascading risks of the climate crisis

RISKS TO NATURAL SYSTEMS RISKS TO HUMAN SYSTEM RISKS TO DEMOCRACY

• Increases in mean temperature, • Human health • Insecurity—particulary food

hot extremes, heavy precipitation, insecurity

drought and precipitation deficits • Livelihoods

• Inequality (social, economic and

• Increases in sea level rise • Food security political)

• Impact on biodiversity and • Water supply • Instability—internal conflicts, wars,

ecosystems (including species forced migration (internal and

loss and extinction) • Human security international)

• Economic growth • Democratic backsliding

• Increases in ocean acidity and
decreases in ocean oxygen levels
• Threats from climate action • Threats to free and fair
and impact on marine biodiversity,
(mitigation and adaptation) elections
fisheries and ecosystems

Source: Author’s compilation.

Alongside the 3Is are other potential threats to democracy. There

is the serious risk of democratic backsliding, or an erosion of the
quality of democracy. The climate crisis, particularly the instability
that results, might be exploited to institute undemocratic measures.
For instance, genuine emergencies linked to extreme weather events
might be used as a pretext for disproportionate measures and a
prolonged state of emergency, perhaps even a permanent state of
emergency justified on the basis of recurring natural disasters. A kind
of ‘shock doctrine’ might take shape (Klein 2007), leading to stealth
authoritarianism under cover of the climate crisis (Varol 2018). This
might even be combined with an economic system based on ‘disaster
capitalism’.
34 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

That climate backsliding is not fanciful is suggested by the Covid-19

crisis, and the notion of pandemic backsliding (Kolvani et al. 2021),
as autocratic opportunists capitalized on the crisis to weaken
democratic institutions (Daly 2021).

Less appreciated as a risk of democratic backsliding is the increased

significance of the state in effectively addressing the climate crisis.
This will probably mean that the state assumes more of a central role
in planning and regulation of the economy, as well as coordination
and integration to address the risks of the crisis. Unless measures to
institute popular participation and public accountability are integrated
into such changes, there will be an overall decline in the quality of
democracy. There are also risks of corruption, in particular the abuse
of governmental powers to maintain incumbency, including through
coercive powers directed at managing climate disruption and through
the extensive public investment required for climate action (World
Bank 2022).

Finally, there are the threats to free and fair elections. Article 25 of
Elections may be the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes
more difficult to that ‘genuine periodic elections’ are a core democratic institution
administer due to that ‘guarantee[s] the free expression of the will of the electors’
climate disruption, (ICCPR 1966). There are a range of threats here (Asplund, Birch and
including extreme Fischer 2022). Elections may be more difficult to administer due to
weather events and climate disruption, including extreme weather events and heat stress.
heat stress. Insecurity, inequality, and instability might bring about a lower level
of electoral participation. Inequality is likely to specifically undermine
the fairness of elections, as those disproportionately affected by
the climate crisis might be the least able to participate in elections.
Democratic backsliding in the form of incumbent governments
abusing power to remain in office is another clear threat to the
fairness of elections. In more extreme scenarios, elections may be
suspended or postponed during prolonged states of emergency.

1.2.2. Countering threats by deepening democracy

These are all genuine risks but risks are not inevitabilities. Whether
these threats to democracy become a reality will depend on complex
causal processes. Some threats can be confidently predicted; for
instance, food insecurity and some degree of increased inequality.
Others, however, are much more uncertain. These include increased
conflicts—both intrastate and interstate—and increased forced
 1. INTRODUCTION 35

migration (WMO 2021). Centrally determinative, in many instances,

will be the choices made by the international community and nation
states.

These threats reaffirm the imperative of strengthening the democratic

impulse and, in this context, devising an effective risk management
regime for the threats to democracy arising from the climate crisis.
This regime should reflect the three prongs outlined below:

1. Reduce the risks to democracy.

2. Reduce vulnerability to risks.
3. Promote resilience to risks.

The critical priority of the regime should be mitigation of climate

change (see Figure 1.1). Mitigation will reduce the risks to democracy
by short-circuiting the cascading risks of the climate crisis (see
Figure 1.2). It will also reduce the costs of adaptation to these threats
through prongs 2 and 3.

This highlights the profound synergy between effectively addressing

the climate crisis and dealing with its threats to democracy, but this
synergy goes even deeper. The four pillars discussed above should
also anchor the risk-management regime—they are pillars of both
democratic innovation and insulation.

Most critical, perhaps, will be including democracy itself within

the purview of a planning state. This will require a vision of how
democracy should work in the decades to come and ‘back-casting’
that vision to work out appropriate targets and milestones (Giddens
2011). It will necessarily include efforts to reduce the risks to
democracy and to enhance its resilience, or ability to adapt to those
risks.

Solidaristic mechanisms reduce the risks of insecurity and inequality

by providing an assurance of mutual support, including social
protection, that reduces the likelihood of such risks spilling over
into social conflict. Resilience is also promoted by the positive-sum
orientation of a solidaristic ethos, and the problem-solving and
social-learning capacities of its mechanisms, including deliberative
democracy.
36 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Figure 1.2. Principles of democracy can help us overcome the unique obstacles of
the climate crisis

Challenges include:

Long time Spatial Limits to Connectivity Moral &

frames scale human activity & complexity ethical issues

Democratic planning state

Nations lead on economic regulation,
coordination between government and
citizens, and holistic risk mitigation.

Challenges
combated:

An ethos of solidarity
A broad and inclusive mindset that
encompasses solidarity within and
among nations, nature and generations.

Challenges
combated:

Invigorated multilateralism
Creates and protects alliances between
and within nations to work towards a
common goal.

Challenges
combated:

Fair and inclusive politics

Facilitates democratic planning, a voice
for ‘frontline communities’, free and fair
elections, and social dialogue.
VOTE
Challenges
combated:
 1. INTRODUCTION 37

1.3. A GROUNDED APPROACH TO DEMOCRATIC

INNOVATION IN THE CLIMATE CRISIS

Central to this Report are 10 country case studies on Australia,

Bhutan, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. The case study approach has been adopted
to elaborate on how the challenges to democracy posed by the
climate crisis manifest themselves in specific national contexts,
and to identify concrete ways to address these challenges through
democratic innovation (see section 1.4 for the list of questions
generated for the country case studies).

The 10 countries were chosen for their diversity, in terms of climate

vulnerability and climate action. Climate vulnerability was given
particular emphasis. There are four case studies from Pacific Island
nations (Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), in recognition of
the extreme climate risk faced by low-lying islands. The case studies
are also diverse in terms of democratic regime types and geographic
subregions of the Asia-Pacific region. They include the three most
populous democracies in the Asia-Pacific—India, Indonesia and
Japan (see Table 1.2).

1.4. LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR COUNTRY CASE

STUDIES

1. What are the key elements of the country’s political system?

2. What are key aspects of its climate vulnerability?

– How is the country vulnerable to climate impacts, such as
increases in mean temperature; increases in sea level rise;
impact on biodiversity and ecosystems; and impact on marine
biodiversity, fisheries and ecosystems?
– How does the country’s climate vulnerability compare to other
countries? (Please include details from the Notre Dame Global
Adaptation Initiative, 2020.)
38 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

Table 1.2. Key attributes of country case studies

Country Climate vulnerability Climate change Subregion

ranking performance

Solomon Islands 165 N/A Oceania

Vanuatu 157 N/A Oceania

Bhutan 136 N/A South Asia

India 132 10 South Asia

Indonesia 107 27 South-East Asia

Fiji 96 N/A Oceania

Singapore 65 N/A South-East Asia

Japan 49 45 East Asia

Australia 16 58 Oceania

Tuvalu N/A N/A Oceania

Sources: Climate Change Performance Index; University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-
GAIN) Index.
Note: A higher climate vulnerability ranking indicates a lower level of vulnerability (e.g. Australia is
ranked 16th out of 182 countries). Conversely, a lower ranking indicates a higher level of vulnerability
(e.g. Solomon Islands is ranked 165th out of 182 countries).

3. What are key aspects of its climate action?

– Is the country committed to key climate change international
treaties and/or active in regional and/or international forums
addressing the crisis?
– Does the Constitution address the climate crisis?
– Is there specific legislation addressing the crisis?
– Who are the champions of climate action (political parties;
cross-party alliances; civil society organizations, including
environmental, labour and youth groups)?
– What has been the role of various levels of government?
– What has been the role of the courts?
– How does the country’s climate action compare to other
countries? (Please include details from the Climate Change
Performance Index, 2021.)
 1. INTRODUCTION 39

4. What are the key circumstances hindering effective climate

action?
– In the discussion, please include the following circumstances of
democratic debilitation: short-termism; self-referring decision-
making; weak multilateralism; and capture by vested interests.
5. How has, and how can, democracy in this country innovate to
become more effective at addressing the climate crisis?
– In the discussion, please include the following ways of
democratic innovation: a planning state; a solidaristic ethos;
invigorated multilateralism; and fair and inclusive political
processes.
6. What are the key threats to democracy in this country from the
climate crisis?
– In the discussion, please include the threats of insecurity,
inequality, instability, democratic backsliding, and the threats to
free and fair elections.
7. How has, and how can, democracy in this country be better
insulated from these threats?
– In the discussion, please include the following ways of
democratic insulation: a planning state; a solidaristic ethos;
invigorated multilateralism; and fair and inclusive political
processes.
40 CLIMATE CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY

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