GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Richard Grant

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
 AFRICA:
GEOGRAPHIES
OF CHANGE

Richard Grant
PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY,
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, CORAL GABLES, FL, USA

ADJUNCT SENIOR RESEARCH SCIENTIST TO THE EARTH

INSTITUTES MILLENNIUM CITIES INITIATIVE,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK

VISITING PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY,

ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG,
SOUTH AFRICA

NEW YORK OXFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Grant, Richard, 1964- author.
Africa : geographies of change / Richard Grant.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 978-0-19-992056-3
1. Human geography--Africa, Sub-Saharan. 2. Africa, Sub-Saharan--Economic
conditions--21st century. 3. Africa, Sub-Saharan--Social conditions--21st century.
4. Urbanization--Africa, Sub-Saharan. 5. Rural development--Africa, Sub-Saharan.
6. Sustainable development--Africa, Sub-Saharan. 7. Social change--Africa,
Sub-Saharan. I. Title.
GF701.G73 2014
304.20967--dc23
2014003254

Printing number:9 8 7654321

Printed in the United States of America

on acid-free paper
 DEDICATION
To Adriana Cala, Sofia and Natalia Grant
who let me go to numerous places in Africa
and always welcomed me home, and to my mother,
Alva Grant, who passed in 2014 but remains a major
inspirational figure. I am deeply grateful to these
generous individuals for their encouragement,
support and feedback.
 CONTENTS

PREFACE Vill Social Media: Africa Reporting, Blogging

Africa, and Africa Podcasting 35

1 Introduction 1 Africans’ Revisioning of Africa 38

Unchaining Africa 40
Setting the African Stage 1
Ending the Looting of Africa 40
The Urban Revolution and Emerging Rural
Revolution in Africa 6 Political Leadership 43
The Concept of “Africa” 8 Box 2.2. Elf Scandal: Chasing France-
Afrique Shadows 44
Box 1.1. How to Write About Africa 12
Box 2.3. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela:
The “New Africa” Growth Story 14 Africa’s Iconic Leader 45
Box 1.2. Urbanization in Small Towns in Environmentalism of the Poor and
East Africa 18 Sustainable Development 47
Africa as a Millennium Development Ending Aid? 49:
Frontier 20
Civil Society 50
Urbanization in Africa in
African Postcolonial Urbanists 53
Consideration 21
Conclusion 54
Conclusions 25

Africa’s Environments 57
Reframing and Rerepresenting Introduction 57
African Affairs 29 The Environment and International
Development Agendas 58
Introduction 29
The Diversity of African Environments SY)
Representing Africa: The Darkness
Legacy 29 Tropical Rain Forest 59
Box 2.1. “The Coming Anarchy” 32 Tropical Savannas 61
Moving from a World of Shadows into Desert 61
Splintering Light 33 Temperate Grassland (Veldt) 62
 Contents Vv

Mediterranean 62 Africa’s Failed Green Revolution 112

Montane 62 Africa’s New Green Revolution 113
Africa’s Rainfall and Climate Change 63 Genetically Modified Crops 115
Africa’s Mineral Resources 65 Rural Livelihoods: A Challenge to the
Box 3.1. The Resource Curse or Cure? 67 Primacy of Small Farms? 118

Africa's Forest Resources 68 Box 5.1. African Millennium Villages 119

Box 3.2. Coltan 70 Box 5.2. Pro-Poor Tourism Best Practices

from Rural South Africa: Making African
Environments of Africa’s Fisheries 73 Game Parks Work for the Local Poor 123
Human Environments 73 Gender in Rural Africa 124
Box 3.3. Somali Pirates: Responding Girls in Rural Africa: Almost Invisible
to Africa’s Fish Rush? 74 Members of Society 127
Urban Environments and Ecological Conclusions 129
Footprints 75
Conclusions 76
Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution:
Informal Economy, Creativity,
The “Scramble for Africa” and the and Informal Spaces 135
State of European Geographical Introduction 135
Knowledge on the Region 31 The Past 40 Years of Informal Economy
Introduction 81 Evolution and Sophistication in
Africa 136
Box 4.1. Mary Kingsley (1862-1900) 85
Major Informal Economy Debates 138
Box 4.2. Timbuktu: Colonial Escapades
and Unanswered Questions 86 The African Informal Economy on the
Ground 138
Colonial Motivations 87
International Informal Economy
Africa’s Urban Past 88 Entanglements: E-Waste in Africa 141
Box 4.3. “Great Zimbabwe”: An Urban Box 6.1. The Diversity of Informal
History Almost Forgotten 92 Workers, Soweto Township,
Colonial Legacies 93 South Africa 143

Geographies of Empire 94 Dynamism, Creativity, and

Informality 145
Urban Development and Planning
the Colonial City 97 Mobile Phones: “The New Talking Drums”
of Everyday Africa 146
Box 4.4. The Bungalow 98
Ushahidi: Built in Africa for the World 150
Conclusions 104
Designing Sustainable Prototypes for
Africa’s Informals 151

Rural Africa 109 Box 6.2. Community-Led Enumerations

and Mapping: Counting Lives and
Introduction 109 Building Community in Kibera,
Kenya 153
Rural Development Themes and Policy
Emphases: The Elusive Quest for Box 6.3. Slum Tourism and Shack Chic:
Sustained Development 110 Are They Good Ideas? 154
The Green Revolution 112 Conclusions 155
AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Migration 159 Health 209

Introduction 159 Introduction 209

Box 7.1. African Athletes and Global Sports Africa’s Disease Burden 211
Recruitment 160 Box 9.1. Technology Bright Spots in Health
Colonial Policies and Migration 162 Arenas 212

Circular Migration 163 Double Burden of Disease 212

Box 7.2. Burkina Faso: Circular Migration Africa’s Health Data Lacuna 214
in Time and Space 163 Sickness and Health: The Colonial Legacies
Forced Migrants: Refugees and IDPs 165 of Inherited Health Systems 215
Migrant Remittances to Africa 170 The Nexus of International Health
Policy and National Health Policies,
Box 7.3. The Hawala System of Transfer 1980-Present 216
in the Horn of Africa 170
HIV/AIDS: An Extraordinary African
Box 7.4. Transnational Houses 172
Struggle 218
Human Trafficking and Smuggling 173
Box 9.2. AIDS in Uganda: An Unfinished
Box 7.5. Migrant Journeys in Pursuit of the Success Story 220
South African Dream 175
Global Health Funding Priorities,
Box 7.6. The Johannesburg Hub: Emphases, and Omissions: Neglected
How Many Foreigners Tropical Diseases and Mental
Are Present? 177 Health 226
Out of Africa: U.S. and European Box 9.3. Mental Health in Africa 228
Movements 177
Urban Health 228
Conclusions 180
Box 9.4. Traditional Medicine
and Healers 232
Conclusions. 233
Water 185

Introduction 185
10 Land and Food 239
Africa’s Water 186
Introduction 239
Water and Sanitation: Colonialism
to the Present 190 Box 10.1. South Africans’ Next “Great Trek”
into Africa 240
Box 8.1. Indigenous Knowledge of
Water 196 Box 10.2. The Fair Trade Debate 242
Box 8.2. Water Grabbing 197 Box 10.3. Ethical Wildflower Trade and
Water and Poverty LOS) Sustainability: Flower Valley, South
Africa 244
Transboundary Water Issues 201
Why Has Africa Become a Net Food-
Virtual Water 202 Importing Region? 245
Box 8.3. Water Footprint of Cut Contemporary Agriculture in Africa:
Flowers in Kenya: What Is the “The Great African Land Grab”? 247
True Cost? 205
Benefits and Risks of Land
Conclusions 205 Investments 249
 Contents vii

Geographies of Foreign Investment in Chinese Entrepreneurs in Africa's Informal

African Agricultural Lands 250 Economies 293
Arguments for and Against Large-Scale The African Diaspora in China: African
Foreign Investment in African Entrepreneurs in the “Dragon's
Agricultural Land 254 Den” 295
Urban Agriculture 256 China’s Infrastructure Investments to
Box 10.4. Cape Town: The Paradox of Urban
Africa: Building Bridges? 297
Food Insecurity in a Food-Secure Box 12.1. China’s Stadium Diplomacy 298
Country 257
Box 12.2. A Pathway to Economic
Conclusions 259 Development: China’s Special Economic
Zone in Lekki, Nigeria 299
Box 12.3. China and Zambia Relations 302
11 Climate Change 265 Conclusions 304

Introduction 265

Environmental Changes on Mount

Kilimanjaro 268 13 African Futures 309
Climate Impacts on Africa 269 Introduction 309
The Human Impacts of Climate Washington's Engagement with Africa 311
Change 272
Africa’s Terrorism Threats 313
Box 11.1. Is the Conflict in Darfur the
Post-Millennium Development Goals:
World's First Climate Change War? 273
Which Alternatives? 318
African Cities and Climate Change:
New Urban Futures 319
An Urgent Agenda 278
Box 13.1. Eko Atlantic (Nigeria) 322
Global Climate Stalemate and Funding
Intransigence: African Voices 280 Box 13.2. Sseesamirembe, Uganda:
Sustainable Utopias Going Awry
Box 11.2. Indigenous Knowledge
in a Global World 324
in Climate Change: Mitigation
and Adaptation Strategies in the Urban Sustainability 325
African Sahel 282
Evidence of an Unsustainable World 327
Conclusions 283
Post-MDGs: The Sustainable Development
Agenda 328
Rethinking Urbanism 330
12 China and Africa 287 Livable Urbanism 332
Introduction 287 Conclusions 332
China Returns to Africa 289
Chinese Migration to Africa 291 INDEX 337
 PREFACE

frica has become more important. After several of their attacks is raising concern. “Ungoverned” and
centuries of Western dominance and develop- “wild spaces” in Africa are now under closer scrutiny
ment failures, Africa is no longer what has been imag- and surveillance from international counterterrorism
ined as “Africa.” Negative stereotypes and pessimism organizations—although, to be fair, the Africa terrorist
in combination with a myriad of real crises (economic, frontline scenario is restricted geographically and is
health, political, conflict, and humanitarian) under- less applicable to most of the region.
mined the potential of the region and focused the Making sense of these new and competing Africa
world’s positive attention on other world regions. But narratives requires thoughtful and informed analysis.
times have changed. Meta-nartratives can help us to reframe a region but can
In the 21st century, there has been a dramatic turn- highlight only a particular aspect of African events.
around in interest in and engagement with Africa. Schol- This book emphasizes that using such meta-natratives
ars, analysts, and the media now speak of “Africa's turn,” to explain and predict African events is inadequate and
“Africa rising,” “emerging Africa,” “resurgent Africa,” “re- that “thick” moments in African history should not be
Ua

naissance Africa,” and “Africa’s moment.” This increased combined with “thin” geographies. Unraveling these
global attention on the part of those who want to secure complex geographies, this book provides a unique bal-
access to Africa’s resources is leading to a “new scramble” ance of knowledge with some forward-thinking analy-
for Africa. This time around, though, the players are not ses to reveal the continuity and change that are under
only Western countries but increasingly China, Brazil, way in different parts of Africa. This text takes a pene-
India, the Gulf states, and other nontraditional players trating look at Africa through the use of major themes
(e.g., Malaysia and Turkey) who are jostling for African that are most acute in the urban and rural transforma-
concessions. Oil, natural gas, metallic mineral deposits, tion (e.g., water, climate change, health, food, migra-
and abundant farmland are transforming the world’s tion, informality, China, sustainable development)
images of Africa from a “lost continent” to a continent of and provides rich and detailed case studies representa-
“strategic opportunity.” tive of different parts of Africa.
The specter of Africa as a theater for terrorism is also The central argument of the book is that an urban
gaining traction and in many ways is a return to the older revolution is under way in Africa and a rural revolu-
“coming anarchy” argument. Various jihadist groups tion is imminent. This is a profound transformational
are active in the region (eg., Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in story. The region in the past 50 years has recorded the
the Islamic Maghreb and Al-Shabaab) and the frequency fastest population growth in the entire history of our

viii
 Preface ix

planet. Africa is no longer a continent of villages and separate chapters on rural Africa and Africa’s environ-
towns; it comprises a wide diversity of urban settle- ments are included.
ments, from mega-cities through progressively smaller Why write this book? First, Africa should no longer
urban settlements. Most of Africa’s population lives be regarded as a mysterious and unknown region. The
in cities of fewer than 500,000 people, yet the urban fabled, deeply troubled continent of the past no longer
primacy and the dominance of the colonial capitals exists; in fact, it existed more in representation than in
remains a key feature of African economies and soci- reality. This book draws on the large and expanding
eties. Urbanites require food, fuel, water, and ample knowledge base on Africa and provides a coherent,
supplies of other resources, and, as such, cities extend timely synthesis that takes stock of this diverse, complex,
their reach over widening tributary areas and territo- and changing region. Second, this is a particularly oppor-
ries. Shortly after 2030, Africa will surpass the mile- tune time to study Africa. Rapidly growing economies,
stone threshold where more than 50% ofits population expanding national populations, increasing business
will reside in urban settlements. This demographic interest, growing global connections, and expanding
metamorphosis is already affecting rural Africa and it civil society participation are transforming the region. By
will influence it ever more profoundly in coming years. 2030, only Africa and Asia will be growing in terms of
Rural and urban Africa are becoming increasingly population rates (other regions will have reached a plat-
interconnected, not just in terms of migration flows eau). Third, Africans are becoming more self-assured and
but also in other ways, including family finances and insistent about being partners in development. Fourth,
the pervasive effects of urbanism, cosmopolitan be- knowledge about Africa is evolving and becoming more
liefs, and consumer culture. Indeed, urban centers out- sophisticated. The 21st century ushered in more positive
side the region are also increasingly linked to rural assessments about the region and changed the conversa-
Africa by diaspora remittances, by institutional inves- tion about Africa. This conversation continues to evolve
tors buying African farmland and water rights, and by in 2014 as the United Nations moves toward the imple-
mobile phone networks that bind rural and urban mentation of its Sustainable Development Agenda,
actors in ways that do not require travel. There are replacing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
spaces where rural and urban processes blend, such as whose implementation period was from 2000 to 2015.
in the peri-urban environments of African cities, the From 2015 to 2030, sustainable development initiatives
sponge-like periphery of the city that attracts migrants will encourage new thinking and innovation in Africa
who live an in-between existence. Global development and about Africa. And, fifth, there is a pressing need for a
organizations and agrocorporations have bold plans book that is structured around geographical perspectives
to further transform rural Africa by launching a “green in assessing the scale and scope of Africa’s contemporary
revolution” to accelerate food production, improve transformations.
productivity, and feed African urban populations (and Africa: Geographies of Change provides a topical
possibly others). Rural infrastructure is slowly improv- focus but is keenly sensitive to regional, national, and
ing and is attracting investors; there is considerable local actors and contexts. This book purposely does not
room for change, but major obstacles to mobility per- engage in a regional survey of the continent; rather, it
sist. International development initiatives that are follows the contemporary geographical tradition of
under way to deploy mobile technologies and plat- moving beyond regional description toward more
forms to deliver health and educational services to interdisciplinary interpretation. At the same time, con-
rural Africa may be especially transformative. siderable effort went into the selection of diverse case
Of course, interconnecting urban and rural Africa studies that highlight important local, national, and re-
and thinking through the interactions between African gional topics (e.g., coltan mining in eastern Democratic
physical environments and human change are ambi- Republic of Congo, e-waste in Accra, Ghana, circular
tious intellectual projects and represent a formidable migration in the Burkina Faso-Céte d'Ivoire corridor,
challenge. Effort is made in the chapters to link urban mobile phone technological innovations in Kenya,
and rural phenomena, but for conceptual clarity money transfers to Somalia, sustainable development
x AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

in Nigeria, South Africa, and the Great Lakes area, HIV/ Hallmarks of Africa: Geographies of Change
AIDS in Uganda, and China’s relations with Zambia).
e Emphasis on contemporary Africa to excite stu-
As the discipline of geography advances, it is incor-
dents and invigorate a new generation of educated
porating new and more complex perspectives from
global citizens to think differently about alterna-
urban studies, public health, political economy, envir-
tive and more positive possibilities for African
onmental studies, political geography, political ecology,
development
and sustainable development. These, in turn, provide
e Relevant historical knowledge to underpin the as-
ever more nuanced understandings of African issues,
sessment of contemporary issues and advance stu-
thereby deepening our knowledge of Africa and Africans
dent thinking to contemplate future development
in the global economy. Africa can no longer be under-
and policy trajectories and outcomes
stood by looking through a single prism; accordingly,
e Current material on China in Africa, the mobile
chapter topics have been carefully selected to develop a
phone revolution, the Millennium Development
comprehensive approach to explaining contemporary
Goals, sustainable development, “land and water
Africa as well as shedding light on the processes that will
grabs,” food security, informal livelihoods, the
shape its future. Therefore, this book should be of con-
“Green Revolution,” new satellite cities, and African
siderable interest in fields beyond Geography, especially
terrorist groups
African Studies, Environmental Studies, Development
e Incorporation of uniquely African perspectives
Studies, Urban Studies, Globalization Studies, Political
into each chapter to ensure that the book does not
Science, and International Studies.
draw exclusively from literatures produced in the
The book’s recurrent leading themes are the histor-
Global North
ical legacies of colonialism; the profound demo-
e Carefully selected case studies to vividly illustrate
graphic transformation unleashed by the growing shift
topics being discussed, which are critical to in-
toward urban centers; widening urban-rural spheres
forming a broad-based geographical perspective
of interactions; the growing complexity and diversity
e Case studies of fair trade products and coltan
in the range of options for African states to secure ex-
mining to show how resources in Africa are con-
ternal support for national development projects; and
nected to everyday consumer products in the
rising self-confidence among Africans, who want to be
Global North in order to make connections to the
partners in development plans and projects. At the
region that can be less obvious
same time, persistent poverty (sometimes extreme), a
e Accessible writing, synthesis of scholarly and
burgeoning informal economy, inferior infrastructure,
policy debates, links to videos that help bring ma-
resource overdependence, and the challenge of climate
terial and contexts to life, and a comprehensive
change are also taken into consideration.
bibliography
There are numerous good books about Africa, but
e Multiphrenic information about Africa to stimu-
most of them focus on a different era: yesterday's
late active student engagement with the subject
Africa. Africa in the 21st century is an increasingly dif-
matter, including a listing of social media and the
ferent place than it was in the 20th century. The over-
leading Internet sites on reporting about Africa
riding objective of this book is to sharpen awareness
that Africa is no longer the place that has been imag- Ultimately, the major goals of this book are to provide
ined but a complex region taking its place on the world a broad and comprehensive knowledge base regarding
stage; it is place where many changes are being wrought 21st-century Africa so that students can critically reflect
and where alternative futures are being contested. on the material; stimulating in-depth learning.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

riting a textbook on contemporary Africa is a Calvin Masilela, Indiana University of

major undertaking, and during my work I re- Pennsylvania
ceived advice, guidance, and input from various Garth A. Myers, Trinity College
experts. First and foremost, I was provided with excel- Benjamin Neimark, Old Dominion University
lent feedback from the reviewers who pushed me to Kefa M. Otiso, Bowling Green State University
develop and extend my analysis to rural Africa. This Jennifer Rogalsky, State University of New York
book is a lot better because of their encouragement to Geneseo
link rural and urban Africa. They are: Elizabeth Edna Wangui, Ohio University —
Athens
Fenda Akiwumi, University of South Florida
John Warford, Florida A&M University
Seth Appiah-Opoku, University of Alabama
Raymond Asomani-Boateng, Minnesota State In addition to the external reviewers, several col-
University - Mankato leagues engaged me in conversations about Africa that
Donovan C. Chau, California State University broadened and deepened my understanding of the
Bernadino region. I had the pleasure of engaging many of these
Amy Cooke, University of North Carolina - colleagues in the field in Accra, Cape Town, Gaborone,
Chapel Hill Johannesburg, and other African cities as well as to
James Craine, California State University learn from their experiences that went beyond areas
Northridge I had the pleasure of traveling to. Many colleagues
Gregory DeFreitas, Hofstra University commented on chapters and helped make the presen-
Sheila J. Gibbons, Salem State University tation of material better. Other colleagues provided a
Joel Hartter, University of New Hampshire - sounding board to develop my thinking on important
Durham issues. This book is much better because of these con-
Joshua Inwood, University of Tennessee - versations. For their scholarly engagement, I thank:
Knoxville
Ezekiel Kalipeni, University of Illinois - Urbana Japhet Aryiku, Adakum Educational Foundation
Champaign Susan Blaustein, Columbia University
Margaret Kidd, Texas Southern University Kevin Chaplin, Amy Biehl Foundation Trust

xi
xii AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Jonathan Crush, Balsillie School of International Jayne Rogerson, University of Johannesburg

Affairs, Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University
Heather Dalton, Flower Valley Elliot Sclar, Columbia University
Padraig Carmody, Trinity College, Dublin Shouraseni Sen Roy, University of Miami
Mike Gaines, University of Miami Sarah Smiley, Kent State University
Bill Green, University of Miami Justin Stoler, University of Miami
Chris Hanson, University of Miami Daniel Thompson, University of Miami
Maria Huchzermeyer, University of the Ivor Turok, Human Sciences Council,
Witwatersrand South Africa
Francis Koti, University of North Alabama Ian Yeaboah, Miami University
Mazen Labban, Rutgers University Leo Zulu, Michigan State University
Nico Kotzé, University of Johannesburg
The book has also benefited tremendously from
Adam Levy, University of Colorado at Boulder
the team of professionals at Oxford University Press,
Isaac Luginaah, The University of Western
and I am grateful to be associated with them. Here
Ontario
I thank my editorial team: Dan Kaveney, Executive
Peter Muller, University of Miami
Editor, for shepherding the project from the idea stage
Joe Melara, Columbia University
through to publication, and Assistant Editor Christine
Bill Moseley, Malacaster College
Mahon and Editorial Assistant Nathaniel Rosenthalis,
Jim Murphy, Clark University
for helping to attend to the many details involved in
Martin Murray, University of Michigan
preparing a manuscript for production and for ably as-
Jan Nijman, University of Amsterdam
sembling the diverse and helpful review panels men-
Franklin Obeng-Odoom, University of
tioned above. The book you are holding wouldn't have
Technology, Sydney
been possible without Production Editor Christian
Martin Oteng-Ababio, University of Ghana
Holdener’s steady hand on the tiller coordinating the
Sophie Oldfield, University of Cape Town
myriad of tasks required to turn a manuscript into
Francis Owusu, Iowa State University
composited, edited pages supported by a terrific art
George Owusu, University of Ghana
program. Finally, I wish to thank Marketing Manager
Gordon Pirie, University of Cape Town
David Jurman for his tireless work and travel in sup-
Jyotika Ramaprasad, University of Miami
port of the book.
Chris Rogerson, University of Johannesburg
 GARNI WEIR. 4

INTRODUCTION

SETTING THE AFRICAN STAGE Colonialism obliterated numerous artifacts and de-
Africa is the cradle of humanity. Its historic human sig- stroyed many African traditions, and the European
nificance is immense: it is the origin of the earliest written word and European laws and plans were em-
human beings and the land from which peoples mi- phasized at the expense of African oral traditions and
grated to populate Europe, Southeast Asia, and much means of administration.
later the Americas. Archaeological, genetic, and lin- Two major misconceptions of Africa are that it is a
guistic research indicates that peoples migrated from single country or entity and a marginal area. Geo-
Africa to nearby regions around 130,000 years ago. graphically, Africa is an enormous region, roughly
Despite archaeological records chronicling 7 million three and half times larger than the United States. The
years of human traditions, we know comparatively African continent constitutes the second largest land-
little about Africa from 5,000 years ago until the onset mass on Earth, after Eurasia, with one fifth of the plan-
of European colonialism around 1500 CE. Much more et’s land surface. It is larger than the United States,
is known about the European, Asian, and American China, India, Japan, and the entire European region
descendants of the original African peoples than about combined (Fig. 1.1).
their African descendants. Stretching from the tip of Bizerate, Tunisia, to the
Much of Western understanding and contempo- base at Cape Agulhus, South Africa, Africa is 5,000 miles
rary framing of the region has roots in the European (8,000 km) from north to south; from the furthest
colonial experience. The colonial era had many endur- point west on Cape Verde to the furthest point east in
ing legacies, and it is notorious as the time when Somalia (Cape Gwardafuy) it is 4,600 miles (7,400 km)
misconceptions about Africans became entrenched. east to west. The expansive region contains a range of
Colonialism put forward a myth that Africans were climates and biomes that have created conditions
peoples without history. Ancient civilizations (e.g., the conducive to the formation of diverse peoples and
Nubia) and cities dating back to the 11th century (e.g., cultures.
Great Zimbabwe) are just two of many possible exam- A fascinating-map produced by anthropologist
ples that demonstrate unequivocally Africa’s rich and George Murdock in 1959 illustrates the complex ethnic
diverse historical past. It is important to consider that mosaic of ethno-linguistic groups in Africa, with 835
when universities were getting off the ground in distinct groupings (some linguistic experts argue for
Oxford and Cambridge (UK) in the 12th century, Tim- even more groupings) (Fig. 1.2). Whatever the true
buktu (Mali) already had three established universities. number of ethnic groupings in Africa, it is clear that
2 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

The True Size of Africa

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 14TH, 2010 NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM |
PORTUGAL SWITZERLAND

UNITED STATES

FIGURE 1.1 True Graphic of Africa's Size.

colonial partition was enforced with little regard for Contemporary Africa is an amalgamation of many
the spatial boundaries of ethnic groups (their histories, regions and subregions. Dividing it into subregions is
languages, and economic linkages), and this gave rise a useful starting point, but justifying a contemporary
to multi-ethnic states and partitioned ethnic groups regional breakdown of Africa south of the Sahara is
(e.g., the Maasai of Kenya and Tanzania) in an arbitrarily fraught with difficulties. Any attempt to delineate sub-
determined quilt-work of national borders (compare regions is going to be heavily critiqued. No major top-
Fig. 1.2 and Fig. 1.3). There was considerable diversity ographical features partition Africa into regions, and
among ethnic groups with regard to size, areal extents, historic migrations of peoples within Africa led to
and regional power and regional ties and extra-regional shifting regional distributions of the population over
ties. Some societies had large population concentra- time. Regional geographers (e.g., DeBlij, Muller, and
tions and some areas maintained ties within Africa and Nijman 2014) interpret maps of environmental distri-
with distant places in the Middle East, China, and bution, ethnic patterns, and cultural landscapes to yield
India, all before the European colonists arrived, but a four-region structure—West Africa, East Africa, Central
many groups and areas were sparsely populated and Africa, and Southern Africa—and various African coun-
isolated. Nations are far more than multicolored tries are subsumed into these broad regions (Fig. 1.4).
patches on a map: they have internal coherence and These regional classifications provide the basis for the
historical significance and deep ties to places and management of major international organizations’ re-
environments. porting (e.g., the United Nations [UN]) and variously
 Introduction 3

0 280560 1,120 1,680 2,240

eeees Kilometers

FIGURE 1.2 Murdock’s Map of Ethnic Groups. Source: Cole and DeBlij 2007:96. oe

constitute membership in several prominent regional Africa and the North African region to facilitate an eco-
economic and political organizations. The African Union nomic union with a common currency, full mobility of
(AU) holds ambitious plans to complete an African the factors of production (labor, capital, and technol-
Economic Union by 2027, uniting these four regions of ogy), and free trade among the 54 countries.
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ea
ve

FIGURE 1.3 Colonial Boundaries: Heavy Lines Superimposed on Murdock’s 1959 Ethnolinguistic Map
of Africa.
Source: Larson 2011.

Paradoxically, none of the existing regional trade countries and territories whose locational affiliation
groupings demonstrates the unity assumed by broad and appropriateness is debated. For example, Chad
regional classifications, and most regions are com- lies in a transition zone between West, East, and Cen-
posed of several subregional groupings. There are also tral Africa, and its northern section is more aligned
 Introduction 5

iiss sige

Ethiopia
South Sudan
East Africa

Equatorial Guinea id
Uganda
(Gabon,
» Central Africa f ee RRS
X. a Rwanda
m5 Congo CongoDRC Bruni
(

Tanzania

Percent Muslim
., 0-50
51-90 nen de i é :

V/A, A 91 - 99 | Soatneen Africa | v —

ue \ itis | Botswana + liye \ . AX xO G

Be African Transition Zone | ;

“ South AfricaLesotho
4

FIGURE 1.4 Africa’s Regions. Source: Adapted from “Maps of African Transition Zone” (DeBlij 2012:200) and “Map of
Sub-Saharan Regions” (DeBlij, Muller, and Nijman 2014:306).

with North Africa than the rest of the country is. Based _ region south of the Sahara from Guinea in West Africa
on cultural-religious criteria, DeBlij (2012) proposes _ to coastal Tanzania in the East. This is a zone of long-
an addendum to the four-region classification, adding _standing Islamic influence that completely dominates
a middle belt or transition zone that straddles the some countries (e.g., Somalia), dissects others, and
6 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

creates Islamized northern areas and non-Islamic rural. In 2011, 40% of Africans live in cities, and it is
southern zones in some countries (e.g., Nigeria and predicted that by 2050 this figure will rise to 60%. In
Chad, where 51% of the population is Muslim) and the last 27 years, the entire continent's population has
coastal strips in others (e.g., lowland Ethiopia, Kenya, doubled from 500 million to 1 billion, a number pro-
and Tanzania). Its social, political, and geopolitical jected to reach 2 billion by 2050 (UN-HABITAT 2010).
significance is immense. It has been the site of numer- The simultaneous population explosion and rural-
ous wars between Arabs and Africans and is currently urban transformation within the region is nothing
the terrain in which several terror groups operate (e.g., short of spectacular. In East Africa, for example, the
Al-Shabaab, Boko Harman, and Al-Qaeda in the Is- urban population has doubled in the last seven
lamic Maghreb). In recent decades this transition zone years—the shortest doubling of population of any
has expanded southward as the Islamic African popu- region in world history. Since current urbanization
lation has increased. trends indicate that cities are soon to be the habitat for
While regions are a useful starting point in learn- the majority of Africans, now is the time for a thought-
ing about the complexities of Africa, regions and sub- ful examination of what is unfolding. The region’s
regions are artificial constructions, and contemporary population explosion will change the political, social
dynamism in Africa is at the urban rather than at the and economic dynamics within African countries and
regional scale, and urban transformation is having thus their relationship with the rest of the world.
profound implications on rural areas (e.g., drawing The term “urban revolution” is used to portray
rural resources such as food, minerals, and people profound urbanization and its wider societal implica-
into the functioning and expansion of African cities). tions (Parnell and Pieterse 2014; Myers 2011). An
This text works from the standpoint that an extended urban revolution occurs in environments with large
urban approach is better equipped to combine global, gains in population (natural increase of population in
African, and local perspectives in efforts to understand urban areas coupled with high urban migration) within
the profound change that is occurring throughout a short time period. At some tipping point (impossible
urban and rural Africa. to pin down, but when the level of urbanization reaches
In this text, I discuss Africa south of the Sahara (as a significant threshold, perhaps around 40%), society
opposed to the more racist “black Africa” or the Euro- shifts from a rural agrarian-based to an urban orienta-
centric “Sub-Saharan Africa”). North Africa is not in- tion. Of course, urban settlements vary in size and
cluded in the discussion as it merits a study in its own complexity, but urban influence extends well beyond
right. Throughout the pages of this book, “Africa” is the confines of the capital city. Urban settlements
used as shorthand for Africa south of the Sahara. The thrive on commodity production, exchange, diversifi-
global positioning of Africa situates the region at the cation, and differentiation that transcend the ethos of
minimum aggregate distance to other major world household self-sufficiency that prevails in the country-
regions as well as antipodal to the Pacific Ocean. In a side. Over time, the economic division of labor changes,
21st-century context, Africa is centrally located to Asia as and the links between residents and economic agents
well as to Europe, North America, and the Gulf states—a from the world beyond evolve. Eventually all of society,
centrality important to the operation of markets and the to varying degrees, becomes enmeshed in urban affairs.
reach of financial capital in the contemporary era. This is Africa’s urban revolution.
Urbanization in Africa is not yet complete, but its
trajectory seems inevitable. Urbanization is accompa-
THE URBAN REVOLUTION AND EMERGING
nied by sustenance and sustainability activities; stable
RURAL REVOLUTION IN AFRICA
food supply, water, shelter, security, transportation,
The 21st century is the dawn of a new era in Africa. An and communications are all requisites for the densifi-
urban revolution is unfolding. For much of its history, cation of urban settlements. While urban centers are
Africa was the least urbanized region of the world, not the only players in statewide phenomena, national
and its societies and populations were predominately capitals dominate national decision-making processes
 Introduction 7

and debates. These cities host the majority of national in diverse ways to local and transnational urban sites, and
elites and institutions (ministries, courts, universities, transformative change in rural Africa seems inevitable.
banks, etc.) and the emerging middle class in Africa, as An urban vista allows us to confront the rural bias
well as a range of stakeholders whose activities often that affects many studies of Africa, particularly those in
involve them significantly in nationally important the English language. In the past, a major concen-
issues. Voluntary civic and social organizations, such as tration within African studies (a multi-disciplinary
self-help groups, business associations, advocacy groups, association of scholars and specialists of Africa) has
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), charities, pro- been rural affairs: experts in rural studies, peasant stud-
fessional associations, trade unions, student groups, com- ies, and other related fields easily represented the remote
munity groups, and social networking groups, heavily village as the “true” Africa, and development models
populate the urban policy and advocacy terrain. They tended to reinforce this kind of thinking. It is hardly sur-
typically (but not necessarily) pursue more transforma- prising then that most stereotypes of Africa evoke rural
tive agendas and can be rapid responders to unfolding imaginaries of sorts. It is important to underscore again
urbanization challenges, sometimes at odds with the that Africa has a long urban tradition, a history that has
entrenched interests of the political, economic, and until recently been neglected, and that the future of
social elites. Civic and social organizations can provide Africa is likely to be increasingly urban.
checks and balances and encourage more transparent At the same time, we need to be mindful that not
and accountable responsive governance. Serving as only people moving to cities change but also urbanites
change catalysts is not always a smooth process: in many visiting rural Africa and maintaining family homes
instances, certain organizations can be the targets of state and/or second homes or indeed families are change
repression. Urban actors extend their influence through agents. There are sparks of a parallel socio-spatial
information and communication technologies, which transformation in rural areas (Krause 2013): an African
connect urban centers with the entire globe and link rural revolution in the making. Key elements include
tural areas into an urban network. Perhaps the best ex- the spread of mobile phones to even remote African
ample is the uptake of mobile phones, particularly in villages, inflows of remittances, foreign direct invest-
the past 10 years; they have connected urban and rural ment (FDI) in agricultural land, introduction of hybrid
societies like never before in instantaneous communi- seeds and other agricultural technologies, growing di-
cation. Africans now joke that the region has more versification of rural livelihoods, the development of
mobile phones than working toilets. rural infrastructure, and the growth of rural towns and
The scale and scope of urban transformation calls markets that are altering hitherto rural isolation and
for a rethinking of the rural-urban dichotomy that has connecting virtually all areas to rural nodes and urban
underpinned African studies until very recently. A binary centers and even linking them to global circuits. The
division of African societies into urban and rural tends demands of global urban industrial society for various
to mask more varied dynamics, such as mobilities and African resources (gold, diamonds, oil, uranium, timber,
links between rural and urban areas, most saliently ex- etc.) also means that rural Africa is integrated into
pressed in migration flows, circulatory movements, and global circuits, and newer global demands for African-
remittance flows through which urban migrants move sourced food, biofuels, and natural gas will deepen
monies and imported commodities from cities to rural this global integration of rural spaces.
hometowns. An extended urban reach is also under way: Mobile phones reduce the cost of communication
for example, the entry of urban actors into the agrarian over long distances and enable individuals to interact
scene, such as urban-based elites buying up rural land, more easily and frequently with members of their social
signals a new phenomenon. Facebook’s consideration networks, making it easier and faster to ask for help as
of delivering Internet connectivity to rural Africa via the needed. Various combinations such as mobile phone
launch of solar-powered drones (if the project gets im- and remittances are very transformative and powerful,
plemented and works) could profoundly change rural providing a channel to tap funds for launching small
Africa (Wired 2014). Thus, rural environments are linked businesses, deliver financial security to migrant workers’
8 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

families, and provide emergency funds that help mitigate land” (Goldman 2011:65). However, the socio-spatial
the effects of natural or political shocks. The latter pro- transformation of rural Africa is still at a preliminary
vides the first-ever insurance mechanism in rural Africa. stage and therefore not easy to assess, but there are
Reductions in communication costs improve access passionate debates about the changes.
to all kinds of information. For example, poor, rural, Krause (2013) contends that there is a ruralization
semiliterate farmers can now obtain almost instant in- of the world that is subsumed within the urbaniza-
formation on the likely impact of a drought, food tion of the world. This is spatially represented in the
shortage, or cholera epidemic by accessing information sponge ofthe urban fringe or peri-urban edge, a porous
via a mobile phone (Rothberg and Aker 2013). Farmers in-between zone that is neither urban nor rural in its
can now obtain real-time information about grain character or governance (Pieterse and Parnell 2014).
prices in proximate and distant markets, and traders Examples abound of rural migrants practicing urban
can use this same market information to move grains agriculture and adopting rural lifestyles and practices
from low-price to high-price areas so markets operate in Africa’s cities, and urban phenomena in rural areas
more efficiently and more equitably. A pioneering pro- such as a growing diversity within the informal rural
gram called iCow (2013) in Kenya enables small farm- economy and international migrants moving to engage
ers to access agricultural services and information (e.g., in commercial farm labor. One the most contentious
information about gestation, access to veterinarians and issues in rural Affica is offshoring food farming,
artificial inseminators) over the mobile phone. Dairy whereby investors from the Gulf states, India, and to a
farmers using iCow services report significant increases lesser extent China aim to develop commercial farms
in milk production and a gain of US$78 per month in to produce food for urban markets outside of Africa.
rural Kenya (iCow 2013). Mobile phone technology
therefore provides new benefits that are transforming
THE CONCEPT OF “AFRICA”
the everyday lives of rural Africans.
Rural Africa was never a static place, and develop- The origin of the word “Africa” is unknown, but experts
ment policy interventions have always sought to im- trace it to Latin (Africa = sunny) and Greek (Aphrike =
prove societies but the rural arena is now in play more not cold). Cartographic evidence from the sixth century
so than at any time since the introduction of colonial shows that the Romans identified a region as Africa on
plantation agriculture. Global agro-corporations, inter- early maps of the world; however, they had knowledge
national financial capitalists, and their domestic part- only of the northern parts of the continent. Much later,
ners have turned their attention and investment funds around the 11th century, Europeans began to use “Africa”
toward rural Africa. The livelihoods and culture of mil- to refer to the land south of the Sahara. The evolution of
lions of Africans are at stake. Rural Africa has become Africa as a cartographic reality through delineating and
more unsettled, and tensions are escalating among ag- refining the contours of the continent on maps contrib-
ricultural interest groups (small family farms vs. large uted to the conception of “Africa” as a unified cultural
industrial farms, pastoralists vs. nomadic farmers, reality that continues to permeate popular thought. Al-
forest farmers vs. the timber industry, food producers though similarities among peoples and groups are likely,
vs. biofuel producers), raising the important question we cannot deduce from their mere coexistence on the
of what is the fastest way to lift most rural people out of same continent that one cultural reality existed. Africa is
poverty. Traditional agriculture is under threat: many of not one country or place and Africans are not one people:
the new ideas on conservation, tourism, and commer- the region comprises a rich mosaic of peoples, places,
cial farming (e.g., producing food to be sent to food cultures, economies, languages, and political systems.
markets abroad) entail complete breaks with tradi- Indeed, Africa as a region is very much a geograph-
tional activities and practices. Some new projects are ical accident. Even African philosophers struggle with
being hailed as successes, such as the development of hor- the concept of “Africa” and point out that interre-
ticulture exports in Kenya for urban markets in Europe. gional encounters have led to constructions of a wider
Other projects, such as wildlife conservation efforts in spatial stage for Africa but not a unitary Afrocentric
Tanzania, have made the Maasai “strangers in their own narrative. As evidenced by historical records, extensive
 Introduction 9

dispersal of many peoples of Africa throughout the lost decades, enduring poverty, hopelessness, horrific
world meant that Africans were internationalizing diseases, etc.
well before the contemporary period of what academics The most prominent anticolonial thinker of the
and policy makers have termed “transnationalism.” Mi- 20th century, Frantz Fanon (1966), asserts the psycho-
gration, however, does not confirm peoples’ conscious- logical effects of colonialism on subjects’ engendered
ness of living in or originating from a region termed feelings of dependency and inferiority: subjects were
Africa. It takes time for complex networking to develop taught to aspire to be Europeans but could never do
among cultures, economies, and societies and for territo- enough to be accepted. Sartre (1966:7), in his preface to
ries and landscapes to be inscribed with common mean- Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, conveys the indecency
ings. At most, groups created their own “little Africas,” of Europe's manufacturing of an indigenous colonial
each laying the foundations of African identify across a elite: “They picked out promising young adolescents,
much larger area. Clearly, this is no different than peo- they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the
ples in Europe and in the Americas struggling with their principles of Western culture; they stuffed their mouths
own regional spatial consciousness. In sum, for Africans, full with high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words
“Africa” was never a single place. that stuck to the teeth. After a short stay in the mother
Unfortunately, Africa as a concept is as much a prod- country they were sent home, whitewashed. These walk-
uct of modern race thinking as it is an obvious cultural ing lies had nothing left to say to their brothers.” Ex-
and historical region. Historically, Western societies have treme social distance was preserved by the continuation
represented Africa in their desperate desire to assert of Western narratives telling us what Africa societies are
Western difference from the rest of the world (the “West” not and relating little about what they are.
category could also be unpacked, but that is beyond the Western media concentrate on negative crisis re-
scope of this book). In the Western imagination, Africa is porting about Africa (hunger, famine, starvation, en-
often an empty category juxtaposed against the full, de- demic violence, conflict and war, and HIV/AIDS).
veloped, modern West. Western writers have consistently Such one-sided, incomplete information about Africa
depicted Africans as “others” (Edgar Rice Burroughs’ is a self-perpetuating growth industry. The Western
Tarzan, set in fictionalized Africa, is a classic example; imaginary is further impeded by the preoccupation
never having set foot in Africa did not hinder Burroughs’ with the “animalization of Africa.” Television chan-
ability to capture the Western imagination of Africa or nels (e.g., Animal Planet and Discovery) and numer-
contribute to white outsiders’ perspectives). Common ous documentaries focus on wild Africa and safari
fantasies and myths depicted Africa in the most deroga- Africa. Economic fundamentals of the Western media
tory ways: “a dark continent,” “a mysterious place,” with business explain some of this bias. Media conglomer-
endless tropes of tribalism, savagery, and chaos. Wole ates from the United States and Europe traditionally
Soyinka (2012:3), Nigerian Nobel Laureate in Literature, controlled much of the news that flows into and out of
emphasizes that the darkness of Africa was due to “the Africa. Media transnationals control what is reported
cataract in the eye of the beholder.” Writings that as- about the entire world and how it is reported and ex-
serted the superiority of the West were an instrumental ported to the African media. The commercialization
part of the domination of colonial peoples. Despite the and corporate control of the news mean that the West-
obvious commercial imperatives of European colonial- ern media are profit-driven; they select coverage on
ism, Europeans portrayed their conquests as noble altru- what is good for the bottom line. Crisis-driven journal-
ism (e.g., referred to by English poet Rudyard Kipling ism that churns out fast, short-byte news stories and
as “the white man’s burden”). attention-grabbing headlines with little in-depth re-
In the past, deeply embedded assumptions and ste- porting or proper contextualizing is all too common
reotypes about Africa too easily informed popular writ- in the West. A possible exception is the UK Guardian
ings, academic research, and development policies and newspaper, which has the most in-depth and consis-
now hinder knowledge creation and real learning. Many tent coverage of the region. These days, however, the
contemporary narratives recycle old assumptions and media landscape is becoming more populated in
clichés about Africa: failed states, development failures, Africa, and CCTV (China) and Al-Jazeera (Qatar) have
10 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

made great headway; more Africans and other people little has flowed back to the community (80% of the
from around the world are learning about the region Maasai live below the poverty line). Companies like
from non-Western media houses. Louis Vuitton (France) appropriated Maasai designs for
Western photojournalists have had a powerful their 2012 fashion collection (Fig. 1.5). All of this ex-
effect in depicting conflict, disease, rape, and poverty ternal commercial exploitation has promoted the
as staples of their coverage. African photojournalists Maasai to fight back and begin a process of trademark-
have been documenting other sides to life in Africa for ing their brand, illustrating the collision of regional
years (e.g., African fashion, art, and buildings and culture, capitalism, and identify in 21st-century Africa.
more humanistic everyday lives), but their more hope- The Maasai Intellectual Property Initiative (MIPI 2013)
ful and positive images do not fit the prevailing narra- in partnership with the U.S. NGO Light Years IP was
tive. The power imbalances among those in the Global launched in 2012 to reclaim the Maasai’s economic
North seeing ofa one-sided view ofAfrica, those being rights to their iconic image (estimated to be worth sev-
watched (the sufferers in Africa), and other Africans eral million dollars per year).
such as those who are thriving have never been so Negative and incomplete imagery allows groups in
acute. A very low knowledge base on Africa (most U.S. the West to claim they are “saving” Africa by their hu-
students know only a handful of African countries) manitarian interventions, a problematic contention.
allows the media to continue their role in educating Some humanitarian groups do great work and change
the masses about what kind of a place it is. lives (e.g., the Millennium Villages Project has changed
Lack of cultural understanding of Africa and African the lives of thousands of rural villagers), but there will
cultures has enabled the global fashion industry to always be well-meaning but frivolous groups that get in
usurp African designs and cultures. Cultural exploita- the way with misguided initiatives (e.g., Knickers 4
tion accompanied by cultural insensitivity is common. Africa, a small British women’s group that collects used
For example, Western companies have employed iconic underwear for export to Africa). Negative, outdated, and
cultural brands like the Maasai to make money, and misplaced representations of Africa mean that many

FIGURE 1.5 Louis Vuitton’s Maasai Collection. Source: © Thomas Mukoya/Reuters/Corbis.

 Introduction 11

governments (e.g., the United States) do not have clear Northerners with feelings of superiority. There is power
and relevant Africa policies or a geographically informed in who gets to tell the story and how the Western story
citizenry that can debate and demand Africa policies. has become the definitive story of Africa. We need
Africa is a vast and complex region and defies easy more complex, nuanced, and balanced assessments of
definition. The closest to an accurate definition may be Africans and their continent as subjects in their own
found perhaps in Sierra Leone poet Abisoeh Nicol’s right rather than as objects. Africa is not a single coun-
(1950) poem that speaks to the essence of an African try or a uniform place. Africans have diverse histories,
definition of Africa as well as to a Euro-Afrocentric multiple trajectories, and various and complex interac-
conceptualization: tions among themselves and with outsiders; there are
great differences in resources among the regions and
You are not a country, Africa,
states ofAfrica.
You are a concept,
Even now, simplified narratives of Africa are retro-
Fashioned in our minds, each to each,
fitted for today’s youth. For instance, the documentary
To hide our separate fears
Kony 2012 became a viral sensation and Facebook phe-
To dream our separate dreams.
nomenon (86 million people watched the 30-minute
—Abisoeh Nicol, “The Meaning ofAfrica” (ca. 1950)
movie in March 2012). The documentary was made by
Despite the lack of a precise definition, Africa lives a U.S.-based campaign organization, Invisible Chil-
on as a real category. African states like all states are in- dren, and it focused on Ugandan warlord Joseph Kony
ventions, but the primary difference is that African states and his role in child abductions. The video motivated
were not constructed by their inhabitants but rather young people across the world to care about an issue
from the outside by Europeans, many of whom never in a “distant land” and to act as a pressure group to
set foot in the region. Imposed and acted upon by in- bring Kony to justice in a strong example of pop hu-
ternational organizations and their official reports, it is manitarianism (join the movement, sign petitions,
a geographical entity. Wide arrays of actors on the con- donate, purchase “action kit” merchandise, put up fliers,
tinent understand their situation and act based on a and encourage governments to capture the fugitive).
concept of the region and Africa’s place in the world. The video came under heavy criticism for its simple
(Listen to the Institute of Development Studies’ [IDS good-and-evil message and its promotion of blind
2012] podcast on how the British media provide imbal- action, overlooking the agency of locals and failing to
anced accounts of Africa news.) Defying an easy and understand the local context. Invisible Children’s spend-
simple explanation, Africa has become an inconvenient ing practices were critiqued (less than one third of its
continent to understand; it does not fit many of the budget went to on-the-ground programs). The docu-
major development paradigms, but it is a spatial stage mentary did not resonate well with many groups, espe-
that has increasing relevance in the 21st century. cially Northern Ugandans, who saw it as a simplified
Old representations of Africa need to be reconsid- portrayal of complex events—not to mention that
ered. Several of them, overly reproduced in the Global Kony had left the region for the Central African Repub-
North, grossly simplify and distort understandings of lic five years earlier. Since the campaign, the United
the complexity of Africa. First, there is the romanti- States has deployed 100 U.S. Special Forces personnel
cized image of the “noble savage” living in primitive to the region to assist governments in tracking Kony,
unspoiled rural settings in harmony with nature. This and a 2013 Crownfunding campaign (“Expedition
representation conjures up images of innocence and a Kony”) fell way short of its campaign goal to raise
lost paradise. Second, there is the representation of US$450,000 to launch an expedition to the capture
difference, which leads to a generalized “other.” Third, the fugitive. The Kony phenomenon may be supported
an urban underdevelopment representation highlights by a well-intentioned youth movement with a social
poverty, suffering, and lack of employment, with images conscience, but it falls into the old trap of Westerners
of helplessness and hopelessness. When these represen- knowing what is best for Africa and a Western message
tations dominate, they can inadvertently imbue Global that simplifies on-the-ground complexities.
12 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

A single story is always problematic because one the “discovery of the African continent” by Europeans.
storyteller has to begin somewhere and sometime Of course, it is important to ask why the Chinese waited
before proceeding to a middle and an end. For in- so long to divulge the map’s existence and to counter
stance, if we start the story of Africa with the arrival of Eurocentric narratives of Africa's “discovery.”
the Europeans, we get one particular account. If we The scramble for Africa and China’s deepening
begin the story with the arrival of the Chinese, we get a engagement with many African states are important
very different account. If we start the story with the fail- reasons. Also, this is a time when African states have
ure of African political leadership and with the arrival increased self-confidence and there is a resurgence of
of Europeans, we arrive at yet another story. (Listen to interest in and attention to Africa’s place in the world
the TED talk by Nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie and to the world’s place in Africa. Educated Africans
[2009].) Any single story may well feed into stereo- are now more acutely aware of the power ofthe inter-
types that emphasize difference rather than similarity, national media in creating a global imagination
making it virtually impossible to engage with people about Africa and how the media are prone to stereo-
or a region fairly. A fundamental problem with stereo- typing Africans. (Listen to the BBC’s [2011] podcast
types is their incompleteness: only more in-depth ex- and award-wining play Silhouettes to hear an African
aminations can bring forward a balance of stories. account of Hollywood's depiction of African accents, vo-
A revisionist story has recently emerged about China cabulary, and modes of reasoning.) Africans are now pro-
engaging with Africa, particularly with East Africa, long viding a fuller picture of Africa that is more easily
before the Europeans. It has come to light, with the accessible because of the Internet. African news maga-
circulation of a rare map, “Great Ming Amalgamated zines (eg., African Business and the French-language
Map of 1389,” that Chinese cartographers produced the Jeune Afrique) and various African news websites and
earliest, most complete Africa exterior map (Europeans blogs now provide direct information from Africa.
had no cartographic knowledge of the southern part of Unfortunately, the dominance of the West's negative
Africa at that time). This map, drawn on a large tapestry, representations of Africa is exemplified in how the pop-
had been stored carefully within historical archives in ular Western media write about Africa (See Box 1.1) and
Beijing, China. Less than a decade ago, the Chinese it is also reflects the marginalization of Africa’s social
government decided to publicize the map’s existence, scientific scholarship. Africa’s share of social science
authorizing the South African government to reproduce knowledge production (measured by papers on Webs of
the tapestry for a 2004 map exhibition at the South Knowledge [citation indexes]) has been declining for
African Parliament in Cape Town. The existence of the several decades. Many scholars in Africa publish via
map showed that direct communications between local outlets; by default, this typically results in making
China and Africa took place over 100 years earlier than their scholarship invisible to mainstream North-centric

BOX 1.1 HOW TO WRITE ABOUT AFRICA thin people who are starving. Or it is hot and steamy with very
short people who eat primates. Don’t get bogged down with
Always use the word ‘Africa’ or ‘Darkness’ or ‘Safari’ in your title.
precise descriptions. Africa is big: fifty-four countries, 900 million
Subtitles may include the words ‘Zanzibar’, ‘Masai’, ‘Zulu’, ‘Zam-
people who are too busy starving and dying and warring and
bezi’, ‘Congo’, ‘Nile’, ‘Big’, ‘Sky’, ‘Shadow’, ‘Drum’, ‘Sun’ or
emigrating to read your book. The continent is full of deserts,
‘Bygone’. Also useful are words such as ‘Guerrillas’, ‘Timeless’,
jungles, highlands, savannahs and many other things, but your
‘Primordial’ and ‘Tribal’. Note that ‘People’ means Africans who
reader doesn't care about all that, so keep your descriptions ro-
are not black, while ‘The People’ means black Africans.
mantic and evocative and unparticular.
Never have a picture of a well-adjusted African on the cover
Make sure you show how Africans have music and rhythm
of your book, or in it, unless that African has won the Nobel
deep in their souls, and eat things no other humans eat. Do not
Prize. An AK-47, prominent ribs, naked breasts: use these. If you
mention rice and beef and wheat; monkey-brain is an African‘s
must include an African, make sure you get one in Masai or Zulu
cuisine of choice, along with goat, snake, worms and grubs and
or Dogon dress.
all manner of game meat. Make sure you show that you are able
In your text, treat Africa as if it were one country. It is hot and
to eat such food without flinching, and describe how you learn
dusty with rolling grasslands and huge herds of animals and tall,
to enjoy it—because you care.
 Introduction 13

Taboo subjects: ordinary domestic scenes, love between just make do in mundane circumstances. Have them illuminate
Africans (unless a death is involved), references to African writers something about Europe or America in Africa. African characters
or intellectuals, mention of school-going children who are not should be colourful, exotic, larger than life—but empty inside,
suffering from yaws or Ebola fever or female genital mutilation. with no dialogue, no conflicts or resolutions in their stories, no
Throughout the book, adopt a sotto voice, in conspiracy with depth or quirks to confuse the cause.
the reader, and a sad I-expected-so-much tone. Establish early on Describe, in detail, naked breasts (young, old, conservative, re-
that your liberalism is impeccable, and mention near the begin- cently raped, big, small) or mutilated genitals, or enhanced geni-
ning how much you love Africa, how you fell in love with the place tals. Or any kind of genitals. And dead bodies. Or, better, naked
and can’t live without her. Africa is the only continent you can dead bodies. And especially rotting naked dead bodies. Remem-
love—take advantage of this. If you are a man, thrust yourself ber, any work you submit in which people look filthy and miserable
into her warm virgin forests. If you are a woman, treat Africa as a will be referred to as the ‘real Africa’, and you want that on your
man who wears a bush jacket and disappears off into the sunset. dust jacket. Do not feel queasy about this: you are trying to help
Africa is to be pitied, worshipped or dominated. Whichever them to get aid from the West. The biggest taboo in writing about
angle you take, be sure to leave the strong impression that with- Africa is to describe or show dead or suffering white people.
out your intervention and your important book, Africa is doomed. Animals, on the other hand, must be treated as well rounded,
Your African characters may include naked warriors, loyal ser- complex characters. They speak (or grunt while tossing their
vants, diviners and seers, ancient wise men living in hermitic splen- manes proudly) and have names, ambitions and desires. They
dour. Or corrupt politicians, inept polygamous travel-guides, and also have family values: see how lions teach their children? Ele-
prostitutes you have slept with. The Loyal Servant always behaves phants are caring, and are good feminists or dignified patriarchs.
like a seven-year-old and needs a firm hand; he is scared of snakes, So are gorillas. Never, ever say anything negative about an ele-
good with children, and always involving you in his complex do- phant or a gorilla. Elephants may attack people's property, de-
mestic dramas. The Ancient Wise Man always comes from a noble stroy their crops, and even kill them. Always take the side of the
tribe (not the money-grubbing tribes like the Gikuyu, the Igbo or elephant. Big cats have public-school accents. Hyenas are fair
the Shona). He has rheumy eyes and is close to the Earth. The game and have vaguely Middle Eastern accents. Any short Afri-
Modern African is a fat man who steals and works in the visa office, cans who live in the jungle or desert may be portrayed with
refusing to give work permits to qualified Westerners who really good humour (unless they are in conflict with an elephant or
care about Africa. He is an enemy of development, always using chimpanzee or gorilla, in which case they are pure evil).
his government job to make it difficult for pragmatic and good- After celebrity activists and aid workers, conservationists are
hearted expats to set up NGOs or Legal Conservation Aréas. Or Africa's most important people. Do not offend them. You need
he is an Oxford-educated intellectual turned serial-killing politician them to invite you to their 30,000-acre game ranch or ‘conserva-
in a Savile Row suit. He is a cannibal who likes Cristal champagne, tion area’, and this is the only way you will get to interview the
and his mother is a rich witch-doctor who really runs the country. celebrity activist. Often a book cover with a heroic-looking con-
Among your characters you must always include The Starving servationist on it works magic for sales. Anybody white, tanned
African, who wanders the refugee camp nearly naked, and waits and wearing khaki who once had a pet antelope or a farm is a
for the benevolence of the West. Her children have flies on their conservationist, one who is preserving Africa's rich heritage.
eyelids and pot bellies, and her breasts are flat and empty. She When interviewing him or her, do not ask how much funding
must look utterly helpless. She can have no past, no history; such they have; do not ask how much money they make off their
diversions ruin the dramatic moment. Moans are good. She must game. Never ask how much they pay their employees.
never say anything about herself in the dialogue except to speak Readers will be put off if you don’t mention the light in Africa.
of her (unspeakable) suffering. Also be sure to include a warm And sunsets, the African sunset is a must. It is always big and
and motherly woman who has a rolling laugh and who is con- red. There is always a big sky. Wide empty spaces and game are
cerned for your well-being. Just call her Mama. Her children are critical—Africa is the Land of Wide Empty Spaces. When writing
all delinquent. These characters should buzz around your main about the plight of flora and fauna, make sure you mention that
hero, making him look good. Your hero can teach them, bathe Africa is overpopulated. When your main character is in a desert
them, feed them; he carries lots of babies and has seen Death. or jungle living with indigenous peoples (anybody short) it is
Your hero is you (if reportage), or a beautiful, tragic international okay to mention that Africa has been severely depopulated by
celebrity/aristocrat who now cares for animals (if fiction). Aids and War (use caps).
Bad Western characters may include children of Tory cabinet You'll also need a nightclub called Tropicana, where mercenar-
ministers, Afrikaners, employees of the World Bank. When talk- ies, evil nouveau riche Africans and prostitutes and guerrillas
ing about exploitation by foreigners mention the Chinese and and expats hang out.
Indian traders. Blame the West for Africa's situation. But do not Always end your book with Nelson Mandela saying something
be too specific. : about rainbows or renaissances. Because you care.
Broad brushstrokes throughout are good. Avoid having the
African characters laugh, or struggle to educate their kids, or Source: Binyavanga Wainaina (2005).
14 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

social scientists. Moreover, South Africa, Nigeria, and and increased economic momentum have appeared,
Kenya account for 75% (mostly produced by leading garnering very positive pro-business assessments. The
universities within these countries) of Africa’s academic Economist magazine reports that six African economies
publications in the social sciences. It is very worrisome registered among the top ten fastest-growing economies
that many African countries continue to publish a negli- in the world for the last decade (2001-11) (Angola
gible proportion of research and writing on Africa. 11.1%, Nigeria 8.9%, Ethiopia 8.4%, Chad 7.9%,
Mozambique 7.9%, and Rwanda 7.6%), and the aver-
age African economy is forecasted to outpace its Asian
THE “NEW AFRICA” GROWTH STORY counterparts over the next five years (Fig. 1.6).
In recent years, a number of decidedly upbeat economic In 2000, The Economist regrettably labeled Africa
examinations of leading African countries’ performance “the hopeless continent.” However, the World Bank

Guinea-
Bissau

Liberta
Sierra Equatorial Guinea
Leone
Sao Tomé & Principe

00
Seychelles
BB Above 10%
Comoros
7.5% to 10%
ey 5% to 7.5%
2.5% to 5%
[) Below 2.5%
9
Mauritius

FIGURE 1.6 Africa’s GDP Growth (2012-2016 forecast). Source: EIU 2012:2.
 Introduction 15

believes that Africa could be on the brink of an eco- regional office from Windsor, England, to Johannesburg,
nomic takeoff, much like the one that China witnessed South Africa; and global corporations are promoting
30 years ago and the one that India has undergone Africans to manage African markets. To avoid any claims
since 1995. Some business stories have hyped Africa as of being outside invaders, global corporations are em-
the consumer market frontier. Some of largest global phasizing corporate social responsibilities on the ground.
players (e.g., Coca-Cola) are steering the way with es- For instance, Coca-Cola has committed US$30 million
tablished footholds. Coca-Cola’s market presence in (2009-15) for a variety of community-based initiatives
Africa already surpasses its market penetration in throughout Africa (e.g., hygiene education, HIV/AIDS
China or India. Africa is “in play” again because inter- and malaria prevention). Coca-Cola’s sophisticated net-
national capital has access to the region (and this is work of 900,000 retail outlets throughout the continent
not just limited to European capital, as was the case in presents significant distribution opportunities (condoms
the colonial period). Barron’s, a financial news publica- have been distributed via some of Coca-Cola’s channels)
tion lauds Africa as “the final frontier” for investment (Mahajan 2009).
and marketing opportunities. Wall Street is taking Africa experts have put forward various strands of
notice: the first fund exclusively focused on Africa was a more positive assessment on “Africa’s turn.” Four
introduced in 2010 (Nile Pan Africa Fund trades on the fundamental changes are igniting this turn. First, there
stock market as NAFAX). In truth, it is not all of Africa has been a catching up and a closing of the gap be-
but a cohort of 17 African countries (with 300 million tween Africa's economic performance and that of
people) that is leading the way, with another six coun- more developed regions. From 2000 to 2008, conti-
tries showing promising but less steady improvement nental Africa’s annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP )
(Radelet 2010). In 2010, private equity firms raised growth was 4.9%, making it the world’s third fastest-
US$1.5 billion for projects in Africa. growing region (after Asia and the Middle East). This
A segment of the business press focuses on bottom- continental growth rate is more than twice the average
of-the-pyramid opportunities (developing business growth rate in each of the two preceding decades. The
models that target the poorest consumers, typically those growth trajectory could be even more impressive, but
that earn less than US$2.50 per day): the sum of infrastructure deficiencies trim an estimated 2% from
Africa's poor population is very lucrative when busi- growth per year.
nesses can tap into large volumes of small increments Second, improved internal macroeconomic man-
in purchasing power. The consumer product invasion agement in many African states, combined with many
of the world’s poor, not surprisingly, is heavily cri- successes in ending political conflicts, has led to an
tiqued. For example, major ethical as well as health improved business climate in the formal sphere (mea-
objections have been raised about targeting soft drinks sured by reductions in the costs of doing business and
at people eking out a living (where discretionary in the time it takes to start up a new business), whereby
spending is scarce and monies may be diverted away African leaders have sought to harness global capital
from more productive expenditures into the consump- and expertise to promote free market economies in
tion of empty calories). Nevertheless, when money their respective states. The “peace dividend,” after years
can be made, corporations will focus on the bottom and decades of conflict and military rule in some
line. Thinking that the poor of today could be the places, and the tilt toward democracy are producing a
middle class of the future has led to a fundamental tilt management dividend and making the region more
in consumer marketing strategies and adds Africa to attractive to international investors. According to the
the marketing focus. Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), two thirds of
There is far more to the bottom of the pyramid than global companies (based on a survey of 217 global cor-
hype. Changing perceptions of Africans are altering cor- porations) have prioritized expansion in Africa within
porate behaviors. For instance, Siemens, operating for the next decade. ©
over 150 years in Africa, for the first time in its history Third, a new generation of policymakers, activists,
has established a separate African organization within and business leaders are emerging across Africa. They
the corporate structure; Coca-Cola switched its African are Africans to the core but with a global perspective
16 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

derived from the Internet age, easier international the development of Africa’s industry and infrastruc-
travel and communication, and greater exposure to ture. This nationalist model ran out of steam by the
current trends and international thinking. Fed up with mid-1980s.
unaccountable governments of the past, they are Of colossal importance, China has exploded onto
bringing new ideas, energy, and vision to the table. the African scene, influencing trade, investment, aid,
They have been called the “cheetah generation” for not and diplomatic relationships. It is now Africa’s largest
relating to the old colonist paradigm, the slave trade, trading partner, but its engagement is uneven: the bulk
or the internal-oriented nationalism of the early inde- of China’s trade and investment is concentrated in
pendence days. (Listen to Ayittey’s 2007 TED talk.) resource-rich countries (e.g., South Africa, Zambia,
Fourth, the African debt crisis is winding down, Angola, and Sudan in particular). China’s infrastruc-
and improving interactions with donors are now evi- ture commitments alone now surpass those of the
dent. Relationships with the World Bank and the Inter- World Bank (the most prominent development orga-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) are much less adversarial nization in Africa until recently). The “China effect”
than they had been in the mid-1980s (when countries has coincided with a surge of investment flows into the
were forced to comply with IMF mandates) and are region, which peaked at US$87 billion in 2007 (before
now healthier, moving from crisis management to the global financial downturn that began in 2008).
more forward-thinking development. China’s effect is everywhere: Figure 1.7 shows the
Several components of Africa’s economic turn- African Union headquarters built by the Chinese.
around are important. There is, without doubt, an ele- Large numbers of new investors provided an im-
ment of learning from past mistakes: African governments portant buffer that has protected much of Africa from
are evolving from their roles as merely recipients of West- the steep decline experienced by other world regions
ern governmental aid and development industries and during the global recession. Despite the global eco-
are becoming more assertive in their desire to act as nomic downturn, engagement between China and
“partners” in the development of their states. Fortunately, Africa appears to be strengthening: Beijing has con-
a partnership mantra also coincides with the changing cluded various memoranda of understanding with Af-
rhetoric of the global development community. In recent rican governments (e.g., US$23 billion of investment
resource deals that have taken place in the context of in- is committed to Nigerian oil refineries). China leads
tensified global competition for commodities, African the way among the emerging economic powerhouses
governments appear to possess a newfound bargaining known as the “BRIC” countries (Brazil, Russia, India,
power. Buyers are motivated to offer upfront payments, and China). Along with other countries such as Turkey
build infrastructure in return, and even share manage- and Malaysia, it can engage Africa free of the North’s
ment skills and technology. African governments’ en-
larged role allows them to coordinate multiple suppliers
across industries, secure financing, and strike multiple
deals simultaneously, installing them in the driver's seat;
this contrasts to their backseat position in economic de-
velopment from 1980 to 2000. Democratic trends have
resulted in investment dividends by promoting the
region as less risky for international investment and have
encouraged more domestic investment. Historically, do-
mestic business had not been systematically involved in
Africa's development. Following independence, govern-
ments tended to view the private sector with suspicion,
and local entrepreneurs with the requisite capital and
skills were scarce. In these contexts, state-owned enter- FIGURE 1.7 African Union Headquarters, Addis Ababa.
prises emerged as the main institutions for promoting Source: © Wolfgang Kumm/dpa/Corbis.
 Introduction 17

historical baggage but with enough clout to offer an are even more ambitious. New technological cities
alternative to the Global North and the traditional in- were launched in 2013: the Konza Technological City
ternational financial apparatus. A discourse of both (Kenya) and Hope City (Ghana). The Hope City proj-
difference and similarity is evoked to frame relation- ect, just outside the capital city of Accra, will construct
ships between the BRIC countries and Africa. The Africa’s tallest building in a 75-story mixed-use develop-
bottom line is that Western development models are ment serving several hundred technology companies,
no longer “the only game in town”: many African lead- 50,000 workers, and 25,000 residents.
ers have witnessed the rise of Asia in their own life- Africa’s long-term growth will increasingly reflect
time. A tilt toward Asia is also happening within the interrelated social and demographic trends that are
inner circle of national policymaking. For instance, all creating new engines of domestic growth. Of critical
four international advisers on Kenya’s key national importance here are projections that forecast contin-
planning body come from East Asia. Pamphlets used ued urbanization and the rise of middle-class African
to train cadres in Ethiopia's ruling party, the Ethiopian consumers and the transformation of all urban settle-
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, use the ex- ments (See Box 1.2 on urbanization and small town in
amples of Taiwan, South Korea, and China as best East Africa). The middle class (arbitrarily defined as
practices of state intervention. those earning US$5,000 and above) hovers around
The traditional Western aid cartel in Africa is being 85 million households but is projected to increase to
challenged on many fronts. India, Brazil, and the Gulf 128 million households by 2020. Incomes of US$5,000
states play by different rules, with different assistance and above are of vital importance in consumer market-
models closely linked to commerce. In 2009, a group ing because at this threshold people start spending
of 31 businesses from Singapore sent a delegation to roughly half their income on items other than food.
explore business opportunities in Africa; this would The African middle class, defined in terms of wealth,
have been unthinkable 15 year earlier. International and presumably in aspirations and attitudes as well, is
investments in Africa now surpass foreign aid flows, expected to enlarge. Africa’s emerging middle class is
possibly breaking Africa’s decades-old addiction to attracting the attention of multinational retailers and
Western aid. service providers. Shiny new shopping malls, interna-
Initially investments flowed into extractive indus- tional hotel chains, and global fast-food outlets are be-
tries (mining, oil, and gas), underlining the impor- coming more of acommon sight in many African cities
tance of Africa’s rich resource base. The continent's (Turok 2013). Middle-class members of the global vil-
abundance of natural resources, including 10% of the lage are mobilizing via social media and the Internet
world’s oil reserves, 40% of its gold, and 80% to 90% and deploying mobile technologies in innovative ways
of chromium and platinum, has boosted recent growth (Rotberg 2013). Middle-class Africans want urban jobs,
rates. However, investors are now diversifying into a not farm employment, and they strive to hold their
range of sectors, including wholesale and retail, tour- leaders accountable to standards of responsible gover-
ism, financial services, telecommunications, transporta- nance and transparency.
tion, construction, and manufacturing. The technology Africa's population is increasing significantly, and
sector is attracting international as well as African in- this is both an opportunity and a challenge. Half of all
vestors. Africa is breaking into light manufacturing and the persons born in the world from now until 2050
information technology, from call centers to mobile will be Africans (Rotberg 2013:12). An African region
phone platforms to movies to video gaming. Nigerian comprising 2 billion people will be accompanied by
companies are leading the way in developing Africa- major shifts in the sizes of African countries and cities.
themed movies and video-gaming content; for exam- For example, Nigeria) now home to 174 million
ple, popular video games in 2013 include “My Village,” people, will grow to 730 million by the end of the cen-
“Lagos Traffic,” and “The Tribes.” Sizable technology tury, becoming the third most populous country in the
clusters are evident, such as Bollywood (Nigeria), iHub world. In the decades ahead, there will be many more
(Kenya), and CyberCity (Mauritius). Newer projects people aged between 15 and 35 years than in any other
18 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 1.2 URBANIZATION IN SMALL TOWNS and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Its comparatively tranquil
IN EAST AFRICA location near a regional hotspot of civil strife and instability has
served as a major advantage, especially in the cross-border trade
East Africa is the least urbanized region in Africa, but population of foodstuffs. Severe droughts across the region compelled sev-
projections indicate that it will grow at the fastest rate in Africa eral governments, including that of Tanzania, to ban food exports
in the coming decades. in 2011 to increase national stocks, although indirectly this has
East Africa provides an important illustration that most of resulted in an expansion of lucrative informal cross-border trade.
Africa's population lives not in capital cities but in secondary Furthermore, the town’s location within the Geita regional district
cities and smaller towns, some of which are growing at stealth but bordering the Biharamulo regional district spurred interre-
rates and will eventually become large settlements. The fact that gional investments that concentrated in Katoro. Biharamulo’s re-
migrants are showing signs of shunning capital and apex cities strictions on building in the local mining town of Matabe because
and instead relocating to small, coalescing urban settlements is of its location within a forest preserve resulted in a boom in
noteworthy. Some of these smaller settlements are already ex- Katoro as cash-flush miners sought easy, local investment outlets
periencing rates of growth exceeding those of Africa's largest that would circumvent Biharamulo’s taxes.
urban centers. They provide evidence of the emergence and Within the past 25 years, Katoro evolved in this context from
consolidation of an urban hierarchy that is part and parcel of the a village into a regional trading node, exhibiting higher-order
urban transformation and its extensive reach. urban functions at present. It is part of the rapidly expanding
Mining towns during their early stages of formation they typi- contiguous twin settlement of Katoro-Buseresere (by 2002 this
cally experience exceptionally rapid rates of growth. Eyewitness settlement already contained 30,477 people). In Tanzania, a
accounts detail astounding numbers amassing at gold rush sites population of 15,000 generally constitutes a sufficient threshold
in a short period of time; later, town consolidation produces out- to catalyze daily market exchange and cosmopolitan social inter-
migration and triggers different in-migration streams (Bryceson action beyond familial ties. This urban site witnessed the prolif-
2011). Typically, this rapid frontier expansion occurs before ac- eration of a division of labor among residents and also between
curate numbers can be captured by an official population census the residents and economic agents from the world beyond.
or the urban dynamics can be assessed. Mobile phone commu- Katoro became the site of a bustling regional and international
nications and artisanal miners’ freedom of movement within market (peaking on Saturdays), and the market was integrated
mining frontiers can result in thousands arriving at a mineral into the regional capital of Mwanza, where traders converge on
strike site in a matter of months. (Johannesburg's famous gold Thursday to procure stock for Katoro’s Saturday market. On
rush in 1886 triggered a migration explosion that within three
market day the urban settlement bustles as itinerant traders
years made it the largest settlement in South Africa. By the start of
converge, along with visiting miners flush with cash. The bucca-
the 20th century, Johannesburg's population climbed to 100,000,
neering spirit of some of the initial investment activities (alcohol,
a stealth-mining period that drove migration into the city and its
prostitution, tax evasion, minerals, and cross-border exchanges)
expansion.)
was subsequently accompanied by government expenditures on
Sharp upward growth rates can also happen in non-mining
schools, clinics, etc., private investment in permanent residential
towns. Market towns, for example, can move along spectacular
and commercial buildings, and congregational investments in
trajectories of demographic expansion and economic growth.
places of worship.
One such town is Katoro, a market town deep within Africa's
Katoro’s urban evolution reflects the conscious choices to mi-
populous and ethnically diverse Great Lakes region in northwest
grate, to reside in a specific place, to engage in economic activi-
Tanzania. Its emergence has been stunning. Katoro’s urban birth
ties, and to consume goods and services. The overall trend is
was facilitated greatly by its strategic location within a mining
movement away from rural livelihoods based on direct produc-
frontier on the road leading from the Geita gold mines in the vi-
tion toward diversification and fostering of commercial linkages
cinity of international borders with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
with areas beyond.

world region, and this youth bulge will endure for economic growth. With the median age rising, today’s
many years. mass of young people is expected to move into their
Africa may benefit from its growing population in productive work years (contingent on their securing
what demographers and economists term the “demo- jobs). This optimistic view contends that with more
graphic dividend.” With fertility rates dropping and people working, more money circulates and econo-
family size shrinking, the share of working-age adults mies prosper. This demographic dividend, crucial to the
in a country rises, and this has a positive impact on growth of Asian economies a generation ago, is expected
 Introduction 19

to offer large opportunities to African economies in of African firms that have become very successful in
the next decades. It remains to be determined whether international markets in the last decade (e.g., cut flower
Africa can realize a happy demographic dividend: the exporters in Kenya and mobile phone providers that op-
downside of the population explosion is that there erate throughout the region) (Bain & Company 2011).
will be more people to feed, house, educate, care for Africans themselves are leading the growth in in-
medically, and socialize. Some demographers are neu- vestments across the region. This optimism is under-
tral or even skeptical about the effects of population lined by a 21% compound growth rate in Africans
change on Africa’s economic growth potential (drops investing in African countries since 2003, and their
in fertility rates are slow and uneven across Africa, and investments are flowing into a range of sectors. Also,
there is considerable cultural and political resistance governments are striking deals in which buyers make
to family planning). Larger populations are simply upfront payments, commit to make infrastructure im-
more costly and require substantial infrastructure im- provements, and share management skills and tech-
provements: more and better-equipped schools, roads, nology, demonstrating that the investment model has
runways and railway lines, deeper ports, larger airports, evolved from the colonial extraction model. Some oil
enlarged sanitation and water systems and broadband and gas producers in Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Angola,
connections. However, sustaining FDI and economic and Gabon) are creating new “local content laws;” spe-
growth rates, along with continual improvements in cifics vary by country, but they typically require quotas
health, education, and food productivity will be essen- for local employment and managerial staff and specify
tial to ensure that development “works” in Africa, par- that goods and services such as equipment, informa-
ticularly with regard to efficiency, poverty reduction tion technology (IT), and insurance be procured
and gender equity. locally.
The “big five” management consultancy firms are McKinsey’s “Lions on the Move” report compares
now jostling for African business with upbeat regional Africa's business environment today with that of the
assessments. McKinsey’s 2010 report, “Lions on the future (Table 1.1).
Move: The Progress and Potential of African Econo- Pieterse and Parnell (2014:14) underscore that
mies,” has garnered much attention with its rigor. Ernst “despite the crude development policy thinking that
& Young's (2011) “It's Time for Africa” report adds to shapes many of these glossy reports (with some nota-
the chorus that Africa is now the second most attractive ble exceptions), it seems that the new private sector
region (after Asia) for international investors. Citing an actors have a real impact on the policy landscape, out-
African proverb that “the best time to plant a tree is stripping the influence of scholars, civil society pres-
twenty years ago. The second best time is now,” Ernst & sure groups and the old-style development industry.”
Young is striving to drum up business for its manage-
ment consultants. Different management consultancy
firms highlight different opportunities: Accenture em- TABLE 1.1 AFRICA’S BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
phasizes the edge that South African businesses have
Africa Today
due to their familiarity with the “Africa terrain” (institu-
US$1.6 trillion (collective GDP)
tional and cultural contexts) and so are best positioned
US$860 billion (consumer spending 2008)
to serve as a bridge to the rest of Africa; Boston Consullt-
60% (share of uncultivated arable land)
ing (2011) lauds present-day “African capitalism,” high- 52 cities with populations over 1 million
lighting 40 companies that have emerged with the
Africa Tomorrow
potential to become “players” beyond the region; and
the Monitor Group (2011) profiles 439 ventures that US$2.6 trillion (collective GDP 2020)
US$1.4 trillion (consumer spending 2020)
have been able to grow while simultaneously alleviat-
1.1 billion workers (2040)
ing poverty. The important point is that the notion that 50% living in cities (2030)
African firms cannot compete is wholly outdated—not
to mention condescending. There are plenty of examples Source: McKinsey (2010).
20 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

The “Lions on the Move” scenario is based on a production, Africa produces less food per person now
great deal of conjecture, but the key issue is this: Where than it did in the 1960s as agriculture concentrated on
are “the lions” and “the cheetahs” moving? Will it be to export cash crops. Increasing agricultural production is
more unequal societies where only the top echelons of a long-term worry for Africa. Conflict and climate
society reap the benefits, or to societies with a sizeable change could quickly derail economic growth. Africa
middle class? Will development benefit the poor? On has a bulging youth population that will pose a serious
macroeconomic evidence alone, Africa is growing, but economic challenge. An abundance of youth can be
there are rifts in the “Africa rising” narrative. A narrow like gearing on a balance sheet: it makes good situa-
elite is benefiting disproportionately and the poor and tions better and bad situations worse. By 2040, Africa’s
unemployed are being left behind. Current growth is working population will be 1.1 billion (more than
neither inclusive nor democratic: unregulated, infor- China or India), placing a huge burden on societies to
mal economic activities are very common in urban prepare the workforce. Workers will require extensive
Africa, both in terms of the numbers of informally em- skilling and up-skilling, and educational systems are
ployed and in terms of the goods and services provided currently unprepared. Education and skill develop-
by the informal economy. Regional growth figures ment will have to be much improved: African busi-
focus on the most advanced economies, such as South nesspeople routinely complain about the shortage of
Africa, and on oil exporters that are diversifying (Angola skilled employees, and without better skills African
and Nigeria), as well as on a handful of economies that workers cannot emulate their Asian counterparts. It is
are consolidating recent gains (Ghana, Kenya, Senegal). far from certain that Africa’s growth trajectory can be
However, discussions of the region mask individual realized.
economies that are lagging (South Africa, Sierra Leone,
Mali, Madagascar, Sudan, South Sudan, etc.).
AFRICA AS A MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
Afrobarometer opinion polls (based on surveys of
FRONTIER
51,605 respondents in 34 countries) reveal that one in
five Africans lack food, health care, and clean water. Africa has always been a key region to the develop-
Three quarters of Africans believe their governments ment complex (the array of academics, practitioners,
are not doing enough in reducing income inequalities policymakers, civil society, and other humanitarian
(Afrobarometer 2013). Africans are taking to the streets organizations and to a lesser extent businesses),
to air their social and political grievances. Women aiming to make a difference and promote various
traders in Nigeria have protested tax increases; farmers paths toward development. Legacies of colonialism
and miners in South Africa have demonstrated against and persistent poverty, poor health, economic and in-
low wages; Ugandans have demonstrated against poor frastructure deficits, unemployment, and inequality
road conditions. Some urban demonstrations have coupled with population growth make a compelling
been large and widespread, taking on multiple de- case that Africa is in need of development.
mands (e.g., the July 2013 protests in Burkina Faso In the 20th century, “big push” Western ideas domi-
against high prices, low wages, poor health and educa- nated African development policy. In the 1950s and
tion services, and corruption). Harsch (2013) tallies 1960s the modernization paradigm promoted urban-
3,000 protests across Africa in the first six months of ization and industrialization and Western technology
2013 and protests about lack of job creation are be- and values to transform society so that economic growth
coming more frequent. Social protests are symptom- could “take off” and lead to development and eventu-
atic of both the new democratic environment and an ally achieve “a level of high mass-consumption” (Rostow
undercurrent of widespread social grievances. There is 1960). However, the model, based on the historical tra-
even some speculation that “an African spring is in the jectory of the United States after its independence,
making” (Harsch 2012). could not be replicated in a single African country. Its
Africa is a net importer of food, and there will be grand failure to deliver development lead to major pull-
more mouths to be feed in the future. In terms of food backs in the 1970s (e.g., Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia and
 Introduction 21

Ethiopia). Following the writings of dependency theo- food, and natural resource systems. Local solutions to
rists (e.g., Wallerstein 1974) and a tilt toward socialism, local problems may be designed that will be able to
many African leaders questioned the relevance of the draw on global technology and expertise. The increas-
Western development model in Africa and saw it as per- ingly digital world enables African entrepreneurs and
petuating a dependent relationship where Africa was development practitioners to connect in new ways.
overly reliant on the West, or neo-colonialism. This may open up possibilities for contributions to
In the 1980s and 1990s the external big push re- stem from ordinary Africans, who no longer have to
turned with structural adjustment policies and liberal- wait for help to trickle down from the center and to be
ization policies mandated by the World Bank and the diffused in their direction.
IMF following economic crises, balance-of-payment The resilience and creativity of many Africans to
deficits, insolvency, and widespread conditions of un- devise affordable solutions to problems (doing more
derdevelopment. Structural adjustment policies opened with less) may bode well for the global sustainable-
up African markets to global competition and global development tilt. Olopade (2014:1) emphasizes that
investors took center stage. These policies were very “Africa is a bright continent” where solution-oriented
transformative in ushering in market forces and acceler- ordinary people are taking the reins of development
ated urbanization, but they also inflicted a lot of suffer- and making empowered contributions to solve imme-
ing on populations and were very unpopular. diate development challenges. The creativity of Africans
In the early 21st century development policies is expressed in a flurry of recent innovations and adap-
started to focus on alleviating poverty. The UN was a tations, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent
driving force in developing the Millennium Develop- chapters—for example, the Ushahidi platform devel-
ment Goals (MDGs) in 2000. The MDGs comprise oped in Kenya to monitor elections; the formal Da-
eight international development goals that have been habshill and the informal Hawala systems of money
approved by all 189 members of the UN and most in- transfers for remitting money between the members of
ternational organizations and NGOs. The internation- the Somali diaspora and relatives back home; the
ally agreed-on frameworks represent the broadest uptake in mobile phone technologies for delivering
consensus on development priorities ever achieved, various content (e.g., education, health, market prices);
and they are inspiring efforts to improve the lives of “green shacks” (incorporating solar power and other
poor people around the world (Fig. 1.8). green technologies) and the incorporation of agricul-
The MDGs will expire in 2015, and the UN and the ture into urban living. The sustainable-development
international community are launching Sustainable frontier may allow solutions to flow from Africa to
Development Goals to follow on from the MDGs. Al- other world regions.
though the MDGs have not been fully achieved, many
African states have registered successes on many of the
URBANIZATION IN AFRICA
targets (e.g., primary school enrollments and maternal
IN CONSIDERATION
care). A renewed commitment is necessary to continue
along this development track. However, a central dif- The scale and velocity of Africa's urbanization dwarf
ference this time around is that when the Sustainable that which occurred in the Global North in an earlier
Development Goals are implemented, all countries time. For example,-London in 1910 was seven times
will be pioneers, not just Africa and the developing larger than it had been in 1800; Kinshasa and Lagos
world (as was the case in the MDGs). Sustainable de- are now 40 times bigger than they were in 1950. While
velopment will be the next development frontier, and cities of the Global North are all too often seen as par-
low-carbon technologies, greener living, eco-friendly adigms for understanding urbanization everywhere in
buildings, designs, and communities, protection of the world, urbanization in the Global South is playing
biodiversity, and adaptation to climate change will be out very differently: populations are larger, timeframes
crucial elements. These new targets will require an over- are shorter, and modes of integration into the global
haul of existing energy, industrial, urban, transport, economy differ. A major underlying difference is that
22 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

END POVERTY éF&

2015 United Nations

The Millennium Development Goals

In September of the year 2000, leaders of 189 countries met at the United Nations in New York and endorsed the
Millennium Declaration, a commitment to work together to build a safer, more prosperous and equitable world.
The Declaration was translated into a roadmap setting out eight time-bound and measurable goals to be reached
by 2015, known as the Millennium Development Goals, namely:

1 . Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Reduce by half the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day
e Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people
e Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

2. Achieve universal primary education

Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of
education no later than 2015

4. Reduce child mortality

Reduce by two thirds the mortality of children under five

5. Improve maternal health

Reduce maternal mortality by three quarters
Achieve universal access to reproductive health

6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it
Halt and reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Integrate principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes;
reverse the loss of environmental resources
Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of loss
Halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
Improve the lives of at least 100 million sium dwellers by 2020

8. Develop a global partnership for development

Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system
Address special needs of the least developed countries, landlocked countries and small island
developing States
Deal comprehensively with developing countries’ debt
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in
developing countries
In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially
information and communications technologies

For more information, please visit: www.un.org/millenniumgoals

Issued by the UN Department of Public Information

FIGURE 1.8 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

 Introduction 23

urbanization in the Global North was triggered by in- and retailing cellphone time) and may even surpass the
creases in agricultural productivity; this has not hap- top economic performances in the world (rapidly ex-
pened to date in Africa. It is no longer possible to panding informal sectors may grow at 12% to 20% per
defend the position that cities in Africa will evolve ac- annum). Third, most official data-collection efforts in
cording to Eurocentric “norms” or that the urban form Africa (as elsewhere) focus on national-level rather than
in Africa is a consequence of the all-encompassing in- city-level data. Therefore, there is much conjecture in
fluences of the dominant global powers (the colonial relating national data to urban trends and in apportion-
urban anchor and the ex-colonial city as central en- ing (with any accuracy) an individual city’s role within
gines in the domestic economy). Macro-thinkers who the national experience. In terms of the availability of
conceptualize late 20th- and early 21st-century urban- city-level data to assess urbanization processes accu-
ization as a diffusion of urbanism from a European rately, we are in “the twilight zone” of statistical accu-
center outward and those who sketch urban histories racy. Turok (2013) emphasizes the dearth of econometric
in terms of an all-determining system of global capital studies that could elucidate the complex relationship
exploitation miss too many of the details on the between urbanization and economic development in
ground in urban Africa. Africa. Fourth, if we operationalize development with
Until recently, urbanization in Africa was conceptu- an alternative methodological lens, such as the Human
alized as “abnormal” (Obeng-Odoom 2010). Three ar- Development Index (HDI), a different picture emerges.
guments provided the intellectual scaffolding for this HDI measures the overall progress of a country along
widely held viewpoint. First, the dependency claim is three dimensions: health, knowledge, and a decent
that Africa’s urbanization is atypical because it is based standard of living. Urbanization and HDI are positively
on colonialism, which structured a particular type of linked in Africa.
incorporation into the international system that was Based on this evidence, the ground is shifting
particularly advantageous to external powers. Second, under the “abnormal” thesis. For instance, the World
the over-urbanization argument posits that capitalism’s Bank (2000, 2009) switched its prognosis of African
deep penetration in the countryside pushes people off urbanization without industrialization to urbaniza-
the land and into cities because conditions are worse in tion and growth in services bypassing the develop-
rural environments. Third, the urban bias claim is that ment of manufacturing. Nevertheless, on balance,
urban development is the result of targeting spending there is a great diversity of urban experiences through-
on inefficient pro-urban public policy that detracts out Africa. A recognition and empirical examination of
from resource investment in the countryside. The hege- these experiences unsettle the notion of African urban
mony of the “abnormal” thesis had profound implica- exceptionalism.
tions. Hostile perspectives toward African cities were Africa's urbanization is not accidental. If urbaniza-
common. Development organizations and many African tion in Africa is not comparable to that in the West, are
governments developed policies with an eye to reducing there similarities and differences between African cities
the rate of urbanization and slowing and/or reversing and other cities in the Global South? There is evidence of
rural migration. Many assumed that urbanization and similarities, but important differences remain. First, Af-
economic development could only be negatively corre- rica’s infrastructure lags behind its peers in the develop-
lated in African contexts. ing world. There are critical differences in terms of
The “abnormal” thesis is increasingly being chal- missing regional links in infrastructure within and be-
lenged. First, recent growth figures provide evidence tween among African countries. Africa has more land-
that in some African countries urbanization is not de- locked countries than any other of the world regions:
coupled from economic growth. Second, GDP values 15 countries are without sea access and are only weakly
do not account for the large size of African informal linked in regional air hubs and trans-African road net-
economies: informal economic activities can account works. The fragmentary regional African infrastructure
for one half added to GDP and growth rates in specific further isolates many small countries, hindering urban
informal economic activities (e.g., processing of e-waste centers from harnessing efficient large-scale technologies
24 AFRIGA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

and participating more successfully in the global econ- West Africa) that are similar to the city-regions that
omy. To put this in perspective, Africa's road density net- have been identified in China’s Beijing-Tianjin corri-
work per 386.1 miles? (1,000 km’) is five times less than dor and Sao Paulo in Brazil. Third, there is a blurring
that of BRIC countries. Overall, Africa has a huge infra- ofthe distinction between city and countryside around
structure deficit, and 30% of its existing infrastructure is many of the urban centers in Africa (akin to many
in dire need of rehabilitation. Its annual per capita ex- Asian cities). Heterogeneous mixes characterize this
penditure on urban infrastructure is low compared to hermaphroditic landscape: rural and urban features
the BRIC countries (e.g., US$34 compared to US$116 in coexist in environmental, socioeconomic, and institu-
China). Power is problematic, and 30 African countries tional terms. Fourth, Africa’s concentration on resource
experience intermittent power cuts; rolling blackouts to exploitation is driving much of the urban expansion,
avoid widespread power disruptions occurs even in and urban growth is not based on diversified econo-
South Africa, the country with the best infrastructure. mies. Clearly, there is a need to add to the value of
Poor infrastructure restrains Africa’s GDP growth by natural resources before they are exported (Botswana
2% per year. The African Development Bank emphasizes is leading the way in adding value to its diamonds)
that it would take US$93 billion of spending until 2020 and to diversify into manufacturing and its more tech-
to rehabilitate Africa's infrastructure. Current average lo- nologically advanced components as well as a range
gistics costs in Africa are twice that in the BRIC countries. of financial and producer services (e.g., commercial
Second, Africa lacks a manufacturing tradition banking, engineering, marketing and product design)
comparable to its peers. Africa’s industrialization, fos- (Turok 2013).
tered by nationalist government policies in the after- Drivers in addition to regular employment migra-
math of independence, never took off but rather went tion streams are evident. For one, climate change and
into reverse in the context of the post-1985 economic environmental degradation are contributing to the
liberalization environment. Export-processing zones movement of people to cities. There are no reliable fig-
(free trade areas that offer special concessions for in- ures on these movements, but urban growth has paral-
ternational firms to locate there) based on assembly leled a threefold increase in the number of storms,
jobs and call centers have by and large been unsuccess- droughts, and floods over the past 30 years. Gradual
ful (although Mauritius and Madagascar have used climate changes appear to have a greater impact on the
these zones successfully). Low FDI until recently movement of people than extreme events. The Interna-
meant that urban authorities could not finance urban tional Organization for Migration estimates that the
infrastructure improvements, so the infrastructure number of environmental, migrants will climb to
catch-up predicament further deterred investors. 200 million by 2050. Also, conflict and war accelerate
There is evidence of a broad convergence of gen- urbanization as people flee the violence in their home
eral urban characteristics as well as drivers of urbaniza- area to seek refuge in the city. In receiving cities outside
tion. First, there is the phenomenal growth of slums in of migrants’ home states, displaced people keep a low
Africa, both in terms of absolute numbers (166 + mil- profile, avoiding registration, enumeration, and profil-
lion) and as a proportion of the total urban popula- ing exercises. Those who are displaced but remain in
tion (62%), now surpassing the total slum population their home state can add to the urban footprint when
in Latin American and the Caribbean. Africa's cities displacement camps on the outskirts of cities become
have in common with India and Brazil that they house integrated socially and economically into cities (e.g,
extreme poverty. Some commentators even speculate one third of Darfur’s population is located in camps
about the emergence of mega-slums (slums that house on the perimeter of cities). Overall, relationships be-
1 million people) in Lagos and Kinshasa. Second, tween displacement and urbanization as well as cli-
urban corridors or city-regions are emerging in Africa mate and environmental change are topics that urban
(e.g., the Gauteng city-region centered on Johannesburg planners, demographers, and development specialists
and the Greater Ibadan-Lagos-Accra [GILA] corridor in have not addressed to a significant degree.
 Introduction 25

CONCLUSIONS China, Brazil, India, the Gulf states, Malaysia, and a

range of other corporate financial players worldwide,
Africa is still perceived far too negatively in most ofthe
as well as traditional partners from Europe and the
world. The region remains in an intellectual limbo
United States. are jostling for ties with the region,
compared to other world regions. Africa is no longer
providing considerable room for African agency and
the fabled, deeply troubled, conflict-ridden, “dark con-
maneuverability.
tinent,” but the amazing distance between Westerners
In a radical departure from earlier thinking, urban-
and Africans remains a chronological gulf. In most
ist Michael Cohen (1996) has proposed the urban
representations in the West, Africans remain confined
convergence hypothesis, postulating that cities in the
to a past era and are mislaid in the contemporary era.
Global North are converging toward cities of the
Westerners’ knowledge about Africa is laden with ste-
Global South in the contemporary age of globaliza-
reotypes, decontextualized images, and sound-bites
tion (growing unemployment, declining infrastruc-
about particular places and particular people: it is as
ture, deteriorating environment, collapsing social
shallow as it is incomplete. Only recently has the
compact, and increasing institutional weakness; we
West's knowledge of Africa begun to improve.
can also add that growing informal economic activities
Africa is rising in terms of many economic criteria,
in all urban environments are features of 21st-century
both absolutely and relatively. Many African economies
urbanism). Obviously it is difficult to predict what will
are at an inflection point, and this is the basis for tem-
happen in the next half-century, but this kind of think-
pered optimism but not premature exuberance. There is
ing goes hand in hand with urban Africa theorists’ ar-
no denying that many risks loom (the global financial
guments that urban theory needs to grow from looking
situation, climate change, national political change,
through the prism of urban Africa. Understanding
geopolitical stability, food security, etc.). The current
African cities as part of the Global South experience is
slowdown of economic growth in the BRIC countries
a framing that is more relevant than ever to under-
may hurt African economies, especially China’s appar-
standing 21st-century urbanism as opposed to previ-
ent transition from a heavy emphasis on resource in-
ous prisms that better explained Europe's urbanization
vestment toward domestic consumption. Perhaps only
in the 19th century and that of the United States in the
the story is changing: the fundamental structure of rela-
20th century.
tions remains intact. Simply put, improved economic
The urban change unfolding in Africa is drawing
performance may be due more to a new scramble for
the region closer to the forces that shape many cities
Africa than anything else. Even Africa opportunity
outside of the region. Urbanization in Africa is nor-
boosters acknowledge the lack of a spectacular regional
malizing in the sense that it is diversifying away from
role model of economic success comparable to the Sin-
the colonial spatial imprint that was firmly centered
gapore model, which helped power the Asian surge.
on national cities. Now, more than ever, the factors
South Africa, the most sophisticated economy in Africa
that draw cities in Africa into the global capitalist
and the engine that powers the southern African region,
economy are also shaped by local agents, forces, and
still faces considerable challenges in the years ahead
circumstances. At the same time sparks of a rural revo-
both politically and economically (specifically with
lution are discernible. Still, many in the Global North
regard to its high unemployment level).
continue to understand Africa in an outdated and par-
Putting Africa into perspective is still fraught with
tial way—as an inexpensive source for raw materials
problems. Models used to represent, analyze, and
and/or as a rescue mission for their pop humanitarian
plan in the Global North have little relevance to
impulses. Being caught in a loop between these posi-
urban and rural Africa. African economies are charac-
tions has prevented the West from expanding its think-
terized by very different articulations with the global
ing about Africa, and it prevents a balance of stories
economic system and substantial informality. The
about Africa and Africans.
countries of the region are engaging with a wider
range of powers today than at any point in the past.
26 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES
OF CHANGE

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REFRAMING AND REREPRESENTING

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

INTRODUCTION and peoples, their paths and options, their different

The myth of Africa as a “dark continent,” a mysterious histories, and without understanding the whys and
place populated by deprived and depraved African na- wherefores of current situations.
tives, is deeply embedded in Western consciousness. This chapter outlines the legacy of the darkness
European writers in the 19th century projected this fic- representation and stereotyped images of Africa that
tional Africa representation. The people of Africa were are continually peddled by the media and some self-
characterized by Westerns as deprived, lacking Western interested communities. The crisis and chaotic Africa
civilization, education, culture, religions, industry and narrative is challenged by Africa evidence indicating a
progress. This was accompanied by advancing vari- changing region and a movement out of the shadows,
ous myths ofsavagery and chaos in the region. Joseph in different and often unanticipated directions, that
Conrad's Heart of Darkness (an 1899 serialized magazine diverge greatly from what it is expected in negative de-
article that was later published in book format and regu- pictions of the region. The Africa growth narrative (re-
larly makes lists of the top 100 books of the 20th century) viewed in Chapter 1) coincided with the explosion of
is a good example ofa fictional text in this genre (Fig. 2.1). Africa interest and the multiplicity of resources on the
Heart of Darkness is a controversial work of fiction (heav- Internet. As Africa’s economies boom so does Africa
ily critiqued as a racist), and it is regularly reprinted; the knowledge, and the latter is becoming more diverse
latest edition is 2014. Thoughtful scholars have helped and democratic. Africa’s current and future transfor-
correct some myths about Africa and Africans, but mis- mation is the subject of deep reflection and debate. In
representation and unfair negative representation have this chapter seven perspectives of Africans’ revisioning
endured. Indeed, the darkness metaphor may teach us a Africa are reviewed to illustrate how Global Northern
lot more about the political development of Western frameworks can be rethought. The metaphor and orga-
modernity than it does about Africa (Popke 2001). nization of this chapter is Africa moving from darkness
Africa is an inconvenient region for generalization, into shadows and then into splintering light.
comprising a multiplicity of states, more than 1,000
REPRESENTING AFRICA:
spoken languages, and thousands of cultural groups.
THE DARKNESS LEGACY
Lumping together such diversity and homogenizing
African contexts and/or selectively picking cases is In the 21st century it needs to be underscored that
problematic. Too often Africa is portrayed in general, Europe is not represented by the humanitarian tragedy
with a lack of distinction between different countries that took place in Bosnia; Myanmar/Burma is not

Zhe)
 30 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

HEART O1

FIGURE 2.1 Front Cover of Joseph’s Conrad's Heart of Darkness, 2014 Edition.

representative of the Asian investment environment; context. Such overgeneralization is barely tolerated in
and Venezuela is not considered illustrative of Latin other world regions. It is, however, totally mistaken to
America. Yet, when it comes to Africa, extreme cases argue that extreme suffering, bad governments and
(e.g., evidence of kleptocrats in Nigeria and Guinea- failing states do not exist. Unfortunately, there is abun-
Bissau, humanitarian tragedies in Somalia and Ethiopia, dant evidence supporting many negative characteriza-
and pirates and terrorists in the Horn of Africa and tions in Africa, but normative standards (“proper
Nigeria) are taken to represent all of Africa in every states,” “good economies,” “transparent regimes,” and
WM
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 31

“responsible leadership”) may also be unfair bench- their contexts. Scholarly studies of U.S. network cover-
marks: all societies of the world are imperfect under age of Africa show that the large networks focus on the
the microscope. major story (South Africa in the 1980s and southern
A failure to capture Africa’s heterogeneity is a cen- Sudan in 2011 and 2014) to the detriment of broader
tral problem in understanding Africa. Because Africa’s and balanced coverage. In the 1980s, three major U.S.
diversity is rarely captured in media reporting, major networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) reported on South
information gaps hinder public knowledge. The in- Africa but underreported on the region, limiting Africa
ternational media fail to provide balanced and com- beyond South Africa to a few minutes of total cover-
prehensive Africa coverage; many places are even age. In 2013 the Westgate Mall tragedy in Nairobi and
ignored. For instance, Angola—as well as its capital the rise of Al Shabaab dominated U.S. coverage of the
and largest city, Luanda—were hardly reported on in region. Time and again the foremost international
2011. Angola is overlooked by two of the largest news story is taken to represent a subregion and even
media corporations that report on Africa (BBC and the entire region.
Al-Jazeera). Both the London and Qatari corpora- As a consequence, African successes measured ac-
tions maintain Johannesburg offices, but no one in cording to African values never see the light of day. For
Al-Jazeera’s Johannesburg bureau speaks Portuguese, example, a water pump in an urban slum ora tural area
let alone an indigenous Angolan language. The BBC may transform community livelihoods and health, but
is also short-staffed in Portuguese language speakers, it hardly makes international news. International
a situation only compounded by the BBC budget cut- press coverage marginalizes events deemed “ordinary”
backs that ended its Portuguese for Africa service in or uniquely African. In their defense, journalists, when
2011. As a consequence, the media are unsure of the allotted 800 words or less to explain a complex Africa
changing Angolan narrative, which further under- event, find it difficult to do much more than peddle a
mines responsible coverage. Media and programming few facts within a thin historical and geographical
space requires financing, and most media outlets are framework. Mall massacres, coups, wars, and other
not willing to prioritize funds to make Africa cover- human tragedies make better copy when succinctly
age more complete. The general public can under- reported.
stand a country and a city more fully only when The public receives little news reflecting grassroots
provided with more complex and subtle reporting by Africa. Most Africa news flows from North to North
well-informed journalists and scholars who spend and not from Africa to North. What is often marketed
considerable time in the field. as news from Africa is, for the most part, Northern re-
Accessibility to African knowledge is restricted to porters and/or African reporters on Northern payrolls
an elite (scholars, policymakers, practitioners). The adding to Africa’s poor image. The manner in which
knowledge gap between experts and the general public international correspondents pitch and ultimately
is massive, and the media are culpable. Reporting on frame their story and secure its backing may indeed
only those aspects of African affairs deemed most im- tell us more about the global news business or the in-
portant to Western audiences, the media are prone to ertia of ideas about Africa in the Global North than
select stories according to Western values. Mainstream about contemporary Africa. Extending this line of rea-
TV and Internet coverage is restricted to special program- soning, the information that is recorded about Africa
ming on PBS, BBC, France 24, and Al-Jazeera, and to is actually the return of Northern ideas to a global
occasional news slots—for example, 60 Minutes, with marketplace, dominated by the Global North.
its formulaic news safaris by helicoptered reporters en- There are groups in Africa (e.g., some reporters and
gaging in one-off exposés composed of the hunt, the photojournalists, aid officials and informal entrepre-
chase, and the triumph of good over evil. AC-360, with neurs) who are co-conspirators in perpetuating negative
acclaimed journalist Anderson Cooper, is among the narratives depicting political turmoil, corruption, vio-
worst offenders: CNN reporters relate the news abroad lence, poverty, and humanitarian and personal tragedy.
rather than provide actual reports on the locals and For instance, West African Internet scammers promote
32 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

these dramatic and stereotyped representations of in the information superhighway. No doubt scammers
Africans and the region. Internet fraud scammers, par- would neither have been able to get Westerners’ atten-
ticularly advance fee scams, also known as “419” scams tion nor dupe victims with more authentic, balanced,
(“419" is the number ofthe Nigerian criminal code that and place-sensitive narratives.
deals with fraud), deploy these representations. Numer- Academics have failed to contribute more nuanced
ous Internet scams purport to share inheritance wind- accounts to public understandings of Africa. Their
falls and/or include the lucky recipient in a lucrative glaring disconnect in the Africa conversation is indi-
business or export venture as a “business partner.” rectly abetted by their ineffectiveness and by the per-
African scammers have received personal gain but in suasiveness of simplistic apocalyptic narratives in the
process fed the unruly and chaotic narrative of Africa inte- popular press such as Robert Kaplan’s “The Coming
grated but not abiding by any rules in their participation Anarchy” (Box 2.1). Astonishingly, individuals working

BOX 2.1 “THE COMING ANARCHY” that there is a “re-primitivized man” in Africa’s urban slums and
because of weak social bonds and unstable social systems the
Robert D. Kaplan’s essay “The Coming Anarchy,” published in
region is on “the verge of igniting—producing hordes of young
the Atlantic Monthly (1994), achieved notoriety in the Global
men who turn to violent crime.” He speculates that the West
North. The thesis was grounded on the journalist's travel from
African countryside is draining into dense, coastal slums, and he
West Africa to Turkey to Asia. Written in 1994, it took up the
contends that the region’s rulers will be forced to reflect the
timely topics of the end of the Cold War and the search for an
values of shanty dwellers. Kaplan's future world is nothing short
alternative macro scenario for the future of the world and, to a
of apocalyptic.
lesser extent, the place of Africa in this future world. Kaplan is a
However, his doom-saying is unfounded and the deformities
renowned journalist who has consulted for the U.S. military, and
of his thinking are sadly not unique. He gets away with it be-
presents himself as “a master global strategist”. He captures
cause of a deficient base of knowledge about Africa and be-
attention because of stellar book sales, his profile in public dis-
cause scholars are not fulfilling the roles of public intellectuals.
courses, and his ability to influence the upper echelons of poli-
Kaplan has no Africa credentials. His thesis is empirically selec-
cymaking. “The Coming Anarchy” was faxed to every U.S.
tive in assembling facts and embellishing loose collections of
embassy in Africa, and then-president Clinton found this article
myths that do not appear under the microscope. Punditry is a
“stunning,” remarking, “It makes you really imagine a future like
business where the object is to hold audiences’ attention
one of those Mel Gibson Road Warrior movies” (Kagen 2000:1).
through hurling ideas, large claims, and colorful statements.
However, Kaplan’s numerous critics exposed him as one of
“The Coming Anarchy” falls into the media trap of building on
America’s top pundits who got it totally wrong (Bestman and
audiences’ existing prejudices rather than on unsettling assump-
Gusterson 2005).
tions about the world and/or ‘trying to present accurate
“The Coming Anarchy” presents a terrifying and unambigu-
knowledge.
ous portrayal of the contours of the post-Cold War world. The
Kaplan is a modern-day mythmaker. At best, his thesis is mis-
essay's primary themes are “Third World” anarchy, with West
leading; at worst, it promotes dangerous ideas about Africa and
Africa as an epicenter, and the threat to (Western). readers’
shapes an ill-conceived future course for U.S. foreign policy on
safety, health, and culture by an impending collapse of “Third
Africa. It is evident that not much has changed since colonial
World” countries. West Africa's implosion is offered as an over-
narratives and the construction of an image of Africa as the re-
the-edge event of the impending global future. Kaplan is fixated
pository of the West's greatest fears. The colonial image has
on a fear-provoking Africa with numerous impressionistic anec-
become the media image. The coming anarchy and similar sce-
dotes of his experience in West African cities (with no details
narios (e.g., Mike Davis’ Planet of Slums also portrays West
about his length of stay in days or hours [!] or about whom he
Africa as the largest footprint of poverty on the planet and disil-
spoke with and in what language), detailing corruption, slums,
lusioned slum dwellers as the next big threat to global peace
crime, disease, and pollution. His article recounts the children
and stability that could be recruited by Al-Qaeda and its various
“as numerous as ants” and the “nightmarish Dickensian specta-
African affiliates, such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
cle” of Guinea's capital, complete with garbage floating in pud-
[AQUIM] and Al Shabaab) could become self-fulfilling unless
dles, dead rats, and “scabrous” homes “coated with black
these overgeneralized theses are scrutinized and people talk
slime.” He envisions infrastructure as continuing to fall apart and
back and act to deconstruct the negative prophecies. In every
dangerous disease-ridden coastal trading ports becoming infec-
instance, Africa is better off with more complex narratives and
tious diffusion gateways to the rest of the world. He believes
multiple scenarios and alternatives.
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 33

on the ground in Africa allowed themselves to be by- of the generalized construct that is “Africa,” the idea
standers in broader conversations about Africa until of Africa is still very consequential and it informs
recently. Their reluctance to speak broadly and loudly global policy, geopolitical events, interregional inter-
meant that broad-stroked journalistic accounts and actions, and visions ofinfluential leaders (e.g., Nkrumah,
one-size-fits-all policy papers occupied center stage. Kenyatta, and Mbeki). The concept of Africa must be
However, social media are changing the conversation, accurate and accepted so that Africans can rightly
and Africans and Africa experts are using this format to claim social and economic rights that are informed
contribute knowledge and to inform members of the by an implicitly moral demand for full membership
engaged public as well as connect to a new generation of the global community.
of an Africa-interested public. Academics and practi-
tioners are becoming more active in an increasingly
MOVING FROM A WORLD OF SHADOWS
multiphrenic environment of knowledge production,
and blogs, tweets, shorter more accessible articles, and INTO SPLINTERING LIGHT

op-ed pieces are taking on entrenched myths and mis- Much that is happening in many parts ofAfrica is posi-
understandings of Africa realities (see Moseley 2011; tive. Leading economic historians underscore that
Samatar 2013). Africa has a better chance of economic success now
Presenting a picture of Africa’s darkness as the than any time in the last five centuries. Given the
only reality is as inappropriate today as it has always weight of recent historical experiences and representa-
been (and even more so, given past mischief). More tion, this evidence needs a much higher profile. Two
thoughtful, balanced assessments are needed so African women (Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah
Africa can be rendered less dark in the eyes of the Gbowee, both Liberians) were recipients of the Nobel
world. James Ferguson, a prominent Africanist (a Peace Prize in 2011 for their nonviolent struggle for the
term used to describe scholars engaging in primary safety of women and for women’s rights to full partici-
research on Africa) and anthropologist, put forward a pation in peace-building work. They add to the grow-
“global shadows” (2007) metaphor as an alternative ing list of Africans awarded Nobel prizes since 1960
framing of contemporary Africa. Although the shad- John Lutuli, 1960; Desmond Tutu, 1989; Nelson
ows metaphor is abstract, it sheds nuanced light on Mandela, 1993; Frederick William de Klerk, 1993; Kofi
Africa in four different ways. (1) African aspirations of Annan, 2001; Wangari Maathai, 2004, and literature
development and modernity have always been shad- prizes have been awarded to Wole Soyinka, 1989;
owed by questions about the authenticity of the copy Nadine Gordimer, 1991; and John Coetzee, 2005).
and whether the duplicate is too different from the More prizes have been awarded to Africans than to
original (a faux copy) or not different enough (merely Latin Americans.
an empty derivative). (2) The bond and relationship Numerous recent events challenge and overturn
producing the shadow are inseparable from that to many widely held assumptions. Mo Ibrahim, the Su-
which it is bound: the Global North (this bond is danese tycoon, is an African philanthropist who is en-
much more than an empty space). (3) Shadow rela- dowing scholarships at London’s Business School as
tions prevail within Africa states (a shadow/informal well as London’s School of Oriental and African Stud-
economy, a shadow state occupied by clandestine as ies (the latter was founded as a place where British of-
well as civil society networks, and shadow soldiers ficials learned how to run their empires). As many as
existing alongside official armies). (4) The shadows 500 African companies have been growing at more
of Africans in the world involve extensive African than 8% per year since 1998, and some are well
mobilities of peoples, monies, and commodities placed to break out beyond the region onto the global
(some legal, some illegal). African governments’ stage. African academics are writing in peer-reviewed
desire and aspirations to move out of the shadows journals more than ever before. Africa Journals
toward full membership and full inclusion in the OnLine (AJOL), a South Africa—based portal, com-
world is a long-term goal. Recognizing the ambiguity piles over 400 scholarly peer-reviewed African
 34 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

journals, allowing a diverse body of scholarship to the wealth). According the CIA’s (2012) own rankings,
flourish within Africa and Africa-originating research the United States is now more unequal than Nigeria
to percolate to the rest of the world, in theory at least. and Ethiopia. ,
Angola’s president Dos Santos’ pledge ofassistance for One third of Africa’s university graduates now make
Portugal, its former colonizer, to help Lisbon deal their professional living outside of Africa. Africans in
with its financial crises is aid in reverse. Increasing Por- the diaspora are active in the development of their
tuguese migration for new opportunities in former home regions. Remittances sent to Africa in 2012
Portuguese colonies in Africa (e.g., Angola, Guinea- reached US$60.4 billion, and perhaps an extra 50% of
Bissau, and Mozambique) is new movement and brain this figure gets sent back via informal channels (United
drain in reverse. Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2013). Most
Africans are gaining greater global recognition of this money keeps extended families afloat, while
outside oftheir home region, not just as scholars, writ- some funds are channeled into productive investment
ers, business and political leaders, and sports stars but in houses and businesses and microdevelopment proj-
increasingly in diverse professions. African-born ar- ects. Most of the latter projects (building toilets and
chitects are building prominent international build- community development centers, stocking libraries,
ings in Europe and North America (e.g., David Adjaye equipping Internet cafés) target very local areas and are
designed the Nobel Peace Center in Oslo and is the not always delivered effectively nor completed. Never-
lead designer for the National Museum of African theless, diaspora hometown initiatives demonstrate a
American History and Culture in Washington, D.C., continued commitment to a locality as well as a modest
scheduled to open in 2015). African Catholic priests effort to ameliorate infrastructure deficits. An important
and parishioners are contributing to a remapping of impact of this new dynamic is that communities ac-
Europe's religious landscape, and African churches are quire goods and services with extraordinary value
also flourishing. Catholic priests from Africa attend to through connections beyond their locality.
the faithful in Italy, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, These are contemporary developments that the an-
and Belgium, and evangelical African preachers minis- cestors of Africans and European colonialists could
ter to congregations across Europe. The spectacle of not have imagined. Still, the representation of Africa in
Christian missions in reverse—Africans converting the the Global North has remained fixed in the colonial
descendants of those who ventured to the “dark conti- period. Dethroning misguided groups in the Western
nent” now based in a secular Europe—entails a deep academy, many of them highly influential in Africa
irony. One can only wonder how inverting dominant “chaos and crisis speak,” is still a work in progress, and
historical relations will affect the future imagining of a balance of narratives about Africa’s place in the world
Africa. is only now emerging.
Regional demographic trends of fewer people living One highly positive sign is that academic output is
in Europe compared to Africa are altering the historical expanding in Africa. For a long time, Africa-based schol-
balance of the population. With the European and U.S. ars found outlets in local journals, nongovernmental
populations reaching a plateau and projections of organization (NGO) reports, and government and pri-
worker shortfalls, there is good reason to believe that vate consultancy reports. These outlets are still impor-
Africans will continue to have an impact beyond their tant in Africa-based research, but there is a movement
home region. Indices of income distribution are im- toward wider and more public dissemination. This re-
proving in many African states: only 12 African states flects the revitalization of academic life and improved
register as having more unequal family income distri- academic freedom across Africa. AJOL is now adding
butions than the United States (in other words, in most journals at a rapid rate, and journals from 30 countries
African countries wealth is more evenly distributed in Africa are included in its online portal. Even AJOL’s
among society as opposed to concentrating at the top, listing is not exhaustive; additional Africa-based jour-
whereas in the United States, the top 1% holds 90% of nals are published by international publishing houses
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 35

(e.g., Urban Forum is published by Springer). High- other commentators from research organizations,
profile Africa scholars in the diaspora are reasonably NGOs, consultancies, business, and so forth. There is
well represented in editorial membership and research no mechanism to rate blog quality, and thinking in
output in top-ranked journals (according to impact this way defeats the process of democratizing knowl-
factor rankings, which is only one [and some argue edge. An example of a highly successful blog with
biased] yardstick of quality based on average number of many followers and contributors on an Africa theme is
recent article citations and cannot assess relevance), Deborah Brautigam’s “China in Africa: the Real Story.”
based in the United States and Europe. Journals pub- The Africa-focused social media landscape is ever-
lished in Africa are now entering international impact changing: new sites appear frequently, some efforts
rankings; for example, South African Medical Journal is run out of steam, and blog initiatives may end after a
ranked in the upper third of English journals in medi- hiatus of intensive activity and focus on a particular
cine worldwide, and Southern African Development, a topic. For instance, William Easterly’s “Aid Watchers”
leading Southern Africa development journal, joined ended in May 2011 and Shanta Devarajan’s “Africa Can
the impact-ranking system for the first time in 2010. The End Poverty” ended in June 2013 but has since been
economics and politics of research funding and univer- continued by other World Bank staffers; both blogs are
sity rankings mean that it may be impossible to dis- important as historical markers in documenting how
lodge the preeminent position of U.S. and European the Africa conversation changes in a particular time period.
universities as gatekeepers of knowledge production In some emerging areas such as the technology—Africa in-
about Africa. And, of course, it would be wrong to di- terface, technology insiders are at the knowledge frontier
chotomize African studies scholarship by Africans and (see “White African” and “Africa Musings” blogs).
the rest. For instance, 10,000 Nigerian academics are Blogging offers a new genre of authoritative and
employed in the United States, indicating the extent of accessible academic textual production, and in this
the circulation of African human capital. Africa research way it is changing the nature of what it is to be a
output and knowledge production now include an Africa- 21st-century academic practitioner and student learn-
based stream, but the study of Africa is still a long way ing about Africa. The advantages of the medium are its cur-
from cross-fertilization and coproduction of knowledge. rency and ability to disseminate on-the-ground reporting
and coverage of material that is sparsely covered or not
covered at all in conventional texts. In this format
SOCIAL MEDIA: AFRICA REPORTING,
ideas can be developed and expressed, often in a con-
BLOGGING AFRICA, AND AFRICA PODCASTING cise and accessible form quite different from the tradi-
Electronic space is a medium that is becoming richer tional lengthier academic books, written for expert
and more diverse and has the potential to greatly audiences. As such, social media are on the way to be-
expand the Africa conversation. A growing number of coming a forum for academic generation of knowl-
sites concentrate on Africa and report and analyze edge outside of the classroom and traditional libraries
issues, host African expert reflections, and offer blogs and professional forums (e.g., public lectures, work-
and podcasts about Africa topics. Table 2.1 provides a shops, and conferences). These media are changing
summary of the leading sites on Africa (multi-blogging the way Africa and African topics are written about,
and individual bloggers) and links to media at the and they represent a new contribution to an increas-
forefront of Africa reporting and podcasting. Emphasis ingly multiphrenic environment of academic produc-
is on academic bloggers and practitioners who have a tion of knowledge on Africa.
research and policy focus, but not all bloggers are tra- The downside of social media is its huge size and
ditional academics with university posts. its varying quality and coherence (it is devoid of qual-
Several geographers are active bloggers (Ed Carr, ity filters, and topic postings are often random and re-
Christian Kull, Bill Moseley, Abdi Samatar, and Daniel flect the interests of the blogger as much as anything
Thompson) but also included in Table 2.1 are blogs by else), making it difficult to navigate and to decipher
36 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

TABLE 2.1 AFRICA IN SOCIAL MEDIA

Multi-blogging Sites

Blog Name URL Themes

African Arguments http://africanarguments.org international affairs, business, politics, book reviews

Africa at LSE http://blogs.|se.ac.uk/africaatlse/ development, economics, health, cities, politics, international

affairs, gender

Africa News Blog http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews news, politics, business, lifestyle

Africa in Words http://africainwords.com literature and writing

Africa on the Blog http://www.africaontheblog.com diaspora, development, politics

Al-Jazeera Blog Africa http:/blogs.aljazeera/blog/Africa news, analysis

Footprints Blog http://www.sustainabilityinstitute.net/ sustainability, sustainable development, sustainable urbanism

newsdocs/footprints

Millennium Villages Project http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/category/ rural development, MDGs

millennium-villages

Millennium Cities Initiative http://mci.ei.columbia.edu/blog/ urban development, MDGs

Individual Bloggers

Blog Name Author URL Themes

Al-Jazeera Opinion Abdi Ismail Samatar http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ development, Somalia

opinion/profile/abdi-ismail-samatar.html

Africa Can End Poverty Shanta Devarajan http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan development, combatting poverty
(June 2013)

Africa Political Epbhemera Sara Rich Dorman http://africanpoliticalephemera post-colonial political objects, fashion, posters
.blogspot.co.uk

Africa is a Country Sean Jacobs http://africaisacountry.com/latest/ reinventing the Africa narrative, visual
commentary on Africa
Tv
Aidnography Tobias Denkus http://aidnography.blogspot.de development, anthropology, communications
Africa Musings Juliana Rotich http://afromusing.com Ushahidi, renewable energy, tech Africa
Aid Watchers William Easterly http://aidwatchers.com (May 2011) foreign aid policy and approaches, transparency
China-Africa Real Story | Deborah Brautigam http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com China-Africa myths and realities, Chinese
workers, research ideas

Christian Kull Christian Kull http://christiankull.net geography, environment, development

Informal City Dialogues Sharon Benzoni http://nextcity.org/informalcity/city/ urban development
accra
Isthmus & Strait Kelsey Jones Casey http://isthmusandstrait.com/blog community development, land, gender, racial
and economic justice
Map East Africa Daniel Thompson http://mapeastafrica.com/blog/ geography, mapping, urban and political
trends, East Africa
Mats Utas Mats Utas http://matsutas.wordpress.com/about/ informality, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia
Open the Echo Chamber Ed Carr http://www.edwardrcarr.com/ rural development, foreign aid, climate
opentheechochamber change, food security
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 37

Paul Collier Paul Collier http://www.theguardain.com/profile/ Risen aid, development, population

paulcollier

Researching African Ivan Cuesta http://africanstates.wordpress.com African politics, research

States

Texas in Africa Laura Seay http://texasinafrica.blogspot.com politics, development, advocacy

uthinkafrica Richard Grant uthinkafrica.com geography, development, urban Africa

White African Eric Hersman http://whiteafrican.com Africa and technological innovation

Zimbabweland lan Scoones http://www.ianscoones.net/Blog.html rural development, agriculture, Zimbabwe

ZSpace Patrick Bond http://www.zcommunications.org/ social change, activism

zspace/patrickbond

Podcasts

Name URL Thematic Focus

China Africa http://china.buzzsprout.com China-Africa current topics weekly

BBC Africa Today http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/africa news roundup 5 days per week

The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/series/ —weekly development topics

global-development-podcast

Media Reviews

Outlet URL Perspective

The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/africa/roundup progressive

Think Africa Press http://thinkafricapress.com progressive

Pambazuka http:/Awww.pambazuka.org/en/ radical

African Strategic Center —http://africacenter.org U.S. military security

China Daily http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/africa.html Chinese

France 24 http://www.france24.com/en/atrica French

Good News About Africa http://www.goodnewsaboutafrica.com South African

One http://one.org/africa/blog grassroots advocacy and campaign to end

poverty

Knowledge, Technology _http://knotsids.blogspot.co.uk development, agriculture, rural development

and Society

This is Africa, our Africa http://www.ourafricablog.com cultural Africa, photography,

film, style

whom and what is important and how it fits into or The growing number of daily compilations of Africa
deviates from other knowledge. Without a good back- news dispatches (from different perspectives) makes it
ground knowledge and general framework, social possible to stay current on various events unfolding in
media postings about Africa can be as confusing as Africa. The Guardian consistently has the most compre-
they are provocative and informative. hensive general Africa coverage. Topic coverage varies
38 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

greatly among many organizations. For example, the Chapter 6) is a good example of how NGOs and
African Center for Strategic Studies provides daily secu- communities create their own geographical infor-
rity briefs from a U.S. and pro-US. African perspective. mation in real time. The Internet is better equipped
At the other end of the political spectrum, Pambazuka than traditional static media because it extends
offers a platform for critical perspectives (mostly African) beyond immediate media space by using extensive
by disseminating news about freedom and social justice networks of hyperlinks and tags for readers to
issues in Africa. It provides a broad base of analyses and follow, stimulating reader interest and debate, crys-
has earned a reputation as being among the top 10 web- tallizing issues, and keeping them alive. This arena
sites that are changing the world of the Internet and has the potential to diffuse the gatekeeping function
politics. Pambazuka operates from three offices in Africa of traditional media conglomerates.
as well as from London and provides a platform for Obvious drawbacks to Africa on the Web and
2,600 organizations and individuals to produce Africa social media exist: information is fragmentary, and it
news in multiple languages, making it the most pan- takes time and effort to provide coherence to the mul-
African web news source. Another useful source is “Think tiple sources of information. Without some basic
Africa Press,” a London-based magazine staffed by a large knowledge about Africa and consideration of the vari-
number of Africa-based writers; it has become one of the ous objectives and agendas, many students will strug-
leading Web magazines about Africa. The publication fo- gle to make sense of the various social constructions of
cuses on gender, health, environment, development, and African reality. It is hard to support the case that the
culture and represents an alternative to the coverage of- Internet nullifies the old representation of Africa: even
fered by some of the mainstream media houses. the most prominent sites attract niche audiences.
Inspiring Africans and Africa experts are making a Overall, Internet space has the potential to enlarge the
contribution to the uplift of the region by focusing on positive representation of Africa by providing increas-
advancing the humanity of Africans. African Arguments, ing amounts of new and alternative knowledge by an
the multi-blogging site funded by the Royal Africa Soci- increasing numbers of sources.
ety and the Social Sciences Research Council in the
United Kingdom, has a wide expert base (journalists,
academics, and businesspeople) and aims to present AFRICANS’ REVISIONING OF AFRICA

the most vigorous Africa debate on the Internet. Several There is no off-the-shelf model to solve complex Africa
good news sites are available. For example, Africa Good challenges. Virtually everyone acknowledges that
News is a South Africa-based portal, and Good News Africa has challenges—economic, leadership, environ-
About Africa is a London-based site; both assemble mental, and social. Despite Africa’s vast natural re-
only positive news about Africa without understating sources, many of its peoples remain mired in the
the challenges. deadly grip of poverty, squalor, and destitution, and
Information about Africa is more diverse, splin- buffeted by environmental degradation. Although
tered, and voluminous than ever before. Social macroeconomic indicators show improvement in
media platforms allow opportunities for different some national contexts (growth rates, international in-
and sometimes alternative voices. The Web offers a vestment, human development index [HDI], Gini co-
different platform of hope and possibility to change efficients, etc.), hard-hitting critiques claim Africans
popular perceptions about Africa: decades of aca- are worse off today than they were at independence in
demic research have not effectively communicated 1960. A good portion of this blame has to be shoul-
different ideas about Africa to nonacademics. NGOs dered by Africans themselves: leaders, politicians, and
using the Internet can offer competing construc- intellectuals have failed Africa.
tions of reality and can even allow their affiliates and Ake (1991:14) claims that “most African regimes
supporters to participate in the knowledge process have been so alienated and so violently repressive that
itself. Mapping using the Ushahidi (discussed in their citizens see the state as enemies to be evaded,
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 39

cheated and defeated, if possible, but never as a part- recover their humanity. Owomoyela (2010:48) puts it,
ner in development.” He believes that African leaders “Let us imagine, as an analogy, a man/woman is on
are so totally engrossed in coping with hostilities that trial for certain offences. The tribunal is quite disposed
they misrule and unleash repression. Their depen- to be considerate because its members believe that the
dence and policy reliance on external powers, coupled accused had a rough and deprived upbringing. They
with their domestic priority of holding on to power at also hold the belief that the charges are quite valid,
all costs, afford them little energy for anything else. UI- consistent with what is known about the accused and
timately, African leaders’ compulsion to gear policies established patterns of behavior. Tribunal members
to win international approval rather than to meet the are of the opinion that the best course of action is to
needs of their citizens is a failure of the highest admit guilt, plead for leniency and the opportunity to
magnitude. reform. But suppose the accused pleads innocence and
The ire of many African commentators is under- insists on explaining why those who assume guilt are
standable. Monga (1996:38-39, vii-ix) points out, wrong. The more the accused strives to persuade the
“When it comes to Africa, one can afford to indulge in tribunal the more the tribunal may be alienated and
approximations, generalizations, even illiteracy. Africa’s consequently hold the opinion that the accused is irre-
overall image is so negative that only the most pessi- deemable and deserving of the most draconian
mistic types of discourse conform to the logic that gov- lesson.” This is the kind of framing that led the Inter-
ems understanding of the continent. Publications as national Monetary Fund to impose structural adjust-
‘prestigious’ as the Financial Times, Der Spiegel, or Time, ment policies on African governments and for
can publish cover stories and surveys built upon false- market-based policies to be rolled out across Africa
hoods and factual errors without stirring up a storm of from the mid-1980s onward.
protest, no doubt because ‘experts’ on Africa know that Marxist ideas have held sway among African schol-
rebuttals will not damage their professional reputa- ars for decades. In the 1970s, there was a tilt toward
tions.” Monga goes on, “the more I read, the more frus- the left after the first generational wave of academics
trated I become because neither the academics nor the returned from the Global North (some of whom were
journalists were able (or willing) to capture the deter- messengers of the new design) and witnessed develop-
mination of people at the grassroots level to engage in ment failures firsthand. University library shelves con-
the political arenas, at any cost, in order to bring about tain many books written by African scholars that
some positive changes in the way they had been ruled frame Africa’s situation from a Marxian perspective, a
for several centuries.” The weight of history and the psy- theoretical stance oddly out of style with fashionable
chological damage, not to mention the economic and topics in the highest-ranked research journals. This
political realities that stem from history and its various Marxist tilt was reinforced by significant material cuts
continuities, are hard to overstate. at African universities, where scholars lacked access to
Difficult to dismantle is the international supposi- the latest theoretical debates, effectively silencing Afri-
tion that Africa is broken, off the global map, and un- can voices in the production of global knowledge on
wholesome and that the international development Africa. It is a deep paradox that the greatest opening of
industry must lead Africans on what to do. Multilat- African societies has occurred during the last 30 years,
eral agencies, international governments, and most a span when African academics were cut off from
NGOs participate in large efforts that result in Africa global scholarship and vice versa. Store shelves filling
being dependent on external assistance. Tens of thou- up with imported global commodities as library
sands of Westerners, spanning a range from volunteers shelves were cut off from global materials became an
to highly paid consultants based out of the top hotels, African predicament of enormous magnitude. The
would need to find a new line of work if Africa stopped left’s critique of market-led policies was largely si-
needing development advice. Their collective weight lenced by press censorship, which has only recently
makes it very difficult for Africans to maneuver and to begun to lessen.
40 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Africans are seeking an answer to a complex ques- that only maldevelopment (in medical terms this is
tion. African academics, policymakers, and commen- brain maldevelopment of the fetus) can take root. For
tators have been arguing for some time that Africa’s Amin, economic development is only a tool, but all
future must be founded upon indigenous roots and too often it is misconstrued as the end goal of develop-
true partnerships. A wide spectrum ofideas on alterna- ment, and concentrating on economic growth rather
tive development and on alternatives to development than fairness is misguided.
has been put forward. It is not possible to present all of Amin highlights that Africa is adversely incorpor-
these ideas here, but seven prominent visions put for- ated into the global economy, shackled by five exter-
ward by Africans are presented in the next sections of nal monopolies: high technologies, control over the
this chapter (various other visions are presented financial systems, control over environmental discourse,
throughout this book). Africans are battling to pro- the mass media, and weapons of mass destruction. Eco-
mote different ideas (many of them incompatible with nomic projects in Africa have not brought about human
each other) that prioritize (1) restructuring global eco- and social development: instead, Africans are generally
nomic arrangements (e.g., Samir Amin); (2) increasing poorer than the rest of the world. Amin’s position over
financial transparency and ending the looting ofAfrica the years, as well as that of many of his followers, has
(e.g., Patrick Bond and others); (3) promoting better shifted from self-reliance and “autarky”—a complete
political leadership (Mo Ibrahim); (4) supporting delinking from the international system—toward a
sustainable environmental development (Wangari revamping and restructuring of the relationship.
Maathai); (5) ending aid (Dambisa Moyo); (6) pro- The Amin camp believes that the international
moting civil society participation in development system is rigged and results in a systematic looting of
(e.g., Slum/Shack Dwellers International); and Africa's resources because most African governments
(7) promoting alternative ways to understand Africans have assumed ownership of all valuable resources.
and African urban society by a postcolonial lens (e.g., Claiming to hold them in trust for the people, they
Jennifer Robinson and AdouMaliq Simone). actually utilize them for the needs of multinational
Common elements among these diverse perspec- corporations (MNCs), various local cronies, and their
tives include the recognition of the complexity of own purposes. Alternative development and a new de-
African societies; the need to move beyond project- parture for Africa can occur only under conditions of a
oriented development; the necessity for Africans to better balance in the political and economic organiza-
develop fresh ideas, not replicate models from the tion of the global economy, a real multiplicity, and
United States, Europe, China, or elsewhere; and the not just a system that benefits the elite in the Global
aim for Africans to become active partners in sus- North. Radical African political economists now argue
tainable development (rather than passive develop- that alternative thinking about Africa’s resources is
ment subjects) and for development to be more needed, even a consideration of leaving them in the
inclusive of the poor. ground.

UNCHAINING AFRICA ENDING THE LOOTING OF AFRICA

Samir Amin (1990) is a highly acclaimed Egyptian Patrick Bond is a Marxist who contends that the most
political economist who emphasizes delinking from horrid chapter in the global economy since slavery is
the global economy as the only viable choice for the gargantuan illicit financial flow out of Africa. His
Africa. His radical perspective is based on an the as- book, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation
sumption that the international financial system is (2006), is a tour de force Marxian analysis that ex-
unfair and disadvantages Africans who, as it happened, plains why Africans are poor and becoming poorer.
were never even consulted about the financial regime Africa is being drained of resources by a pinstripe fi-
and its functioning. Neocolonialism, exploitative rela- nancial brigade of bankers, accountants, lawyers, and
tions, and lack of African peoples’ autonomy means corporate officers who build the instruments that
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 41

make an offshore world. “Offshore” is defined as a TABLE 2.2 LARGEST AFRICAN KLEPTOCRATS
legal space that decouples the legal and real location of Country Head of State Amount (US$)
a transaction with the aim of avoiding some or all reg-
Nicer Sani Abacha 4.3 billion
ulations. This financial brigade operates from luxury
offices in the heart of global financial centers (eg., Cote aiveire alc Heuphouee Biociy 3.5 billion

London, Paris) as well as from an offshore financial fygarianm Ibrahim Babangida 3.0 billion
network oftax havens (involving secrecy jurisdictions,
Zaire (Congo) Mobutu Sese Seko 2.2 billion
disguised corporations, anonymous trust accounts,
Mali Moussa Traoré 1.8 billion
fake foundations, etc.), integrated into an offshore
labyrinth. Céte d'lvoire Henri Konan Bédié 200 million
Offshoring reaches deep into African societies via Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso 120 million
corrupt officials, suave insiders, rogues, and various
Gabon Omar Bongo 50 million
companies that do all within their means to avoid
paying taxes. Individual interests at the expense of so- Cameroon Paul Biya 45 million

cietal interests rule the day: secrecy, greed, and exces- Ethiopia Haile Mariam 20 million
sive profiteering knit local and international players Chad Hissene Habré 2 million
together. Their bonds cement in-group trust as well as
an external wall of opacity. The outcome is that money Source: Based on information reported from Basel Institute of Governance,
Tax Justice Network-Africa, and Pambazuka.org.
leaves and flows elsewhere, circulating and hiding ina
shadow economy without being identified from any-
where. Money escaping from Africa is not only a
Marxist concern: Christian Aid, Oxfam, and civil soci- to the furrier who made his leopard-skin hats. The
ety organizations such the Basel Institute of Gover- piece de résistance was his marble palace in his home
nance, as well as journalists and whistle-blowers, are village of Gbadolite.
engaged in tracing the hidden billions from develop- Major banks (e.g., Citibank, Barclays, ABN Amro)
ment (Shaxson 2011). A task force on financial integ- Participate as pass-through conduits connected to oc-
rity and economic development was launched in cluded financial intermediaries in a complex labyrinth.
2009 to coordinate activities among civil society orga- Money does not flow in obvious and transparent geog-
nizations and national governments (some African raphies. Illicit transfer evidence is mounting, an ele-
governments are members). International organiza- phant in the room, bizarrely ignored in mainstream
tions (e.g., World Bank and Basel Institute of Gover- analyses and mysteriously under the radar partly be-
nance) are now starting to put more emphasis on cause it is veiled in secrecy that makes it impossible to
mechanisms for asset recovery and transparency. The see more than a minor part of the system at any one
largest identified official culprits in Africa are pre- time and is endlessly shifting as competition among
sented in Table 2.2. financial centers produces competition to enlarge the
Many asset recovery efforts are ongoing. Asset recov- loopholes. The offshore financial terrain is now even
ery efforts from Abacha’s reign have led to the retrieval locating to African tax havens. For example, Mauritius
of US$1.1 billion from banks in the United Kingdom, is becoming a conduit haven for investment into India
Switzerland, Lichtenstein, and Luxembourg. Asset port- and into Africa extractive industries from China and
folios attributed to Mobutu Sese Seko, one of the worst from London. Gaborone, Monrovia, and Seychelles are
resource plunderers, are staggering and still under emerging as additional on/offshore hubs, but the gov-
examination. His known property constellation included ernment of Ghana terminated its offshore financial ar-
a vineyard in Portugal, a 32-room mansion in Switzer- rangement with Barclays Bank of London in 2011 after
land, a castle in Spain, and a magnificent first-floor Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
apartment in Paris close to the Arc de Triomphe and ment (OECD) criticism.
42 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

According to Global Financial Integrity (GFI) TABLE 2.3 THE LOOTING OF AFRICA
ee

data, illicit flows hemorrhaged from US$854 billion Slavery and dispossession of more than 12 million people
to US$1.8 trillion between 1970 and 2008, growing Net supplier of energy and raw minerals to the Global North
at rates of about 12% per year (Kar and Cartwright-
Loss of 20,000 skilled professionals in annual brain drain
Smith 2010). Other estimates ofthe draining of Africa
calculate that between US$0.50 and US$10 leaves for 95% of cultural property trafficked (antiquities in British
every aid dollar sent. Draining may be facilitating a museums, private collections)

revolving door of odious debts: in-debt African gov- Unquantifiable losses due to stripping of animals and animal
ernments have to accept aid as well as allow unre- matter (e.g., endangering rhinoceroses, and elephants [especially
strained resource extraction to meet the demands of for taking ivory])

their creditors. An exact value of illicit flows may 30% of Africa’s GDP moving offshore
never be determined, but the size of the racket is US$30 billion—$148 billion moving to overseas financial
mind-boggling. Mounting evidence reveals that Africa institutions (Geneva, Monaco, Jersey, London, and other financial
is a net-creditor region to the rest of the world: the secrecy jurisdictions)
region’s net external assets now vastly exceed what is US$174 billion siphoned via corruption
owed in debts.
US$10 billion leaving in multinational transfer mispricing
We are still in an early phase of education in at-
tempts to see, understand, and measure the offshore 50% shortfalls in national tax revenues due to tax evasion and
avoidance measures
system. The Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A) is a
pan-African organization that provides data, reports, Sources: Bond, 2006; Tax Justice Network-Africa, 2013.
and commentary for academics, students, and those
interested in the harmful tax and financial activities
that are depleting African societies. As with much of Africa continues to be looted (Table 2.3). The cor-
the gaze on Africa, the Western media have focused on porate crime wave is global, stretching from Africa
capital flight from Africa, pointing an accusatory finger over to the Americas and to China, India, and almost
at the political-economic establishments in Gabon, everywhere else. The wealth, power, and illegality en-
Nigeria, South Africa, Congo, and Cote d'Ivoire in par- abled by this hidden system are now so vast as to
ticular. However, each capital flight location in Africa threaten the global economy’s legitimacy. Outflows
needs to have a corresponding inflow destination are a system driven from supply-side institutions
somewhere else. (London, Washington, D.C., Delaware [for tax avoid-
It is worth reversing the gaze to ask why the em- ance]) and accommodated by partners in Africa (Pre-
phasis is not on the inflows, especially as richer coun- toria, Libreville, Abuja). The looting of Africa that
tries have more resources and technical expertise in began centuries ago continues today, entailing trans-
forensic accounting to go after this illicit money. It is fers of natural resources, human resources (slave labor
not just clandestine operations that are occluded, but in the past replaced by recruitment of skilled graduates
routine MNC behavior utilizes transfer price mecha- today), antiquities, animals, and ivory; this trend is
nisms to avoid paying African taxes. Palen, Murphy, most evident today in the transfer of siphoned monies.
and Chavagneux (2010:175) cite a Deloitte report that This multibillion-dollar industry means African wealth
underscores the lack of a single successful African chal- is being subtracted from funds that could be otherwise
lenge to the transfer pricing behavior of any MNCs op- deployed within Africa, for projects such as poverty al-
erating in Africa. African governments are ill equipped leviation. Particularly egregious about the outflows is
to broach a charge against MNCs operating adversely that a minority of the elite is appropriating large
within their territories, since they lack the expertise, amounts of the region’s private assets while the gen-
relevant legislation, and commercial confidence to eral public, via their government, is bearing the exces-
take on entrenched corporations. sive public debt.
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 43

The 2013 index of financial secrecy in Table 2.4 Opponents of looting argue that policies designed
shows that only a few African countries register as the to help Africa are nothing more than a facade and a
world’s top 50 supply-side havens (Mauritius is ranked charade because they end up benefiting Western insti-
19th, Liberia 27th, Seychelles 28th, and South Africa tutions, multilateral institutions, and the global finan-
36th); in sharp contrast, Europe and to a lesser extent cial industry more than Africa itself. Mainstream
the United States predominate in global financial se- development theorists need to better understand the
crecy activities. The United Kingdom and dependents destructive dynamic of looting. Supply-side curbs need
under British control stand out as a major offshore to be set up. Africans need to engage in self-activity
network, accounting for one third of all offshore ac- and in campaigns to ensure that declarations are taken
tivities linking businesses and London that otherwise seriously and accommodated with new curbs and
might not be related. The geography of UK financial more transparency.
networks within financial networks operates like a re-
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
charged version of the colonial empire where modems
rather than gunboats orchestrate vast transfers. Few The world’s largest annual prize, the Ibrahim Prize, is
funds ever return to Africa. London is the epicenter of awarded to improve leadership in Africa. It offers a
African outflows, determined by an apparatus that en- monetary award that exceeds the Nobel Peace Prize.
abled the banking and legal systems to expand to pro- The prize is awarded to a democratically elected former
vide an escape route for capital at the time those African executive head of state of a government who
African countries were achieving independence. The demonstrated excellence in office, abided by constitu-
French established a parallel system, whose veil was tional term limits, and gracefully left office within the
lifted by the Elf scandal (see Box 2.2). last three years. This incentive to improve leadership is

TABLE 2.4 AFRICAN COUNTRIES IN THE FINANCIAL SECRECY INDEX (FSI) RANKINGS

Rank Secrecy Jurisdiction FSI Value Secrecy Score Global Scale Weight

1 Switzerland 1,265:2 78 4.916

2 Luxembourg 1,454.4 67 12.049

3 Hong Kong 1,283.4 72 4.206

4 Cayman Islands 1,233.5 70 4.694

5 Singapore 1,216.8 70 4.280

6 USA 1,212.9 58 22.586

7 Lebanon 747.8 7S) 0.354

8 Germany 738.3 59 4.326

7) Jersey 591.7 75 0.263

10 Japan 51Sel 61 1.185

19 Mauritius 397.8 80 0.047

27 Liberia 300.8 83 0.014

28 Seychelles 293.4 85 0.011

36 South Africa 209.7 53 0.260

a

Source: http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/introduction/fsi-2013-results.
44 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 2.2 ELF SCANDAL: CHASING FRANCE- the United States but to Omar Bongo in Libreville. Bongo ruled
Gabon, a small country on the coast of Central Africa, from
AFRIQUE SHADOWS
1967 until his death in 2009, making him the world’s longest-
The Elf affair was a jolt to the world. A dedicated magistrate in serving head of government. Assuming office at age 31, his
France, Eva Joly, investigated a corporate legal dispute, and her reign coincided with Gabon’s oil boom. During his rule, Gabon
inquiry led her to dig deeper and deeper until she was able to became the fourth-largest oil producer in Africa. The country is
peel off layers that eventually showed complex Africa—France richly endowed in other resources, containing one fifth of the
entanglements. The story, as it unraveled, linked President world’s known uranium supplies, iron ore, manganese, colum-
Omar Bongo of Gabon to a gigantic system of corruption involv- bite, and talc deposits, and abundant dense forests with some
ing the French state-owned oil company Elf Aquitaine and of the world’s most valuable woods. Gabon shares (with neigh-
French political, commercial, and intelligence establishments. A boring Equatorial Guinea) a world monopoly on the production
web of deceit contained details straight out of a spy novel. of okoumé, a light wood used in the production of plywood.
It connected former lingerie model Christine Deviers-Joncour, Bongo became France's point man in the region, and Sarkozy
who was paid over US$6 million to help persuade her lover— referred to this as a special relationship. By many accounts this
who happened to be the French foreign minister—to reverse his special relationship is ongoing: France is reported to have
opposition to the sale of missile boats to Taiwan, among other been involved in rigged elections, enabling Bongo’s son to
things. This money originated from oil proceeds from the small take power after his father’s death. One thousand French
African state of Gabon. A seven-year investigation uncovered a troops remain in Gabon today, connected by underground tun-
chain of transactions from Libreville to Paris via Geneva and nels to the presidential place. Gabon is an oil-producing coun-
Luxembourg and a host of other tax havens, as well as from Paris try, but with a small population of 1.7 million. During the Bongo
to French MNC affiliates via a slush fund for spending on oil years, the government built more pipelines than roads, and the
bribes in African oil frontiers. This was made possible by selling country astonishingly registered among the highest infant mor-
African oil cargoes and splitting the proceeds among a range of tality rates in the world. During Bongo senior’s days his name
bewildering accounts in myriad tax havens. The investigation and image adorned everything from stadiums to bottled water,
put Deviers-Joncour in prison, and after she felt that the estab- and the Bongo system doled out cash to buy friends and to
lishment had deserted her, she broke her code of silence and in appease the opposition as needed. Bongo was said to be so
1999 wrote a best-selling book, The Whore of the Republic averse to writing checks that when summoned to the presiden-
(English translation of the title). She revealed that she had used tial palace one traveled with a suitcase to collect payments.
an Elf credit card to buy the French prime minister a pair of A local joke that made the rounds in Libreville was that the
handmade ankle boots from a Paris designer shop so removed quickest way to become a millionaire was to set up an opposi-
from reality that the shop owner offers to wash customers’ shoes tion party.
once a year in champagne. Bongo’s presidential salary was €20,000 per month (US$26,322),
The Elf affair turned out to be the biggest corruption case of yet he lived an outrageously extravagant lifestyle—dozens of
the postwar era. This secret oil money was used to covertly fi- luxurious properties in and around Paris and in southern France, a
nance French political parties, the intelligence services, other US$500 million presidential palace, 70 bank accounts, nine luxury
well-connected parts of French society, and other projects. This vehicles worth about US$2 million, and many other cars (and
stash even provided a fund to pay bribes for large contract bids these holdings are only what prosecutors knew about).
in Venezuela, Germany, and Taiwan. The out-of-sight Gabon ori-
Bongo'’s rise is a full-blown snapshot of what went on behind
gins meant that the money trail was invisible, and the slush fund the scenes when African countries gained independence and
was able to grow in size and complexity over time. Gabon does
the French empire acted to set up new ways to stay in control.
not appear on any list of tax havens, but the Elf system it funded
When Gabon’'s first president, Leon M'‘ba, died prematurely,
was intertwined in an offshoring complex that may have com-
Omar Bongo was the ideal replacement as far as French inter-
prised 4,000 channels around the world.
ests were concerned. Belonging to a tiny ethnic minority group
The secretive Elf pot of hundreds of millions of dollars en-
and with no natural base of support, he would have to rely on
abled France to “punch above its weight” on the international
France for protection. In exchange for French backing, Bongo
scene. Shady dealings meant that Elf operated as a state within
granted French companies almost exclusive access to the coun-
a state. Monies even reached the United States. A U.S. investi-
try's resources, on preferential terms at the expense of the
gation showed that former president Bongo used loopholes in
needs of the local population. Gabon acquired a taste for
American laws to transfer millions to bank accounts of American
things French, and it is the world’s largest consumer of cham-
lobbyists. U.S. and international banks facilitated these transac-
pagne per capita, but most of its people are impoverished.
tions without questions.
Wealth is so unevenly distributed that half of the population
Nicolas Sarkozy's first phone call (after assuming the French
lives below the poverty line—remarkable for a country with
presidency in 2007) was not to the president of Germany or of
such a huge GDP and further corroborating the small elite’s
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 45

stranglehold on all power and economic resources. All this profound ways. Ordinary Africans have their resource monies
could occur because Bongo was a shrewd international opera- siphoned off to the rich world through unfair contracts and gen-
tor and tapped into French Freemasonry networks and African eral corruption, while French politicians helped prop up Gabon’s
secret societies to become one of the most important power leaders, making them less accountable to their citizens. At the
brokers in France itself. Bongo facilitated France’s relationship same time, the Elf system made France’s elites unaccountable to
in such a way that it has been remarked that France left by the their own citizens. The Elf case symbolizes the problems with the
front door at independence but returned in the side, opened global regime in international accounting standards. It turns out
window. that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is a
The Elf affair illustrates shadowy dealings and the workings of privately funded company financed by the largest accountancy
cross-border corruption. The gigantic system of corruption af- firms and global MNCs, headquartered in London and regis-
fected ordinary people in both Africa and France in invisible but tered in Delaware.

the brainchild of African billionaire Mo Ibrahim, who was Pedro Verona Pires, former Cape Verde president
made his vast fortune from the mobile phone industry. (Fig. 2.2). According to the awards committee, under the
Prize money consists of US$5 million over 10 years and latter's 10 years as president, the nation became only
US$200,000 annually for life thereafter. The Mo Ibrahim the second African country to graduate from the United
Foundation also considers granting an additional Nation’s Least Developed category and has won inter-
US$200,000 per year, for 10 years, toward public interest national recognition for its record on human rights and
activities and good causes espoused by the winner. The good governance. The committee chose not to award a
inaugural winner was the former South African leader prize in 2009, 2010, and 2013, signifying that no leaders
Nelson Mandela in 2007 (Box 2.3); the 2011 recipient met the criteria for the award.

BOX 2.3 NELSON ROLIHLAHLA MANDELA: and martyr to diplomat and statesman (Stengel 2008:1). His au-
AFRICA’S ICONIC LEADER tobiography Long Walk to Freedom (1995) is a very compelling
account of his coming of age as a political leader, his immense
Nelson Mandela, who passed away on December 3, 2013, is
human spirit, his education, and his deep reflection during his
widely regarded as the greatest African leader of the 20th cen- 27 years of imprisonment. In his memoir he notes, “Il had no
tury and a leader of global historical significance. A charismatic epiphany, no singular revelation, no moment of truth, but a
man of Africa and a worldwide symbol of resistance to the injus- steady accumulation of a thousand slights, a thousand indignities
tice of his country’s apartheid system, Mandela evolved into a and a thousand unremembered moments produced in me an
global iconic figure. He was jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in anger, a rebelliousness, a desire to fight the system that impris-
1993 (with F. W. de Klerk) “for their work for the peaceful termi- oned my people. There was no particular day on which | said,
nation of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundation for henceforth | will devote myself to the liberation of my people;
a new democratic South Africa” (Nobel Prize Organization instead, | simply found myself doing so, and could not do other-
1993). As the first black president of South Africa and leader of wise” (Mandela 1995:95). Mandela was also deeply concerned
the African National Congress (ANC) party, Mandela shepherded with justice for all, and he maintained that “a nation should not
a difficult transformation from apartheid and racial conflict to de- be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest
mocracy. He became the face of the “new South Africa” that re- ones.” (Mandela 1995:201). His autobiography was made into a
engaged internationally and helped reimagine and turn South 2013 Hollywood biopic (breaking news of Mandela’s death coin-
Africa toward Africa, considerable feats as the country had long cided with the London premiere), and Mandela’s dedication to
been regarded as an international pariah and a settler colony run reconciliation is well chronicled in various texts and films. For
by Europeans, many of whom did all in their powers to be sepa- example, the Academy Award-nominated Invictus film details
rate from Africans and Africa. Mandela getting behind the South African rugby team the
Mandela's global status is such that he is perhaps the closest Springboks (who personified the sport of his former oppressors);
the world has come to know as “a secular saint,” but as one of they were crowned world champions at the 1995 Rugby World
his biographers emphasizes, he would be the first to admit that Cup hosted by South Africa.
he was in essence something far more pedestrian: a quintessen- The Mandela legend storyline and his persona made him a
tial politician who knew when to make the transition from warrior pop cultural icon. From Mandela shirts to musical powerhouses
(Continued)
46 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 2.3 (Continued) transformation from apartheid; championing the cause of for-
giveness and reconciliation; dismantling the geographical lines
writing and performing songs in his honor (U2, Springsteen, of segregation and separation; promoting the “rainbow nation”
Miles Davis, etc.) to Hollywood heavyweights portraying his life (the coming together of peoples from different backgrounds,
(Danny Glover, Sidney Poitier, and Idris Elba), Mandela is the colors, and creeds); developing a new foreign policy, with spe-
most celebrated African. cial attention to the Southern African region through the promo-
Mandela was born into the Madiba clan in Mvezo, Transkei, in tion of the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
1918 but grew up in Qunu, a small village in Eastern Cape Prov- which allowed South Africa to be both provider and recipient of
ince. His father, Chief Henry Mandela, was a member of the migrant labor, transport services, and hydroelectricity; actively
Thembu people’s royal lineage and his mother was one of his four engaging with African institutions such as the Organization of
wives. At age seven, he became the first member of his family to African Unity (now AU) that rallied African leaders behind the
attend school, and he went on to complete a high school educa- vision of a unified Africa as well as an African Renaissance; dem-
tion and enter university. He studied for a BA at University College onstrating that public protest and boycotts can bring about
at Fort Hare (a higher education institution for the black popula- change; and establishing a precedent that stepping down from
tion) but never completed his studies because he was expelled for the office of the presidency is important for the functioning of
joining a student protest. He studied law at the University of democracy.
Witwatersrand (Johannesburg) but also never completed this pro- Mandela, the “father of the nation,” continued to engage in
gram. By his own admission, he was a poor student, and he dedi- public life and philanthropy after leaving the presidency, estab-
cated himself to political activism, which culminated in his joining lishing the Nelson Mandela Foundation, which is committed to
the ANC in 1994. With a group of fellow ANC members (including
rural development and education and combatting HIV/AIDS.
Walter Sisulu and Oliver Tambo) he established South Africa’s first
Of course, no leader can achieve everything, and Mandela has
black-run law firm as well as the ANC Youth League. Later he
been criticized for not doing enough in the political and eco-
resumed his studies via a distance-learning program from the
nomic transformation of South Africa. He did not complete the
University of London, but he did not compete that degree and it
transformation of the ANC party into a mature political organiza-
was not until 1989, while in his last months of imprisonment, that
tion that is not built around the cult of the leader. The hegemony
he obtained a law degree from the University of South Africa.
of the ANC is such that a mature multiparty democracy has yet
Mandela spent his formative activist years as volunteer-
to emerge. His policies did not do enough in ending spatial and
in-chief of the ANC’s Campaign for the Defiance of Unjust Laws,
social disparities in South Africa. The gap between the rich and
whereby volunteers defied selected laws in nonviolent resist-
poor remains wide, and unemployment remains very high (offi-
ance. Mandela changed tactics in 1961 when he decided to
cially it is almost 40% and it may be even higher in reality). Shock-
go underground to help create the ANC's paramilitary wing—
ingly for a resource-rich country such as South Africa, nearly one
Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation)—that engaged in
third live on less than US$2 per day (World Bank 2013).
sabotage against the government. Captured in 1962, he was ac-
South Africa has not flourished as well economically as the rest of
cused of traveling outside of the country without a passport and
Africa, and its economy is stumbling as a brain drain of South
of inciting workers’ strikes. Subsequently, he was charged with
African professionals has occurred for many years.
treason in what became known as the Rivonia Trial and was im-
Subsequent South African presidents (Thabo Mbeki and Jacob
prisoned, along with seven other members of the top command
Zuma) have failed to live up to Mandela’s legacy and have been
of the ANC, for life without parole. Until 1982 he was imprisoned
rather flawed. Corruption and patronage of the ANC has
on Robben Island, South Africa's most notorious island prison,
become rampant, and the Zuma presidency continues to be em-
situated 11 km (7 miles) from Cape Town. There, he was con-
broiled in a series of scandals (sex, misappropriation of state
fined to a 2.1 2.1-meter cell (7 x 7 feet), was made to do hard
funds, and the Gupta wedding jet scandal). Despite the overall
labor (breaking rocks), and was permitted to write and receive
economic presence of the country in the region, South Africa
only one letter every six months. As international pressure
holds limited soft power in Africa. Even in its immediate
mounted on the apartheid regime (through boycotts, divest-
region, South Africa has not provided leadership in managing
ments, the “Free Mandela” global media movement), Mandela
the Zimbabwean crisis. However, it is important to emphasize
was transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982 and later to Victor
that South Africa began its transformation under Mandela in
Verster Prison, and from these locations negotiations with the
1994, and 20 years is not a lot of time for deep transformation.
apartheid regime ensued for over a decade.
As Mandela noted, “we have not taken the final step of our jour-
Mandela's legacies are many. His most important accom-
plishments include engineering and overseeing South Africa's ney, but the first step on a longer and even more difficult road”
(Mandela 1995:624).
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 47

Therefore, any efforts to improve Africa’s leadership

deficit can only be positive for all.

ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR

AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Environmentalism was a preserve of the Global North

until recently, and environmentalism of the poor in
Africa has been overlooked. Wangari Maathai (2009)
was a leader of the sustainable development and envi-
ronmental conservation movement among the poor
who was very influential in Africa. Through her work
and advocacy, she showed that poor women often
FIGURE 2.2 Mo Ibrahim and African Leaders at Prize
Ceremony, 2012. Source: © Sylvain Cherkaoui/AP/Corbis. have intimate understandings of what is at stake with
regard to poor management of the environment. By
The prize is aimed at tackling the leadership deficit relying directly on land and its natural resources, many
in African states. Business and intellectual African elites of Africa’s poor understand the relationship between
are convinced that improving government leadership environmental degradation and poverty and are moti-
is one of the most effective ways to transform Africa vated by conservation. Their situations stand in sharp
from within. Well established is the reality that many contrast with many in the Global North, where the re-
African leaders are motivated to cling to power rather lationship with the natural environment as a source of
than to put all of their energies into developing their livelihood is largely lost.
economies. Retired presidents receive no benefits in Maathai, born in Kenya, excelled as a leader: she
many African countries, increasing the incentives for became the first woman in Eastern and Central Africa
corruption as a means to provide for their own welfare to be awarded a PhD, the first woman to be appointed
when they leave office. Retirement brings an abrupt professor at the University of Nairobi, and the first
end to presidential perks; the mansions, cars, meals, African woman to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
wine, and social events are withdrawn. Renting a house (2004). She led an international campaign that pre-
in the capital can even become unaffordable to many, vented the Kenyan government from erecting the tallest
especially with regime changes, when the opposition skyscraper in Africa and extended her environmental
wants to entrench its entourage and marginalize the activism into urban centers like Nairobi. Her career
old regime. Some attribute Africa’s reverence for “big also encompassed crossing the political divide, from
men” presidents as a leftover from precolonial rever- being an outsider activist to a member of Parliament
ence to traditional social systems of leadership, fol- insider; she even went on to hold a deputy ministerial
lowed by a shift to colonial administrations that appointment. She gained most international promi-
encouraged this kind of leadership (native administra- nence for her leadership of the Green Belt Movement
tion), and then to postcolonial development policies (GBM), a grassroots environmental conservation and
that privileged top-down development until recently. community development NGO (Fig. 2.3).
Leadership is very important because it sets the priori- Under Maathai’s stewardship, the GBM became a
ties for development. In the past, African leaders were vehicle for mobilizing community consciousness (it
preoccupied with blaming their failures on external utilized tree planting and tree care as an entry point)
factors, scarcely reflecting on internal deficiencies. A and for facilitating self-determination, equity, improved
legacy of past leadership failures is that international livelihood and security, and environmental conserva-
governments and their publics appear incapable of dis- tion, and in the process made progress toward invigo-
tinguishing between African leaders and Africans. rating self-confidence. Since 2006, the United Nations
48 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

reforestation movement.-GBM validated women’s will-

ingness to mobilize and work together to help meet
their families’ and communities’ needs through sus-
tainable strategies. Through activism, the marginalized
poor demonstrated that the poor do provide leadership
(as much as the elites). Creating healthier environ-
ments that sustain communities, GBM created spaces
in which people affected by environmental degra-
dation were provided with a voice in the negotiation,
sharing, and management of resources. In this regard,
GBM provides a vehicle for strengthening local cultures
and economies, and an alternative to the continuation
of past negative influences of colonial-enforced changes
in land practices and external commodity prices.
Maathai’s most important legacy is her leadership in
influencing people and communities to overcome the
ingrained attitude that solutions to problems should
come from the outside and from the top down.
Maathai contended that many of Africa’s problems
stem from a destructive dynamic where national re-
sources turn into a curse and where effective resource
leadership is absent, a dynamic rooted in colonialism.
Colonists introduced commercial crops that were not
native to the land; forests were cleared for export-
oriented agriculture, and other areas were planted with
exotic species of trees for the international lumber in-
dustry. Once harvested, exotic timber species were
FIGURE 2.3 Wangari Maathai. Source: © RADU SIGHETI/ rarely replaced with seedlings, exotic or otherwise.
X00255/Reuters/Corbis.
Kenya, for example, lost 90% of its forest in 50 years
(1950-2000). In time, deforestation leads to soil
Environment Programme (UNEP), in Maathai’s honor, runoff and the degradation of water supplies. Scarce
has embarked on annual international campaigns to water in rural areas motivates men to migrate to cities
plant 1 billion trees. Remarkably successful, some 7 bil- for work, and rural communities and family networks
lion trees had been planted by 2011. GBM is well on its unravel at the source.
way to becoming a pan-African movement and is suc- Maathai advocated for an African leadership revo-
cessful in scaling up its very local community advocacy lution. Current leadership and democracy deficits con-
to the highest level of society. For example, GBM suc- stitute a major development bottleneck. Africans
cessfully lobbied for the new constitution of Kenya remain stuck on a wrong-bus syndrome: behaving as
(promulgated in 2010) to guarantee environmental travelers who have boarded the wrong bus, many
rights: the fundamental right of all Kenyans to live ina people and communities head in the wrong direction
healthy and clean environment and to have the envi- or travel on the wrong path, while allowing their lead-
ronment protected for the benefit of present and future ers to lead them farther from their desired destination.
generations. Poor education, naiveté, fear, pride, pack mentalities,
GBM built community, livelihoods, and sustain- powerlessness, and poor advice have led Africans on
able development. Women’s groups functioned as the the wrong development path. The disempowerment of
conduit for the successful mobilization of a massive Africans is one of the most unrecognized problems,
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 49

and it finds expression in a lack of self-confidence, schools). Aid has financially benefited African govern-
apathy, fear, and inability to take charge of one’s situ- ments, NGOs, and community-based organizations, but
ation. Disempowered Africans find it acceptable to rely the effectiveness of aid is always open to question and
completely and without question on third parties debate. Its impacts are difficult to measure and quantify.
(government, aid agencies, and God) rather than have Establishing causality on many dimensions of the
faith in their own efforts. African leaders shoulder a impact of international assistance is inherently difficult
large portion of the blame by not being transforma- (e.g., aid and economic growth). Intangibles are not cap-
tional leaders. Their attitudes and policy decisions tured by standard assessments (e.g., transferring know-
have supported the belief that Africans are helpless, how and reverse transfers of African know-how).
unable to act on their own behalf. Values such as Nevertheless, it has not gone unnoticed that the terms
self-determination, embraced by the majority of Afri- upon which it is delivered are rarely defined by the
cans in the period after independence, have seriously people of Africa. African aid critics have lacked a public
eroded. Personal and collective uplift have been shat- platform until recently.
tered recklessly. Africans must embrace the freedom of The argument that aid is not working has been
self-discovery and Africa-led solutions. Strong psycho- gathering momentum among academics and activists
logical, intellectual, and other rationales are advanced in Africa. There is a striking irony to current 21st-
for not accepting the prevailing freedoms (i.e., the century aid realities. The capitalist West declares Africa
global marketplace and global financial system). to be in need of aid, while former communist and so-
Counterintuitively, Maathai called for reimagining cialist countries such as China and India see Africa as
community and embracing micro-nations instead of an economic opportunity. There is an aid constituency
wholly concentrating on artificially constructed coun- in Africa that would like to continue the current aid
tries. African states merely serve to issue necessary docu- regime with modifications (some radical), but none of
ments such as passports and identity cards. Anything less the most passionate advocates for aid to Africa are
than embracing Africa’s multitude of micro-nations per- Africans.
petuates the cultural deracination that has left millions The perspective that aid may actually prevent
of modern Africans with the traits deriving from disem- African countries from developing by allowing their
powerment discussed in the previous paragraph. She tulers to avoid long-term solutions is gaining ground.
advocated for Africans reconstituting their nations with Aid may be destroying local initiatives and holding
the support of grassroots civil society. Only through Africans back. As the Ugandans say, “begged water does
broad-based African ownership, foresight, and collective not quench a thirst.” One of the biggest opponents of
action will a positive and alternative future emerge. Africans aid is Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian-born economist. Her
cannot change the past, but they can manage the present book Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There
differently to determine a better future. Is a Better Way for Africa (2009) has received much at-
tention. Moyo gained recognition quickly as an articu-
ENDING AID? late, African-born economist, with an academic and
Within the last 50 years, US$1 trillion of foreign aid has business pedigree (Harvard and Oxford University—
been remitted to Africa. The continent ranks consistently educated and Goldman Sachs investment strategist).
as the largest aid-receiving region. Aid is given via loans Her argument is not entirely new; others (e.g., William
and grants or materials, labor, and/or expertise. National Easterly, a professor at New York University and a
governments, multilateral agencies (e.g., the United Na- former World Bank economist) have come to similar
tions), private organizations, and NGOs participate in a conclusions. Moyo argues succinctly that aid is a disas-
multilayered global aid regime. There are different types ter in Africa and that it is a disease pretending to be a
of aid: project aid (schools, ports), program aid (sectoral cure. Like many others, she believes that aid fosters de-
support, such as for agriculture or education), budget pendence, encourages corruption, and ultimately per-
support (direct financial support), and various combina- petuates poverty and bad governance. Aid is compared
tions, such as sector-wide aid (build and maintain to oil in that it enables powerful elites to misuse and
50 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

embezzle public monies. The siphoning of funds to re- economic development, reinforcing poverty, and erod-
plenish Swiss bank accounts happens all too often. She ing health and education systems.
reasons that aid is too-easy money for governments; if The future of foreign aid in Africa is an important
governments were to rely on private investments, they debate. It may be easier to argue for ending aid than to
would be accountable to private institutions, and if demand a radical restructuring of the entire global ar-
they relied on taxation, they would be accountable to chitecture of international assistance. Aid can make a
their citizens. As it stands, African governments are difference, but it should not distract us from consider-
hardly accountable, as the aid professionals are not ing other important mechanisms for promoting devel-
predisposed to lift the lid on aid and undermine their opment (e.g., transparency, leadership, accountability,
own positions. In her writing, Moyo fervently calls on civil society, international finance). Africa's future will
Africans to start representing themselves on the world ultimately not depend on aid; it will depend far more
stage rather than leaving it to Western rock stars (such on its people and its governments. The framing of
as Bono and Bob Geldof). The core of her argument is Africa’s development futures is now firmly shifting
that economic development in Africa can come about away from what the outside world owes Africa toward
through borrowing on international capital markets, what Africans owe themselves.
promoting Chinese investments, microfinance, and re-
CIVIL SOCIETY
mittances. How these ingredients can combine and in-
terrelate is left unexamined. Civil society has come to play a significant role in
Moyo’s arguments have been roundly criticized Africa’s democratization process and development ini-
and contested for being based on weak analysis and for tiatives. A plethora of civil society organizations and
coming to mistaken conclusions about the life-and- NGOs emerged in the 1990s, coinciding with the tilt
death realities of Africa’s poor. Jeffrey Sachs, director of toward democratization and more freedom of expres-
the Earth Institute at Columbia University and one of sion within particular African states. The term “civil
the most influential economists in the world, is very society” pertains to the population of groups formed
vocal in asserting that “dead aid” is dead wrong. Sachs primarily outside the state and the marketplace for col-
believes that ending aid would be irresponsible and lective purposes. At its core, civil society holds ambi-
would damage the poorest of Africans, some 400 million tious aims of equality and justice, democracy and
people living in extreme poverty. Lumping all aid into tolerance. It encompasses many forms of voluntary col-
one undifferentiated mass program and project does not lective action—formal and informal, traditional and
allow for the identification of the most successful aid modern, secular and religious—extending well beyond
programs. Examples of effective aid include support for high-profile formal NGOs with international support
farmers to grow more food, childhood vaccinations, and funding. This landscape is diverse and complex,
deworming, school meals, training and salaries for but poverty reduction is the common denominator for
community health workers, safe drinking water, anti- many civil society organizations in Africa. These orga-
retroviral medicine for AIDS sufferers, and clean low- nizations attract membership from the urban poor be-
cost cooking stoves to prevent respiratory diseases in cause state structures that affect their day-to-day lives
young children. Some countries in Africa are on their seldom permit their active participation. Working at
way toward graduating from aid (e.g., Ghana, Rwanda, the grassroots permits a better opportunity to create
and Tanzania), but all of the fastest-growing African local ownership of development (arm’s-length govern-
economies are still highly dependent on aid. Aid paved ment and international aid agencies often have diffi-
the way for growth in Asia (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea), culties in this respect). In theory, civil society constitutes
but it is not clear why African states should be an ex- a space for action outside the state, but in practice, dis-
ception. Moyo has been sharply criticized for giving tinctions and roles blur as mainstream development
too little consideration to the structural integration of organizations co-opt civil society. Nevertheless, a criti-
African economies into the global economy. She ig- cal feature of civil society organizations at the grass-
nores the impact of the debt crisis in undermining roots level is that they provide civic energy and,

i
i
if
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 51

therefore, unleash hope and potential, even in the

midst of unpromising circumstances.
Some scholars (e.g., Arjun Appadurai [2001]) hold
very ambitious visions for civil society: a globalization
from below to counter top-down globalization, mem-
bers of the urban poor forming global alliances, and
simultaneous activism at different geographical scales
(local, urban, international). Intermingling the vari-
ous scales of political action strengthens civil society
by enhancing their knowledge bases and strategic arse-
nal. Cross-border activism is viewed as one of the most
effective strategies for shaping a new political horizon
of the urban poor and for pressuring local govern- 2 SLUM
UPGRADING
ments to make cities more inclusive of the poorest of
the poor.
Some civil society organizations are registering
successes. A very prominent civil society organization
active in 15 African states is Shack/Slum Dwellers
International (SDI). SDI is active in Angola, Ghana,
Nigeria, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, FIGURE 2.4 Self-help: Shack/Slum Dwellers International
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The organization was founded (SDI) Methodology.

in 1996 as a grassroots movement of the urban poor.

Initially, intellectual leadership came from India and people they serve. SDI’s successes contribute to reassess-
South Africa, but the organization has broadened its ment of these relationships.
expert base over time. SDI has been successful in ad- SDI federations excel in the initial stages of commu-
vancing a pro-poor agenda that aims to make cities nity planning. Their community-led enumerations have
more inclusive. Its central message is that slum dwell- been vital in giving visibility and legitimacy to the poor,
ers need to organize into local groups (federations) in communities otherwise rendered invisible in national
order for governments to change the way they operate censuses (official censuses are notorious for under-
toward the poor. SDI has a tried and tested methodol- counting slum dwellers) and in mainstream urban poli-
ogy that is deployed in their member communities cies. Community-led enumerations count households,
(Fig. 2.4). map settlements, and survey at the household level to
Six interrelated components (saving and finance, provide detailed socioeconomic profiles of settlements.
community planning, exchange and learning, partner- For example, the Ghana National Population and
ships, slum upgrading, and women) allow for the poor Housing Census of 2000 recorded 10,000 people in
to insert themselves (via the NGO) at the center of strate- Old Fadama, a slum in the center of Accra, the capital of
gies to develop their communities. A central tenet is that Ghana. A community-led enumeration in 2009 tallied
ownership of the process leads to better development 76,684 persons, providing a more exhaustive baseline.
outcomes. This raises an important question: can inter- The settlement profile also revealed that almost all of
national aid agencies better reduce poverty by direct rela- the working-age population is employed in the infor-
tionships with the poor as opposed to operating at mal economy and thus not recorded by government
government levels? Unfortunately, donor agencies and data. Given that the Old Fadama community is under
their constituencies are more preoccupied with account- an eviction threat and relocation is being discussed,
ability upward in their own countries (national govern- these discrepancies have enormous implications for
ments, media, and pressure groups) rather than with the settlement provisions and their possible outcome. The
52 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

bottom line is that when communities own their own asset of the SDI network. The major advantage of inter-
information, they are able to gather more accurate in- national exchanges has been their ability to turn the
formation and become active partners in planning their tables on local development planners: slum dwellers
development. Ultimately, as SDI federations work with now possess knowledge. When they meet with local of-
local governments to verify and legitimize their findings ficials and external actors to debate development poli-
in order to mainstream community-collected informa- cies, they can draw from international examples,
tion for citywide planning purposes, everybody benefits forcing their government and other stakeholders to
from a bottom-up approach. Enumerations thus build listen as well as to think. Certainly, the federations of
political capital for communities both internally and the urban poor working with SDI dramatically increase
externally. Activities such as community mapping create their exposure to international organizations, the inter-
space for communities to identify development priori- national press, academics, and a range of other domes-
ties, organize leadership at the street and household tic actors.
levels, build community consensus, facilitate local de- SDI has been remarkably successful in garnering
velopment, and envision an alternative future. support from academics, development practitioners,
Another transformative aspect to the SDI methodol- and funding agencies. It attracts millions of funding
ogy is that people learn through exchanges. Conven- dollars from multilateral institutions (e.g., Cities Alli-
tionally, development is planned by professionals, with ance), national development organizations (e.g., De-
experts providing solutions that sometimes work but partment for International Development, UK [DFID],
often fail, and many solutions never reach an imple- Swedish International Development Cooperation
mentation stage (many are shelved, deemed too expen- Agency [SIDA]), and philanthropic organizations (e.g.,
sive and/or low priority). A deplorable outcome is that Gates Foundation). SDI intellectual supporters claim
the communities are unable to advance their under- to have created a new optimistic development strategy
standing of their own problems, which is undermined of coproduction (Mitlin 2008), which purports to link
by professionals coming and going on project work the poor, their support professions, the state, and in-
with little regard for community-learning processes. ternational funders in a win-win alliance in several
Two types of exchanges are practiced among feder- domains, such as providing tenure and shelter to slum
ations of the urban poor. First, horizontal exchanges dwellers and incorporating the role of women in
are the primary vehicle for learning and occur when development.
one federation visits another to discuss communities’ As with every international organization, SDI has
savings groups and/or toilet building, for example; its critics. The most frequent criticism is that SDI
learning takes place within the urban and national simply mirrors outside interests and agendas—in es-
network. Exchanges encourage self-learning in that sence, that activists operate within networked societies
“doing is knowing,” promoting the belief among the rather than focus on resistance. Radicals phrase this as
poor that they can become experts in their own de- co-opting or sleeping with the enemy. An ever-present
velopment and can contribute toward a collective money and power dynamic means that NGO opinion
vision. This breaks the isolation of those in poverty, leaders are prone to look to the coordinators rather
reclaims local learning, and prevents development than to the constituents. A deeper complaint is that
professionals from repackaging ideas as their own. civil society, in general, is a dangerous distraction from
Second, vertical exchanges involve international exchange, the unfinished business of building national identities
for example, slum dwellers from Ghana can visit with and developmental states, states that would have the
slum dwellers in Nairobi, although in more recent authority and legitimacy to redistribute land and other
times most of these exchanges take place within a prox- assets and to provide coherent direction for economic
imate African region. International exchanges are in- development. Some observers cast doubt on whether
structive about successful outcomes and about failures, civil society can actually be realized in African societies
thus generating a knowledge bank that is a collective so fragmented along particularistic lines that public or
 Reframing and Rerepresenting African Affairs 53

common interest is little more than a pipe dream. In Postcolonial analysis recovers ordinary lives and il-
some instances SDI has monopolized the voice of the lustrates diverse trajectories and complex interconnec-
urban poor. SDI's successes may inadvertently reduce tivities (eg, between planned and _ unplanned
the role of smaller and alternative NGOs focused on buildings, between formal and informal economies),
poverty that simply cannot compete on the same play- intersections largely rendered invisible in mainstream
ing field. There is also the charge that activists are no urban analyses. Contemporary postcolonial scholars
more than other urban elites; influence is restricted to underscore informality as mode of urbanization in
cyberspace, international conferences of like-minded Africa, and in the process, they go a long way toward
intellectuals, World Social Forums, and the corridors valorizing ordinary Africans’ own agency (Myers 2011;
of Davos, London, Washington, and Pretoria. In spite Pieterse 2008; Simone 2010). However, there contin-
of these criticisms, the voices ofAfrica’s urban poor are ues the perception that ordinary Africans’ delibera-
now being heard. tions about present and future ways of living are still
heavily dependent on global power dynamics.
AFRICAN POSTCOLONIAL URBANISTS
Postcolonial theorists argue for switching the em-
Postcolonialism is a body of scholarly work that pro- phasis toward ordinary cities (away from the upper
vides a postmodern reaction to, as well as an analysis echelon of global cities such as London, Paris, and
of, the cultural legacy of colonialism. Unlike the previ- New York) to create a more cosmopolitan urban
ous perspectives, there is not one African individual theory—a theory based on a diversity of cities in Africa
who represents the perspective. Instead, there is a body and not grounded only on Global Northern experi-
of scholarly work that follows on from the work of lit- ences. Routinely, African researchers are expected to
erary theorists such as Edward Said and Frantz Fanon. frame their contributions within the theoretical terms
African urbanists (e.g., AbdouMaligq Simone and Edgar and concerns of leading Global Northern scholars and
Pieterse) and urban Africa geographers (e.g., Garth almost never frame their work on Africans’ work. The
Myers and Jennifer Robinson) are examples of-con- comparative urban research tradition offers a middle
temporary urban postcolonial scholars. ground by assessing what can be learned in different
The postcolonial lens reverses the gaze of urban regional contexts—for example, Africa and the United
history and contemporary urbanity, invoking African States (Mitchell 1987; Robinson 2002). The compara-
perspectives. Emphasis is directed toward grassroots tive urban approach illustrates that African and North
actors (and away from the axes of power) and toward American cities in different times and different places
the politics of struggle and opposition and under- (the United States at the turn of the 20th century and
standing ordinary cities in their true state as opposed Central Africa in the 1960s) can inform each other in
to comparing African cities with Global Northern understanding urban social processes (Mitchell 1987).
cities. The postcolonial project aims to move beyond For example, Chicago of the 1860-1910s and Zambian
naive, false utopians and project-targeted develop- towns in the 1960s display similar economic growth
ment initiatives in order to liberate thinkers to imag- trajectories, with high demands for cheap male labor,
ine other, and different, future possibilities. which found geographical expression in patterns of
Oral histories, previously unused sources (some- poverty, overcrowding, racial segregation, and ethnic
times in local languages), and community-based re- associations. The comparative lens moves beyond id-
search are powerful methods for capturing varied and iosyncratic and single-case studies toward understand-
interlocking dynamics of lived urban experiences. The ing general sets of circumstances that arise in different
city is represented more as a product of indigenous, times and spaces. To produce cosmopolitan urban
local agency even against the backdrop of powerful theory is one of the most important challenges that the
Western modern influences (e.g., urban planning, academy faces (Robinson 2002). To make truly cosmo-
planning ordinances, and continuities in the built politan urban theory a reality, scholars in privileged
environment). academic environments have to find responsible and
54 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

ethical ways to engage with, learn from, and promote post-2105 (discussed in Chapter 13). More self-confident
the ideas of intellectuals in Africa and to share in the African leaders expect nothing less than to be partners in
coproduction of urban knowledge. current and future development instead of the objects of
The particular value of a postcolonial approach in development.
an urban context is its sensitivity to diversities of expe- Africa knowledge is very splintered. It no longer
riences and its assertion of a global perspective that makes sense to have two different academic planes of
views different urban forms as integral to an under- knowledge on Africa: that of Northern experts and that
standing of the contemporary world and the rightful of African experts. In the twenty-first century it makes
place of African urbanism within global urban knowl- more sense to combine global and local knowledge;
edge. Building more adventurous as well as more nu- only together will our knowledge be sufficient to fully
anced urban accounts is an ambitious intellectual understand the complexity and diversity of the region.
project. However, the perspective offers more in terms Coproduction of knowledge is an important path, and
of critiquing mainstream approaches but less in the significant support is required. Educational approaches
transfer of its insights into urban practice. This ap- need to contextualize better and more creatively knowl-
proach, which is gaining ground in the social sciences, edge on Africa, and the academy needs to find ways to
is yet another advance against the traditionally over- make theories more cosmopolitan, incorporating evi-
generalized and totalizing narrative. dence and ideas from Africa.
On a practical level the current global financial
crisis offers a rare moment in history where the inter-
CONCLUSIONS ests of rich countries and those of people living in pov-
The Africa conversation is changing. It has moved on erty in Africa are synonymous. At the core of the global
from the colonial dark days into contemporary splinter- financial crisis is the absence of transparency of the
ing light. Africa knowledge is becoming more diverse, entire international system and burgeoning global in-
democratic, and informed. A wealth of up-to-date ma- equality. The shadow financial system is bleeding
terial is available online for those who want to be in- Africa as well as putting the global economy on life
formed about Africa. Social media with an Africa focus support. It is particularly egregious that pundits, jour-
is becoming ever more important. Still, the general nalists, and politicians fawn over people who get rich
public in the Global North's basis of Africa knowledge by abusing the global system—getting around taxes
is low: ignorance, misunderstanding, and oversimplifi- and regulations and forcing everyone else to shoulder
cation are an enduring colonial legacy. the associated risks and taxes. Much of the public in
There is no shortage of ideas about how to shape the Global North is too distracted by their own imme-
Africa's future. Some of the leading ideas from African diate financial challenges to notice that much is hap-
scholars/thinkers were presented in this chapter. pening in the world and that Africa is not the place
Scholars such as Amin and Bond use Marxian reason- many imagine it to be.
ing to demonstrate how the capitalist system unfairly
treats Africa and Africans. Others (e.g., Ibrahim and
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 GARPACR
aT eanuaec

AFRICA’S ENVIRONMENTS

INTRODUCTION The second prevailing narrative advances Africa as a

Aspects of the environment are foregrounded in the resource frontier where minerals (gold, diamonds, ura-
majority of visual and written representations of Africa. nium, oil, natural gas, etc.) are abundant, and other re-
There are two dominant, yet competing, popular narra- sources (timber, land, and fisheries) are available for
tives of Africa's environment. First, the more dominant processing and export to wealthier countries. Private deals
one depicts the region as an increasingly fragile milieu can be struck (with highly favorable and expedient con-
subject to different and recurring environment crises: tract terms) for immediate access to virtually all of Africa's
droughts in the Sahel, deforestation, declining large resources. The continent's biophysical resources can be de-
animal populations and fish stocks, more frequent ployed to sustain distant industries and populations. This
floods, and dirty and dilapidated urban settlements. underexplored and underexploited African environment
Some 30 African mammals (e.g., chimpanzee, African narrative is reminiscent of the colonial scramble for the
wild dog, and mountain gorilla) are endangered spe- region. Many label the current resource grab “the second
cies, and several species are threatened with extinction scramble for Africa” (Carmody 2011).
(e.g., cheetah, African elephant, white rhinoceros). Both narratives are highly selective and incomplete.
This narrative has colonial origins, whereby African en- They overlook the complex nexus among people,
vironments came to be viewed as strange and defective environment, economy, and domestic and interna-
by outsiders compared to Europe's familiar and pro- tional political contexts. Ironically, the resource frontier
ductive environment (Davis 2011). narrative feeds into the environmental crisis narrative,
Many deeply engrained images of African environ- as environmental damage caused by mining, overfish-
ments can be incomplete and fixed in a particular crisis ing, and so forth eventually leads back to the older en-
period. For example, most people hold an image of vironmental orientalist viewpoint. Thus, the need to
Ethiopia as a site of famine and human-environmental “improve,” restore,” and “repair” African environments
tragedy: starving children, adults in ragged clothes, all provides powerful justifications for innumerable impe-
helplessly corralled in refugee camps waiting for out- rial and developmental projects, privileging external
side assistance or death. Considerable environmental assistance to restore the environment that hitherto
challenges remain, but fast-forward to 2012: Ethiopia other external forces altered dramatically. This does
has become the world’s largest livestock producer and not, however, negate the role that Africans have in de-
its economy grew 7.5% in 2011. stroying their own environments (by artisanal mining,

57
58 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

exploration, logging ventures, etc.), and a small cadre of Particular MDGs create ambitious environmental sus-
Africans have profited greatly from these and other tainability targets. For example, MDG 7 seeks to ad-
externally driven resource activities. vance environment sustainability by reversing the loss
of environmental resources (e.g., forests), by preserv-
ing biological diversity (wildlife, plants, and fisheries),
THE ENVIRONMENT AND INTERNATIONAL
by enabling access to drinking water and basic sanita-
DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS tion, and by improving the lives of slum dwellers.
Beginning in the 1970s, and especially since 2000, However, the UNEP (2008) progress report indi-
environmental issues have risen on the global devel- cates that more African countries are failing than suc-
opment agenda. International organizations (e.g., ceeding on each of the environmental targets, with the
World Bank, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate exception of water (Fig. 3.1). Many governments are
Change [IPCC], and the United Nations [UN]) and acknowledging the environment more, but many
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; e.g., Green- African elites only pay lip service and instead focus on
peace, Wildlife Conservation Society, World Wide business as usual and political priorities.
Fund for Nature) are spearheading a more internation- The environment is critical to Africans’ livelihood:
ally driven emphasis on the environment. The UN over half of the population engages in agriculture, and
body, for instance, is composed of several prominent forest activities and subsistence fisheries (both inland
environment-focused organizations (e.g., Food and and coastal) support many others. Overharvesting, de-
Agriculture Organization [FAO] and United Nations structive methods by large, external industrial fisheries,
Environment Programme [UNEP]) that engage in coastal oil and gas exploration, and unsustainable
high-profile initiatives in various policy arenas. The urban and industrial development—to mention just a
environment and sustainable development have risen few environmental threats—are causing unknown (and
to the top of the global agenda. to date unquantifiable) coastal and marine resource
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Millen- damage. Extreme wave events, sea-level rise, and land
nium Development Goals (MDGs) became a key sources of pollution are growing threats to marine and
driver in development policy and practice after 2000. coastal resource productivity.

Improved sanitation

Improved water sources

Reduced proportion of
people in slums

Reduced CO, emissions

Increased protected areas

Increased land covered

by forests

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Number of countries

FIGURE 3.1 Progress Toward Environmental Sustainability 1990-2007. Source: UNEP 2008:xii.
'
 Africa's Environments 59

On land, deforestation, the conversion of more and fish, and plentiful agricultural land. The DRC is well
land to biofuel production and other export crops, and endowed with water supplies, which have enormous
mining are inducing environmental change. Moreover, potential for capturing for hydroelectric power genera-
fluctuations in rainfall, the diffusion of plant diseases tion and for trade/sale or diversion to water-insecure
and pests (e.g., locusts), and some human diseases (es- countries.
pecially water-borne ones) that are sensitive to envi- In Africa, broad biomes can be identified (Meadows
ronmental and climate change are becoming more 1999). A biome is defined as a large region whose in-
problematic. Given the prevailing low levels of tech- teractions of plants and animals with the climate, geol-
nology, weak environment regulations, and scarcity of ogy, soil types, and water resources produce broad
funding for ecosystem preservation, African popula- uniformity. These large-scale mapping units represent
tions are highly vulnerable to environmental change. reasonably homogeneous areas of the land surface
Human adaptation to environmental change is being that capture the close ties among climate, vegetation,
emphasized as the most expedient response. biota, and general environmental conditions. In
In Africa, there is a tendency to equate the term Africa, plants tend to be used as the fundamental clas-
“environment” with wilderness and rural settings, sification basis (rather than animals) because vegeta-
overlooking the critical urban-human environment tion is the most reliable indicator of other environmental
and downplaying other external drivers (e.g., global factors. However, natural vegetation is greatly modified
climate change and the role of foreign investors and by human activities (e.g., planting of species, fires, graz-
multinational corporations [MNCs]). The environ- ing). Thus, what is actually mapped is more properly
ment in this chapter is conceptualized in a broad sense, termed anthropogenic vegetation: that influenced or
encompassing the complex biophysical arena and urban- disturbed by human beings. Emphasis is placed on the
ecological and coastal and marine systems, and an at- broad uniformity within the biome because significant
tempt is made to provide examples of international variation occurs within the classification based on local
environmental drivers. From a social science perspective, changes in soil, wildlife, and human settlement patterns.
environmental issues need to be contextualized—socially, Biomes provide a useful starting point for an overview
economically, and politically. For example, political of habitats at the macroregional scale in Africa. Six
instability, war, government policy, and international major biomes are presented in Figure 3.2.
contractual arrangements related to resources have pro-
TROPICAL RAIN FOREST
found implications for Africa's environments.
A vast tropical rain forest (TRF) centers on the Congo
Basin (almost 700,000 square miles [1.8 million km?]);
THE DIVERSITY OF AFRICAN
other rain forests are concentrated in coastal West Africa
ENVIRONMENTS (extending westward and then northward from the
Africa is the second largest continent (after Asia) and Cameroon Highlands through the Niger Delta and along
covers one fifth of the planet's total land surface. It has the Guinea coast as far as Sierra Leone) and eastern
many diverse and varied environments: deserts, rain Madagascar. TRFs occur in close association with equato-
forests, savanna grasslands, wetlands, and large urban tial climates, which are characterized by consistently
settlements. The environments in Africa “span entire high temperatures, heavy rainfall (exceeding 55 inches
moisture and temperature gradients, from perhaps the [1,400 mm] per year and at least 2 inches [51 mm] per
most arid to among the most well-watered places on month), and a minimal dry season. These climatic con-
earth, from the coolness of the Cape to the furnace ditions permit the development of a diverse biome and
that is the Sahara” (Meadows 1999:161). lush forest.
Several of the largest states in Africa exhibit consider- Biodiversity in TRFs is the greatest among all ter-
able environmental diversity. Its largest state—Democratic restrial biomes. However, African TRFs contain fewer
Republic of the Congo (DRC)—comprises a plethora of numbers of plant species but more richness in pri-
different environments: rich forests, abundant minerals mates (e.g., endemic forest gorillas) compared to the
60 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Cape Verde
at \ Plateau
38°

take
f Ntomba

¥ Lake
Mai-Naombe

FIGURE 3.2 Map of Biomes. Source: UNEP 2008:10.

a

Amazon Basin. An apparent impoverishment of plant this regard, soils in African TRFs are poorer in nutri-
biodiversity is still a matter of debate, partly reflecting ents and more weathered and therefore less fertile than
the dearth of African TRF research compared to related those in Amazonia.
research on Amazonia. Some posit that plant biodiver- TRF vegetation characteristically encompasses three
sity relates to the breakup of the world landmass into layers: a ground cover of shrubs and ferns (6-10 feet
continents before the development of seed flora; [2-3 m]); a middle story of trees, palms, and woody
others argue that climate fluctuations in former ice climbers (59 feet [18 m]); and a dominant canopy of
ages triggered the retreat of rain forests into the current broad-leaved evergreens (66-98 feet [20-30 m]). Trees
TRF distribution refuges, which represent a net loss of with commercial value include mahogany, rubber, and
diversity; still others posit that refuge species richness oil palm, and other trees are felled for plywood. Legal
is more a function of local climate and soil conditions timber concessions cover extensive areas. An area the size
than any geophysical epoch event (Meadows 1999). In of Sweden (173,731 miles? [449,964 km2]) has been
.
 Africa's Environments 61

cleared in West and Central Africa (Mercer et al. 2011). The baobab tree (a cylindrical tree with a trunk
There can be no doubt that the corridors of African (16-26 feet or 5-8 m wide) and the acacia tree (popu-
deforestation have widened in the last 30 years. lar with grazing giraffes) are species typical to this
Other human activities have added to deforestation biome. The savanna supports the bulk ofAfrica’s cattle
pressures: land conversion to agriculture and human population and the world’s most diverse wild animal
settlements, road construction through rain forests, populations (Meadows 1999). Animals such as lions,
local lumbering and the cutting of timber for firewood steenbok, antelopes, wildebeest, buffalos, zebras, and
and charcoal, and even civil conflict (where informal rhinoceros are found on this land, and protected game
logging takes place unabated). According to the FAO reserves such as the Serengeti (Tanzania) are known
(2010:xvi), 386,102 miles? (1 million km?) of Africa’s for abundant grazing herbivores.
TRF have been cleared in the last three years alone. Human influences on savanna vegetation are ex-
Clearing is still taking place at very high rates (averag- tensive. Farmers, herders, and hunters have disturbed
ing 8.4 million acres [3.4 million hectares] per year the evolution of vegetation in the savanna by their
since 2000), even though it is slowing somewhat. For activities, selectively eradicating less fire-resistant spe-
instance, five of the world’s top 10 countries with the cies and favoring grasses that regenerate more rapidly.
highest annual loss of forests are in Africa (FAO Moreover, savannas have been commonly cleared for
2010:xv1). Human stewardship is still quite limited agriculture.
there: less than 14% of TRFs are under legal protection
(UNEP 2008). DESERT

At the polar margins of the savanna, mean annual pre-

TROPICAL SAVANNAS
cipitation declines, and the length of the dry season
Savanna vegetation covers an extensive area (approxi- becomes a major geophysical constraint (Meadows
mately two thirds of the continent) and is largely 1999). Dry savanna gives way to grass steppes, which
located between TRFs and the deserts to the north and transition to semidesert (e.g., the Kalahari and Karoo in
south. Savannas prevail in strongly seasonal climates, southern Africa and the Sahel in northern Africa) and
punctuated by a dry season (three to eight months’ then eventually into desert. For example, the semidesert
duration), with heavy precipitation at other times. Sahel zone lies between the dry savanna of Sudan and
African savannas have been studied more extensively the Sahara to the north. The area’s expanding human
than Africa’s TRFs. Tree species and densities vary and livestock populations have been affected by pro-
according to the amount of rainfall, soils, and anthro- longed and recurring droughts. Anthropogenic influ-
pogenic influences. The savanna is an elongated belt ences (e.g., overgrazing, fire, collection of firewood)
stretching from east to west just under the Sahel, and it have had a negative impact on the environment. How-
is also found in Central Africa and parts of Southern ever, there is considerable ongoing debate about the
Africa. Two different subregions—dry savanna and main drivers of the Sahel’s desertification and the precise
moist savanna—are often delineated. role of human-induced changes, climate change, and
The dry savanna is located around Sudan, where various combinations (see Chapter 11).
scattered trees and short grasses predominate. The At the outer edges of these arid areas lie two major
moist savanna is found closer to the Equator as well as deserts, the Sahara and Namib. The Sahara is the
the Guinea coast and includes a broad zone from world’s largest hot desert, extending over 3.6 million
Angola to the Indian Ocean and a zone in the Southern miles? (9.4 million km*), occupying an area almost
African region in the lowlands of Zimbabwe and equivalent to that of the United States. Vegetation
South Africa. In wetter areas, the vegetation changes adapts to sparse and unpredictable rainfall (less than
to a mixture of trees and tall grasses, extending to 4 inches or 100 mm per year), extremes in temperature
woodlands in a band adjoining TRFs. The vegetation (daily and seasonal), and poor soils. Saharan vegetation
range in this biome is enormous, varying from region comprises fewer than 500 plant species, an extremely
to region. low number considering its size. It is generally sparse,
62 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

with scattered concentrations of grasses, spiny shrubs, (Meadows 1999). As a result, there is a lack of true
and trees in highlands (e.g., acacia tress and oasis woodland, otherwise referred to as the “vacant trees”
depressions [often consisting of date palms and pome- niche (Meadows 1999). Nevertheless, tremendous bio-
granate and other fruit trees grown with irrigation]). logical diversity is evident: over 9,000 plant species grow
The population of the Sahara is thin: 2.5 million in a 35,000-mile? (90,000 km?) area, and 70% of these
people are scattered wherever there are available and species do not grow anywhere else on earth.
reliable water sources and vegetation that supports The Cape region also contains a distinct fynbos
grazing. Vast expanses of the Sahara are virtually empty (‘fine bush” in Afrikaans) concentration, containing
of human population. 7,000 species in an area stretching along the coastal
belt of the southern Cape. The Cape Floral Kingdom in
TEMPERATE GRASSLAND (VELDT) South Africa is the only floral kingdom (of six) con-
centrated in a single country. Covering an area of
Temperate grasslands are concentrated in Southern
1.36 million acres (553,000 hectares), it accounts for
Africa (known as prairie in the United States); this
0.05% of the African continent yet encompasses 20% of
biome is characterized by a landscape dominated by
all of its plant species: such a high level of diversity is
grasses with some trees, largely a function of an inte-
comparable to that of TRFs. Fynbos areas are threat-
rior area of higher elevation and moderate tempera-
ened by the spread of alien species, in particular acacia
tures. Subsets of this biome are short-grass steppe
species from Australia, and of pine plantations in the
(prairies) of humid climates and tall-grass steppe that
Cape foothills. Many species have become extinct, and
can support forest. Soils, deep and rich in organic
more than 1,000 are endangered. Anthropogenic in-
matter, and ample annual precipitation (18-28 inches
fluences, especially urbanization and expanding viti-
or 450-700 mm, concentrated in summer months)
culture, threaten much of this area (see the section on
produce very productive agricultural land. Sauer
Ethical Wildflower Trade and Sustainability: Flower
(1950) and others postulated that because its grasses
Valley, South Africa, in Chapter 10).
are fire-resistant, it is of anthropogenic origin.
In South Africa, this area is known as the veldt (an MONTANE
Afrikaans word for field), but the area extends into
Zimbabwe. The veldt is one of the world’s oldest re- This biome is found in relatively isolated mountain
gions inhabited by humans: fossil evidence indicates areas, such as the Ethiopian highlands, the Arc Moun-
that members of the hominid genus Australopithecus tains of East Africa, the Albertine Rift in central East
were present some 3 million years ago and Stone Age Africa, Drakensberg, the Cameroon highlands, and the
people some 300,000 years ago. The natural state of Atlas Mountains. In these discontinuous areas, altitude
this environment has been dramatically transformed is a primary determinant of vegetation, soil, and cli-
over time; most profound and most recent has been mate. Accordingly, the vegetation is patterned in verti-
environmental change. Large tracts of land have been cal zones with distinctive species graduation.
converted to dry land agriculture and _ livestock For example, the Albertine Rift (named after Lake
production. Albert) is a 920-mile-long geologic valley of savannas,
lake chains, and wetlands that rise to highland forests
and snowcapped mountains, producing a luxuriant
MEDITERRANEAN
and biodiverse zone. The mountain chain making
The Mediterranean biome is found in both Northern up the Albertine Rift straddles five countries (Uganda,
and Southern African regions. For example, the South Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo). Paradoxically,
African Cape region is characterized by warm, dry sum- the Albertine Rift’s richness (soils, animals, fish, and
mers, alternating with a cool, rainy period. The season minerals) has led to human overexploitation of its
during which temperatures are most suitable for resources. People crowded into this area because of fer-
growth coincides with the period of minimum avail- tile volcanic soil, plentiful rainfall, and vegetation bio-
able moisture, affecting the vegetation selection process diversity, and population numbers flourished in high
 Africa's Environments 63

there is considerable diversity within tropical climates

due to (1) distance from the Equator, (2) winds and
pressure systems, (3) maritime and continental influ-
ences, (4) ocean currents, (5) elevation, and (6) large
lake effects in East/Central Africa.
Eight climatic zones related to precipitation and
temperature characteristics have been identified (Goudie
1999), and there is considerable overlap between vege-
tation biomes and climatic zones (Fig. 3.4). Working
from north to south, desert in North Africa and the
Namib is the most extensive climate type. Africa’s desert
climates receive very little precipitation, and daytime
temperatures are extremely high. The desert merges into
FIGURE 3.3 Albertine Rift. Source: Image from National
Geographic Society. a zone of tropical climate (the Sahel, the southeast of
Africa) with long dry spells and low rainfall for at least
six months (Goudie 1999).
altitudes that were inhospitable to mosquitoes and
The tropical savanna is located within a large area
tsetse flies and the diseases associated with these pests.
extending from the Equator in West and Central Africa
The lack of management has put significant pressures
and a small area on the east coast and in eastern
on available resources. For instance, rural population
Madagascar. This zone is characterized by precipitation
densities in Burundi and Rwanda are among the high-
and high temperatures throughout the year. Adjacent
est in Africa. Population pressures require more forest
to this zone is a tropical wet climate with a short dry
clearing for farm and grazing lands, producing ecosys- season and two rainfall maxima related to the inter-
tem changes evident in the sharp human-induced de-
tropical convergence zone’s movement back and forth:
marcations between land uses (Fig. 3.3). the first occurring in the months surrounding January
Wars have also made the management of forest as the zone moves poleward and the second arising
areas difficult, exacerbating encroachment pressures when it retreats toward the Equator in the months sur-
and other informal activities. For example, large num- rounding August. The tropical summer-rain climate is
bers of refugees from the Rwanda/Burundi/DRC wars located in the interior plateaus of Central and Southern
have led to the deforestation of some areas, and bands Africa. Precipitation is concentrated in three summer
of rebels use other parts of the forest to hide in be- months. The northern and southern extremities are
tween periods of raiding and fighting. Despite high characterized by hot, dry summers and mild wet winters,
biodiversity importance, it is therefore not surprising and precipitation can be quite low (e.g., Cape Town
that this forest montane is poorly studied. receives 24 inches or 615 mm annually).
The majority of scientific opinion recognizes that
AFRICA’S RAINFALL AND CLIMATE CHANGE climate change is affecting Africa. Most scientists agree
Most of Africa's climate is tropical, and its latitudinal that anthropogenic influences (deforestation, pollu-
extent is between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn tion, industrial emissions) are altering climate world-
(i.e, the extreme southwestern tip of South Africa, the wide, and human impacts on climate are projected to
northwestern African coast, and the Sahara are not in- accelerate as the 21st century progresses. Human influ-
cluded). Temperatures above 70° F or 21°C for nine ences have been linked to increased concentrations of
months of the year characterize the majority of the carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and other
continent. The mean temperature in the hottest and greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Anthropogenic
coldest months of the year varies little for most of CO, emissions have increased since the industrial rev-
equatorial Africa, but away from the Equator and along olution with the burning of fossil fuels, and more
the coast, seasonal variation is more dramatic. Still, urban-oriented industrial development and emissions
64 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

800
{See [eee
KM

FIGURE 3.4 Map of Main Climatic Divisions. Source: From Adams, Goudie, and Orme. 1999. The Physical Geography of
Africa, p. 37.

have accelerated in recent years with the heavy reliance life, climate change will exacerbate existing condi-
on carbon-based fuels (coal, petroleum, natural gas). tions and may undermine MDGs and other develop-
Unfavorable and fluctuating climate conditions have ment goals. Climate is forecasted to have a dramatic
been widespread in African since the 1960s, and the impact on the desert margins and the savanna re-
adverse and unpredictable climate contributes to pov- gions, which are expected to become hotter and drier.
erty and underdevelopment. African environments are While the wet climates will become warmer and
sensitive indicators of global climate change. wetter, flooding is expected in the Nile Delta and
The authoritative IPCC forecasts that Africa will along the east and west coasts. The geographical dis-
be hardest hit by climate change even though it is the tribution of diseases is likely to change, with the dif-
region that contributes least to global carbon emis- fusion of malaria into previously malaria-free areas:
sions. In countries and regions where poverty is en- the East African highlands and a southward shift into
demic and vulnerability is ever present in everyday South Africa.
 Africa's Environments 65

Rising sea levels and more frequent storm surges Of the world’s supply, Africa is thought to contain
and flooding may affect the west and east coasts of 42% of its bauxite, 35% of uranium, 42% of gold,
Africa in particular. Many people live in coastal and 57% of cobalt, 39% of manganese, 73% of platinum,
delta regions in West Africa and along the Nile. The 88% of diamonds, 10% of oil, and 5% of copper
existence of informal settlements with poor building (Carmody 2011:2; Custers and Matthysen 2009:20).
materials and without adequate infrastructure (drains, Africa in the 21st century is regarded, along with
pipes, sewers, and waste collection systems) makes Siberia, as the largest remaining underexplored mining
these areas particularly vulnerable to rising sea levels, frontier. Africa extractive potential is now being courted
storm surges, and flooding. by a growing list of suitors (China, India, Brazil, the
European Union, the United States, and Japan), all seeking
reliable supplies (Economic Commission for Africa 2011).
AFRICA’S MINERAL RESOURCES
The mineral and metal deposits in Africa have vari-
Africa contains an enormous wealth of mineral re- ous geographical distributions (Fig. 3.5). For example,
sources, including some of the world’s largest reserves several African countries have significant deposits of
of fossil fuels, metallic ores, gems, and precious metals. uranium: South Africa possesses 8% of global reserves,

Resources

Gold €2 Coal
lron ore Natural

Platinum

/U\ Uranium

Bauxite
<= Fishing
/EX\ Coltan
ZL, Other Primary 1000 km
[ear eee
minerals forestland 600 miles

FIGURE 3.5 Map of Africa’s Resources. Source: Reprinted with the permission of Polity Press. Padraig Carmody. 2011.
The New Scramble for Africa, p. xii.
66 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Niger 5%, and Gabon, DRC, Central African Republic, mainly in automobile catalytic converters as well as in
and Namibia 5% each. The uranium used for the atomic electronics and jewelry. Africa’s second largest gold
bomb dropped on Hiroshima originated from DRC. producer is Ghana. In colonial times, West Africa was
Africa’s proven oil reserves (including North known as the Gold Coast: outsiders were interested in
Africa) in 2011 represent 10.4% of the world’s total, gold from Ghana to Guinea. In recent times Tanzania
amounting to 417.4 billion tons (British Petroleum and Mali have rapidly become Africa’s newest gold
2012). Shares of global oil production among top producers.
African producers are Nigeria (2.9%), Angola (2.1%), Copper and associated metals are mined in South
Sudan (0.6%), Gabon (0.3%), and Equatorial Guinea Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. DRC has
(0.3%) (British Petroleum 2012). New emerging oil the second largest copper reserve in the world (70 million
producers in the region (e.g., Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, tons) after Chile, and reserves in Africa’s copper belt,
and Tanzania) have experienced investment surges to stretching from Katanga in the DRC through northern
the tune ofbillions of dollars of investment, and inves- Zambia to Angola, hold the world’s highest copper
tors are widening their Africa foci to include other grades.
emerging producers (e.g., South Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Diamonds are the most important nonmetallic in-
Mozambique, and Sierra Leone). Africa accounts for dustrial minerals produced in Africa and account for ap-
20% of the world’s new production capacity, and its proximately half of the world’s supply in terms of
contribution may increase as emergent and new pro- production and 62% in terms of value (Custers and
ducers come on line. ExxonMobil, the world’s largest Matthysen 2009). Africa has 16 diamond-producing
oil company, now extracts more oil in Africa than any countries; Botswana, South Africa, DRC, Angola, and
other region: 25% of its oil originates in the region Namibia are most important in terms of carat output, and
(Carmody 2011). French oil giant Total holds 30% of other important producers include Tanzania, Ghana,
its reserves in Africa (Carmody 2011). Sierra Leone, and Central African Republic. Included in
African oil is less expensive, safer, and more acces- diamond resources are both high-value gemstones as well
sible than many other oil producers, and although as smaller industrial diamonds used in the manufacture
Africa may not be able to compete with the Persian of cutting, grinding, drilling, and polishing tools.
Gulf as far as proven reserves, it is emerging as a “swing” Despite the wide geographical dispersion of Africa's
region on the global energy supply map. African oil ex- mineral resources, certain key minerals are geographically
ports are accounting for larger shares of oil imports of concentrated. For example, South Africa possesses 92% of
major global powers such as the United States (32%) the continent's platinum reserves and 90% of its coal.
and China (11%) (Custers and Matthysen 2009). There Guinea accounts for 90% of Africa’s bauxite, and DRC
is also a regionalization to the global powers’ African mines 90% of its chromium. Ghana and South Africa pro-
oil supplies. For example, the Gulf of Guinea accounted duce 60% of Africa’s gold, and virtually all manganese
for 16% of U.S. imports in 2002, and its contribution is originates from three states: South Africa, Gabon, and
expected to rise to 25% by 2015 (Ghazvinian 2007). At Ghana. Thus, a detailed examination of relative shares of
the same time, oil produced in East and Southern Africa key African minerals and petroleum reserves shows that
is exported mainly to China and Asia. The rise of non- mineral resource wealth is concentrated heavily in South
Western contemporary influence and ties with Africa is Africa, Angola, DRC, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria. Africa's
the subject of immense debate (see Chapter 12). mineral wealth appears to be more concentrated in a
The best-known platinum- and gold-producing subset of countries compared to other world regions.
area is the Rand in South Africa. South Africa is the In several-African countries, warring factions have
largest gold and platinum producer in Africa. Although appropriated diamonds as a source of income to fund
its gold has been declining steadily, its platinum re- wars and raids, resulting in the term “blood diamonds”
serves are ample and can meet world demand for in Sierra Leone, Liberia) DRC, and Angola. There are
many decades—up to a century using current mining cases, however, where nonconflict gems have been mis-
techniques (Cawthorn 2010). Mined platinum is used labeled conflict diamonds (e.g., tanzanite in Tanzania)
 Africa's Environments 67

(Schroeder 2012). Addressing the issue of blood/conflict Mining Act. In total, artisanal mines account for 10% of
diamonds, a major international effort in 2002 among Africa’s gold output and 30% of its cobalt (Economic
industry, government, NGOs, and the UN led to the Commission for Africa 2011).
implementation of a system of certification known as African fuels and minerals make important contri-
the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). butions to the global supply and account for over half
KPCS aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds so that of Africa’s total exports. Opinion is divided as to
rebel movements cannot use these resources to finance whether the region’s ample supply of resources is a de-
wars against legitimate governments. Under KPCS, only velopment curse or a development windfall to propel
rough diamonds accompanied by a government-issued African’s growth and deepen it, particularly with regard
certificate can be imported and exported, ensuring that to poverty reduction and gender equality (see Box 3.1).
diamonds originate from conflict-free dynamics. Some countries have resource-dependent economies:
The world’s largest mining companies (e.g., BHP minerals account for at least 90% of exports of Nigeria,
Billiton, Rio Tinto, Anglo American, Xtrata, Chinalco, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea. Many other African
and Vale) are converging on Africa at an unprecedented countries depend on exports of two or three commodi-
rate and scale. More than 1,500 industrial mining op- ties, accounting for the lion’s share of their trade output.
erations are scattered across the region; many are pri- African efforts to transform the extractive industrial
vately owned, but some involve African partners. For sector away from colonially created enclaves have so far
example, the government of DRC owns 17% of the registered only partial success. South Africa is a partial
Tenke Fungurume copper mine in central Congo. There success story in that mining returns facilitated the
are also thousands of artisanal or small-scale mines that country’s economic development as mining companies
use more labor-intensive techniques (and some deploy reinvested profits and diversified into other sectors, but
child and/or forced labor). Increased activity by Chi- miners’ salaries have remained low and contested (e.g.,
nese migrant artisanal miners in Ghana is taking place, a 2012 miners’ strike at Marikana resulted in extreme
despite being banned by the 2006 Ghana Mineral and violence and the deaths of 44 strikers).

BOX 3.1 THE RESOURCE CURSE OR CURE? violations); and resource volatility and excessive borrowing lead
to an unstable macrofinancial situation (Le Billon 2012). More-
Africa's mineral wealth typically does not result in broad-based over, in countries highly dependent on mineral exports, the inter-
development or trickle-down effects: half of Africa's population ests of the mining industry drive national priorities and often lead
lives on the equivalent of US$1.25 per day (World Bank 2012). to the neglect of other sectors, such as agriculture. This often
Indeed, Africa mineral-rich countries are most characterized by results in a vicious circle of agricultural decline, a greater reliance
underdevelopment. This is an apparent paradox of plenty, often on food imports, and a corresponding requirement to bolster
dubbed “the resource curse”: countries and regions with an mining to pay for food and other imports. Countries dependent
abundance of natural resources, specifically nonrenewable re- on nonrenewable resources also run risks of not conserving their
source such as fuels and minerals, tend to grow more slowly than resources and/or mining companies moving elsewhere when re-
those in which natural resources are scarce (Sachs and Warner serves run low or less expensive supplies become available.
1995). Furthermore, there is often an empirical correlation be- The classic example of a natural resource-rich region prone to
tween resource richness and low investments in human capital chronic underdevelopment is the Niger Delta (Nigeria). In this
(especially education), high levels of corruption, and failures in oil-abundant region the majority of Niger Deltans live on less
economic diversification. The resource curse has been identified than US$1 per day, and conditions of abject poverty have wors-
in Angola, Chad, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Nigeria, ened rather than lessened since the discovery of oil; 2 million
Sudan and Zambia. barrels of oil are pumped per day, which equals, on average,
A complex array of sociopolitical factors lies behind resource- US$180 million per day in revenue (Watts 2008). Uneven devel-
rich countries’ inability to develop. Typically, mineral returns are opment (caused by government neglect and poor profit-sharing
siphoned off by a small, powerful wealthy elite (often members of mechanisms) and severe environmental degradation (oil pollu-
the government); government institutions are weakened (non- tion caused by oil operations with decayed, leaky infrastructure,
transparent, corrupt, and tolerant of high levels of human rights gas leaks, flares, etc.) are everyday realties of the Niger Delta
(Continued)
68 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 3.1 (Continued) proneness did not bode well for its economic future. Despite
these geographical constraints, the government has been able
(Le Billon 2012). An average of two oil spills occur daily there. to increase GDP per capita to US$16,800 in 2012. The country
Flaring (the burning of natural gases that can neither be pro- has been progressive in deploying mineral wealth for societal
cessed nor sold) releases pressured gases (CO, and other toxic development and avoiding the resource trap that other resource-
gases) produced from oil extraction into the atmosphere and rich countries have fallen into. Breaking the mold of exporting
the immediate vicinity, causing health problems (especially re- minerals in raw form, the government of Botswana has part-
spiratory ailments) and contributing to acid rain and the destruc- nered with De Beers (South Africa) and begun diamond process-
tion of the ecosystem. Flaring continues in Nigeria despite a ing, marketing, and sales from Gaborone in 2012 in a highly
1984 government law declaring it illegal. Moreover, the exclu- ambitious effort to relocate diamond processing from London to
sion of the majority of the Delta's population from the benefits Gaborone (Fig. 3.6). Gaborone is being turned into a major
produced by the natural resource has led to conflict and vio- diamond hub that processes a US$6 billion share of the global
lence in the region (see video images from Curse of Black Gold diamond economy.
at http://talkingeyesmedia.org/curse-of-the-black-gold). In other
cases, conflict over controlling the returns from resources is mani-
fested in separatists’ claims (e.g., Angola’s oil-rich Cabinda prov-
ince), but routinely it causes intra-government ministerial wrangling
over access to budgetary allocations.
Oil-rich countries are not the only ones experiencing the re-
source curse. Guinea, in West Africa, contains almost half of the
world’s supply of bauxite (the raw material for aluminum), yet its
government budget is 0.0005% that of its former colonial ruler
(France) (Carmody 201 1:2). Of course, a large part of the explana-
tion of the adverse incorporation of Guinea and other commodity-
producing African states into the global political economy lies in
the colonial relationship established centuries earlier. African coun-
tries provide many minerals for export with little domestic con-
sumption, resulting in their unfavorable incorporation into the
global economy and failure to deploy their minerals in domestic
industrialization and/or to specialize in more profitable parts of
the mining value chain (e.g., refining and value additions).
Botswana is an important example of a resource exception. It
is a shining example of a resource-rich country that ascended to
middle-income status by 2007, largely on the basis of its dia-
mond wealth and sustained economic growth since 1966. At in-
dependence, Botswana was one of the poorest states in the ‘

world, with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of FIGURE 3.6 Diamond Trading Company, Gaborone,
US$283, and its landlocked status, poor soils and drought Botswana.

AFRICA'S FOREST RESOURCES largest forest areas. The majority of African forests are lo-
Africa's forest cover is estimated to constitute 17% of cated in rural and often remote areas.
Africa's annual net loss of forest area is proceeding
global forest resources and 1.6 million acres (650 mil-
at the rate of 8.4 million acres (3.4 million hectares)
lion hectares) (FAO 2010). The major forest types are dry
per year (the second highest rate of regional loss after
tropical forest in the Sahel and Eastern and Southern
South America). Still, 20% of Africa is forested. Much ofa
es
i
Africa, moist tropical forest in Western and Central Africa,
of the deforestation (as is the case in other environ-
and mangroves in the coastal zones. Only 1% of African
mental degradation) is the result of large numbers of
forests have been planted, so the vast majority is natural.
individuals engaging in decisions that are privately ra-
DRC, with 284,171 acres (155 million hectares), and
Sudan, with 172,973 acres (70 million hectares), are
tional but collectively destructive. Each year Africa is
losing forest cover the size of the Netherlands.
ranked in the top 10 countries in the world with the
 Africa's Environments 69

Still, there is a growing movement to place more largely responsible for Africa’s losing one half to two
forests under conservation and protection: since 1990, thirds of its original wildlife habitat (World Bank
12.3 million acres (5 million hectares) have been desig- 2000:195). Overharvesting of nontimber forest re-
nated for conservation. Forests are important for storing sources, such as medicinal plants, is also part of the de-
a vast amount of carbon. When a forest is burned and forestation process. Suffice it to say that the causes and
cut down and converted to another use, such as agricul- drivers of deforestation cannot be reduced to a single
ture, carbon is released back into the atmosphere. For- explanation and vary from place to place.
ests are critically important in terms of both supporting Mismanagement of Africa’s forest resources is in-
biodiversity and mitigating climate change. disputable, but considerable debate surrounds its
Deforestation is very controversial. Anthropogenic main driver. For some time, it was often too easily as-
influences are most important, but naturally occurring sumed that deforestation was due to indigenous shift-
physical events such as fires, landslides, diseases, pests, ing cultivation practices, resulting in land degradation
and floods also play a part. In Africa, the major human and desertification. Evidence can be found of local
factors include clearing for agriculture (subsistence and practices that have led to these results (e.g., Freetown),
increasingly commercial agriculture for palm oil planta- but there is also extensive evidence of indigenous man-
tions and biofuels), commercial logging, fuel wood agement of forest resources (Binns 1995). In addition,
consumption, and infrastructure expansion (especially there is evidence from Guinea of indigenous adaptive
transport infrastructure, human settlement, and mining agroecological practices, working with and conserving
in certain locations) (Osei 1993). Oil exploration in the diversity of vegetation (Fairhead and Leach 1995).
forest areas is a newer phenomenon. For example, oil From a livelihood and sustainable development per-
concessions have been given out to cover 85% of spective, trees and shrubs can be considered as a sav-
Virunga National Park (Africa’s first conservation park ings to be drawn on in an emergency. Forests can serve
and world heritage site) in the northeast DRC, but the as a source of food, a wild food bank, to be tapped in
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWE) is leading a-high- times of famine (Cline-Cole 1995).
profile campaign to prevent a UK company from begin- Forests play an important role in sustaining liveli-
ning drilling. More typically, the growth of towns and hoods, especially for the rural poor, providing a range of
cities brings increased demand for charcoal and fuel products such as timber for construction, fuel wood for
wood and results in a decline in tree stocks (typically in cooking, foods, medicines and other materials (reeds
a radius of 50-100 miles [80-160 km] of settlements). for weaving and wood for utensils/crafts). Forest foods
The construction of access roads (by forestry and mining (wild fruits, berries, roots, tubers, leafy vegetables, palm
companies) can also make the situation worse by open- fruit and wines, cola and shea nuts, and mushrooms)
ing closed forest areas. When resources are more easily are a regular part of rural diets. Wild meat contributes an
accessible, this can enhance the profitability of the important (and often main) source of protein in some
timber trade and thereby encourage more illegal activi- rural communities in West and Central Africa. Local in-
ties and human activities in the area. habitants can also derive benefits in terms of spiritual
Loss of forest quality and biodiversity is also af- and aesthetic needs and employment. Tens of millions
fected by different economic activities. For example, se- of rural households in Africa depend on forests to sur-
lective vegetation removal (during logging and fuel vive and to supplement cash incomes.
wood collection) affects the forest ecology. Indeed, Many experts blame governments for their inability
when forests are cleared for agriculture and other activi- to manage forest resources and to curb illegal forest ac-
ties, there is no guarantee that trees can even grow back, tivities. The exploitation of forest resources can be
as the soil composition is altered in transformation. traced to the colonial period, but the fundamental ex-
The building of roads not only affects vegetation but traction system has remained intact: timber is a cash
also accelerates the killing of animals for bush meat, the commodity and the basis of an extractive industry that
trade (prevalent in Central and West Africa) in which pays low taxes and mostly profits external actors, with
endangers forest-dwelling animals. Deforestation is little trickling down to rural communities that depend
70 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

on and legally own the resource (Owusu 2012; see also example, Triple Forest Trust's (2011) activities in Cameroon
Al Jazeera’s 2011 report on illegal logging in Sierra and Congo. In addition, the Nile Basin Reforestation
Leone). Typically, agreements are drawn up between Project (Uganda), launched in 2009, became the first
governments and logging companies without local par- project approved under the UN’s Clean Development
ticipation, and logging companies are not held ac- Mechanism that linked increased reforestation and
countable for paying taxes or for adverse environmental supporting the poor to adapt to climate change.
consequences. Corruption is rife in the logging busi- Africa is a major timber exporter: some of the
ness across Africa, but in 2011, the Malawi and Sierra strongest, hardest, and most sought-after timber is
Leone governments intervened to curb corruption by harvested in the region (e.g., mahogany is world-
temporarily suspending timber exports. renowned for its use in fine furniture making, panel-
On balance, most African communities are unable ing in homes, and boat building). Around 45% of
to balance the protection of forest resources with the African timber is exported as unprocessed logs, but
pressures from population, urbanization, and poverty. the largest share of its exported timber is processed
State power can be misused and corrupted, resulting in (sawn wood, plywood, and veneer). The big timber
“Faustian deals” whereby agreements are made with companies in Africa are located in the Congo Basin
international and domestic interests for present gain (Congo, DRC, Gabon, and Central African Republic)
without regard to future costs or consequences (Owusu and West Africa (Ghana, Nigeria, and Céte d'Ivoire).
2012). Some NGOs have emerged to assist rural popu- Commercial forestry provides an important source of
lations in the responsible use of forest resources—for national income in these countries. For instance,

BOX 3.2 COLTAN investigate the situation produced an exposé that claimed a re-
lationship between violence and the exploitation of coltan.
Fifteen years ago, few nongeologists and high-technology re-
Since then, “conflict coltan” has become synonymous with a
searchers had ever heard of coltan, an obscure mineral that is an
human disaster: forced labor, killings, rape, and environmental
essential ingredient in electronic components (Nest 2011). From
destruction in eastern Congo. UN Special Envoy of the Secretary
mobile phones, laptops, Xboxes, PlayStations, and iPods to mili-
General on Sexual Violence and Conflict, Margot Wallstrém, has
tary weapons (and electric hybrid motor vehicles in the near
referred to Congo as “the rape capital of the world,” highlighting
future), the use of coltan has become commonplace.
extraordinarily high incidences of sexual violence against women
Coltan is an abbreviation for columbite-tantalite, a mixture of
and the rape of the environment (UN News Center 2011).
two mineral ores (creating a dull, black-colored rare metal).
The politics of coltan interweaves artisanal miners, local war-
When coltan is refined, it becomes a heat-resistant powder that
lords, MNCs, and concerned activists. Many documentaries have
can hold a high electric charge, vital for capacitors in a vast array
detailed coltan mining in the area—for example, Blood in the
of electronic devices and a key reason why devices can be min-
Mobile: Mining in the Congo (2011), and ABC News (Australia)
iaturized. Coltan has become a vital rare metal to the contempo-
(2009) The Congo Connection. Conflict minerals in Congo are em-
rary global economy (Carmody 2011). Coltan mined in eastern
bedded within a complex geopolitical environment. At its height,
Kivu Province (DRC) ends up on the mobile phones used on U.S.
conflict in Congo involved seven external African armies (Rwanda,
college campuses (Fig. 3.7). Demand for the mineral is predicted
Uganda, Burundi, Namibia, Chad, Angola, and Zimbabwe), and
to grow at 10% to 20% per annum (Lalji 2007).
the regional scramble was partly fueled by coltan (Carmody 2011).
Many industries, as well as the U.S. government, stockpile this
A UN peacekeeping mission commenced in 2010, and current
strategic mineral. Outside of Africa, the mineral is known as tan-
(2012) UN forces number 20,000 in DRC, representing the largest
talite, but the label “coltan” became associated with the arti-
UN peacekeeping presence in the world.
sanal mining of this ore in the Congo. Concerned activists and
Congolese rebel groups have ruthlessly exploited conflict min-
the general public now associate coltan with conflict minerals
erals (not just coltan but also gold, diamonds, etc.) and extracted
and the Congo. Coltan, however, properly refers only to the
considerable wealth to fund their wars. Since the early 1990s, 15
mineral found in the Central African region.
to 20 different antigovernment armed forces have participated in
Coltan has recently become a prominent activist issue. Around
conflict mining, and new groups enter the scene, but some have
2,000 reports leaked out of DRC of mines deep in the jungle
limited longevity (e.g., the March 23 Movement [M23] was active
where coltan was extracted in brutal conditions under the con-
2012-13) as the 3,000-strong UN peacekeeping forces are being
trol of various warlords. A UN team dispatched to the region to
 Africa's Environments 71

Australia currently produces most of the

world’s caltan. However it's estimated
VISUALIZING AFRICA’S COLTAN RADE that over 60 percent of the world's
coltan reserves are located in DRC.
ever

Columbite and Tantalite are mineral resources found in many parts of the wor! tic Republic of Cor iMlegal coltan
extraction only adds to the many other problems and conflicts plaguing the re j#on, Coltan has. been discoveredinmany parts f.the world © (
including Colombia, Venezuela, 8razil, Afghanistan, Finland,th ited States, Australia, Canada, Mozambique, Ethiopla, and Chita. Buyers of
been encouraged to avold purchasing coltan from on ethical ground: Most coltan refineries-are located
apeitendwen
in East Asia, Here factories chemically
process it with other minerals which can
be sold to manufacturers for use in parts.

re eres 4
Many of the worlds leading technology companies use
coltan in the consumer electronic products we use
everyday (the Wii, Playstation, iPhone, Computers etc),
1 Coltan is largely mined in the Kivu area of Since the turn of the century most have imp~
Congo lemented measures to ensure that most of their coltan
is not coming from Congo. Who are some of them?

(Nintendo) NOKIA

& Mal sony

2 From the mines, coltan-travels to:trading towns and
‘on to major cities the region. However, it’s the illegal trade and smuggling of colum-
bite and tantalite that is in part feuling the conflicts of
DRC. Coltan smugglers operating near the borders of
Cango, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have been directly
linked to various DRC militias. it’s estimated that 5.4
million people have died in the Congolese conflicts

LEGEND,

Columbite ~ Tantalite Railroad

Mining Areas
e Major City

Conflict
Area
3 Congolese coltan leaves Africa thretgh
Kenya and Tanzania. from there it travé!
East Asia for refinement bef
electronic devices we love.

Tantalite is used primarily for the pro s requiring high performance, ”

7 small compact forrnat and high reliabi acermakers, airbags, GPS
‘ems, anti Jock brakes in aixtomobiles, laptop computers, mo! bones, vidéo game consoles, video
cameras.

FIGURE 3.7 Coltan’s Spatiality: from DRC to College Campuses. Source: © Some rights reserved by Jon Gusier.

more aggressive in defeating and disarming local rebel groups. Furthermore, deforestation pressures are intense as people chop
Militias control many of the mines and most of the trade routes down forests for charcoal, kill gorillas as part of forest-clearing
within Congo as well as the cross-border smuggling routes. efforts, hunt other wild animals for food, and engage in poaching.
Coltan is eventually legally exported from neighboring countries Miners are far from food sources, and poverty and starvation
(via airports such as Kigali in Rwanda and ports such as Mombasa caused by the war have driven some miners and rebels to hunt
in Kenya). Despite a UN presence, war lingers in the Congo. the parks’ endangered elephants and gorillas for food. UNESCO
Coltan is mined, with heavy impact on the environment, in has placed both the Kahuzi-Biéga National Park and Okapi Wild-
eastern and southeastern Congo. In eastern Congo, mining life Reserve on the list of World Heritage Sites in Danger.
takes place at two World Heritage Sites: Kahuzi-Biéga National Campaigns to publicize the brutality of coltan processing in
Park and Okapi Wildlife Reserve. Coltan is found in high con- Congo (e.g., Blood in the Mobile, YouTube celebrity testimonies,
centrations in Kahuzi-Biéga (75% within the boundaries of the and college student boycotts) have led to a recycling of facts about
Kahuzi-Biéga National Park in the Albertine Rift Valley) (Taka conflict coltan and some mythmaking. For example, Congo does
2012). This area is home to the endangered lowland gorilla not contain 80% of the world’s tantalite, as is often claimed. Of the
(whose population is estimated to be 250) and other threatened world’s supply of tantalite, 40% is non-African, originating from
species (e.g., chimpanzee). The park does not have a delineated modern industrial mines in Brazil, Australia, Canada, and China,
boundary, and thousands of displaced people and artisanal where mining operates under long-term contracts and stable politi-
miners (of coltan and now oil and gold as well) have moved into cal conditions. Although more than half of the world’s supply comes
area and practice intense artisanal mining (Fig. 3.8). To mine from Africa, approximately 13% originates from DRC. The actual
coltan, rebels have overrun Congo's national parks, clearing out number of artisanal miners in eastern Congo is unknown: estimates
large parcels of lush forests. range widely from 20,000 to 400,000 (Global Witness 2012).
(Continued)
72 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 3.2 (Continued)

FIGURE 3.8 Artisanal Coltan Mining. Source: © DAVID LEWIS/Reuters/Corbis.

Most of Congo’s supply moves onto a spot market, 80% of suitable for farming. The war economy has boosted mining as
which involves exchange for cash and/or supplies (e.g., flour, the main survival mechanism for many poor rural communities,
dried fish, beer) by “papas coltan” (i.e., wealthier brokers trade and it has become a lucrative endeavor compared to alterna-
coltan). Several other intermediaries participate in trading and tives (e.g., farming and cattle ranching) deemed too dangerous
transporting coltan before it is packed into barrels and air- because of marauding guerrillas. The mining push has drawn
freighted out of the region. Coltan trade has led to a dollariza- people away from farming, and agricultural production has de-
tion of eastern Congo's rural and urban economies, and the clined, triggering a food crisis.
local economy is poorly insulated from coltan price fluctuations, It has become unethical for major producers to source coltan
which means that mining returns and prices for food and other from the Congo, but the coltan is rerouted to other producers and
commodities do not move in tandem (Jackson 2003). the supply line has become very complicated. Complicating the
Most mines are suitable only for artisanal mining because of sourcing issue further is the confusion between legitimate mines
the soft geology, requiring the use of basic tools such as picks, in eastern Congo and illegal rebel operations, so the source of
shovels, and buckets. Teams of miners claim a plot of about coltan is uncertain (Lalji 2007). According to Nest (2011), most
33 X 33 feet (10 x 10 m); they dig down about 20 feet (6 m), Congolese coltan is routed to Australia and China for processing
make craters, and water the ore until the heavy coltan sinks to via neighboring countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya.
the bottom for sorting. Some mines are large, with thousands of There is a scientific effort by German scientists to “fingerprint”
miners, but others are small. the geographical origins of coltan based on the geological dating
The coltan fever in eastern Congo has led-to uncontrolled of minerals. This research is an important first step in the develop-
mining. Parcels of land are being eroded, and lakes and rivers ment of a certified trading chain (similar to the KPCS for diamonds).
are being polluted. Unregulated coltan mining destabilizes hill- Despite activists’ call for a coltan certification scheme, it is unclear
sides, leading to landslides, and further undermines agriculture how such a system will improve the political conditions in the area
potential. Half of the land seized for coltan mining is no longer and whether it will enhance or worsen local livelihoods.
 Africa’s Environments 73

wood exports represent 11% of total exports in Ghana tuna) (Carmody 2011), and large tuna canneries are lo-
(US$400 million) and in most years is the third larg- cated in Ghana and Mauritius. However, many fish access
est export after cacao and minerals (Owusu 2012). agreements (especially those involving Chinese interests)
Ghana's forests and wildlife resources provide direct are much less transparent, and considerable illegal
employment to 100,000 people, and another 60% to trawling by unregistered vessels occurs (Carmody 2011).
70% of the population depends on forest resources Total illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
for livelihood and cultural purposes (Owusu 2012). fishing in African could amount to US$1 billion per
A critical issue with timber is that once the most de- year. In Somali waters alone, up to US$300 million a
sired species are cleared and the commercially viable year in tuna, shrimp, and lobster is being stolen by for-
timber is gone, the export trade moves to a different eign illegal trawling (Carmody 2011). The unauthorized
country. In Africa, the DRC, with the most unex- plundering of Somali waters partially explains the esca-
ploited timber, is the timber frontier. lation in Somali piracy (see Box 3.3). Local communi-
ties are not compensated by royalties or other means for
ENVIRONMENTS OF AFRICA’S FISHERIES practices that undermine environmental conservation.
International trawling is efficient in harvesting fish
Marine fishing off the coast of Africa accounts for 5%
but often to the detriment of local artisanal fishers.
of the world’s harvest, while inland fishing produces
Local fishers often object to the large quantities of fish
8% of the world yield (Gates and Appiah 2012). African
that are thrown away (the “by-catch”) because of their
fisheries, in total, produce approximately 7.3 million
limited international commercial value; the by-catch
tons of fish per year (Carmody 2011), and exports are
reduces fish reproduction rates and further disrupts
accelerating. African marine resources are fully ex-
the food chain, resulting in even more reduction of
ploited and tending toward being overexploited. Inland
total fish stocks (Carmody 2011).
fisheries, however, are generally underexploited (Kenyan
In many parts of Africa, fish provides 60% to 70%
and Ugandan inland resources are exceptions). In gen-
of animal protein consumption in the population’s
eral, Africa’s inland fisheries have not been developed
diet. Ironically, Africa is exporting more protein at a
for the international market and still serve only local
time when malnutrition is accelerating and popula-
consumers. The Institute for Security Studies (2007)
tion is increasing in the region. Generally, artisanal
warns that several African states are in danger of doing per-
fisheries are reporting decreasing returns per fishing
manent damage to their marine resources. Overfishing not
effort and reductions in the size of fish caught. Despite
only depletes fish stocks, but it also causes severe and
more evidence of scarcity from African fishers, govern-
irreversible damage to marine and aquatic ecosystems.
ments continue to sign agreements with international
Some of the world’s most productive fisheries are lo-
fishing fleets and lack the capacity to monitor and en-
cated along Africa's Atlantic coast (from Morocco to South
force agreed-upon quotas. Under current conditions,
Africa) around a broad continental shelf and cold upwell-
African fisheries are unsustainable. One of the most
ing and currents. This area is becoming a fish basket for
critical issues is the lack of data: African governments
Western Europe: the European Union now imports 60%
have poor information about the extent of fish stocks
of its fish from Africa (Carmody 2011). The main near-
and hence are making poorly informed decisions
surface fish include sardines, tuna, and mackerel, and
about marine and coastal environmental issues.
the principal deep-sea fisheries bring in hake, octopus,
snapper, and grouper. Africa's fishery exports produce
HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS
US$2.7 billion in annual revenues (Carmody 2011).
European, Russian, North American, and Asian The human ecological footprint in Africa has expanded
distant water fleets dominate Africa’s marine fisheries. especially in recent times, doubling between 1961 and
There are some direct benefits, such as the payment of 2008, and remains in an accelerated growth phase
fishing royalties (the European Union pays €600,000 (World Wildlife Fund and African Development Bank
to Tanzania for 79 fishing boats to catch 8,000 tons of 2012). As noted earlier, this expansion is largely the
74 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 3.3 SOMALI PIRATES: from hijacking. Former rural fishermen need an extensive sup-
RESPONDING TO AFRICA’S FISH RUSH? port system for piracy to function (muscle, technical and financial
assistance). Analysts claim that wealthy external actors (possibly
Intense political fragmentation in Somali since the 1990s has the Somali diaspora) play a command-and-control function in
meant that the country has been characterized by large-scale managing and financing these endeavors, although it remains to
fighting among different regional clan groups until recently; con- be established what level of organization exists between pirates
sequently, the government had little control of the national terri- and warlords, and between pirates and members of the dias-
tory. In the context of state collapse, international trawlers heavily pora. There is a dearth of academic research on the internal or-
harvest fish from Somali waters with impunity. Through the 1990s, ganization and structure of piracy, and many unsubstantiated
approximately US$600 million of fish per year were poached from claims are made.
Somali waters. The UN estimated that some 700 foreign-owned Somali piracy cost various governments and the shipping in-
vessels operated in Somali waters in 2005 alone. Closely parallel- dustry US$5.7 billion to US$6.1 billion in 2012 (One Earth Future
ing illegal fishing, other opportunistic illicit activities, such as the Foundation 2013). The coast of Somalia is a well-traversed ship-
dumping of toxic and nuclear waste off and_on shore, occurred ping route (especially for oil tankers) due to its location near the
that also damaged marine and coastal environments. Gulf of Aden and the Suez Canal: 20% of global trade passes by
Somali fishermen’s livelihoods have been negatively affected
the Horn of Africa. Because it is a high-danger area for piracy,
by dwindling catches. Prior to the 1990s, some fishermen
shipping companies pay US$2.7 billion in additional fuel costs to
claimed that prohibited fishing methods were being deployed
speed up vessels along the Somali coastline, making it more dif-
off the Somali coast: drift netting and use of underwater explo-
ficult to be hijacked. Other shipping companies avoid the area,
sives, methods that accelerate the plundering of marine re-
rerouting tankers on a longer journey around the Cape of Good
sources. Somali fishermen also maintained that IUU fishing fleets
Hope. Somali piracy even affects Kenyan trade, as increased in-
were attacking them: pouring boiling water on local defenseless
surance premiums are levied on ships transiting the region. The
fishermen, and in certain cases destroying Somali fishing nets.
1,500 or so Somali pirates do untold damage to the interna-
Beginning in the mid- to late 1990s, Somali fishermen began to
tional reputation of Somali and contribute to Somalia's interna-
respond. An early successful local defense group called them-
tional reputation as a pirate state.
selves the Somali Coastguards, and their membership largely
Piracy activity off the coast of Somalia is now on the decline, how-
represented former fishermen. To this day, most Somali groups
ever. Counter-piracy measures such as the use of private armed se-
continue to label themselves as “saviors of the seas” (badaadinta
curity guards by shipping companies, increased patrols by warships
badah), although this label masks various other agendas.
(with a 30-minute response time), and the imprisonment of more
By 2003, the term “piracy” was commonly used to describe
than 100 Somali pirates in Kenya has quelled the intensity of piracy
the ships and fishing vessels attacked by small, organized groups
attacks along the east coast of Africa. However, piracy is
from Somalia (many of them initially operated from the north-
intensifying in West Africa and became a US$1 billion industry
east province of Puntland, but more recently groups have oper-
in 2012.
ated primarily from Galmudug in the central section of the
However, piracy appears to have had a positive effect on the
country). Somali pirates approached ships (cargo, oil tankers,
overfishing problem. Local catches off the coast of Somalia seem
and chemical tankers) and fishing vessels (to a lesser extent) and
to have recovered to 1990s levels, whereas overfishing seems to
demanded payment. When this strategy failed, hijacking
be a much greater problem farther down the coast in Tanzania.
became the strategy of choice. In the process, activities
Much remains to be researched about Somali piracy, and most
morphed from protection of Somali waters into an-organized,
of the information at this point comes from media reports and
lucrative criminal activity in its own right. The frequency of this
international maritime organizations. Nevertheless, the pattern
activity slowly increased over the years, and Somali piracy at-
of plundering Somali fisheries is illustrative of a broader system
tacks on ships peaked at 151 in 2011, with 1,118 hostages taken
of looting African extractive resources. In a twist of argument,
(One Earth Future Foundation 2012). Analysts report that Somali
Carol Thompson (2009:300) claims that “piracy refers to the re-
pirates earn on average US$5 million ransom per ship and crew
fusal to compensate or even acknowledge the original cultiva-
via hijacking (One Earth Future Foundation 2012).
tors of the bioresource.” Somali news media perhaps sum it up
Of course, contemporary pirates need the security of a land
best by noting that the piracy of the rich has led to a piracy of
base for conducting negotiations, accessing shipping and secu-
the poor (Carmody 2011:153).
rity information, and transferring the payments they receive
 Africa's Environments 75

result of population increase and urbanization pres- especially in situ urbanization (the expansion of the
sures, but extractive industrial expansion and infta- urban footprint and the absorption of smaller satellite
structural development (building of dams and some settlements within the spatial expansion of the larger
roads) also account for an enlarged footprint. Aftica’s city). Africa's population is clustered around resource-rich
current human ecological footprint is forecasted to areas, and almost 25% of the population resides within
double in size by 2040 (World Wildlife Fund and 62 miles or 100 km of the coast. Much of this popula-
African Development Bank 2012). tion is particularly vulnerable to climate change and
Exploding population has become a driving force future sea-level rise.
of environmental change on many fronts and at an un- Urbanization directly transforms its immediate
precedented scale. According to some biogeographers, environment. Urban residential development incor-
humans have emerged as a force of nature rivaling cli- porates various types of land use: hillsides and wooded
matic and geological forces in sharing the biosphere areas can be cut and bulldozed; valleys, swamps, and
and its process (Ellis and Ramankutty 2008). lagoons can be filled in; and coastal areas can be devel-
Urbanization pressures, expanding population, and oped with little regard for planning regulations. In the
associated human activities are affecting vegetation, ani- process, water and minerals are extracted beneath the
mals, land use, water, and air. Increased population to city, and soil, groundwater, and local climate are al-
feed requires more space for agriculture, adding pres- tered in significant ways. The construction of roads,
sures on forests, wetlands, and other natural habitats. buildings, and factories changes the chemical, water,
Urban concentrations of population necessitate a move- and energy balance. For example, the temperature in
ment toward more intensive agriculture (irrigated crops), urban areas is affected by several factors, such as the
shifting land use away from pasture, forest, or other uses. way that walls and roofs of buildings conduct heat,
Deforestation is a major reason for land degradation in which often results in an urban heat island effect
Africa, especially when followed by overcultivation and (meaning that the urban area is significantly warner
overgrazing. Soil erosion and water pollution are-other than its surrounding rural areas).
urgent rural problems. Agricultural runoff can also be African urban environments are poorly equipped
manifested as an urban problem as cities draw from the to deal with rapid urbanization and its consequent in-
water that flows through them, which can be polluted adequate infrastructure systems, phenomenal expan-
from toxic chemicals in fertilizers and biocides applied sion of slums, and hazardous economic activities
in urban hinterlands. gravitating to poor urban environments (e.g., e-waste).
Much of the economic dynamo of African cities resides
URBAN ENVIRONMENTS
in the informal economic realm outside of state regu-
AND ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINTS lation (Simon 2010). Negative environmental effects
Africa’s urban population growth rates are the fastest of from both informal and formal economic activities are
any world region. Cities and towns are growing at twice widespread as pollution concentrates in areas with the
the rate of rural population, and by 2030 more than lowest regulation and the greatest gaps in detection.
half of Africa’s population is expected to live in cities Organic and unplanned urban expansion is pro-
(projected to be 60% by 2050). Africa will have an ceeding without the provision of adequate health,
urban population of more than 1.2 billion by 2050— shelter, water, and climate change adaptation (Sclar,
more than the combined urban and rural population Volavka-Close, and Brown 2012). The peripheries and
in the Western Hemisphere. Specific spectacular urban fringes of urban settlements are mined for sand, gravel,
growth rates are being recorded: Abuja (Nigeria), and other construction materials such as wood for
8.75%; Yamoussoukro (Cote d'Ivoire), 7.25%; Luanda building as well as firewood/charcoal. Motor vehicle
(Angola), 6%; and Kinshasa (DRC), 5% (UN- HABITAT and industrial emissions, inadequate supplies of safe
2008). Growth of urban settlements is based on rural- water, insufficient provision of sanitation and solid
urban migration, natural population growth, and waste and toxic waste disposal, and water pollution
76 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

(contaminated water bodies such as rivers, lagoons, and fisheries). In this process, the ecological environ-
lakes, oceans, and groundwater) are major contribut- ment of the hinterland is changed as it provides ser-
ing factors to disease and death in urban Africa. In ad- vices and resources for urban dwellers. The ecological
dition, an array of common informal activities augment footprint of this relationship is estimated to be at least
urban environmental pollution problems. For exam- 10 times greater than that contained within the built-
ple, market women in the food niche of smoked fish up area of a city (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 1996).
(via burning fuel wood) sell their product for seven Although African ecological footprints are smaller
hours per day on busy streets and marketplaces to than the global average, African citizens’ footprints
poorer urban dwellers, but the process of smoking fish grew by 30% (1961-2008), leading some experts to
amplifies the fuel wood/charcoal issue (beyond defor- conclude that African footprints are approaching the
estation and its ecological and climate impacts). Col- biocapacity available within Africa’s borders, although
lecting fuel wood is a means of livelihood for the urban it varies significant from country to country (World
and rural poor, but one with immense environmental Wildlife Fund and Africa Development Bank 2012).
implications. For example, Mauritius, Mauritania, and Botswana
Urban management of many institutional and in- have national footprints larger than the global average,
dustrial wastes is poorly developed, resulting in severe but Eritrea, Rwanda, and Congo have footprints that
environmental health implications. Sewage sludge and are among the lowest in the world (World Wildlife
hospital waste often contain bacteria, viruses, and cysts Fund and Africa Development Bank 2012).
from parasites, all posing human health and safety
risks. Many toxic wastewaters are either disposed of or
CONCLUSIONS
channeled untreated into rivers, lagoons, and other
nearby water sources. Urban toxicity is further aug- Africa is well endowed with natural resources, yet it is
mented when toxic waste and e-waste dumping occurs characterized by low levels of economic development. In
at or near urban African sites. Several high-profile cases the last decade, external powers have intensified efforts
have been documented in recent years, but many con- to secure more African resources in a “second scramble
tinue to operate under the radar. for Africa” (Carmody 2011). External arrangements and
The Trafigura case of toxic dumping in Abidjan local partnerships are reconfiguring Africa's resource ge-
(Céte d'Ivoire) resulted in a court case and conviction. ographies, and many extraction activities are having dra-
A Dutch court in 2010 found the Swiss MNC guilty of matic effects on the environment. Mineral and resource
exporting toxic waste from Amsterdam and concealing contracts appear to be unfavorable to African peoples
the nature of the 2006 cargo that was unloaded at and environments in the long run. Governments are
12 dumpsites in Abidjan. Gases released from toxic taking a short-term view to obtain immediate returns
chemicals in this waste led to 17 deaths and over from resources without giving adequate consideration
30,000 injuries. The Abidjan victims sued Trafigura to sustainable development. Current trends of resource
but were unsuccessful in their request for financial depletion and ecosystem degradation are likely to accel-
compensation. Instead, Trafigura was forced to pay erate in a future of increasing populations, urbanization,
US$198 million for the cleanup of the waste and was climate change, and further structural transformation of s

further penalized €1 million for illegally transiting the African economies.

waste through Amsterdam. Africa's human-environment nexus is highly com-
The ecological footprint also extends beyond the plex. For a long time, Africans were viewed as passive
built-up area of cities into the surrounding regional en- victims of environmental change based on their particular
vironments. Urban centers and particularly primate incorporation into the global political economy, but
cities (leading and disproportionately large cities others viewed Africans as responsible for their own en-
within respective urban hierarchies) draw on water, vironmental degradation. These ways of thinking still
minerals, and other resources from wider regional eco- hold sway, but there is now a greater acknowledgment
logical environments (croplands, forests, grazing lands, of the central role that government and other domestic
 Africa’s Environments 77

institutions play in mediating the international and do- Cline-Cole, R. 1995. “Livelihood, Sustainable De-
mestic environmental spheres. Globally, there are velopment and Indigenous Forestry in Dryland
stronger voices advocating for a deeper appreciation of Nigeria.” In People and Environment in Africa,
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WEBSITES 2013). Documentary film on the resource curse in

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Sierra Leoneans be able to benefit from their own natural
-youtube.com/watch?v=qDOYGNbB5fQ (accessed
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December 5, 2013). Documentary film about en-
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.com/programmes/africainvestigates/2011/11/
201111 23131914242861.html (accessed December 5,
 ut PToereniiee UND a
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 Ca PAC Paina em

THE “SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA” AND THE

STATE OF EUROPEAN GEOGRAPHICAL
KNOWLEDGE ON THE REGION

INTRODUCTION

The colonial experience created deep ruptures with

Africa’s past. In 1870, nine tenths of Africa was still
under African control, but by 1914, nine tenths was
under European control. Extraordinarily, within a six-
year period between the Berlin West African Confer-
ence of 1884-85 and a series of tidying-up agreements
in the 1890s, Europeans carved up Africa. These events
are referred to as “the scramble for Africa” and are
without historical or geographical precedent.
The Berlin proceedings were larded with expres-
sions of good intent; however, no African leaders were
invited to the Berlin conference. Amazingly, at no FIGURE 4.1 The Berlin Conference that Divided Africa.
point in the proceedings were African voices heard. Source: © Bettmann/CORBIS.
Instead, the conference transpired as a strictly European
affair and consisted of European posturing, high-
powered scheming, competition, and haggling over delineations on African soil. Reader notes (1998:551-552)
African territories (Fig. 4.1). that “African leaders, no doubt, shared the European
According to historian John Reader (1998:551), talent for diplomatic nullity or charlatanism where
“there was much to be won; although the cultured appropriate, but few managed to negotiate agree-
gentility of the gathering and the complexity of com- ments with the Europeans that gained Africa more
peting interests might suggest the proceedings were than a modicum of benefit; the Europeans got (or
analogous to a game of chess, they were more akin to took) everything they wanted.” The outcome of the
a backstreet game of poker—with marked cards .. . Berlin conference was that Europeans marked out
African leaders, however, appear to be extraordinarily their “spheres of influence” (Fig. 4.2). Subsequently,
trusting of these white men with guns with their each invaded the continent within its own “sphere,”
haughty attitudes of superiority.” Subsequently, lead- until foreign flags waved above nearly all African ter-
ers throughout Africa were persuaded or cajoled to put ritories. The only territories to escape 19th-century
their marks on pieces of paper to agree to European invasion were Sierra Leone (a British colony established

81
82 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

SPANISH

MAURITANIA

FRENCH WEST AFRICA ERITREA

UPPER SENEGALAND NIGER SOMALILAND
(Fr.) (Br.) (It)

PORTUGUESE
GUINEA

Independent

British

French

Belgian

Portuguese WALVIS BAY

German

Italian UNION OF“)

SOUTH AFRICA—
BASUTOLAND
Spanish

FIGURE 4.2 Africa After the Scramble. Source: Cole and DeBlij, 2007:83.

in the 1790s with the special purpose of providing a languages (Reader 1998). European translators drew up
home base for freed slaves), Liberia (under U.S. pro- the treaties, translating among European languages,
tection with an identical purpose but for American which provided “outsiders” the advantage of semantic
freed slaves), and Ethiopia (annexed by Italy but never subtlety when applying the treaties in their colonial ter-
colonialized). ritories. Many of the key terms written into treaties were
All of this colonization took place in the context of untranslatable across cultures. For instance, rulings about
Europeans and Africans not playing the same game, not land ownership had no direct counterpart in African un-
following the same rules, and not speaking the same derstandings of land ownership: African traditions of a

a
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 83

land belonging to ancestors and spirits and being held by Of course, lack of understanding and basic knowl-
chiefs and families in communal ownership had no rela- edge of Africa is another major consideration. A diffi-
tion to Western land practices and law that privileged culty that bedeviled European understanding of Africa
private ownership and town and country planning. was that 19th-century Europe could not see beyond
Through a 21st-century lens, it is unimaginable that power embodied in the nation-state. Europeans found
an entire continent could be partitioned among exter- it almost impossible to recognize any other form of po-
nal European powers, some of them not even great litical organization; they regarded the absence of states as
powers, without African consultation (Chamberlain proof of chaos. Essential differences between European
2010). But to 19th-century Europeans, it appeared nat- states and their underlying assumptions and those of
ural, understandable, and justifiable. African political entities were ignored and, even worse,
Several factors may explain how this could tran- misinterpreted when it was convenient. It is obvious
spire (Chamberlain 2010). First, Europe had under- that in this time Africans did not lack a sense of territo-
gone an industrial revolution and Africa had not. Thus, riality; an essential difference was that Africans mapped
for the first time in history, an enormous economic, political space mentally and orally rather than carto-
technological, and military gap opened between the graphically. Europeans emphasized discrete spaces
two regions, with power skewed heavily toward Europe. marked by boundaries, whereas Africans focused more
The industrial revolution had transformed the cities of of the arrangement of centers of power and influence
Europe, and urban Africa looked nothing like them. surrounded by unappropriated territory. Europeans
Second, Europeans claimed that they were at the had a fixed sense of boundaries, whereas Africans
forefront of progress and civilization and that Africa maintained a fluid sense of boundaries that could os-
was “backward” and primitive; Europeans garnered cillate and respond to ecological change, especially re-
the resources and patronage to “civilize” the region. lated to rainfall and drought. Europeans tended to
These views had been formed during the slave trade view states and populations as constant and stable,
when humans were treated as merchandise. Although whereas Africans were more open to including mobile
there were minor correctives to the general slave ste- and nomadic populations. Historian Basil Davidson
reotypes (e.g., the noble savage) and although Africans (1992) concluded that this process resulted in “the
were known to many Europeans (several thousand curse of the nation-state”: with the organization that
personal servants labored in Europe), a perception of was forced on Africa, these territorial containers turned
“backward and inferior Africa” persisted. out to be “the black man’s burden” in Africa.
Third, a moment of eclipse among several African African historical and geographical knowledge
empires (e.g., Savannah) in the mid-to late 19th cen- was hidden from Europeans for a variety of reasons.
tury presented favorable conditions for European in- Europeans were accustomed to studying and learning
cursions. The opening up of Africa coincided with through written records. For large parts of Africa, no
African political systems becoming more fragile and such records exist. Historical records of Arab travelers
“Balkanized” (broken up into more micropolitical ar- produced written accounts of parts of urban Africa
rangements). Previously, Africans had supplied the (e.g., Western Sudan, Timbuktu, and Great Zimbabwe),
goods that Europeans coveted, whether it was slaves, but Europeans paid them no heed. From the seventh
gold, or spices. Europeans knew that the gold mines to the 14th centuries, Europe’s written record on Africa
lay just out of their sight—a bare 200 miles (322 Kms) is a lacuna; to Europeans Africa was a largely unknown
from the coast—but West African societies were orga- and misunderstood region. Africa was often seen as
nized enough to keep Europeans at arm’s length until one geographical and cultural mass, intermingled with
the late 19th century. tall tales of places of African splendor. Partly due to
Fourth, it was more than coincidental that Africa was their limited understanding, Europeans developed a
opened up on a large scale when the North American series of tantalizing mysteries about the interior of
frontier was closing. Africa become known as the last Africa in the early 19th century as they turned their at-
frontier, and this representation persists today. tention to the wonders of Africa. There were stories of
84 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Africa as an El Dorado—a land of fabled wealth (the H. M. Stanley, René Caillié, and Pierre de Brazza (founder
legendary kingdom of Prester John and the city of of the city of Brazzaville).
Timbuktu were among the most famous). Explorers wrote vivid accounts of their travels and
Much European knowledge was restricted to the discoveries, fulfilling a 21st-century role as journalists/
past two centuries, and information was geographi- bloggers on the spot. Their writings generated great en-
cally fragmentary and restricted to a few contact points thusiasm among the public interested in knowing
because the Europeans (e.g., the Portuguese, Dutch, more about the world as well as among industrialists
and Danes) were first restricted to a few port areas and and merchants interested in economic opportunities
relied on second-hand reports for information about in Africa. Most explorers narrated as if they were the
the interior. When Europeans did engage Africans in first people to penetrate an unknown region. For the
arenas beyond trade, the former were always outsiders most part, the peoples of Europe viewed the explora-
(e.g., explorers, missionaries, town planners, and colo- tions as little more than entertainment and excitement
nial officers), and their documentary sources became set on an alien and exotic stage. In the eyes of the gen-
the narrative about Africa. Their chronicles are those of eral public in Europe, exploration had a theatrical ele-
non-natives rather than of natives. Outsiders did not ment to it. “The same men who saw their scientific
always appreciate or understand what they observed; missions endangered by African pomp and circum-
they were prone to bias as well as prejudice. stance were in Africa as agents of an enterprise that was
Many key European agents of change had compli- sold to the European public through pompous cam-
cated relationships with Africans and the colonial en- paigns of propaganda, through exhibits and shows,
terprise. For instance, missionaries portrayed their and through drama and tragedy reported in travel-
undertaking in Africa as humanitarian and saw Africans ogues and in the press. The drama has its heroes and
as capable of being uplifted, but they were also prone villains and a grand plot called oeuvre civilisatrice”
to denigrate indigenous culture. Historians continue to (Fabian 2000:121).
debate the relationships among mission activity, colo- Most writing on colonial Africa focused on the
nialism, and indigenous self-esteem. Missionaries op- contributions of men. There were, however, women
posed the harsher aspects of colonialism but backed travelers and explorers who contributed to European
European colonial expansion because it provided an scientific knowledge of poorly known places in the
opportunity to extend Christianity’s reach. However, 19th century and who continued to do so long after.
almost unwittingly, missionaries supported negative English women travelers found greater freedom away
representations of Africans, largely to raise funds back from the socials norms of Victorian England, where
home. Raising funds depended on public sympathy they were confined to the home. Their journeys to dis-
(many donations came from the working classes), so tant places such as the African region were revolution-
missionaries’ literature was prone to selective represen- ary. Women traveling during these times were mainly
tations of life in Africa: for the unconverted, it was travel writers, missionaries, and colonial residents
brutal and barbarous. It is no surprise that the mission- (typically the spouses of colonial administrators). An
ary debate is far from settled: humanitarian impulses English woman, Mary Kingsley, stands out because of
produce ambiguous results. her achievements as a prominent travel writer, ex-
Waves of explorers from several European countries plorer, and amateur geographer and anthropologist
traveled to Africa from the end of the 18th century until (see Box 4.1).
the late 19th century, the intense period of African ex- In most accounts, Africans were reported as mere
ploration. Some explorers were captivated by discovery background, almost as if they were part of the local
and fame, others were after souls to save, and the re- fauna. Some European explorations focused on incred-
mainder were largely agents of European imperialism. ible places like Timbuktu, a mythical “city with gold
Many of the most famous explorers were men, who roofs,” supposedly the hub of a fabulously wealthy
became nearly legendary in Europe—David Livingstone, trading system (Heffernan 2001) (see Box 4.2).
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 85

BOX 4.1 MARY KINGSLEY (1862-1900) Victorian limits of acceptable behavior for women both in Africa
and in Britain.
Mary Kingsley had little formal education, and she got a late
Women faced credibility challenges in their pursuit of explora-
start in exploration (Fig. 4.3). Until the age of 30, she was a duti-
tion. In sharp contrast to male explorers, who behaved as adven-
ful Victorian woman, caring for her sick mother. Her mother’s
ture heroes and authoritative experts, Kingsley issued disclaimers
death—within weeks of her father’s unexpected passing—
about her field observations, stressing the difficulties of African
suddenly freed Kingsley to undertake her life’s ambition to
travel. Her approach enlivened her descriptions of people and
travel. She possessed a strong intellectual curiosity and was
places, and she became known for her anecdotal humorous travel
self-educated from reading books in the family's study. In a short
tales (humor was not often demonstrated by male explorers at
time, she went on to become an amateur anthropologist, a
that time). Her subjectivity gave her a particular vantage point in
famous writer, and an African explorer. She made frequent trips
observing Africa and Africans, and in writing about it. She was a
to Africa (e.g., Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Gabon, Cameroon, and
single white woman with a lower-class accent, her parents came
South Africa); this was rare for a woman at that time. In West
from different classes (her father came from a prominent literary
Africa, she collected valuable specimens of fish, she completed
family; her mother was a servant; and Mary came into the world
her father's study of world religions by researching fetish prac-
four days after her parents were married). Her ambivalent position
tices, and she became one of the first Europeans to reach the in society seemed to equip her with a sharp ability to reflect on her
summit of the highest mountain in the region—Mount Cameroon surroundings. Although her actions broke many barriers of the day,
(4,042 meters)—via a route not previously attempted by any other
Kingsley was uncomfortable about being regarded as a feminist.
European. Kingsley challenged the ideas of gender, pushing the Kingsley’s writings were widely disseminated. She wrote two
books about her experiences: Travels in West Africa (1897)
became an immediate bestseller, and West African Studies
(1899) was positively received by academia. However, newspa-
pers such as The Times refused to review her books because her
views were seen as too radical. In her second book, she criticized
colonial administrators and missionaries, writing disapprovingly
of their “white man’s burden” approach to Africa. She renamed
the colonial enterprise “the black man’s burden,” and the Colo-
nial Office responded by claiming she was “the most dangerous
woman on the other side” (Davies 2012:1). She challenged the
establishment with her actions as well as with her words.
Kingsley recorded a vast amount of data on the geography of
West Africa, including information on local flora and fauna. In
Victorian England, geography was considered a male-only sci-
ence; thus, through her work, she challenged many accepted
norms. However, when on expeditions her dress style was always
that of a Victorian woman at home, massively unpractical for
Africa travel. “She traveled through the bush and swamp in a
long, tight-waisted skirt and a high-necked blouse, armed with
an umbrella, paying her way as a trader” (Middleton 1991:103).
Kingsley described her primary purpose in traveling as publi-
cizing West Africa, and she was motivated to inform the general
public with different interpretations about indigenous people in
an effort to develop more complex understandings of Africans
and their culture. She said in one of her letters, “until the truth is
known to the general public the GP will be content to let things
slide there” (quoted in Blunt 1994:129).
Mary Kingsley’s life ended prematurely at age 37. She had
traveled to South Africa to care for Boer prisoners of war, and
while there she died of typhoid. Kingsley’s life was influential
even if her public role was short-lived. Her writings and public
lectures on life in Africa-helped draw attention to Britain's impe-
rial agenda as well as to the indigenous customs of Africans,
FIGURE 4.3 Mary Kingsley. both topics greatly misunderstood by the public. She had an
(Continued)
86 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 4.1 (Continued) medicine. Her vision for a society focused on Africa that would
bring together disparate interests (e.g., academics, friends, po-
influence on public opinion and was instrumental in the develop- litical groups, traders) to discuss alternatives to harmful colonial
ment of the Fair Commerce Party, a colonial politics pressure policies in Africa was realized when the Royal African Society
group that fought for improved conditions for the natives of (RAS) was established in Britain. The RAS has gone on to
British colonies. Many of her accomplishments were recognized become an academic body with the mission to promote Africa in
only after her death. For example, the Liverpool School of Tropi- many spheres of UK public life (e.g., academia, business, poli-
cal Medicine established an honorary medal in her name to be tics. and international development).
given for outstanding contributions in the field of tropical

BOX 4.2 TIMBUKTU: COLONIAL ESCAPADES A three-volume account of his journey published in 1830 (trans-
AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS lated into English the same year) provided a surprising descrip-
tion of Timbuktu: “| now saw this capital of the Soudan, to reach
Timbuktu is an important town in Mali (the current population is which had so long been the object of my wishes. On entering this
approximately 60,000) that was designated a United Nations mysterious city, which is-an object of curiosity and research to the
Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world heri- civilized nations of Europe, | experienced an indescribable satis-
tage site in 1988. In the 11th century, Timbuktu flourished as a faction. . . . [But]! looked around and found that the sight before
hub within the caravan trade between Africa, the Mediterra- me did not answer my expectations. | had formed a totally differ-
nean, and the Middle East. From the 13th through the 17th cen- ent idea of the grandeur and wealth of Timbuctoo. The city pre-
turies, Timbuktu thrived as the world center for Islamic learning, sented, at first view, nothing but a mass of ill-looking houses, built
instrumental to the spread of Islam in Africa, and a center of lit- of earth. Nothing was to be seen in all directions but immense
erary heritage (with libraries and intense scribe activity). During plains of quicksand of a yellowish white colour. The sky was pale
its heyday, a depository consisting of an estimated 200,000 red as far as the horizon: all nature wore a dreary aspect, and the
manuscripts was produced. There were Islamic religious books, most profound silence prevailed; not even the warbling of a bird
and other works on poetry, history, law, medicine, astronomy,
was to be heard. . . . Timbuctoo and its environs present the most
and botany as well as stories from the region. Timbuktu func- monotonous and barren scene | ever beheld” (Heffernan 2001:211,
tioned as an oasis of learning and literacy and a marketplace for quoting a translation of Caillié 1830:49).
books, where the trading of manuscripts was negotiated and The idea of Timbuktu as a city of splendor and plenty was so
books were circulated within the region. deeply ingrained in the popular imagination that Caillié’s discov-
Today we use the word “Timbuktu” to denote any distant or
ery was greeted with disappointment, skepticism, and even indig-
outlandish place; it even appears in Dr. Seuss’ “Hop on Pop”
nation, especially in Britain. Doubt was cast upon the legitimacy
book. But more importantly, the truth about the city dispels the
of the messenger as well as of the message. In this and other ex-
Western narrative that Africa consists of people without a his-
plorations to.the African continent, the search for scientific and
tory. Timbuktu’s learning, buildings, and urban lifestyle predated
geographical truth produced ambiguous results and raised fun-
the arrival of the Europeans.
damental questions. Sorely lacking were efforts at critical and
During the European colonial interlude, a frenzied competi-
deeper reflection on what constituted “real” geographical knowl-
tion ensued among European explorers to verify the mythical
edge and truth. Europeans overlooked the real significance of the
city’s existence. The British government funded an expedition
place: the African repository in the desert (Fig. 4.4). During the
by explorer Mungo Park (UK £60,000 in 1805) and deployed a
colonial period, the French imposed their language as the main
battalion of 40 well-armed soldiers to support the mission. Park
language and its hegemony lessened the importance of Arabic
failed in his efforts and was killed miles from Timbuktu in 1810,
and indirectly Arabic texts. As a result, many locals lost the ability
but the race to “discover” the city continued.
to read and interpret the Timbuktu manuscripts in the languages
Rivaling the British, the Paris Geographical Society offered a
in which they had been originally written.
prize in 1824 of 10,000 francs to the first person to provide a
In 2012, Timbuktu was added to the UNESCO list of World
first-hand, verifiable, and scientifically valid description of Tim-
Heritage Sites in Danger. Climate conditions, time, and extremists
buktu. In 1828, French explorer René Caillié won the prize, but
pose different threats to the city. The building of the Ahmed Baba
his claim sparked considerable controversy and raised ethical
Center archive library in 2009, funded by Kuwait, Libya, UNESCO,
questions. Recounting how he was the first European to survive
and South Africa, to house a large collection of long-neglected
the journey to Timbuktu, Caillié highlighted the importance of
historical works (20,000-30,000 works) is a contemporary effort in
disguise and deceit: he had assumed the identity of a Muslim
historical preservation of Africa's intellectual past and written tra-
(Abd Allahi) in light of his predecessors’ poor survival rates.
dition. However, in 2012, during a period of civil unrest, insurgents
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 87

Great Zimbabwe in 1868, they supposed that they must have

been relics from the Phoenicians (peoples originating from the
Fertile Crescent, present-day Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and
Israel), who might have mined gold in the area. The European
mindset precluded them from considering that the urban settle-
ment had largely indigenous origins. It is a striking example of
Europeans believing that Africans were passive in the making of
their own histories and that Africans lacked their own urban
creativity.
Geographical myths and legends became less prevalent in the
late 19th century; in place of these, mapmakers recorded cities
and towns, forests and savannas, snow-capped mountain ranges
and deserts, and so forth. What the 19th century achieved for
geographical knowledge on Africa, however, the 21st century
FIGURE 4.4 Manuscripts in the Desert. has yet to achieve for a peoples’ history of Africa. Closer detailed
examinations can often reverse assumptions based on Eurocen-
Source: © Sebastien Cailleux/Corbis.
tric worldviews. The assumption that Africans lived in universal
chaos and/or stagnation until the Europeans arrived was exceed-
from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQUIM) entered Tim-
ingly convenient for colonial agents of all persuasions.
buktu and set fire to the library, destroying some works, although
The story of the Timbuktu manuscripts is ongoing. One effort
most of the collection had been moved to private homes for safe-
in 2013 involved an Indiegogo online crowd-funding campaign
keeping prior to the attack. Few other great sites of learning in the
that raised over US$67,000 in one month from international indi-
world have faced such cultural wars to obliterate their meaning
vidual donors to help preserve the historical manuscripts.
and historical significance.
Indiegogo funding will be used to purchase archival boxes and
During the colonial era, in many cases geographical informa-
humidity-proof footlockers to safely store 600 manuscripts. The
tion was misinterpreted, so misrepresentations continued. This
Ford Foundation is sponsoring larger efforts to preserve the rich
happened with comparatively late European discoveries of some
heritage of Timbuktu and has provided grants totaling more
of Africa’s great artworks and large urban ruins: for example,
US$3.3 million since 2000. An important initiative is the University
Great Zimbabwe, located in the southeast part of Zimbabwe
of Cape Town's Tombouctu Manuscript Project, which provides
(see Box 4.3). European misinterpretation of Great Zimbabwe
expertise in archiving, preserving, and creating online database
eventually sparked one of the major controversies in the archae-
access to some of the manuscripts.
ological world. When Europeans stumbled on the remains of

COLONIAL MOTIVATIONS
or corrected, over the decades when the intensity of
Colonial motivations are complex, and the objectives of European explorations on the continent increased.
different European agents were not always in sync. The Europe’s civilizing mission was particularly blinkered.
mélange of interests included an increasing awareness It rested on the assumption that indigenous people
of the possibilities of Africa, some genuine scientific in- were inferior in mental, moral, and practical capacities
terest, and a modicum of sincere humanitarian interest. compared to white Europeans. Rudyard Kipling’s 1899
Beneath the surface, others had self-centered motiva- poem “The White Man’s Burden” captures the essence
tions such as (1) the acquisition of new scientific and of these feelings of racial superiority and responsibility.
geographical knowledge for Europe's benefit; (2) a desire Europeans assumed that indigenous people needed
to spread Europe's civilization and, for some, to extend training in basic arts and skills, which would occur with
Christianity; and (3) efforts to bolster Europe's grandeur exposure to Western belief systems. Missions and edu-
and economic prowess by incorporating Africa into cational systems were to become two potent forces for
European-commanded circuits of trade and production, the dissemination of information.
facilitating the international expansion of capitalism. Some Africans welcomed colonialism, many opposed
Many European attitudes toward Africa were formed it, but almost all were transformed by it to varying degrees.
during the long slaving and trading connection on the Europeans and Africans of all persuasions were at the mercy
Guinea coast. Counterintuitively, negative images seemed of processes of change that they neither comprehended nor
to endure and even harden, rather than being modified fully controlled. Nevertheless, colonialism set the stage for
88 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

a deep and inexorable misunderstanding between Africans based on human endeavor, and this is highly contin-
and the rest of the world that has never been corrected. gent on funding for excavation. It is easier to search for
Colonialism was objectionable and even evil on settlement sites in the,open grasslands of the African
many grounds. It damaged societies economically, politi- savanna than in the tangled undergrowth of the rain-
cally, psychologically, culturally, and in many other ways. forest. Funding agencies are motivated by finds and
Whether colonialism can be benign has long been de- want the biggest bang for their funding monies. There-
bated by economic historians. Debating the pros and fore, the mapping of cities of ancient Africa is more
cons of colonialism, however, is akin to debating rape! likely to reflect the distribution of archaeological re-
Colonialism entailed coercive practices that conflicted search and stone ruins rather than the complete ancient
sharply with basic human rights and democratic values. urban geography. Indeed, as Connah (2001:3) stresses,
In both principle and practice, colonized people were the word “unexplored” should be written across con-
considered subjects rather than citizens and were as- temporary archeological maps, just as it was a couple of
signed duties but were never granted rights. The colonial centuries ago with many early maps of Africa.
years set the course of African states’ integration into the It is now recognized that cities existed in a wide
world economy, a mode of incorporation that has lin- range of African environments in the precolonial era.
gered and continues to structure Africa’s relations with The broad pattern of the geography of African cities in
the world. European rule in most parts of Africa lasted precolonial times has been established by urban scholars
60 to 80 years, a short period that produced profound and historians based on historical and ethnohistorical
effects. It shaped the contemporary urban, political, eco- evidence. Some of the leading books on this topic are by
nomic, and social geographies of Africa, most saliently by Anderson and Rathbone (2000), Coquery-Vidrovitch
town planning and imported architectural designs (see (2005), and Freund (2007). Urban centers in Africa show
Box 4.4 on the bungalow). The crises and difficulties that considerable diversity: some were densely occupied for
many African states experienced in the latter part of the long periods, some were settled only briefly, a few were
20th century as well as their current situations cannot be completely mobile (e.g., West African Savannah), some
understood without reference to the colonial epoch. had transient residents from season to season and year to
year, and still others were dispersed settlements covering
immense areas. Such diversity indicates social complex-
AFRICA’S URBAN PAST
ity as well an indigenous urban tradition.
Given the paucity of Western texts about Africa, as well A key finding is that towns and cities are not some-
as the biases many of them contain, we have to turn to how extraneous to the real Africa but rather an inherent
archaeology as a major source of information about part of developing Africa. Urbanization unfolded over a
the region’s urban past. According to urban archaeolo- long time, and the process reflected indigenous origins
gist Graham Connah (2001:3), “archaeological evi- rather than simply external beginnings derived from
dence is like a jigsaw puzzle from which two-thirds of Arabs, Europeans, or others. There is no basis for the per-
the pieces are lost, while the rest have the picture worn spective that Africa lacked an urban tradition or that
off or the corners missing.” The goal of the archaeolo- urban development in Africa was contingent on the colo-
gist is to study the physical evidence of past human nial city. However, urban settlements did not meet all of
activities in order to reconstruct those activities. the criteria used to define “true” cities (the Western in-
Archaeological evidence is, however, not unbiased dustrial city). Similar arguments have surfaced in Middle
in contributing geographical information on ancient America concerning Mayan cities in the North and South
settlements in Africa. For instance, in Central Africa, ar- American contexts. True, Africa lacked industrial cities
chaeology has contributed much less information than and, for the most part, still does; however, historical
in other areas, largely because many of the urban settle- urban formations are evident, and these settlements
ments were constructed of grass, wood, and other or- were tailored to meet the needs of various inhabitants.
ganic materials, making it much more difficult to Figure 4.5 depicts the main areas of urban develop-
excavate these structures than those made of stone. ment in Africa: in West Africa, along the southern edge
Moreover, the corpus of archaeological knowledge is of the Sahara; in the West African forest, west of the
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 89

FIGURE 4.5 Early Urban Settlements in Africa. Sources: Reprinted with the permission
of Cambridge University Press; Connah 2001:13.
90 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

lower Niger River; on the Middle Nile in the Sudan; and Mike Smith (2009), an expert on ancient cities,
in the Ethiopian mountains. Urban centers are also evi- posits that several urban subtraditions may have flour-
dent along the East African coast, on the Zimbabwean ished in Africa prior to, European conquest. Thus, not
plateau, around the lower Zaire (Congo), and in the all of the urban functions were necessarily present at
Lake Victoria area. It appears that urban life emerged in the same time in every ancient city. For instance, there
Africa around 750 BC, and certainly by 1200 BC urban is evidence of modest public architecture in Jenne-Jeno
life was evident throughout many parts of Africa. (AD 450-110, located in present-day Mali) but not in
The debate is far from settled on how, why, and Yoruba cities (AD 1400-1900, in present-day Nigeria,
where cities emerged in Africa. Did they arise indepen- Benin, and Togo), the latter having busy commercial
dently or via regional processes of diffusion? Current centers without large public buildings. Each city bore
thinking is that long-distance trade was more of an in- the marks of regional patterns of economy, political
tensifier than an originator of urbanization in Africa. relations, and social organization, but high levels of
Several varieties of early urban forms and their geo- variation existed. Put in a global context of ancient
graphical spread throughout Africa suggest that there cities, Africa’s urban settlements had ample popula-
must be some common denominators. There is evidence tions, differing degrees of long-distance trade, social
of ample population sizes and densities (settlements of complexity, and some degree of economic specializa-
10,000 and more), which is especially notable given the tion (but much less than other regions). But, overall,
sparseness of population throughout the region. There is African cities showed weaker evidence of predictive sci-
also evidence of cities or settlements containing activi- ence (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy) and un-
ties and institutions that affected wider political, admin- clear relationships to political states (the basis of
istrative, economic, and/or religious realms. Childe’s [1950] well-known thesis on the relationship
We know more about some urban settlements in of states to urbanization in early city formation).
the region. Nigerian geographer Akin Mabogunje Precolonial cities in Africa had some commonalties.
(1962) made major contributions in understanding First, population densities in urban settlements were
functional specialization in Yoruba cities. He found that high compared to the general, thinly populated conti-
specialization occurred when (1) food surpluses were nental region. People were mainly agriculturalists, but
created to feed specialists (in crafts, building, adminis- varying degrees of other specializations were evident
tration) and when the central authority administered (traders, administrators, crafters). Second, there is ample
the surplus; (2) a small group of people were able to evidence of the sacred and spiritual roles of urban settle-
exercise power over food producers and to ensure peace- ments and the establishment of places of worship, no
ful conditions; and (3) traders and merchants provided doubt tied to the emergence of beliefs that tran-
raw materials for the specialists. Mabogunje believes scended local ancestor cults. The early elites held both
that state formation was related to the development of political and spiritual authority. Third, there is the well-
urbanization: states played a pivotal role in defending documented rise of powerful states in West Africa, often
urban centers against external aggression, and their ap- tied closely to religious rituals. Fourth, urban and rural
paratuses allowed them to extend control over other mesh in original ways, and large concentrations of
cities, permitting linked urbanization. people combine both elements (different from the
There are other contending hypotheses about why divide of town and country that is often imagined). One
cities developed in Africa (See Box 4.3 for the debate should bear in mind that something rather exceptional
about “Great Zimbabwe”). Some argue they developed (the force of urbanization) was needed to explain any
through elite vision; others contend that the accumu- concentrations of power in a tribal Africa. Fifth, another
lation of political power related to economic gain feature of the early cities was the presence of some type
from long-distance trade and/or scarce resources and of fortifications. Early cities needed some form of de-
minerals led to urbanization; still others maintain that fense since they contained storehouses of food, the seat
they developed as a means to endure droughts or other of central authority, and concentrations of people.
environmental pressures (e.g., agricultural overuse of Distinct periods of urbanization in Africa can be
land and deforestation). discerned (Fig. 4.6). First, there is the period of ancient
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92 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 4.3. “GREAT ZIMBABWE”:

AN URBAN HISTORY ALMOST FORGOTTEN

Europeans largely justified colonialism on the basis that Africans

were a people without history and incapable of indigenous devel-
opment. One detrimental and damaging aspect of colonialism was
Europe’s role in denying African peoples their cultural heritage. In
the southern African region, there was a well-documented effort to
misinterpret evidence of an important indigenous urban civilization.
Falsification became a handy tool to distort past African achieve-
ments and to support the representation of Africa as “uncivilized.”
This happened in the interpretation of Great Zimbabwe.
The word “Zimbabwe” means “stone dwellings” in the native
Shona language, and remnants of stone buildings sparked one of
the most important controversies in the archaeological world.
Great Zimbabwe is known for its extensive stone complex and evi-
dence of an ancient city. The central area of ruins extends about
200 acres (80 hectares), making Great Zimbabwe the largest of FIGURE 4.7 Ruins of Great Zimbabwe.
more than 150 major stone ruins scattered across Zimbabwe and
Source: © Robert Harding World Imagery/Corbis.
Mozambique. The site is located in southeastern Zimbabwe, ap-
proximately 19 miles (30 km) southeast of Masvingo (Fig. 4.7).
Great Zimbabwe was the heart of a trading empire that extended example, Mallows (1985) claims the great enclosure was built by
internationally from AD 1100 to AD 1400. At its height, the settle- Arabs for storing slaves for shipment to India.
ment was home to at least 18,000 people (Connah 2001:223), and The ruins were shrouded in controversy not only in the colonial
gold in the vicinity was a major catalyst for long-distance trade period but also during the first years of independence. The new
and urban consolidation. The Great Zimbabwe complex is the Rhodesian government put considerable political pressure on
largest precolonial ruin south of the Egyptian pyramids. archaeologists to deny its construction by local, black people.
Cecil Rhodes, a well-known British imperialist and influential Eventually, radiocarbon testing and other archaeological evi-
colonizer who conquered large parts of Southern Africa and dence (e.g., close examination of dwellings, defensive sites, dams,
named territories such as Rhodesia (modern Zimbabwe) and and irrigation systems in addition to indications of trade, mining,
Northern Rhodesia (modern Zambia), played a devious role in and carts) enabled researchers to piece together the chronology
concealing the truth about the ruins. The complex mesmerized of activities; this construction left no doubt that the ruins were of
Rhodes, like previous European explorers who had rushed to African origin and that the inhabitants had engaged in regional
hasty judgments without a shred of evidence about the origins (within south-central Africa) and long-distance trade within a com-
of the ruins, surmising nonindigenous origins (associating them plex social system. Great Zimbabwe functioned as a capital city
with King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba). However, Rhodes whose elite was tied to an extended economy of small towns on
saw an opportunity and a challenge in the authenticity of the the Zimbabwean plateau. The settlement, in part, operated as a
site. He got involved on two levels: he established the Ancient clearinghouse: goods were imported from the Islamic world and
Ruins company to prospect the ruins for treasure, and he China (e.g., ceramics) and India (e.g., beads) for distribution to
financed a British archaeologist, Theodore Bent, to travel to the interior areas. These latter areas, in turn, exported primary prod-
region and study the site. Bent published his findings in an 1892 ucts, especially gold, via the main center. The stone buildings
book, The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland (Mashonaland is the even display evidence of considerable technological expertise in
home of the Shona peoples), and determined (conveniently for construction. According to Peter Garlake, a Zimbabwean archae-
Rhodes) that the Great Zimbabwe complex “proved” that the ologist (1973:50), the indigenous dry-stone walling tradition in
civilization was not built by local Africans. Falsification contin- Great Zimbabwe is an “architecture that is unparalleled elsewhere
ued, and subsequent archaeologists and explorers supported in Africa or beyond.”
Bent’s opinion: one archaeologist supported the nonindigenous European reaction to the discovery of Zimbabwe is just one
thesis without ever visiting the site; another curator (unqualified striking example of the generally held belief that Africans had
for his post) at the site spenttwo and half years blundering reck- played a passive part in history, occasionally influenced by Phoe-
lessly by removing 12 feet of deposition and anything else that nicians, Arabs, or other outsiders, but that they had lacked their
could be linked with the local population. Subsequent European own urban creativity. Europeans were more willing to jump to
excavators questioned the alien origins thesis, but the counter- exotic theories of the origins of Great Zimbabwe than to accept
thesis barely saw the light of day. A minority of scholarly opinion the information that the site revealed. Eventually, incontrovertible
has always supported the nonindigenous origins thesis. For evidence established that the urban settlement had emerged,
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 93

developed, and then declined, and that the urban population was region's origin, censoring guidebooks, textbooks, museum ex-
diffused throughout the region. hibitions, etc.
The historical interpretation of Great Zimbabwe became an When Southern Rhodesia eventually achieved majority rule, the
important symbol for both sides in the struggle for majority rule new government chose the name “Zimbabwe” to enshrine African
after Rhodesia declared its independence in 1965, governed pride, achievements, and cultural values. The country’s official
exclusively by whites. For black Africans, Great Zimbabwe was name became Zimbabwe on April 17, 1980, the only country
powerful evidence of an early African urban civilization, while named in honor of a past urban civilization. In 1986, the site at
for a white African minority, it became psychologically essential Great Zimbabwe was declared a World Heritage Site. Unfortu-
to detract from scenarios of Africans’ organizing and control- nately, despite its historical significance, Great Zimbabwe has re-
ling their own territories, both past and future. During the lib- ceived inadequate government funding for its preservation and
eration struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, the ruins were scientific study, and the current political crisis in the country masks
presented as a potent icon of achievement and pride for the the world’s understanding of its contribution to past urban life.
country’s inhabitants and became a rallying symbol for unity. Great Zimbabwe (like Timbuktu and other places) is a mystery
The national movement against colonial rule used the name only when viewed in isolation. When we put the urban settlement
“Zimbabwe” as a deliberate act of defiance. During white mi- into proper time and space contexts, it is evident that Africa had
nority rule, the government suppressed information on the various urban traditions before the Europeans arrived.

cities (discussed earlier), which emerged with the ex- earlier urban centers. Colonial cities used, competed
pansion of agriculture, depending on location. Second, with, and, in some cases, completed previously existing
there are cities created through contact with Islam and settlements. The colonial period also determined the
the Arab world through long-distance trade. They future trajectory of cities without regard for their his-
appear along the eastern coast and in western Sahelian tory. Colonization and urban development were inti-
Sudan. Their function as commercial and cultural links mately related. Europeans were few in number and
is clear, but we know much less about the synergy be- interested in speed and efficiency, so they used existing
tween indigenous processes of urbanization and_exter- urban centers and dramatically changed transportation
nal impulses. The third period involves the beginning and trade networks to suit their purposes. All trade
of European-directed urban development commenc- was reoriented toward port cities and tied to external
ing in the second half of the 15th century; among the interests. Colonizers created new port cities (e.g., Accra,
first was the Portuguese-directed urban model. Such Abidjan, Durban, and Port Harcourt), turned other
European influences on urbanization predate the strategic crossroads and small settlements into cities
scramble for Africa and the building of colonial territo- (Johannesburg, Brazzaville, Lusaka), and also created
ries. Interactions between the Portuguese and the new cities from scratch (Nairobi, Cotonou, and Kam-
Congolese at this time showed some complementarity. pala). They had the choice of destroying or abandoning
For example, cordial relations developed between the ancient cities or using them for their own purposes;
two powers (Congolese came to Europe and Portuguese they preferred the latter strategy whenever possible.
experts and printers went to Congo to instruct locals), Timbuktu, Jenne, and Kilwa are examples of cities that
and Lisbon’s introduction of new crops like cassava and were not deemed pivotal for empire; they declined but
corn helped a Central African capital to emerge in did not disappear from the map.
M’banza-Kongo (in present-day Angola, near the border
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo) and facili-
COLONIAL LEGACIES
tated the centralization of power in other cities of
the region. In much of Africa, Portuguese-style cities The course of Africa’s development was profoundly
developed in accordance with local conditions, with- affected by colonialism. Fach European power had its
out the political and legal dependency on Western own complex motivations for colonizing African terri-
characteristics that punctuated the colonial period. tory, but the imposed values, perceptions, and insti-
The fourth period is the colonial era, which brought tutions left an indelible imprint on the people and
about a divide but did not necessarily destroy the territories in the form of changed economic orientation,
94 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

language, education, law, urban planning, and so forth. Europeans was often paramount. Divide-and-rule strat-
Colonialism was far from a uniform process; it is better egies and policy implementation that intentionally
characterized by great heterogeneity because experi- weakened indigenous power networks and institutions
ences varied from colonial ruler to colonial ruler and were common in direct rule. Europeans manipulated
from place to place, but there were some commonali- ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences to
ties. It unfolded in complex ways as European powers their own advantage. For example, Germans and then
built their empires and faced various reactions from in- Belgians employed the same divide-and-rule strategy in
digenous peoples. Rwanda to elevate the minority Tutsi to positions of
A new elite with different value systems and beliefs power in colonial administration. The level of animos-
was implanted on African soil. A small cadre of admin- ity in Rwanda was so severe that it became a trigger to
istrators and military officers operated to extend the the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Colonial administrations
European “sphere of influence” within the colonial recruited supporting cadres of Africans as lower-level
territory. European colonial policy reflected European bureaucrats. They tried to ensure loyalty by recruiting
interests and bore no relationship to the needs of Afri- subordinate classes, such as former slave families, or by
cans. Decisions were made without any mechanism importing individuals from other regions, but they
for African participation, consequently undermining made good use of minority groups when it suited them.
and weakening traditional authority. In contrast, Britain used indirect rule. In principle,
Colonial governments believed their primary re- indirect rule was intended to prevent the destruction of
sponsibility was to maintain law and order at a mini- indigenous culture and to be more cooperative than
mum cost to the European taxpayer. The rationale was direct rule. This is not to say that its impacts were not
to extract revenue from resources and to have each as consequential as direct rule. Indirect rule incorpo-
colony (if possible) also supply the revenues to govern rated traditional authorities into the colonial adminis-
the colony. They anticipated it would take time to pro- tration, with inferior roles. Some traditional rulers held
duce wealth from the territories, which was contingent on to power in particular areas and performed day-to-
on upfront investments toward the establishment of day government duties, gaining prestige and power but
government machinery, immigration of the colonial forfeiting local autonomy. Indirect rule allowed a small
apparatus and settlers, colonial settlement extensions, number of Europeans to govern effectively a large
and other strategic apparatuses such as railways, roads, number of people over extensive territories.
and ports to facilitate the development/exploitation
of Africa’s resources. No matter how resource-rich a
colony was, the colonial government was starved of GEOGRAPHIES OF EMPIRE
funds necessary for development. Colonial govern- Colonies were increasingly incorporated into global
ments were scarcely able to provide basic infrastruc- economic and resource systems and dominated by
ture (e.g., roads and communication networks), and European metropolitan centers, far removed from the
basic social services (e.g., education, health care, and areas of production. Some plantation agriculture was
housing) were severely and strategically limited. As a introduced, though it tended to be on a much smaller
result, many colonies spent more funds on the military scale than those of Southeast Asia and Central America
and policing than on education, housing, and health and with stronger control. Crops such as cotton,
care combined. groundnuts, coffee, and tea were planted in some areas.
Colonial powers differed in how they ruled. The Mineral exploitation of copper, gold, tin, and diamonds
French, Belgians, Portuguese, and Germans imple- took place ona larger scale because of European invest-
mented direct rule. They functioned via centralized ments and use of technologies, largely driven by de-
administrations in urban centers, and their policies mands in industrial Europe. Europe's command and
emphasized assimilation. The motive of civilizing control of Africa's economies resulted in changes in
African societies so that they would be more like the orientation and direction of trade; previously,
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 95

the flow of mineral wealth was mainly via land, routes linking the hinterlands of French territories to
moving north to the trading cities of the savanna belt coastal ports at Dakar, Abidjan, Lomé, and Cotonou,
and across the Sahara, but with colonialism, it all but these were never connected. In practice, this meant
went via the ports and the sea to Europe. that many regions lay within 50 miles (80 km) ofa rail-
Colonial powers built the arteries of empire by es- way, but the railways were not used within the regions
tablishing transport and communication networks. because of their location on the “wrong side” of an in-
Africa had long-existing transport networks that in- ternational boundary. For example, eastern Ghana,
cluded coastal navigable rivers, but navigation was separated from the rest of the country by the Volta River
much more difficult in the interior (e.g., the Zambezi and Dam, would have benefited from a connection to
River had rapids and waterfalls). Dirt paths, routes the Togolese railway, but colonial partitioning made
used by nomadic people, and foot tracks, especially in sure that this would never happen. The British and
East Africa, were routine links in transportation sys- French considered building a trans-African railway. The
tems. Traditional means of transportation by portage, main proposal was a railway from the Cape to Cairo,
cart, and river were extremely slow. In contrast, Europeans largely the idea of British explorer Cecil Rhodes (Fig. 4.8).
built new larger-scale roads to speed the movement of The project commenced but was never completed. It
goods and people (especially troops), exemplified by was deemed too expensive, and colonial rivalry eventu-
the construction of frontier roads in South Africa. New ally meant the project was doomed.
roads were also built as feeder roads to railways, and at
the beginning of the 20th century, better-quality roads
for motor vehicles were built in colonial urban centers.
Roads principally served European’s interests; there
were disproportionately fewer in border regions (away
from the colonial capital), and very few actually crossed
international boundaries.
The development of railways in Africa accelerated
fragmentation of the region and at the same time con-
solidated European economic control. Constructed to
facilitate the transportation of goods from inland areas
to the coast, railways inevitably hastened the drainage
of resources, agricultural products, and human power.
Their economic effects were profound in the develop-
ment of a colonial economy: transportation costs were
reduced by “90 to 95 percent,” trading systems were
restructured, labor was released, and outlets for inland
commodity production were created (Butlin 2009:481).
Railways influenced the expansion of ports (e.g., Dar es
Salaam, Mombasa, and Dakar), while interior areas
not connected to railways declined. Railways were also
influential in the development of European settlement
and commercial agriculture in interior areas (e.g., the
Kenyan highlands, Southern Rhodesia, and southwest
South Africa).
how lng Viens eA.
Few railways cut across international frontiers in “

Africa; most do not even approach them. In French FIGURE 4.8 The Rhodes Colossus: Striding from Cape
West Africa, this resulted in a series of almost parallel Town to Cairo. Source: Punch, December 10, 1892.
96 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Demarcating colonial territories and boundaries was Leopold was vague, simply stating that the border runs
a critical feature of colonialism. According to Clapham southwards from Lake Bangweulu to its junction with
(1996:31), “The previously fuzzy borderlands between the watershed separating the Congo and Zambezi
indigenous centers of government, together with the rivers, following this line for 500 miles ‘til it reached
large areas which possessed no formalized govern- the Portuguese frontier.
ment structures at all, were replaced [at least on the International borders even bisected villages in par-
map, though only much later and with more uncer- ticularcases. Forexample, Jassini, avillageontheTanzania—
tainty on the ground] by precisely demarcated fron- Kenya border, suffered because of neglect due to colo-
tiers of the sort that European concepts of statehood nially imposed lines partitioning the village between
deemed necessary.” two colonial entities. An Anglo-German treaty of 1900
Colonial boundary making was dubious and un- demarcated the official international boundary via
scientific. Nugent (1996:41-42) records that 44% of mangrove poles, anthills, and baobabs. Jassini’s loca-
African political boundaries were drawn according to tion around the mangrove swamps and shifting water-
astronomical lines (meridian parallels), 30% were courses of the tidal estuary on which the village is
mathematical lines (arcs and curves), and only 265 situated illustrates.the problems of drawing African
were related to geographical features. One obvious national boundaries from desks in Europe and of ar-
paradox was that Africans’ local knowledge was infi- ranging space to adhere to a line on a map. None of
nitely more detailed than Europeans’ knowledge, yet the original markers survived the course of time.
Europeans were infatuated with their sense of purpose, Efforts at nation-state building in the independence
which propelled them to draw lines without second- period also sought to erase the past. For example, the
guessing their legitimacy. It is a myth that the Berlin government of Tanzania after 1975 withheld services
conference settled the boundaries once and for all. to Jassini and actively discouraged people from living
Some efforts at readjustment took place, and various there, instructing the villagers to relocate some miles
boundary commissions worked to adjust lines in some away, where services would be provided. They re-
instances to include known chiefdoms’ boundaries. fused and have since been left to their own devices.
For instance, the boundary between Nigeria and cur- Jassini to this day does not appear on any Tanzanian
rent Niger was redrawn three times, the last effort or Google map.
making use of local trade routes in the precolonial Colonial partition resulted in Africa becoming the
period. most divided continent on Earth. It was Africa’s mis-
The work of boundary commissions varied enor- fortune not only to be plundered by Europe but also
mously. Lamb (2000:11) presents a glimpse into a bound- to have been colonized at a time when the concept of
ary commission in Northern Rhodesia tasked with the nation-state was firmly entrenched as the deter-
boundary resolution pertaining to an early agreement mining» principle in territorial organization. As
between Britain and King Leopold of Belgium: Reader (1998:574) emphasizes, “Africa south of the
Sahara contains 48 states, more than three times the
The Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission has been some-
thing of a disappointment, too, though [Gore-Brown, a number of states in Asia (whose land surface is
member of the commission] has reveled in the out- almost 50% larger) and nearly four times that of South
doors life and the hunting. It was all far too bureau- America.” The sum of Africa’s boundaries is more than
cratic and tied up with the petty egos of the other 28,600 miles (46,000 km), compared to 26,100 miles
officers. Within three months Captain Everett, the (42,000 km) in Asia (Reader 1998:574). Not surprisingly,
second in command, was eaten by a lion, a most ill- most African states have more than one neighbor—
omened start. Major Gilliam, who headed the com- 20 possess four or more—and the Congo has the most
mission, spent most of his time in a haze of whiskey international borders, surrounded by nine states (making
and kept issuing and rescinding orders. . . . The work it seem more than a coincidence that it is afflicted by
marking out the border has been damnably slow. The internal strife and neighboring interference). One of
1894 agreement between Britain and Belgium's King the severe criticisms of the Berlin conference is that the
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 97

resulting boundaries divided cultural areas and tribes. fewer continuities. Colonization was a crucial turning
One calculation is that “103 international boundaries point as urbanization was implanted over wider areas
in Africa cut through a total of 131 cultural areas, some from the late 19th century onward. Prior to Europeans’
of which are partitioned by more than one boundary” arrival, the region was not highly urbanized and re-
(Griffiths 1996:74, 81; cited in Butlin 2009:342). mained rural in orientation. Urbanization existed in
Boundaries are frequently ignored by people circulat- pockets, and cities were only moderately integrated
ing within a cultural area and by nomadic peoples. into regional urban systems and, in fewer cases, articu-
Some borders are not clearly marked, so leaky state lated into systems beyond the continent.
borders are common, and all sorts of cross-border Whenever possible, colonial powers modified exist-
transactions take place (e.g., migration, smuggling, ing settlements because Europeans were few in number
and legal trade). and colonizers were motivated by speed and efficiency.
There are many examples where artificial boundar- The selection of new sites for colonial headquarters—in
ies severed established trading relationships and other words, the implementation of urban develop-
ripped apart communities. The boundary between ment from scratch—was much less common than is
Senegal and Gambia is a case in point. The Gambia, supposed, although examples do exist (e.g., Lusaka,
311 miles (500 km) long and only 12.4 miles (20 km) Pretoria, Nairobi, and, to a lesser extent, Accra) (See
wide in places, sits astride the navigable section of the Figure 4.10). As can be expected, colonial-orchestrated
Gambia River, which is a wormlike intrusion into the urban development negatively affected some interior
state of Senegal. Apart from some small sections, the towns and urban settlements. For example, settlements
boundary is entirely geometrical, consisting of arcs formerly dependent on caravan routes could not oper-
and straight lines that in some cases run directly ate within the context of colonial borders and with-
through villages, severing trade routes and dividing ered (e.g., Timbuktu, Jenne). Colonial capitals, many
populations between French- and English-speaking of which were ports, experienced the most dramatic
administrations. At the same time, the Gambia River is expansion as transport networks for the shipment of
one of the easiest and most extensively navigable rivers minerals; agricultural exports became focused on the
in Africa. The international boundary has prevented capitals; and imports into colonial territories were cir-
the river from being developed as the principal artery culated via the same networks. In most cases in Africa,
of trade for Senegal, landlocked Mali, and the Gambia. port cities became the colonial capital as well as the
Instead, French colonial authorities used the inferior economic and population center for the entire terri-
Senegal River as a means to access their inland territo- tory. Exceptions existed in landlocked African coun-
ries in Senegal, the Gambia, and Mali, resulting in the tries (Bamako, (Mali), Ouagadougou, (Burkina Faso),
inability of all three states to access and use the river to and N’Djamena, (Chad)) and in some places in East
the same degree; thus, each state pursued an indepen- Africa (Kampala and Nairobi) where the capital was
dent and uncoordinated economic strategy. The in the interior.
Gambia is the most artificial state in Africa, an English- Although most colonial urban planning was
speaking country within a French-speaking subregion grafted onto older settlements, its schemes overturned
of West Africa. indigenous spatial and physical arrangements. Formal
planning efforts concentrated in the central part of old
towns and in new elite residential areas. Europeans
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING took over the most desirable land: the strategic arteries
THE COLONIAL CITY of the city, the beaches and breezy hilltops, and so
African urban development had deep roots, and ur- forth. Whenever more land was needed, colonial au-
banism had flourished in particular places at particular thorities enacted laws (e.g., zoning ordinances and/or
times, while in certain areas it had disappeared before powers of eminent domain) and rezoned and usurped
the Europeans arrived. Early African urbanism experi- land. The function of colonial headquarters was po-
enced considerable discontinuities—and, it seems, litical, administrative, and commercial, and the built
98 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 4.4 THE BUNGALOW EUROPEAN BUNGALOWS.

SAPELE.
Another colonial legacy was the pro- SCALE 40FT TO 1 INCH
motion of alien architectural design,
which changed housing preferences. In
VERANDAH
Africa the colonists, as newcomers, did BED | BED | BED
not consider adopting the dwellings ROOM |ROOM |ROOM

and settlement form of the indigenous VERANDAH

Trellis i i Trellis BILLIARD DINING
peoples; instead they opted for a rad- ROOM ROOM

ical change in the imported housing

style of the bungalow. The bungalow
(C.3) EUROPEAN BUNGALOW, SAPELE.
(known as the “banggolo”) originated ABOUT THREE YEARS OLD, ONE OF THE FIRST TYPE OF PERMANENT BRICK HOUSES.
THE SIDE VERANDAHS HAVE BEEN ADDED LATER - THE ENDS OF THE HOUSES BEING
from 17th-century India and was used WITHOUT PROTECTION RENDERED SOME ROOMS ALMOST UNINHABITABLE AS CERTAIN
to define a peasant’s rural hut in HOURS OF THE DAY. THE VERANDAHS ARE OF THE CORRECT OPEN TYPE BUT THE
ROOMS ARE TOO SMALL; IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO HAVE HAD LARGER
Bengal, made out of mud, thatch, and ROOMS ARE TO HAVE REDUCED THE SIZE OF THE VERANDAHS PROPORTIONATELY
HAD THE BASEMENT BEEN RAISED 3 FT MORE THE ACCOMMODATION WOULD
bamboo. The model was transferred HAVE BEEN DOUBLED FOR ALMOST THE SAME SUM OF MONEY. THE BASEMENT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN EITHER LOWER OR HIGHER TO GIVE MORE SPACE;
from India to Britain in the second half EVEN AS IT IS BASEMENT PROVIDES FOR BOX AND STORE ROOMS.
of the 19th century, and the bungalow
was developed in new ways for other
regions of the world. A well-known
manual of that time, John Murray's
1895 How to Live in Tropical Africa, de-
scribed how the bungalow was the
best house for tropical Africa (King
1995:199-200). The popularity of the
bungalow since its introduction into
Africa has been remarkable: this hous-
ing model is now a dramatic and per-
C.4.
sistent element in urban Africa (and is
now visible in rural Africa). EUROPEAN BUNGALOWS.
The British modified the standard WARRI, 1906.
design for Africa by raising the struc- [I

ture off the ground for greater dry- sath |VERANDAH

room room

ness, ventilation, and freedom from RESTING

OR SITTING
BED SOM OPEN
dust and invasion of insects (Fig. 4.9). ROOM
(C.4) EUROPEAN BUNGALOW, WARAI.
In contrast, the Dutch, Spanish, and DINING HAD IT BEEN POSSIBLE TO BUILD THESE HOUSES FOR £500 EACH
ROOM THEY WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY SATISFACTORY BUT THE COST
Portuguese built brick and more solid HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY MORE, THEY ARE OF BRICK BUT
OF VERY LIGHT CONSTRUCTION, THEY PROVIDE COMFORTABLE
structures firmly on the ground. Some VERANDAH QUARTERS, BUT HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE OF BEING ALMOST
ON THE GROUND AND ARE NOT SUTABLE FOR FLAT AND DAMP.
prefabricated houses were even ex- PLAN. PLACES. THE ACTUAL COST HAS BEEN ABOUT £750 IN LIEU OF £500.
ported from Liverpool to British 40 FT x 1 INCH.

Africa. The dwelling unit was a tech-

nological device: a form of shelter for
British colonial officials to provide
protection against malaria and shelter
from the tropical heat. At the turn of
the 19th century, the bungalow design
involved new material, science, and
technology developed in industrial
Britain. Building bungalows was ex- SCALE 20FT TO 1 INCH
pensive, ranging from £1,000 to
£2000. For instance, in Lagos, the unit ESTIMATED COST £500. HEIGHT TO EAVES 7 FT
belonging to the general manager of
the railways cost £1,500 and that of FIGURE 4.9 The Bungalow Transferred: Official Colonial Housing in West
the principal medical officer cost £1,775. Africa. Source: King, 1995:211.
Adoption of foreign building design
and the dependence on imported
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 99

construction technologies resulted in the high costs of units; in higher-density dwellings. Thus, the social and spatial organization
bungalows were beyond the means of most of the population. of building design based on multifamily, tribal structures and on reli-
The bungalow design served European ideas of low-density gious and indigenous political life was cast aside.
living and privacy in which domestic activities such as eating, The bungalow is a good example of how foreign design and
sleeping, and bathing occurred within the house and out of sight building aesthetics were imposed onto Africa, and it has social,
of indigenous inhabitants. The official residing in a bungalow was political, and economic ramifications. It was a “tool of Empire”
typically a single person or a nuclear family (with servants), isolated (like quinine, the railway, and the Enfield rifle), accommodating
from their home community (some thousands of miles away) but colonial officials who exercised direct control over expanded
socially distant from surrounding populations. Bungalows were dif- territorial economies. Its emergence as a sphere of (European)
fused across colonial economies in the late 19th century. In the knowledge marks the expansion of Europe into a region where
1880s and 1890s, growing number of merchants, missionaries, Europeans had not previously lived. The bungalow is a marker of
doctors, engineers, and government officials came to West and the physical and spatial process of urbanization that incorpo-
East Africa, and bungalows were built to serve officials’ needs. rated modern Africa into a capitalist world economy. Bungalow
Africans, too, adopted bungalow living in time. The bungalow construction relied on imported concrete and materials and was
preference gained momentum among Africans in the 20th and espe- highly differentiated from traditional forms of shelter built with
cially the 21st century. Many Africans switched their living arrange- local materials. Housing construction practices during the colo-
ments from residing as extended families, farming on family-held nial period became insensitive to local resources, and the prac-
land, and living in compound dwellings of grass or mud to modern tice has endured. It is obvious that the proliferation of bungalows
urban living as nuclear families, working for wages, and residing in has contributed greatly to sprawl throughout the region, and it
single-family bungalows built with concrete materials. This is in sharp is no coincidence that housing remains one of the most pressing
contrast to traditional chiefs and families, all part of a collective, living problems in Africa.

environment was organized spatially to allow the colo- clerks, police sergeants, and foremen, prospering
nial city to fulfill these roles. In other cases, such as the from these positions as the “African face” of the new
mineral areas of the copper belt in Zambia and the colonial order.
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the function of Colonial administrations operated, for the most
urban settlement was different, oriented toward housing part, on a shoestring budget, which limited the develop-
and providing services for the mining industry rather ment of basic public infrastructure; the vast majority of
than for colonial administration. Colonial cities never urban funds was earmarked for the European city.
fully realized a holistic objective; economic control was Racial spatial segregation policies allowed colonial au-
limited to pockets within colonial territories (no doubt thorities to target European districts for the provision
the more lucrative), and administrative and political of limited supplies of scarce infrastructural services
control ebbed and flowed and was undermined by (e.g., electricity, tarred streets, pipe-borne water, and
the indigenous people. Furthermore, neither the de- police patrols). Therefore, “the good life” was concen-
velopment of markets nor the conscious programs of trated and overlooked the indigenous population.
social, political, and physical transformation suc- The colonial push toward urbanization did not to-
ceeded in propelling the urban centers into a truly tally transform bonds between urban Africans and
capitalist world economy. On balance, colonial plan- their rural home areas. It was quite a stretch for plan-
ning produced uneven, patchwork outcomes, and co- ners to assume that planned urban space and planned
lonial cities were fragmented places. In time, these neighborhoods could break traditional tribal and kin-
fragmented colonial epicenters became new indige- ship bonds. Many acts of resistance took subtle
nous urban centers and brought forth the shift from a forms—everyday expressions of African identity super-
rural to an urban African orientation. Indeed, as the seding the colonial enterprise rather than submitting
years passed, a new African leadership emerged in to the colonial city; for example, speaking indigenous
cities, where the most opportunities presented them- languages or acting within ethnic, extended family,
selves for African social mobility, albeit limited to a and religious memberships. Cultural opposition was
small group of educated African elites. From the early manifested by individuals’ holding on to spiritual be-
days of colonialism, Africans became interpreters, liefs and also found expression in poetry, songs, and
100 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Algiers
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Funchal Oo

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Khartoum
(e)Ouagadougo

Addis Ababa
Bangui
°e é Yaounde
x< ce)
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fo}
7) s Mogadishu
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fe) Libreville
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Oa Dzaoudzi
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Port Louis
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1500 km
3 New capitals [ees
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FIGURE 4.10 Colonial Cities. Adapted from Binns, Dixon and Nel 2012:149.

storytelling. More salient forms of opposition involved sparked the Soweto Uprising of 1976 in South Africa).
organizing outside spheres of European control. There Earlier resistance was suppressed heavy-handedly by
were acts of open defiance, such as nonviolent protests the colonial authorities; for example, the Maji Maji
(e.g., opposition to the imposition of the Afrikaans Rebellion in German East Africa (Tanzania) in 1905,
language in education led to demonstrations and in which the locals opposed labor and tax laws, was put
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 101

down by the Germans (the indigenous people sprin- There was an absence of critical reflection on the
kled their bodies with holy water—maji in the Swahili part of the planners, who understood their mission as
language—to protect their bodies against bullets). Re- a constituent part of a larger project to realize the goals
sistance also found expression in revolts against colo- of the colonial enterprise. Physical planning was
nially imposed chiefs and colonial collaborators. One viewed as an exportable commodity: town planners,
example is the Igbo women’s revolt in 1929 in south- town planning legislation, building design, and the
eastern Nigeria: it was an entirely rural women’s rebel- European experience of new towns were cut and pasted
lion against an impending tax that threatened their into a different landscapes without much deliberation
livelihoods. Rather than rebel directly against the Euro- and even less reflection. Colonial planners did not
peans, they directed their opposition against Warrant work in isolation or for themselves; ideas about the
Chief Okugo (a warrant chiefis a recognized chief who planning of urban form and function moved within
served as tax collector for the British). and between imperial networks. Urban planning was
Overall, there was not a unified path of African re- not just a tool to impose order and juxtapose land-use
sistance (in ethnic, class, gender, age, or other ways) activities; it was used for social control and to ensure
against the colonial administration. Colonial opposi- that the colonial headquarters city was the focal point
tion was expressed most often in subtle forms as African in colonial Africa (See Figure 4.11). Elsewhere, particu-
individuals and groups sought to remove themselves larly in the interior and in areas where there was no
from the colonial sphere of influence rather than to previous urban settlement, Europeans established
challenge it. Acting in this way, Africans resisted the co- cities for the first time. Cities became the vehicle for
lonial order and undermined European authority. the colonization enterprise.
Colonialism brought profound socioeconomic
changes in African society. In many ways, the European
elite and their African cadre were cultural pioneers. For
example, colonialism was based on assumptions that
the state should both promote development and pro-
vide particular services such as education, agricultural
instruction, and some housing. According to Gann and
Duignan (1978:347). “the very notion of the state op- Rural and
Semi-Rural
erating as a territorial entity independent of ethnic or Area
kinship ties, operating through impersonal rules, was
one of the most revolutionary concepts bequeathed by
colonialism to post-colonial precedent. . . . All of them Cricket Field
have taken over, in some way or form or other, both the
boundaries and the administrative institutions of their Industrial’
Area x
erstwhile Western lords.” Colonialism also diffused
different cultural values such as dress. Myers (2003:165) Golf Course
shows how dress was used to inculcate ordinary urban
Race Course
Africans: colonial residents of Zanzibar, were told by
the British to dress like gentlemen, keep their hair cut,
wear a sports coat, and press their trousers. They were
made to feel dirty because they did not have good
GULF OF GUINEA
clothes. For a small African elite, colonial rule provided overt

new opportunities (particularly for Western-educated

natives), and they became indispensable to European FIGURE 4.11 Colonial Accra. Source: Grant and Nijman
tule and influence. 2002:325.
102 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Throughout colonial headquarters cities, the built in import-export trade and construction, and they played
environment was socially and spatially organized an important intermediary role in the colonial enterprise.
around a number of key zones: (1) a European town Many Europeans went to Africa on a temporary basis
that functioned as a central business district (CBD) for as administrators, engineers, missionaries, health and
the colonial headquarters of European companies as educational specialists, and workers for infrastructural
well as a warehouse center for storing and transshipping projects and in due course returned to their countries of
commodities; (2) an administrative center that contained origin. The French, Germans, and Italians were less suc-
the key buildings and institutions of colonialism with cessful than the British in encouraging the movement of
army barracks or cantonment, the police, hospital, jails, people from the metropolis to the colony. Non-British
etc., in close proximity; (3) upscale planned European colonies had very thin European populations in many
residential areas (on higher elevations whenever possi- territories: Equatorial Guinea (French) had a population
ble for security, climatic, and psychological reasons) for of 3.19 million in 1931, and only about 4,657 were
colonial administrators, consisting of bungalows and rec- Europeans (Butlin 2009:157). Togoland (German) hada
reational spaces that were well serviced (sanitation, water, population of 1.03 million in 1914, and the white popu-
and road systems); (4) a native town for African workers, lation numbered a mere 368 persons (Butlin 2009:160).
who were wedged into dense, mixed low-cost dwellings In French colonies, there tended to be greater mixtures of
and indigenous commercial zones without planning, ser- other Europeans: Italians, Spaniards, and Maltese, all of
vices, Or amenities; and (5) an agricultural hinterland whom jostled each other for status, with the French elite
where food could be grown to feed expanding urban looking down on all of them. In addition, the white pop-
populations. There were large differences in population ulation was heavily stratified by occupation. Although
densities between the areas of the colonial elite and the the whites were primarily in control, colonial cities in
areas of the indigenous population, influencing lifestyle Africa were far from “white” cities.
and quality of life (Fig. 4.11). Indeed, expatriate life in The colonial city became a quintessential expression
many African cities today still reflects the colonial order- of white power. Company headquarters, banks, adminis-
ing of physical and social space, although new elements tration structures, military organization, and, of course,
(shopping malls and supermarkets) have been added to jobs were centered in the city. Large numbers of workers
the landscape of privilege (Smiley 2010). were drawn into cities to serve the colonial enterprise,
The European population was concentrated in co- while the responsibility of reproduction was left to the
lonial cities, but not to the degree one might imagine countryside. Urban life acquired specific features that dis-
based on most accounts. For example, in Nairobi (the tinguished it from rural; life—military parades, art,
capital of a settlement colony), only 7.5% of the total modern celebrations—but this is not to imply that indig-
population in 1933 were Europeans, which amounted enous traditions disappeared: they took place out of co-
to about half of the European population in Kenya at lonial sight in different parts of the city.
that time. There is a common notion that the cities African communities had a life rich in association:
were primarily “white,” but this is misleading. Even in participation in social activities such as funeral
a settler colony such as South Africa (an exception groups, hometown groups, drinking clubs, and drum-
rather than the rule in Africa), people from Europe ming groups was common. Despite attempts at rigid
never constituted more than 20% of the population segregation and occupational stratification, different
(Butlin 2009:141). Natives, for the most part, greatly cultures came into contact. Migrants refashioned the
outnumbered Europeans and the more modest num- urban environment more quickly than the white
bers of international immigrants from Asia (mainly population cared to acknowledge. For example, mi-
Indians and Chinese) and from the Middle East gration proceeded despite colonial governments’ at-
(mainly Syrians and Lebanese and very small numbers tempts to restrict labor to what they needed and could
of Jews). Asian and Middle Eastern groups occupied a control. The flows into cities meant that Africans, out
middle rung in the occupational ladder. Many engaged of necessity, opted for their own patterns of settlement
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 103

and irregular employment. Even in well-laid-out cities. They played a vital role in impressing on the na-
native residential locations, Africans paid no heed to tives that colonial authorities controlled abundant re-
municipal building codes. Typically, dwelling struc- sources that could be tapped for colonial government
tures exceeded the maximum as a ratio to plot sizes objectives. Therefore, the size, scale, and order of
because builders were motivated to enlarge dwellings structures within these areas cannot be divorced from
and to increase the numbers of rooms that could be the discourses of domination and intimidation. The
used for subletting arrangements, a further violation built environment epitomized a domineering and in-
of building codes. violable image of the imperial power and visibly em-
Urban life in colonial cities entailed more blend- bodied Western concepts of aesthetics and order. The
ing and melting of cultures than is typically recognized, environment signaled Europe’s extensive power and
and cultural crystallization clearly took place. Colonial ability to rule without a distance constraint, compared
cites were, however, “colonized spaces” above all else, to African political power, which was territorially re-
wide open to modernization influences from Europe stricted as well as spatially confined and centered on
and dominating Western values, but European urban the villages.
ways of life underwent transformation in the process. Urban living resulted in changes in economic ac-
In colonial cities, people combined the old and the tivities and occupation, and in the way people lived.
new, integrating their heritage with the present as indi- The city was not merely the incubator of new values
viduals adapted to different urban environments and and ideas, but it also became a vector for transmitting
cities in the making. Beneath the surface, colonial cities to the villages external values and ideas as well as new
were far more complex arenas than simply European urban African ways of doing and being. As urban cen-
or white outposts in Africa. Instead of understanding ters grew, they disrupted surrounding regions and often
African colonial cities as adaptations to the Western contributed to their reorganization. The colonial head-
urban model, it is more appropriate to appreciate them quarters city was also instrumental in the organization
as examples of synthesis and creativity. of an urban hierarchy that greatly extended the reach of
Administrators used urban designs and the policy colonialism.
apparatus to make colonialism more attractive to Despite differences in emphases on town plan-
Europeans and more tolerable for the colonized peo- ning and social control (the British adhered to racial
ples. The spatial order (gridiron street systems com- segregation and the French to cultural and socioeco-
bined with racial segregation, neighborhoods, etc.) nomic division), the outcome was segregated urban
and the architectural form of public buildings were space (Njoh 2007). Efforts were made to segregate Af-
reminiscent of Europe. European architectural forms ricans by ethnic and religious origin, allegedly to
were adapted to meet the climatic and resource con- reduce conflict. Africans’ living and working spaces
straints of colonial regions. Colonial officials sup- were placed in separate parts of the city. African mi-
ported the urban design of cities with policies that grants were essential to the working of the colonial
could dampen any possibilities of social unrest and city and economy but were denied any claim of citi-
this elevated the instruments of their authority, over zenship; instead, they were regarded as impermanent
and above the level of authority that existed in urban urban dwellers. Segregation was often justified on the
Europe, to deliver the colonial enterprise. basis of security and public health, but an underlying
Obviously, the colonial city symbolized much motivation was racial division and containment. Poor
more than the built physical environment. A crucial Africans lived in precarious circumstances: low-income
aspect was the social complex and social structure of African neighborhoods could be flattened when it was
the city and the colony. The colonial administrative convenient. For instance, the early years of planning
center, the European town, and the European elite resi- Nairobi were marked by demolition episodes and
dential neighborhoods signaled power and control in destruction of impoverished settlements. Demolition
grander ways than anything similar in earlier African was often said to be justified based on public health
104 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

concerns, and this type of justification was used to ex- of Overseas Development suggested the retention of a
plain the removal of black Africans from inner-city small iron bridge that had been erected by Lord Lugard,
Johannesburg and their forced relocation to the the previous colonial governor, for sentimental as op-
South-West Townships (Soweto) on the outskirts of posed to practical reasons (King 1995:56).
the city. Cultural conflicts were part of the tensions en- Town planning expertise was increasingly trans-
demic in the character of colonial towns. Europeans planted to Africa. Town planning as a university disci-
adopted attitudes of superiority and almost contempt pline and profession emerged during the early years of
for local cultures. In colonial Brazzaville, the French the 20th century, and garden city ideas were incorpo-
administration went out of its way to impose cultural rated into aspects of African town planning. The sphere
restrictions on the local population: of influence of the English Town and Country Planning
Act of 1932, developed in the West Indies, was extended
the administration did issue a draconian decree which to Africa. For example, Uganda adopted the entire act in
imposed restrictions on drumming, affecting not only
1948. An urban planning apparatus with the locus of
recreational dancing but also funeral rights and the cel-
power outside of Africa emerged: external professional
ebration for the end of mourning known as matanga.
agents (appointed by the colonies) were sent, legislation
Not only was “drumming and noisy dancing” limited
was transplanted, professional publications on planning
in time and space, that is to hours prescribed by the
in tropical environments emerged, and reliance on the
administration and on the outskirts of the town, but
Africans had to give advance notice and pay a fee which
expertise of external consultants became routine. The
was particularly resented, since it was set at a rate that predominance of international networks of communi-
was difficult for workers to meet. (Martin 1995:37) cation and expertise was so extensive as to make local
channels unimportant, and it set a precedent that has
In South Africa, the apartheid laws were an extreme been hard to break. Colonial students studying, return-
form of control. For example, laws criminalized inter- ing, and reinforcing European practices subsequently
racial marriages and interracial sexual intercourse, and encouraged this kind of thinking. It was further strength-
restricted access to facilities such as beaches, toilets, and ened by international organizations and professional
all entertainment venues for the black population. entities communicating expert planning knowledge to
An obsessive concern with “health” (a sort of sanita- the colonies and then to the former colonies. For exam-
tion syndrome) was another underlying consideration ple, the United Nations Human Settlement Programme
in colonial planning. The creation of “healthy” environ- (UN-HABITAT), UNESCO, and the World Health Orga-
ments was defined in accordance with the cultural crite- nization (WHO) are among the prominent expert orga-
tia of European powers with no appreciation of nizations that African governments engage today. The
indigenous definitions of health and the means to assumption that urban planning expertise has to lie out-
achieve health. Culture- and class-specific perceptions side of Africa and be imported has been challenged only
of health hazards were more instrumental than an in recent years.
actual assessment of health risks in determining a spe-
cific health tilt in colonial urban planning policy. In the CONCLUSIONS

interests of health and the new economic and social The promotion of colonial cities as centers of economic,
order, new environments were created (King 1995:35)— administrative, and political power had profound impli-
“rows of minimal ‘detached’ housing units, surrounded cations for African society. The implantation of a colo-
by ‘light air’ open space, gardens, and recreational areas nial urban model in the region intensified urbanization
in total disregard of the religious, social, symbolic and processes that eventually led to society being anchored
political meaning of the built environments.” to urban centers in each African state. The gateway func-
Planning went ever further in terms of the criteria tion of the colonial city was paramount: these cities
for preservation. Buildings of colonial architecture and served as conduits for the export of African rural, raw
history were to be preserved while the remnants of in- materials to Europe and as sites of import and dissemi-
digenous culture were allowed to disappear. For instance, nation of European manufactured goods and European
in planning Kaduna in northern Nigeria, the Ministry ways of life that were heavily privileged above traditional
 The “Scramble for Africa” and the State of European Geographical Knowledge on the Region 105

and rural ways of life. African rural life and rural areas European economic and cultural values were dis-
were oflittle interest to the Europeans except as sources seminated from colonial cities outward into the region.
of raw material and labor reserves. European influence extended well beyond planning
An enduring legacy of the colonial era was that the and organizing the built environment, and was mani-
mode of integration into the world economy was estab- fested in colonial cultural life in terms of sports, the
lished. African economies concentrated on exporting arts, and, in particular, eating habits and dress. Educa-
minerals and agricultural primary commodities rather tion became a crucial mechanism for inculcating in
than focusing on production for domestic consumption. Africans Western practices of modern work: work
Extreme specialization took place in many colonial terri- revolved around regularity, discipline, and hierarchical
tories. There are examples of resource economies where structures based on work specialization and the organi-
one commodity dominates domestic production and ex- zation of time and energy around work routines.
ports (for example, coffee in Rwanda and Burundi); in According to Cooper (1980:70), education prepared
most countries, three commodities or fewer account for workers for “internalizing cultural values and behavior
most production and export activity (e.g., cocoa, coffee, patterns that would define their role in the economy
timber in Cote d'Ivoire; tea and coffee in Kenya; copper and society.” When Africans did not obey Western regi-
and cobalt in Democratic Republic of Congo; cocoa and mented time, their behavior was chastised as “Africa
gold in Ghana). In most cases, colonial powers relied on time.” There were other more obvious ways that Afri-
African small-scale farmers to produce crops that were can urbanites engaged in Western modernization, such
sold to state marketing boards and then exported. There as housing preferences (e.g., bungalows) and food con-
are cases where colonial powers forced Africans into sumption. Consumption patterns changed at first be-
export agricultural production. For instance, in Gabon, cause they were encouraged and convenient, but over
the French coerced indigenous Gabonese to shift from time, taste preferences were altered. In due course, mi-
staple food crops to export crops such as coffee or cocoa, grant laborers helped introduce these and other prod-
and/or to harvest timber for export in order to pay colo- ucts (e.g., consumer durables) into their rural home
nial taxes. This meant that African farmers began to pur- villages.
chase a larger proportion of their food supplies, many of The colonial conquest of the late 19th century ended
which were traded in urban centers. Africa's relative isolation, and the slow pace of indige-
Even though colonial cities grew and expanded, nous urban development strongly influenced the rise and
continuities and links with rural life remained, and fall of African societies that had prevailed for centuries.
rural affairs continued to have an impact on urban life, Colonialism increased the tempo and the spread of ur-
particularly in migrant and indigenous areas. In parts of banization in Africa and rapidly dragged Africans into the
the colonial city, idealized European norms were incor- 20th century, sometimes brutally. Not every European
porated into the built environment. Spatial planning idea was flawed, and not everything the Europeans
became a vehicle for organizing urban functions, and brought was bad. Medicine, water, urban drainage sys-
European concepts of aesthetics, order, and so forth tems, education, and new methods of agriculture made
were introduced. On the one hand, a small African edu- positive contributions to societies. Furthermore, intra-
cated urban elite helped reinforce the colonial city proj- African warfare was suppressed and internal slave trading
ect. These Africans aspired to “modern” urban living was Officially abolished. In Africa, the number of children
and participated in urban lifestyles. Their urban social attending school grew faster than did school enrollments
mobility was contingent on educational, occupational, in Europe during colonialism’s boom years. Urban plan-
and European-language achievement. On the other ning and political and economic ideas were more contro-
hand, the vast majority of urbanites were excluded from versial but had the potential to be used for good or for
participation in European urban life, especially the bad, but mostly they served the privileged.
“sood life”; their urban existence revolved around low- Ultimately, colonialism was imposed upon Africans,
status labor without urban citizenship. Rural Africans peoples who had long and vigorous historical experi-
were confined to serving as peasants in the hinterlands, ences with their own societal and territorial organiza-
growing crops for export. tion. Europeans largely justified colonialism on the
106 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

basis that Africans were a people without history and Cooper, F. 1980. From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation
incapable of indigenous development. Colonialism Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya,
forged patron-Client relationships where handpicked 1890-1925. New York: Yale University Press.
African elites became clients of colonial and overseas Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. 2005. The History of African
states (and they benefited accordingly). The political Cities South of the Sahara. Translated by Mary Baker.
organization of African colonies had a total disregard Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener.
for the political and territorial organizations that had Davidson, B. 1992. The Black Man's Burden. Africa and
existed prior. From the outset, European ideas were the Curse of the Nation-State. New York: Times Books.
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lonial cities within externally determined entities (i.e., content&task=view&id=169&ltemid=165 (accessed
colonial territories) ruled the day, and subsequently January 28, 2012).
Africa was divided into far more countries than would Fabian, J. 2000. Out of Our Minds: Reason and Madness
naturally occur with smaller and, as it turns out, more in the Exploration of Central Africa. Berkeley: Univer-
ethnically diverse populations, on average, than any sity of California Press.
other world region. These two colonial influences of Freund, B. 2007. The African City: A History. New York:
small populations and ethnic diversity would have Cambridge University Press.
major impacts on the way that states, cities, and rural Gann, L., and P. Duignan. 1978. The Rulers of British Africa,
areas experienced development. 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Garlake, P. 1973. Great Zimbabwe. London: Thames
and Hudson.
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Connah, G. 2001. African Civilizations: An Archaeological Myers, G. 2003. Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and
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RURAL AFRICA

INTRODUCTION
rural development initiatives. Broadly defined, the dif-
Most Africans still live in rural areas, despite recent ac- ferent types of agriculture consist of large-scale com-
celerated urbanization trends. Most remain either mercial activities, smaller-scale commercial activities,
physically located in or dependent on rural environ- and subsistence activities. Across Africa, most are small-
ments (Binns, Dixon, and Nel 2012). In 2011, 60% of holder subsistence farmers, engaged in agriculture in
the population (some 632 million people) lived in regions characterized by underdevelopment with poor
tural areas (United Nations [UN] 2012). While the infrastructure and services. Smallholders and their fam-
urban transition is well under way, not until some time ilies are highly vulnerable populations with very high
after 2030 will urbanization be fully representative of incidences of poverty, especially among children and
modern Africa. women.
Rural Africa is largely characterized by underdevel- Rural Africa is in a nascent state of deep transfor-
opment and widespread persistent poverty, and the mation. This chapter focuses on three major topics of
latter is deepening in many instances. The expansive- rural development, the outcomes of which will deeply
ness and isolation of many rural areas, colonial ne- affect the kind of rural transformation that will take
glect, failure of national rural development strategies, place. First, there is the debate about the push for an
infrastructure deficiencies, projected rural population African green revolution (GR) and the role of geneti-
growth, and the widening urban-rural development cally modified (GM) crops to increase agricultural pro-
gap—combined with complex ethnic, poverty, and cli- ductivity, enhance food security, and bolster rural
mate contexts—all magnify contemporary rural devel- livelihoods or whether such an experiment is mis-
opment challenges (Binns, Dixon, and Nel 2012). guided. Second, there is the contentious debate over the
Agriculture is the backbone of Africa’s rural econ- multifaceted development initiative of the Millennium
omy. Employing 60% to 70% of the population and Villages Project (MVP; see Box 5.1) and whether spend-
accounting for 15% of Africa’s gross domestic product ing on a set of interventions (to reach Millennium De-
(McKinsey 2010), agriculture encompasses crops, live- velopment Goals [MDG] targets) has resulted in measurable
stock, and fisheries. It continues to be central to na- successes or whether the funding could be better spent
tional development despite massive flight from the on alternative emphases. The third major topic is the
countryside and the failure of rural development poli- identification of neglected development foci in rural
cies to stem this migration. In the 21st century, most Africa such as (1) the gender gap, which brings into
experts target agricultural transformation as the core of focus female farmers (as opposed to male farmers) and

109
110 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

adolescent girls (as opposed to contemporary empha- and underscoring that indigenous knowledge and prac-
ses on children and adults) and (2) diversified rural tices were unrecognized and misunderstood by modernist
livelihoods (rural “informals” [i.e those earning a proponents. Indeed, in many instances, small-scale farm-
living from informal economic activities or petty trade] ing could be dynamic and productive (Warren, Slikkerveer,
as opposed to an exclusive focus on agricultural) and and Brokensha 1995). Toward the mid-1960s, the rural
alternative rural industries (e.g., tourism). The out- development paradigm switched to considering small
comes of debates on what, whom, and where is priori- farms as the very engine of growth, although it did not
tized in rural Africa to bring about sustainable defeat a set of ideas about large farms. Indeed, many
development will be critical to determining how the agricultural advisers believed that the faster small farms
tural revolution unfolds. Rural Africa is characterized expanded, the faster their eventual demise would be
as “globalization’s shoreline,” and once the tide comes, (Ellis and Biggs 2001). However, the inverse relation-
particular futures (out of many possibilities) will be ship between farm size and economic efficiency gained
determined (Carr 2011). currency. Small farmers were proven to be more efficient
than large farmers, making use of abundant labor, small
plots, and scarce capital. In spite of resource deficits,
RURAL DEVELOPMENT THEMES AND POLICY
small farmers generated higher yields per unit area
EMPHASES: THE ELUSIVE QUEST
(Berry and Cline 1979).
FOR SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT
The mid-1980s, with the emphasis on structural
Perspectives on rural Africans have come a long way in adjustment policies (free market and liberalization),
the last half-century. Various decades are associated led to governmental withdrawal of large-scale manage-
with heydays in particular rural development para- ment of the agricultural sector, and development poli-
digms, but several competing paradigms operate during cies concentrated on urban development projects that
most of the time. Nonetheless, a basic understanding of aimed to facilitate more linkages to global economic
the chronology of rural development emphases is help- circuits. The liberalization era of the 1980s to 2000 led
ful in understanding how policy switched from con- to retreat of the state from rural Africa, and although
centrating on large commercial farms to small farmers small-farm efficiency ideas were not debunked, rural
to eventually embracing integrated and diversified rural development policy moved into a phase of neglect.
development. At the same time, nongovernmental organizations
An agriculture-centered development strategy has (NGOs) for rural development filled a gap created by
remained central, but ideas about the roles of agricul- the retreat of big government. This led to another rural
ture and of African farmers in development have ebbed paradigm shift (mid-1980s-2000) from a top-down or
and flowed. Early 20th-century observers considered blueprint approach to rural development, characterized
Africans lazy and “backward” farmers, employing un- by external technologies and national-level policies, to
productive, rigid, and unscientific agricultural methods. a bottom-up grassroots or process approach (Ellis and
The modernization paradigm (1950-70) aimed to Biggs 2001). Rural development was approached as a
bring regressive African agriculture into the modern era participatory process that empowered rural dwellers to
by promoting plantation estates and large commercial set their own priorities for development and change. It
farming, but the rural emphasis was secondary to the was also accompanied by a growing acknowledgment
core idea of promoting industrialization in urban set- of the validity of indigenous technical knowledge and
tlements. Small-scale agriculture was allocated a more of the agency of the rural population. Researchers and
passive role, contributing to economic development farmers moved toward rebuilding agricultural practices
when possible by supplying resources to the modern based on farmers’ knowledge and local resources, and
urban economy. some of these efforts led to reductions in the use of pes-
In time, the modernization paradigm was widely ticides. For the first time, Africa's rural poor were viewed
refuted and counterbalanced by other perspectives high- as capable of contributing solutions to the problems
lighting the cultural dimension of rural development they encountered and interdependencies with urban
 Rural Africa 111

areas were recognized (e.g., circular and permanent aims to accelerate agricultural productivity in rural
migration, food, remittance and durable commodity areas. This major initiative provides a different and sep-
flows, and so forth). arate road map to realize the MDGs. Both approaches
A sustainable livelihoods approach from the late have revitalized the 21st-century rural development
1990s onward has aimed to broaden the rural devel- path after previous efforts have lost momentum. Science-
opment debate by deepening understandings of the informed strategies have gained more broad-based support
dynamics of rural poverty and survival. This people- than the narrower economic and planning initiatives
centered approach focuses on how individuals and of earlier times.
households make livelihoods for themselves and how Large international organizations (e.g., the World
the assets that they draw on (skills, social networks, Bank, African Development Bank, and Food and Agri-
nature, and financial capital) are affected by their vul- culture Organization of the UN [FAO]) continue to em-
nerability contexts, which take into consideration such phasize the centrality of agriculture in economic and
events as shocks (e.g., environmental change), season- tural life but recognize differences among countries: for
ality, and rural and urban trends. This approach instance, agriculture dominates the gross domestic
extends thinking about ordinary rural Africans, and it product in states such as Central African Republic and
moves the center of attention away from farming and Sierra Leone but makes only minor contributions in
farmers and toward broader survival mechanisms states such as South Africa and Botswana (World Bank
among the rural populace. Most sectoral programs of 2011). Indeed, the World Development Report of 2008
major international organizations now incorporate emphasized agriculture’s role in development and
sustainable livelihoods thinking and analysis, ac- called for more investment in African agriculture (World
knowledging the multidimensionality and interrela- Bank 2008). For example, only 4% of public investment
tionships among a range of factors that affect rural and 4% of official development assistance goes into
livelihoods and the survival choices made. agriculture (Asian countries averaged 12% in the same
The MDGs of 2000 to the present day center on a budget categories during the 1970s) (World Bank 2008).
multifaceted approach to development, emphasizing Nevertheless, the future of rural Africa remains conten-
key development targets. MDGs renewed investment tious, with widely different views about what should be
in agriculture, which had been abandoned by interna- prioritized, how rural and urban Africa development
tional investors in the 1990s as they short-circuited gaps can be narrowed, and what role foreign direct in-
tural development initiatives that they had heavily vestment should play (if any) in the transformation
promoted in earlier decades. MDGs prioritize social process.
investments as a requirement for rural development There are four key debates in rural Africa: (1) in-
(especially human capital through education and creasing agricultural productivity and promoting food
health), alongside infrastructure and agricultural in- security; (2) diversifying rural livelihoods and support-
vestment. Several important initiatives have been ing alternative, nonfarm employment opportunities;
launched on the ground to bolster the MDGs. The (3) closing the gender gap in agriculture; and (4) im-
MVP (2005-present) aims to promote sustainable and proving education and access to education, particularly
complementary investments in health, education, making education equal and relevant, especially for
family planning, infrastructure, gender equality, water, girls. Although these issues are interrelated and con-
sanitation, and agriculture to move people out of pov- temporary development efforts take an integrated
erty. Subsidized fertilizers and seeds are provided to all approach, there remain considerable differences of
farmers in these communities to increase crop yields opinion on how to prioritize and proceed. Of course,
and to diversify crops (to improve household nutri- ideological and sectoral debates are always present in the
tion), and various training programs based on best development arena, but the stakes could not be higher
practices have been introduced (e.g., agronomics). as rural population numbers continue to climb and as a
A separate initiative launched by the Alliance for decade of strong growth rates at the national level have
an African Green Revolution (AGRA) (2008-present) resulted in little improvement in rural livelihoods.
112 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

THE GREEN REVOLUTION TABLE 5.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES

OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION
William Gaud, a U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) official, coined the term “green revo- Advantages

lution” in 1968. This term refers to a series of research, e Production and yields increase.
development, and technology initiatives commencing e Extra production can be used to feed animals, and more
animal products can be incorporated into human diets.
in the mid-20th century that accelerated agriculture
e National and economic security is enhanced with reliable food
productivity in many regions of the world (but not
supplies.
Africa). Relying on hybrid crops, improved fertilizers, e Smarter agriculture and new concentrations on vegetables,
herbicides, and much irrigation, this modern scientific fruits, and dairy can position farmers to be integrated into
approach signaled a large-scale historical agricultural urban markets (e.g., supermarkets).

transformation of traditional farming methods. It ¢ Standards of living improve for some farmers.
e Improvements in rural infrastructure (e.g., irrigation systems)
further demonstrated that the same scientific revolu-
bring more land under cultivation.
tion that occurred in Global Northern agriculture could e Credit facilities and access to inputs enable farmers to be
be transferred and adapted to the Global South. Pro- more entrepreneurial and productive.
ponents credited the GR with helping move large num- e The rural economy becomes diversified.
bers of poor people out of poverty and with aiding Disadvantages
many nonpoor people to avoid poverty and hunger traps
e Pollution, contamination, and degradation of land and water
that they would have otherwise experienced if agricul- occur from fertilizers and pesticide runoff.
tural output had stayed on the traditional agricultural e The burning of soils by heavy use of chemical fertilizers leads
productivity trajectory. to overreliance on chemical inputs to compensate for
The achievements and consequences of the GR are deteriorating soil quality.
¢ Biodiversity changes; for example, the genetic diversity of
hotly debated and contested (see Table 5.1).
crops diminishes as monohybrid crops are introduced into
There are strong views on both sides of the debate. regions previously characterized by crop diversity.
Leading environmental activist Vandana Shiva (2000:7) ¢ The erosion of biodiversity may impair the ability to improve
emphasizes that “small farmers are pushed to extinc- crops in the future.
tion, as monocultures replace biodiverse crops, as farm- ¢ Poor farmers cannot afford inputs and machinery, and many
run up debts.
ing is transformed from the production of nourishing
e High-yielding crop varieties require more water and fertilizers,
foods and diverse foods into the creation for genetically
which are expensive.
engineered seeds, herbicides, and pesticides. As farmers * Cash cropping for a global market does not always improve
are transformed from producers into consumers of local food security.
corporate-patented agricultural products, as markets ¢ Labor is displaced, increasing rural-urban migration.
are destroyed locally and nationally but expanded © Cultivation of marginal land can lead to soil erosion.

globally, the myth of ‘free trade’ and the global econ-

omy become a means for the rich to rob the poor of
their right to food and even their right to life.” outraged that fashionable elitists back home were
GR proponents counter that environmentalists trying to deny them these things” (quoted in Tierney
miss the central issue of feeding more people as the 2008:1).
population expands and resources become scarcer.
Norman Bourlag, an agronomist instrumental behind AFRICA’S FAILED GREEN REVOLUTION
the GR, responds that environmentalists are not the Attempts to implement a GR in Africa in the 1960s
ones going hungry. “They do their lobbying from com- and 1970s failed for several reasons. First, African diets
fortable office suites in Washington or Brussels. If they are based primarily on grains (eg., millet and sor-
lived just one month amid the misery of the develop- ghum) and tropical root crops (e.g., cassava, yams, and
ing world, as I have for fifty years, they'd be crying out sweet potatoes), all considered peripheral crops in the
for tractors and fertilizer and irrigation canals and be GR framework. Instead, the GR concentrated on rice,
 Rural Africa 113

wheat, and maize; only maize could be considered an

African staple, but not throughout the region. Second,
African agriculture is predominantly rain-fed rather
than irrigated, and fears prevailed that irrigated mono-
culture would enhance disease and pest risks. Third,
Africa's poor transportation and commercial infra-
structures were serious impediments to the distribu-
tion of agricultural inputs and outputs; transportation
costs alone doubled the input price for smallholders
and raised costs to a level beyond their means. Fourth,
government support was generally lacking, and agricul-
tural science and research in the region was not suffi-
ciently developed to play a supporting role. Indeed,
the African region still maintains the world’s lowest ag- FIGURE 5.1 Kofi Annan, Chair for Alliance for a Green
ricultural research capacity (i.e., 70 African agricultural Revolution in Africa at its Headquarters, Nairobi, Kenya.
researchers per million population in 2013 compared Source: © ANTONY NJUGUNA/X90056/Reuters/Corbis.
to 2,640 in the United States). Fifth, most of Africa’s Corbis image 42-18662346.
farmers were subsistence smallholders deficient in
training and skills to harness new technologies even market-based approach would be sufficient to support
when they could afford them. Sixth, women, the bed- Africa’s agricultural transformation; in the second GR,
rock of African agriculture (responsible for 70% of the emphasis switched to a capital-intensive approach.
stable food production and contributing 60%-80% of The case for an African GR is supported by the
the labor used to produce household crops), lacked need to feed Africa’s hungry (200 million Africans, one
access to institutional credit and were generally excluded third of them children, are undernourished) and ex-
from participation (Negin et al. 2009). panding population. It seeks to address the stagnating
Africa's heterogeneity and diversity meant that insti- and downward spiral of agricultural productivity and
tuting the GR’s innovations was particularly challenging. inertia of farming methods that rely on traditional
However, a few African countries (e.g., Kenya, Nigeria, practices with few inputs (on average, African farmers
and Zimbabwe) registered increased maize yields from apply one-quarter the fertilizers that farmers in other
introduced hybrids. Other GR improvements included regions use). Evidence shows that average yields are
the introduction of a breakthrough rice variety (weed, 2.6 metric tons per hectare—less than half that of com-
drought, pest, and disease resistance) in the late 1990s parable world regions—and farms are producing 20%
(termed the “New Rice for Africa” or “Nerica”) to upland less (on a per capita basis in 2005) than they did in
areas. Nerica’s cultivation now extends to 300,000 acres 1970. Small-scale farming has been proven to be inef-
(1.2 million hectares) (Rockefeller Foundation 2006). fective in nourishing Africa’s population, and it cannot
Despite these few modest successes, the GR largely manage projected growth and environmental changes.
bypassed Africa. Although 60% to 70% of Africans engage in agrti-
culture, Africa has become a net food and agricultural
AFRICA’S NEW GREEN REVOLUTION importer (the food trade deficit is climbing; it hovers
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a in excess of US$26 billion per year and is anticipated
new African GR in 2004 (Fig. 5.1). Advances in agricul- to increase in coming decades), and food insecurity
tural research as well as a political commitment to har- has become a major African and global concern since
ness these advances in Africa underpinned the renewed the food price hike of 2007-08 (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate,
attention (Sanchez, Denning, and Nziguheba 2009). In and Paschali 2011). Thus, a switch to more intelligent
the first GR, influential donors maintained that a farming methods and the production of higher-value
114 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

crops such as vegetables and fruit would boost farmers’ its initiatives have been extended to 12 other countries.
incomes and contribute more food. The breadbasket strategy aims for quick wins in achiev-
There are also arguments that Africa's farming future ing food security, so breadbasket regions were selected
is going to depend on rigorous research and a multifac- on the basis of good soils, dependable rainfall, preexist-
eted technological approach, and that the region’s farm- ing basic rural infrastructure, and supportive national
ers need to be pushed toward using proper science- and political environments.
evidence-based methods. Such an approach is essential to AGRA programs have recorded some successes:
build resilience to the effects of climate change on crops, 40,000 metric tons of 322 improved varieties of seeds
growing seasons, rainfall/droughts, and pests. It prom- (e.g., maize, wheat, beans, sweet potato, cassava, sor-
ises to deliver results well beyond those of traditional ghum, millet, cowpea, and rice) have been introduced
agricultural adaptation. (183 of which have been commercialized) (AGRA 2012).
Africa's underperforming agricultural sector is to be In Burkina Faso, seed companies and input dealers have
transformed through smallholders gaining access to ag- supplied improved seeds to 20% of farmers. Building ca-
ricultural inputs—primarily fertilizers, high-response pacity through postgraduate training has produced 2,500
seeds, and small-scale water management technologies— new agro-certified, trained people to work with small-
all within a comprehensive rural development strat- holders. Smallholders have received training ranging
egy. The African GR has been endorsed by the UN as from planting to storage to making more informed
well as by African heads of states on several occasions. market decisions (e.g., use mobile phones to access real-
It fits within their agreed target of 10% public expend- time commodity market prices).
iture on agriculture and their annul target of an 8% Africa’s new GR has staunch critics, and many im-
agricultural productivity growth rate, as outlined in pediments persist. The single magical technological
the 2002 Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Develop- bullet has been criticized for failing to address diver-
ment Program of the New Partnership for African sity and heterogeneity throughout the region’s farm-
Development. African leaders endorsed the GR again ing systems (Thompson 2007). There is a danger that
at the 2006 Abuja Africa Fertilizer Summit, and they African farmers will lose control over seeds as a major
continue to support the effort. farming input: 80% use saved seeds, enabling them
Private philanthropy, largely spearheaded by the not to purchase seeds every season. Africans’ wealth of
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller indigenous ecological knowledge, reflecting centuries
Foundation, was instrumental in launching and fund- of adaptation (e.g., interspersing different plants to
ing AGRA in 2007. By 2011, it was mobilizing US$76.4 enrich the soil and to deter pests from food crops),
million to support the African GR (AGRA 2012:32). could be lost forever. High-tech solutions to Africa's
AGRA’s mission “is to transform African agriculture food crisis are seen by many as incorrect answers be-
into a highly productive, efficient, competitive, and sus- cause they pollute the environment with fertilizers and
tainable system that assures food security, lifts millions pesticides, destroy small farming, and transform the
out of poverty, and protects the environment” (AGRA genetic wealth of Africa into cash profits for a few
2012:11). This is to be achieved by improving seed global corporations.
quality (750 new varieties are targeted for introduc- Another viewpoint holds that political solutions
tion) and soil fertility, strengthening farmers’ access to more than technical ones are needed to end hunger.
agricultural inputs and markets, ensuring better access Anti-GR proponents claim the silent revolution is not
to water, establishing innovative financing methods, primarily about helping peasants to produce more
improving agricultural education, and creating an en- food but rather about creating a food system in which
vironment in which governments and international smallholder agriculture, widely regarded as backward
organizations can support farmers and introduce in- and unproductive, is subordinated to a global com-
centives to adopt new technologies (AGRA 2012). mercial and capital-intensive mode of production.
The AGRA concentrates on four “breadbasket” Thus, the African GR is set to reshape social relations,
areas—Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, and Tanzania—but transforming rural production by incorporating small
 Rural Africa 115

farmers into the global marketplace. In the meantime,

of golden rice, an enhanced (biofortified) staple crop
the issue of who is responsible for protecting the rights enriched with provitamin A, is well under way but not
of smallholders has been overlooked. yet in the African marketplace.
Other critics (e.g., Moseley 2011) claim that the GM crops were first officially commercialized in
successes of the GR elsewhere (in India and China, in 1996, when six countries planted them on 1.7 million
particular) are being misapplied to Africa. For example, hectares. By 2011, GM planting had expanded to 29 coun-
in the Punjab region of India, yields increased fivefold tries with 148 million hectares in production, roughly
within 20 years, but groundwater dropped by 12 inches equivalent to 2% of the world’s agricultural land
(30 cm) and one quarter of small farmers were driven (Africa Center for Biosafety 2012). Globally, an 87-
off the land, unable to continue purchasing seeds, fer- fold growth makes GM the crop technology to be most
tilizers, and pesticides (Patel 2009). Suicide rates among quickly adopted in the history of modern agriculture
small farmers escalated as many fell into serious debt. (Adenle 2011). Uptake in Africa has been slow: only
The social and environmental costs of the Indian GR three countries south of the Sahara have commercial-
were very high. The international lesson was that small- ized biotech crops—South Africa (1997 -present),
holders were easily seduced into a new system that was Burkina Faso (2008-present) and Sudan (2012-present).
detrimental to their survival: they participated in a Nevertheless, the percentage of total area allocated to
higher-yielding system unaware that productivity costs GM crops is increasing (2.2% of total area in South
would rise and that new crops would be subject to un- Africa and 0.03% in Burkina Faso [African Center for
predictable international markets. Therefore, many Biosafety 2012]), and research is under way in another
(e.g., Patel 2009) contend that Africans should follow 18 African countries (mostly confined trials). Some
a different path by sustaining plant and food biodiver- (e.g., Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria) have introduced forward-
sity rather than eliminating it by industrial monocul- leaning biotechnology laws and frameworks, paving
ture. It should be noted that African-grown food for the way for large-scale introductions.
human consumption is derived from 2,000 plants, South Africa is the leading and largest African adop-
while the U.S. food base is dependent on 12 plants ter of GM crop technologies: GM maize, GM soybean,
(Thompson 2007). and GM cotton have been introduced, and a GM potato
is under development. Since 2010, South Africa has ex-
ported GM crops to other African countries. A few African
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
countries (e.g., Kenya and Ghana) have facilitative bio-
GM agricultural crops are laboratory-designed or engi- technological frameworks in place, expected to pave the
neered crops that increase or modify a gene containing way for the introduction of GM crops. However, despite
the desirable trait in the living DNA of a host plant. The Kenya's 2009 Biosafety Act (regarded as the more facili-
most common desirable traits include resistance to pests, tative biotechnology framework in Africa) and Ghana's
diseases, and drought, and/or tolerance of herbicides. 2011 Biosafety Act, public confidence in national regula-
Sometimes additional modifications can enhance the tory systems of GM technologies is low. In 2010, protest-
taste, appearance, and color of crops. Large-scale commer- ers at Mombasa’s port blocked a GM maize import
calization of biotechnology for the African market has so shipment from South Africa. Protesters criticized the
far delivered only two traits—pest-resistant (known as Bt) Kenyan government for failing to preform relevant
crops and herbicide-tolerant crops—while other modifi- safety checks and for not alerting Kenyans about GM
cations remain in the pipeline. Leading-edge GM maize imports (Cooke and Downie 2010). The Kenyan
crops include maize, soybean, cotton, and canola. government responded by establishing a temporary ban
Current GM research aims to improve the shelf life on GM imports in 2010, but it has since been lifted. In
of harvested products, whereas other frontier research Ghana, the Food Sovereignty movement has been a
focuses on increasing nutritional value, although in vocal opponent of GM imports.
both these areas scientific breakthroughs have been Kenya has joined an increasing number of African
slow. For example, the development and introduction countries developing their own GM research and
116 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

development capacity: 20 countries had commenced breakthrough sciences, securing acceptance is difficult
R&D by 2012 (African Center for Biosafety 2012). Re- upstream and virtually impossible downstream. In
search cooperation between Africa-based institutions general, there is a lack of quality information to sup-
and companies and institutions based in the United port policymakers and the public in evaluating their
States and/or Europe is driving this research effort. The options. Much of the available information is either
private sector primarily determines the research themes highly specialized (incomprehensible to non-GM ex-
(with public sector collaboration), and profit is a dom- perts) or overly simplified and polemic, focusing on
inant motive, as opposed to needs fulfillment (eg., one aspect of the debate without considering a balance
focusing on herbicide-tolerant crops rather than on of effects. Nevertheless, the stakes are very high: a major
employment generation). Declining public-sector African miscalculation could lead to major changes in the
agricultural research, combined with the privatization planet's ecosystem with significant repercussions for
of agricultural research, has led to a focus on providing humankind. It is hardly surprising that GM technolo-
high-tech solutions, including transgenics, over other gies are controversial.
agricultural options. There are three key debates in Africa: (1) the inter-
There are an increasing number of Africa-focused pretation of science and whether genetically modified
research efforts. Significant attention is being directed organisms (GMOs) are safe for human health, the envir-
to develop “water-efficient maize for Africa.” Field onment, and biodiversity; (2) whether GMOs are a sus-
trials are under way in South Africa, Uganda, Kenya, tainable food security option for Africa; and (3) what
Tanzania, and Mozambique, and the project involves the capacity of Africans is to participate in GM research,
local agricultural research institutes, with significant monitoring, and assessment of GM technologies.
financial backing (US$47 million) from the Gates Arguments in support of GM crops for Africa in-
Foundation, the Buffett Foundation, USAID, and clude that the technology is available and can be re-
Monsanto. Proponents of water-efficient maize for fined and transferred to African contexts. GM crops
Africa argue that a drought-tolerant crop could in- have been demonstrated to be safe in the United
crease yields by 30% and, importantly, safeguard food States, Brazil, Argentina, India, Canada, and China.
security in drought years. Similar but less resourced The United States is the leading producer of GM crops,
initiatives target the introduction of other crops: GM and its government (especially the Food & Drug
soybean pilot projects are proceeding in Mozambique Administration [FDA], agroindustry, and mainstream
and Zambia; a virus-resistant sweet potato and a stem scientists) has tested GMOs and declared them safe.
borer-resistant maize (a pest that destroys, on average, GMOs are well embedded in the U.S. food chain, and
20% of the crop) are being developed in Kenya; and some foods now contain 70% GM content. They have
GM banana and GM cassava development is continu- not been proven to be harmful: neither death nor ill-
ing in Uganda. nesses have been attributed to North Americans con-
GM technology is a revolutionary, young science suming food with GM content.
spawning a powerful industry and support basis. It is GM support for Africa has garnered momentum
changing agriculture, the food system, and environ- among major philanthropic and international organi-
ments. Only time will tell if it proves to be the biggest zations and global corporations. GM proponents
innovation, or the biggest mistake, of our times claim that it is only a matter of time before a global
(Makoni and Mohamed-Katerere 2006). Risks and scientific consensus emerges (as was the case in the cli-
benefits of GM technologies are hard to quantify at mate change debate). Advocates are armed with scien-
these early stages of development. Resistance to new tific evidence showing that the introduction of GM
technologies and new food has historical precedents crops will increase crop yields, elevate farm incomes,
(e.g., coffee was restricted in 17th-century Cairo, Stock- and reduce herbicide spraying by 50% (Adenle 2011).
holm, and London, and tomatoes were viewed as poi- Major international regulatory bodies, including the
sonous in the United States until the 1830s). As in all World Health Organization and the FAO, reaffirm that
 Rural Africa 117

the application of GM technology has not had negative environmental activists. Since seed companies wield
effects on human health. patent power over their products, independent re-
There is also an argument that GMOs can support searchers are not provided access to GM seeds for test-
biodiversity. By preventing more land from being ing. The GMO lobby is powerful and has deep pockets
brought into agricultural production, GM technology and research clout; its research results inform FDA
helps conserve land. GM technology can even be ap- approval processes and global GM policy. For the
plied to safeguard plants under threat of disease and most part, regulations in the United States, as else-
pests. Furthermore, GM planting can reduce the where, have been adapted for GMOs rather than de-
amount ofpesticides and fertilizers used and limit the veloped from the outset to test their safety. The
amount of harmful runoff into the environment. inability of the anti-GM lobby to compete in research
Arguments against GMOs in Africa center on this has resulted in a concentration on advocacy, but even
biotech solution as being yet another one-size-fits-all in this domain they compete against well-financed
initiative for rural development. Moreover, the fast- pro-GM campaigns.
track approach privileges crops developed elsewhere Peer-reviewed scientific evidence of the harmful
over African varieties, with little regard for the tradi- effects of GMOs is limited to testing on animals. In a
tional African diet, the diversity of ecological zones, study that assessed how Monsanto’s Roundup-tolerant
and farming systems. There is the specter of fostering maize affected rats’ health, a group of French re-
another unhealthy dependency, this time on a hand- searchers (Séralini et al. 2012) found severe adverse
ful of powerful companies (e.g., hybrid seed compa- health effects, including tumors and kidney and liver
nies such as DuPont and Syngenta and agrochemical damage, that led to premature death. This article find-
companies such as Bayer, BASE, and Monsanto). Fears ings were explosive and led to a Europe-wide ban on
of global corporate dependency resonate with many GMO maize and a Kenyan ban on all GMOs. How-
Africans, deeply suspicious of further Western intru- ever, this article became mired in controversy, and the
sion into African ways of life. Global corporations journal Food and Chemical Toxicology subsequently re-
dominate seed and chemical sales worldwide, and tracted the article in 2013, noting that the rats used in
Monsanto has secured patents (on the basis of a the study were cancer-prone and the experiment did
World Trade Organization 1995 ruling) that allow not adequately distinguish tumors that might have
companies to claim private ownership of GM seeds. been caused by GM from those that were spontan-
Critics charge that GM powerhouses are purchasing eous. Skeptics charged that the French researchers
patents on nature and depriving Africa’s small farm- were blinkered by their anti-GMO predispositions;
ers in the process. As a result, corporate control, prof- for example, Séralini had already published a popular
its, and agenda setting of agricultural practices take anti-GMO book (Séralini 2012). However, the retrac-
priority over small farmers’ interests. This means that tion of the article has not dulled the campaign against
African farmers will not longer be in control of seeds all GM foods.
and of saving and storing them (a very common prac- Civil society organizations in the region claim they
tice); instead, they will be forced to buy seeds each have been excluded from discussions about the safety
year. Participants in the anti-GM lobby perceive of biotechnologies in agriculture and that their govern-
themselves as waging a David-versus-Goliath struggle. ments lack the scientific, legal, and administrative cap-
Their campaigns are spearheaded by environmental acity to monitor GMOs. This means that most of the
NGOs such as Greenpeace and Oxfam, but these orga- regulating is within industry (self-regulation) with
nizations lack the resources to conduct research on very little information sharing (African Center for
communities experimenting with GM technologies. Biosafety 2012). Civil society is adamant that the GM
Published scientific evidence is skewed heavily toward revolution is not a farmer revolution and that indige-
positive evidence-based reports, and the anti-GM nous agricultural knowledge could be lost forever.
lobby is restricted to moving testimonies from local Anti-GM protests have occurred throughout Africa,
118 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

canola pollination occurs up to 1.9 miles [3 km] away).

These situations raise patent-infringement issues, as
the presence of GMO on a non-GM farm means that
farmers can be charged.with infringement of intellec-
tual property rights of seeds. In the United States and
Canada, lawsuits have resulted in favorable judgments
for GMO producers. (Also, the blowing of GM pesti-
cides onto adjacent farms can damage non-GM farm-
ing, so the issue of a buffer zone comes into play.)
According to La Via Campesina, an international peas-
ants’ movement, the UN estimates that 75% of world’s
plant genetic diversity has been lost as farmers have
a abandoned native seeds for the genetically uniform
varieties offered by corporations (quoted in Morvaridi
FIGURE 5.2 Anti-Monsanto Protest, Cape Town,
South Africa. Source: © NIC BOTHMA/epa/Corbis. Stock
2012:253).
Photo 42-47027259.
Throughout most of Africa, some governments,
most media, and many people maintain hostile views
and Africans have joined a global movement against toward GM crops, largely based on perceived negative
large agrocorporations such as Monsanto (Fig. 5.2). environmental and human health consequences. In
Fears have been raised about the promotion of fact, even in crisis times, several African countries have
“superweeds” and “superpests” as well as the substitu- rejected GM food aid (e.g., Namibia, Zambia, Benin),
tion of an enhanced secondary pest in place of a pri- while others (Malawi, Zimbabwe) accepted it only on
mary pest (as occurred with Bt cotton in India) the condition that the maize was milled prior to distri-
(Makoni and Mohamed-Katerere 2006). Superweeds bution in the country (Makoni and Mohamed-Koterere
and superpests require farmers to use more and more 2006). It is understandable that African governments
herbicides. Crops engineered for pest resistance are are taking a go-slow approach toward the adoption of
also potentially problematic, as pests themselves are GM technology. The South African and Tanzanian govern-
capable of developing resistance. ments are the most pro-GM in the region. Within these
Potential risks of GMOs continue to be raised, par- states, however, there is strong resistance to GM crops
ticularly in Europe, and the European media are calling by urbanities, farmers’ groups, civil society, and rights-
attention to the question of whether GM products are based organizations. For their part, African farmers are
safe. Largely based on a precautionary principle, the slow to embrace GM technologies because of signifi-
European Union (EU) decided not to introduce GMOs. cant local variations in climate, soil, water, and disease.
The European stance needs to be contextualized, how- Biotechnology may present long-term promise, but
ever: EU agriculture is already highly productive and farmers are preoccupied with their immediate needs
therefore not urgently in need of a productivity boost. and are risk-averse. GM monocropping is, therefore, the
Based on close historical, political, and trade ties, African antithesis of biodiverse (and often organic) farming,
governments are very mindful of the EU’s stance and fear the mainstay of African agriculture.
damaging their traditional agricultural export market.
There are grave concerns about harming Africa’s
RURAL LIVELIHOODS: A CHALLENGE TO
biodiversity. Small farmers and diverse farming prac-
tices are viewed as nurturing biodiversity. A movement THE PRIMACY OF SMALL FARMS?

toward large-scale GM agricultural farming will un- In Africa, farmers have always diversified their sources
doubtedly lead to a decrease in farm biodiversity and of income, but in the past it was a seasonal rather than
perhaps overall biodiversity. For example, GM seeds a permanent phenomenon. Farmers were known to
can contaminate neighboring farms by drift (GM pursue two or more livelihoods simultaneously or to
 Rural Africa 119

BOX 5.1 AFRICAN MILLENNIUM VILLAGES lacking basic services and infrastructure. In total, the effort de-
The Millennium Villages Project is a 10-year, UN-backed initia- livers targeted development assistance to approximately
500,000 villagers in diverse agroecological environments.
tive that promotes an integrated approach to rural development
In Phase Two (2013-present), the project has expanded in two
and aims at achieving the MDGs by 2015. It is led by Jeffrey
ways. First, the UN Development Program (UNDP) and partner
Sachs at the Earth Institute of Columbia University and imple-
governments are cooperating in 17 independent MVP efforts in
mented by the Millennium Promise (an NGO founded in 2005).
13 countries, in addition to the original 10 MVP sites. Second,
The MVP is well publicized, backed by celebrities such as U2's
the IsDB, the Earth Institute, and its partner the Millennium
Bono and Angelina Jolie, and funded by high-profile individuals
Promise are extending the MVs by launching a new initiative, the
(e.g., the Lenfest family), international foundations (e.g., Open
Sustainable Village Project, a flagship program that focuses on
Society), and international development organizations (e.g., the
rural villages in Sudan, Chad, and Mozambique in an effort to
UK's Department of International Development [DflD] and the
fight rural poverty by improving agriculture, health, education,
Islamic Development Bank [IsDB]) (Carr 2008; Tran 2013). In
and standards of living. In total, more than 20 African countries
2013, the IsDB agreed to provide US$104 million in loans (pro-
in 2013 are implementing rural strategies based on the MVP's
vided in the form of Islamic finance of long-term repayments at
coordinated development approach (Fig. 5.4). The interventions
a 0% interest rate) to extend program efforts. Described by its
are deemed so successful in Uganda that the government is
proponents as a “bottom-up approach to lifting African villages
scaling them up.
out of the poverty trap” (Millennium Villages Organization
The main principles of the MVP are:
2012), the MVP aims to combine proven science-based interven-
tions with local knowledge to create a new, practical approach * proven science- and evidence-based technologies and
to alleviate rural poverty at the village level. Its goal is to halve practices
rural poverty by 2015. * community-based strategy, with a participatory approach
The inaugural MV was established in Sauri (Kenya) in Decem- to planning, implementation, and monitoring in which the
ber 2004. Rather than targeting an individual village, the project interventions are adapted to the context of each village
encompasses clusters of several nearby villages. Phase One e enhanced by the development of local capacity in
(2005-12) comprised 14 villages, involving more than 80 com- technical, managerial, and participatory skills
munities (Fig. 5.3). MV sites span a range of population sizes e multisectoral and integrated interventions based on
(5,000-80,000 villagers). The villages are located in 10 countries the MDGs
(Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, ¢ links to district, national, and global strategies
Tanzania, and Uganda), which are all stable countries whose ¢ costs shared by the community, government, and donors
governments have functioning service-delivery structures (although ¢ supported by increased national financing of public goods
in most cases they are far from optimal). Carefully selected in in line with increased official development assistance to
close coordination with national and local governments, this ini- the respective African governments (Millennium Villages
tiative targets areas prone to chronic hunger and disease and Organization 2011).

The MVP has three basic principles: (1) to demonstrate that

integrated, community-based, low-cost interventions can speed
progress towards the MDGs in these rural settings; (2) to identify
processes whereby MVP interventions can be scaled up to sup-
port rural, regional, and national development strategies based
on the MDGs; and (3) to empower villagers to frame their devel-
opment concerns in the context of integrated development (as
opposed to isolated policy interventions), further promoting
cross-village shared understandings while enabling village-level
issues to be intelligible to national policymakers applying the
MDGs (Carr 2008).
At the investment level, the MVs invested on average US$99
per capita per year in multiple sectors during the first five years
of implementation. Interventions are multisectoral and typically
encompass fertilizers, insecticide-treated bed nets, schools, HIV
testing, microfinance, electric lines, road construction, piped
FIGURE 5.3 Jeffrey Sachs Dancing with Rural Women water, irrigation, and so forth, the precise mix tailored to each
at Ruhiira Millennium Village, Uganda. Source: © Guil- village cluster’s requirements. Multiple buy-ins are secured by
laume Bonn/Corbis. Corbis 42-50223430. the sharing of funding contributions among stakeholders in the
(Continued)
120 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 5.1 (Continued)

Saudi
Vestern
Arabia
Sahara

Mauritania

/ Central
African
2 e Republic
Abidjan~ Accra
Gulf of o
Guinea Yaounde

Equatoriai
Guinea
DR Congo
o)
% Kinshasa Burundi

Zambia
Lusaka 7

Harare? Mozambigq
Zimbabwe ¢ ,
Ge New MVP Site
Madagascar
Existing MVP Site Botswana
Sustainable Villages Program
Pretoria
£2 Multiple Projects fe)
Q
Swaziland

FIGURE 5.4 Location of Millennium Villages.

approximate ratios: MVP and core partners (49%), external these debates is available on Tom Murphy's [2011] “A View from
donors and NGOs (10%), local and national governments (33%), the Cave” blog). :
and the village community (8%) (labor/service commitments The four main criticisms of the MVP are (1) there is a lack of
count as contributions). rigorous assessment, particularly by independent researchers;
According to the Millennium Villages Organization (2011:5), (2) MV team assessments rely on results that are based on a
substantial improvements have been recorded in MVs (Fig. 5.5). before-and-after project and the scaling of a-number of indica-
The MV group has published peer-reviewed results. One tors, but fail to disaggregate general positive development
paper highlighted the multisectoral package of interventions trends such as economic growth rates from MVP results; (3) the
improving levels of child undernourishment and lowering rates initiative is not sensitive enough to understand (and change) vil-
of stunting (low height for age in a given population) by 33% lage power dynamics (e.g., the structure of gender relations);
(Remans et al. 2011). Another paper reported preliminary reduc- and (4) agricultural productivity growth may not result in a sig-
tions in poverty, food insecurity, stunting, and malaria after three nificant improvement in recipients’ incomes compared to rural
years of project implementation (Pronyk et al. 2012). The same villagers who were switched out of agriculture. Carr (201 1:209)
study also initially claimed a decline in child mortality at three argues that the MVP “is predicated on problems and solutions
times the rate of the general rural trend; this finding embroiled designed in advanced economies and implemented in villages
the MVP in deep controversy due to an error in the calculations, along globalization’s shoreline in a manner that marginalizes
however. community participation.” Carr (2011) contends that globaliza-
A cadre of researchers, bloggers, and policy analysts remain tion and development are much more unruly and defy easy con-
skeptical of the effectiveness of MVs and MVP assessment (Bump ceptualization in any predetermined set of policy interventions.
et al. 2012; Carr 2008 and 2011; Clements and Demombynes Instead, Carr (2011) advocates for more locally informed sets of
2010; Wanjala and Muradian 2011). Debates have been exten- community interventions, new and different data metrics, and
sive and heated both online and in the print media (a summary of more open-ended possibilities.
 Rural Africa 121

livelihood impacts and farmers actually receive training to diver-

sify their livelihoods; some go on to become fisherman, barbers,
and small kiosk owners.
The debate about the MVP results reached a fever pitch in the
pages of the prestigious medical journal the Lancet in 2012, when a
letter by prominent critics (Bump et al. 2012) prompted the re-
searchers to withdraw one of the study claims—that child mortality
declined at three times the rate of the general rural trend (on the
basis of conceptual measurement difficulties). After the withdrawal
of this finding from the overall results, the Lancet’s editors empha-
sized that a correction did not detract from the study's overall
merits. However, the MVP was challenged and put on the defensive,
Households withaccess toimproved nking Ww and this led to a new commitment to independent evaluation.
In June 2012, DflD announced a US$18.1 million project
to launch a new MV in northern Ghana. DfID also allocated
US$3 million for a 10-year evaluation of the project to measure
its impact, sustainability, and value for money. In addition,
Robert Black of the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health is
leading an independent expert group to advise MVP on its final
Births delivered by skilled health person evaluation. Institute of Development Studies researchers (DfID
: 2013) designed a sophisticated instrument to conduct an inde-
48%
pendent evaluation of the MVPs in northern Ghana that will be
Adults tested for HIV in the fast 12 months completed in 2016. It is impossible to select a control village, so
- SS the DflD methodology selects matching villages and matching
households based on observable village-level characteristics to
compare the effects of the MVP interventions with those of non-
Average faige yields {aGrOss 6 sites}
participants in the vicinity. The independent assessment will
_130ha measure the impact of the MVPs and determine whether bene-
fits diffuse from MVs to nearby villages and also to assess
whether demonstration effects occur whereby other villages
adopt packages similar to those of the MV districts.
FIGURE 5.5 Year-3 Result Highlights Across 11 Millen- The range of development ideas for rural Africa is large, with few
nium Villages. and hard-won victories. Funding for rural Africa is always finite, so
it matters greatly how and where money is spent. Particular inter-
Different pieces of evidence are marshaled to criticize or sup- ventions will always produce winners and losers within the villages
port the MVP. For example, critics often claim that MVP- as well as in wider rural development contexts. The effectiveness
“imposed” interventions preclude farmers from diversifying into and success of the MVP will undoubtedly attract more funding and
more profitable nonfarm employment (Wanjala and Muradian will extend this rural development initiative in scope and scale, in-
2013). Proponents argue that MV interventions have diverse directly diverting funds from alternative paradigms.

switch from one activity to another in a process of ex- income-earning reorientations, and social identifica-
perimentation, trying to offset losses in one area with tion with nonfarming activities. Simply put, rural
gains in another (Bryceson 2009). Now, rural Africans dwellers are shifting away from exclusively agriculture-
are engaging in more diverse economic activities. This based livelihoods. Approximately 30% to 50% of rural
transformation began in the mid-1980s and coincided households’ income has been found to be derived
with the withdrawal of big government from the coun- from nonfarm sources, and the share is as high as 90%
tryside and the introduction of liberalization policies, in some rural parts of southern Africa (Ellis 1999).
but it has gained considerable traction over the past Some income is generated by engaging in multiple
decade (Bryceson 2009). endeavors, farming being just one of them. More people
Labeled the “deagranization thesis,” this phenom- are deriving incomes from nonfarm activities, such as
enon captures processes of occupational adjustment, (1) petty trade (food selling, brewing, handicrafts,
122 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

mobile phone airtime selling and selling to urban economic activity than ever before, suggesting a break
periodic markets); (2) employment in construction, from the cultural tradition of pooling income among
operations, and maintenance generated by village and household members (Bryceson 2005).
town consolidation with accompanying infrastructure Declining agricultural returns and uncertainty are
development (houses, roads, mills, transport depots) deterring younger generations from agriculture. Con-
(Bryceson 1996) and mobile phone network expansion; tinued subdivisions of land at inheritance and other
(3) transfer payments (remittances and pensions from highly varied land tenure arrangements impose limits
family members); (4) selling their labor to others; and on participation, making it impossible for youths to
(5) the development of new consumer markets for prod- obtain enough land to take up farming as their main
ucts formerly freely available in rural areas (e.g., fuel wood economic activity. Poor farm performance, declining
and water supplies). Also, rising urban demand has en- yields due to declining soil fertility, a degraded natural
couraged rural dwellers to “mine” tree stocks for sup- environment, and increased climatic variations are
plies, whereas in earlier periods, rural people obtained fuel other factors. In areas heavily afflicted by HIV infec-
wood communally rather than through market processes. tion, the shortage of able-bodied labor to take on the
Typically, rural households engage in several income physically onerous tasks can compound these factors.
diversification strategies at the same time, reflecting dif- Urban residents’ investment in commercial farming is
ferent opportunities at various times of the year and in displacing undercapitalized small farmers, particularly
different places (Binns, Dixon, and Nel 2012). Most of in areas close to urban centers. Inputs have become
the activities are highly opportunistic, involving quick more expensive, and many agricultural markets are
responses to market demand and supply (Bryceson declining for small producers. Two diverging processes
2005). Different informal economy niches are also pop- are taking place simultaneously. First, large-scale land
ulated by different genders: women gravitate to all-year- investments are consolidating farms into larger, more
round petty and curios trade, beer brewing, hair plaiting, commercially oriented units, and the appropriation of
knitting, tailoring, and soap making, while men domi- land by foreign investors is disadvantaging and even
nate in businesses based outside of the home, such as dispossessing many smallholders. Second, family
construction and transport (Bryceson 2005). There is farms are shrinking largely on the basis of generational
inconclusive evidence of whether women benefit—by subdivisions, especially in agricultural fertile areas.
being empowered as entrepreneurs—or are doubly Rural tourism and mining activities have expanded
burdened—by being straddled with petty trade responsi- in different areas, offering alternative employment op-
bilities on top of home responsibilities. Access to diversi- tions. Often mining is the most lucrative alternative to
fication opportunities varies by income group. Wealthier agriculture, but mining cannot absorb all rural Africans,
rural entrepreneurs are able to diversify into more lucra- and mining practices are highly problematic and un-
tive nonfarm businesses (brick making, trade, transport, sustainable. There are alternative policy efforts that
etc.), while rural dwellers in poverty are much more target rural livelihood diversification as a means of lift-
prone to casual labor diversification (Ellis 2004). ing people out of poverty (e.g., pro-poor tourism) (see
The rise in rural engagement in informal economic Box 5.2). However, the orthodoxy of agriculture first is
activities and the participation of women and youths are difficult to dislodge, and contributions of nonfarm
changing age-old patterns of a predominant agrarian activities tend to be shrugged off by proponents of
economy and undermining the traditional transfer of mainstream views.
farming skills from one generation to the next. However, Rural areas do not exist in isolation and are con-
not all nonagricultural activities are specialized, and nected to urban areas in diverse ways other than through
considerable occupational churning (movement back agriculture. In.fact, rural development and urbanization
and forth among occupations) takes place. Even at the are highly interwoven. For example, there is a rising
household level, many families still strive to maintain a urban demand for all kinds of rural resources. ‘As cities
foothold in farming in order to contribute subsistence and towns grow, they create additional demand for re-
food. However, there is more individualization of sources (land, labor, food, water, energy, and other
 Rural Africa 123

BOX 5.2 PRO-POOR TOURISM BEST

PRACTICES FROM RURAL SOUTH AFRICA:
MAKING AFRICAN GAME PARKS WORK
FOR THE LOCAL POOR
Pro-poor tourism is an initiative first supported by DfID that gen-
erated significant scholarship on rural (and urban) best practices
to build partnerships between tourism businesses and local resi-
dents to unlock opportunities for economic gains for the poor.
The UN's World Tourism Organization has endorsed pro-poor
tourism, and rural South Africa is a center of significant experi-
mentation and innovation.
Four potential advantages of pro-poor rural tourism have been
identified (Rogerson 2006). First, the community can be engaged
directly as a partner in environment resource management. Second,
the community can be positively incorporated into global supply FIGURE 5.6 Madikwe River Lodge, South Africa.
chains, altering historical physical, social, and economic isolation. Source: © Atlantide Phototravel/Corbis.
Third, rural residents are enabled to draw on assets of natural (wild-
life and scenery) and cultural capital and to participate in viable Locals obtained the lease rights for a prime tourism conces-
employment alternatives to subsistence farming. Fourth, bringing a sion in the reserve and brokered these rights to raise capital,
wealthy customer base to target destinations (e.g., remote rural develop two luxury lodges (Fig. 5.6), and develop partnership
areas) creates economic multiplier effects. agreements with private firms to operate and maintain the
Game lodge tourism generally occurs in remote pristine rural lodges. These lodges became anchors for generating local em-
areas also characterized by rural poverty. In the past, it func- ployment (in hospitality, field guide, and cultural interpretation
tioned as an enclave economic space in rural Africa with weak areas). By 2007, the Madikwe Reserve employed 773 workers,
local linkages and few benefits accruing to the rural poor. An three fourths of whom were local people (Relly 2008).
alternative tourism model has emerged combining market- Another best practice in community-led tourism development
based sustainability with robust poverty alleviation. New leasing is the Makuleke model in the northernmost portion of Kruger
concessions have enabled new high-end safari lodges to be de- National Park, in an area known as the Pafuri Triangle, a 54,363-
veloped in such a way that the local community forges partner- acre (22,000 hectare) reserve with abundant natural resources.
ships with the state and the private sector (African Safari Lodge Historically, the area belonged to the Makuleke people
Foundation 2012). This model allows the community to benefit (a Tsonga tribe that settled the area around 1700), but the apart-
as a shareholder (from lease fees and profit-sharing arrange- heid government forcibly removed the community in 1969 in an
ments), directly from employment creation and indirectly from effort to secure international borders.
small business development as providers of auxiliary services Its development as a tourism initiative grew out of a landmark
(e.g., managing gate access, horticulture farming). This pro-poor community restitution case in 1998 that returned the land to the
ecotourism venture is also based on an-ethos that conservation Makuleke community. The Makuleke opted not to resettle the
is most effective when local communities participate as co-owners area but rather to maintain the land within the national park.
and realize direct economic benefits. They initiated a new relationship with the land by engaging with
Madikwe Game Reserve in the North West Province of South South African National Parks and leasing their tourism rights
Africa (bordering Botswana) is based on a best practices pro- to the private sector, convinced that conservation and tour-
poor rural tourism development model. The reserve was estab- ism would generate more revenues than cattle farming or other
lished in 1991 on 75,000 acres (30,351 hectares) of land formerly agricultural activities. Under an agreement with South African
degraded with abandoned cattle farms and derelict buildings; National Parks, the community participated in joint manage-
the entire area had been emptied of natural wildlife by extensive ment of the area to maintain the same standards of the national
poaching. The project commenced with Operation Phoenix, park and retained the right to access the natural resources (e.g.,
which represented the largest transfer of game to have ever firewood, stone gravel, medicinal plants) (Shehab 2011).
taken place in the world (1991-97). More than 8,000 animals (of The Makuleke community engaged in several private-sector
approximately 28 species) were released into the reserve, en- partnerships. Lease fees (10% of turnover) and other profit-sharing
closed by a 150-km perimeter fence (Madikwe Game Reserve mechanisms generated approximately zar 6 million (US$688,374)
2014). Importantly, the Madikwe project aimed to put local people (Shehab 2011). Two private partners, Outpost and Wilderness
first, promoting livelihoods before wildlife and conservation Safaris, built luxury tourist lodges, and the latter also built and
(Rogerson 2006). operated the EcoTraining facility. Since the beginning, 31 locals
(Continued)
124 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 5.2 (Continued)

have been trained as field guides, 61 are employed in hospitality the lodges and a village-based bed and breakfast. Unfortunately,
services, and additional members of the community are em- neither of these enterprises turned a profit, so the private-sector
ployed as rangers (engaged in security and antipoaching moni- partner withdrew from both. However, another project—a chil-
toring) (Shehab 2011:175). dren’s life skills camp (Children in the Wilderness)—was sustained.
Community profit sharing from tourism underwrote the elec- Clearly, pro-poor tourism initiatives cannot solve most rural
trification of two Makuleke villages (outside the reserve) and poverty issues, but they can result in modest improvement in
paid for some school improvements. Nevertheless, community local livelihoods and serve as another economic anchor in de-
opinion remains divided on whether income generated from the pressed, remote rural areas. High-end, low-volume safari lodge
project was distributed equitably: many perceive that well- tourism can be developed to maximize the engagement of
connected community members usurped the profits (Shehab locals and to allow the community to participate in corporate
2011). In addition, Wilderness Safaris participated in several profit sharing, elevating local people as active participants in the
small joint-venture community projects; for example, a hydro- economic development of their own communities, even though
ponic farm (tomatoes, spinach, and lettuce) to produce food for this will never be an uncontested process.

commodities). Urban demand generates rural income until the 1970s. Ester Boserup’s (1970) groundbreak-
and creates opportunities for nonfarm income. It also ing scholarship demonstrated that women’s work in
increases pressures on rural areas to produce and con- the household and in subsistence economic activities
tribute more to urban and national economies. More- was discounted in official statistics. As a consequence,
over, in regions where the town can be brought to the development interventions failed to consider women’s
countryside, enhanced possibilities for rural develop- full economic roles and their social and political con-
ment exist (water and sanitation systems, road infra- straints. Boserup’s work inspired the Women in Devel-
structure, regional markets, etc.). opment movement, which gained momentum during
Diversification points to different paths in rural the UN Decade for Women (1975-85) and opened a
development. However, the rural livelihood perspective space for engendering development. In 2007, the UN
has waned in terms of its impact on changing develop- declared October 15 as the International Day of Rural
ment thinking (Scoones 2009). The approach was more Women in Africa (Fig. 5.7). The establishment of the
useful through its descriptions (showing complexity Association of African Women for Research and Devel-
and diversity and assessing good and bad livelihoods) opment in 1977 marked the beginning of efforts to
than its prescriptions of solutions (although pro-poor
tourism is an example of how practitioners are grap-
pling with diversification of livelihoods). For the most
part, proponents failed to articulate a vision of what
future livelihoods should be like. Nevertheless, the
policy implications are that livelihood diversification
trends point to endowing rural people with the skills
they need to escape farming and even the countryside, if
they choose. At this juncture, Africa’s rural future looks
uncertain, but it is clear that substantial displacement of
smallholder agriculture is highly likely. However, the rural
livelihood perspective needs to be reinvigorated to face
contemporary and future challenges.

GENDER IN RURAL AFRICA

FIGURE 5.7 International Day of Rural Women in Africa,
Scholars and development planners paid scant atten- Dogon, Mali. Source: © Jose Luis Cuesta/Demotix/Corbis.
tion to the role of gender in development in Africa Corbis image 42-37181127.
 Rural Africa’ 125

institutionalize gender and women’s studies in the alcohol, and provisioning services). Some women
region. Notable individuals from the region (eg., combine these activities with civil society activism,
Wangari Maathai) also championed the cause of rural while a few concentrate on activism. Some household
gender issues as women began to raise their voices in- duties can be very time-consuming. For example, in
dividually and collectively (Mama 1996). Malawi, women can spend up to nine hours per week
Combined, these efforts prodded the development collecting water, eight times more than men spend
community to question gender-neutral cost-benefit getting water (UNDP 2011). Traditional stereotypes,
assumptions in various development interventions. A however, may not allow men to dedicate more time to
critical development benchmark is the MDGs that un- fetching water without reflecting negatively on their
derscore gender equality; MDG 3 explicitly targets social standing. In general, women’s jobs in the infor-
gender equality and women’s empowerment. mal economy concentrate at the lower end of labor
Feminists contend that African women had to con- markets (in more crowded micro-activities that are less
front “two colonialisms”—that ofthe former European remunerative and with low levels of productivity).
colonialists and that of contemporary men (Urdang Beer brewing, very lucrative in some communities, can
1979). Colonialism produced a patriarchal dividend, be an exception.
although gendered power relations existed prior to the In other regions of the world, men dominate in
arrival of the Europeans. Colonialism was responsible agricultural employment, which is not true in Africa.
for elevating the Victorian and missionary ideal of Women in Africa have relatively high participation
women’s spatial confinement and entrapment to the rates and the highest average agricultural participa-
home to concentrate on childrearing and domestic tion rate in the world. Cultural norms have long en-
duties. Certain colonial policies reinforced patriarchal couraged women to be economically self-reliant, and
dominance. For example, taxes were paid by men, since colonial times, women have assumed responsi-
which encouraged them to assume their “appropriate” bility for subsistence agriculture. Significant geo-
breadwinner/head of household role. In addition, em- graphical variation occurs: women are more heavily
ployment and migration practices targeted male labor, engaged as agriculturalists in the poorest countries
leaving rural women to fend for themselves without and in the most deprived rural regions (FAO 2011).
the traditional African economy support structure. The share of women in agricultural employment
Overall, colonialism led to a decline in women’s eco- ranges from 35% in Céte d'Ivoire to over 60% in
nomic independence and social status. However, the Mozambique and Sierra Leone (FAO 2011:8). (Added
decades following political independence brought to this, time-use studies in agricultural employment
little to halt gender inequalities. reveal that women work longer hours than men.)
While the disadvantages of rural women are un- Official statistics show the share of women in African
equivocal, they were not passive victims. Women have agriculture to be approximately 50%, but it could be
been active individually as well as collectively in exer- higher as women underreport some of their efforts as
cising control over their own destinies, and many par- work (FAO 2011).
ticipate in several spheres. However, their contributions Gender inequality is highly prevalent in African
may go unnoticed because they do not fit the way that agriculture (FAO 2011). The gender gap refers to the
Western minds consider home and work as separate fact that women have less access to productive re-
domains. In rural Africa, much of women’s work sources and opportunities. The gender disparity is evi-
straddles the home-work continuum. Indeed, rural dent in terms of land, livestock, labor, education,
women are active on several fronts, assuming respon- communication and learning activities, financial ser-
sibility for domestic and productive responsibilities vices, and technology.
(childrearing, educational duties, household subsis- Land ownership, the most important household
tence activities such as food preparation, farming, asset in rural Africa, is highly unequally distributed.
and water and firewood collection) and engaging in Women, in general, account for 15% of all agricultural
various income-earning activities (selling food, wood, holders, but there is significant geographical variation
126 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

among countries (women own less than 5% of hold- parity in education but has narrowed the gap only at
ings in Mali but 30% in Botswana and Malawi) (FAO the primary levels. A consequence is that the education
2011). Augmenting landownership inequalities, farms pyramid remains unchanged for African women at
operated by women are smaller, more isolated, and/or higher levels. Women are almost totally unrepresented
closer to home, with poorer soils than those cultivated in professional agricultural management and decision-
by men (Momsen 2004). making positions.
Livestock represent a valuable agricultural asset Access to financial services illustrates another di-
and a guarantee of income in hard times. Livestock mension of the gender gap. These services are vital for
ownership shows large gender differences: men own providing credit and insurance and for enhancing
larger livestock holdings and larger animals (cattle, opportunities to improve agricultural output, to manage
horses, and camels), while women tend to the smaller risk, and to accumulate and retain other assets. Cul-
animals (chickens and pigs) that typically feed on tural and sometimes legal barriers prevent women
household scraps. These differences also carry societal from entering financial contracts and from holding
and symbolic meanings. Horvaka (2012:875) notes bank accounts. Women typically have less control over
that “cattle are admired and respected, reflecting high the types of fixed assets that can be used as collateral
social status and economic wealth of individuals and for loans. Even though microcredit agencies target
the nation; they drive the economy, feature in govern- women, in most countries, the share of female small-
ment development programs, reside in reserved, priv- holders obtaining credit is 5% to 10% lower than that
ileged physical spaces of cattle posts and ranches, of males, and women are able to tap less than 10% of
and mark important social occasions through their available credit (FAO 2011).
exchange. Chickens garner much less attention, wield The use of agricultural technologies (e.g., machines
little status and power, and feature in low-valued and tools, improved plant varieties, animal breeds, fer-
domestic subsistence or impersonal industrial tilizers, and herbicides) also illustrates the gender gap.
agriculture realms.” African women are only half as likely as men to use
Women’s jobs in rural agriculture tend to be more fertilizers. The net result is smaller yields (20%-30%
precarious and less protected than men’s. They par- less than men). However, this does not mean that
ticipate more as subsistence farmers, unpaid workers women are less productive farmers than men (FAO
on family farms, and temporary and seasonal workers 2011), but rather that their productivity levels are a
on other farms. Far more likely to be the lowest-paid function of their weaker structural positions.
workers, women typically are paid less than men for Women-operated farms concentrate on different
the same work, even when they have more experi- crop/livestock mixes, with an emphasis on production
ence. In several contexts (e.g., Ethiopia), the gender for home consumption rather than commercial sale.
division of agricultural labor allows men to specialize For the most part, women grow staple foods, while
in plowing and herbicide spraying and women to men focus on cash crops. This is a function of women’s
weed, and social norms oblige female landholders to exclusion from modern contract farming arrange-
recruit male labor to undertake activities traditionally ments. For example, in Kenya, women make up less
done by men rather than to do them themselves. than 10% of farmers engaged in smallholder contract
The historical bias against girls in education has farming integrated into fresh fruit and vegetable export
resulted in the widest gaps (between males and markets (FAO 2011:13). ;
females) in attendance and educational attainment in Closing the gender gap in agriculture would gener-
Africa among all the world regions, especially in rural ate significant gains for women, the agricultural econ-
areas. In Ghana, for example, male heads of house- omy, and society. If women had the same access to
holds attain more than double the education of their productive resources as men, they could increase yields
female counterparts, and the gender gap is even larger by 20% to 30% (FAO 2011). This could raise total agri-
in many rural communities. MDG 3 targeted gender cultural output by as much as 4%, which could lift
 Rural Africa 127

millions of women and their families out severe pov- Farm activities are divided by gender: men handle the
erty and greatly contribute to food security (FAO 2011). plow, women guide the oxen, girls weed the fields.
Moreover, research shows that when women control Adolescent girls in virtually every rural household
additional income, they spend more of it on food, make significant economic and social contributions,
health, clothing, and education for their children. but they are generally undervalued and uncounted as
Women play important roles in agriculture. productive labor. Working alongside their mothers
Beyond laboring, women are reservoirs of plant and family members, they participate in a wide range
knowledge, especially about seed saving and medici- of economic activities. Their specific farm duties in-
nal applications. They dominate rural retail trade in clude weeding, sorting and pounding grain, collecting
small-scale agriculture, and in some regions (eg., milk and eggs, and gathering wild foods. Their domes-
West Africa), rural women traders are a major link and tic duties routinely involve helping with food prepara-
source of information between rural and urban econ- tion and household chores (e.g., cleaning, collecting
omies and serve intermediary roles in some urban fuel wood, water, and trash). Girls engage in female-
food supplies. dominated informal activities such as petty trade,
drinks/food production, daily wage labor, and infor-
mal construction (Population Council 2010). Some
GIRLS IN RURAL AFRICA:
rural girls move to cities to earn income in informal
ALMOST INVISIBLE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY
urban economies, and moving to a city almost ensures
Children under five have received increased attention that the girl will drop out of school.
in the MDGs, and significant progress has been made Adolescent girls’ duties are time-consuming, leav-
in increasing gender parity in enrollments (but not ing little time and energy to focus on school. In
equality) in primary school education. However, girls extreme cases, girls spend five to eight hours per day
in their second decade remain invisible in the global fetching household water. On top of their many
development agenda. Rural adolescent girls (aged duties, adolescent girls also care for younger siblings,
10-19) face triple disadvantages based on their age, the sick (especially HIV-infected family members),
gender, and location in rural poverty contexts (Chicago and the elderly. Rural adolescent girls therefore carry
Council on Global Affairs 2011). Rural girls are one of heavy burdens, working more than urban girls and
the most marginalized and discriminated-against groups rural boys.
in Africa. The UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
Development scholars have only recently noted adopted in 1945, states that education is a basic
adolescent girls’ lack of human and educational rights. human right for all children. MDG 3 promotes gender
To raise the profile of this issue, the UN launched its equality and women’s empowerment, with specific
first-ever International Day of the Girl on October 11, targets set to eliminate gender disparity in primary,
2012, coinciding with Plan International's campaign secondary, and tertiary education. As of the early
to publicize the denial of education to one third of 2010s, millions of girls are denied the right to educa-
girls globally (half of the girls in Nigeria and Mali do tion, unable to access the knowledge, skills, and capa-
not complete primary education) due to poverty, vio- bilities necessary to take an empowered and equal role
lence, and discrimination (UN Education, Scientific in society. In most African countries, girls have less
and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 2012). These than a 50% chance of attending secondary school, and
campaigns coincided with the UN Secretary-General’s only 5% of girls enroll in tertiary education institu-
launch of an Education First initiative, positioning tions. A girl in North America is more than 15 times
education at the center of the Africa development more likely to have a chance to attend college than a
debate. girl in Africa (Fig. 5.8).
In contemporary African rural environments, ado- Throughout Africa, girls’ drop out rates to grade 5
lescent girls’ lives remain hard, insecure, and fragile. are very high. A number of factors explain girls’ limited
128 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Percent of students at each education level

100%

N. America & W. Europe

Latin America
iEast Asia & Pacific
‘Arab States
:South and West Asia
:Sub-Saharan Africa

Oy val | |
Enroll Complete Enroll Enroll
in primary primary in secondary in tertiary
school school school education

FIGURE 5.8 Percentage of African Girl Students at Each Educational Level.

access to education and their low retention rates. First, girls. For example, perceptions that men feel threat-
poverty poses a severe challenge to educating girls. ened by and are reluctant to marry educated females
Education costs remain prohibitive for many of the are powerful disincentives against breaking the gen-
rural poor, especially large families. Parents must dered norm.
decide how to use their limited resources and how Third, early pregnancy and/or early marriage can
best to provide a secure future for their families. While end girls’ already slim chances of education. The pres-
most African countries have national policies man- sures of motherhood, its stigma for young girls, and
dating free primary education, additional costs (ex- the lack of support mechanisms make it highly un-
amination fees, supplies, and transport) must be likely that girls will remain in school after they give
borne by the family. Families in poverty are highly birth. Some countries (e.g., Malawi, Kenya, Ghana,
vulnerable to poor health, and family illness can force and Liberia) have amended legislation to safeguard
a girl to drop out of school. Unfortunately, tough the right of young mothers and pregnant girls to
choices have to be made, and sacrificing girls’ educa- remain in school, but this legal right is unenforceable
tional opportunities and ultimately their chances in in remote, deprived rural school districts.
life is all too common. Fourth, sexual behaviors can hinder girls’ educa-
Second, social and cultural norms (within house- tion. Sexual violence at school can force girls to drop
holds, communities, and societies) that disadvantage out. Reported sexual abuse rates among girls are alarm-
girls are entrenched. Villages, ethnic groups, religious ingly high: case studies report rates as high as 30% to
orders, and national communities bolster gender 50% in some rural African contexts (Africa Child
norms. Within households, boys are often valued as Policy Forum 2011). Transactional sex, found to be
future family heads and providers, whereas girls are common in some severe poverty contexts where sex is
typically regarded as temporary family members be- used to raise money to pay for schools as well as luxury
cause they are expected to join another family at mar- items (clothes and perfumes), has been shown to be
riage. For many parents, the choice not to spend negatively correlated with school completion.
money on girls’ education is supported based on how A number of African governments have imple-
far education supports or threatens traditional roles for mented child-friendly policies. For example, Uganda
 Rural Africa 129

has introduced universal secondary education polices CONCLUSIONS

that target parity in secondary school enrollment.
Rural development is very important for Africa’s future.
However, an enormous education challenge exists
Several decades of large-scale, one-size-fits-all initia-
throughout the region. Nine out of ten countries of the
tives have failed to produce rural development. The
world with the worst gender disparities in education
bottom-up local approaches of the last 15 years have
are African countries—Niger, Mali, Ethiopia, Burkina
also failed to reduce poverty at the macro scale. There
Faso, Eritrea, Guinea, Togo, Mozambique, and Benin
are a plethora of ideas and approaches on how to meet
(UNESCO 2010). In these countries, life is especially the rural development challenge. There is considerable
tough for rural girls (Table 5.2).
debate and some controversy about whom, what, and
Girls’ obligations outside of school have high where to prioritize. The most controversial of all is the
opportunity costs for themselves, their households, introduction of an African GR and GM crops, which
their communities, and their national economies. nevertheless is gaining traction.
Whether they drop out of school, become victims of While there is broad support for the MDGs,
sexual violence, and/or marry early, these factors have there is a need to sharpen and extend targets and
major repercussions on their ability to realize their to be more geographically sensitive to place and cul-
full potential as contributing, empowered members ture. Compelling arguments can be made that there
of society. Girls’ adolescent experiences reverberate should be more attention to adolescent girls, and
for generations. Unequal education means unequal a better focus on education outcomes at all levels
job opportunities, made worse by social and cultural is necessary (rather than a sole focus on primary
norms that hinder women’s entrepreneurship and education). Of course, the MDG approach is not the
limit their participation (outside of prostitution) to only game in town, and rural development initia-
the most crowded and least profitable economic activ- tives are also needed in tourism, livelihood diversi-
ities. Enabling girls to gain an equal position in soci- fication, and other sectors (see Chapterl0 for a
ety begins with equal educational opportunities and discussion of food, and land challenges).
attainment. Education may be the policy arena where the
broadest agreement can be reached. A focus on im-
proving education and making it more relevant could
TABLE 5.2 RURAL GIRLS’ LIVES IN ETHIOPIA greatly add to national economic growth by making
1% are registered at birth rural residents more productive. However, the state of
education in rural Africa is appalling and is the worst
71% have less than five years of education
in the world. Some 31 million children are not in
47% never attend school
school, and the numbers are projected to increase (van
40% work for pay before age 15 Fleet and Watkins 2012). African countries that have
91% fetch water conducted education assessments show that many
schoolchildren are not learning reading and math
Over 50% did not know about menstruation before it happened;
25% managed menstruation by sequestering themselves in
skills to a fourth- and fifth-grade level (van Fleet and
remote place (fields, forests, and deserts) Watkins 2012). Current economic and financial opti-
mism at the national level needs to be tempered by the
58% report having experienced clitoridectomy (female genital
reality of underlying structural problems in education.
mutilation)
Investing in education and in making education more
41% are married and 5% are divorced/widowed
relevant is important so that the skills of the rural pop-
81% have an arranged marriage ulation can be upgraded and future workers can be
Misconceptions about HIV are common better prepared.
African governments and their development part-
Health workers only reach 19%
ners should not underestimate the long-term conse-
Source: Chicago Council on Global Affairs (2011:39). quences of continued poverty and gender inequalities
130 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

in rural areas. Tacking the educational crisis is going to Available at http://www.acbio.org.za/index.php/

require a holistic and integrated approach: African publications/rest-of-africa/371-understanding-
governments must implement policies that reduce the-impact-of-genetically-modified-crops-in-africa
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achieved using a single strategy or a single paradigm. and Development. New York: Routledge.
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 CSHPAIP TEsRee6

AFRICA’S MOBILE PHONE REVOLUTION

Informal Economy, Creativity, and Informal Spaces

INTRODUCTION
revolution has been nothing short of spectacular in
Informality looms large throughout Africa. Informal- transforming economic, social, and political activities.
ity captures different ways of social life, forms of living, Though less spectacular, a rise in computer imports,
working, and operating outside the mainstream. The especially used devices that are repurposed, has been
vast majority of Africans work outside of the formal noteworthy in reducing the digital divide and sparking
economy, live in informal housing, and conduct busi- a plethora of informal information technology busi-
ness without using banks. Outside of governments’ nesses (e.g., email, remittance, Web-based tourism en-
regulatory purview, informal Africans rely heavily on terprises such as slum tours) and other spin-offs (e.g.,
friends, family, and favors. Making do, being entrepre- harvesting precious metals from used computers and
neurial and creative, and tapping into new technolo- operating “419” Internet scams). In societies where in-
gies that have been developed for the base of the frastructure is thin and land lines are sparse (and often
economy are essential to their everyday lives. not working) and where governments have controlled
For a long time, informality had negative connota- the flow of information as well as its content, the con-
tions of being small-scale, oriented toward mere sur- temporary technological revolution is unprecedented.
vival, and devoid of innovation and creativity. Many Technological innovation is emanating from Africa’s
still hold this perspective and maintain that the infor- informal economy. Various prototypes are under devel-
mal economy is in dire need of formalization as well as opment (e.g., ishacks, solar-powered toilets, devices
transformation by expert ideas (often originating from attached to bicycles that can recharge mobile phone
well-paid economists with international reputations batteries), and these contributions are increasingly
and/or business consultants who advise on how to being recognized, adapted, and supported internation-
eradicate it). More recently, however, the perspective ally. For example, the Ushahidi platform is an innova-
that aspects of the informal economy are a crucible for tive solution born in Africa that was introduced to
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity has gained monitor election violence in Kenya and but has devel-
ground. It has taken 40 years since Africa’s informal oped into a platform for grassroots activism, citizen
economy was “discovered” by Keith Hart (1973) (in his journalism, and geospatial information that is easily
research on informality in Accra) for a balance of narra- accessible by an Internet-connected public. Since its
tives on informality to emerge. introduction in 2008, the Ushahidi platform has been
African’s massive uptake of information technology refined, improved, and deployed over 40,000 times in
has caught the world by surprise. Africa’s mobile phone 159 different countries (Ushahidi 2013). Like everywhere

135
136 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

else in the world, technology is embraced by young THE PAST 40 YEARS OF INFORMAL
people, who use the technology to bypass the inefficien- ECONOMY EVOLUTION
cies in existing systems. Some of their output (e.g., slum AND SOPHISTICATION IN AFRICA
mapping) is used to challenge aspects of the status quo
Most experts recognize that informal activity has always
and municipal failure to count every citizen. The techno-
been around, and it was a major characteristic in the de-
logical uptake has gone some way toward digital inclu-
velopment of all early and medieval cities. In colonial
sion by universalizing the use of communication
Africa, informal economic activity was tolerated but
technologies to boost autonomous and continuous
frowned upon, and two separate economies and cultures
learning, enabling users to perform basic Internet re-
were recognized (Myers 2011). In independent Africa,
search and to tell their stories first-hand. Technology is
policymakers focused on enlarging the formal economy
lowering the barriers of entry for everyone to get in-
and neglected the rest in the hope that informal activity
volved and to be heard and connected. For example,
would eventually disappear. Industrialization in Africa
many of Nairobi’s Matatu buses (informal privately
was expected to lead to the demise of traditional/marginal
operated transport vehicles) are equipped with free
activities. However, the opposite transpired: African
Wi-Fi. Technology has become a very important vehi-
industrialization failed to took root, and instead informal
cle to advance the inclusion ofAfrican informals.
work expanded in scale and scope and became deeply en-
In the 21st century, informality encompasses ac-
trenched. Eighty percent of Africans now find employ-
tivities that cut across many realms of social, eco-
nomic, and political life. However, it is the economic ment in the informal economy (OECD 2009).
arena where scholarship is most developed. Various Study of the informal realm in Africa begun in ear-
terms (e.g., “shadow economy,” “black market,
Meu
un-
nest in the early 1970s. At that time, scholars and poli-
derground economy,” and “system D”) have been em- cymakers believed that the informal realm was a
ployed to capture this enlarged scope, and instances separate sector. Hart's (1973) research showed that the
where a local informal activity is part of an international urban poor engaged in petty capitalism as a substitute
network. The term “system D” has a French African/ for wage employment, from which they were excluded,
Caribbean origin as a slang phrase (originating from the but their work was articulated to economic activities
word débrouillard) that describes the resourcefulness and beyond their place of residence. As failures of modern-
ingenuity of informal entrepreneurs engaging in busi- ization became more apparent, it became evident that
ness and livelihood strategies. informality was not a temporary phenomenon but
Subsisting, resourcefulness, improvisation, self- rather a permanent fixture that needed to be reckoned
reliance, and using social networks to substitute for capi- with. The informal arena came to be recognized as a
tal and other deficiencies are essential components of the wider sphere that provided coping and survival mech-
informal life. In general, the informal economy is enlarg- anisms for the poor in terms of housing, health care,
ing more than the formal economy. Portions of the in- food, employment, and social life.
formal economy are among the most dynamic sectors of A massive expansion of the informal economy co-
the global economy: for instance, the growth rate of incided with the introduction of liberalization policies
some businesses in the informal economy in South and the tilt toward markets from the mid-1980s
Africa is estimated to be higher than that of the world’s onward and the corresponding retreat of the state from
top-performing national economy (Neuwirth 2011). providing housing, employment, and social protec-
Major international organizations now recognize the in- tion. During this era, governments’ over-emphasis on
formal economy as contributing to the global economic the private sector and free markets resulted in a neglect
output, although its measurement is very difficult. The of the informal economy, culminating in a colossal
informal economy is expected to expand, and the Organ- “elephant in the room.”
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development In the 1990s, an expanded definition of the informal
(OECD) projected in 2009 that by 2020 it will encompass realm was adopted. The informal economy was defined
two thirds of the world’s workforce. as encompassing all forms of informal employment that
 Africa's Mobile Phone Revolution 137

are (in law or in practice) not covered, or insufficiently

covered, by formal contracts. The extended definition
moves beyond simply describing unregistered individuals/
enterprises to shedding light on their invisibility by an
acknowledgment that many workers are not protected
by labor and/or social legislation. There is a con-
tinuum from the informal to the formal ends of the
economy and thus the two sides are interdependent;
the informal economy is not an isolated sector (as it
was considered in earlier eras), and it affects all aspects
of people's daily lives. Many workers operate with con-
fidence in the informal economy but lack government
protection (Meagher 2003).
FIGURE 6.1 Informal Street Selling in Soweto, South Africa.
In the 21st century the informal economy continues
to be a hot topic for policymakers, activists, and re-
searchers. The large share of the workforce that remains
outside the world of full-time, stable, and protected
employment makes it an important and timely issue
(Rogerson 2007). The last decade has seen a fresh interest
in the informal economy worldwide and in its social and
technological dimensions. Internationally, this renewed
interest is also attributed to the fact that contrary to the
predictions and intentions of many economists’ policies
of regularizing the informal economy (by registering,
taxing, and enforcing municipal codes such as health
and safety), implementation of these policies has not
resulted in its disappearance. Instead, it has expanded
massively on a global basis, sheltering retrenched work-
FIGURE 6.2 Informal Production in Soweto, South Africa.
ers and permanently accommodating and providing
livelihoods for the masses. Informal employment is
growing faster than formal employment, and liveli- without the contribution of and reliance on informal
hoods within the economy are highly differentiated: workers and their entrepreneurial activities. World-
there are survivalists, entrepreneurs, exploiters and the famous architect Rem Koolhass (2003) offers an opti-
exploited, and all shades of in between that operate mistic evaluation of informality as the genesis of a city
from discrete spaces (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2). of the future, whereby informal agents demonstrate
The informal economy has emerged in new guises large-scale efficiencies in constructing living spaces
and in unexpected places, even on the streets of devel- and creating livelihoods. Through a lens of living sus-
oped countries. Conventional wisdom that street com- tainably, informals use resources more efficiently and
merce belonged to a bygone era, and was only a their activities incorporate more sustainable use of
characteristic of an early stage of urbanization, has resources, with heavier use of recycled and repurposed
been overturned. Some (e.g., Davis 2006) even suggest materials. In the words of Koolhass: “Lagos [Nigeria] is
that the opposite is transpiring and that the formal not catching up with us. Rather, we may be catching
world now depends on the informal one. According to up with Lagos.” There is an emerging consensus that
Davis (2006), our urban future is one of a “planet of informalization is a mode of urbanization as well as a
slums” with only islands of formal spaces. There are constituent part of rural development rather than an
claims that the formal economy would grind to a halt exception (Lindell 2010; Roy 2005).
138 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

MAJOR INFORMAL ECONOMY DEBATES subordinate units to formal entities, and informal work-
Vigorous debates about the informal economy have ers serve to reduce the costs of labor and represent a
been going on since the 1980s. As with all fundamental labor reservoir that more powerful entities can draw on
social questions, one’s ideology affects the question and (Breman 1996; Castells, Portes, and Benton 1989;
points to particular answers; thus, early on there was Moser 1978). Horizontal networks rather than efficient
little consensus and much more confusion on what to bureaucracies are seen as more important in shaping
do with informality. Four main perspectives on the the organization of life of the working poor in the de-
veloping world. Structuralists propose that there should
causes of informality and the best course of action have
been identified. be more equitable linkages between the formal and in-
First, dualists (e.g., Hart 1973; Tokman 1978) empha- formal economy and social and labor protection for
size the mismatch between people’s skills and the needs informal workers. Collective organizing by informal
of the formal economy. Subscribing to a regressive view of workers to engage in policy discussion is deemed es-
the informal economy, they view informal enterprises as sential (Lindell 2010).
operating on the basis of involution rather than entrepre- Debates among the different perspectives have gen-
neurship (lacking solid business practices, particularly the erated more heat than light, and each perspective
separation of personal and business finances). Dualists focuses on only certain aspects of the informal economy
emphasize “up-skilling” and participating in a regularized rather than taking a holistic perspective. Dualists focus
market structure (“learning by doing”), as well as govern- on those engaged in traditional and survival activities;
ment support, as critical mechanisms to bridge the gap structuralists emphasize petty traders and producers
between the two economic worlds. and subcontracted workers; and both the legalists and
The legalist perspective (De Soto 1989, 2000) un- voluntarists concentrate on informal enterprises and
derscores the inadequacies of regulatory systems: infor- entrepreneurs. The informal economy is, however,
mal entrepreneurs find it necessary to operate outside more heterogeneous and complex than any individual
the official system because of its excessive red tape, the perspective can shed light on. Under close scrutiny, the
burdensome costs of registration, and their lack of mosaic of each livelihood is a complex one.
know-how about operating an enterprise in the formal Informality is best conceptualized as encompass-
sphere. Strong arguments are made that the poor hold ing a series of transactions that connect different econ-
assets tied up in informal property, not legally recog- omies and spaces to one another. However, without a
nized and so not leveraged: “dead capital” (De Soto clear consensus on how to engage with informality,
2000). Uncertainties surrounding ownership of such policymakers and planners risk dealing with only a
assets prevent individuals from lending or borrowing portion of informality at a surface level. This can pro-
against their real value. De Soto’s logic advocates con- tect the status quo as well as the interests of a small
verting these assets into formal property so that entre- minority (slumlords, labor brokers, subcontractors,
preneurs (in waiting) can be unshackled. and exploitative firms) that benefit most from the cur-
A third perspective, the voluntarist school, sees rent impasse.
micro-entrepreneurs choosing to operate informally to
avoid taxes, commercial regulations, electricity and THE AFRICAN INFORMAL ECONOMY

rental fees, and other costs of operating formally ON THE GROUND

(Maloney 2004). Inadequate human capital consigns African economies are different from economies in
workers to the informal economy. Microfinance and the Global North in that the informal economy is
mentorship and training programs are proposed to much more significant in Africa. African labor markets
promote broader and more extensive engagement are much less segregated, and it is common for people
with the formal economy. to hold multiple jobs and work in different sectors
The fourth perspective, the structuralist one, argues and different locations at different parts of the day.
that informal workers and informal enterprises are Some workers even switch between the informal and
 Africa's Mobile Phone Revolution 139

formal economies in the same workday. It is, however, Traditionally, the informal economy was perceived
more common for a formal worker to participate in as comprising mainly survival activities. Its negative
the informal economy as an income-boosting strategy. aspects were highlighted, ranging from undeclared
For example, a health professional can work at a labor, tax evasion, and unregulated enterprises, to
national health facility during the day but make house more serious illegal activities. Some of this indeed
calls at night; or a secretary at a formal firm can make takes place, but the vast majority of activities in the
jewelry at home in her off time (Owusu 2007; Portes informal economy provide goods and services whose
and Castells 1989). In Africa, people routinely have production and distribution are quasi-legal. Not all in-
multiple livelihoods conducted in different spaces formal activities are for survival purposes.
(Owusu 2007). The informal economy includes legal and irregular
The informal economy encompasses heterogeneous operators. The informal minibus taxi or “tro-tro”
activities and spaces. The informal economy comprises a system of public transportation is a good example of
range of workers, from self-employed persons (street the mix of legality and irregularity: regulations pertain
traders are the largest group in Africa, home-based work- to the vehicle (vehicles are registered and drivers are
ers the second largest group) to informal enterprises licensed but not always insured), but the mode of op-
(often with less than five to 10 full-time workers) eration and the operator are unregulated. Some gov-
and other informal wageworkers (e.g., casual, part-time, ernment officials (e.g., police officers) often enforce
unpaid family members and subcontracted homework- informal arrangements or “daily tickets” (as they are
ers or industrial outworkers). Formal firms can reach called in Nigeria) for the non-harassment of informal
inside informal spaces to employ homeworkers in man- street hawkers and to ensure that their goods are not
ufacturing, retailing, transportation, and construction confiscated. It is reasonable not to include criminal
(Grant 2010). The informal economy is located every- activities in the standard conceptualization of the
where: in markets, on the streets, in informal industrial informal economy to avoid stereotyping the informal
areas, in parts of formal dwellings (so-called “boys’ economy and conflating it with the criminal economy.
quarters”) and in both upscale and low-income residen- Obviously, criminal activity occurs throughout the
tial areas (in informal additions or backyard shacks informal-formal continuum.
that accommodate home-based enterprises or renters) The bifurcation of the economy finds its spatial
(Oosterbaan, Arku, and Asiedu 2012). equivalent in the neat separation of informal from
The informal economy is characterized by: formal residential areas (Myers 2011). However, the in-
formal economy does not operate just in slums: it is
¢ low entry requirements in terms of capital and ubiquitous. Although informal settlements can be hives
professional qualifications of informal economic activities, some of which are con-
¢ small scale of operations (often family-organized) fined to the local slum economy, other activities are in-
e skills often acquired outside of formal education tegrated into a wider space. The phenomenal growth of
e labor-intensive methods of production and adapted slums in Africa since the 1980s—they now house 62%
technology of Africa's population (UN-HABITAT 2003—is a striking
e highly varied hours of operation and wages development. UN-HABITAT (2003:12) describes the
e heavy reliance on mobile phone technology physical characteristics of slums as having inadequate
e lack of regulation (for the most part) access to safe water, inadequate access to sanitation and
e frequent reuse and repurposing of materials other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing,
¢ clientele based on personal contacts overcrowding, and insecure residential status (Fig. 6.3).
e prices that are generally negotiable between the According to Becker (2004), 80% of non-agricultural
seller and buyer employment, over 60% of urban employment, and over
e financial support and credit based on personal net- 90% of new jobs reside in the informal economy. There
works as opposed to bank or government-backed credit is an absence of non-farm employment opportunities in
¢ many work-related injuries. rural Africa. Women, in particular, are overrepresented
140 AFRICA, GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Official attitudes to the informal economy vary from

being benign or mildly positive to showing open hos-
tility and antagonism (Potts 2008). Street traders have
been harassed in many African countries, with polit-
ical leaders claiming that itinerant street activities are
untidy, unhygienic, and not compatible with a modern
city. Slum dwellers have been evicted under the guise
of nonpayment of rent by unscrupulous politicians
who are in cahoots with land investors (Otiso 2002).
To complicate matters, informal workers have little
FIGURE 6.3 New Shack Construction, Soweto, South Africa.
in common (eg., street hawker, scrap worker, con-
struction worker), and there are many different labor
in the informal economy. The poor construct their arrangements within the informal economy. Breman
own houses (often using recycled materials) and often (1996) underscores that poverty can be endlessly
invent their own jobs as self-employed workers in franchised and the poor can be very exploitative of
a wide range of production and service activities. The each other; some of the exploitative relations are even
uptake of mobile technologies has been unprecedented. conducted at arm’s length by agents and nonvisible
On average, African informal economies contribute owners, who can even reside in different countries or
42% of gross national product (Schneider 2005). regions. The informal e-waste international economy
Informality as a mode of organizing society was cer- is a good example of the web of distant and specialized
tainly around in 19th-century Europe, and there are players who engage in the commodity chain (recy-
some parallels with contemporary African informality. cling, shipping, refurbishment, repurposing, local col-
But contemporary African informality dominates soci- lection, burning, metal extraction and re-exporting),
etal relations to a degree that it never reached in indus- with huge differences in work conditions and reward
trializing and urbanizing Europe. The European past structures. Some parts of the chain are never in contact
does not reflect the African present: informality in the with other parts, and no one entity controls the entire
region is now manifested in new forms and new geog- chain (Fig. 6.4). Many Africans are not living in worlds
raphies, both at the rural-urban interface and in terms “unto themselves” or leading lives divorced from
of developments that may serve as a principal avenue to wider global, national, and urban processes.
property ownership and livelihoods. Perceptions of in-
formality have changed from being a marginal activity
performed by destitute people to acknowledging African
informals as articulated but differentially integrated into
society. The informal economy simultaneously encom-
passes flexibility and exploitation, productivity and
abuse, aggressive entrepreneurs and defenseless workers
(Castells, Portes, and Benton 1989). Some contend that
politically underrepresented, socially stigmatized, and
culturally repressed people are overrepresented in the
informal economy (AlSayadd 2004).
Engagement with informality is difficult for plan-
ners and policymakers. Informal spaces seem to be the
exception to planning, lying outside its realm of con-
trol. In a very real sense, informality is the object of
development, a seemingly natural phenomenon that is FIGURE 6.4 E-waste in Accra, Ghana. Photograph by
external and alien to those studying it and managing it. Martin Oteng-Ababio.
 Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution 141

INTERNATIONAL INFORMAL ECONOMY consequences: such as digital dumping and may have
ENTANGLEMENTS: E-WASTE IN AFRICA contributed to an escalation in cyber crimes.
Electronic waste (e-waste) is now a US$7 billion global Monthly estimates of e-waste shipments to Ghana
range from 300 to 600 40-foot-long containers (each
industry (Grant and Oteng-Ababio 2012). E-waste gen-
with 2,390 cubic feet of storage space) arriving at the
erated in the United States and Western Europe is in-
creasingly being dumped in Africa. E-waste is defined as port of Tema, just outside the capital, Accra (Grant and
Oteng-Ababio 2012). Government import policies were
discarded, surplus, obsolete, or broken electronic de-
vices that enter the waste stream but are subsequently developed with working computers/electronics in mind
reused, resold, salvaged, recycled, or disposed of (Grant and without adequate consideration of nonworking de-
vices. The 1992 Basel Convention was developed to
and Oteng-Ababio 2012). E-waste encompasses obso-
help regulate trans-boundary movement of hazardous
lete computers, refrigerators, televisions, mobile phones,
wastes, making it illegal to ship hazardous materials
and other devices that are discarded in one country and
from the developed world to the developing world.
shipped to unsupervised dumpsites in other parts of the
There are ongoing efforts to strengthen the Basel Con-
world. The United Nations Environment Programme
vention; under consideration is the Ban Amendment,
(UNEP 2005) estimates that 50 million tons of e-waste
which aims to close a loophole by restricting countries
is generated globally per year, an amount equivalent to a
from exporting hazardous wastes intended for recovery,
line of dump trucks stretching halfway around the globe.
recycling, or final disposal. The geography of e-waste
Large e-waste sites are found in several African countries,
dumping is disguised by the comingling of working de-
including Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Céte d'Ivoire, Kenya,
vices and nonworking devices in shipments, making it
and South Africa. South Africa is the only country in the
virtually impossible to monitor shipments and the
region with formal e-waste recycling capacity.
movement of e-waste through different jurisdictions.
E-waste became a visible environmental issue in
One of the most high-profile e-waste sites in Africa
the 1990s as governments in Western Europe, Japan,
is Agbogbloshie, a large slum in the center of Accra, the
and the United States set up e-waste recycling systems
capital and largest city in Ghana. This e-waste site
but did not have the capacity to deal with the vastly
emerged after 2005, and e-waste has expanded to
expanding quantities of e-waste. Global Northern
dominate and engulf the slum, providing employment
players began the process of exporting the problem to
for more than 5,000 workers. The international media
developing countries, where laws to protect workers as
have produced exposés of e-duimping at this site (e.g.,
well as the environment are inadequate and not en-
Frontline's “Ghana Digital Dumping” [2009]) and local
forced. The economics of e-waste recycling means that
social media are playing an active role in monitoring
the cost of glass-to-glass recycling of computer moni-
illegal shipments and dumping (e.g., E-Waste Watch
tors in the United States is 10 times more than the cost
Ghana on Facebook).
in Africa, making the business of dumping very profit-
Greenpeace researchers (Brigden et al. 2008) empha-
able as well as expedient (even after factoring in ship-
size the local health and environmental consequences
ping and agent fees). At first international e-waste
of e-waste toxicants wafting into the immediate atmo-
exports converged on China and other locations in
sphere and leaching into soils, the lagoon, and the
Asia, but by the early 2000s e-waste was also being
nearby sea. E-waste generates significant toxicity risks
routed to urban “wastelands” in Africa.
(posing serious threats to human and environment
African policymakers facilitated the region’s entry
health), especially in low-technology informal back-
into the e-waste business. For example, the government
yard processing and the unregulated dumping of toxic
of Ghana implemented a policy in 2004 to “bridge the
components. Exposure to hazardous chemicals can
digital divide” by reducing the import duty to zero on
cause acute damage to the lungs, kidneys, and other
used computers; the country thus became a popular site
vital organs as well as increase cancer risks and lead to
for e-waste shipments. The national policy encouraging
cognitive impairment in children. Illegal dumping also
one laptop per child/household yielded unintended
poses a security risk at the end of a commodity chain,
142 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

with potential lack of security of data drives and even present (computer specialization is clearly evident, but
cyber-crime threats. It is no coincidence that Ghana is mobile phones, refrigerators, and other devices are also
recognized as a major hub of cyber-crime activity, espe- repaired). Thirty-six individual stationary scrap buyers
cially Internet scams. Numerous Internet scams (e.g., (with weighing scales) participate as intermediaries be-
lotto, inheritance windfalls, business or export ven- tween the collectors and the main scrap dealers. Many
tures, employment, and invitations to visit Ghana) are collectors hire pushcarts on the site on a daily basis for
disseminated by young, tech-savvy “entrepreneurs” US$1.39. Trucks are available for hire from particular Old
based in the region. Fadama vendors for transporting larger loads (too heavy
E-waste processing and dumping are not isolated to to be lugged by human power), but upfront rental costs
the Agbogbloshie slum. E-waste processing, open stor- are prohibitive for many collectors. E-waste burning takes
age, dumping, burning, and extracting scrap metals take place on the outer fringes of the settlement, furthest away
place at the site, but these activities are part of a wider from human settlement. A range of ancillary services has
space economy with hierarchies as well as specialized grown up around the e-waste and scrap market to serve
niches (Fig. 6.5). An informal e-waste economy center- workers (“chop bars” [local informal eating places],
ing on the settlement has expanded in recent years. As mosques, and various enterprises for renting carts and
of 2012, some 30 electronic device repair facilities are trucks for picking up and transporting e-waste).

£ E-Waste Burning
TV-Radio Repair
fin Scrap Dealer
f' Middlemen
nf Main Middlemen
t. Chop Bar
é& Transport
C Mosque
af Scrap Dealers Assoc.
Gf) Public Bath and Toilet.

FIGURE 6.5 Agbogbloshie, Accra, Ghana. Source: From Grant and Oteng-Ababaio 2012:12.
 Africa's Mobile Phone Revolution 143

Warehousing and scavenging take place through- of new commodities (Lepawsky and McNabb 2010).
out Accra as well as other urban centers in Ghana. Im- For example, the minerals extracted from e-waste burn-
porting of e-waste and exporting of scrap metals derived ing can be bundled and sold as inputs to make iron
mainly from burning computers both occur via Tema; rods in formal industry or ground down as powder and
these scrap metals are sent to companies in Asia and sent to plants in Germany and China, where traces of
Europe. A web of activities constitutes the e-waste econ- precious metals can be extracted from the residue, and
omy: global agents and brokers, importers, warehous- this metal can be sold to formal firms. Agbogbloshie
ers, backyard processors, waste and metal intermediaries, thus functions as a site of informal work activity within
itinerant buyers, waste pickers, small-waste sellers, the international e-waste exchange.
second-hand electronics markets, formal/informal in- E-waste circulates through a hierarchically organized
dustrial representatives, and exporters (Grant and space economy with very different occupational and
Oteng-Ababio 2012). As such, materials disposed of as wage structures. In livelihood terms, e-waste collectors
e-waste in one location (e.g., the United States) become are daily-wage laborers who earn, on average, US$3.50
sources of value in Ghana when commodities are trans- per day, about two and half times the average income of
formed through reuse, repurposing, and/or breakdown informal economic workers in Ghana. Collectors in-
as raw materials for primary inputs for the production volved in dismantling and recovery earn an average of

BOX 6.1 THE DIVERSITY OF INFORMAL more developed economy status and townships as marginalized
WORKERS, SOWETO TOWNSHIP, spaces accommodating a marginalized labor force. Unemploy-
SOUTH AFRICA ment is high in Soweto and hovers (unofficially) at 50%, with lim-
ited local employment opportunities. High township population
Soweto is the best-known and largest township in South Africa.
growth and influxes of international migrants, some of them
Townships were created under colonial/apartheid policies that
more skilled than the local people and willing to work for lower
separated groups on the basis of race, and they became infa-
wages, add additional pressure. Often the complexities of spatial
mous during the apartheid years as icons of poverty, oppression,
arrangements are underappreciated, such as the way the proxim-
and despair. Townships largely performed residential dormitory
ity and density promote social networks and township milieus
functions (without an internal business and commercial role,
that enable informal entrepreneurial endeavors (e.g., sourcing
although under-the-radar businesses always operated) and
recycled materials for local suppliers for production processes,
housed workers (not firms) who performed jobs in the “white
labor pooling arrangements among township firms, and securing
city.” Everyday township life under apartheid included broken
family and friends’ help as needed).
families, flimsy shacks on dusty streets, lack of infrastructure, and
Despite the challenging context, workers find diverse employ-
acute poverty.
ment opportunities inside the township as well as outside of
Soweto is located in southwest Johannesburg, some 14 miles
Soweto. There are three general patterns. First, there are work-
(22 km) from Johannesburg’s central business district. It has
ers who participate in the township’s informal retail economy as
become the largest “black city” in South Africa. In a concerted
street sellers and hawkers, selling everything from curios to
effort to begin to normalize townships, it was officially incorpo-
pirated DVDs to bottled water. A smaller subset engages in in-
rated into the greater Johannesburg metropolitan area in 2001.
formal production in a number in township industrial estates
The township comprises 43% of Johannesburg's population (ap-
(e.g., making furniture and clothing, constructing fences and
proximately 1.7 million people) but contributes only 4% of total
gates for burglar-proofing). Many have no option but to become
economic activity (largely based on estimates of formal activi- self-employed workers who use their home as a base (known as
ties) (Grant 2010). Soweto has grown to become a diverse resi-
home-based enterprises) (Gough, Tipple, and Napier 2003).
dential area, ranging from upper-middle-income areas to many Home-based workers concentrate on retailing, preparing food,
more low-income areas, and it also contains several informal
building shacks and offering services, running hair salons and
settlements or slums. Shacks are still a ubiquitous feature in
shebeens (informal drinking establishments), and doing auto re-
many residential areas (200,000 people live in backyard accom- pairs; there are also traditional healers selling medicine and
modation in Soweto; Crankshaw, Gilbert, and Morris 2000:845). treating patients at home.
Informal work in Soweto operates in the context of historical Second, the dominant spatial pattern is for informal workers
factors such as the legacy of apartheid policies and South Africa's to leave the township to obtain employment in the city beyond
(Continued)
144 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

workers are active in the informal economy. Informal work is

BOX 6.1. (Continued)
done at home, in the worker's block or neighborhood in Soweto,
as domestic help, gardeners, security guards, and low-skilled elsewhere in Johannesburg, or at a variety of locations; workers
workers. These informals remain at the beck and call of more engage the urban economy at all spatial scales. The working
powerful individuals who demand chores and favors, and this spaces of the urban poor are more extensive than can be identi-
activity necessitates extensive travel to work. fied in any uniform spatial narrative or single perspective.
A third group comprises individuals and families excluded Work involving the retail and the food and beverage industry
from formal and informal opportunities. To cope they emphasize is heavily home-oriented. Small-scale manufacturing activities
self-help and mutual aid and their ability “to work” at making (furniture, arts and crafts, shack construction, brick making) also
friends and contacts (i.e., create social capital). In South Africa take place in the vicinity of the home. Individuals in domestic
(in contrast to the rest of Africa) the state allocates grants for services, tourism, and transport work mainly outside of their
child support, pensions for the elderly, and disability grants. Aid neighborhoods—particularly in other parts of the township or
is nominally targeted to individuals (based on disability or paren- elsewhere in Johannesburg. Construction and transport workers
tal status), but it is widely known that funds end up supporting are the most mobile. Some skilled workers are moved from site
more than the recipient. Typically larger, multi-generational to site by contractors, but other daily construction workers have
households pool their resources (e.g., shelter, state grants). In more unstable work. Multisite work is also common: for about
some instances links can extend to rural and international house- 20% of workers, work is split between two sites (e.g., making
holds in support chains, and relatives with HIV/AIDS can hide crafts at home but also at a fixed market site) (Grant 2010).
away and receive some support in urban homes. Relationships Soweto is the best-established township near Johannesburg's
are cemented for better (and sometimes for worse) when fami- central business district (compared with newer and more remote
lies devise several strategies to amplify their income, such as urban informal settlements), but the Sowetan evidence demon-
renting rooms and space (when available). strates that even historically marginalized poor residents are
Figure 6.6 illustrates the diverse engagement of Sowetan in- connected to a wider space economy (albeit incompletely
formal workers. It is clear that the informal economy encom- incorporated).
passes diverse places, workers, and sectors, and the township

Joburg- South
Gauteng Africa International

Chemicals

Fashion

Construction

Furniture

Machinery

Printing

Metals

Pottery

Tombstone

Recycling

Repairs

Retailing

Other J
Peete Los 20.95

FIGURE 6.6 Spatiality of Work by Sector in Soweto, South Africa.

Source: Grant 2010, p. 605.
 Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution 145

US$8.00 per day, but incomes vary significantly. Another statistics. Most informal economy data are derived from
factor in the different income levels is the fact that pre-
(1) surveys that sample a portion of the population;
cious metal recovery rates vary widely: recovery rates can (2) government estimates that rely on incomplete em-
be very low for gold but as high as 85% for copper. ployment data, enterprise registrations, and tax records
Youths under 15 years of age earn as little as US$20 per (countries do not collect data on informal enterprise and
month. At the top of the informal income ladder are informal workers); and (3) other proxies. Proxies such as
scrap dealers specializing in used computers, who earn electricity consumption and membership in informal
around US$50 per day. Just below them are “the middle- worker organizations (e.g., scrap dealers’ organizations)
men,” making US$20 to $35 per day (but whose earn- provide additional limited information (restricted by
ings can rise to US$80 on a good day). These people common phenomena such as illegal electricity taps and
purchase scrap (e.g., copper, brass aluminum, iron) in non-affiliation with member organizations). Some of
bits from the recyclers and subsequently sell it in bulk to the most reliable and insightful observations are derived
the dealers, who in turn sell it to refinery industries and from household and individual interviews.
exporters. Refurbishment produces a steadier but smaller Research on household finances, such as paying for
income stream; earnings average US$7 per day. Workers the costs of housing, routinely necessitates separate in-
at the upper end of the informal hierarchy have more terviews with different household members to obtain
regular working hours as well. accurate data on income and spending: agreed-on bud-
gets have been shown to differ widely among family
members (Grant 2009). Of course, besides employment
DYNAMISM, CREATIVITY, AND INFORMALITY
income, other income sources come into play, such as
Poverty is widespread in Africa: 51% of the population— credit given by informal shopkeepers; loans from family
763 million people—exist on US$1.25 per day (World members as well as loan sharks; inheritances; remit-
Hunger Organization 2012). Population pressure and tances; community support; charity; “gifts from the
the spectacular growth of slums is leading to speculation grace of god” or from “an aunty”; income from irregular
that large mega-slums (slums housing 1 million people) work; income brought into the household from working
are emerging in cities such as Lagos and Kinshasa (Davis children; and payments in kind (e.g., neighbors sharing
2006). Life is bleak for many people operating in pre- food or food derived from urban agriculture). House-
carious circumstances, and resourcefulness is a key strat- hold budgets are very fluid and show significant variabil-
egy for survival. ity in time and space, making it hard to calculate what is
Researchers identify the “wage puzzle” (the gap be- actually circulating within the informal economy.
tween what is reported in official statistics and what The sum of money circulating in the informal
individuals have at their disposal) in Africa to account economy is immense. For example, the daily cash turn-
for how workers could possible survive on such meager over of 5,000 to 8,800 informal traders in a Durban
sums. The wage puzzle grapples with the complexity market ranks just below that of the largest shopping
and unpredictability of income streams and sheds center in the city (Brown 2006). Migrant remittances
light on fluid household budgets, especially relevant to Africa rose to US$40 billion in 2012, surpassing for-
to extended family situations (e.g., on the one hand, eign aid flows to the region (see Chapter 7 for a de-
heads of household can pay he school fees for relatives tailed discussion of remittances). Most of these flows
and allow extended-family members to live rent-free; are targeted at keeping families afloat (e.g., paying for
but on the other hand, in different households ex- food, housing, school, and health care), and some
tended-family members can be charged rent and even funds are used for business start-ups. Commonly,
expected to pay to use household toilet facilities or con- family members earning aboard set up a relative in a
tribute to household budgets). Household finances are bootstrap enterprise and participate in profit-sharing.
highly complex and politicized. Simone (2010:3-5) provides a rich description
Given the complexity of the informal economy, of the rhythms of the city and the multiple use of
it is hardly surprising that there is a dearth of reliable space, 24 hours a day. He describes the Oju-Elegba
146 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

neighborhood and market in Lagos where, when the MOBILE PHONES: “THE NEW TALKING
day's commerce recedes, different kinds of night oper- DRUMS” OF EVERYDAY AFRICA
ations are visible. Local government, trade associa-
Following the first mobile call in Africa in 1987, the
tions, police and security companies, and sanitation
uptake of mobile phone technology in the region is
crews are officially in charge of the market, but their
taking place at an amazing speed and scale, leading
oversight withers during the night hours. At 3 a.m.
many to describe the adoption and adaptation as “a
there are many activities going on, unlike most Global
mobile phone revolution” (Carmody 2010; Porter
Northern urban spaces at this hour (with the excep-
2012). From slums to remote villages, Africans use
tion of fast-food outlets and entertainment venues).
mobile phones in hundreds of ways beyond voice
Simone (2010:4) paints a vivid picture:
communication: to email, bank, text, send money,
Small stalls sell huge marijuana cigarettes next to tweet, send and receive public health or emergency
those that sell votive candles and batteries through- messages, monitor elections, check market prices for
out the night, and then there are sales of rice, ciga- agricultural commodities, search the Internet, and
rettes, laundry soap, and batteries throughout the access educational content (Etzo and Collender 2010)
night as well as cooked meals, many stalls specializ- (Fig. 6.7). Africans also perform everyday activities
ing in regional cuisines. Pharmaceuticals, charms, such as taking photos, making films, watching televi-
and local medicines are hawked both by ambulatory sion, and accessing Facebook. Activists can take ad-
sellers and various forms of makeshift stalls. Set back vantage of the range of functions on mobile phones to
further along the streets are stores whose histories plan campaigns and respond quickly to unfolding
have known hundreds of functions and whose identi-
events.
ties even now fluctuate according to the time of the
The mobile phone market in Africa is thriving,
day. At this hour, hardware stores become outcall ser-
with approximately 642 million phones and a 65%
vices for sex workers delivered to almost any location
penetration rate (penetration rate is the number of
in the surrounding vicinity; a small business center
takes calls and sends out a fleet of young repairmen
phone subscribers per 100 people) (Biosca 2012). Sub-
on motorcycles for various domestic emergencies scription rates range from 70% in Reunion to 1% in
such as broken water pipes or shorts in overtaxed Burundi (Carmody 2010). Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria,
electricity distributors that often occur when too and Tanzania are the early and principal adopters of
many households try to connect to a branch line. mobile phone in the region.
Schools that teach computer classes during the day
host all-night prayer meetings next to bars and small
discos, next to a small law office which at this hour
serves as a kind of floating “design workshop,” where
a local politician holds court soliciting ideas, plans,
drawings, and models for new housing develop-
ments, roadways, drainage systems, and a host of
small improvements in every aspect of life in the area.

Informals demonstrate a remarkable inventiveness

in creating places that support a wide range of endeav-
ors and aspirations, even in the face of dilapidated and
poor conditions and government neglect. These pur-
suits have continued for decades. Most informals strive
to “do the right thing” under harsh conditions: chil-
dren are nurtured, clothed, and fed and sent to school FIGURE 6.7 Bedouins using a Laptop and a Mobile Phone
(many of them charge fees in slums, as public schools in the Sahara. Source: © Philippe Lissac/Godong/Corbis.
are located elsewhere). Corbis image 42-46297569.
 Africa's Mobile Phone Revolution 147

This expansion of technology represents a dra- and can encourage more rural dwellers to come to the
matic reversal ofAfrica's “black hole” in terms ofinfor- city in search of jobs (Porter 2012). Information tech-
mation networks that prevailed in the 1990s, when nology can promote communication among a vast
Manhattan accounted for more landlines than the Africa network—not only those located in the region,
entire African region (Castells 1998). However, the use but increasingly incorporating the Diaspora.
of mobile phones differs from that in the Global Economically empowered individuals such as
North: many users operate within a mobile footprint, family heads and business owners are often “beeped,”
accessing phones on an as-needed basis (at mobile signifying their centrality in social and financial net-
phone kiosks or village phone desks), and many sub- works and their ability to place calls. Mobile compa-
scribers share phones, some possessing their own or nies do not approve of beepers jamming networks,
even several SIM cards, and others rent SIM cards to given the high network priority for voice, however.
use in phones borrowed from family members or Telecoms such as Vodacom Tanzania responded by
friends or at commercial phone points. Therefore, rolling out a beeping replacement with a free text mes-
there are many more users than subscribers in Africa. sage, and subscribers can send three “please call me”
In many contexts in the region, mobile phones are messages per day. Despite such creative ways to mini-
more a communal instrument than a personal instru- mize phone charges, these costs remain a burden on
ment, but this is changing as intense competition poor people: poor South Africans spend 10% to 15%
among providers is driving prices down. Mobile of their incomes on mobile phones, and it is unclear
phones are progressing from simple communication whether their livelihood strategies benefit in a propor-
tools into service delivery platforms. Mobile coverage tionate way (Carmody 2010).
is increasing and mobile platforms are enlarging. The People have even devised creative ways to deploy
rollout of 4G services and the introduction of afford- phone and prepaid airtime vouchers. Sending prepaid
able smartphones (under US$50-$90) are expected to vouchers between an urban and rural location has
have a further transformative effect in the coming become a vehicle for transferring money. It works this
years. There are projected to be 160 million mobile way: an individual wanting to remit money to the vil-
broadband connections by 2016 (Deloitte 2012). lage buys airtime, but rather than loading it into the
Most Africans still use prepaid services with low- phone, he or she calls the shared village phone opera-
end phones, but a high cost per unit of time means that tor and reads the code. The operator purchases the air-
people have developed creative ways of communicat- time for the village phone, and the transfer is complete
ing. Africans have devised “beeping” or “flashing” as a when the operator hands over the money, minus a
means of communicating via phones: the caller dials commission, to a specified recipient.
but hangs up before the call is answered so as to avoid The informal economy is a crucible for mobile
a phone unit charge. Typically a beep is used to send a phone innovation and entrepreneurship. Long-distance
message such as “call me back,” but callers and receiv- trade networks have always been important in many
ers can established a predetermined message such as African contexts, and mobile phones create new pos-
“pick me up” or “I have arrived at my final destina- sibilities for facilitating communication within supply
tion.” “Flashing” is a way to promote relationships at a chains. They are very beneficial in situations where
low cost: it reminds distant call recipients of ties and of long-distance travel is onerous and time-consuming
obligations with minimal effort (Porter 2012). For ex- and road accidents are common. Face-to-face contact
ample, rural dwellers have a way of communicating is particularly significant in African social and business
with urban migrants or relatives (who are assumed to contexts, so phone communication serves as a substi-
have more resources) (Porter 2012). By giving phones tute, in part, for travel, but it has made a greater impact
to rural relatives, urban dwellers can change extended- on eroding the role of intermediaries in conveying
family dynamics. It can discharge some obligations to messages. Overall, it is taking time to consolidate trust
rural kin and reduce the number of journeys to rural in the technology in African business contexts where
areas. It can also strengthen family ties across space legal contacts do not exist and social capital is based
148) AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

on face-to-face contact. However, major industrial

players are converging on this space and, in time, in-
dustry and consumers may feel assured that their data
are secure, guaranteed, and well administered. Impor-
tantly, the technology allows for great efficiencies in
exchanging all kinds of information (e.g., market in-
formation for agricultural commodities and between
rural herdsmen and urban livestock traders, feedback
about unscrupulous operators, updates from key
buyers, and customer promotions), it reduces travel
(and the carbon footprint), and it leads to a boost in AL
productivity. Deloitte (2012:45) reports that an in- weve — ‘ po

crease of 10% in mobile penetration increases gross

FIGURE 6.8 Mobile Banking, Nairobi, Kenya.
domestic product growth by 1.4% in Africa. Source: Corbis image 42-46179058.
The ubiquity of mobile phones is being matched by
an expansion of value-added services and m-commerce.
M-commerce is helping Africans to make the transition Mobile money transfers (m-banking) has put East-
from an exclusively cash economy in the informal em and Southern Africa within the forefront of the
sphere and one in which savings took place under the global mobile money industry. The M-Pesa (“m” stands
mattress, in jars, and in secret hiding places to an for mobile and “pesa” is the Swahili word for money)
m-money economy, where funds can be accessed, saved, mobile banking system in Kenya is at the vanguard.
and transferred in digital space. Mobile money systems Open to people who do not have bank accounts, it has
are being introduced to Africa’s unbanked population developed into a system that is accepted by over 100
(roughly 80% in 2013) and offer great potential for partnering organizations (e.g., banks, media houses,
financial inclusion (Ericsson 2012). One of the most government agencies, microfinance institutions, and
innovative developments is the mobile wallet, which insurance companies) (Fig. 6.9).
creates a smartphone-based equivalent of a physical M-Pesa allows its customers to access account in-
wallet, a cloud or SIM-based collection of financial, formation, buy airtime, save money, receive payments,
personal, and identification information that an indi- pay electricity bills, receive/pay salaries, purchase
vidual wants to carry based on his or her budget and goods, make donations, and withdraw money at ATMs,
technical abilities. Mobile wallets use digital currency and UK citizens can use the system to send remittances
or bitcoins, and they are emerging as the leading edge (up to UK£1,000 per month) to relatives in Kenya.
of grassroots financial revolution. Uptake has been fast From 2007 to 2012 the M-Pesa customer base has ex-
in Kenya and Tanzania (Fig. 6.8). panded to cover 17 million users.(more subscribers
A large informal economy has emerged to support than bank-account holders in Kenya).
the mobile sector, with individuals selling airtime; Mobile phones have become deeply embedded in
charging, fixing, unlocking, and renting devices; and many aspects of Africa society, and the swift uptake has
selling accessories. Mobile services that travel to cus- led to the description “the new talking drums of every-
tomer bases by bike with phones and spare batteries day Africa” (De Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and Brinkman
have emerged in rural areas. In addition to adding 2009). Upwardly mobile money is turning parts of
vibrancy to the informal economy, a critical mass of Africa's informal economy into a cashless society.
technologists, entrepreneurs, and activists experiment- There are some creative examples of rural Africans
ing with new ideas in the mobile sector is emerging. using mobile phones to link with distant clientele. Van
Mobile operators also invest in civil works, extending Beck (2009) documents an indigenous healer from
their networks to rural areas, building roads, and tural northern Cameroon who is using the technology
bringing electricity to remote areas. to expand his business operations beyond his rural
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150 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

locality to Douala and Yaoundé (Cameroon) and even project had added 28 novels, five Shakespeare plays,
as far afield as Paris. The mobile phone allows for treat- and 11 poems, suggesting the potential of technology-
ment sessions without face-to-face contact. The patient enhanced learning in Africa.
describes the ailment and after the consultation pays a Despite improvements in information flow, access
fee that is transferred via the phone. Upon receiving is still stratified, in many ways mirroring the way that
the payment, the healer mails the products; each pack- employment is stratified. Employers and middlemen
age is labeled with a different number. When the pa- own smartphones, while many non-full-time employ-
tient receives the packages, he or she is instructed to ees, apprentices, and family laborers cannot afford a
phone the healer; the patient is informed what the basic handset, let alone the running cost. In addition,
numbers stand for and is given detailed instructions on this greater use of information technology appears to
how to administer the products. The client is expected be enabling larger businesses and players to capture
to memorize the instructions so that the secret healing customers from smaller firms (Carmody 2010). Fears
formula is not written down. The healer checks back are also raised that the bitcoin currency is more
with the patient in two weeks; if the patient is feeling untraceable and may facilitate more under-the-radar
better, he or she is expected to send a final “gesture of activities and illicit transactions. On balance, mobile
appreciation” based on what he or she can afford. phones offer great transformation potential, but chal-
This is still early days to assess the full social lenges remain to scale up many of the initiatives in
impact of mobile phones and whether they are truly banking, health, education, agriculture information,
benefiting the poor. In rural Africa mobile phone ser- and to provide more locally based content.
vices represented the first modern telecommunica- M-money goes a long way toward enhancing fi-
tions infrastructure of any kind. Mobile phone use has nancial inclusion by assisting Africa’s unbanked popu-
become part of everyday life in many African countries, lation to engage in convenient and affordable money
even in poor households (Porter 2012). Without doubt transfers (the transfer fee in Kenya is US$0.04). It pro-
mobile phones connect rural and urban Africans and vides an alternative to bank transfers and couriers.
extend family responsibilities by facilitating remit- Africans no longer have to walk long distances to their
tance flows to relations like never before. Obviously, nearest financial institution or fear being turned away.
mobile phones make people feel more important and Using mobile money services means that traders and
connected, reduce rural isolation, offer numerous ad- travelers do not have to conceal their cash and run the
vantages to workers and the self-employed, promote tisk of robbery and theft. It is clear that m-commerce is
digital inclusion, allow autonomous and continuous being primed to occupy an even bigger part of every-
learning, and enable users to perform basic Internet day lives.
research and use common applications (e.g., spread-
sheets, text editors). Mobile services allow workers to
USHAHIDI: BUILT IN AFRICA
search for employment with online job postings in-
FOR THE WORLD
stead of depending on word of mouth and personal
networks. Kenya is a technological and creative hub for applica-
Pilot projects have shown that the technology can tions for the base of the economy. It is home to the
be applied to enhancing literacy. For example, the Yoza Ushahidi system (which means “testimony” or “wit-
Project (South Africa) developed an episodic novel in ness” in Swahili), an open-sourced platform for
English and isiXhosa. Readers were invited to interact grassroots activism, citizen journalism, and geospa-
with an unfolding story, through discussions about the tial information. Developed by an ad hoc group to
evolving plot, and vote on the story, as well as submit facilitate grassroots reporting of violence following
a written sequel for a competition. During the first the elections in Kenya in 2008, it collected eyewitness
seven months, two stories had been read over 34,000 reports of violence reported by email and text mes-
times on mobile phones, surpassing South African sages and placed them on a Google map. The basic,
bestseller sales criteria of 4,000 units. By 2013 the low-cost system was developed by four Kenyans,
 Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution 151

experts in either software development or blogging

Ushahidi is planning on releasing a BRCK device
(Erick Hersman, Juliana Rotich, Ory Okolloh, and (a backup generator for the Internet) in 2013. This
David Kobia), and their tech-savvy networks during a US$215 device (which includes postage to anywhere
very short period (see the WhiteAfrican [2010] blog on in Africa) caters to the unpredictable state of Internet
the three days of intense collaboration). Since 2010 iHub connectivity in much of Africa. This smart, rugged
(Nairobi) has provided physical office space for the device (which can withstand humidity and dust)
Ushahidi organization. allows continuous Internet connectivity (switching
Today Ushahidi is a nonprofit tech company, spe- seamlessly between Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and 3G/4G con-
cializing in developing free and open-source software nections, allowing users to switch from one network to
for information collection, geovisualization, and in- another) and creates a hotspot for multiple devices
teractive mapping. Ushahidi builds tools for democra- (up to 20) while plugged in or running on battery
tizing information, increasing transparency, and power. Over US$172,107 was raised on the crowd-
lowering the barriers for individuals to share their sto- funding site Kickstarter to develop the device, showing
ties. Through Crowdmap.com, Swiftly.org, and accom- how global funding can be raised for technological de-
panying mobile applications, Ushahidi is expanding velopments for the base of the African informal
its global footprint and making crowd-sourcing tools economy.
available at no cost (Fig. 6.10).
The platform is capable of accepting input from
SMS text messages and/or Internet-based Web forms DESIGNING SUSTAINABLE PROTOTYPES

while simultaneously creating a temporal and geospa- FOR AFRICA’S INFORMALS

tial archive of events. It is now the most widely used Considerable effort is being devoted to designing sus-
platform for local-level geospatial reporting. tainable or green innovations for Africa's extensive
Ushahidi has been deployed throughout Africa informal environments. From toilets to solar panels,
and the world in 40,000 projects in 157 countries from fire-retardant building materials to the integra-
(Ushahidi 2013). It has been deployed within Africa to tion of urban gardening into dwelling units, diverse
monitor elections and xenophobic outbursts, to track efforts are under way to improve the lives of the urban
the availability of medicines, and as part of emergency poor, reduce their dependence on costly inputs (build-
response efforts. It has given rise to a new phenome- ing materials, long-distance fuel, and food imports),
non, the African citizen-journalist, who is both an and ease negative environmental impacts (e.g., pollu-
observer and an active participant in events. Outside of tion of air, water, and soil). International competitions
Africa, it played an important role in emergency to champion new innovations are becoming common,
response efforts in Haiti, Afghanistan, and Chile. For and donors are committing support for these pilot
example, after the 2010 Haitian earthquake, individuals projects. For instance, the Bill and Melinda Gates
sent text messages reporting the locations of survivors; Foundation funded several seed projects to reinvent
these locations were mapped and used in search-and- the toilet and to develop a new sanitation solution for
rescue efforts. Global corporations have also deployed the world’s poor (typically harnessing solar power and
the technology. For instance, Al-Jazeera used the plat- clean water solutions) (Gates Foundation 2014).
form to monitor elections in Kenya, obtain citizen- Housing models for the poor have been prioritized
journalist reports from Somalia, and to gather Ugandans’ (in much the same way that housing has been the
reactions to the Kony 2012 campaign. focus of traditional urban development policies).
There are increased efforts to mainstream sustainable
building designs (including methods of construction

Ushahidi and the incorporation of local materials) to address

various aspects of slum living conditions. Three green
prototypes are the US$300 shacks, earthships, and
FIGURE 6.10 Ushahidi Logo. ishacks.
152 " AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

The US$300 housing challenge—to design and

build more sustainable dwelling units for the poor—
received international acclaim. The challenge, launched
by Harvard Business Review in 2010, was the brainchild
of Vijay Govidarajan, a Dartmouth business professor,
and Christina Sarkata, a marketing consultant. The
Harvard Business Review set up a competition “to design,
build, and deploy a simple dwelling which keeps a family
safe from the weather, allows them to sleep at night, and
gives them a little bit of dignity” (Govindarajan 2010:1).
The objective was to replace unsafe and unsanitary
dwelling units with a sustainable prototype solution
that could be mass-produced and built from local
materials. Students, architects, and businesses com-
peted to design the best prototype of a one-room pre- FIGURE 6.11 An Ishack. Photograph: Sustainability Insti-
tute, Stellenbosch University.
fabricated dwelling, equipped with solar panels,
water filters, etc. The concept won the Thinkers50
Breakthrough Idea Award (2011), an Oscar-like award settlement in Stellenbosch. The Bill and Melinda
for innovative thinkers’ ideas with potential to change Gates Foundation has provided funding to retrofit 100
the world. shacks, and there are plans to build ishacks in Ghana
A second effort is the earthship model. Largely the and Tanzania.
brainchild of environmental activist Michael Reynolds, The ishack model is a sustainable modification of
the prototype is being introduced into Africa. Built by the basic corrugated-iron shack. The design strives to
sweat equity, earthships promote living within an en- protect occupants from extreme temperatures, and a
closure that integrates the environment. Using solar central feature is a roof solar panel to provide basic
energy (no heating or air-conditioning is required) energy needs (with capacity for two interior lights, a
and local harvesting of water and recycled materials motion-sensitive exterior security light, and a cell
(old tires packed with dirt, aluminum cans, discarded phone charger). Windows are strategically placed for
appliances), these off-the-grid structures eliminate re- optimal air circulation and‘sunlight heating, while the
liance on public utilities (electricity and water) and roof is sloped so that rainwater can be harvested during
fossil fuels. African examples include the Sierra Leone winter months. Recycled cardboard boxes and “Tetra
Earthship School outside of Freetown (established in Pak” containers are used for insulation between the exte-
2011) and the Kapita Earthship Community Center in rior zinc surface and the interior, while a flame-retardant
northern Malawi (established in 2013). The Malawi paint is used to lessen the risk of fire. Inside the shack,
project is the most ambitious African undertaking, with rows of recycled bricks create a sturdy flooring base,
plans to build a rural community center (incorporating serving as a “thermal mass” and protection against ex-
a community bank, a library, a health facility, offices, treme temperature change. Excluding the solar power
and a food bank) to serve 38 villages (5,000 people) in system, an ishack costs approximately US$660.
an area lacking basic infrastructure, off the development However, critics argue that the techno-housing-fix
grid, and with a low presence of nongovernmental green experiments are divorced from the realities of
organizations (NGOs). social process, culture, and power (Swilling and Annecke
A third example is the ishack (“improved shack”) 2012). They may provide a straightforward business
initiative developed by the Sustainability Institute solution, but they fail miserably as social solutions.
of Stellenbosch University in collaboration with the They promote the misconception that a ready-made
City of Stellenbosch (South Africa) (Fig. 6.11). Ishack standardized housing strategy “fits all” of the poor
models have been introduced in Enkanini, an informal in Africa. Housing prototypes cannot be inserted in a

>
 Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution 153

cut-and-paste logic, and the complexities of property self-builders. Such a change would transfer the oppor-
demarcation and land ownership rights are not ad- tunity of coming up with creative solutions away from
dressed. In many slums, some dwellings accommodate the poor to large corporations, elite universities, exter-
extended families, and in older slums many buildings nal entrepreneurs, and global innovators. Replacing
have been in families for generations. Importantly, infor- incrementally self-built houses with ready-made pre-
mal dwellings, for the most part, are not self-contained fabricated models could be likened to the introduc-
residential units: many function as industrial work- tion of the mass-produced British bungalows into
shops, classrooms, and shops, and various additions colonial Africa. Indeed, the 20th-century experience
provide accommodation for paying tenants. Such struc- with public housing experiments in the United States
tures facilitate trade, production, service, and residential and Europe provides a telling lesson of good ideas and
activities—often simultaneously. Indeed, informal con- good intentions going awry. Housing experts since the
struction is an important neighborhood economic activ- classic work of John Turner (1976) have advocated
ity, providing employment to shack builders, providers that the poor should be deeply involved in building
of recycled building materials, electricity installers (in- their own houses (deciding what to build and how)
formal), and informal real estate brokers. and that the state, NGOs, and the private sector should
The availability of mass-produced houses may well be enablers rather than direct providers of houses
turn the poor into consumers and away from being (Yeboah 2005).

BOX 6.2 COMMUNITY-LED ENUMERATIONS the British Army, but land tenure was never formalized. Over the
AND MAPPING: COUNTING LIVES AND years other tribes moved into the area and paid rent to Nubian
BUILDING COMMUNITY IN KIBERA, KENYA landlords, and over time Kibera became ethnically diverse. It de-
veloped into a vibrant community often thriving with numerous
There is a growing trend of civil society organizations working
informal enterprises, health clinics, schools, churches, mosques,
with the urban poor to engage in community-led enumerations,
movie theaters, water vending points, and pay-showers and
mapping, and other efforts to make informal life and practices
latrines. Until recently, the area was not classified accurately on
more visible to mainstream society. Obviously, this is a complex
official maps: its land-use designation—as forest—was com-
relational topography that encompasses relationships among
pletely out of date.
NGOs, local branch affiliates, and members of the urban poor,
Although it was heavily studied and represented in fiction
who constitute a community of diverse identities, interests and
(e.g., Michael Holman’s [2007] Last Orders at Harrods: An
goals.
African Tale) and film (e.g., John le Carré’s [2005] The Constant
There is, however, some remarkable evidence of particular
Gardener included several scenes filmed on location in Kibera),
slum communities organizing within this context to use the city
public information was sparse and few research findings were
as a platform to connect their housing issues with the global
shared directly with the community. The media typically reported
world beyond. An important example of community-led map-
only violence and evictions in Kibera, so that internal community
ping initiative took place in the Kibera slum in Nairobi.
resources remained largely unknown to the public as well as to
Map Kibera is an open-source community map that has devel-
the residents. The dynamism of the community meant that any
oped into a comprehensive interactive community information
preexisting map of the community's layout was outdated: the
effort. For many years Kibera, located on 550 acres (223 hect-
adding of new structures and the tearing down of older ones
ares) of government-owned land, 3.1 miles (5 km) southwest of
meant that the spatial layout was always evolving.
Nairobi’s central business district and minutes away from
In 2009 13 trained members of the community initiated Map
UN-HABITAT’s headquarters, was an illegible slum (missing from
Kibera to produce an open-source community map in real time.
official maps) and therefore an invisible area to urban planners
Initial funding was secured from Jumpstart International, a U.S.
and the public. Population estimates varied wildly, ranging from
NGO, and from local development partners, Social Develop-
200,000 to more than 1 million. The dense and overcrowded
ment Network, Carolina for Kibera, and Kibera Community De-
settlement narrative dissuaded any attempt to tackle slum up-
velopment Agenda. Surveying with GPS devices enabled the
grading on the basis of its large population.
community team to record spatial data and produce a free and
Historically, the land was given to members of the Nubian
open digital map of the community. Recording the settlement’s
tribe (the word kibera in the Nubian language means forest or
footprint in terms of buildings and infrastructure using hand-
jungle) during the colonial era in exchange for their service in
held GPS units uncovered an intricate community of buildings,
(Continued)
154 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 6.2 (Continued) against women and AIDS/HIV vulnerability). The girls’ security
layer of Map Kibera illustrates the kind of practical information
that can be produced by members of the community to enhance
safety (Fig. 6.12).
Map Kibera has stimulated the development of offshoots such
as Kibera News Network and SMS monitoring of services and
incidents. Kibera News Network is a citizen video journalism
program where citizen-reporters use hand-held video cameras
to cover stories not covered by the mainstream media (e.g.,
local electricity disruptions). These Kibera projects are not just
about the products: most importantly, they empower slum
dwellers by allowing them to participate and create local knowl-
edge that begins to change the broader political context that
surrounds this community. Participatory and open technologies
are an important tool to help marginalized communities to am-
plify their voice. The success of Map Kibera has stimulated
grassroots efforts to map other neighborhoods in Nairobi,
Dar es Salaam, and Kampala, and an ambitious community proj-
FIGURE 6.12 Map Kibera. Source: © OpenStreetMap. ect is under way to map the entire country of Swaziland.
The first Map Kibera recorded a population of 170,070, but the
2012 version shows that the number of residents has increased to
firms, and services. Once that reference network was created, 250,000. The initial population number was dramatically lower
the mapping process was divided into four key themes: health, than the figure assumed by the City Council of Nairobi and inter-
security, education, and water. Subsequently the map incorpo- national development organizations, who commonly portrayed
rated initiatives reflecting community concerns such as mapping Kibera as one of the largest slums in Africa. Map Kibera’s major
safe and unsafe pedestrian routes for girls (bringing attention to contributions were to make the community more legible to resi-
lighted/unlighted spots and safe places for girls to access gender- dents, planners, civil society, and other organizations and to de-
targeted resources, such as literacy, counseling, and vocational mocratize spatial information and to allow the community to
training). This community initiative also contributed to other create their own content. The Wiki platform offers a mechanism
goals, such as raising awareness about women’s safety (violence for initiating a discussion about more inclusive spatial planning.

BOX 6.3. SLUM TOURISM AND SHACK CHIC: there can be greater transformative possibilities. A deeper level
ARE THEY GOOD IDEAS? of engagement is provided in “volun-tourism,” which seeks re-
ciprocal benefit for both tourists (e.g., gaining cultural experi-
Slums are not typically thought of as tourist sites nor shacks as a
ences) and host community residents (e.g., receiving assistance
fashion and design style icon. Nevertheless, slum and township
to repair or construct housing or preserve vital resources). Slum-
tours (also referred to as “reality and poverty tours”) have
dwelling hosts are recruited (and compensated) to provide del-
emerged as niche tourism in recent years. From community
egates with the opportunity for social gatherings, to present
tours in Kibera to showcasing township eating establishments
their domestic and exterior spaces in their own voice, and to
such as Mzoli’s Butchery in Gugulethu (Cape Town) to historical
showcase general life and community initiatives (which often in-
walking tours in Ga Mashie (Accra) to overnight stays (e.g.,
volve microenterprise projects); some programs also include
township B&Bs in Soweto) to bicycle tours and adventure sports
short home-stays. Specialized programs organize micro-finance
(e.g., bungee jumping in Soweto), outsiders have a growing
excursions for matching donors and recipients in socially respon-
number of opportunities to observe and engage slum communi-
sible investments. More commonly, donors connect with com-
ties at graduated levels, depending on the program. Kibera, for
munities in virtual space. For example, Kiva is an U.S.-based
example, is marketed as “the friendliest slum in the world” by a
NGO that solicits loans of US$25 and above and brings together
local tour operator.
lenders and needy participants to alleviate poverty. Socially re-
These mainly for-profit programs seek to provide learning ex-
sponsible investors have supported Kiva-sponsored projects in
cursions that offer some form of “meaningful” encounter be-
many African countries (e.g., Benin, Cameroon, The Republic of
tween the tourist and the host. Some programs explicitly aim to
Congo, DRC, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, South Sudan, Togo, Uganda,
move beyond tourists and visitors toward a delegation model,
and Zimbabwe.)
mindful of providing greater sensitivity in the encounter so that
 Africa’s Mobile Phone Revolution 155

Along with poverty tourism, an interior design style emanating

poor-inspired entrepreneurial and tourism-focused projects cre-
from South African slum communities called “shack chic” is
ates badly needed jobs, allows money to flow to marginalized
being promoted. Craig Fraser (2002), a freelance interior design
communities, emphasizes positive and creative practices, and
photographer, captured artful images of Cape Town shack interi-
begins to deflect entrenched negative stereotypes.
ors in a book entitled Shack Chic, which has become a coffee-
table best-seller and an inspiration for curio and clothing
designers (Fig. 6.13) (Grant 2012). Shack chic curios (e.g., radios
made from recycled materials such as wire and Coca-Cola bottle
tops) are sold in various tourist shops and markets across Africa.
This styling provides an illustration of how the patched-together
life of slum dwellers finds artistic expression within the domestic
interiors of some of their homes. The display of color and
vibrancy by using recycled materials with an Andy Warhol flair
provides a strong visual. The most striking examples of shack
chic have become staging points on township tours in South
Africa, whereby tourists facilitate and reproduce this style in the
global imagination. Shack chic is a new culture-scape involving
the spatial reimagining of shack living, leisure, and tourism that
provides an alternative to conventional depictions of dirt, pov-
erty and suffering.
However, there are serious debates about slum tourism and
the repackaging of slum interiors as shack chic. Poverty chic
treads the finest of lines and can easily be perceived as insensi-
tive and complicit in doubly marginalizing informal subjects.
There are strong arguments against poverty safaris, the aesthetici-
zation of the domestic spaces of poverty, and unleashing informals
into a branded world where their communities become yet an-
other site to be consumed. A counter-argument is that supporting FIGURE 6.13 “Shack Chic”. Photograph: Craig Fraser.

CONCLUSIONS also changed the way social networks operate (most

visibly expressed by “a lot of more talking and a lot less
The informal economy can no longer be considered a
walking”). Several Africa countries are at the vanguard
temporary or abnormal phenomenon. It provides em-
of embracing a mobile technological future. There are
ployment to almost half of all workers in the world
more than 50 mobile tech hubs in Africa where entre-
(Neuwirth 2011), and it supports most Africans. Far
preneurs, innovators, and investors are focusing on
from being a disorganized residue of petty capitalism,
finding local solutions for the most pressing regional
parts of the informal economy are vibrant, creative,
issues. Kenya stands out as a center of mobile innov-
and innovative. There has been an unrealistic expecta-
ation; it represents the origin of the Ushahidi plat-
tion that economic development would be highly
form, which has been globally adopted. The uptake of
organized and subject to bureaucratic regulation and
mobile wallets in East Africa has been so fast that some
measurement, with local, national, and state govern-
speculate about a bitcoin (cashless) society emerging,
ment at the center. Instead, economic development in
with informals at the leading edge. In addition, Africans
Africa has taken place outside of these conditions, and
are using available technologies to engage in commu-
informality remains misunderstood by governments,
nity mapping, blogging, and first-hand reporting. How-
donors, and the general public.
ever, despite the hype about a grassroots democratic
Mobile phone providers and mobile phone appli-
transformation, the jury is still out on whether mobile
cation entrepreneurs are embracing the business pros-
phone technology can facilitate an alternative type of
pects of deploying their technologies in the informal
politics and social change. To date, Africans seem to use
economy. The uptake in mobile phones in Africa has
the technology more as consumers and learners than
been unprecedented. It has enhanced freedom but has
156 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES
OF CHANGE

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 Colm
ZAP TE Is 7/

MIGRATION

INTRODUCTION
well-defined overland route of West African Muslims
Africans have always demonstrated a high propensity traveling to Mecca has been important for a long time.
for geographical movement, a trend that appears to be Mobility and migration go beyond the movement of
intensifying in the contemporary era. Archaeological, people: there are nonhuman and nonmaterial aspects.
genetic, and historical records reveal evidence of sig- Ideas and values also circulate and migrate. Migration
nificant mobility and movement across as well as out dynamics have affected greatly the development of soci-
of Africa. The immense human consequences of 100 or eties throughout the region, influencing economic, cul-
so Africans walking from the region and beginning the tural, religious, and political systems. Migration has
processes of human settlement some 130,000 years added and subtracted to, and divided, places depending
ago, leading to the emergence of regional civilizations, on a range of other factors.
is the most fantastic consequence of mobile Africans Many migrants are drawn to cities to take advantage
(Reader 1999). Africans’ oral histories are embedded of economic opportunities; often family members will
with narratives of mobility. The rapid urbanization join the migrant once he or she has secured an urban
that is well under way in the region is just one recent livelihood. The character of a region is an important
manifestation of African people on the move. consideration in the decision to move: the presence of
Different types of movements and different mobil- affiliated ethnic/religious or political groups, relative
ity rhythms occur. Nomadic pastoralists, healers, trad- safety from persecution, and tolerance are important
ers, artisans, artists, adventurous individuals, and others pull factors. Although flows to the largest cities are slow-
move back and forth between two places or among sev- ing, flows to middle-sized and small settlements are
eral locations. Some movements are linked to seasonal gathering speed, and some migration back to rural areas
thythms in hunting, fishing, market commerce, and, is taking place. Still, the largest cities are particularly at-
especially, agriculture (eg., pastoralists relocate for tractive to younger, ambitious migrants, those wanting
water and fodder, and agricultural workers move to less oversight from tribal chiefs or family heads, and
keep up with harvests and migrate to towns in the off those seeking alternative living options. Patterns of mo-
season); some are for survival (e.g., during droughts) or bility appear to be increasing and undergoing some
related to a life-cycle process (e.g., students) or family change: some older patterns are decreasing and newer
income diversification (e.g., male laborers moving to ones are emerging. For example, over the last two de-
work in mining). Other circular movements are linked cades, women have been participating more in urban
to religious obligations and pilgrimages. For example, a migration flows, and human trafficking has become a

159
160 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

massive illicit global industry: Africa accounts for ap- second largest concentration of refugees (after Asia)
proximately one third of all global trafficking cases. (Forced Migration Online 2013).
A good proportion of migrants are pushed to move Efforts to collect data on migrants center on inter-
because of the lack of opportunities in rural areas; national flows and miss many internal flows or what
many have no other option to escape poverty. Conflict, are termed “irregular flows” (movement that eludes sta-
political instability, and human rights violations are tistical coverage) Official statistics focus on national
also important drivers. Environmental change such as boundaries, even though many national boundaries
drought and floods are other factors forcing people to have little relevance for Africans, who consider them
migrate. Droughts in the Sahel, for example, have led porous. As a result, there is much weaker systematic
to significant movements from this region. Climate knowledge on international movements: data on rural-
change scenarios envision greater unpredictability in to-urban movement, IDPs, and smuggled/trafficked
climatic patterns, although it is still unclear whether cli- persons are estimates—at best.
mate change will empty certain rural areas, trigger re- Flows to the Global North consist of four categories of
verse rural migrations, or vary from one region to the next migrants. First, there are refugees and asylum seekers. Second,
region. As such, the climate/environment/migration nexus there are smaller outflows of highly qualified Africans (e.g.,
is a critical unknown for the future. health professionals, accountants, and educators) drawn by
Most Africans move within their country or within upward mobility, professional development, stable careers,
the continent. Even though migration to the Global and higher salaries. There is an ongoing debate as to
North captures most international headlines, it consti- whether this outflow represents “brain drain” (loss of
tutes a much smaller flow than internal and intrare- bright, able-bodied, educated people) or “brain gain”
gional migration. Movement of people from rural to (added benefit of return migrants with improved skills and
urban areas (a classic urbanization trend) is the domi- members of the diaspora who engage in development
nant pattern of recent decades. Two additional move- from afar) for the region—or elements of both. Third, there
ments stand out in terms of the numbers and is a smaller, but consequential, flow of athletes (Box 7.1).
scale—internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refu- Fourth, there are flows of undocumented and trafficked in-
gees. Africans account for almost half of the world’s dividuals, mainly to Europe but, of late, to Asian and Middle
IDPs, and the African region is home to the world’s East destinations as well.

BOX 7.1 AFRICAN ATHLETES France in under-21 football, and Togo’s only Olympic medal was
AND GLOBAL SPORTS RECRUITMENT won by French-born Benjamin Boukpeti, who placed third in the
canoe individual slalom in the 2008 Olympics).
A growing exodus of Africa's top athletes abroad has been
The largest exodus of elite African athletes is to Europe's profes-
taking place, primarily to elite leagues in Europe and North
sional soccer leagues, but flows are increasing to Australia, Russia,
America. This talent migration is termed the “muscle exodus”
New Zealand, and China. European recruitment of African players
(Darby 2007). Kenyan, Ethiopian, Sudanese, and other track-and-
extends back to the colonial period. Following the European Court
field athletes migrate to the United States and the UK. Some of
of Justice's Bosman Ruling in 1995, however, soccer players’ migra-
the basketball players going to U.S. college teams are moving on
tion surged as limits on the number of international players on
to become’ National Basketball Association (NBA) stars (e.g.,
European team rosters were abolished. Indeed, France's recent
Dikembe Mutombo of the Democratic Republic of Congo
international successes are, in part, attributable to the contribu-
[DRC]. Ghana, Céte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria lead the way in
tions of talented players who were born in Africa but became natu-
exporting soccer players to European, Asian, and Middle Eastern
ralized French citizens. Squad rosters of teams Participating in the
leagues. Several top African athletes even opted to represent
2013 African Cup of Nations reveal the degree to which Africa's
their host countries (e.g., Poland, Qatar, United States, Denmark,
elite soccer players have been integrated into European markets:
the UK, and Bahrain) in the 2012 London Olympics. One of the
188 of the 368 players were Europe-based. The Céte d'Ivoire team
most high-profile international athletes is Mo Farah (a Somali-
was composed almost exclusively of European club players (21 of
born UK citizen), who won two gold medals (for the men’s 5,000
23 national squad members earn their living in Europe). Several
and 10,000 meters) at the 2012 Olympics (Fig. 7.1).
African players are global soccer superstars (e.g., Didier Drogba
There is a smaller stream going the other way. A few soccer
[Galatasaray, Turkey], Samuel Eto'o [Chelsea, England], and the
players are opting to represent their father’s home country (e.g.,
Touré brothers, Yaya [Manchester City, England] and Kolo [Liver-
Frédéric Kanouté chose to represent Mali after representing
pool, England). Eto'o in former years was the top earner in the
 Migration 161

their highest values after one or more trades within the global
football market. Most profits accrue to European clubs, agents,
and the players themselves. Much lesser sums are distributed
among scouts and members of the African network involved in the
initial transfer of players (often outside of official channels). Still,
the grassroots actors remain enticed to nurture the next “great
talent” for export, anticipating a windfall. The lure of Europe and
global football stardom and financial rewards is irresistible to
young African players, who perceive the sport as their only escape
from poverty. Unscrupulous local agents and officials participate in
the associated underground network, falsifying documents such as
age to obtain contracts outside of the region. While thousands of
African players are given apprenticeship contracts outside of
Africa, only about 20% move on to obtain professional contracts
(Scherrens 2007). The majority are released after a few years, and
numerous African players become stranded (some entered coun-
tries on improper student/tourist visas and, after playing football,
gravitate to informal employment in their host countries), whereas
others return home with little financial gain for the time invested in
honing their athletic skills. The soccer conveyor belt has been lik-
ened to youth trafficking, with well-documented cases of abuse by
unscrupulous scouts, agents, cutthroat clubs, and local African
networks. FIFA president Sepp Blatter (2003:17) strongly con-
demns this labor recruitment system: “Europe's leading clubs con-
duct themselves increasingly as neo-colonialists who do not give a
damn about heritage and culture but engage in social and eco-
nomic rape by robbing the developing world of its best players.”
The global soccer industry's great wealth inscribes itself within
FIGURE 7.1 Mo Farah Wins Gold at the London the African grassroots infrastructure. Its hegemony greatly accentu-
ates the underdevelopment of the sport in Africa at all levels (apart
Olympics. Source: © Tim Clayton/Corbis.
from national teams), and the domestic sports infrastructure re-
mains impoverished. Governments are the main sponsors of sport,
world soccer circuit (US$25.1 million per year) (Sports Business
but due to pressing budget concerns they cannot allocate adequate
Daily 2012). Another African player, George Weah (Liberia; A.C.
spending. Most playing fields and stadiums are owned by govern-
Milan, Italy), received the world’s most coveted soccer player of the
ments and managed by the Ministry of Sports or by local govern-
year award—the Ballon d’Or—in 1995. Nevertheless, the majority
ment administrations and therefore cannot be used by local clubs to
of African players are concentrated in the lower leagues, where
generate income, further hindering the development of a profes-
there is a constant renewal and circulation of players (Poli 2007).
sional infrastructure. Players are highly motivated to seek external
The European soccer industry's perspective on African player
opportunities for developing their talent in developed countries
migration (i.e., scouts, agents, clubs, broadcasters, and promot-
with superior infrastructure, education, remuneration, and social
ers) is that participation in European leagues contributes to the
welfare systems. Overexposure by the media of the elite European
development of the African game, provides global exposure to
teams and unbalanced accounts of a handful of successful African
top African talent, and should be allowed to continue unfettered
footballers further contribute to the African football dream.
(Darby 2007). An opposing perspective considers the loss of Africa's
Since the 1990s, football academies have become estab-
soccer resources to Europe to be a neocolonial activity that re-
lished throughout Africa to nurture talent for export. Some are
sults in a dependent relationship between African clubs and acad-
government-supported; others involve partnerships between
emies of the European soccer industry that drains talent and leaves
local academies and European clubs (e.g., Ajax [Amsterdam],
less-accomplished players to populate African leagues, undermin-
Ajax [Cape Town], Feyenoord [Rotterdam], and the Feyenoord
ing its grassroots structure and ultimately restricting possibilities for
Fetteh Football Academy [Accra]); some are privately owned or
developing a domestic soccer industry in Africa.
corporate-sponsored. Most, however, are nonaffiliated acade-
African soccer fans are drawn to follow elite European teams
mies. Academy networks frame the aspirations of young African
and African players who ply their trade at top clubs. An analogy players and operate within of broader systems of talent identifi-
can be drawn with the colonial economies that sourced, refined, cation, recruitment, and export. Given the global financial clout
and exported raw materials for European markets, where most of elite clubs, sponsors, and global TV rights, the draining of
profits accrue upstream. This time around, raw football talent is Africa's talented footballers will continue.
being exported at a low initial purchase cost, and players realize
 162 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Migration has moved to center stage in development to serve on overseas plantations and produce commod-
policy after decades of waiting in the wings. During the ities controlled by Europeans for international markets
20th century, migration was portrayed largely in negative represented the most brutal and inhumane system.
terms—an African development problem area. Since Forced slave migration brought 10 million Africans
2005, the positive role of migration to the development to the Western Hemisphere between 1519 and 1867:
process has been acknowledged beyond the migration 360,000 landed in what is today the United States (Capps,
expert community, for example by the central banks of McCabe, and Fix 2011:2).
various African states, nongovernmental organization As Europeans established colonies in Africa, the
(NGOs), and local communities. The discovery of the emphasis shifted to the deployment of migrant labor
enormous amount of funds transferred worldwide by to serve the colonial endeavor (in mines, commercial
international migrants to the “home front” and the de- - ventures, farms, and the lower echelons of colonial ad-
velopment implications of such remittances, skill trans- ministration). The functioning and profitability of the
fers, and international networks (from trading networks colonial state required Africans to migrate to work, and
to hometown associations) have generated excitement it limited the mobility rights of other Africans.
and anticipation (Zoomers and Nijenhuis 2012) (See Colonial migrants were enticed to “islands of eco-
Table 7.1 for a discussion of the positive and negative nomic development” (Prothero 1965) such as mining
effects of the migration of educated Africans). areas of the Witwatersrand (South Africa), copper belts
in present-day Zambia and DRC, fertile agricultural
areas in the Kenyan highlands and the southern part of
COLONIAL POLICIES AND MIGRATION
present-day Zimbabwe and Eastern Cape, and major
Colonialism controlled the movement of people to serve cash crop-producing areas (e.g., cocoa in Ghana, Nigeria,
European economic development. The development of Céte d'Ivoire, and Senegal; tea and coffee in Tanzania,
the trans-Atlantic slave trade and the export of Africans Uganda, and Kenya; rubber in DRC). The economic

TABLE 7.1 POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF THE MIGRATION OF EDUCATED AFRICANS
ee rR] «PRR

Positive

¢ Migrants are better off (professionally and financially).

¢ Individual freedom is enhanced by allowing individuals to migrate.
* The migrants’ families benefit (e.g., from remittances and from the satisfaction of family members succeeding abroad).
¢ Migration may lessen the pressures on other less-skilled family members to migrate.
¢ Successful African migrants abroad provide an incentive for the youth to acquire as many skills as possible to succeed as migrants
(the “Kofi Annan factor”).
¢ Migrants may have a positive effect on their home politics and/or institutions from abroad.
* The threat of migration may be an incentive for governments to pay higher salaries to people in various professions and to ensure
that the tax system treats them favorably.
¢ Migrants facilitate international networks.
¢ Some migrants return home and contribute positively to their societies.

Negative

* There is a loss of skilled professionals, which translates into poor return on government spending on public
education.
* Migration of educated people undermines the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other development efforts.
*° Family separation due to migration causes suffering in nonmonetary ways.
* Tensions develop among families who receiving remittances and those who do not (remittances help families to
afford housing and
consumer items).
e Tensions arise within families over access to remittance funds.
¢ Migration of the educated population impedes the development of the middle class, limits the tax base, and
contributes to the
development of highly polarized societies consisting of an elite wealthy class and a large underclass of very
poor people.
¢ Not all migrants abroad are successful, and those who are not successful return home and represent
ee an added burden.
eee
 Migration 163

geography of colonies was punctuated by isolated After African states’ independence, governments
modern economic nodes with requisite indigenous la- and development agencies emphasized rural devel-
borers and neglected peripheries that warehoused a re- opment, with the goal of enabling people to achieve
serve army of workers at the beck and call of colonial a better quality of life in their home areas. There
rulers. The implementation of poll and hut taxes, the ex- were massive government investments in rural devel-
propriation of the best land for settler agriculture, and the opment programs, agricultural extension programs,
provision of services for wage laborers compelled Afri- and rural infrastructure (e.g., schools, health care
cans to offer their labor to earn income. As infrastructure facilities, and roads). Some observers contend that
for Africans was nonexistent, Africans undertook travel the agricultural/rural development emphasis had an
on foot, routinely walking hundreds of kilometers. underlying aim of controlling population move-
Colonial administrators did not want the migrants ments (Bakewell 2007). Certainly within develop-
to settle permanently in their new work locations, ment thinking, migration was viewed as an indicator
however. Laborers were welcomed but were expected of failure. Thus, until the 21st century, development
to return home after their contracts ended to make way thinking on migration aimed to keep people rooted
for new workers. This established a circular labor mi- in rural areas.
gration system, which was reinforced by the fact that
migrants were encouraged to maintain their tradi-
CIRCULAR MIGRATION
tional ways of life and village households so that they
had homes to return to. Above all else, African mi- Circular migration is the movement of people, includ-
grants were to be kept in their place. ing temporary and permanent migration, within and be-
In time, more and more unplanned migration took tween countries that is often multidirectional and involves
place to urban centers. For colonial rulers, the growing different destinations (Grant 1995; Potts 2011b) (See
urban population of poor and underemployed workers Box 7.2 for a detailed case study of circular migration to
presented serious social, economic, and moral challenges. and from Burkina Faso). No formal legal or administra-
Planners were faced with a dilemma—to allow families to tive definition of circular migration has been adopted;
migrate and create permanent. settlements or to control its legality varies by country and region. Protocols on the
more rigidly migrant settlements and social tensions. freedom of movement within Southern Africa have

BOX 7.2 BURKINA FASO: African country (Wouterse 2011). Consequently, Burkina Faso is
CIRCULAR MIGRATION IN TIME AND SPACE unlike many countries in that it has neither a large diaspora in the
West nor high levels of within-country migration (less than 30% of
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in West Africa surrounded total migratory flow) (Konseiga 2005). Despite its former colonial
by six countries (Mali to the north, Niger to the east, Benin to the status, migration to France plays a very minor role, and only in the
southwest, Togo and Ghana to the south, and Céte d'Ivoire to last decade has Italy emerged as a new European destination for
the southwest). Gaining independence from France in 1960, the Burkinabé, many of whom work as agricultural laborers.
country has struggled to improve its agricultural-based economy. Burkina Faso is representative of a number of poor African
Consistently rated among the poorest countries of the world, countries (e.g., migration from Lesotho and Mozambique is con-
Burkina Faso ranks in the bottom seven least-developed coun- centrated on South Africa/Botswana, and wars forced popula-
tries according to the UN's human development index (UN 2013). tions from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and the DRC to seek
More than 80% of the population (17.2 million in 2012) is en- refuge in neighboring countries) in that intraregional migration
gaged in subsistence agriculture, and remittances provide a predominates. Burkinabé have traditionally migrated within the
major source of national income. In the 2000s, prior to conflict in West African region to Céte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, and Nigeria.
neighboring Céte d'Ivoire, remittances accounted for 6% of gross Two thirds of Burkinabé migrate to Céte d'Ivoire, traditionally
domestic product, but the level fell during the years of instability. the strongest French-speaking economy in West Africa, and this
However, outflows from Céte d'Ivoire recovered US$726 million is a very important intra-African migration corridor.
in 2012 (World Bank 2013). Importantly, Burkina Faso’s migration Burkina Faso ranks very high in migration indices, simultane-
is a regional phenomenon: 90% of migrants leave for another ously as a sending, receiving, and transit destination for migrants.
(Continued)
164 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 7.2 (Continued) In the 1960s and 1970s, West African corridor migration
system revolved around major immigration hubs, with Cédte
Despite its economic problems, the country attracts a range of d'lvoire, Ghana, and Nigeria as receiving countries and Burkina
immigrants, including Syrian and Lebanese merchants, French Faso, Mali, and Niger as sending countries. During recurring
professionals, and Malian workers and refugees. In 2012, 40,000 economic crises, host countries tended to adopt restrictive mi-
additional Malian refugees fled to Burkina Faso following the out- gration policies and to expel migrants (e.g., Nigeria in 1983-85
break and intensification of conflict in Mali (UNHCR 2013a). and Céte d'Ivoire in 1986), and migrants responded by altering
Circular migration is part of a long tradition, a way of life. For their migration strategies and shifting to neighboring countries
over 1,000 years, people have followed livestock, crops, and (Konseiga 2005). For the most part, periods of decline and epi-
trading markets on a seasonal basis (Kress 2006). Foundations of sodes of restrictive policies in one country coincided with more
circular migration were laid by the region's various ethnic groups, liberal admission into another (Konseiga 2005). Therefore,
such as the Mossi (50% of Burkina Faso’s population), the Lobi, despite disruption, population movements within the region
and the Fulani, all operating within a fluid zone crisscrossing the were sustained by readjustment to alternative destinations as
subregion. opposed to returning home.
These groups and other Sahelians maintain traditions of circular The signing of the treaty creating the Economic Community of
regional migration, many passing through Burkina. Some transit West African States strengthened the legal basis for migration,
migrants remain in Burkina Faso, replacing Burkinabé labor that facilitating freedom of movement among member states. At the
has circulated elsewhere. In 2011, Burkina Faso’s immigrant pop-
same time, possibilities were created for unscrupulous agents to
ulation climbed to 1 million, while 1.6 million Burkinabé circulated
engage in human trafficking, especially children, who are traf-
(often for durations of two or more years). By the mid-2000s, the
ficked from Burkina Faso into Ghana, Céte d'Ivoire, Benin, Nige-
long-established migration tradition had resulted in one in five
ria, and Mali. Girls are used as domestic helpers, beggars, and sex
Burkinabé residing outside their home state (Kress 2006).
workers and boys are put to work in mines, farms, and houses.
French colonial rule sought to restructure forcibly the region’s
In 2010, some 11.2% of Céte d'lvoire’s population was foreign-
economy and developed a different logic for circular migration.
born, a decrease from more than 26% in 1982 (UN 2013). Prior to
During the colonial period, Upper Volta, as Burkina Faso was
the civil war (2002-11), the country was among the top 12 desti-
then known, unsuccessfully experimented with producing
nations for migrants in the world. Almost a decade of civil war
cotton for export, and colonial administrators decided that the
and political strife has shrunk the numbers of Burkinabé, but they
area was unsuitable for plantation agriculture. Its distance from
still represent the largest foreign-born group. Xenophobia has
markets and ports reinforced their decision. As a result, inland
become significant, and politicians have manipulated the rhetoric
West Africa was largely disregarded in colonial economic devel-
of “authenticity” (i.e., “Ivorite”) to mobilize “real Ivoirians”
opment initiatives, fostering a dependent relationship between
against “other lvoirians”; identity has become a key issue in pres-
the interior labor reserve areas and exterior colonial islands of
idential elections.
economic development.
As a result, many Burkinabé (including children born abroad)
Many laborers were coerced to work on plantations and in
have returned home, but even in the face of repatriation, emigra-
factories in Cédte d'Ivoire, while others were forced to work in
tion still proceeds, indicating the durability of circular migration.
construction and communications projects in other French colo-
Returnees typically choose not to settle in their places of birth
nial areas. A colonial edict set a target for Upper Volta to con-
and instead to gravitate to where the jobs are: urban centers and
tribute half a million workers to Ivorian plantations. Colonial
rural areas undergoing economic development (e.g., western
policies were not devised to meet the demands of seasonal ag-
Burkina Faso). Recent migration to western Burkina Faso has
ricultural work in Upper Volta but instead were driven by global
been accelerated by urbanization, the eradication of river blind-
market demands for cacao, groundnuts, and coffee. Heavy colo-
ness, and successes in cotton production. Urban returnees tend
nial taxation and the creation of a waged workforce ensured that
to be self-employed entrepreneurs, and rural returnees engage
migration was necessary. Some 60% of the adult male popula-
more with agriculture. Of note, there are tensions between
tion migrated in the early 20th century, and the exodus was so
Burkinabé and the repatriated population, who find themselves
large that it undermined farming in Upper Volta. Voltanique mi-
marginalized at the national and local levels; they, in turn, are
grants also sought employment as colonial clerks and construc-
organizing to advocate for a new kind of Burkinabé citizen,
tion workers and gravitated to Ghana, Mali, and Senegal to take
whose identity is shaped by transnational and forced migration.
up these positions. Ghana, then known as the Gold Coast, was
Burkina Faso illustrates a migration dynamic where regional
the preferred destination for Upper Volta migrants because of
mobility predominates. Labor has always been particularly
higher wages, better working conditions, and an alternative to
mobile in West Africa, but environmental drivers are now adding
forced labor in Céte d'Ivoire. In essence, the colonial era set in
to longstanding economic and social factors. The Burkina Faso
motion a pattern of labor mobility that wove a complex grid of
government recognizes that migration of many of its people is a
relations and interdependencies across West African borders,
problem and that it also has to grapple with displaced people
overlaid upon traditional circulation patterns.
from neighboring countries.
 Migration 165

been implemented (e.g., Southern African Develop- dwellers become partly dependent on rural sources of
ment Cooperation allows for 90-day visa-free entry, per- food and/or income, evidence of a reverse flow illus-
mits employment, and includes provisions that allow trating a different symbiotic relationship.
visa extensions for citizens of Angola, Botswana, DRC,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, FORCED MIGRANTS: REFUGEES AND IDPs
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa,
A refugee is defined as a person who, owing to a well-
Seychelles, and Madagascar [though the latter's mem-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
bership is currently suspended]).
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
Circular migration involves continuous engage-
group, or political opinion, is outside the country of
ment between a migrant’s home and his or her adopted
his or her nationality and is granted protection (United
residence. Migrants become active in both spaces, creat-
Nations High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR]
ing connected economic spaces straddling separate lo-
2012). IDPs are people who are forced to leave their
cations. This type of migration ebbs and flows according
homes as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed
to the strength of urban and rural economies, shifting
conflicts, violence, violations of human rights, or nat-
to longer-term family migration when economies are
ural or human-made disasters but seek refuge in their
vibrant and to shorter stays/return migration in hard
home countries (not crossing international borders)
times or the off season.
(UNHCR 2012) (Fig. 7.2).
Circular migration affects those remaining in the
Many Africans in conflict zones encounter the de-
home area as well. Migrants are typically young, able-
struction of land, homes, and livelihoods. Shattered
bodied males and, increasingly, young women, whose
lives and livelihoods compel many to move in search
exit means that they cannot contribute to their home
of safety and security. In 2011, Africa had 2.7 million
rural economy. Losses of substantial numbers of
refugees, or one quarter of all refugees globally, pri-
young people can endanger the viability of a village
marily from Somalia (760,800), Sudan (462,100),
economy, creating gaps in the physical and social
and DRC (457,900) (UNHCR 2012). Two principal
infrastructure. However, migrants’ absence can be subregions of displacement are evident: a West African
compensated by the remittances they send back home, axis covering Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
which are critical to sustaining families and to avoid-
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and a Central/East African
ing agricultural shortfalls. Moreover, the timing of cir- axis encompassing DRC, Congo, Burundi, Ethiopia,
cular migration, with family members moving during Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda,
the unproductive season and returning before the
onset of the rains, allows for the continuity of the ag-
riculture cycle in home villages. According to Potts
(2011b:593), wives in rural Africa “operate a rural
string to the urban livelihood bow.” In addition,
urban migration relieves the pressure on feeding all
rural family members during difficult parts of the
year. In African contexts, migration is fundamentally a
family affair rather than an individual activity, so
maintaining connections and moving back and forth
is often the norm.
Rural links are important for urban migrants. Main-
taining a stream of rural food production for consump-
tion or for sale in town to boost household incomes is
part of the economics of rural-urban linkages. Rural
families provide a safety valve and a welfare option for FIGURE 7.2 IDP Camp, Rutshuru, DRC. Source: © Yannick
urbanites during hard times (Potts 2011a). Some urban Tylle/Corbis. Corbis 42-28620393.
166 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

and Zambia. Adverse environmental factors (e.g., droughts, Al-Shabaab forces in southern Somalia), and, other
degradation, deforestation) may be compelling people times, armed groups crossing borders into neighboring
to move, although many refute the degree to which the countries (e.g., armed groups from Ethiopia and Somalia
environment/climate is the ultimate trigger of refugee triggering displacement in northern Kenya).
movement (Gill 2010) (Fig. 7.3). Five of the top ten refugee-producing countries in
Various types of violence, armed conflict, and op- the world are located in Africa—Sudan, Burundi, DRC,
pression are driving most of the movement. Intercom- Somalia, and Liberia (Crisp 2010:2). Several of the
munal violence can range from political oppression to world’s top hosting countries are in the region—
interethnic cattle rustling for financial gain, assertion Tanzania, Chad, and Uganda. Refugee concentrations,
of dominance over neighboring tribes or groups (prev- or hubs, arise in areas where conflict has been en-
alent in northern Kenya and areas of South Sudan, demic; most refugees settle in immediate neighboring
Ethiopia, and Uganda), and armed conflict. Armed countries or stable countries within the subregion. Few
conflict itself takes various forms, such as governments African refugees have the resources to travel outside
and their armed forces being pitted against armed op- their region. Many African states have refugee popula-
position groups, governments crossing borders into tions in excess of 50,000 (Fig. 7.3). According to Crisp
neighboring countries (e.g., Kenyan army attacking (2010:2), eight of the 20 countries with the highest

Libya
Up to 50,000
Chad
About 90,000
Senegal
20,000 — 40,000 a)
Mali
At least 227,000
<
Cote d'Ivoire
40,000-80,000

CAR
About 132,000
Republic of the Congo
Up to 7,800

DRC
About 2,700,000

Angola Eritrea
Up to 20,000 Up to 10,000
Somalia
Sudan
1,100,000 — 1,360,000
E At least 2,230,000
Kenya
South Sudan About 300,000
At least 240,000 Uganda
About 30,000
Burundi
About 78,800

FIGURE 7.3 Internal Displacement in Africa 2012.

 Migration 167

ratio of refugees to local people are located in the displaced persons are not welcome across borders and
region. Africa refugee figures for 2011 indicate a down- face increasingly restrictive national admission poli-
ward trend, reflecting a more peaceful region overall cies and hostile receptions. African governments are
(even though there are some protracted conflicts), but more willing to reject refugees at frontiers and return
there is a countervailing rising trend of IDPs. An inverse them to their areas of origin, even when the conditions
relationship exists between declining refugee figures that motivated them to flee still exist. The plight of
and rising IDPs, indicating that barriers may be pre- IDPs is further aggravated by the lack of an interna-
venting people from moving across state borders. tional agency with a mandate to aid them and offer
Africa houses close to half of the world’s IDPs them legal protection.
(Forced Migration Online 2013) and nine of the 24 Official counts represent underestimates, as many
countries with the largest IDP populations in the world displaced persons neither report to authorities in their
(Crisp 2010:2). Countries with large shares of their pop- countries of residence nor remain in official camps.
ulation displaced include Somalia (16%), Sudan (7%), There are wholly undetermined predicaments (e.g.,
Zimbabwe (7%), and DRC; South Sudan also records the displacement of pastoralists throughout the Horn
high levels, but given its recent emergence as a state, its of Africa) that are neglected by both governments and
IDP tally is impossible to calculate at this time. Official donors. Moreover, many displaced persons are hard to
counts put the number of IDPs in Africa in 2011 at 9.7 mil- track and blend into the local poor populations, an
lion, and displacement is geographically widespread absorption often made easier by speaking the same
(Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement language or belonging to the same cultural/ethnic
Monitoring Centre 2013). Combining the official fig- groups as the local population. Indeed, UNHCR now
ures of refugees and IDPs indicates that 12.4 million recognizes that displaced persons are leaving rural
persons were displaced (the generic term covering both camps in significant numbers (approximately half)
refugees and IDPs) in 2011 (UNHCR 2012). and moving to urban locations (typically slums) where
Outstanding grievances over political power shar- they believe they can earn a living, improve their liveli-
ing and disputes over natural resources or land are hoods, and perhaps even send remittances to family
some of the main drivers of contemporary displace- members. Also, health care, education, and other ser-
ment in Africa (Norwegian Refugee Council and Inter- vices are generally better in urban centers. Urban loca-
national Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012). IDPs tions enhance possibilities for communication with
are often intentionally uprooted by governments on distant family members, and the existence of ethnic
ethnic, religious, or political grounds, or as part of urban enclaves and other social networks supports the
counterinsurgency campaigns. In some civil wars, the integration process. However, urban anonymity brings
displaced are perceived as the enemy or the govern- a different set of challenges: isolated, displaced per-
ment objects to relief efforts in insurgent areas (e.g., sons are more easily denied access to government ser-
Angola and Darfur); in other cases, the displaced are vices, and individuals are prone to exploitation by
trapped between opposing sides in civil wars or are employers, landlords, and other locals.
threatened by insurgents (e.g., DRC). IDPs frequently Refugees as well as IDPs are not adequately pro-
suffer the highest mortality rates. In Uganda, for ex- tected. The head of a UNHCR research unit, Jeff Crisp
ample, the HIV/AIDS rate among IDPs is six times (2010:5), notes “that the industrialized States—rather
higher than in the general population (Crisp 2010:21). than those in Africa—have taken the lead in eroding the
Many people become internally displaced because right of asylum and undermining the principles of refu-
physical barriers (distance and difficult terrains) gee protection. . . . introducing a vast array of measures
impede their flight across borders; some flee to other specifically designed to prevent or dissuade the arrival of
parts of their own country because they prefer to refugees.” At the same time, the African tradition of hos-
remain in familiar surroundings. However, a large part pitality and offers of asylum, prevalent in the two de-
of the explanation of rising IDPs is that hostile reac- cades after independence, now operate in reverse.
tions to refugees have become more pervasive. Most Indeed, negative attitudes toward refugees are growing.
168 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

The declining commitment to asylum in Africa is a on immediate “hot” situations. Donors have failed to
result of pressing internal economic problems in every designate IDPs as a special category for humanitarian
African state, concerns about the long-term cost of assistance on the basis that singling out one group
refugee assistance, inadequate international compen- could lead to discrimination against others and gener-
sation to cope with refugee influxes, and misgivings ate more tension and conflicts. For example, the Inter-
that settled persons are not appreciative enough of national Committee of the Red Cross _ provides
their host’s generosity. Refugees now exchange one assistance and protection to all civilian victims of
form and degree of vulnerability for another when armed conflict. Indeed, IDPs can face poorer treatment
crossing into another state. Corralling refugees into than refugees in the same location. For instance, in
“safe zones” is the norm. specific places, UNHCR provides returning refugees
Sources of insecurity in Africa’s refugee camps and tools and seeds but does not extend the same support
settlements are varied and numerous. Commonly to IDPs.
exiled populations are viewed as posing threats to the Displacement has social, cultural, economic, and
local economy, local society, and political security. Refu- environmental consequences for both transient individ-
gee populations may be targeted by direct external mili- uals and locals. Displaced persons lack economic and
tary attacks. Despite the Organization of African Unity’s social capital. Their relocation to high-density camps
Refugee Convention of 1974 (Article 2.6) and UNHCR’s adds significant stress on immediate food and water
guidance of settling refugees “at reasonable distance supplies and on health care, sanitation, and security sys-
from the frontier of their country of origin” (OAU tems. Establishing the rule of law in concentrated areas
1974), refugees are often settled close to the border; of displaced persons is difficult. Conflict can be antici-
geographical propinquity jeopardizes their safety and pated when displaced and destitute peoples live along-
undermines their protection. Furthermore, refugees side poor members of the local population; the potential
may be subject to numerous nonmilitary security for disorder and violent outbreaks is intensified when
threats involving violence, coercion, intimidation, and camp populations include persons responsible for terri-
criminal activity. A long list of potential threats includes ble crimes in their country of origin. Although relief
domestic and sexual violence, rape, armed robbery, ab- agencies provide considerable assistance, much of the
duction into militias, forced marriages, arbitrary arrests burden falls upon national governments and already-
and punishment by refugee community leaders and overwhelmed municipalities (e.g., Johannesburg in the
members of local community security forces, fighting 2000s and Dar es Salaam in the 1990s).
between different clans and subclans within the same It is increasingly difficult to distinguish among legal
refugee community, and armed confrontation between categories of people, and mixed migratory movements
refugees of different nationalities (Crisp 2010): (encompassing refugees, asylum seekers, economic mi-
The 2009 Kampala Convention (signed by most grants, and other migrants) are occurring (Long and
states) is a legally binding regional instrument that Crisp 2011). In many mixed movements, people travel
protects IDPs from arbitrary displacement and man- alongside each other using the same routes and means
dates protection and assistance during displacement of transportation but with different motivations and
until a durable solution can be implemented. How- objectives. Many of those involved in these movements,
ever, in most instances, IDPs are weakly protected and while not having a claim to refugee status, can end up in
the feeble rule of law further perpetuates their eco- situations where their human rights are violated; hu-
nomic and political marginalization. While levels of manitarian needs may develop along their journey or
violence and insecurity are difficult (if not impossible) occur upon their arrival. Mixed movements also include
to assess in Africa, many IDP camps are becoming in- people who are recognized as refugees in a country of
creasingly dangerous places. Precarious and protracted first asylum but who move on to another state in search
situations are not helped by weak donor commitment of better protection, more economic opportunity, and/
to protecting IDPs and by the donors’ focus or reunion with their family.
 Migration 169

For some refugees moving to a third country is the d'Ivoire for 20 years. Warehousing is, basically, the prac-
only way to secure permanent safety and basic human tice of depriving millions of refugees the right to work,
rights. Options and placements are limited: only 26 coun- practice professions, operate businesses, own property,
tries offered a resettlement base in 2011 (the United move about freely, and choose their place of residence.
States and Canada admitted 80% of resettled refugees), Spending years in refugee camps with enforced idleness
and worldwide only 80,000 were resettled out of deprives refugees of a decent life. Concentrating on
800,000 applications (UNHCR 2012). In war-torn long-term “care and maintenance” programs does little
areas, some refugees eventually return home voluntarily, to promote self-reliance and/or integration into local
and processes of postconflict resolution can begin. Once communities. Skeptics suggest that relief organizations
disarmament and demobilization have taken place, the have a vested interest in perpetuating a relief model of
more difficult process of reintegrating ex-combatants refugee assistance, including the maintenance of large,
and refugees proceeds. Besides mental trauma and other highly visible camps.
health challenges, creating new livelihoods or recreating More than 5 million refugees in Africa have been
old ones is difficult. For example, gaining access to land repatriated during the past decade, and an unknown
is fraught with difficulty as displaced persons often ex- number (perhaps even more) have voluntarily returned
propriate land during conflicts. Large numbers of refu- to their home communities. There is a well-established
gees, however, never make the journey back home and legal principle that voluntary repatriation would result
instead blend in to their host countries. in upholding the rights of refugees, but, in fact, sub-
There are more than 20 protracted refugee situa- stantial numbers return under conditions that do not
tions in Africa, and more than 2.3 million persons meet standards of safety and dignity. In some instances,
have been in exile for over five years (Crisp 2010:13). undue pressure is placed on refugees by governments,
Wats in recent decades (e.g., Angola, DRC, Liberia, local communities, and militia forces to return home,
Rwanda, Somalia) have encompassed intense ethnic as repatriation plays an important role in validating
and communal antagonisms, high levels of organized postconflict political order and in rebuilding commu-
violence, and deliberate targeting and displacement of nity. Kenya and Somali signed an agreement in 2013 to
civilian populations. The international community initiate the voluntary repatriation of 500,000 Somalis
has failed to bring these predicaments to an end, from Kenya, but many Somalis who settled in Nairobi’s
which contrasts with refugee situations in northern Eastleigh suburb, known locally as “Little Mogadishu,”
Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, where the United States and have rebuilt their lives and have little incentive to take
its allies directed speedy repatriation after the wars. the risk and return home 20 years later.
Weaker geopolitical and economic stakes in Africa ex- Repatriation is far from being a smooth process; re-
plain the international community's lack of urgency integration can be difficult. Returnees often experience
and commitment to repatriation. As a result, voluntary several legal forms of insecurity. They may not have
self-repatriation has become an African norm. proof of their nationality and thus are not recognized
Some refugee populations become “warehoused” as citizens of the country to which they return. Lack of
indefinitely in camps while the lucky ones escape to official documentation such as identity cards and birth
cities. Dadaab, in northern Kenya, is the largest refugee certificates can open the door to arbitrary arrest, inhibit
camp in the world, housing mainly 380,000 Somalis in-country movement, and prevent returnees from find-
who have fled civil conflict and settled over the border ing a job and voting. Many going back to war-ravaged
(Al-Jazeera 2011:1). There have been mass refugee places experience severe material insecurity. Land-use
movements across Africa, and refugee camps have patterns and the fabric of the local economy may have
become more permanent settlements. For example, been dramatically altered. Depending still on emer-
500,000 Somalis have been in Kenya since 1991; gency relief, they live hand to mouth, as they did in
200,000 Eritreans relocated to Sudan and Ethiopia 40 years exile. This reality clashes with many unrealistic expecta-
ago; and 70,000 Liberians have resided in Ghana and Cote tions about returning to their homeland.
170 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

MIGRANT REMITTANCES TO AFRICA and Ratha 2011). Remittances to Africa equaled 2.6% of
gross domestic product (GDP) in 2009, higher than the
“Migrant transfers” to developing countries have in-
average of 1.9% of GDP for all developing countries.
creased substantially since the 2000s, although the
Indeed, the true size of remittances to Africa may be
volume of remittance flows to Africa lags behind
significantly larger because of the scale of undocumented
other world regions. Nevertheless, Nigeria has become
internal migration, the prevalence of informal remit-
the fifth largest remittance-receiving country in the
tance channels, and weak data-collection efforts in the
world in 2011 (World Bank 2013), and repatriated
region (only half of African countries report remittance
earnings of Africans are increasing, showing a steady
data, and countries such as DRC, Somalia, and Zimbabwe
rebound after the 2007-08 world economic down-
do not report any remittance data) (Mohapatra and
turn and a temporary remittance decline. The sub-
Ratha 2011). Indeed, when African states improve their
stantial share of remittances to Africa is accounted for
national data-collection efforts, they reveal significant in-
by several countries: Nigeria (US$21 billion) received
formation. For example, the Central Bank of Ghana re-
half of remittances in 2011, in addition to Sudan
ported US$1.6 billion in remittances in 2009, more
(US$1.4 billion), Senegal (US$1.4 billion), Kenya
than ten times the value reported by the International
(US$1.3 billion), South Africa (US$1.1 billion), and
Monetary Fund’s balance-of-payments statistics.
Uganda (US$953 million) (World Bank 2013).
Intraregional, domestic, and many international
In 2012, US$40 billion was remitted to Africa, up
remittances are sent through informal channels. Per-
from US$9.1 million in 1990. Remittances have been
sonally carried during visits home, sent through trans-
growing in volume as well as relative to other sources of
port companies, or transmitted through informal
development finance. Remittances are at present one of
hawala channels (Box 7.3), they reflect the fact that
the region’s largest source of foreign inflows (Mohapatra

BOX 7.3. THE HAWALA SYSTEM OF TRANSFER concerns); it involves the transfer of money without money actu-
IN THE HORN OF AFRICA ally moving. It is estimated that US$1.6 billion per year is trans-
ferred by hawaladars (brokers), and the system is capable of
Some groups participate in the hawala system of transferring
delivering funds to the most remote parts of Africa. In some
funds. Developed in ancient times and still active, this system
parts of the world (for example, Somalia and northern Mali since
operated in the medieval and colonial periods to facilitate trade
the 2012 Taureg rebellion), it is the only available option for le-
across geographical, political, and cultural borders. Originally
gitimate funds transfer, and aid agencies make use of it. In East-
developed in the Middle East and South Asia for transferring
leigh, aneighborhood of Nairobi (locally known as “Mogadishu”),
money long distances and across borders, the system is used by
informal agents with radio or satellite phones are conduits in
many Islamic groups in African states with weak or absent formal
transferring money to Somalia. Not surprisingly, the hawala
financial institutions. It was established to transfer funds through
system become controversial in the United States after 9/11
clearing systems that minimize costly shipments of coins and
after it was alleged that Al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist
bullion. Over time, it led to the development of networks of
groups use the system to channel money for arms and military
agents who could transfer funds, often without physical currency
operations. (The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
changing hands in propinquity, and later involved agents ex-
the United States later showed that SunTrust Bank in Venice,
changing credits and debits with each other over long distances
Florida, transferred the bulk of funds to finance the Twin Towers
and balancing transactions. The hawala system operates like an
operations.) A vigorous debate has ensued about how to regu-
informal Western Union transfer system but without government
late the hawala system and about whether it is possible to strike
enforcement or legal recourse. Failure to deliver funds is rare;
a balance between protecting U.S. national security interests
strong social bonds within the system seem to safeguard against
(there are proposals to get hawaladars to register in the United
fraud, and the system is self-enforcing (Schaeffer 2008). More-
States) and ensuring that very poor Somalis have access to badly
over, the costs of using the hawala system are in the 2% to
needed funds; in their war-torn country, alternative supply lines
5% range, much lower than formal financial institutions charge.
function poorly or not at all. Nevertheless, although many
Somalis use the hawala system extensively, and it works by
groups have strong codes of trust, Africans are wary of the
honor and outside of official purview (a major advantage to cus-
“Nigerian” or “South African factor,” whereby certain groups
tomers because of tax, immigration, currency control, and other
are distrusted and transferring via formal institutions is boosted.
 Migration 171

trust in social networks plays an important role. Lim- large, well-established expatriate communities in Europe
ited access to formal banking and cost are other incen- and North America.
tives to use informal channels. Africa is the most Remittances are a tangible link between migration
expensive region to remit money to, with transfer costs and development. Migration and remittances are
averaging 12% in 2012. Abroad, certain offices/homes linked but do not always mirror each other. Distortions
of Ghanaians, Ugandans, and others are known among in remittance flows occur due to intercontinental flows
migrants as providing back-office transfer services, but surpassing continental flows, and refugee and remit-
Africans also use formal transfer institutions (eg., tance flows do not readily match as refugees quite often
Western Union). remit to or receive money in neighboring stable coun-
Data on remittance and regional migration flows tries rather than in their home countries. Moreover,
within the region are very weak, and this is significant levels of remittances tend to differ by migrant group,
as intraregional migration is more important in Africa migration intent, and duration (remittances generally
than in any other developing region. For many de- increase in time). Nigerians, for example, are highly
cades, the economies of South Africa’s neighbors— mobile: two thirds of all Nigerian households are esti-
Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Malawi, etc.—have mated to have had emigrants, and 10% of Nigerians
depended heavily on financial transfers from migrants live outside their homeland (Sander and Maimbo
working in South Africa: US$1.4 billion was remitted 2003). West African immigrants to North America (e.g.,
from South Africa in 2011 (World Bank 2013). Lesotho Nigerians and Ghanaians) are far more likely to build
is the most heavily remittance-dependent African coun- their “dream house” in their home country rather than
try: these transfers accounted for 28.5% of GDP in 2010. in the host country (Grant 2009) (Box 7.4). In addition
However, intraregional remittances involve smaller to remittances, migrants spend, on average, US$1,000-
sums than intercontinental remittances, largely because $3,000 per visit back to their home country (Appiah-
migrants to North America, Europe, and the Gulf states Yeboah, Bosomtwi, and Yeboah 2013). Skilled migrants
have higher incomes. also spend more time working abroad before returning
Africa's more constrained remittance inflows reveal home and in the process return with more to invest
that geography matters. There are large out-migrations than lower-skilled workers.
from countries, but civil strife sends migrants across As with other external resource flows, the effects of
borders to other impoverished African countries rather remittances are complex. Remittances are the most vis-
than to the Global North. Not being geographically ible examples of how migration reshapes countries of
contiguous to wealthy countries is clearly a major im- origin (Yeboah 2008). Many economists and develop-
pediment to large flows of migrants to wealthier coun- ment experts (e.g., Easterly and Nyarko 2008) are
tries (a sharp contrast to the geographical proximity of highly positive about the contributions of remittances
Mexico and the United States). to national economic development. Remittances can
Major remittance outflow countries to Africa in- be particularly important in augmenting private con-
clude the United States, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia, sumption and emergency spending, and in alleviating
Israel, Kuwait, and Oman. Within Africa, there are some transient poverty in receiving countries. Trans-
remittance-sending countries, for example Nigeria, South fers can be spent on nutrition, education, and health
Africa, Botswana, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon; care. Overseas communities have become an invalu-
Lesotho, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria are major re- able source of investment for business ventures and all
cipient countries for African remittance flows. There are sorts of bootstrap enterprises, and they have contrib-
some prominent source-destinations dyads, including uted to residential building booms in many African
Mozambique-South Africa, Zimbabwe-South Africa, cities as migrants build houses from a distance.
Ghana-Nigeria (1970s), and Burkina Faso-Cote d'Ivoire. Many geographers and anthropologists working at
Remittances are very important to poor countries, as the household/individual level are less sanguine about
mentioned, but they are also significant to more prosper- the effects of remittances, however (Grant 2009). Re-
ous countries, such as Nigeria and Ghana, which have mittances may unfairly advantage recipients and, in
172 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 7.4 TRANSNATIONAL HOUSES between migration and local urban development. A select few
of them (with considerable net worth) have been able to obtain
A dramatic feature of the residential geography of particular mortgages from lenders abroad. These wealthy individuals are
African cities (e.g., Accra, Kumasi, Lagos, Nairobi, Dakar) is the far more attracted to gated communities, and, consequently,
housing built by members of the diaspora or by intercontinental private developers employ international advertising and market-
flows of remittances. A large part of the explanation of how in- ing techniques (websites, social media, brochures, in-flight mag-
dividuals can pay between US$25,000 and US$300,000 for a azines, international housing exhibitions) to pitch upper-income
home when per capita incomes are still low and mortgages are enclave communities to targeted buyers abroad. For example,
scarce involves the confluence of transnational forces. ReconnectAfrica.com is a portal that has been developed to ad-
Members of the diaspora are building transnational houses vertise properties to members of the Ghanaian, Nigerian, and
with greater frequency, so much so that they have become a South African diasporas. Usually, international housing exhibi-
salient feature in several types of neighborhoods. tions are coordinated with targeted communications to mem-
Transnational houses are dwellings built with money earned bers of the diaspora. Real estate developers have also worked
abroad and often are of architectural designs and styling more with banks with branches in Africa to organize payment transfers
reminiscent of housing in Europe and North America. Prefer- to pay for this housing.
ences are for single-family, villa-style dwellings (as opposed to The urban focus of transnational houses shows that expatriates
extended-family traditional dwelling units such as compound have a reduced loyalty to their traditional villages and are more
housing) in low-density residential locations. Some of these attracted to cities. Some expats have short-term investing hori-
houses are located in new secure gated communities that oper- zons and build houses to rent to expats in Africa, earning rental
ate as residential enclaves with high proportions of absentee incomes (often in dollars/euros, taking advantage of currency fluc-
owners. Also, foreign builders with imported building materials tuations). Other expats have longer-term horizons, opting to build
construct many houses in gated communities. However, the ma- in unserviced new areas where land is relatively cheap and where
jority of transnational houses are found in new suburban locations housing can potentially appreciate more in time when services are
where land is available and where housing develops in a haphazard
eventually delivered to the area. Others build immediately to take
manner (Owusu-Ansah and O’Connor 2010). On the fringes of
advantage of money earned but plan on full occupancy at a later
cities, houses built by monies sent from abroad are typically incre-
date. About 30% of such homes are left vacant.
mentally constructed based on cycles of remittance flows (local
By investing in houses during their period abroad, migrants
parlance now equates the height of a building to the length of
strengthen their membership rights in their community of origin
time the owner has been abroad); as such, some transnational
for when they return. Many migrants care about their home
dwellings can take more than a decade to complete. Smaller
communities and invest so as to contribute directly to their
numbers of transnational houses are built in traditional, indige-
family members’ housing needs. Housing investments result in
nous neighborhoods, standing out as larger dwellings that are
indirect benefits, such as increasing family members’ marriage
incongruent with traditional architectural styles in the vicinity.
prospects as transnational houses signal access to international
The notion of a transnational house can also apply to transmi-
connections and global funds. At the same time, these housing
grants’ split existence of working abroad and investing in a
investments add to the development of more modern housing
property in their native country in the hope of occupying the
stock in native cities. In turn, hometown residents benefit from
home on their return or retirement. In the interim, the transmi-
employment opportunities and increased demand for local con-
grant may occupy the home during vacations, and family care-
struction materials. Significantly, housing investment may be a
takers are often allowed to live in it rent-free in compensation
starting point for a broader investment relationship between
for house-sitting responsibilities. Increasingly, individuals who
migrants and their countries of origin.
have lived and made money abroad reinforce the connection

turn, dislocate them from the dynamics of their imme- exports more expensive. Moreover, the benefits accru-
diate environments. Remittances exacerbate income ing to remittance-receiving families can further foster a
inequalities, particularly in households receiving inter- culture of remittance dependency and even promote
continental remittances, which tend to be better off future migration streams. High levels of migration dis-
from the start. Large remittance flows into land and rupt agricultural production and lead to the replace-
housing can cause “Dutch disease” (negative conse- ment of crops requiring high labor inputs with less
quences due to large inflows of monies) effects, partic- labor-intensive varieties, which, in turn, has a negative
ularly in small open economies (e.g., Cape Verde and effect on nutrition (e.g., substitution of cassava for
Swaziland), causing currency appreciation and rendering yams is labor-saving, but cassava is nutritionally inferior).
 Migration 173

Remittances can be a public moral hazard, whereby and policy formulation are playing catch-up. Knowl-
governments ignore some obligations, anticipating edge is especially thin compared to the large body of
that inflows will fill voids in public expenditure. Other accumulated knowledge on official development assis-
human costs associated with the cycle include the neg- tance and foreign development assistance. A more
ative social effects on people left behind (hardship, active policy of engagement related to the African dias-
stress, and missing parents and family members) as pora is now taking place. The governments of Senegal
well as on those who leave. In the case of women who and Cape Verde are leading the way by their establish-
migrate without their families, raising children from ment of a ministerial department devoted to the dias-
abroad can entail tremendous pressures and sacrifices pora and the management of migration (Ghana and
(Wong 2006). Nigeria also tried but subsequently reversed course).
Remittances do not burden taxpayers in rich coun- In addition, the president of Senegal now appoints
tries but represent a substantial source of transfer to four Senegalese returnees to the senate to represent the
poor countries. Countries more open to immigration interests of the diaspora. Ethiopia, Ghana, and others
are the main source of remittance transfers: the United are attempting to engage the diaspora by issuing dias-
States, France, Italy, the UK, the Gulf states, Canada, pora bonds to raise funds to boost national econo-
and Australia. There are far fewer contributions from mies. Clearly, governments and the international
immigrant-resistant countries (e.g., Japan). However, community perceive the remittance arena as dynamic,
it remains to be determined whether remittances will and governments want to innovate. They have to be
become the principal method of transfer between rich watchful that remittances do not become another de-
and poor countries. This would require a more liberal stabilizing globalizing force and that they instead serve
open-door policy to immigration. Perhaps, in the next as another tool to work toward the MDGs. However,
round of global negotiations, “immigration not aid” the role of the diaspora and its relationship to national
could be the new mantra for development, replacing governments in developing their own societies need
the older “trade not aid” slogan. considerable reflection.
The flow of ideas embodied within the transfer of
monies may actually have a more lasting impact on so-
HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SMUGGLING
ciety. The communications revolution has facilitated
an exponential growth in international phone calls, International organizations (eg., UNHCR, Inter-
emails, and social media communication, and in inter- national Labor Organization, and International Or-
national travel. It is no longer just the elites who are ganization for Migration), migration research institutes
exposed to external flows of new ideas. Instead, the cir- (e.g., Southern African Migration Project at Queens
culation of knowledge about what, where, and how to University in Canada, African Center for Migration &
change things, for example, alters expectations about Society at Witwatersrand University in South Africa,
global and local societies (e.g., service quality, national and the International Migration Institute at Oxford
regulations, and the behavior of politicians). University in the UK), NGOs, and individual research-
The diaspora has emerged as a major development ers are increasingly drawing attention to the exploita-
actor in an increasingly interdependent, global world. tion of vulnerable migrants by international human
Many of those involved have acquired skills, and some smugglers and human traffickers.
have accumulated capital and established contacts with Human smuggling is when an individual crosses a
business partners and potential investors in Africa. More- country’s international border without state authoriza-
over, a number of the diaspora are influential in their tion and with the assistance of paid smugglers. Costs
host societies and have risen to positions that can engen- of smuggling are typically paid up front and vary ac-
der positive socioeconomic and political outcomes in cording to the length and difficulty of the journey. An
their host countries in favor of their home countries. average long journey from the Horn to South Africa
Given the importance of remittances and their ex- costs approximately US$2,000, but many undertake
panding 21st-century trajectory, data collection, research, the journey in stints, paying for each leg along the way,
174 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

often working or waiting for sponsors to remit pay- sex trafficking because, unlike drugs, humans can be
ments so their journey can be continued (Horwood sold repeatedly.
2009). Some long-distance migrants have no option The clandestine nature of the activities means that
but to enter into debt bondage agreements and invol- the full extent of trafficking cannot be ascertained. Hun-
untary service, often enforced by threats of violence. Many dreds of thousands of African men, women, and chil-
newly arrived migrants become part of their benefactor's dren at any given time are in the process of being
workforce until smuggling debts are paid off, while others recruited, entrapped, transported, and exploited by
are allowed to obtain employment elsewhere and make human traffickers (Fitzgibbon 2003). The global traf-
periodic payments to their benefactors. ficking business is characterized by a high supply of des-
International trafficking occurs when unsuspecting perate individuals and an equally large demand for
people are lured and deceived by promises of a better inexpensive labor and commercial sex workers. Estab-
life but are subsequently coerced into forced labor and lished cultural norms of child migration throughout
sexual services. In the Palermo Protocol and other legal many parts of Africa on the basis that “relatives” else-
conventions, coercion (whether directly or indirectly where are better positioned to take care of the children
via the threat of physical force against them or their and the propensity to rely on child laborers make it very
relatives back home) is the key difference between difficult to uncover evidence of child trafficking.
human smuggling and trafficking. Drugs and witchcraft Human trafficking flourishes because of porous
(juju can be used to get victims to take an oath of loyalty borders, the involvement of organized crime syndicates,
to traffickers) are used to control workers in the com- the ease with which border officials look the other way,
mercialized sex industry, and confiscation of identity and the collusion between criminal gangs and the police
documents is also common. (Horwood 2009). Only around half of African countries
Some of the worst cases of human trafficking in- have enacted anti-trafficking legislation. Enforcement is
volve child migrants ending up in modern slave-like an even greater challenge; it has concentrated on forced
conditions (working as street hawkers, laborers, and sex workers and has accomplished much less in terms of
sex workers) or, in others, having their organs removed. identifying, much less tackling, other forced labor or
Forced labor typically takes place in the informal econ- organ harvesting. Trafficking is conducted ‘at low risk
omy or on the margins of the formal economy, where and high profits to the organizers, who establish the net-
workers are not legitimate entrants into the national work at arm’s length, making their detection and even-
labor market and so are severely deprived in terms of tual conviction difficult. International organizations
protection. Advocacy campaigns and documentary and NGOs have assembled many testimonies and pho-
film (e.g., Dark Side of Chocolate) have shown trafficked tographic narratives of victims, but still surveillance and
child labor being deployed by various commercial enforcement are weak. Victims rarely pursue legal justice
interests—for example, cocoa plantations in West and bear witness against traffickers, fearing retaliation or
Africa—and as domestic help in homes, sometimes la- rectimination against their families and villages. Mistrust
boring for distant relatives (occasionally even in their of police and their possible complicity further compel
own countries). Wealthier African families typically victims to remain silent. Fear and abuse are common,
have several laborers working as house help, and some and trafficking survivors typically struggle with post-
people remain in slave-like employment conditions that traumatic stress disorder.
are hidden behind residential walls, without any labor Trafficking can span numerous states and link, di-
protection or recourse. Modern-day slavery flourishes be- rectly or indirectly, specific tasks such as recruiting,
cause of its profitability: it is the second largest illicit profit transporting (via trucks, buses, bush guides, etc.), trans-
industry in the world (after narcotics), accounting for ferring, harboring, and receiving persons at their final
approximately US$30 billion per annum, and the fast- destinations. There are cases where small syndicates
est-growing criminal enterprise, expected to surpass organize and operate all of the stages, but more com-
drug trafficking in five years (Polaris Project 2013). monly the trafficker subcontracts tasks along the way
Criminal syndicates are attracted to the profitability of and chooses from a variety of facilitators who compete
 Migration 175

and offer their specific trafficking services. These chains point for people brought from Asia and the Middle East
make prosecuting trafficking crimes especially difficult, bound for North America and Europe (See Box 7.5 for
as laws are written to target multiple criminal elements a case study of migrant journeys to South Africa). Some
rather than isolated acts of kidnap, assault, rape, extor- smuggled migrants change their objective during their
tion, and illegal border crossing, for instance. journey. For example, a refugee originally intending to
Most African states are affected by trafficking to vari- reach South Africa may take up residence in one of the
ous degrees, but impoverished and conflict zones are countries along the route or may decide to move out-
especially affected; they can serve as origin, transit, and side the region. Others experience harsh forms of deten-
even destination locales. There are general geographical tion, relocation, and deportation along the route. Key
patterns to origin, transit, and destination areas, but safe houses may be used to hold and process smuggled
these are not discrete categories and often overlap. For persons or those to be channeled into the sex industry.
example, some transit countries (e.g., Kenya and Mo- However, most migrants are drawn to large and eco-
zambique) are also source and destination countries nomic vibrant metropolitan areas such as Johannes-
and also transit countries for smuggling people from burg, where the size of the immigrant population is
the Horn to South Africa (e.g., DRC and Burundi). The hotly debated (See Box 7.6 on The Johannesburg Hub:
Western Cape province in South Africa is a key trafficking How Many Foreigners Are Present?)

BOX 7.5 MIGRANT JOURNEYS IN PURSUIT plays a critical role in financing many migrants’ passage to South
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DREAM Africa (Horwood 2009). The key receiving payment locations
appear to be in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, and various South African
South Africa, with its strong economy and good infrastructural
cities, but a range of alternative agents and intermediaries facili-
system, is a migrant hub. The country is the largest single recipi-
tate parts of deals, and as a result payments can be made at a
ent of asylum applications in the world: its refugee and migration
variety of other locations as well.
policy offers all irregular migrants the chance to seek asylum
Various modes of transportation are used to make the journey
once they are in the country. South Africa and Kenya have reputa-
to South Africa. Choice of passage depends on the economic
tions as venues for solving documentation and visa issues. For
status of the migrant but also on the options presented at any
example, after acquiring a Kenyan passport, irregular migrants
given time. Kenyans have the greatest ease traveling to South
headed south can acquire a visa for South Africa from facilitators
Africa, and most obtain visas and subsequently travel by bus to
in Nairobi for between US$400 and US$600 (Horwood 2009:13),
South Africa or by long-haul truck. Kenyans rarely travel in
and documents are transacted with similar ease in South Africa.
groups except in buses and opt to pay bribes to ensure safe
Johannesburg is a major end destination as well as the most reli-
passage. In some instances, bus drivers assume smuggler roles
able departure destination to exit Africa by air. by brokering deals with immigration officials on migrants’
South Africa has more than 210,000 asylum cases pending (half behalf. Some Kenyans are even able to make their way to South
of the applications are from Zimbabwe) and 57,889 registered Africa without documentation.
refugees (UNHCR 2013b). In addition, tens of thousands of people Horn of Africa irregular migrants have a more difficult time
are trafficked to and through South African every year. Harwood in their passage, and many do not have the required funds to
(2009:7) estimates that between 17,000 and 20,000 males un- complete the journey, so working along the way and spending
dertake a journey to South Africa every year from the Horn, but time in Nairobi is common. Typically, Somali and Ethiopian
not all make it there. The number of women and children is esti- groups start off with 15 to 30 migrants, but the numbers expand
mated to be lower, possibly in the low thousands. South Africa is to the low hundreds by the time they move into the countries
the top smuggling route in Africa for aspirant migrants, particu- bordering South Africa. Reportedly, grouping is a cost-saving
larly for those originating in the Horn, Great Lakes, and Southern measure to move large numbers of people at the same time,
African regions. The journey to South Africa is perceived as less and it minimizes negotiations and bribes paid to officials. Usu-
dangerous and difficult than crossing the Gulf of Aden into ally, migrants are taken overland the entire way, but some routes
Yemen (a route with a reputation for violence and fatality) or combine boat and road travel or air and road, or other various
traveling across the Sahara to Libya and on to Europe (a very combinations. A myriad of unofficial rural tracks (known as
difficult and expensive route). “panya routes” in East Africa) are used to crisscross countries.
On average, it is an eight-week journey for Ethiopian or Migrants routinely have to walk some stretches along the jour-
Somali migrants to reach South Africa. The sizable Ethiopian and ney, especially in border regions, sometimes for days at a time.
Somali diaspora (estimated to be larger than 2 million people)
(Continued)
176 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 7.5 (Continued) forests, or beaches for periods of time or become stranded
indefinitely. Bribes, harassment, and exploitation are common
The overland route from Ethiopia and/or Somalia to South Africa hallmarks of the migrant experience. Irregular migrants’ tran-
with the fewest border crossings passes through only three sit across countries is characterized by significant night travel,
countries (Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique), but few migrants cramped traveling spaces (containers are among the most
are channeled along the most direct route (See figure 7.4). Most dangerous), hiding in woods and safe houses, robberies,
stop in Nairobi, which serves as a migrant interchange hub. beatings, arrests, and multiple shakedowns for bribes by vari-
Refugee camps and Nairobi neighborhoods with high concentra- ous officials. As a result, the physical and mental conditions of
tion of Ethiopians and Somalis (e.g., Eastleigh and Kariobangi) migrants often deteriorate, and unknown numbers of people
are key staging points at which members of their clans/ethnic are killed along the way. Exposure to considerable exploit-
groups work out arrangements. In these locations, there are safe ative situations and prejudice in South Africa is the price
houses for smuggled persons as well as clandestine offices that many accept for new lives of “opportunity.” For some
where travel documents can be obtained. Many irregular mi- migrants, the South African dream turns into a nightmare.
grants reinvent themselves in Nairobi with various identifica- Hundreds of Somalis now disillusioned about their lives in
tion cards, birth certificates, or passports (Somalis are known South Africa are returning every week to Somalia, where
to obtain Ethiopian forged identities because Somali passports political conditions are stabilizing and now offer them an al-
are not accepted in South Africa). ternative. Nevertheless, others still arrive, and working for
Safe passage to South Africa is far from guaranteed. Mi- months and even years in South Africa is viewed as a neces-
grants can face deportation along the way, some spend sary step in joining the diaspora and in raising enough funds
time in prisons (often until the smuggler can raise the funds for sponsoring the next generation of migrants.
for their release), and others are left waiting at safe houses,

CAMEROQ
Yaoundé

Kinshasa

6)Luanda

ZAMBIA
Lusaka

MBIQUE

Atlantic
Ocean Indian
Ocean
Cape Town

FIGURE 7.4 Human Trafficking in South Africa. Adapted from Horwood 2009, p. 25.
 Migration 177

BOX 7.6 THE JOHANNESBURG HUB:

HOW MANY FOREIGNERS ARE PRESENT?
In 1994, the South African police estimated that there were
2 million undocumented migrants in the country. In 1995, they
came up with the figure of 8 million—20% of the South African
population—an implausible figure that was highly questioned.
A survey by the Center of Socio-Political Analysis of the Human
Sciences Research Council (HSRC) revealed an estimate of 5 million to
6 million (the survey asked respondents how many foreigners they
knew in their surrounding area). These figures confirmed popular sus-
picions, were quickly bandied about in official speeches, and became
popular knowledge. The HSRC withdrew the figures in the early 2000s
on the basis of a flawed methodology (Segatti and Landau 2011).
The effects of these counts on political rhetoric and popular
discourse cannot be overstated. Their numbers shaped immigra-
tion policy and were used to shore up government failure to de- FIGURE 7.5 Somali Shop in Thokoza Township, South-
liver jobs (the government alluded to a figure based on a flawed
east of Johannesburg. Photograph by Dan Thompson.
estimate that coincidentally corresponded to a significant propor-
tion of the unemployed). They have fanned xenophobic fears and about 3 million, a number that would need to be revised upward
popular unexamined views that foreigners have “taken” South with the Zimbabwean crisis beginning in 2000. Surprisingly,
African jobs as well as South African women. Xenophobic attacks these more reasoned estimates by leading migration academics
and police harassment of undocumented immigrants have been were not incorporated into political or popular discourse.
common. In 2008, violent attacks on immigrant entrepreneurs Estimating the number of South Africans who are moving to
erupted in several locations of South Africa. The xenophobic riots, urban areas is very difficult. Domestic migration is far more sig-
as they became known, resulted in 62 deaths and 670 wounded nificant than international migration in terms of local government
people. More than 150,000 were displaced and forced to leave challenges. The importance of domestic migration is particularly
South Africa. Tensions against international migrants also run high evident in peri-urban areas around Johannesburg, Tshwane, and
in townships: Somali, Bangladeshi, and Chinese shops are often Cape Town, which the number of migrants increased by 20% to
the object of robberies, extortion, and attack (Fig. 7.5). 35% over a seven-year period (Segatti and Landau 2011). By
The Southern African Migration Project and the African Centre global standards, these are extraordinary figures.
for Migration and Society generated more modest figures of

OUT OF AFRICA: U.S. AND EUROPEAN Large-scale voluntary migration from Africa to the
MOVEMENTS United States is recent. Severe restrictions were placed
on flows when the slave trade ended. It was not until
A growing number of Africans are making their way
the 1965 immigration reforms, when national origin
to Europe and North America and recently to China
quotas were lifted and caps on non-European migration
and the Middle East. The number of self-identified
were eliminated, that the door opened for African im-
members of the African diaspora living in the United
migration. Small numbers of Africans have pursued
States was 3.5 million in 2009 (Capps, McCabe, and
higher educational opportunities for many decades,
Fix 2011). Although the number of black Africans as
and some have stayed on, securing positions at univer-
a proportion of the total U.S. foreign-born popula-
sities, colleges, and hospitals. For example, Africans
tion is small (about 3%), they have been among the
regularly taught Africa courses in universities. Still, dis-
fastest-growing groups in U.S. immigration since 2000
tance, travel costs, and admission procedures proved
(Capps, McCabe, and Fix 2011). Net African immigra-
to be significant obstacles for unskilled Africans.
tion to the United States is even larger, as white and
President Barack Obama’s two terms in office have
biracial Africans are recorded in different U.S. census
bolstered awareness of the presence and sacrifices of
categories.
178 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

African immigrants and their families/descendants, whereby Nigerians, Ghanaians, Kenyans, and Liberians
and his success has gone some way to raising the pro- heavily dominated in previous decades. African na-
file of Africans in the U.S. and world imagination. The tionals from French-, Portuguese-, and Arab-speaking
geography of African immigrant settlement in many countries have moved beyond traditional migrant des-
ways mirrors some of the major patterns of African- tinations in Europe and North Africa to the United
American concentrations. African immigrants (as the States and elsewhere.
U.S. black population) are concentrated in New York, In Europe, labor migration from Africa has taken
Texas, Florida, California, and Illinois. Large metropolitan place for decades. Large flows of Senegalese and Malian
concentrations of African immigrants are found in males to France have occurred since the 1970s. Africa-
Washington, D.C.-Arlington—Alexandria and New York- wide flows to a greater number of European countries
northern New Jersey—Long Island. Also, noteworthy is (the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland)
Minneapolis-St. Paul, where one in five of the immi- have occurred since the 1980s. There are an estimated
grant population is African-born. However, unlike the 3.5 million to 8 million Africans in the European
black population, fewer Africans reside in rural South- Union. North Africans, especially Moroccans, Algerians,
eastern states (e.g., Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Tunisians, dominate the flows northward, but, in
and South Carolina). practice, many Europeans fail to differentiate between
In general, in the United States, immigrants from migrants from these countries and those from other
Africa have a high educational attainment, higher African countries, leading to hype about an “African
than other immigrant groups and higher than the invasion of Europe” (de Haas 2008).
native-born population. The United States, along Many Africans enter Europe by traditional routes
with Canada and Australia, disproportionately at- (e.g., ports and airports), but several nonconventional
tracts better-educated African immigrants, while less- routes are well traveled (Fig. 7.6). Several well-traversed
educated migrants move to the UK, France, and other cross-border circuits are used prior to difficult sea
European countries. There are, however, immigrants crossings. Many migrants from East Africa/the Horn
from refugee-originating countries in the United journey through transit circuits via Sudan—Egypt and/
States (e.g., Somalia) who have attained much lower or Sudan-Egypt-Libya as well as routes from Nairobi
levels of education. (Kenya) to Bossasso (Somalia) and from Addis Ababa
There are four main channels by which African (Ethiopia) to Obock (Djibouti). Several West African
immigrants can enter the United States legally. First, routes are prominent. First, there isa land route draw-
most are admitted through family reunification chan- ing people from Gulf of Guinea countries (Ghana,
nels. Second, some groups have a high proportion Nigeria, and Cote d'Ivoire) that connects via the migra-
of people accepted through employment (e.g., white tion hub of Agadez (Niger) to Libya and Algeria.
South Africans and white Zimbabweans). Third, im- A second land route draws others from Gulf of Guinea
migrants from countries such as Burundi, Somalia, countries and connects via Mali to the southern Algerian
DRC, Congo, and Rwanda tend to gain admission from migration hub of Tamanrasset and/or via Senegal
refugee resettlement and asylum programs. Fourth, through Mauritania to Morocco. A third route runs from
the diversity visa program has increased flows from various West Africa ports to the Canary Islands (a Spanish
underrepresented African countries by allowing im- island located off the Moroccan coast). A fourth route is
migration by individuals from countries such as Benin via major airports in the West African region (e.g., Accra,
and Cameroon who would not qualify under the Lagos, Dakar, Bamako, and Abuja). Many Africans ply
other schemes. these routes independently, but human smugglers and
Multiple channels for immigration mean that the criminal syndicates guide other African migrants. Smug-
African-born population in the United States has never glers’ help is typically solicited to make the illegal, peril-
been so culturally, linguistically, and nationally di- ous boat journey across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.
verse. Africa-to-United States migration is no longer Thousands of Africans have perished in this dangerous
dominated by flows from English-speaking countries, crossing: 1,500 died in 2011, a record-high year.
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180 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

TABLE 7.2 MAINSTREAMING MIGRATION IN THE MDGs

MDG 1. Eradicate Extreme Poverty

® Remittances: increase remittance transfers; create better opportunities for investment of remittances in productive and employment-
generating activities and agricultural production
° Migrant rights: eliminate exploitation of vulnerable migrant workers; facilitate cross-border movements to enhance migrants’
business opportunities; encourage urban agriculture among rural-urban migrants and facilitate the transfers of foodstuffs from rural
to urban areas

MDG 2. Achieve Universal Primary Education

e Harness the contribution of the diaspora for education

e Promote remittances to be invested in education
e Remove barriers to migrants’ accessing education

MDG 3. Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women

e Address gender discrimination in migrant households

e Identify obstacles to girls’ migration for education
e Harness remittances for girls’ and women’s education

MDG 4. Reduce Child Mortality

e Address health needs of pregnant migrants and newborns

e Reduce out-migration of health care professionals from vulnerable states/localities
¢ Develop special programs for the children of migrants

MDG 5. Improve Maternal Health

e Ensure migrants’ access to health care

e Eliminate gender-based violence against migrant women
e Promote exchange of health care professionals between over- and underserviced countries/locations

MDG 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases

e Understand the role of migration in the diffusion of diseases

e Improve access of migrants and other mobile people to health care and medicines
e Eliminate migration systems that forcibly separate migrants from spouses/partners

MDG 7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability

e Avoid resettlement in marginal or unsustainable environments

e Ensure migrants are not involved in unsustainable resource exploitation, and eradicate unsustainable practices triggering further
population migration
e Eliminate discrimination against migrants’ access to land, housing, and services

MDG 8. Develop a Global Partnership for Development

e Liberalize temporary freedom of movement of workers to supply services in another country

¢ Promote good governance of global migration and mainstream migration in regional, national, and urban and rural development
plans
¢ Strengthen efforts to manage migration at all spatial scales

Source: Crush and Frayne 2010:11-13.

CONCLUSIONS recognition of differential earning potentials by

Africans, like other people around the world, will country and location and the emergence of a culture
continue to be mobile in the 21st century. The media of remittances are salient features of Africa’s place in
have made the wealth of opportunities that may be the contemporary global economy. Technology and
possible abroad more visible and enticing. Far greater transnational networks have also prompted the
 Migration 181

movement of people across international borders. For Unfortunately the MDGs were formulated before
the foreseeable future, the dynamics motivating migration was recognized as a critical development
people to leave their home country in search of work cross-cutting issue. Migration researchers have elabo-
and opportunity look set to continue and even expand rated on how strengthening migrants’ rights, reducing
in the African region. migrant vulnerabilities, and harnessing the knowl-
Opportunities to emigrate legally are severely edge, skills, and resources of the diaspora can be used
limited, and this is unlikely to change. In a global- and incorporated into development policies (Crush
ized world, irregular migrants remain highly vul- and Frayne 2010). Going about this in sensible, sys-
nerable. There will always be a lucrative market for tematic, and balanced ways will provide the greatest
smugglers and traffickers and their foot soldiers, benefits to the greatest number of people.
transnational criminals, corrupt officials, document
forgers, and other facilitators of the illicit transport
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 RWI ER &

WATER

INTRODUCTION
and its movement is expensive and difficult (e.g., 1 m3
Water is a vital substance for human survival. Safe weighs .35 tons). Considerable research is devoted to
water is required for drinking, hygiene, and food prep- quantifying how much water is currently available, as-
aration; adequate water is needed to produce energy sessing areas of “water poverty,” and projecting future
and to support economic activities in both urban and water withdrawals (Jones 2010). Some innovative tech-
tural settlements. An essential resource for economic niques for mapping water resources at the national and
development, water is critical not only to food produc- regional levels are emerging (MacDonald et al. 2012).
tion but to most production processes, from micro- Water is moving up on the 21st-century political
chips to potato chips. Historical patterns of human agenda. It is becoming one of the most important se-
settlement have reflected the distribution of adequate curity challenges, and future water scarcity may
water resources; for example, the emergence of early threaten economic and social gains, undermine the
civilizations along the Nile River was closely tied to the global system, and quite possibly trigger widespread
availability of water. conflict and even war (although violent water conflicts
A now-salient theme in books, at international have been rare to date). Sporadic conflict has occurred,
conferences, and in media reports is that global water for example, among Kenyan and Ethiopian pastoralists
demand is spiraling out of control and a water crisis over access to a declining Lake Turkana, and ongoing
is looming (Jones 2010; Oakland Institute 2011a). The projects to build a number of dams (for hydropower
strain on water resources is greater now than it has generation) on the Omo River (Ethiopia) that feeds
been at any time in human history, and the current the lake will escalate tensions (Fig. 8.1). Broad interna-
global water trajectory looks unsustainable. Water de- tional frameworks and transboundary agreements are
mands have increased on many fronts: rising popula- urgently needed to avoid conflict.
tion and the urban revolution require more food and Water and sanitation goals were incorporated into
more from agriculture, and industrial and domestic the United Nations (UN) Millennium Development
needs have increased significantly. Industrial and do- Goals (MDGs) in 2000. MDG 7c sets a target of halv-
mestic water demand quadrupled in the second half of ing the number of people without access to safe water
the 20th century. In Africa, increased water scarcity, the and sanitation by 2015. The UN now provides a global
shrinking of some water bodies (e.g., Lake Chad, Lake water audit via its World Water Assessment Program
Turkana), desertification, and deforestation have been and convenes regular World Water Forums to inform
documented. Water is one of the most local resources, political leaders, policymakers, and the public about

185
186 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

private-versus-commons °debate remains unresolved

and is sure to become even more contentious.

AFRICA’S WATER

At an aggregate level, Africa is the world’s second driest

region, surpassed only by Australia. However, overlook-
ing temporal and spatial climate variability (for the
moment), Africa has abundant rainfall and relatively low
levels of water withdrawal for the three major uses of
water—agriculture, community use, and industry; com-
bined, these three account for approximately 3.8% of
total annual water resources (UNEP 2009). Water re-
sources are unevenly distributed throughout the region,
FIGURE 8.1 Lake Turkana, Kenya: Water Amidst a Barren
plentiful in some counties and scare in others. Central
Landscape. Source: © Toby Adamson/ Design Pics/Corbis.
Africa has abundant water, with 50% of Africa's water
resources, whereas West Africa contains approximately
water management and its development dimensions. 23% of the continent's water (UNEP 2010). Existing
The World Economic Forum, the annual meeting of (known) water resources are limited in other African re-
influential corporate leaders at Davos, Switzerland, gions, but aquifers may represent an untapped resource
also recognizes water as a key global issue. At the 2009 (UNEP 2010).
meeting, water rights were hotly debated. Many stake- In Africa, access to water is a critical issue. Distribu-
holders favored a basic right to water, but international tion and reliability problems impede development
financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank) and corpo- throughout the region; the result is that two thirds of
rate interests advocated water privatization. An uneasy Africans lack proper sanitation facilities and 40% lack
compromise was reached at Davos: governments com- reliable access to safe water (WHO/UNICEF 2008).
mitted to provide citizens with up to 25 liters of water Lack of access to safe drinking water and adequate
per day for drinking and hygiene but acknowledged water for hygiene is a major cause of health and dis-
that water use above this level would incur charges ease throughout the region. Moreover, large portions
(Jones 2010:10). of the available water supplies are undermined by
The tilt toward privatization has sparked a global human activities such as rapid urbanization without
water justice movement. Since 2003, grassroots activists proper water and sanitation infrastructure (e.g., dis-
have held an annual concurrent Alternative Water Forum charges of untreated wastes, solid waste thrown into
focusing on their vision of water as a resource that storm drains, and liquid leaching from refuge dumps),
should be held in common, opposing the water privati- poor land use and agriculture practices (fertilizer and
zation movement. African nongovernmental organiza- pesticide runoff), and mining and industrial activities
tions have formed around such a “water commons” (petroleum refining), many of which contaminate the
vision and have played an integral part in developing a region's water supplies.
world water vision. In July 2010, the UN endorsed the Africa's climate is a fundamental source of its water
grassroots vision, passing a landmark resolution that challenges. Straddling the Equator and extending beyond
access to water and sanitation is a “human right that is both tropics, the climates of Africa are dominated by the
essential to the full enjoyment of life” (Resolution Hadley cells. These circulation cells create both the exces-
64/292) (UN 2010). The vast majority of countries sup- sive rains on the rising limb along the intertropical con-
ported the resolution (no state opposed it), but Canada, vergence zone around the equator and the desiccation
the United States, the UK, Australia, and Botswana ab- of the adiabatically heated air on the sinking limb
stained from voting, weakening the global agreement. around the subtropics, suppressing convective activity
The politics surrounding the resolution ensures that the and rain formation. They contribute to a highly uneven
 Water 187

distribution of water, ranging from desert to equatorial world’s largest groundwater lakes are located in the
rainforest. Climatic conditions also result in high region. For example, Lake Victoria or Victoria Nyanza
evaporation losses of water, reflected in higher un- is the world’s second largest freshwater lake, and Lake
usable and nonrenewal resources compared to other Tanganyika is one of the world’s deepest and largest
world regions (UN-Water Africa 2001). Fluctuations in lakes. Africa's inland lakes support vital fisheries, par-
climatic variability in recent decades have led to an in- ticularly important to populations in Uganda, Tanzania,
creasing frequency of droughts, particularly in the Kenya, Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo
Sahel and the Horn of Africa. At the same time, else- (DRC). Wetlands are found in almost all countries and
where in Africa, seasonal flooding and water over- cover about 1% of the region’s total surface. Examples of
abundance appear to have increased in frequency (€.g., significant wetlands are the marshland along the White
floods in the Zambezi Valley in 2000 resulted in a Nile in Central Sudan and the Okavango Delta, which
major flood in Mozambique). straddles large areas of Botswana and Namibia and in-
Africa's water geography is composed of big rivers, cludes smaller areas of Angola and Zimbabwe. Wetlands
large lakes, vast wetlands, and limited but widespread are important for water storage and filtration as well as
groundwater. Large rivers and lakes represent much of for food and wildlife habitats.
Africa's surface and groundwater resources. The region Countries with abundant water are Congo, Gabon,
is home to 63 shared river basins. Rivers such as the Liberia, Equatorial Guinea and Central African Republic,
Congo, Nile, Zambezi, and Niger hold vast amounts of DRC, and Gabon; the latter two countries are among the
water and flow through multiple states. Some of the world’s top 10 natural water-available states (Table 8.1).

TABLE 8.1 WATER AVAILABILITY IN AFRICA

Water Resources [Total

Resources: Total Renewable
Item Country International Rank Per Capita (m3/capita/year)]

he Congo W 275.679

2 Gabon a 333338

3 Liberla 15 79.643

4 Equatorial Guinea 21 56.893

5 Central African Republic 28 38.849

6 Sierra Leone 31 36.322

ue Guinea 36 27.716

8 Guinea Bissau 39 25.855

S Congo (DR) 41 25.183

10. Madagascar 46 21.102

alt Cameroon 49 19.192

WA Sao Tomé and Principe 51 15.797

ies Angola 33) 14.009

14. Mozambique 61 11.814

15. Namibia 65 10.211

16. Zambia 66 10.095

(Continued)
 TABLE 8.1 WATER AVAILABILITY IN AFRICA (Continued)
Water Resources [Total
Resources: Total Renewable

Item Country International Rank Per Capita (m?/capita/year)]

lee Botswana 71 9345

18. Mali 75 8810

(I Gambia 87 6332

20. Chad 90 5453

21. Cote d'Ivoire 92 5058

22s Swaziland 93 4876

23. Mauritania 95 4278

24. Senegal 96 4182

25: Benin 99 3954

26. Togo 109 3247

27. Niger 111 3107

28. Uganda 115 2833

2 Ghana 119 2756

30. Tanzania 124 2514

SHle Nigeria 125 2514

SPs Sudan 129 2074

33: Ethiopia 137 1749

34. Eritrea 139 1722

35. Comoros 140 1700

36. Zimbabwe 143 1584

Bi. Somalia 144 1538

38. Malawi 145 1528

39. Lesotho 147 1485

40. South Africa 150 1154

41. Burkina Faso 152 1084

42. Kenya 154 985

43. Morocco 155 971

44. Egypt 156 859

45. Cape Verde 158 703

46. Rwanda 159 683

47. Burundi 161 566

48. Tunisia 162 482
49. Algeria 163 478
50. Djibouti 164 475
Ke Libya 174 113
r 3 =.

Source: Njoh and Akiwumi. 2011. Water availability in Africa, p. 455.

 Water 189

DRC, in particular, contains enormous water re- haphazard nature of water availability. Constructing
sources (275,670 m? per capita). In DRC, the popula- dams and irrigated enclosures can enhance the prod-
tion size and the water availability are incongruent; it uctivity of land, but both are expensive to build and
holds vast amounts of water for its population size operate. Irrigation is poorly developed, and 70% of
(Njoh and Akiwumi 2011). Central Africa has huge water used for irrigation is lost and not used by plants
potential to export water, as do parts of southwest and (UN-Water Africa 2001:15). Given the economic situ-
southeast Africa and West Africa. In particular, the ation in the 2010s and projected future water stresses,
Congo and Zambezi rivers have much untapped po- Africa cannot afford to spend its constrained resources
tential for fulfilling human needs. on channeling water that is wasted.
Water scarcity is a critical development challenge in For the most part, Africa lags behind other regions
other areas. At a regional level, water capacity pressures of the world in terms of harnessing water resources
are most salient in East Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn and creating large-scale water infrastructure (e.g., dams
and in the south, especially in the Kalahari Desert. Many to supply hydropower and irrigation), and African
African states fall within the bottom third of the world’s dams are concentrated in Southern and West Africa
worst water-resourced states (Jones 2010:13). For ex- and absent in the Central Africa and Sahel regions. On
ample, Burundi, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, and South Africa average, there is one dam to every 683,000 persons,
have very low levels of natural water resources. Other compared to one dam per 168,000 persons in the rest
within-country water-scarce pockets are evident; for ex- of the world (UNEP 2010). Large dams in Africa have
ample, Windhoek (Namibia), Nouakchott (Mauritania), resulted in some of the largest human-created lakes
and Arusha (Tanzania) are water-stressed cities in their in the world (e.g., Lake Volta [Ghana], Lake Kariba [on
respective countries. the Zambia/Zimbabwe border], and Cahora Bassa
Water availability is not always correlated with water [Mozambique]), but large portions of the interior are
accessibility. For instance, South Africa's water availabil- not dammed and rely solely on rainfall and natural
ity ranking is 150 out of 180 countries, but a large resources.
majority of Johannesburg's urban residents have pipe- Government commitments to increase water coy-
borne water access, and some of this water is provided erage have failed to keep pace with population growth.
by the neighboring country of Lesotho. At the other end Only 12% of rural populations have been provided
of the spectrum, South Sudan and Sudan have low with homme water connections, and less than 50% have
levels of water stress but rank lowest in access to muni- benefited from any other form of improved water
cipal water: less than 15% of Sudanese have access to source (WHO/UNICEF 2012). Urban coverage rates
utility water in its most basic form (i.e., stand-posts). show more improvement: 50% of urban residents
Decades of war, the accompanying lack of maintenance, have access to piped-water connections, and 74% have
and policy neglect have created extreme water vulnera- benefited from some other form of improved water
bility in both countries. Again, factors beyond nature coverage (WHO/UNICEF 2012). Significant intra-urban
play important roles in producing contemporary water disparities, however, exist in water consumption. Infor-
and sanitation gaps in Africa. mal settlements have the lowest levels of piped-water
Water availability is an obvious determinant of access (19% of dwellings), and 40% of slum dwellers
agriculture productivity. In many African countries, have access within 200 meters (UN-HABITAT 2007).
rain-fed agriculture is the most important driver of Average daily rates of urban water consumption show
economic growth. Agriculture accounts for 20% of high variability between formal housing areas and in-
the African gross domestic product and 60% of total formal or slum areas. Slum dwellers consume, on aver-
employment; farming is the main livelihood in rural age, 25 liters per day while other urbanites consume
areas (UN-Water Africa 2006). Agriculture accounts 50 liters per day, and elites may consume as much as
for approximately 85% of water withdrawal (UN- 2,000 liters per day (UN-HABITAT 2012).
Water Africa 2001); however, agricultural productivity Knowledge about Africa’s renewable water stores is
in Africa has traditionally been constrained by the still at an early stage of development. Many contend
190 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

that increasing reliable water supplies throughout poor planning, increaséd poverty, higher standards
Africa depends on the development of groundwater of living, lack of resources, and competition between
(MacDonald et al. 2012). Groundwater is used exten- sectors (industry, agriculture, municipal services) for
sively in agriculture, and many cities depend on it for available freshwater are also significant factors. They
municipal water (e.g., Lusaka, Windhoek, Kampala, contribute to water stress or water scarcity in regions
and Addis Ababa are heavily dependent; Lagos, where the quantity and quality may not be enough to
Abidjan, Cape Town, and Pretoria are partly depend- provide adequate safe drinking water, food, and hy-
ent). Groundwater is present in most African envi- giene, and this can severely constrain economic devel-
ronments and generally does not require treatment opment and overburden health care systems. Water
because it is naturally protected from contamination, availability has wide implications for economic and de-
although in some environments elevated levels of velopment performance, health, food security, trans-
iron, fluoride, or arsenic can be a problem. Ground- boundary cooperation, and environment change. Water
water mapping is an emerging research frontier; Mac- is also attracting international investors and proposed
Donald et al. (2012), for example, have mapped projects will add new and different pressures on water
aquifer potential to indicate the areas where the great- availability. In the context of projected global climate
est borehole potential exists (Fig. 8.2). change, the prudent management of water is a critical
Their mapping shows that some areas identified as development challenge.
being water-insecure (Kenya, Chad, Western Sahara,
Mali, and especially the North African region) actually
WATER AND SANITATION:
have ample underground reservoir supplies. Ground-
water availability is estimated to be 0.66 million km?, COLONIALISM TO THE PRESENT

more than 100 times the annual renewable freshwater Inadequate African water and sanitation systems have
resources and 20 times the freshwater stored in African colonial origins. Under colonial rule, infrastructure de-
lakes (Mac Donald et al. 2012). As the largest and most veloped by the colonial powers was oriented toward
widely distributed store of freshwater in Africa, ground- cities and the elites and was highly uneven, reflecting
water appears to provide an important buffer to climate concerns from Europe (about spatial planning and pro-
variability and change. However, considerable work tecting the health of Europeans) rather than those from
needs to be undertaken on developing water manage- African. Rural areas were generally excluded from colo-
ment and groundwater conservation practices, and pri- nial water infrastructure, except for irrigation projects.
cing mechanisms remain controversial (Strand 2010). Development of infrastructure was driven by the
Water resources are being discovered in~Africa’s colonial financial logic that projects were to be gener-
desert environment. For example, in 2013, the Kenyan ated from Africa’s own natural resources. Labor for
government announced the discovery of two massive many projects was mainly provided by Africans’ forced
stores of underground water by a French exploration labor. For example, British colonial authorities em-
company, Radar Technologies, that was partially funded ployed forced labor to develop the Mombasa water
by UNESCO; it employed cutting-edge satellite tech- supply project (1911-17) (Njoh and Akiwumi 2011).
nology to explore the Turkana Desert for water (Plaut The French, under the auspices of the Office du Niger,
2013). Until this discovery this barren area, inhabited attempted to irrigate the Sahara in an area downstream
by 700,000 pastoralists, had been severely challenged from Bamako for cotton production in the 1930s. The
by widespread poverty and intermittent famines. The project failed for a number of reasons, among them
largest aquifer of the find is estimated to hold 250 bil- the inability to persuade enough Africans to relocate to
lion m? of water, equivalent to the volume of water in the irrigated area, the lack of appropriate seed varieties,
Lake Turkana. technical difficulties, and higher-than-expected costs.
Water is the 21st century's great challenge in Africa. Public health in the colonies was driven by a very
Water scarcity is not simply contingent on geography different rationale. Whereas public health initiatives in
and climate: population growth, rapid urbanization, Europe were designed to benefit the masses, the same
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192 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

logic was not applied to Africa. Instead, initiatives can raise large amounts of money to fund new infra-
there were designed to protect the health of colonial structure for areas with sparse or no coverage and areas
administrators and elites. This was partially attained with aging, inefficient infrastructure. For instance, it is
through spatial and social segregation and infrastruc- estimated that 50% of the water in African urban water
ture enclaves. Colonial enclaves were equipped with systems is lost before it can be used by consumers
sanitation facilities such as piped water, flush toilets, (UNEP 2010). The privatization tilt has enabled several
and electricity. Colonial business and residential en- powerful water services corporations to enter African
claves were separated by a building-free zone or cordon markets. Many private water utility companies receive fi-
sanitaire from indigenous settlements that lacked such nancial backing from international private equity firms.
services. In Accra, a graveyard was planned as a buffer With an emphasis on making profits, privatization treats
to separate the colonial district from the indigenous water as a commodity that can be allocated by the gov-
district or bazaar area. In practice, colonial urban infra- ernment and sold to the highest bidder. Water privatiza-
structure ignored indigenous communities except to tion remains controversial in Africa and in much of the
contain the residents. Colonialism turned Africa into a developing world. In general, because farmers are gener-
nightmare for Africans and a paradise for settlers. ally poor and because rainwater, rivers, and lakes are con-
Another difference between the Western universal sidered a gift from God/nature, charging farmers the full
water and sewerage systems and the Africa partial cost for water is problematic. Governments to date have
system is that the Western model assumes that urban failed to come up with mechanisms to manage water in
space is both relatively homogenous and spatially co- a socially sustainable way. For example, the government
herent (Gandy 2008). The African reality could not be of Tanzania in 2005 reclaimed control of the water
further from this Western model: it is characterized by sector after a two-year experiment with privatization led
fragmentation and extreme polarization. Even if the by Biwater (UK); there was a public outcry after the esca-
colonialists wanted to extend the colonial infrastruc- lation of water tariffs and delays in extending the water
ture (and this was considered only at a later stage in supply system.
urban development), it could never be transposed with There are several important postcolonial legacies
the same effect. The fragmented basis of the colonial involving water. First, African urban areas were poorly
African infrastructure may explain why progress has equipped to deal with the rapid urbanization of the
been so slow on improving access to water and sanita- last two decades. A striking characteristic of rapid ur-
tion. Environmental control was limited and restricted banization in Africa is an enlargement of urban water
in colonial urban Africa. After the colonial period, in- footprints. Inefficiencies and wastage of water means
dependent governments sought to improve the water that many cities now draw’on water both near and far
and sanitation infrastructure by expansion, based on (e.g., Nouakchott, Addis Ababa, Dakar) and several
the principle that water is a social good to be provided cities draw from sources far away (e.g., Dar es Salaam,
free of charge or subsidized. However, poor govern- Cape Town, Johannesburg) (Table 8.2).
ments could not afford to keep expanding or even to For example, a pipeline from Thiés supplied Dakar,
maintain the existing infrastructure. Poor economic and the Akaki wells contributed to Addis Ababa’s needs.
performances resulted in growing fiscal constraints Many cities extract water from rivers that flow more than
and fierce competition for ever-dwindling public re- 15.5 miles (25 km) from their urban perimeters, and sev-
sources. Nevertheless, governments continued to sub- eral now depend on international transboundary rivers
sidize water costs heavily until the economic crises of for water supply. The city of Johannesburg in 1970 relied
the 1980s. on the Vaal River and a dam to meet its water needs, but
Inadequate financing for water infrastructure, poor by 1990 its expanded water needs required capturing
governance, and corruption in many Africa states led water from eight additional rivers (Crocodile, Olifants,
international financial institutions to support water Tugela, Pongola, Komati, Limpopo, Usutu, and Malib-
privatization in Africa and other regions. The privatiza- amatso). These nine rivers will be insufficient to meet
tion rationale is based on the fact that private companies Johannesburg's water and population requirements in
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2030. The projected water deficit could be catastrophic

unless planners devise alternative solutions and better
manage urban water supplies.
Second, women and girls have been most adversely
affected by restrictions on access to water resources. In
general, women perform more than two thirds of
water-collection duties, and some African women
expend as much as 40% of their daily nutritional
intake traveling to collect water (UNEP 2010). An aver-
age African household consumes about 40 to 60 liters
of water daily for drinking, cooking, cleaning, per-
sonal hygiene, etc. Extensive water-collection duties
undertaken by women in rural areas can mean that
FIGURE 8.3 Women Collecting Water in Angola.
they travel as much as 3.72 miles (6 km) a day. On
Source: © Lynn Johnson/National Geographic Society/Corbis.
average, women spend more than half an hour per
round trip for water; this time could be spent on other
livelihood duties, and it reinforces a gender division living attributes), and indigenous water justice issues
of household labor. Women have a higher risk of (how people can have cultural rights and rights of
exposure to water-borne diseases: washing clothes, nature). Indigenous knowledge is acquired by local
bathing children, drawing water from surface sources, people through informal experiences and intensive
and, in some regions, working in flooded rice fields understanding and learning from their environment.
increase their health risks. Women can even be placed It can contribute to water sustainability and should be
in harm’s way when collecting water in conflict or incorporated into the decision-making process and de-
postconflict areas where land mines are still present velopment activities, but integration of indigenous
(Fig. 8.3). knowledge into planning and management is weak
Third, the colonial and modernization approaches (Butt, Shortridge, and WinklePrins 2009). UN-Water
to water management overlooked indigenous water Africa (2006) started compiling some best practices in
knowledge, indigenous watershed management, indi- indigenous water conservation and water knowledge
genous water values (water bodies having spiritual and (Box 8.1). |

BOX 8.1 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE whole layer of red or gray clayey soil and arrive at the sandy layer
OF WATER before finding groundwater. A good-quality groundwater that is
clear, sweet, and has a good mineral content is indicated by the
The Fulani of Mauritania practice a detailed art of detecting
presence of Guiera senegalensis, B. rufescens, termite hills, and
groundwater. Their indicators are based on knowledge of topog-
the depth of wells (the deeper, the better quality). The best-
raphy (e.g., shallow aquifers can be found near natural ponds or
quality natural ponds are indicated by the presence of water
in depressions of mountains), plant species (especially tap-rooted
lilies, followed by Acacia nilotica and Mitragyna inermis. Bad, dis-
trees such as Bauhinia rufescens, Tamaris senegalensis, Capparis
eased water is indicated by the presence of the grass Echino-
decidua, and Acacia albida, but also perennial grasses, such as
chloa pyramidalis. Water quality is also tested by immersing a
Vetivera nigritana and Panicum anabaptistum), and the health or
leather container in it. The best water leaves the leather intact; as
vigor of the plants, such as the greenness of leaves during the
water quality deteriorates, the leather's color will change to
year. Other indicators are based on fauna (e.g., wild boars only
white, black, red, or finally yellow/orange. Water quality is also
live where they can dig and find moist soil; other animals that
evaluated by its effect on livestock, especially their behavior after
prefer to stay around moist places are caimans, amphibious liz-
drinking (whether they are content or not) and the yield of milk.
ards, tortoises, bands of butterflies, some bird species, and many
termite hills). The Fulani also are familiar with the geological
strata in their area and know that they must dig through the Source: Excerpted from UN-Water Africa 2006:306.
 Water 197

Fourth, African governments have continued to Fifth, African informal entrepreneurs are filling
embrace Western models to develop water infrastruc- the gap and providing affordable water supplies for
ture systems. Increasingly, there is a privatization and the urban poor in the form of “water sachets”
large private investment tilt in agriculture, with accom- (Fig. 8.4). Water sachets are 500-mL (approximately
panying plans to build large irrigation projects 2 cups) sealed plastic sleeves of purified drinking
throughout the region in an effort to bring African ag- water that is of generally high quality (but not always)
riculture into the 21st century. Agriculture has become and low cost (prices were US$0.05-$0.07 in Accra in
a fashionable investment frontier, especially since the 2013), compared to expensive bottled water (Stoler
global financial crisis. Since 2005 large land invest- 2014:182). Now ubiquitous in urban West Africa,
ments have been under way in Africa. Increasingly water sachet consumption is related to deficiencies
claims are made that the investors are not only after in piped water coverage and failure to build new
land but also water (See Box 8.2). water infrastructure and/or properly manage existing

BOX 8.2 WATER GRABBING and livelihoods (fishing, farming, herding) that depend on the
resource (Mehta, Vedwisch, and Franco 2012). Water grabbing
Private-sector expectations of higher world food and commodity can span a continuum from agroindustrial farming to the captur-
prices, mainly linked to projected demographic growth, have cre- ing of water for hydropower plant transmission channels. Large
ated a thirst for land that is rain-fed and for land with high irrigation land deals are shrouded in secrecy, making it impossible to de-
potential. Researchers now draw attention to “the hidden agenda termine which water rights are bundled in the deals and which
of land acquisition in Africa” (Woodhouse and Ganho 2011), where are not (if any). According to GRAIN (2012), contracts typically
murky land deals conceal even murkier water deals. do not mention water rights, opening the door for international
The term “peak water” is gaining currency as the state of peak companies to build dams and irrigation canals at their discretion.
water is being approached in many regions of the world. It is In other words, land investment is water investment, but it is not
based on an assumption that population pressures on water will articulated as such in land acquisition contracts.
lead to a peaking in major withdrawals followed by a subse- Importantly, land acquisition involves a corporate commercial
quent decline as production of water exceeds natural recharge transfer and legal capture of local people’s previously estab-
rates. Some even forecast that by the middle of the 21st century lished (customary) rights to water. Powerful actors use all means
water will be the single most valuable commodity, more valuable at their disposal (legal, bureaucratic, and technical) to divert
than precious metals and oil. Private equity firms (e.g., Emergent water and profits away from local communities. Privatization and
Asset Management [UK], the largest agricultural fund manager commodification processes remove water control from local
in the region) market land investments on the basis that African communities. No longer the purview of state or traditional con-
land is undervalued. Other private equity firms (e.g., Chayton trol, new entanglements among domestic and international
Capital [UK]) claim that the real value is in African water sur- players assume wide-ranging control of water resources. The
rounding some lands (GRAIN 2012). According to J. Minaya, BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries, Europe, the Gulf
Global Fund Manager at TIAA-CREF, investment in farmland is states, the UK, the United States, Egypt, and MNCs are the
“probably the most efficient way for us to get exposure to major international players in the land and water deals. lroni-
water ... When you really look into buying water, at the end of cally, many of these investors come from regions facing water
the day it is a water play” (quoted in GRAIN 2012:16). Major U.S. shortages (e.g., China, India, the Gulf states).
universities (e.g., Harvard and Vanderbilt) are allegedly investing Land/water grabbing may be unleashing “hydrocolonialism”
in hedge funds that participate in African land and water deals around major African rivers (e.g., Nile, Niger) and freshwater
(Vidal and Provost 2011). Both Africa’s land and water resources lakes (e.g., Turkana and Victoria) and on fertile and fragile wet-
are seen as underutilized and therefore highly undervalued. lands (e.g., the Niger and White Nile deltas) (GRAIN 2012). Land
The implications of international commercial withdrawals on and water investors have rushed into Africa's newest state, South
local, regional, and national water resources have been over- Sudan, and acquired 8% of the land in a short time. Investors
looked until recently. Some label the trend of commercial with- charged in after a 2005 peace accord to acquire land around the
drawals as “water grabbing”: when powerful actors (multinational fertile Nile in both South Sudan and Sudan. In total, 12.1 million
corporations [MNCs], private equity firms, and individuals) take acres (4.9 million hectares) has been acquired, an area greater
control of or reallocate water resources (from local communities) than the Netherlands. Virtually all of this land will require irriga-
for their own benefit, without considering local access, rights, tion, and water-thirsty crops (e.g., sugar, rice, jatropha) are

(Continued)
198 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 8.2 (Continued) newly acquired land to access their old water sources and to
“steal the water” or buy it at inflated prices elsewhere (Oakland
scheduled to be introduced. According to GRAIN (2012), so Institute 2011b:39). Sun Biofuel’s land parcel (2,029 acres [8,211
much land has been acquired along the Nile Basin (24.7 million hectares]) used to belong to 11 villages before it was leased for
acres [10 million hectares]) from Uganda to Egypt (including 49 years to grow jatropha (Oakland Institute 2011b:17). Custom-
South Sudan, Sudan, and Ethiopia) that irrigating it would require ary law is unclear about whether groundwater is part of the land
more water than is available in the entire Nile Basin; this could and therefore under the private owners’ possession, because
result in environmental disaster, with commercial farms promot- customary law evolved before contemporary repurposing of
ing several harvests per year without adequate consideration of water for agroindustrial use.
seasonal flows. Water requirements for large investor projects Water grabbing is part of the state-sponsored taking of re-
have not been quantified. Large withdrawals will affect the sources from citizens, and the grabber in the first instance is typ-
volume of water in transboundary basins; consequently, intrastate ically the state, bolstered by a bewildering array of foreign
and interstate water disputes are likely to occur because trans- investors (Hall 2011). The water dimension of large-scale acquisi-
boundary water management has been neglected in the land sell- tion means that the impacts are likely to be far more geographi-
off (Jagerskog et al. 2012). Hydrological suicide is even possible. cally extensive than might be anticipated from the initial land
According to the Oakland Institute (http://www.oaklandinsti- deals. Many questions remain unanswered about the impact of
tute.org), an independent think tank and advocacy organization, land/water grabs. What is the “market price” for customary land
twice the volume of water used in African agriculture in 2005 with water rights cleared of its inhabitants and leased by govern-
would be needed if 40 million of the 125 million acres of acquired ments? Does agroindustrial land and water use signal the end of
land came under cultivation, putting considerable stress on Africa's indigenous water-management systems that deploy techniques
freshwater supply (Oakland Institute 2011b). Additional pressure ranging from water conservation and harvesting to stream diver-
on water resources would adversely affect small farmers, pastoral- sion and irrigation in line with intraseasonal interruptions and
ists, and fishermen, people whose livelihoods rely on water re- annual variation in rainfall in Africa? Should water rights be
sources and access. Negative impacts would be felt not only by linked to land? What rights do locals have to water? When most
those in the immediate areas but also by users downstream, pos- water resources are allocated for irrigated agriculture, how will
sibly even across international borders. Irrigation projects (dams, governments deal with competition and scarcity in droughts or
canals, drains) will divert water from rivers and lakes and restrict or even seasonality of water availability? Ultimately, we do not
interrupt the flow of water downstream; for example, the Niger know the extent to which water demand from these projects will
River originates in Guinea, flows through Mali, Niger, and Benin, displace existing water use and result in increased agricultural
and enters the Atlantic Ocean in Nigeria (a 4,180-km journey), and risk and impoverishment (Woodhouse and Ganho 2011).
Lake Turkana stretches from northern Kenya into Ethiopia. Water grabbing raises the crucial issue of who owns water in
Water is critical to land deals, especially in the semiarid and Africa. Throughout the continent, water tends to be vested in and
arid regions of the world and especially when investors plan to managed by national governments. In most places, locals hold cus-
grow thirsty agrofuel crops (e.g., sugar, corn, jatropha). Investors tomary uses (human consumption, agriculture, transportation, fish-
typically want to secure water rights as part of the deal; accessing ing) but lack formal rights. Clearly, transparency is missing in land
abundant water resources is often explicit in investors’ business and water negotiations. Existing land and water rights need to be
plans. Motivated by potential revenues from water fees and the incorporated into land agreements. Adequate compensation is
prospect of improving agricultural productivity, many African essential so the people have the capital to diversify into an alterna-
governments are giving up water rights to investors without con- tive livelihood (Zoomers 2010). Local communities should share in
sidering the impacts on customary users or on future water man- the benefits, rather than lose out, from foreign investments in land/
agement. Agreements are sometimes accompanied by African water resources. Environmental sustainability needs to be pre-
governments’ commitment to build supporting infrastructure served so that industrial agriculture does not deplete or divert
such as dams. For example, Mali’s Office du Niger is building the larger amounts of water from human and-other environmental
Talo Dam (irrigation) and planning another at Djenne (irrigation) uses, cause soil erosion, and eliminate biodiversity. The matrix of
and the Fomi Dam (irrigation and power) in the upper reaches of land deals involving strategic waterways needs to be made trans-
the Niger River; these dams will affect the annual flooding of the parent. Discussion among river basin organizations and intergov-
wetland downstream. Some experts are concerned that the levels ernmental entities is needed to assess how land deals will affect
of water withdrawals from the Niger River will result in changes in the political relations between stakeholders in the shared basins
water flow and availability, water contamination through new in- Vagerskog et al. 2012). Finally, the ethics of deploying water for
tensive agricultural uses, and changes in fish stocks and wildlife, export agriculture (biofuels, food, other commodities) needs to be
all of which threaten the existence of the river. considered, especially in countries where the food supply is inse-
Indigenous water access can be affected after the agree- cure. When food security is at risk (e.g., during droughts), domestic
ments. For example, with the Sun Biofuel (UK) acquisition in supplies need to be given priority, and foreigners should not have
Kisarawe, Tanzania, locals are having to sneak back onto the an overriding right to export at all times (Zoomers 2010).
 Water 199

Poverty is a significant indicator for low levels of

access to safe water and sanitation and for lack of
water for other uses, such as irrigation. It is often
the reason why people have to consume unhealthy
water. Poverty is widespread in rural areas, where
the majority of the population depend on rain-fed
agriculture. Water poverty is being exacerbated by
population increases and accompanying shifts of
the population into cities, manifested in the pheno-
menal growth of overcrowded slums. Whereas the
average rural inhabitant in Africa consumes approxi-
mately 25 liters of water per day, urbanities consume
10 to 20 times more (Jones 2010). Poor residents are
unequipped to deal with municipal water rationing
FIGURE 8.4 Water Sachets in Accra, Ghana. Photograph as water valves are turned on and off to accommo-
by Justin Stoler. date high/low water demand (this is common in
Accra, Ghana), and often water is not stored safely
resources. Sachet water improves water access in
and poses a health risk. In West Africa, informal water
water-stressed neighborhoods, particularly low-income
sachet vendors compensate for some of the short-
and slum communities (Stoler 2014). However, dis-
fall, and some of this water is of good quality but
carded plastic sleeves are a sanitation and environ-
much of it is not (Stoler et al. 2012).
mental menace, causing litter, clogging drains and
Urban slums cause problems for the water supply
gutters, and thus intensifying the likelihood of urban
and contribute to other water-related problems. Lack
flooding in the rainy season. This in turn poses health
of sanitation infrastructure in urban slums results in
risks by increasing the public's exposure to untreated
open defecation and is manifested in the “flying
waste (Stoler 2014). Producing an immense plastic
toilet” phenomenon (plastic bags containing urine
waste burden, sachets remain an unsustainable
and fecal matter are thrown from buildings into gut-
water-delivery vehicle. Governments have considered
ters). Evidence from low-income residential areas in
banning sachet water, taxing its street trade, and
Ghana shows that even the presence of a working
taxing the plastic used in production, but govern-
toilet can give a misleading impression that water and
ment regulation of the activity has been slow (Stoler sanitation service exists. The local reality is that many
2014). Nevertheless, the Nigerian government is con-
residents have to pay informal user fees to heads of
sidering a national ban on sachet water along with households for the privilege of using these in-house
plastic bags in 2014; Benin City, Nigeria, banned facilities; those who can’t afford it may be deprived of
sachet water in 2013. An alternative solution is to these services (Melara et al. 2013). Another factor con-
develop a comprehensive recycling process for dis- tributing to “flying toilets” is the lack of public toilets
carded sleeves. A Ghanaian NGO, Trashy Bags, is and their uneven distribution. Even when public toi-
making an effort to collect used sachets and recycle lets are provided, they involve a fee and are poorly
them into stylish carrier bags, but an urban or maintained. Their inconvenient locations often pose
national program is needed to address the larger security risks at night. Children are especially vulner-
environmental issue. able because they may not have the money to pay to
use a community toilet. Water contamination caused
WATER AND POVERTY by lack of centralized sewage treatment and waste dis-
Africa is widely acknowledged as the poorest and least- posal affects the broader community. Typically, every
developed world region. Multiple linkages exist among liter of polluted water can pollute up to 10 liters of
poverty, water, and the environment (Fig. 8.5). freshwater.
200 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Access to water
for productive use
access to natural resources
sustainable growth

Income
and
consumption

Water quality, safe drinking water

and sanitation, protection
against water borne
diseases

FIGURE 8.5 Linkages Between Poverty, Water, and the Environment. Source: From UNEP 2010:30.

Water plays a central role in the ecology of dis- dengue, yellow fever). There are also diseases related
eases. Water poverty enhances exposure to water- to the lack of water, called water-washed diseases
related diseases. Several categories of water-related (dysentery, lice, scabies, trachoma). More than half
diseases are present; among them are water-borne of Africans suffer from one of the main water-related
disease (e.g., diarrhea, hepatitis A, cholera, malaria, diseases (WHO 2008). The only way to break the
typhoid), water-based disease (guinea worm, intestinal continued transmission cycle is to meet people's
worms), and water-related vector diseases (malaria, basic needs—drinking water, washing and bathing
 Water 201

facilities, and sanitation—and to improve their hy- populations in river basins contribute to deforest-
gienic behavior. ation, land conversion, agriculture, livestock, indus-
On the one hand, poverty is manifested in the trialization, waste disposal, and fishing pressures
lack of access to improved water resources. On the (UNEP 2010).
other hand, wealth is often linked to the overcon- The Nile Basin provides a good illustration of
sumption of water. The contrast can be sharp. For the complex interplay of uses and dependencies. The
example, a family of eight living in a squatter camp basin covers a 4,225-mile (6,800 km) area from
in Cape Town (South Africa) uses about 120 liters of the Burundian highlands to the Egyptian coast in
water a day, collected from a tap a few hundred meters the Mediterranean. Almost one quarter of Africa's
away. In contrast, a couple in a nearby rich neighbor- population resides in the Nile River Basin, which
hood with a large garden can use 2,000 liters per day straddles 11 countries and very different climate
(UNEP 2010). Access to water and the use of water are zones. This means that some countries are net users
some ofthe clearest indicators of inequality through- of water (e.g., Sudan and Egypt), while others are
out Africa. net contributors (e.g., Kenya and Ethiopia; the latter
alone contributes 50% of the total water budget of
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER ISSUES
the Nile due to higher rainfall, lower highland tem-
Worldwide, there are 263 transboundary river peratures, and lower levels of evapotranspiration).
basins, defined as basins shared by two or more ri- Population is concentrated in three Nile Basin areas:
parian states (UNEP 2010). River basins support (1) that surrounding Lake Victoria in Kenya and
complex ecosystems and human settlements. Ap- Uganda, (2) the Ethiopian Highlands, and (3) that
proximately 60% of the world’s population depends along the banks of the river in Egypt. Since the for-
on river basins. Africa is well endowed with 63 river mation of the Nile Basin Initiative in 1997, coun-
basins that contain 93% of the continent's total sur- tries have attempted to manage the Nile’s resources
face water resources, and 77% of the region’s popu- across national boundaries; the 21 development proj-
lation reside around them (UNEP 2010:38). Surface ects that are under way (dams, irrigation, and other
water flows across basins, and sub-basins provide water-diversion projects) in several of the basin’s
common water sources, aquatic habitats, and trans- countries will have major impacts on resource use,
port networks. In Africa, 24 watersheds and 15 lakes irrespective of regional and national boundaries.
cut across the national boundaries of two or more The Jonglei Canal project in South Sudan is the
countries. Water interdependency is high: a high most controversial Nile Basin initiative. Completion
percentage of total flows in downstream countries of this canal is expected to save significant water
originate outside their borders. For example, 94% of from evaporation and transpiration and could be of
total flow in Botswana and Mauritania originates immense value to communities downstream in
outside of these countries’ borders. Sudan and Egypt, but it will have serious repercus-
Complex human-environment interactions sions on the Sudd wetland. The project commenced
make equitable transboundary basin management in 1977 but was put on hold in 1983 (two thirds of
challenging. Different geographical distributions of the total length had been dug) because of military
resources and populations within large basins mean conflict in the area. The giant excavator shown in
there are significant intraregional and interregional Figure 8.6 becaine a rusting monument to a project
differences. In general, upstream areas are more ad- that was one of the triggers of the renewal of civil
vantageous locations than downstream ones. The type war in Sudan. The Sudd is a vast wetland in South
and degree of dependence on river resources vary Sudan where the Nile meanders for 400 miles or
among states. For example, Uganda is heavily depend- 644 km on its journey through the country. The
ent on the Nile for hydroelectric power generation, Sudd overflows to 80,000 m? in the wet season but
whereas South Sudan primarily uses the river for agri- contracts to 8,300 km? in the dry season (UNEP
culture and transportation. Furthermore, expanding 2010:81). Annual patterns of flooding are crucial to
202 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

dams submerged some of Lesotho’s most fertile

land, which previously had supported several thousand
agricultural families. Lesotho receives much-needed
income from the project (earning US$40 million
per year in water exports plus $400,000 for hydro-
electric power exports), and it has enabled hydro-
electric power sufficiency in the country. Moreover,
the project enables water-poor South Africa to share
the benefits of a shared water resource, making an
invaluable contribution to Johannesburg's water
supply, without which the economy of the extended
regional area (Gauteng province) would suffer.
However, the future sustainability of water exports
FIGURE 8.6 ‘The Jonglei Canal, South Sudan.
to its wealthier neighbor is now in question: 30% of
Source: Photograph by George Steinmetz.
Lesotho’s water points (boreholes, wells, and springs)
are drying up.
flora, fauna, birdlife, wild animal migrations, and Transboundary aquifers are another important
local livelihoods. Many fishermen depend on the water source, but research is lacking. Just as there are
area, and pastoralists depend on the seasonal flood- internationally shared river basins, there are under-
ing to access grass and water for livestock. It is esti- ground transboundary aquifers in many parts of
mated that canal completion will result in the Africa. Some contain huge freshwater resources of
diversion of 55 million m? of water daily, resulting excellent-quality water that can provide safe drink-
in a loss of 36% of pasture and 20,000 metric tons ing water for current and future populations. Africa
of fish (UNEP 2010). Environmentalists further is endowed with large aquifers in the large shared
claim that the project could affect climate, ground- subregional sedimentary structures of the Sahara,
water recharge, and water quality (Howell, Lock, Central and Southern Africa, and West and East
and Cobb 1989; UNEP 2010). Proponents claim the Africa. Large shared aquifer resources often represent
benefits will outweigh the negative impacts on the the only source of drought security in semiarid re-
wetlands: the project will enhance downstream irri- gions. However, the watersheds in many aquifers’
gation and allow more food crops to be grown (e.g., recharge zones are threatened by accelerated land
rice), and a road on the bank ofthe canal will reduce degradation and desertification. Thus, management
the travel distance from Khartoum to Juba by 186 issues and transboundary implications extend beyond
miles (300 km). water balance and control of hydraulic systems to
Even when agreements can be reached to construct include land-use protection in recharge and dis-
these large international projects, the outcomes are charge areas.
far from straightforward. For example, the Lesotho
Highland Water Project is the world’s largest inter- VIRTUAL WATER

basin transfer water exchange. The project enabled Africa's water is traded out of the region in occluded
Lesotho (a landlocked mountain kingdom completely ways. “Virtual water” is a concept-that involves the
surrounded by South Africa) to become a major water complex interactions among water, commodities,
exporter to South Africa by transferring water north to and long-distance trade. It was developed by Tony
meet the water needs of Johannesburg's expanding Allan, who was awarded the 2008 Stockholm Water
population. An engineering triumph, this massive Prize for this contribution to water scholarship.
project won international acclaim, but it also exacer- The virtual water concept is used to examine the
bated rural impoverishment in Lesotho. The project's volume of freshwater needed to produce a product
 Water 203

measured at the production location and considers traded from Africa to urban centers in Europe,
the increasingly international travels of embedded China, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The per
water in commodities (Hoekstra and Chapagain capita water footprint (measured by usage from
2007). Virtual water is incorporated into exports washing, drinking, and the production of food and
and represents a subtraction from an area’s indigen- other consumer goods) in Southern, Central, and
ous water. Therefore, it represents a water addition Eastern Africa is among the lowest of the world
or a water import in the receiving country. (Fig. 8.7). On a daily basis, North Americans and
A plethora of organizations (the UN’s Food and Europeans on average consume at least 3,000 liters
Agriculture Organization [FAO], the National Geo- of virtual water, compared to 1,100 liters consumed
graphic Society, the UN Organization for Education, in Africa, reflecting unequal consumption power
Science and Culture [UNESCO]) employ the concept as well as more elaborate consumer tastes and de-
to measure commodity/country water footprints mands for imported foodstuffs, and especially meat-
(the direct and indirect quantities of freshwater used rich Western diets. Most of the water footprint is
in a product). Water Footprint Network, a Dutch- accounted for by products purchased in super-
based nonprofit organization, coordinates the main markets, particularly meat, and very little is related
portal for information about water footprints and to water used in homes. This is strikingly at odds
virtual water. Consideration of water footprints with public water conservation campaigns in the
sheds light on the wide differences in global con- United States that emphasize water-saving strategies
sumption patterns and the extent to which con- (e.g., more efficient toilets, advice on lawn-watering
sumption in one area affects water resources in practices). However, African diets appear to be moving
another area. in the same direction as a middle class emerges, as
Increasingly, more virtual water is being incorp- societies continue to urbanize, and as large super-
orated into calculations related to commodities market chains gain more of a foothold in urban

Total water u <M

footprint
[m?/yr/cap]
HM 550-750
= 750-1000
1000-1200
1200-1385
1385-1500
1500-2000
HB 2000-2500 -
(RB 2500-3000
BH >3000

FIGURE 8.7 Average Water Consumption Footprint Per Person. Source: From Mekonnen and Hoekstra (2011).
204 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

markets. Virtual water transfers from Africa to other TABLE 8.3. VIRTUAL WATER NEEDED TO PRODUCE
COMMODITIES
regions will grow, especially in the context of land
and water grabs. For example, European firms are Product and Measure Liters of Water

acquiring 3.9 million hectares of African land to Foods

meet their 10% biofuel target by 2015. The amount
Beef, 1 kg 15,500
of water required for biofuel plantations is high:
1 liter of ethanol from sugarcane requires 18.4 liters Rice, 1 kg 3,400

of water and 1.52 m? of land (UN-Water Africa Sugar cane, 1 kg 1,500

2012). Wheat, 1 kg 1,350
Virtual water has implications for the alteration
Tomatoes, 1 kg 180
of the natural distribution of water resources and
their sustainability. It often involves inequitable Potatoes, 1 kg 160-250
transfers from poor and water-scarce rural regions to Coffee, 250-mL cup 280
wealthy urban centers (and sometimes abundant
Fuels
water centers), and it has longer-term national se-
curity implications for the water-originating regions, Biodiesel:

especially when the population is expanding. In Jatropha, 1 liter 20,000

general, higher-value crops such as sugar and vegeta- Soybean, 1 liter 10,000
bles are more water-intensive than cereals, and meat
Bioethanol:
and dairy are also more water-intensive. Product
water footprints are complex, and water use varies Cassava, 1 liter 2,926

by method of production, local soil types, variety of

Sources: Jones (2010:166, Table 8.1) and Gerbens-Leenes, Hoekstra, and van
product, time of year, and, above all, location and der Meerb (2009:10222).
how much water has to be applied to make things
grow (e.g., in dry vs. wet climates). The exact water
footprint can be calculated for any commodity, but plant itself. Water is “virtual” because once crops
a tomato produced in an irrigated Ghanaian field are grown, the water used to grow them is no longer
will require different amounts of water than one available.
produced in drier field in the same country or in a About one fifth of the water consumed globally
different country. In spite of measurement obstacles, is virtual water. Virtual water and water footprint
it is important to understand the movement and concepts offer exciting opportunities for research
transfer configurations within the international and development. For instance, knowledge of the
trade system. For example, the water footprint of maize water footprint of a river basin or of an urban area
is three times higher in Nigeria than in Germany (the would be very meaningful, providing insight into
most efficient producer in terms of water usage). The water conservation or water depletion, which would
water footprint of bioenergy is very large and varies greatly benefit water sustainability management.
tremendously by crop—jatropha is among the most Product labeling with information on virtual water
water-intensive crops (Table 8.3). content and source area would help educate con-
During the growth cycle of a plant, water is ap- sumers about water stewardship: (e.g., informing
plied to the field, whether by rainfall or by irriga- them on how their purchases affect water supplies in
tion. Some of it is absorbed by the root system of other countries). At present, water use is hardly re-
the plant, and the remainder finds its way into rivers, flected in the price of consumer products (Box 8.3).
percolates into the soil, or evaporates. At harvest, A global standard on measuring water footprints
most of the water consumed by the plant has been was developed in 2011. However, unlike the carbon
lost to the atmosphere through evapotranspiration. footprint, where it matters less where it happens,
A small portion of the water is locked inside the geography matters in the water footprint.
 Water 205

BOX 8.3 WATER FOOTPRINT (the main export designations are the United Arab Emirates,
OF CUT FLOWERS IN KENYA: France, and the UK).
WHAT IS THE TRUE COST? The average total water footprint of a rose is 9 liters per stem.
According to Severino Maitima of the Ewaso Ngiro Water Au-
Kenya's cut-flower industry has been hailed as an economic suc-
thority in Kenya, “a flower is 90% water. We are on the driest
cess, and flower exports now rank as Kenya's third largest for-
countries in the world and we are exporting water to one of the
eign exchange earner after tea and tourism. The industry
wettest” (quoted in Vidal 2006:1). The capturing of water from
provides employment to 25,000 people directly (plus another
rivers such as Ngiro by UK- and other European-owned flower
25,000 indirect employees) and income and infrastructure such
companies (usually between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m.) means that
as schools and hospitals for the community around Lake
there is much less water available for small-scale farmers. Local
Naivasha. Most farms pay workers more than the legal minimum activists claim the river's course has been shortened by 60 miles
wage and provide housing, free medical services, schools for
in some areas (Vidal 2006).
children of farmworkers, and modest sports facilities.
There are major controversies surrounding the flower industry
Lake Naivasha, situated 50 miles (80 km) northwest of Nairobi,
at Lake Naivasha. Local environmental groups contend that
lies in the fertile Rift Valley of Kenya. Lake Naivasha is also the companies exporting flowers use pesticides at levels that are
second largest freshwater lake in the country. The total irrigated unacceptable to the flower industry in Europe and are poisoning
commercial farm area around Lake Naivasha is approximately the lake and killing the fish stock. Beginning in the 1990s, in-
10,996 acres (4,450 hectares), and cut flowers are grown on
creased attention has been paid globally to the ethical sourcing
about half of the irrigated area. Production in the Lake Naivasha of commodities and to the social and environmental conditions
area accounts for 95% of Kenya’s cut-flower exports (Mekonnen in the cut-flower market, and conditions are now better moni-
and Hoekstra 2011:12). Growers concentrate on roses, but tored. The burgeoning flower industry has also attracted mi-
other flower varieties (e.g., carnations) are also produced. Both grants to the region in search of jobs, but in the process, social
roses and carnations require high rates of fertilizer application problems have arisen and many workers live in poor conditions,
(especially compared to vegetable crops such as baby corn and mainly seasonal workers and, particularly, single women. There
cabbage, also grown in the area), and leaching runoff has are major differences between farms that have adopted codes
become an issue. Most of this area's cut flowers are exported to that comply with fair trade and European retailer codes and
the European Union; urban markets in the Netherlands (69%), those that do not comply (about 25% of the farms). Conditions
the UK (18%), and Germany (7%) are the main export destina- of employment and living conditions are generally much better
tions (Mekonnen and Hoekstra 2011:12). The total virtual water on compliant farms than on noncompliant farms. For example,
export of fresh flowers was 21 million m?/year in 2005. Vegeta- half of the workers on noncompliant farms have no access to tap
bles grown in the region account for another 8.5 million m?/year water on their house plot (Omosa et al. 2005).

CONCLUSIONS MDG targets, 300 million people would need to gain

access to an improved drinking water source and
Providing safe water for Africa’s growing population is
400 million would need to secure access to an im-
a mounting challenge, especially for large numbers of
proved sanitation facility. In the meantime, unsafe
new immigrants moving into urban slums, where
drinking water and inadequate sanitation structures
municipal services are virtually nonexistent. Most
impede human health and drain community assets.
states in Africa will not achieve the MDG safe water
Water scarcity is not entirely a natural phenom-
target (halve the portion of the population without
enon. Some of the problems have colonial origins;
sustainable access to safe drinking water) and the MDG
municipal and regional water utility budgets fail to
sanitation target (halve the portion of the population
keep pace with population growth; and existing infra-
without sustainable access to basic sanitation). At pres-
structure is not adequately maintained. In addition,
ent, Africa has the lowest provision of piped water in
water is wasted by leakages in all major water-use sec-
the world. Incidences of water-related and water-borne tors: agriculture, industry, and municipalities. UNEP
diseases and diarrhea (1.29 cases per person annually
(2010:153) estimates that over half of the water intro-
[UNEP 2010]) are the highest in the world. To meet duced into distribution systems cannot be accounted
206 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

for. For example, Kibera (Nairobi) receives about is bundled into international land and water invest-
20,000 m? of water per day and 40% is lost through ment deals (without clarifying specific water uses/
leakage, illegal taps, and dilapidated infrastructure costs) may well subtract from the water available for
(UNEP 2010). As a consequence, great inequalities in Africans. Without investment in irrigation, depend-
water provision and costs borne by households ence on food imports will increase, and both water
are evident in Africa. In urban areas, high-income and food security will remain major burdens.
households derive most of the benefits from munici- Moreover, it remains to be determined how countries
pal water provision, where water is typically provided will navigate the conflicts that may emerge within Africa's
at prices below the amount required to cover opera- 63 water basins, especially because some of the massive
tions and maintenance costs. Kenyan slum dwellers irrigation plans will affect the volume of water flows
pay five to 10 times more for water per unit than and the seasonality of water downstream. The impact of
Kenyans residing in high-income areas and even more climate change remains the big unknown, and Africa is
than consumers in world cities such as New York and already experiencing extreme rainfall vulnerability.
London. In rural areas, women shoulder the largest Effective institutional and technical capacities for
burden in fetching water; they make multiple trips managing water are lacking. There is an insufficient
each day to collect household water. water knowledge base about Africa: lack of data, dearth
There is also a growing rural-urban disparity in of skilled staff, poor dissemination of water data, weak
access to improved drinking water and sanitation: cross-national collaboration (except in Southern Africa),
rural access is greatly lagging (drinking water coverage and a lack of legal frameworks for ownership, allocation,
is 51% and sanitation coverage is 29%) (UNEP 2010). and management of water. Governments need to ensure
Although water and sanitation are inextricably linked, that water is an integral part of the development and
sanitation investment has lagged behind water invest- planning processes, and they urgently need to change
ment. In Africa today, there are more working phones the perspective that water is a stand-alone public utility.
than working toilets. However, the extent of mobile Sanitation, water, and irrigation infrastructures re-
phone penetration provides an example of how inno- quire considerable upfront investments beyond what
vation and entrepreneurship could yield economic poor countries can afford. It is also not feasible to pass
benefits and improve well-being if water and sanitation the upfront costs on to users, so unless there is a major
technologies were introduced. One novel approach global initiative to provide soft loans, privatization and
is being put forth by the World Toilet Organization more international commercial involvement seem the
(WTO) to accelerate progress in sanitation provision: most likely ways that infrastructures will be provided.
the promotion of toilet ownership as a status symbol However, privatization support should only be solic-
and an object of desire (just like cell phones) but with ited within a framework that is sensitive to safeguard-
significant health benefits. ing access to water as a human right. UN-Water Africa
Globally, more water will be needed to provide has outlined an Africa Water Vision for 2025, recom-
for future food security. Africans need to secure more mending an accelerated increase in water resource in-
water now, a time when water resources are under vestment by 10% by 2015 and 25% by 2025 to meet all
mounting pressures. As Africa’s population rises and increased demands. UN-Water Africa (2009:17) out-
becomes more urbanized, increasingly more water will lined 10 key pillars to guide Africa’s water management
be needed to meet food requirements. Africa’s water and policy:
infrastructure is underinvested and underdeveloped
to meet this challenge; for example, the continent's ir- 1. Provide safe and adequate water and sanitation
rigation capacity is so underdeveloped that only 7% of for all, urgently.
cultivated land is under modern irrigation (UNEP 2. Make equitable and sustainable use of Africa’s
2010). Lack of irrigation investment has contributed to water resources.
an expansion of rain-fed agriculture onto marginal 3. Ensure sustainable development and manage-
lands with uncertain rainfall. Moreover, the water that ment of water resources for all.
 Water 207

4. Use water resources wisely to promote agricul- Transboundary Waters?” Report no. 30, Stockholm
tural development and food security. Water Institute, Stockholm.
5. Develop water resources to stimulate socioeco- Jones, J. 2010. Water Sustainability. A Global Perspective.
nomic development. London: Hodder Education.
6. Treat water as a natural asset for all in Africa. MacDonald, A. M., H. C. Bonsor, B. E. O. Dochartaigh,
“NJ Share management of international water basins and R. G. Taylor. 2012. “Quantitative Maps of
to stimulate efficient mutual regional economic Groundwater Resources in Africa.” Environmental Re-
development. search Letters 7(2):1-7. Available at http://iopscience
8. Ensure adequate water for life-supporting .iop.org/1748-9326/7/2/024009/pdf/1748-9326_
ecosystems. 7_2_024009.pdf.
9. Manage watersheds and floodplains to safeguard Mehta, L., G. J. A. Vedwisch, and J. Franco. 2012. “Intro-
lives, land, and water resources. duction to the Special Issue: Water Grabbing?
10. Price water to promote equity, efficiency, and Focus on the (Re)Appropriation of Finite Water
sustainability. Resources.” Water Alternatives 5(2):193-207.
Mekonnen, M. M., and A. Y. Hoekstra. 2011. “National
Water Footprint Accounts: The Green, Blue and
Grey Water Footprint of Production and Con-
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 livAIP Wier

HEALTH

INTRODUCTION
of the top 20 countries with the highest emigration
Africa is a region with enormous public health chal- rates of health care professionals are in Africa (Sanders
lenges. Broadly defined, public health is the art and et al. 2009:172). The World Health Organization
science of preventing disease, promoting population (WHO 2006) acknowledged the severity of the prob-
health and well-being, and extending life through lem and determined that 36 of 57 countries with
organized local and global efforts (McMichael and critical shortages of health care professionals were
Beaglehole 2009:2). Constituting 13% of the world’s located in the region. The hemorrhaging of health
population, Africa carries 24% of the global disease care professionals reflects active recruitment by insti-
burden without an adequate corresponding health tutions in the Global North, underinvestment in
care infrastructure. For instance, the continent ac- African medical systems and health care facilities,
counts for less than 1% of global health expenditures, lack of established posts, low pay, and substandard
its share of the global supply of doctors is 2%, and its working conditions.
share of health workers is 1.3% (Mills et al. 2009). The physician outmigration stream from Ethiopia,
Moreover, Africa’s immense disease burden and frail Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda,
health care systems are embedded in the broader Zambia, and Zimbabwe represents a US$2.17 billion
contexts of rapid urbanization, poverty, underdevel- loss of return from public investment in medical edu-
opment, and weak governmental institutions. Some cation (based on underwriting the entire education
countries face additional health burdens from prolonged cost of physicians and their practical training prior to
conflict and intermittent humanitarian emergencies emigrating with proper qualifications) (Mills et al.
(eg,, large-scale migrations, famine, and economic crises). 2009:1). The benefit of Africa-educated nurses and
Throughout the region, medical facilities, clinics, physicians to medical systems is US$2.7 billion in the
and laboratories are in short supply Those that exist United Kingdom and US$846 million in the United
are routinely in poor condition with outmoded, non- States, representing a 50% net loss of investments for
working equipment and erratic or no electricity supplies Africa (even after accounting for remittances) (Mills
(in some rural areas). Africa’s health care infrastructure et al. 2009:4). As a result, the World Health Assembly
is in a very unhealthy condition and there is a major (the decision-making body of the WHO) adopted the
shortage of physicians (Fig. 9.1). first code of practice for the international recruitment
Loss of African medical professionals to the “brain of African health care personnel in 2010, recognizing
drain” in the Global North is disturbingly high. Nine the global shortage of health care professionals but

209
210 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

FIGURE 9.1 Global Distribution of Physicians Working. Source: © Copyright Sasi Group (University of Sheffield) and Mark
Newman (University of Michigan).

also the negative effects on home country’s health sys- ceuticals are rampant. With a few notable exceptions
tems of “poaching” African professionals. (e.g., the South African pharmaceutical manufacturer
Africa’s health care worker ratio is 2.3 per 10,000 and supplier Aspen is the leading generic drug manu-
population compared to 24.2 in the United States. facturer in the Southern Hemisphere), there is a dearth
Some of the lowest physician ratios per population in of domestic pharmaceutical production in Africa,
the world occur in Niger (0.2:10,000) and Ethiopia which means that countries are heavily dependent on
(0.3:10,000) (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation imports. Indian and Chinese generic companies have
2012). This critical shortage of health care workers emerged as prominent players. The global import
translates into a deficit of doctors and nurses of 2.4 mil- business has many loopholes and blind spots that
lion professionals (Naicker et al. 2009). Statistics mask enable counterfeit medicines to enter the African mar-
the real human tragedy of these personnel shortages. ketplace. The main dangers to health produced by fake
The majority of Africans will never visit a physician's medicine are (1) failure to provide effective treatment,
office in their lifetime, and because of the vastly inad- (2) direct harm, and (3) drug resistance. Various fail-
equate number of trained and employed health care ures in manufacturing, importation, handling, and
workers, people cannot enjoy good health that would regulation prevail. Some medicines are accidently or
enable them to flourish. According to WHO (2006:xvi), deliberately falsified, producing dire results (they are
“the lack of health workers is a major factor in the sometimes a direct cause of death; e.g., 80 children
deaths of large numbers of Africans who would survive died in Nigeria in 2009 after ingesting a teething mix-
if they had access to healthcare.” This means that the ture named My Pikin). Drugs are not dispensed prop-
Africa health care infrastructure underperforms in pre- erly in many locations. For example, imported Chinese
venting and treat injuries and diseases and in relieving and Indian medicines are routinely sold in the infor-
pain and suffering. mal economy, sometimes in open-air markets along-
Making matters worse, the region has a chronic side fruit and vegetables. Estimates are highly
shortage of medicines, and counterfeit pharma- unreliable, but approximately 30% of pharmaceuticals
 Health 211

sold in Africa could be counterfeit and/or substan- Indeed, international public health policies involving
dard. In a recent study oftuberculosis (TB) medicines Africa have focused more on treating symptoms and
in Africa, 16.6% of them failed and 7% were outright sickness than on the causes of ill health but there are
fakes, containing no active ingredients (Binagwaho health technology exceptions (see Box 9.1). Neverthe-
et al. 2013). The effects of counterfeit medicine are dif- less, the vast majority of people living in Africa have
ficult to quantify, but they may have disastrous effects yet to benefit from the advances in medical and public
on human health. For example, malaria parasites can health research that other regions have enjoyed. With-
build up resistance if diluted medicines are used (see out any doubt, Africa is the continent where suffering
Dan Rather's 2010 report on counterfeit antimalarial related to poor health is concentrated and where illness
medicines). needs to be tackled.
Despite human and physical infrastructural con-
straints, the global HIV/AIDS pandemic has spurred a
historic and unprecedented mobilization of attention AFRICA’S DISEASE BURDEN

and resources for Africa. HIV/AIDS has elevated the WHO has taken the lead in compiling regional pro-
profile of African public health among development files of disease burdens (including mental health dis-
and foreign policy practitioners, generating new global orders), commencing in 2004 and updating them in
institutions (e.g., UNAIDS and Global Fund to Fight 2008, in an attempt to shape health policies by using
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) and mobilizing new regionally accumulated bodies of evidence rather
constituencies, including religious organizations and than just well-intentioned advocacy. WHO's (2008a)
private foundations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates statistics for Africa are alarming: 1.7 million die each
Foundation, Ford Foundation, Aga Khan Foundation), year from HIV/AIDS, 900,000 from entirely prevent-
corporations (e.g., Pfizer, Bristol-Myers Squibb & able diarrheal diseases, 700,000 from malaria, and
Gilead), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs; 400,000 from TB (Table 9.1). The latter two diseases
e.g., Save the Children, Oxfam, Christian Aid). The are very treatable, but treatment is sporadic and
focus on African health has been reinforced by a bur- drug-resistant TB is a new public health concern in
geoning public health research community. NGOs the region.
play a strong global advocacy role, appealing for in- WHO’s global disease burden data show a large
creased resources from donor countries and organiz- number of annual deaths in Africa due to diseases,
ing specific campaigns aimed at accelerating access to specifically HIV/AIDS, parasitic infections, and mater-
badly need medicines. Public policy experts now posi- nal and nutritional causes. Centuries-old disease
tion international health as a global security issue, and threats (e.g., malaria and TB) continue to pose high
39 new pathogens (that we know of) have emerged risks because of mutation, rising resistance to antimi-
since 1967. Some (e.g., HIV/AIDS and Ebola) have Af- crobial medicines, and weak health care systems.
rican origins. Largely attributable to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, adult
The key challenge in Africa is to break out of the life expectancy remains low in Africa, hovering between
vicious cycle of ill health and poverty, which impedes 40 and 60 years in most countries but with considerable
development. Africa is, and will remain for the foresee- spatial variation (Fig. 9.2).
able future, a preoccupation of global public health Child mortality rates on the continent are the
policies and interventions. There is an obvious global- worst in the world, Among the 10.4 million deaths in
ization and public health paradox: the sanitary revolu- children under five worldwide, 4.7 million (45%)
tion (the introduction of clean water and sewage occur in Africa. High child mortality rates occur even
disposal on a mass scale) that was very effective in im- though cost-effective interventions are available to pre-
proving public health in the Global North centuries vent major causes of death (WHO 2008a:15). A child
earlier has yet to be transferred to Africa, even though born in Africa today is more likely to lose his or her
it had been acknowledged as the greatest medical ad- mother from childbirth complications or by HIV/AIDS
vance since 1840 in the Global North (Ferriman 2007). and will have a life expectancy of 47 years, during
212 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGI

BOX 9.1 TECHNOLOGY BRIGHT SPOTS medicine is authenticated, an approval text message is sent,
IN HEALTH ARENAS confirming that the medicine is certified in its current jurisdiction
and has not been blacklisted since entering the supply chain.
There are several bright spots where technology is being de- The platform was rolled out in Ghana in 2008 and subsequently
ployed to improve health care services in Africa. Rwanda has was introduced into Kenya and Nigeria (all malaria medicines in
implemented a national system with legal and technical over- Nigeria are integrated into the mobile phone-based consumer
sight to manage entire pharmaceutical supply chains and to verification system). The technology facilitates trust between an
combat substandard and falsified medicines (Binagwaho et al. African consumer and a pharmaceutical manufacturer that is
2013). The Rwandan government purchases high-risk drugs, such typically some distance away. MPedigree verification codes had
as those for treating TB, exclusively from manufacturers certified appeared on 10 million medicines by February 2013. MPedigree
by WHO, and the Rwandan Ministry of Health oversees their dis- is being tested in South Asia, and this African innovation is being
tribution to hospitals and clinics. The Ministry of Health performs imitated aggressively worldwide.
quality control by testing each imported drug shipment as well Other technological advances are enabling a rise of telemedi-
as by sampling systematically anti-TB and antimalarial drugs on a cine, which offers enormous potential to extend access to health
quarterly and annual basis. In addition, the Rwandan govern- care throughout the region, even to remote locations. Project
ment has trained health care workers who handle the medicines Masiluleke (Project M) (in Zulu the word means “giving warm and
to spot and report substandard and falsified products. Rwanda’s wise counsel”) is a South African mobile health initiative that com-
comingling of policing and public health is now being suggested menced in 2008 and promotes HIV/AIDS awareness, education,
as the antidote to the counterfeit drugs problem. The country and treatment. Project M sends over 1 million messages daily and
has not recorded a single case of drug-resistant TB (Binagwaho connects with rural South Africans in peripheral locations with
et al. 2013), but Rwandan pharmacovigilance (the science and sparse access to health information and services. It is now work-
activities related to detection, assessment, understanding, and
ing on self-testing for HIV (with mobile support during the test-
prevention of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem) ing) and follow-up mobile support for HIV-positive individuals.
needs strengthening by international protocols. A global treaty Self-testing for HIV/AIDS is controversial and there are access
and leadership by WHO are essential to address the manufactur- problems and other barriers to overcome, but it may be success-
ing and trade of substandard and falsified medicines and to
ful in getting a population tested that otherwise avoids clinics.
make pharmaceutical falsification an international crime.
Considerable interest and efforts are under way to develop
Nigeria and Ghana are leading the effort to deploy technol-
“lab-on-a-chip” medical testing using mobile phones that could
ogy to intensify pharmaceutical surveillance. In Nigeria, the Na-
potentially diagnose HIV, TB, malaria, hepatitis, etc.
tional Agency for Food Drug Administration Control (NAFDAC)
Mobile health (mHealth) is rapidly evolving in many spheres.
uses hand-held spectrometers (laser light passes through pills to
For example, remote health care workers can now confer with
assess their chemical composition) to verify the authenticity of
specialists in tertiary medical facilities to diagnose and treat ill-
key pharmaceuticals. NAFDAC’s TrueScan monitoring has re-
ness. Chinese and Indian companies are using video-related
sulted in a progressive decline in counterfeiting: from 40% in
health care technology in the region that allows India-based
2001 to 6.4% in 2012 in medicines sampled. In Ghana, MPedi-
doctors to treat African patients remotely in three regional hos-
gree (http://mpedigree.net) developed a technology platform
pitals (Nigeria, Republic of Congo, and Mauritius) by linking
that connects mobile phone networks to a central registry: callers use
these hospitals to specialist Indian facilities through the pan-
toll-free numbers to verify pedigree information on pharmaceutical
African e-Network Project, a joint venture between the Indian
products from participating manufacturers. Consumers can get
government and the African Union.
drug authentication information at the point of purchase. If the

which he or she will have to grapple with poverty, poor geography and public health. It specifies three processes
health care, droughts, floods, and civil conflict and of the epidemiological transition: (1) replacement of
may be compelled to migrate. common infectious diseases (e.g., malaria and TB) by
noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) or degenerative
DOUBLE BURDEN OF DISEASE
disease (e.g., hypertension, stroke, and diabetes), with
As societies pass through various stages of develop- injuries as the primary cause of death; (2) a shift in peak
ment, they show significant changes in patterns of morbidity and mortality from the young to the elderly;
health and disease. Abdel Omran’s (1971) model of and (3) a situation in which mortality predominates
epidemiological transition is widely applied in health rather than one in which morbidity is dominant.
 Health 213

TABLE 9.1 LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH The quality of the health care system greatly affects
IN AFRICA, 2004
————— the stages. North America and Europe have passed
Deaths % of Total through the transition, and countries of the Global
Cause of Death (millions) Deaths South are at different transition points, Latin America’s
1 HIV/AIDS } ‘ 174 ; z 14.2 . path is not unidirectional: some diseases are near erad-
2 Cardiovascular diseases 4 By * “43.9 :
ication by immunization (e.g., polio) but others are
reemerging (e.g., TB, malaria, and dengue fever). Fur-
3 Lower respiratory infections 1.4 HUEY
thermore, in contexts of extreme income inequality,
4 Perinatal conditions laf 8.6 epidemiological profiles are polarized, with higher
5 Diarrheal diseases 0.9 : 7.2 morbidity and mortality rates among the poor, who
have high rates of infectious and nutrition-related dis-
6 Malaria 0.7 7
eases, while NCDs predominate among the wealthier
7 Malignant neoplasms 0.7 Dis classes.
8 Tuberculosis 0.4 33 The African region is experiencing a “double burden
9 Respiratory diseases 0.4 SZ of disease” based on the coexistence of communicable
diseases and NCDs (Agyei-Mensah and de-Graft Aikins
10 Unintentional injuries 0.35 29
2010). Indeed, African slum dwellers may be carrying a
11 Digestive diseases 0.3 2.4 quadruple burden of disease: in addition to the double
12 Road traffic accidents 0.3 2.4 burden, they experience very high rates of personal in-
juries, accidental deaths, and nutritional deficiencies.
15 Diabetes 0.14 1.8
Wealthy Africans, especially urbanites, have a higher
Source: World Health Organization, The Global Burden of Disease: 2004 risk of chronic diseases—diabetics, hypertension,
Update.
cancer, and chronic respiratory conditions. The rapid

High income WM Cardiovascular diseases

[fj Cancers
Western Pacific |__| Other noncommunicable diseases
[@ Injuries
Americas —] HIV/AIDS
[_] Other infectious and parasitic diseases
[_] Maternal and nutritional conditions
Eastern Mediterranean

South-East Asia

Europe

Africa

6 8 10 V2
Deaths per 1000 adults aged 15-59 years

FIGURE 9.2 Adult Mortality in Africa Compared to Other World Regions.

214 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

expansion of chronic disease is driven by more seden- urban poverty. As such, the epidemiological transition
tary lifestyles (increased inactivity and reliance on tech- cannot be separated from the urban revolution that is
nology), dietary changes, and increasing alcohol and unfolding in Africa.
tobacco consumption. Alarmingly, available data suggest Africa’s health transition represents an enormous
that age-specific mortality rates for chronic disease in Africa challenge because of limited resources, limited pre-
are as high as the worst-affected developed regions. paredness, and widespread poverty. Whereas previous
Community studies also reveal the urban poor to epidemics, including HIV/AIDS, caught Africa unpre-
be experiencing increased rates of chronic diseases. pared, this time around there is little learning about pre-
Moreover, there is also mounting evidence of adverse paredness. Lessons from the epidemiological transition
interactions between some chronic diseases and infec- model are not been heeded in Africa.
tious diseases, especially among the poor. For exam-
ple, diabetes intensifies the risk of developing TB, and
AFRICA’S HEALTH DATA LACUNA
antiretroviral (ARV) therapy enhances the risk of dia-
betes and cardiovascular risk factors (de-Graft Aikins WHO's (2006) Global Burden of Disease is the best
et al. 2010). Africa recorded 10 million diabetes cases available region-wide source of data on many disease
in 2006, making it the 15th highest leading cause of indicators, but overall health data are sparse. Medical
death, a ranking that is expected to climb as the recordkeeping is abysmal in many countries, especially
number of metabolic disease cases doubles by 2025 in rural areas. Only a few African countries maintain
(WHO 2008a). Indeed, the incidence of diabetes may vital registration systems that are more than 50% com-
be much higher in Africa as NCD data are scant. The plete (South Africa, 90% complete; Kenya, 60%; and
rate of undiagnosed diabetes in Africa is acute: the In- Mauritius, 90%) (Bradshaw et al. 2010). Far more common
ternational Diabetes Federation (2012) estimates that are scant registration systems (eg., Mozambique, 5%
78% of cases are undiagnosed. Accounting for only complete; Zambia, 16%), and many countries collect
20% of health spending targets, chronic diseases are only urban data (Rao, Bradshaw, and Mathers 2004:83).
marginalized within African public health systems. Fifty-five percent of births are not registered, and half
The relationship between poverty and Africa's of adult causes of death are not recorded (Bradshaw
tising burden of chronic disease needs to be under- et al. 2010). Data on child mortality are even sparser.
scored. Urban poverty is directly associated with Most causes of death are based on national data
diets, and slum dwellers and recent migrants are par- reported to WHO, which, along with various minis-
ticularly at risk. For example, poor diets—low in fruits tries of health, uses region-wide projections based on
and vegetables and high in saturated fats—are more econometric modeling. WHO is attempting to stan-
prevalent. Salt intake, a risk factor for hypertension, is dardize causes of death certification, but reported data
also much higher. Current obesity rates in Africa are are highly variable. Lack of information technology
high; for example, women’s obesity rates tripled in and skilled administrative personnel and inconsisten-
Ghana, rising from 10% in 1993 to 30% in 2008, and cies in monitoring are producing poor health informa-
men’s obesity rate was 46% in Accra (Agyei-Mensah tion systems throughout Africa.
and de-Graft Aikins 2010). In addition, child obesity South Africa maintains the most uniform records
is an emerging problem among middle- and high- in the region. Still, imprecise data on deaths could
income groups. produce inaccurate numbers as high as 20%, particu-
A key factor is the role of comorbidities: major in- larly with regard to HIV/AIDS (Bradshaw et al. 2010).
fectious diseases prevalent in poverty-stricken areas in- Accuracy and quality of cause-of-death data are highly
crease the risk of chronic diseases (Agyei-Mensah and variable: inaccuracies occur because causes of death
de-Graft Aikins 2010). The impact of comorbidities on may be certified or coded incorrectly, especially by
the cumulative burden of infectious and chronic dis- poorly trained personnel (often relying on oral au-
eases is strongest in African cities that are experiencing topsy and lay reporting); distinctions are not always
high levels of rural-urban migration, urbanization, and drawn between the principal underlying cause of death
 Health 215

and contributory causes of death; and poor handwrit- health of Europeans. Hospitals in colonial outposts
ing in non-electronic record systems also may lead to were exclusively for the colonial elite, and urban and
improper coding. In Africa, death often occurs outside residential planning was used to protect European
of health facilities, and information is often obtained populations from the threat supposedly posed by “un-
from the family and village leaders in rural contexts, healthy Africans.” Outside of official colonial health
individuals with limited knowledge and no training in apparatuses, there were missionary efforts to provide
cause-of-death attribution. The major concern about medical care that linked a health mandate to a prosely-
cause-of-death information is that it is used to inform tizing mission. Protestant and Roman Catholic mis-
health policy and allocations of health spending for sions pioneered Western medicine and public health,
various programs. Lessons from the past are troubling. building hospitals throughout rural Africa (Good
For example, inaccurate records of cause of death 1991). For example, Swiss missions built hospitals in
during the denial days of HIV/AIDS in South Africa led rural South Africa, Tanzania, and Ghana. Church-
to ill-informed national policies from the mid-1980s based hospitals and health care programs had endur-
to 2000, and it was only after efforts were made to im- ing legacies: in many African countries a century later
prove the quality of data collection that real changes in they were providing 25% to 50% of available services
policy and programs were implemented. (Good 1991:1).
Most people in Africa are born and die without a For the most part, rural Africans had no access to
trace in any legal record and official statistic. The ab- Western colonial health care. Instead, rural (and urban
sence of reliable data about births, deaths, and causes poor) populations relied on traditional medicine and
of death is at the root of health data inaccuracies, and indigenous healers. Colonial government campaigns
the poor are disproportionately affected. For example, against specific diseases targeted colonial capitals and
most official health statistics use hospital-based data ports. There was very little interest on the part of colonial
and incorporate community reporting, but these latter powers in promoting health care in rural areas except in
data miss some of the urban poor who remain outside crisis situations when disease could undermine stability
of these systems. Existing data rely heavily on major in the colony, particularly by diminishing the productiv-
cities, giving little or no coverage to small and ity of the labor force. When wider campaigns were
medium-sized urban centers. Vital statistics about launched against sleeping sickness, yellow fever, and
births, deaths, and causes of death provide crucial in- plague outbreaks, they were crafted in response to par-
formation for policy, planning, and evaluation of all ticular crises and represented isolated rather than sus-
sectors of development. tained efforts. As a result, the health care system handed
over at the end of the colonial period was oriented
toward cities, served the elite, was fragmented in its
SICKNESS AND HEALTH: THE COLONIAL
spatial organization, and was geared toward curative in-
LEGACIES OF INHERITED HEALTH SYSTEMS stead of preventive medicine. The inherited professional
Africa has long been portrayed as “the land of disease” cadres and structures fashioned for Western health sys-
and “the white man’s grave,” representations derived tems were inappropriate for African health needs. The
from the Europeans’ inability to survive in the region patchy, selective, and intermittent nature of colonial in-
before the modern medical age. The colonial era was ac- terventions made many Africans skeptical about the
companied by vast improvements in hygiene and health benefits of public health programs.
and medical care for some members of colonial society. Colonial health systems in Africa were far from ho-
The development of tropical medicine, the implementa- mogenous and exhibited considerable variation inside
tion of modern medical infrastructure, and improve- countries and from country to country. Core parts of the
ments in urban infrastructure contributed to a decrease system in the Belgian Congo were so neglected that on
in mortality and facilitated urban population growth. the eve of independence in 1960 there was not a single
Colonial health systems produced enduring lega- indigenous graduate in medicine in the country. By con-
cies, and the policy behind those systems targeted the trast, health systems in Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa
216 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

were more promising, comprising a good number of the brain drain (e.g., the number of physicians in
trained doctors, including medical specialists. Ghana decreased from 1,700 in 1981 to 800 in 1984)
Ironically, in the colonial era, European medical (Oppong 1997:13). Government cutbacks in health
knowledge benefited from pioneering field research in expenditures were mandated by the International
the region. The Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, Monetary Fund because African governments were in-
for example, operated its first overseas field laboratory solvent (strapped with rising debts and declining
in Sierra Leone, and research conducted in Freetown terms oftrade), meaning that health care spending was
helped identify the vector for malaria. British doctor halved in the 1980s. Cutbacks disproportionally af-
Ronald Ross was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiol- fected poor rural populations; more powerful urban
ogy and Medicine in 1902 largely on the basis of field constituencies ensured that reductions in national
research in Africa and of other research in India. capital expenditures were the last resort. Meanwhile,
In the decade after independence, substantial prog- governments confronted new sources of health care
ress was made in improving the reach of health care demand and costs as the spread of HIV/AIDS meant
services in many African countries. Most African gov- health systems had to do more with fewer resources.
ernments increased spending in the health sector to Already-compromised national health systems almost
extend primary health care and to develop national collapsed, health care provision became even less in-
public health systems that redressed some of the in- adequate and in many cases nonexistent, and people
equalities of the colonial era. Despite these increased were left to resort to what private or traditional medi-
expenditures, however, African governments failed to cine had to offer. Those who could afford health treat-
build adequate health care structures. Deteriorating ment (political and business elites) went abroad for
macroeconomic conditions in the early 1970s resulted treatment; the rest were left to suffer (Chabal 2009).
in African governments pulling back from investment The reality on the ground in Africa became dissoci-
in public health. Governments were forced to reduce ated from the international health policy consensus
their per capita expenditures on health (Senegal and advice. African governments signed the Declaration of
Céte d'Ivoire cut health expenditures by half [UNICEF Alma-Ata (renamed as Almaty, Kazakhstan) in 1978,
1990]): many facilities had to close their doors, medi- vowing to deliver “health care for all by 2000” by pro-
cal personnel were reduced, and funding for needed viding community-based, affordable, and accessible
repairs, equipment, and pharmaceuticals dried up. health care (as had been done in China). However, fi-
Severe cutbacks compelled health care workers to moon- nancing such a comprehensive health system became
light as a survival strategy, and absenteeism became an insurmountable obstacle for African governments.
more frequent, adding further stress on already fragile More and more governments moved further from the
health systems. These factors led to even poorer service development of primary universal health systems rec-
delivery and a hemorrhaging of health professionals ommended by prominent international health organi-
from the national systems. In the worst cases (e.g., the zations at this time.
Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC] and Somali), per In time, the Alma-Ata Declaration was criticized as
capita government expenditures were reduced to less being too broad, too idealistic, and too unrealistic in its
than US$1 by 1985 (Vogel 1993). implementation timetable. Instead, international donors,
agencies, and scholars recommended and promoted a
more cost-effective strategy that could deliver measurable
THE NEXUS OF INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
goals as an interim strategy—later labeled the selective
POLICY AND NATIONAL HEALTH POLICIES,
primary health care (SPHC) for disease control. UNICEF
1980—PRESENT
and other major international health organizations got
With few exceptions, health conditions worsened in on board with this targeted approach.
Africa until the 2000s. The economic crises of the SPHC was promoted by neoliberal thinking and
1970s and 1980s led to declining real incomes and fatigue about spending money on programs that might
cutbacks in public health expenditures and accelerated never attain a utopian goal and a “children’s health
 Health 217

revolution.” Instead, SPHC involved the reprioritiza- more accessible in remote rural areas (child mortality
tion of programs around four interventions: growth was reduced by 40% in two districts within five years)
monitoring, oral rehydration techniques, breastfeed- (Uthman 2012). Most African countries, however,
ing, and immunization. The neoliberal political con- have not met the Abuja commitment.
text forced more international agencies to concentrate The implications of modest national expenditures
on short-term technical programs with clear budgets are that, in most African countries, governments and
(prioritized programs to address a few targeted dis- private national sources (e.g., employers and private
eases, the leading causes of mortality) rather than on insurances) pay only half of the total average national
broadly defined health programs. Not everyone agreed health expenditure. The other half is met by out-of-
with the SPHC approach: three major criticisms are pocket spending, a ratio that rises to 70% in Nigeria
(1) its failure to address the root causes ofill health in and 90% in DRC. These costs represent a huge burden
Africa (i.e., poverty); (2) its emphasis on top-down, on many who can ill afford to shoulder the burden of
externally driven, technological approaches that failed health costs. Ghana and South Africa have taken steps
to empower communities to tackle their own health toward universal coverage, but even in these countries
problems; and (3) its focus on only targeted diseases. many medicines and services are not included and re-
New international funds became available in the quire out-of-pocket payments. The result of frag-
2000s with the Millennium Declaration that acknowl- mented coverage across Africa has meant that private
edged the fundamental importance of health in the health financing fills some of the void (e.g., for-profit
development rubric. In the 2000s, the emphasis hospitals and clinics and nonprofit providers such as
switched back to an integrated approach: six of the aid organizations and missionary hospitals). The
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) aimed Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2012) notes that
to improve an aspect of health to accelerate develop- in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda more than
ment: MDG 1 aimed to reduce extreme poverty and 40% of people in the bottom 20% income bracket re-
hunger; MDG 4, to reduce child mortality; MDG 5, to ceive their health care from private, for-profit provid-
improve maternal health; MDG 6, to combat HIV/ ers. The remainder and the poorest Africans have little
AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; MDG 7, to ensure or no access to public health care coverage, and they
environmental sustainability; and MDG 8, to provide frequently also lack access to the prerequisites of
access to affordable essential drugs. The emphasis on health: clean water, sanitation, and adequate nutri-
addressing diverse factors (e.g., clean water, univer- tion. The global financial crisis of 2008 to the present
sal education, and food production) to improve well- added even more pressure on external financing for
being was widely welcomed by development experts, African health systems, and the immediate horizon
but the levels of international and national commit- looks shaky and somewhat bleak. African govern-
ments needed to achieve the MDGs were lacking. At ments are going to need to make up for shortfalls and/
the same time, African governments recognized more or turn toward more private sector provision.
and more that national health systems need to be More recently, African governments have reen-
strengthened and, above all, that there was a dire need gaged and reaffirmed their commitments to provide
for much greater financial and capacity building in universal primary health care. The Ouagadougou Dec-
health care delivery systems. laration in 2008 on primary health care and health
In 2001, African Union heads of state signed the care systems in Africa is the most comprehensive state-
Abuja Declaration, establishing national health care ment of intent. It acknowledges that the sources of
expenditure targets of 15% of the national budget. many African health issues are products of weak na-
Since that time, some countries (e.g., Botswana, tional health systems (without denying other societal,
Burkina Faso, Rwanda, and Tanzania) have risen to the behavioral, and environmental determinants of
_ challenge and reversed decades of underinvestment in health). According to the Ouagadougou Declaration,
health services. Tanzania embarked on health service major challenges that beset health systems include
reform by decentralizing services and making them lack of financing, poor health infrastructure, and
218 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

geographical and socioeconomic inequalities (e.g., the that could champion the transition toward comprehensive
spatial mismatch in clinics and medicines and restric- horizontal integration.
tive access for those most in need but unable to pay). There is considerable debate about what to em-
The declaration calls for action from Africa’s govern- phasize post-2015 (i.e., after the MDG deadline) to
ments and the international community on primary improve and strengthen African health systems. EIU
health care development, and a framework for imple- (2012) makes five recommendations: (1) primary and
mentation was outlined with nine cross-cutting priorities preventive care that can educate people about healthy
for African countries (Fig. 9.3). lifestyles and that can tackle the double disease burden;
The main challenge is to develop a comprehensive (2) empower communities as health care providers (stop
health care system using a coordinated, cross-sectoral “di- the brain drain and augment the professional cadre by
agonal” approach (Ooms et al. 2008). “Vertical” health training lay health care workers; (3) implement uni-
programs aiming for disease-specific results (e.g., AIDS versal coverage; (4) make telemedicine ubiquitous; and
and malaria), popular among international donors and (5) encourage local pharmaceutical manufacturing.
NGOs, are too focused. The ultimate goal of horizontal
integration of health programs is to create environments
HIV/AIDS: AN EXTRAORDINARY
where stakeholders can cooperate within a framework of
AFRICAN STRUGGLE
shared policies and strategies, and where health policies
can be aligned and mutually reinforcing. Of course, much Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) is a
more global funding and commitment from national fatal disease caused by the slow-acting human immu-
governments is necessary to ensure that health alloca- nodeficiency virus (HIV). The virus multiplies in the
tions are transparent and accountable and that proper body until it causes immune system damage, leading
integration takes place within national health care sys- to AIDS. HIV emerged in Africa in the 1930s in the vi-
tems. It is interesting to consider whether the Global cinity of Cameroon and Congo, and it traveled to the
Fund could be converted into a larger global health fund United States and Europe in subsequent decades. The
virus diffused spatially in the early independence years
of Zaire (formerly the Belgian Congo) as Belgians
returned to Brussels and as 10,000 Haitian contract
workers returned to Port-au-Prince (Haitians were
hired on short-term contracts as French-speaking
teachers and professionals for government positions).
Around this time (during the 1970s), there are also re-
ports of medical missionaries and-some Africans in
several European countries seeking treatment of what
Service may have been AIDS (Chin 2007). During the 1970s
delivery , and 1980s, increasing “sparks” of HIV-infected persons
traveled throughout Africa and other world regions.
These “sparks,” however, were limited and remained
silent and unrecognized. According to Chin (2007:37),
Research it was not until “such ‘sparks’ were introduced into gay
Health
information
for bathhouses and/or IDU [intravenous drug users,
health mainly heroin users] shooting galleries during the
1970s, explosive HIV epidemics ensued.”
HIV diffused across the globe and became a pan-
demic in the 1980s. HIV/AIDS is the greatest disease
FIGURE 9.3 Nine Health Policy Priorities for African problem the world has ever faced. The first strain (HIV-1)
Countries. was identified in laboratories in 1983 (largely on the
 Health 219

basis of screening homosexual men), and labs identi- and Zimbabwe) bear a disproportionate share of the
fied a second strain in 1985 (HIV-2) (among hetero- global AIDS burden—in total, they account for 34% of
sexual West Africans, many of them of Guinea-Bissau people living with AIDS worldwide. Swaziland has the
origin). Since then, the virus has shown a proneness to highest adult prevalence in the world: in 2011, approxi-
mutations: more than four different groups and nine mately 26% of its population were living with AIDS
different subtypes have been identified. Worldwide, (UNAIDS 2012). In Swaziland, AIDS kills 50 people a
HIV-1 predominates. As recently as 2009, a new strain day and HIV infects another 55, and this occurs in a
was discovered in a Cameroonian woman and desig- country that has only two physicians for every 10,000
nated as HIV-1, group P (AVERT 2012). The virus is people. South Africa continues to be home to the
transmitted mainly by sexual fluids but also by blood world’s largest population of HIV-positive people: 5.6 mil-
(from mother to child in the womb, by birthing, by lion in 2011. HIV prevalence in West and Central Africa
breastfeeding, and by blood transfusions) and by IDUs is relatively lower, ranging from 2% in most countries
sharing needles. (Benin, Burkina Faso, DRC, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Unsafe medical and dental practices and careless- Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Sierra
ness may be responsible for a smaller, but largely un- Leone) to 5.3% in Cameroon (UNAIDS 2012). HIV
known, portion of transmission in Africa (Oppong and prevalence in East Africa shows a considerable range,
Kalipeni 2003). While IDU needle sharing is no more from approximately 2% to 4% in Ethiopia, South
of an issue in Africa than in other world regions (IDU Sudan, and Rwanda to 6% to 7% in Kenya and Uganda
needle sharing can spike in some refugee camps and (Fig. 9.4) (see Box 9.2 for the sharp reduction in HIV
among some sex workers), a much greater problem is incidence rates in Uganda).
the repeated use of unsterilized needles and syringes Within regions and within countries, there is con-
for injections to treat various ailments such as malaria. siderable geographical variability in the burden of HIV
A WHO study revealed that in 2000 approximately (Kalipeni and Zulu 2012). There can be wide varia-
19% of injections were administered unsafely (quoted tions among neighboring countries (e.g., Cote d'Ivoire
in Reid 2009:2). Unsafe needle practices especially
affected populations relying on bush doctors, roadside
dentists, and itinerant pharmaceutical vendors. Indeed,
in some contexts blood tests for malaria and sexually
transmitted diseases constitute a potential source of
HIV infection. Moreover, public awareness of HIV risk
from various other skin-piercing procedures (e.g., tat-
tooing, unsterile dental care, shaving with an unsteril-
ized razor) remains weak in the region.
Africa is worst-afflicted region in terms of HIV/
AIDS transmission: 16 million people have already
died from AIDS there, some 23.5 million people are
living with HIV/AIDS, and 1.8 million new infections
occurred in 2011 (UNAIDS 2012). The region remains
the most heavily burdened by the HIV/AIDS pandemic HIV %
(accounting for 69% of the global HIV burden), al- 0.3-25
though the number of new infections has fallen by VIZ 2.6 - 7.2
30% in the past six years (UNAIDS 2012). XXX

ne
©

The geography of AIDS is a complex mosaic, but

there are some broad national patterns. Ten countries
in southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, FIGURE 9.4 HIV Prevalence in 2011.
220 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 9.2 AIDS IN UGANDA: Some researchers and grassroots organizations have ques-
AN UNFINISHED SUCCESS STORY tioned the accuracy of previous official figures, believing that real
figures were higher and that the success stories involved selective
Uganda's sharp reduction of its AIDS incidence has won interna- use of information (Parkhurst 2002). For example, surveillance data
tional acclaim, and its experience inspired a wave of aid pro- from antenatal clinics are generally biased and exaggerate re-
grams and public health strategies to combat the disease in corded declines in prevalence. The extrapolation of data from
Africa and other world regions. Uganda was the first country to urban clinics to the entire population (when 87% of the population
devise a national response based on strong government com- is rural) is problematic. Undoubtedly, there was pressure to show
mitment, vigorous civil society participation, donor support, and results and to maintain the narrative of success to keep interna-
multiple public messaging campaigns. Locally known as “slim,” tional funds flowing into Uganda rather than to contextualize the
the first case of HIV was identified in 1982, and the disease pro- evidence. At the same time, the international community was
liferated in the late 1980s (Allen 2006). Over 1 million Ugandans under pressure to present successful examples of HIV-1 preven-
have died of HIV/AIDS, and 1.2 million children have been or- tion, given the groundswell of media and public attention to the
phaned by the devastating epidemic. profound effects of AIDS in Africa. Parkhurst (2002:80) emphasizes
The Ugandan AIDS prevention program began in 1987 with that “the standard of proof for policy recommendations seems to
extensive public health messages promoting family values, faith- have been lowered to provide the international community with
fulness, and “zero grazing.” In the 1990s, the government im- the African success story it wants, or even needs.”
plemented the “ABC approach” (abstain, be faithful, and use a Others consider that the plateauing of AIDS incidence levels
condom), and Kampala instituted national safe-sex education
reflects normalizing effects of having waged war on high-risk
programs and made condoms widely available. Other key ele- populations (e.g., sex workers, truck drivers, the army, migrant
ments in the government's approach were decentralization, men) and the dulling of people’s attention after public cam-
community mobilization, and the empowerment of the NGO
paigns become routine. Harder-to-target general populations
community. The AIDS Support Organization (TASO) emerged to
naturally exhibit slower containment rates. “AIDS fatigue” may
play a pivotal in providing family assistance, testing, counseling,
be creeping in, and more risky sexual behavior may be on the
AIDS support services (dispensing ARVs), training, and advo-
increase. Multiple partners are still common among wealthy men
cacy. TASO has become the largest NGO in Uganda and the
and among people in poverty who travel for employment and
largest HIV/AIDS support organization in Africa. Grassroots cam-
trade. The Ministry of Health’s (2012:23) latest survey showed
paigns using community mobilization—local chiefs, churches,
that 25% of married men had multiple partners. At the same
community, care groups, and village meetings (which even Presi-
time, national prevention efforts are discriminatory and overlook
dent Museveni would hold)—combined with free ARV medicines
one particular high-risk group: homosexuals. Uganda maintains a
from the 2000s onward (supply and access are still not perfect)
hardline approach toward homosexuality: the Anti-Homosexuality
funded by international donors allowed the country to achieve
Bill (2009) criminalizes same-sex relations, meaning that gays are
noteworthy, measurable successes. Social communication led to
not included within Kampala’s boundaries of prevention.
behavior changes, a major factor behind the reductions in HIV
Other experts (e.g., Allen 2006) contend there is an uncomfort-
(e.g., a 65% reduction in casual sex occurred from 1989 to 1995)
able truth about the Ugandan HIV/AIDS success story: it is a story
(Ministry of Health 2012).
of mythmaking. Allen (2006) maintains that behavior change does
The Ugandan case is widely celebrated (but contested) as evi-
not result from advocacy campaigns alone; social norms are stub-
dence of moving from worst to best practice. Prevalence rates at
born to dislodge. For example, women have more limited agency
antenatal clinics fell from 30% in 2000 to 10% in 2005 (Parkhurst
when it comes to sex: they face pressure to behave according to
2002:79). Overall prevalence rates in Uganda declined from 15%
accepted social and moral norms so they rarely are in positions to
in 1992 to 6.4% in 2005. Nevertheless, recent reports from
abstain from sex and/or negotiate condom use (Allen 2006).
Uganda indicate that infection rates have begun to increase, es-
Moreover, the cornerstone of AIDS prevention—ABC—can be a
pecially in urban areas (rising from 6.4% in 2005 to 7.3% in 2011)
viable prevention option for women only if it is implemented as
(Ministry of Health 2012:25). Uganda is now one of only two
one component of a package of interventions aimed at redressing
Africa countries (along with Chad) where AIDS is on the rise.
deep-rooted gender imbalances.

compared to Liberia and Ghana). According to UNAIDS Kenyans. Spatial clustering of HIV incidence occurs in
(2011a), in Kenya there is a greater than 15-fold varia- the two Kenyan provinces bordering Uganda (Western
tion in HIV prevalence across its provinces, ranging from and Nyanza), where the HIV incidence is almost four
13.9% in Nyanza province to 0.9% in North East prov- times the rate in the adjoining Rift Valley province
ince. Nyanza province is home to 25% of HIV-infected (UNAIDS 2011a). Even in small African countries
 Health 221

(e.g., Benin), a wide variation in HIV prevalence is superhighway for HIV transmission (Epstein 2007) or
documented. whether this claim propagates a polysexual and pro-
HIV infections peaked in Africa in 1998 (Fig. 9.5). miscuous myth about Africans (Lurie and Rosenthal
There is mounting evidence that the region has turned 2010). Of course, concurrency is not only cultural but
AIDS around, and sustained progress in halting new has roots in urban poverty as a driver oftransactional
infections has occurred: since 2001, the rate of new in- sex. The tendency for some members of the urban
fections dropped by 73% in Malawi, 66% in Ghana, poor to form transactional sexual relationships is in-
and 41% in South Africa (UNAIDS 2012). Successes tensified by high levels of poverty in the context of the
have been registered in AIDS prevention: 12 West and rising consumption lifestyles that create desires for
Central African countries have attained prevalence phones, makeup, and fashions. Studies of young
rates under 2% (UNAIDS 2012). One of the brightest women in slums show some woman are often involved
signs of progress against the epidemic is the growing in transactional relationships with men with other part-
number of babies born free of HIV: Botswana has ners (even though these same women have only one
virtually eliminated mother-to-child transmission of partner and are not prostitutes) (Epstein 2007). How-
HIV. More than 7 million Africans have access to life- ever, other studies in rural areas find that women who
saving ARV treatments (UNAIDS 2012). A focus on engage in paid sex do so out of desperation (Oppong
AIDS treatment combined with reductions in the price and Kalipeni 2003). Therefore, sexual activity with
of medicines (which have come down to US$10 per multiple partners may be better understood as a sur-
person per year from US$10,000 in the mid-1990s) has vival response dictated by the vicious economic system
resulted in more than half of diagnosed HIV-positive engendered by colonization and globalization (Oppong
Africans receiving ART (UNAIDS 2012). Domestic and Kalipeni 2003).
spending on HIV/AIDS almost doubled between 2008 There is a salient gender dimension to HIV/AIDS in
and 2011, and some governments have been steadily Africa. Three quarters of all women with HIV/AIDS live
decreasing their reliance on donor AIDS support. Even in Africa. African women are disproportionately af-
though progress in stopping AIDS has been signifi- fected: they represent 60% of the population living
cant, there is still some distance to go before UNAIDS’ with HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2012). Generally, women are
(2011b) three zero targets can be met: (1) zero new HIV at a greater risk of heterosexual transmission of HIV,
infections; (2) zero AIDS-related deaths; and (3) zero and the majority of HIV transmission in Africa occurs
discrimination. during heterosexual encounters. Women’s particular
Through another lens, AIDS can be as much a vulnerability is a product of persistent gender inequali-
social problem as it is a medical problem. Epstein ties embedded in African social relations and economic
(2007:xvii) underscores that “it is not that Africans realities. Adolescent girls are especially vulnerable, bio-
have more sexual partners, over a lifetime, than people logically and socially, to sexual infection. In many
in Western countries do—in fact, they generally have places, male identity is very much linked to sexual per-
fewer.” Many Africans, however, are more likely to have formance: men feel pressure to have many sexual con-
more than one overlapping or concurrent long-term quests to prove their masculinity. At the same time,
partnership (“concurrency” means sleeping with more girls are often socialized to be subservient to men. Bio-
than one partner at closely spaced intervals for months logically, women are twice as likely to acquire HIV
or years) at a time (compared to the general pattern of from an infected partner during unprotected sex than
serial monogamy in the Global North). Still, the men are (AVERT 2012). Moreover, women’s childbear-
theory of concurrency is highly controversial and very ing role means that women also have to contend with
difficult to measure (men overstate the number of issues such as mother-to-child transmission of HIV and
sexual partners and women understate them). Concur- the responsibility of caring for AIDS patients and AIDS-
rent relationships propagate interlocking networks, affected children. AIDS widows experience the most
but there are differences of opinion on whether they negative scenarios: for example, losing out on inheri-
link people into giant networks that create a virtual tances (e.g., property, land, or rights to use land), and
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 Health 223

being brought into relationships (not of their own The scale of the orphan crisis is magnified by in-
choosing) with their deceased husband's male relatives terim periods of suffering between the time parents
and/or forced to return to their maternal homes. Loss become ill and when they die from AIDS. The sickness
of inheritance income, increased workload, and loss of period and the eventual death of one and/or both par-
support structures are usual (Economic Commission ents take a huge emotional toll (see Young Carers’
for Africa 2012). Through Our Eyes 2012 movie). Typically, access to
AIDS is responsible for leaving large numbers of basic necessities (e.g., shelter, food, clothing, and edu-
children across Africa without one or both parents, cation) becomes more difficult, especially if the person
and it has dealt a massive blow to the African family. infected with HIV/AIDS is the main breadwinner or if
Globally, 90% of all AIDS orphans (16.6 million chil- other household members have to forgo working to
dren) live in the region. Countries with the largest stay at home and become a caregiver (Wangui 2009).
number of AIDS orphans are Nigeria (2.5 million), With less money available for food based on loss of
South Africa (1.9 million), Kenya (1.2 million), and income and medical costs, nutritional status can
Uganda (1.2 million) (UNICEF 2010) (Fig. 9.6). One decline for all household members. Rising debts and
fifth of children in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland funeral bills make the predicament even worse. Some
are AIDS orphans. children are forced to fend for themselves; others become

AIDS orphans
2,500,000
1,000,000
400,000

No Data

FIGURE 9.6 AIDS Orphans in Africa, 2009.

224 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

child heads of households; and others are raised by are insidious stereotypes (Oppong and Kalipeni 2003).
relatives (often in female-headed houses). It is not un- Looking at the macro pattern, Craddock (2003:5) em-
common for grandparents to be thrust into the often- phasizes that “it is clear that AIDS has been exacerbated
unwanted roles as substitutes for fathers and mothers. by deepening poverty experienced by the majority of
Caregiver households are likely to become poorer and African countries over the past 20 years; that it has
struggle to care for an additional person. spread in the aftermath of war, civil unrest and refugee
After the death of parents, various poverty contexts movements; that migration patterns necessitated by
put pressure on AIDS orphans to provide for or con- underemployment in chronically underfinanced econ-
tribute to their households. Begging and/or working omies ensure both an increase in the rate of transmis-
typically take precedence over school attendance. AIDS sion and spread from urban to rural areas; and that
contributes to the number of street children and drop- governments shackled by poor terms of trade and crip-
outs. Compared to their peers, orphans are three to pling debts have neither the finances nor the personnel
four times more likely to contract HIV in their teens, to address the problem adequately.”
making them a very vulnerable population. Children The way that patients face AIDS involves other
are often stigmatized by society through their associa- social processes. Paying for treatment requires pooling
tion with HIV, which in turn can be a trigger for social collective resources. Family and kin are the first line of
isolation. Overall, the orphan burden is a window into defense, and patients must draw from extensive social
the potential massive social breakdown and disloca- and solidarity networks. Without solidarity, ordinary
tion in Africa resulting from the AIDS pandemic Africans simply cannot afford access to health care,
(UNICEF 2010). Nevertheless, there are AIDS orphans and the family is instrumental in providing in-hospital
who manage to make ends meet and to survive in the care. Chabal (2009:267) notes that “hospitals in Africa
face of very difficult circumstances. There are obvious require the family feed, clean, provide bedding and
long-term implications of generational rupture and look after the patient. In addition, medicine must usu-
traumatized children on Africa’s development. ally be purchased outside of the hospital, which means
The AIDS epidemic in Africa is essentially a social that a crucial part of treatments also hinges on the
process whereby the spread of a microorganism is social network.” Therefore, when national health care
shaped by social, political, economic, ideological, and systems are lacking, the social network has to make up
cultural contexts (Kalipeni et al. 2003). Unfortunately, for part of the deficiency. In so many ways, AIDS takes
colloquial interpretations of the spread of AIDS are a massive toll on society.
shrouded with myths, some of which further stigma- Leadership on HIV/AIDS in the region has often
tize sufferers. AIDS can be blamed on moral transgres- been lacking. Compounding the infrastructure deficits,
sions, “bad spirits,” and sorcery. Some of those with outright denial has been costly, the most notorious
extreme religious views blame it on sins (i.e., the in- being the former South African government of Mbeki.
nocent remain protected). Some African men believe Researchers (e.g., Chigwidere et al. 2008) claim that
AIDS is a disease of women, so some husbands blame Mbeki’s stance (which went against the medical con-
their spouses for their infections. These kinds of views sensus) in the late 1990s resulted in the loss of 330,000
reinforce unequal and damaging power relations and a lives (or approximately 2.2 million person-years) be-
profound mystification. Internationally, they repro- cause a feasible and timely ARV program was not im-
duce the way that colonial and postcolonial powers plemented in South Africa. Mbeki’s position was
represented African practices and social politics. Such bolstered by maverick scientist deniers outside the
gender-based and racialized representations of sexual region, most notably Peter Duesberg, the University of
practices, social behaviors, and government actions California, Berkeley author of a highly controversial
generated within and outside of Africa cause untold book Inventing the AIDS Virus (1998). It is still
damage. Representations of women as “reservoirs of common for deniers to claim that HIV/AIDS is a ve-
infection,” “Africans as promiscuous,” “AIDS victims as hicle for Western pharmaceutical companies to reap
depraved,” and “African governments as incompetent” economic rewards in “pharmacolonialism.”
 Health 225

New infection rates in Africa appear to have privileged at the expense of integrating biomedical
peaked in 1998, although the struggle is far from and social scientific knowledge.
over. Africa’s HIV/AIDS crisis continues to be an enor- Certainly a vaccine would be a massive boost, but
mous challenge at all levels because of lack of infra- most experts believe it will take at least another decade.
structure, finance, ignorance, misunderstanding, and Too often policymakers have opted for simple solu-
absence of a cure. HIV prevention strategies focus tions and limited interventions (e.g., ABC) that offer a
heavily on encouraging individuals to alter their glimmer of hope of interrupting the epidemic without
sexual behavior, avoid having sexual relations at an threatening underlying power dynamics and altering
early age, reduce the number of sexual relationships, gross inequalities. Many leading medical researchers
use condoms, and use voluntary testing. Specific claim a truly effective AIDS vaccine may be a biological
donor programs vary in their emphases. Under U.S. impossibility. A promising development is the U.S.
President George W. Bush, one third of all available Food and Drug Administration's approval of the first
funding under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS HIV prevention drug in 2012, Truvada; however, its
Relief (PEPFAR) in 2006 was reserved for abstinence- annual cost of US$13,200 per person will be an insur-
only programs, and in 2008, 50% of PEPFAR was al- mountable barrier to most people, so access is likely to
located for abstinence and fidelity programs, excluding be very limited, at least in the immediate future. Con-
comprehensive programs. Ideological and religious troversy surrounds some of Truvada’s drug trials,
views rather than evidence-based interventions drive largely those conducted in Africa, over the difficulty of
many policies. Although the Obama administration getting African women to participate fully in clinical
has reversed some of the Bush-era restrictions, the broad trials (many women stopped taking the medicine on a
thrust remains. daily basis), meaning that the trials produced more
The assumption that sexually active adults will conclusive results for men. The availability of Truvada
have only one uninfected lifetime partner has been and other medicines coming into the pipeline raises
questioned. Societies and individuals do not respond the question of whether their introduction could lead
so easily to advice requiring changes in human behav- to a decline in safe-sex practices, a core focus of the
ior, particularly those involving complex issues such as past two and half decades of HIV/AIDS prevention.
sexual relations. Prevention demands more than in- The history of AIDS in Africa is, therefore, far from
struction and information; it requires alleviation of the complete, and the impacts of the AIDS epidemic will
problems of people most at risk. Empowering African continue to affect future generations, households, com-
women on many levels is now regarded as a vital step munities, businesses, public services, and national econ-
in allowing them to take more control in sexual rela- omies in the region. The epidemic has drastically
tionships and to reduce their vulnerability to AIDS reduced the workforce in many countries, and the
(Ouma and Kalipeni 2009). Limiting sexual transmis- costs of caring for a growing generation of AIDS or-
sion will necessitate empowering large numbers of phans could trim gross domestic product growth rates
people so that they can change their behaviors and by 1% to 1.5% in the worst-affected countries. Accord-
stop engaging in activities that are now central to some ing to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
poor people. Alternatively, a focus on “condoms, nee- (FAO, 2005), 8 million agricultural workers had died
dles, and negotiation” (CNN) is proposed as a better of AIDS in the 25 worst-affected countries by 2003,
alternative than abstinence and fidelity. and 18 million more AIDS-related deaths are projected
There are many critics of the Global North’s ap- by 2020, although this forecast needs to be reduced
proach and strong arguments that the wrong empha- because of the rolling out of ARVs since 2005 and
ses are being pursued in Africa. Epstein (2007) believes sharply reduced AIDS mortality rates. Nevertheless,
that “our greatest mistake may be to overlook the fact the loss of a significant portion of the agricultural
that, in spite of everything, African people often know workforce decreases food production and increases
how to solve their own problems.” Kalipeni et al. food insecurity as human and material resources di-
(2003) contend that biomedical understandings are verted toward covering the costs of AIDS care intensify
226 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

other vulnerabilities. There is no precedent for under- The central argument for extraordinary support for
standing the effects that AIDS deaths will have on HIV/AIDS is that a pandemic requires an unprecedented
small countries with high infection rates such as response. The devastating impacts on individuals, fami-
Botswana and Swaziland; the entire population struc- lies, and communities pose major obstacles to develop-
ture of these countries is being radically altered. ment and threaten to reverse development gains. Health
care systems will remain dysfunctional throughout Africa
until AIDS is controlled and reversed. HIV/AIDS is such a
GLOBAL HEALTH FUNDING PRIORITIES,
sensitive issue—at its core is sex, gender inequality, sex work,
EMPHASES, AND OMISSIONS: NEGLECTED
homosexuality, drug use, stigma, and discrimination—that
TROPICAL DISEASES AND MENTAL HEALTH
only an aggressive and well-financed approach is going to
The global archipelago of international, governmen- make inroads. Few dispute the humanitarian rationale for
tal, and NGO entities that has emerged to channel fighting HIV/AIDS, but there are questions about the dis-
funds, consultants, and medicines to African programs proportionate level of spending and about its crowding
has major impacts on health emphases in the region. out other health concerns. Public health experts empha-
Major international organizations focus intensively size that the costs per disability-adjusted life-years averted
on infectious diseases. For example, WHO allocates are higher for HIV/AIDS than immunizations, malaria,
87% of its total budget to infectious diseases, 12% to traffic injuries, childhood illnesses, and TB. Thus, concen-
NCDs, and less than 1% to injuries and violence. The trating on an alternate set of interventions might produce
Global Fund, the most prominent health donor, allo- wider benefits; for example, bed nets, immunization
cates all of its funding to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria. against pneumonia, family planning, etc. What if more
Between 2004 and 2011, the Global Fund invested money were spent on research and drug and vaccine devel-
US$5.5 billion to dedicated support in Africa: approx- opment for other health challenges? This as an intriguing
imately half of the funds were directed to HIV/AIDS, and provocative question.
one third targeted malaria, and the remainder focused Prioritizing funding for infectious diseases has led
on TB eradication. Concentration on the “big three” to distortions by increasing the profile of certain dis-
infectious diseases is justified because Africa accounts eases and by influencing policy priorities and recipient
for 90% of all malaria deaths, an inordinate share of health care systems. Inevitably, resources are drawn
all people living with HIV/AIDS, and nearly one third away from other important and looming health chal-
of all TB cases. lenges. For example, maternal health, bacterial and
There are serious debates over whether the amount parasite diseases, and chronic diseases receive less
of HIV/AIDS funding in Africa is disproportionate. funding and scant international attention.
HIV is the leading killer, contributing 12.5% to the dis- A major omission is a focus on tropical diseases,
ease burden, but it receives 40% of all health funding which affect the poorest 500 million Africans. Ne-
(England 2007:344). General funding allocations do glected tropical diseases (NTDs) are a group of chronic,
not correspond with causes of death or other measures disabling, and disfiguring conditions that most com-
of the prevalence of illness in Africa. An interesting monly occur in extreme poverty contexts. Combined,
question is how and why some global funding came to NTDs produce a burden of disease that may be equiva-
target HIV/AIDS exclusively and not broaden to tackle, lent to half of Africa’s malaria disease burden and more
for example, diabetes as well. No doubt the fact that than double that of TB (Hotez and Kamath 2009:412).
HIV/AIDS travels and diabetes is stationary is a key The leading NTDs in Africa are helminth infections (par-
part of the explanation. Moreover, because the North asitic worm infections such as hookworm, schistosomia-
has generally conquered the scourge of infections, sis, and ascariasis) (Table 9.2). Hookworm infections
there was a sense that the same could be achieved in affected 29% of Africans in 2003 and accounts for
the South—but this is turning out to be much more 192 million cases per year (Hotez and Kamath 2009).
difficult than anticipated. Nigeria registered the largest number of cases (38 million)
 Health 227

TABLE 9.2 GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION AND ESTIMATED BURDEN OF THE MAJOR

HELMINTH NTDs IN AFRICA

Disease (Number of Country with Country with Second Country with Third Country with Fourth
Cases in SSA) Highest Prevalence Highest Prevalence Highest Prevalence Highest Prevalence

Hookworm infection Nigeria 38 million DR Congo 31 million Angola and Ethiopia Cétes d'Ivoire
(198 million) 11 million cases each 10 million

Schistosomiasis Nigeria 29 million Tanzania 19 million DR Congo and Ghana Mozambique

(192 million) 15 million cases each 13 million

Ascariasis (173 million) Nigeria 55 million Ethiopia 26 million DR Congo 23 million South Africa
12 million

Trichuriasis (162 million) Nigeria 34 million DR Congo 26 million South Africa 22 million Ethiopia 21 million

Lymphatic filariasis Nigeria 106 million DR Congo 49 million Tanzania 31 million Ethiopia 30 million at
(382-394 million at risk) at risk at risk at risk risk, Kenya 29 million
at risk

Trachoma (30 million) Ethiopia 10.3 million Sudan 3.6 million Tanzania 2.1 million Kenya and Niger
2.0 million cases each

Yellow fever (180,000) Cétes d'Ivoire Mali 5 reported cases Cameroon, CAR,
16 reported cases in 2006 Ghana, and Guinea
in 2006 1 case each in 2006

Human African DR Congo 10,369 Angola 2,280 Sudan 1,766 Congo 839
trypanosomiasis
(50,000-70,000)

Leprosy (30,055) DR Congo 6,502 Nigeria 5,381 Ethiopia 4,611 Mozambique 1,830

Leishmaniasis (visceral) Sudan 15,000-20,000 thiopia 4,000 new Kenya and Uganda not
(19,000-24,000 new new cases cases determined
cases)

Dracunculiasis (9,585) Sudan 5,815 Ghana 3,358 Mali 313 Nigeria and Niger
<100 cases each

Buruli ulcer (>4,000) Cétes d'Ivoire 2,000 Benin and Ghana 1,000
each

Source: Hotez, P. J., Kamath, A. 2009. “Neglected Tropical Diseases in Sub-Saharan Africa: Review of Their Prevalence, Distribution, and Disease Burden.”
PLoS Neg] Trop Dis 3(8): e412. doi:10.1371/journal.pntd.0000412.

(Hotez and Kamath 2009). Hookworms affect children present a more adequate assessment of Africa's disease
disproportionately: illness results in school absen- burden. It is important to note that the treatment of
teeism and hurts educational performance. Schis- many NTDs is inexpensive and simple.
tosomiasis cases are largely concentrated around Many other health challenges—for example, mental
contaminated water bodies, rivers, and reservoir dams, health and traffic accident deaths—are almost completely
affecting 25% of the African population (countries ignored (see Box 9.3). Vehicular deaths (currently ranked
with high prevalence include Tanzania, with 19 mil- 12th among causes of death in Africa) are projected to
lion cases, and DRC and Ghana, with 15 million cases increase in the future as vehicles increase with urbaniza-
each) (Hotez and Kamath 2009). Data on other NTDs tion and the emergence of more middle-class drivers.
such as typhoid and salmonella are simply not avail- The strongest criticism for abandoning dedicated
able, and stepped-up surveillance is urgently needed to disease support is that more aid should be allocated to
 228 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 9.3 MENTAL HEALTH IN AFRICA discrimination and marginalization on self-esteem and the lack
of successful role models to prompt and support children’s
Mental health issues rank at the bottom of the list of African aspirations.
policymakers’ health priorities. Most African countries have no In most parts of Africa, people's attitudes toward mental ill-
mental health policies and very weak legal protections for the ness are outdated and strongly influenced by traditional beliefs
mentally ill. African policymakers focus on communicable dis- in supernatural causes and remedies. Policymakers tend to be-
eases and fail to grapple with the impact of mental disorders, lieve that mental illness is largely incurable and/or unresponsive
even where there is a direct link between the two. For example, to medical treatments. Besides these attitudes, a major problem
HIV/AIDS has mental health consequences. Those with the dis- is the lack of trained specialists in psychiatry, neurology, and
ease who tend to be ostracized and rejected by their communi- other mental health fields. WHO's (2011b) Mental Health Atlas
ties. In many instances, rural AIDS patients are forced to relocate reports that median ratios of mental health human resources per
from their home communities to urban locations where they can 100,000 population in Africa are the lowest of any world region
be cared for and/or concealed by more tolerant family mem-
(the ratio is 0.05 per 100,000 for psychiatrists and 0.04 for psy-
bers. There is also the immediate psychological impact of ex-
chologists). Africa is off the global mental health map, and
plaining the illness and imputing causality, which often puts into
human resource and policy environments in Africa even show
sharp relief modern versus traditional explanations of illness.
evidence of deterioration (WHO 2011b). In many African coun-
Traditional explanations of weakness and susceptibility to influ-
tries the ratio of psychiatrists to population is as low as 1 per
ences such as witchcraft are common for those who do not par-
5 million, compared to 13 per 100,000 in the European Union
ticipate in modern clinical treatments (e.g., ARV therapies,
(WHO 2013).
counseling). Effects on bereaved families include dissolution of
As a consequence, traditional healers and religious groups
households, loss of income, depletion of savings, and changes in
carry a large care burden for the mentally ill. Many traditional
families’ spending patterns; a direct casualty is often spending
healers are strongly against any medication intake, and in some
on girls’ education. AIDS-affected children are often sent to live
cases this can be detrimental to those who would be better
elsewhere, are twice as likely to work compared to their peers
served by a different treatment regimen. For example, in
(and in the most exploitative labor arrangements and vulnerable
Ethiopia, one of the most progressive Africa states, 85% of emo-
jobs), and shoulder larger proportions of household chores (Eco-
tionally disturbed people follow traditional healers because of
nomic Commission for Africa 2012). Even more worrisome is the
the dearth of psychiatrists (10 psychiatrists serve the entire pop-
fact that female AIDS orphans are more likely to suffer from
ulation of 61 million) (Gureje and Alem 2000:476). Only South
sexual abuse and exploitation and to contract HIV/AIDS later in
Africa and Ethiopia provide state benefits to people with neuro-
their teen years because they are more prone to engage in
logical disorders. WHO estimates that mental diseases will
sexual relationships with “sugar daddies” to obtain physical and
become one of the leading global health challenges by 2030,
material security.
but African countries have yet to face their current, not to men-
Poverty contexts increase the mental health risks for children
tion their future, mental health issues. Social environments
in particular. Poverty does not harm all children, but many are
where disease, poverty, and migration are common have disrup-
part of the extremely vulnerable population with greater devel-
tive effects on good mental health. Moreover, in many African
opmental risks. Several mechanisms contribute to children’s vul-
environments, dislocation, war, and civil unrest add elements of
nerability. Some are direct, such as exposure to infectious
trauma to the mental health matrix. Africa lacks a broad view of
diseases and environmental toxins, inadequate health care and
mental illness as a major cause of morbidity and as a burden on
nutrition, and overcrowded and economically fragile house-
those afflicted, their families, and society.
holds. Other mechanisms are indirect, such as the impact of

strengthening health care systems within countries URBAN HEALTH

and in urban centers; funding should be focused on African urban environments expose-individuals to a
evidence-based health priorities rather than health range of debilitating diseases and conditions. Urban
issues that draw the attention of global funders and health inequalities begin at birth (with undernutri-
particular international funding constituencies (e.g.,
tion) and are-reproduced and intensified over a life-
Christian groups, celebrity advocates, social justice ad-
time by high exposure to other problems. Long-held
vocates). Health policies and programs should be
assumptions among development specialists that
driven less by global advocacy and more by grounded
urban dwellers (compared to rural dwellers) benefit
research, local contexts, and African agency.
 Health 229

from an urban bias in terms of health care are being which increase NCD risks). Well-being is further com-
reconsidered. An emerging consensus is that African promised by long workdays, lengthy work commutes,
urbanites’ health care advantage is eroding and that a and limited or no access to public health systems.
new “urban penalty” is actually emerging. Many of the starkest contrasts in health outcomes are
Researchers initially chronicled the urban penalty now observed in neighborhoods within cities rather
in 19th-century Europe during an intensified and rapid than in rural areas (Weeks, Hill, and Stoler 2014).
period of industrialization and urbanization. Chronic Indeed, health conditions may deteriorate to the
conditions of urban poverty—overcrowding, dirty and un- extent that established urban poor residents can have
sanitary conditions, high levels of disease transmission— worse health than new, poorer international migrants.
along with concentrations of hospitals, orphanages, and For example, in Johannesburg's inner city, “a healthy
prisons contributed to higher urban mortality levels migrant phenomenon” has been identified whereby
(that was particularly a consequence of a spike in TB). Zimbabwean immigrants have better health on a
Edwin Chadwick's (1842) report on the Sanitary Condi- number ofindicators than poor South Africans (Vearey
tions of the Laboring Population in the Great Britain (Chad- et al. 2010).
wick is considered the father of public health reform in Sixty-two percent of urban Africans live in slums
the UK) documented severe unsanitary urban condi- (UN-HABITAT 2011), concentrated in very unhealthy
tions. He wrote about the poor state of urban drainage, urban zones. Confronted with the worst urban condi-
noting that “many of the streets are unpaved and almost tions and very heavy health burdens, slum-dwellers
covered with stagnant water, which lodges in numerous encounter extra burdens of government neglect and
large holes which exist upon their surface, and into animosity (e.g., threats of evictions and exclusion from
which the inhabitants throw all kinds of rejected animal national health initiatives). Growing and expanding
and vegetable matters, which then undergo decay and populations are channeled into slums; this causes
emit the most poisonous exhalations. These matters are urban environments to deteriorate even further and
often allowed, from the filthy habits of the inhabitants intensifies residents’ vulnerability to, for example,
of these districts, many of whom, especially the poor communicable disease transmission (e.g., TB, acute re-
Irish, are utterly regardless both of personal and domes- spiratory infections, and meningitis) (Sclar, Garau,
tic cleanliness, to accumulate to an immense extent, and Carolini 2005). Inadequate water and sanitation
and thus become prolific sources of malaria, rendering result in high incidences of diarrheal diseases and
the atmosphere an active poison” (1842:93). Eventu- worm infections. Vaccine-preventable diseases (mea-
ally, urban mortality rates declined in 19th-century sles, diphtheria, and whooping cough) spread more
Europe and the United States because of a sanitary revo- rapidly in overcrowded urban areas and among non-
lution that encompassed improved housing and sanita- immunized slum-dwellers (Sclar, Garau, and Carolini
tion infrastructure and immunization and nutrition 2005). Inadequate drainage and sanitation increase
campaigns. the risk of diseases such as malaria, West Nile virus,
A corollary can be drawn with contemporary African and dengue fever, as the respective mosquito vectors
cities that face enormous and escalating challenges— may breed in flooded areas, open drains, or rainwater
unplanned urban growth, extensive migration, a phenom- trapped in piles of refuse. Cooking with solid fuels in
enal growth of slums (with accompanying deficiencies in overcrowded and inadequately ventilated shacks cre-
housing, infrastructure, and environmental condi- ates indoor air pollution, another health hazard, and
tions, few decent jobs, and insecurity of tenure), urban the risks of fires are higher (Weeks, Hill, and Stoler
poverty, and increasing urban disparities—manifested 2014). Moreover, the standard practice of strapping in-
in differential access to health care and social services. fants to their mothers’ backs while cooking increases
With inadequate and often unstable income and low the infants’ proneness to respiratory illnesses. Further-
asset bases, urban slum-dwellers are drawn into un- more, many slums are at high risk from extreme wea-
healthy work in informal economies and have un- ther events, which are becoming more frequent and
healthy diets (higher salt and saturated fat intakes, intense because of climate change.
 230 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Africa’s new urban penalty is manifested in the housing security; to feel devalued, useless, helpless,
urban poor dying from infectious and chronic diseases uncared for, hopeless, isolated, anxious and a failure:
in disproportionate numbers. The penalty can take dif- these feelings can dominate people’s whole experience
ferent forms within the same poor household. For ex- of life, coloring their experience of everything else. It is
ample, child malnutrition and maternal obesity coexist the chronic stress arising from feelings like these,
within the same low-income Johannesburg household which does the damage.” Wilkinson (1996) empha-
(Vearey et al. 2010). Many diseases show much higher sizes that the material environment becomes a con-
rates of prevalence in slums than in other areas of the stant reminder of the oppression of self-failure, social
same city. For example, HIV prevalence rates in South exclusion, and devaluation as a human being. Bad
African slums are more than double that of non-slums, social feelings create toxic environments.
and the more common mental disorders (depression Neighborhood health indicators show extreme
and anxiety) exhibit a similar pattern (Rehle et al. variation within cities. A city of Cape Town study
2007). The urban poor (particularly adolescents) also (Bradshaw et al. 2006) shows that income inequality is
have greater risks of injuries and violence. Occupational manifested in different health and well-being experi-
injury can quickly diminish earnings and hasten pov- ences at the neighborhood level. Large differences
erty. Urban poverty typically goes hand in hand with were recorded in the premature mortality rates among
increased food insecurity. For example, in Nairobi, the poor townships (e.g., Nyanga, Mitchell’s Plain, and
Kenya, nearly half of slum households have insecure Khayelitsha) and the wealthier “white” outer suburbs
food supplies (Faye et al. 2010). Harpham (2010:2) (e.g., South Peninsula and Blaauwberg) (Bradshaw
shows that over the past decade the share of urban pre- et al. 2006) (Figs. 9.7 and 9.8). All diseases were more
schoolers in the group of underweight children has in- prevalent in the townships, and HIV/AIDS featured
creased in urban Africa. This finding is concerning on most prominently as cause of death. However, NCDs
many levels: malnutrition impedes children’s motor, accounted for the majority of diseases in more affluent
sensory, cognitive, and social development and weak- areas. Other studies confirm evidence of geographical
ens their immune systems. This extensive cumulative and racial differences in children’s injuries. For exam-
evidence underscores that urban poverty is both a cause ple, fatal burns and pedestrian road injuries occur
and a result of ill health. much more frequently among black and “colored”
Relative deprivation can be more harmful for township children than among whites and Asians who
health than absolute deprivation (Harpham 2010). live outside of the townships (Burrows, van Niekerk,
Some poor people are overwhelmed by stressful life and Laflamme 2010).
experiences (unlike the theme of the creativity and re- Urban health burdens vary significant within places
silience of poor people in urban livelihoods research). and between different places in the same city. The Nai-
Making social comparisons (i.e., knowledge of how robi Urban Health and Demographic Surveillance
others live) can have a powerful negative effect on System (NUHDSS), the first urban-based demographic
well-being, intensifying anxiety and undermining psy- surveillance system in Africa, studied 70,000 people in
chological good health (Harpham 2010). With eco- two slums over an initial four-year period and found
nomic growth and the emergence of an epidemiological significant variation among different stages of life co-
transition in Africa, some groups attain higher living horts and slum subareas, and between families, even
standards while others continue to encounter severe though the community was affected by similar environ-
deprivation. As inequalities become more apparent, mental and poverty conditions. Women-headed house-
the relative aspects of poverty affect the poor person’s holds, the elderly, and new arrivals had the lowest
subjective experience, with potentially damaging ef- incomes and exhibited the poorest health (Zulu et al.
fects on health. Wilkinson (1996:215) argues that “to 2011). High mortality levels were observed among chil-
feel depressed, cheated, bitter, desperate, vulnerable, dren under five years old, a cohort with exceptionally
frightened, angry, worried about debts or job and low levels of vaccinations, high levels of malnutrition,
 Health 231

Homicide my 10.6
Ischaemic heart disease
HIV/AIDS?
Hypertensive heart disease
Tuberculosis -
Diabetes mellitus
Stroke ==
Lower respiratory infections =
Road traffic _-=
Trachea/bronchi/lung cancer =
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease =
Renal failure Fos
Septicaemia
Pulmonary heart and circulatory disease
Breast cancer } 1
Asthma 1
Perinatal conditions 2am 1
Colorectal cancer (Zaza 1.
Suicide and self-inflicted me
1
Fires
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Percentage of total deaths

4H|V/AIDS = human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome.

FIGURE 9.7 Leading Causes of Death, Cape Town, South Africa, 2001. Source: From Bradshaw et al. (2010).

lost
life
of
Years
population
100,000
per

Health subdistricts

HE Injuries i Noncommunicable diseases

£2 Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS)
El Infectious diseases (excluding HIV/AIDS), maternal, perinatal and nutritional conditions

FIGURE 9.8 Mortality in Cape Town Sub-districts, 2001. Source: From Bradshaw et al. (2010).
232 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

and.a high prevalence of infectious diseases. The main inform people about healthy lifestyles and nutrition
lesson of the Nairobi study is that slums are not ho- have been noticeably absent. Low levels of awareness
mogenous residential areas with identical health issues; exist about the long-term risks of poor diet, hazardous
thus, uniform health interventions may not always be environments, and infectious agents. Much of the
effective for heterogeneous population groups. public remains uneducated about health warning
It is evident that urbanization is so rapid and signs and symptoms. Public wellness campaigns are
recent in Africa that governments cannot provide basic urgently needed that go beyond medical professionals
physical and health infrastructures so that poor urbani- to embrace a range of expertise from agriculture, trans-
ties have to depend on traditional medicine (see Box 9.4 portation, water and sanitation, food security, and
for a discussion of traditional medicine and healers). housing so that the African health debate can shift
Public health education efforts (beyond HIV/AIDS) to from curing illness to preserving health.

BOX 9.4 TRADITIONAL MEDICINE rural), and, especially, income. Indeed, many educated Africans
AND HEALERS consult traditional practitioners but prefer to keep it secret.
Patients visit healers for a range of illnesses (e.g., mental health,
Traditional African medicine, or ethnomedicine, is a holistic dis-
sexual health, common viruses, various aches and pains, vitamin
cipline involving the extensive use of indigenous herbs com-
deficiencies, etc.) and even malaria (Fig. 9.9).
bined with aspects of African spirituality. The term “traditional”
There are several strengths to traditional African medicine. It
acknowledges the longevity and genealogy of healing knowl-
preserves part of African cultural traditions. Medical services,
edge of Africa (which is unwritten for the most part). Contempo-
herbal remedies, and individual and group psychotherapies are
rary healers’ knowledge is derived from the medical systems
delivered in affordable ways, and large swaths of the population
practiced by Africans before the arrival of Europeans and the
have good access. Recent times have coincided with an expo-
implementation of colonial public health regimens.
nential increase in the prevalence of locally produced herbal
Colonial authorities cast doubt on the integrity of traditional
mixed medicine preparations (some reportedly prepared by
healing practices, referring to them as unscientific and inferior be-
African healers) that are widely available at informal markets,
cause they used knowledge derived from magical/religious theo-
supermarkets, and pharmacies. Traditional medicine is suitable
ries of causation. Traditional healing was associated with illiteracy,
for treating a broad spectrum of diseases, including conditions
irrationality, and the chaos of traditional societies, and a sharp
not diagnosed by biomedical practitioners (e.g., social and psy-
contrast was drawn with “official,” scientific biomedicine. Many
chological illnesses). However, at the same time, traditional heal-
colonies banned traditional healers, labeling them as “witch doc-
ers recognize that some diseases (e.g., HIV/AIDS) are better
tors” and branding traditional healing knowledge as fetishistic
treated by biomedicine. Traditional medicine is considered to be
and “primitive.” Biomedical knowledge was established as the

a
authoritative knowledge, and biomedical technology continued
its hegemony.
The contemporary reality is that up to 80% of Africans consult
traditional healers for health-related issues, including life-threatening
diseases (WHO 2008b), and many Africans collect medicinal plants
for themselves or their families (King 2012). There are several
healing traditions, namely herbalism, bone-setting, midwifery,
and spiritual healing. In South Africa, for example, over 350,000
traditional healers practice, and the government is attempting to
regulate the sector. Given the network among traditional healers
in referring patients to one another and also to local hospitals
and clinics, the system requires regulation (King 2012). Some
4,000 of the 6,400 plant species in Africa are employed for me-
dicinal purposes, and 20,000 tons of plants are harvested from
nature each year rather than from cultivation. The decision to use
indigenous healing systems or biomedical health systems (or FIGURE 9.9 ‘Traditional Practitioners; Malaria Sufferer
both) is influenced by culture, history, personal attitudes, and Drinking Liquid Mixture in Lusaka, Zambia.
philosophy; preference varies by country, location (urban versus Source: © John Stanmeyer/VII/Corbis.
 Health 233

superior in treating psychic and psychosomatic disease because Patients are provided with no safeguards and instead are ex-
of the knowledge that healers possess about the social and ethnic pected to totally surrender to the healer (although some contend
backgrounds of their patients (Shizha and Charema 2011). that licensing and regulations in conventional medical systems
Community-based studies show that traditional healers have provide weak safeguards). There is limited documentation and
considerable success in treating some mental illnesses. Persons insufficient data on safety and efficacy, and the quality of tradi-
with psychiatric problems are considered to benefit more from tional medicine varies dramatically throughout the region.
traditional treatments: because of the traditional belief that out- The role of traditional medicine in national health systems has
side forces (e.g., past wrongdoing, lack of balance between pa- been boosted by the declaration of an annual African Traditional
tient and social environment and/or the spiritual world) are the Medicine Day on August 31. WHO has long recognized the cen-
cause of mental disorders, acceptance and inclusion in their com- tral role that traditional medicine can play in providing primary
munities are more likely. In contrast, Western medicine and phar- health care, and there are growing examples of integration.
maceutical companies offer biochemical explanations for mental Many states in Africa are developing mechanisms to involve tra-
illness that may stigmatize the patient. Concentrating on the ditional medical practitioners within the activities of ministries of
deeper causes allows traditional healers to focus on prevention (as health: the Ministry of Health, Botswana, is at an advanced stage
opposed to curative practices, which prevail in biomedicine). of integration. In KwaMhlanga, South Africa, a 48-bed hospital
Some components of African traditional medical knowledge combining traditional African medicine with homeopathy and
have been transferred to Western medicine. For example, a tradi- Western healing methods, as well as traditional Asian medicine,
tional African medicinal cure that has developed a wide following was established. Founded by a traditional African healer, the
is the use of an extract from the bark of Prunus africana (a small hospital is the first of its kind in Africa (Shizha and Charema
evergreen tree) to treat moderate prostate problems. Traditional 2011). A few training institutions, such as the Kwame Nkrumah
healers make a tea from the extract for treating other illnesses, University of Science and Technology (Ghana), have established
such as fevers, malaria, and psychiatric disorders, but these rem- a Department of Herbal Medicine for the training and continu-
edies have not been transferred to Western medicine. A lucrative ing education of traditional health practitioners. The West
export trade of the prunus bark has developed, mainly from har- African Health Organization in collaboration with WHO is develop-
vests from Cameroon, DRC, Kenya, and Madagascar. The trade ing a West African pharmacopoeia and producing a monograph
has expanded so much that unsustainable harvesting now threat- on medicinal plants in the subregion.
ens the tree’s extinction. It takes 12 to 15 years to produce the The deficiencies and shortfalls that prevail in African health sys-
bark, and 40- to 50-year-old trees produce the best medicinal tems are prompting considerations of a rapprochement between
yield, so tree replenishment cannot keep pace with harvesting. biomedicine and traditional medicine. The latter has survived for
There are major limitations to traditional African medicine. centuries despite Western prejudices. If traditional healing meth-
There is a lack of standardized training and much variation in the ods were not effective they would not have endured for so long.
quality of services provided. Many traditional healers consider The schism that exists between biomedicine and indigenous heal-
their medical knowledge to be personal property so they act to ing practices disadvantages patients who could benefit from both
protect and keep it secret, which means that best practices approaches. It is clear that the arsenal of biomedicine cannot cope
cannot be diffused. Disagreements about which herb is effective with the many different health problems and that its medicines are
in treating a medical problem and/or what dosage is most effec- less available and/or unaffordable in African countries. A sound
tive have no way of being resolved or assessed, and the variances argument can be made for depending on local resources when-
may result in serious side effects and have life-or-death implica- ever possible rather than furthering the hegemony of external,
tions. Such lack of consensus makes it difficult for biomedical expensive medical expertise, infrastructure, and pharmaceuticals.
practitioners and traditional healers to cooperate and trust each Traditional healers are an available local resource that can fit
other. The accumulated traditional knowledge base is affected by within the reorientation back to primary health care systems.
limited resources to produce and distribute pharmacopoeia Moreover, modern urban lifestyles may require even greater at-
monographs (scientists who specialize in the toxicology of me- tention to the psychosocial aspects of healing, which fits within
dicinal plants and botanists could benefit and help in verification). the scope of traditional medicine.

CONCLUSIONS health challenge even more daunting than that of

There is obviously much more to Africa’s unfinished 19th-century Europe, and an African sanitary revolu-
public health agenda than the control of HIV/AIDS, tion has yet to be launched. Basic infrastructure is lack-
TB, and malaria. The continuing urban revolution is ing. WHO (2011a:399) estimates that 50% of Africans
bringing looming public health challenges. The double have access to a working toilet but that 68% of Africans
or quadruple disease burden makes the region’s public own a mobile phone.
 234 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES
OF CHANGE

A shift in focus from selective disease-specific in- Moreover, urban and regional governments must take
tervention to a more comprehensive health systems into account the diverse health needs of diverse commu-
approach is urgently required. This will necessitate a nities to deliver spatially targeted, multilevel, and multi-
seismic shift in policy, time horizon, and scale of in- sectoral health responses.
vestment. Much more global, national, urban, and Africa is accumulating a large “health debt,” much
rural funding is needed to mount a large-scale re- of which is urban-centered (Sclar, Garau, and Carolini
sponse. To convince donors that resources are going to 2005:903). This debt will be far more expensive to pay
be effectively used, African governments must develop off (if it even could be) three decades from now
a health care infrastructure with enhanced human ca- through conventional curative methods than it would
pacity as well as integrate and regulate traditional be to prevent the problem now by improving slums,
health care systems. Improved and new data (e.g., for water supplies, sanitation, and waste management and
better projecting trends in chronic disease and mental providing other public health interventions. Slums,
health challenges) and better recordkeeping are needed urban poverty, and poor health are all linked and
so that policy effectiveness can be assessed at all spatial should be addressed together.
scales. Africa’s current and future health challenge is Heaith issues are not accorded the attention they
immense: the region carries almost one quarter of the deserve in development policy and in rural and urban
global disease burden; diseases such as polio and chol- planning. So many measures that relate to health and
era are reappearing in certain places; the epidemiologi- well-being fall to organizations that are not health
cal transition is bringing new challenges; global agencies and that do not understand their roles. For
environmental changes are unfolding and expanding; example, slum upgrading is seen as a housing rather
and possibilities of new diseases remain a threat. than a health intervention. An integrated approach is
African governments need to live up to their Abuja needed in the post-MDG development agenda that en-
Declaration commitment to allocate 15% of their na- larges the scope of health to incorporate healthy life-
tional budgets to fortifying health care systems. They styles, better nutrition, NCDs, gender equality, and
need to augment national health care policies and de- mental health.
velop urban and rural health plans. Many scholars and
practitioners argue that urban and rural governments
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LAND AND FOOD

INTRODUCTION
scalability. Overall, African economies have experienced
Africa is a distinct agricultural and food region. The declines in agricultural productivity and food produc-
colonial legacy that enforced primary commodity and tion since the mid-1970s, which accentuated food
regional cash crop specializations left an indelible im- vulnerabilities. Paradoxically, Africa has become a net
print on the region’s agricultural and food geographies. importer of food and agricultural products since the
Colonial incorporation of African agriculture into the 1980s, despite its vast agricultural potential.
world economy emphasized export commodities such Agriculture development in Africa faces daunting
as bananas, coffee, cotton, cocoa, groundnuts, oil palm, challenges. Climate change and increasing climate
and tea. Cash crops were produced on both smallholder variability are acute. Projected rises in temperature of
plots and large-scale plantations to provide inexpensive 2 to 4 degrees Celsius will affect patterns of crop and
supplies for emerging food and manufacturing indus- livestock production and result in diminished agri-
tries in Europe. The colonial legacy and smallholder culture options in many subregions. Rapid popula-
traditional African agricultural systems have remained tion growth rates (Africa’s population is growing, on
embedded with the rural fabric. Despite the passage of average, at 2.4% per annum, nearly double the
time and various agricultural reform efforts, the region's world’s population growth rate) mean that the region
agriculture and food systems have, for the most part, will have to accelerate the amount of food produced
remained intact. The green revolution that catalyzed ag- within the region or increase food imports to satisfy
ricultural production in Asia and Latin America did not demand and gaps (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and Paschali
happen in Africa. 2012). Acute food gaps in areas where food produc-
Agriculture remains the mainstay of African econo- tion is low add another spatial dimension to this
mies, employing approximately 60-70% of the work- challenge. Macro trade policy environments in Africa
force and contributing 30% of gross domestic product are characterized by a growing liberalization of trade,
(GDP) on average (Thornton et al. 2011). The region whereby states have been dismantling food import
accounts for the highest proportion of agricultural land tariffs, and consumers, for better and (mostly) worse,
(44%) relative to all land (FAOSTAT 2011). Agricultural rely more on imported foods, which are highly sensi-
and development research has registered only modest tive to fluctuations in global commodity prices
successes in improving agricultural efficiency, yields, (Moseley, Carney, and Becker 2010). Most experts
and incomes, and even these successes are further con- forecast worsening food insecurity throughout Africa
strained by their geographical unevenness and limited in coming decades.

239
240 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

With the low food prices and global food stability South African farmers are also acquiring land outside
of the 20th century ending, food scarcity will likely of their home state (See Box 10.1 for a discussion of
become a 21st-century norm. The FAO Food Price South African farmers entry into the African farmland
Index in 2011 reached an all-time high, eclipsing the arena) African governments are opening up their agri-
2007-08 food price hikes that resulted in various cultural land to new investments as a vehicle to in-
urban protests in particular African countries (e.g., crease agriculture spending, spur investment, provide
Burkina Faso, Céte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, jobs, and enhance food security. Cotula (2013:35)
Mozambique, Senegal). Some of the worst rioting notes that “the worlds of high finance and big corpo-
took place in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2010: follow- rations might seem light years away from the everyday
ing demonstrations against government bread price life of villagers who grow crops and graze livestock in
increases in excess of 25%, a three-day riot left a dozen rural Africa,” but the two worlds are increasingly
people dead and more than 400 injured. Hunger pro- intersecting.
tests are becoming more frequent and widespread, There is much debate on how to enhance food se-
and food price hikes disproportionately affect the curity in Africa (Moseley, Carney, and Becker 2010).
poor. Food expenditures as a percentage of total ex- Going beyond “sufficient food,” FAO (2006) has out-
penditures for the poor are high, ranging from 28% lined a multidimensional definition of food security:
(e.g., Swaziland and Mauritius) to 73% (e.g., Tanzania (1) that food is available at all times; (2) that everyone
and Nigeria). By comparison, food accounts for ap- has a means of access to it; (3) that it is nutritionally
proximately 10% of total expenditures in the United adequate in terms of quantity, quality, and variety;
States (Rakotoarisoa, Jafrate, and Paschali 2012:24). and (4) that it is stable for the preceding three dimen-
Not surprisingly, governments consider maintaining sions over time, which acknowledges that weather
affordable and sufficient food supplies to be a na- conditions, political instability, and/or economic fac-
tional security imperative. Food policy is emerging as tors (e.g., unemployment, rising food prices) influ-
a critical issue in urban, national, and global policy ence food security. Major food security challenges
arenas, creating a new geopolitics of food, and con- confronting the region are chronic undernutrition and
temporary inflows of foreign development assistance famine. With one quarter of Africa’s population un-
are altering the control of, access to, and use of African dernourished (many of them children), Africa’s food
agricultural land. security challenge is urgent (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and
Global players have turned their attention to food Paschali 2012:8).
and farmland in Africa. National governments in the The food crisis has produced different responses.
Gulf states and South Korea, London and Wall Street One camp proposes boosting supplies by intensifying
institutional investors, agroindustrial corporations modern farming methods, crop research, and food pro-
(e.g., Lonrho), and private individuals from around cessing in African countries. For those in this group
the world are heavily targeting Africa agriculture. (food companies, crop breeders, and international

BOX 10.1 SOUTH AFRICANS’ NEXT bolstered by an alliance between South African agroindustrial
“GREAT TREK” INTO AFRICA and government complexes that desire a food-secure future (or
for different reasons), given climate change scenarios and their
AgriSA‘s participation in large land investments in the region is
anticipated negative effects that will constrain food production
an intriguing development. Settler land grabbing took place in
in the Southern Africa region. Some 1,000 farmers and agricul-
South Africa during the colonial and apartheid eras, and now
tural entrepreneurs now engage in agrobusiness beyond South
again white (African) investors are eyeing land across Africa. The
Africa's borders (Business Day 2011). South African farmers are
South African media refer to the current development as the
pushed by anticipated national land reform: one third of white-
“new Boer trek north” (Mail and Guardian 2011:1). This trend is
owned land is in the process of being transferred to black owners
 Land and Food 241

by 2014 (even though the record of transfers is slow and consid- other African countries, when coupled with land reform in their
erable inertia prevails). White farmers are propelled to seize op- home states, might result in more food insecurity in South Africa
portunities farther north because of South African changes in (as transpired in Zimbabwe, but under extreme political pres-
labor rights, increases in minimum farmworker wages, exten- sure) or whether South African transnational farmers could pro-
sions of tenure rights to farmworkers and their families, and un- duce for their home market.
resolved land claims by former black land occupiers (Chamberlain In tandem with South African farmer migration, a geographical
and Rogerson 2012). Buoyant at the prospect of reaping large expansion of South African agribusiness, especially the sugar
rewards from an untapped agricultural potential, these South multinational corporations (e.g., Illovo and Tongaat-Hulett), is oc-
African farmers are at the crest of the investment wave (Hall curring. The South African-based sugarcane industry is expand-
2011). Spearheaded by AgriSA, Pretoria provides support by en- ing production with ethanol and sugar-refining plant investments
gaging in bilateral investment talks with a number of govern- in Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, and Malawi.
ments in the region. South African investment has recently been controversial. For
South African expansion into other areas of Africa not only cen- example, Tanzania in the early 2000s received a surge of South
ters on farmland but also incorporates a tourism investment focus African capital flows and commodities following the lifting of the
(to develop gaming, hunting, and safari operations within enclo- apartheid ban. Stunned by the rapid influx of several thousand
sures). Many tourism initiatives center on coastal Mozambique South Africans and their buying power, Tanzanians either wel-
(Maputo to Beria, and Nacala and Quirimbas archipelagoes) as comed (officially) or rebuked (unofficially) the surge (Schroeder
well as on areas in Tanzania. This entire expansion is alluded to as 2008, 2013). South Africans were portrayed by some as “eco-
the “South Africanization of the region”: not in the sense of South nomic invaders,” exporting their expertise and flooding and
Africa becoming a colonizer of the region (but this is an element) dumping goods on Tanzania. Commentators attributed the
but more in the sense that the changes under way, such as control South African incursion as contributing to a rapid reconfiguration
over land, labor, and commodity chains, are altering agrarian of the Tanzanian national economy. South Africans’ economic
structures to that of a settler territory (i.e., South Africa), marking foothold raised fears that the influx would be accompanied by
a departure from historical colonial powers and arrangements the import of apartheid values (Schroeder 2013). Many observ-
(Hall 2011). This process may narrow the contrast that exists be- ers perceived that South Africans were taking over everything of
tween South Africa, Kenya, and other former settler colonies that value in Tanzania (mining, retail, finance, and tourism—especially
engage in agricultural food production for global markets and wildlife safaris), resulting in “the United States of South Africa”
former nonsettler African colonies—since the colonial period, the (Schroeder 2008). The heralded and visible presence of South
latter have been unable to participate in supplying the global African enclaves, with concentrations in particular residential
food market. neighborhoods, and the emergence of de facto all-white bars,
Prior to the current surge, only sporadic movements of South restaurants, rugby clubs, and nightclubs catering to South African
African farmers northward occurred (e.g., to Zambia, Mozambique, clientele led to a spike in race consciousness. For South Africans,
and Nigeria), and they mainly involved individual or small-group Tanzania offered a fresh start and an opportunity for social mobil-
relocation for individual reasons. Current migration is quantita- ity in another African country. However, it was not long before all
tively and qualitatively different: it is more centrally organized South Africans were stereotyped and shouldered with the bag-
and coordinated and larger in scale and scope (Hall 2011). gage of the former minority-ruling Pretoria government and
AgriSA, an association representing 70,000 South African farm- scapegoated for an underdelivering Tanzanian economy.
ers, is enabling large concessions for newly formed consortia of South African investment in Tanzania and the presence of
farmers and agribusinesses. South African investors are taking a South African enclaves were not interpreted so much as repre-
comprehensive agricultural investment perspective, viewing senting a regional power extending its economic muscle but
farmers and land as elements within an agroindustrial infrastruc- rather as a white invasion. This raises the intriguing question of
ture with construction, engineering, and financial services that what is means to be white but also African in the land invest-
can be developed to support investments. By 2010, AgriSA was ment landscape across the entire region, which is opening in one
engaged in discussions with 22 African countries about land ac- sense (by market reform) but closing in another (by the revival of
quisitions. South African farmers, through AgriSA, participate in economic nationalism). For good and bad, it still matters greatly
several of the largest land deals (e.g., 2.5 million acres [1 million where the investor is from, the purpose of the investment, how
hectares] in Mozambique and a Republic of the Congo deal that many good-paying jobs are created in the process, and who
could involve 20.5 million acres [10 million hectares] in south- loses out in the process. Ultimately, it matters a great deal which
west Congo, where in the initial phase 217 million acres [88,000 investor face represents the new South Africa: the black-majority
hectares] were transferred to 70 South African farmers. Major ANC political party or white corporate business. Lines of politi-
deals are also under negotiation for sugarcane production in cal solidarity, once very strong and clear, between Tanzanians
Mozambique and Sudan's Nile Delta (Hall 2011). It is a matter of and South Africans have become contested in the contemporary
conjecture whether the relocation of South African farmers to round of international land investment.
242 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

development agencies), the green revolution of the 1960s plays a major role in influencing what is grown and
was a stunning success and needs to be followed by where, how output enters the market, and the extent to
a 2lst-century African green revolution. International which and the types of foods that are exported and
donors such as AGRA view increased productivity by imported. International development agencies (e.g.,
farmers and the use of genetically modified organism World Bank and FAO) play steering roles in shaping
(GMO) technologies as key to enhancing food security. governments’ agricultural policies and practices.
The alternative view is skeptical of, or even hostile to, the A debate rages over whether Africa should con-
global agrofood industry. This group, influential among tinue to produce cash crops (which now also encom-
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and some con- pass biofuels—fuels produced from renewable
sumer associations, asserts that modern agriculture pro- resources, especially plant biomass, and vegetable
duces food that is tasteless, nutritionally inadequate, and oils), refocus on food crops, do both or move in a
environmentally disastrous; worst of all, modern agricul- fairtrade and/or sustainable trade pathway (See Box 10.2
ture locks Africa into dependent relations with global and 10.3 for an elaboration of fairtrade and sustain-
agribusinesses, creating multiple dependencies (eg., able trade). Many governments are attempting to
seeds, technology, and external expertise). Different solu- do both, swayed by the perspective that land is unde-
tions to increase food supplies are proposed: land rused in Africa and has a high potential for expan-
reform, enhancing land tenure security, and promoting sion. A criticism of the past was that agricultural and
traditional smallholder and urban agriculture. Propo- food production followed a one-size-fits-all approach,
nents of this policy contend that building local capacity which overlooked the diversity among countries, re-
to produce, distribute, and control local supplies is the gions, and places. Governments, international agencies,
only viable option to enhance food security. farmers, and entrepreneurs are assessing Africa’s land
Food is very connected to domestic agriculture and and foodscapes with fresh eyes. Rapid changes are afoot
land use. Food security depends on the availability of with increased foreign development investment in farm-
land, labor, favorable farming conditions (soil, water, land, an international humanitarian focus in improving
climate), and agricultural infrastructure (storage, mar- African food security, and a movement to kick-start the
kets, logistics). At the macro level, government policy African green revolution.

BOX 10.2 THE FAIR TRADE DEBATE so that they can become full-fledged fair trade members.
Bananas, cocoa, coffee, cotton,, sugar, and tea are the largest
Fair trade products can be traced back to 1988, when the first
product categories, and the fair trade product list is continually
fair trade coffee of Mexican origin was retailed in Dutch super-
expanded (e.g., wine and gold are recent additions). South
markets (FLO 2012). Once a small grassroots movement, fair
Africa and Kenya retail Africa-produced fair trade products, and
trade has become mainstream. Since 1997, Fairtrade Labelling
fair trade product launches are being planned for other African
Organizations (FLO), also known as Fairtrade International, has
countries.
set international fair trade standards and regulates the use of
Fair trade cocoa producers in Ghana, the Kuapa Kokoo farm-
the fair trade labels on products. The fair trade logo is currently
ers, have even been successful in launching a joint venture choc-
the most widely recognized ethical logo and is proudly dis- olate company (holding a 45% stake)—Divine Chocolate. In
played at Starbucks and numerous other retail establishments 2013, Divine captured 20% of chocolate sales in the United
(Fig. 10.1). Fair trade sales worldwide climbed to US$6.6 billion
Kingdom, and U.S. sales are increasing. Celebrities have ex-
(€5 billion euros) in 2011; the U.S. market accounts for 20% of
pressed their love for this product. Chris Martin, of Coldplay,
total sales (FLO 2012). African farmers’ revenue share was
claims, “Fair Trade chocolate tastes better. . . . But also it’s amaz-
US$175 million in 2011 (FLO 2012).
ing to go to a rich, green area like this and know that for every
Fair trade in Africa involves the participation of 378 certified
bar of Divine chocolate you're eating, you're helping out the
producer organizations from 29 countries (FLO 2012). FLO is
people who grew it for you more than if you eat Nestlé” (quoted
also working with additional African producers (e.g., in DRC and in Ryan 2011:98). However, the “Divine miracle” has an oc-
Zimbabwe) to help farmers’ output meet certification standards
cluded economic geography: Divine Chocolate is manufactured
 Land and Food 243

swallow a good portion of the price premium, reducing the

amount paid to farmers. For example, about 25% of expenditures
were allocated to producer support in the 2011 FLO operating
budget.
Critics on the left contend that fair trade has evolved along a
philanthropic rather than a rights-based path, a trajectory that
inadvertently obscures the power dynamics in the global trade
system. Moreover, the way fair trade is promoted has put the
responsibility for ensuring that farmers and workers are fairly
paid on the shoulders of moral shoppers. As such, it lets global
companies, importers, manufacturers, and retail chains “off the
hook” and free to make substantial profits (profit margins are
identical for fair trade and non-fair trade goods). Fair trade ini-
tiatives have not accomplished much in altering the general
conditions of unfairness of the North-South trade system: unfor-
tunately, contemporary reality is still in sync with unfairness. As a

FAIRTRADE
result, it is argued that fair trade operates more as an addendum
to market relations than as an alternative. Furthermore, it makes
the export orientation of African economies marginally fairer but
at the same time serves as a distraction from self-sufficiency and
sustainable development. Indeed, airfreighting African fruits
FIGURE 10.1 Fair Trade Logo. Source: Owned and
and vegetables to distant markets contributes to global carbon
licensed by Fairtrade International. emissions. Despite its visibility and consolidation of market
shares in many countries, fair trade volume is still miniscule, ac-
in Germany rather than in Ghana, maintaining the latter's
counting for less than 1% within product categories (Barratt
entrenched role as a raw material provider. Moreover, Kuapa
Brown 2007:273).
Kokoo’s large membership dilutes farmers’ individual returns. In
Fair trade is well entrenched in African agriculture, involving
2007, for example, the organization received a dividend check
700,000 producers from the region. Fair trade has made good
for UK£47,309, which resulted in a US$1.80 payment for each of
progress in improving the livelihoods of the poorest farmers by
the 40,000 farmers (Ryan 2011).
creating a more humane niche within the free market economy,
Fair trade strengthens the position of farmers in the value
but it needs to be scaled up. However, it is important not to
chain. Fair trade pricing incorporates buyers’ payment of a
airbrush the complex dynamics of the international political
“social premium” to the producer organization, a portion of
economy and the role that governments play in establishing
which (US$18 million in 2011) is earmarked for investment in
higher prices for commodities such as cocoa, elements affecting
community-based development projects, mainly schools. Con-
the livelihoods of farmers. In many ways, 25 years of fair trade is
sumers purchasing fair trade products of African origin are, in
not long given the history of agriculture and trade systems, and
turn, assured that they are contributing to improving the liveli-
it may be fairer to assess the project after a longer operating
hoods of African farmers and workers. African farmers are guar-
time. Nevertheless, fair trade is a useful movement for African
anteed stable prices even if world market prices fall, enhancing
producer organizations to ally with, to strengthen their collective
security. Most scholars agree that small-scale producers linked to
influence, and to be supported by Northern social justice activ-
fair trade are better off than producers without this connection.
ists and conscious consumers. Its functioning builds an unusual
Despite its huge achievements and growing popularity, the fair
alliance among small farmers, NGOs, Northern consumers, and
trade movement has many critics. Free market proponents con-
global business leaders who occupy different ideological space
tend the fair trade model is not a long-term strategy for develop-
but find common ground in fair trade campaigns. The concept
ment and reflects the demands of Northern consumers rather
of “fair” is quite esoteric and difficult to quantify (unlike price),
than the needs of African farmers. Paradoxically, a rise in con-
especially as the producers are faceless and far away; the basic
sumer consciousness may have paved the way for retailers with an
question of how much is “fair” to each part of the value chain is
eye on the bottom line to develop politically savvy marketing
never addressed. Overall, the fair trade movement has not yet
strategies (Freidberg 2003). The operational costs of the fair trade
made a significant contribution to international trade and devel-
system are high (inspection, certification, campaigns for prod-
opment policy.
ucts, new market development, organizational development) and
244 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 10.3 ETHICAL WILDFLOWER TRADE

AND SUSTAINABILITY: FLOWER VALLEY,
SOUTH AFRICA

Closely related to fair trade is the concept of ethical trade, which

gained currency from the mid-1990s onward. Ethical trade cam-
paigns focus on cleaning up international trade by ensuring that
agricultural practices conform to international standards in relation
to working conditions, child labor, wage levels, good agricultural
practices, resource conservation, and sustainable practices. Proj-
ects have recorded mixed successes. For example, ethical trade of
micro-vegetables from Zambia rose and then fell (Freidberg 2003),
but a South African niche wildflower trade is maintaining an
upward trajectory (Bek, Binns, and Nel 2010; McEwan, Hughes,
and Bek 2012).
A best-practices example is Flower Valley, a 1,433-acre (580
FIGURE 10.2 Flower Valley Farm, South Africa.
hectares) farm 137 miles (220 km) from Cape Town and situ- Photograph by Flower Valley Conservation Trust.
ated between Stanford and Gansbaai on the western coastal
edge of the Agulhas Plain. The area is characterized by consid- packaging enterprise, Fynsa, then located in the town of Stan-
erable spatial and social inequality. Land ownership is based on ford. Fynsa aimed to produce the first ethically branded fynbos
historical patterns of ownership: white farmers own most of the bouquet in South Africa, and this initiative took off after the
land, whereas the black population experiences high unem- Shell Foundation and UK retailer Marks & Spencer joined forces
ployment (exceeding 50%) and few decent job opportunities. in a small-scale supplier endeavor to develop the producer end
The area is very biologically diverse, located within the Cape of supply chains.
Floral Kingdom, the smallest and richest of the six floral kingdoms Flower Valley is registering successes and profits from domes-
of the world. Flower Valley epitomizes biological diversity and tic and international bouquet sales. For example, Marks & Spen-
is home to 2,000 native fynbos species (“fine-leaved bush”). cer’s UK bouquet sales climbed from 330,000 in 2006 to 470,000
Perhaps the best-known variety is the king protea flower, the in 2010 (Shell Foundation 2012). The sustainable harvesting
national flower of South Africa (Fig. 10.2). Cultivated and wild story was included on bouquet packaging. Fair trade was con-
fynbos are major components in flower farming in this region, sidered but rejected based on cost. Instead, FVCT decided to
although globally they are not well known (accounting for secure accreditation from the Wine and Agri-Industry Ethical
0.001% of the global flower market share), but the flowers are Trade Association, whose Ethical Trade Initiative provides a
popular because of their long vase life and various colors. guarantee of respect for workers’ housing and tenure rights,
Pristinely located, the farm came under threat due to unsus- freedom of association, prohibition of harsh and inhumane treat-
tainable harvesting, commercial viticulture, the development of ment, and prohibition of child labor (Bek, Binns, and Nel 2010).
a nearby nuclear plant, and the presence of alien species. Many FVCT is now-working to secure buy-ins from the Protea Produc-
of its neighboring farms practice intensive horticulture cultiva- ers of South Africa (the industry representative body), which in
tion, and adjacent lands have been converted to more lucrative turn works with large retailers (Walmart, Tesco, Marks & Spen-
viticulture as the boutique pinot noir growing extends further cer, and Pick n Pay), and the association is working on creating a
into the area. Flower Valley has resisted these lures and has single ethical label and base code for horticultural products.
evolved into a best-practices farm with sustainable local devel- Flower Valley provides employment for 13 full-time workers,
opment that brings wildflowers to consumers, incorporating sus- offering them a decent standard of living, in contrast to the local
tainable harvesting and cultivation practices. norm of part-time employment in the seasonal fynbos industry.
The Flower Valley Conservation Trust (FVCT) was established Farmworker compensation at Flower Valley also includes pro-
in 1999 to develop export markets for sustainably harvested vided on-farm housing and schooling for children. In addition,
wild fynbos. The practice of “wild harvesting” entails picking 75 more jobs directly related to sustainable fynbos harvesting
plant stems and flowers from plants occurring naturally in the have been created (Shell Foundation 2012). The farm has experi-
landscape (as opposed to using plantations for commercial hor- mented with various initiatives to provide additional income
ticulture). A core objective has been to establish flower-picking streams such as making handmade stationery that incorporated
schedules and rates that allow for natural rejuvenation within a dried wild fynbos, which proved essential after Flower Valley
plant productivity cycle. The project gained momentum in 2002 Farm was badly burned in 2006, but this effort was discontinued
when the trust received a Shell Foundation Legacy Project to concentrate on the core activities of sustainable harvesting
award. Funding allowed the farm to become linked to a local and opening the farm to visitors to learn about sustainability and
 Land and Food 245

the environment. To strengthen the educational mission of the project, but its accomplishments illustrate an alternative and
farm, links have been developed with a local horticultural col- sustainable land future.
lege (Green Futures), and internships and training on the farm There is still much work to be done in educating consumers,
began in 2013. Plans are under way to create a learning and who are price-conscious and demand flower colors in accor-
education hub on the farm that will bring hundreds of students dance with seasons (e.g., red, green, and silver bouquets for the
and eventually tourists to learn about sustainable horticulture December holiday season and red for Valentine’s Day) (personal
and the environment. Such nature-based educational tourism communication, Roger Bailey, Conservation Manager, Flower
effort is badly needed in an area not known for responsible tour- Valley, June 2012). Nature does not always produce flowers in
ism (e.g., a large flow of adventure tourists bypass the lowland accordance with the Hallmark calendar, and sameness rather
fynbos en route to shark-cage diving at Gansbaai). The planned than diversity punctuates mass consumer tastes. Nevertheless,
tourism enterprise is already offering hiking trails linking Flower Flower Valley demonstrates that local pro-activism can be used
Valley farm with neighboring farms to showcase the fynbos and to harness global resources, inform corporate players, and edu-
milkwood forest unique to the area, and its accommodations will cate global consumers about sustainable land and growing prac-
serve as a research station for students and researchers. Year- tices in distant places.
round employment has been created by training workers in alien This case shows that conservation can take place on private
species harvesting. Failure to clear alien species can result in land and does not have to be limited to state land, the norm in
losses of R1,000 per hectare and of many fynbos species, and Africa. It also illustrates that highly scalable global supply chains
Flower Valley’s workers are now in demand for invasive alien can be developed; that unconventional alliances among NGOs,
species clearing on neighboring farms. large corporations, foundations, farmworkers, and biodiverse
Flower Valley initiatives show that ethical trade and sustain- farms (the strangest of bedfellows) are possible; and that part-
able harvesting can be commercially viable. According to the nerships can be employed to provide opportunities to marginal-
United Nations Development Programme, “Flower Valley is a ized communities and to develop fair trade supply chains
world leader in understanding ecological sustainability of flower (Kilgallen 2008). The ultimate measure of its success, however,
harvesting and translating this into certification.”(cited by will be whether its core principles can be disseminated and suc-
Flower Valley Conservation Trust 2011:1) Flower Valley is a small cessfully adopted in other settings (Bek, Binns, and Nel 2010).

WHY HAS AFRICA BECOME

region (mainly from Europe and Asia). There has been
A NET FOOD-IMPORTING REGION? a failure to foster more intraregional food trade: only
Since 1980 agriculture imports have grown consistently 20% of African food trade is conducted within the
faster than agriculture exports, producing a deficit that region (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, and Paschali 2012:7).
climbed to US$22 billion in 2007 (Rakotoarisoa, Iafrate, Africa’s food imports dramatically increased after
and Paschali 2012:1). The composition of Africa’s agri- the 1980s. Increasing population created more
cultural exports has not changed much since the 1960s demand, and domestic production did not rise to
despite efforts to accelerate nontraditional exports (e.g., meet this demand. Some debate continues about
flowers, semiprocessed fruits and vegetables). Coffee, whether per capita food consumption increased due to
cocoa, tea, and spices are the major food exports, ac- changes in income, dietary patterns, and urbanization.
counting for 35% of agricultural exports. There are indi- At the national level, per capita consumption re-
vidual success stories in export diversification, such as mained fairly stable for staples, meats, and dairy. Roots
Kenya’s development of cut flowers, fruits, and vegetable (such as cassava and taro) produced and consumed
export niches, but most nontraditional export efforts within the region attenuated some food imports.
barely make a dent in altering the composition of agri- However, fundamental changes were recorded at the
cultural exports. urban and regional scales, where a dietary transforma-
Food import dependency is so high for some tion occurred.
countries (e.g., Burundi, Gambia, and Somalia) that Taste changes are evident. The proliferation of su-
total export revenues cannot cover the costs of food permarkets, fast-food outlets, and corporate marketing
imports. Food dependency is aggravated by the fact of processed foods (e.g., tomato paste, cheese, cured/
that 88% of Africa’s imports originate outside of the salted meat, margarine) encourages urban and rural
246 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

households to abandon locally produced foodstuffs. agricultural sector. This started in the colonial period
Growing tourism in many countries (Mauritius, Tanzania, when the colonial occupiers concentrated on minerals,
Ghana) also has an impact on food marketing and forests, and tropical stimulants such as tea and coffee,
product availability, and tourist consumption has dem- and saw food production as a local activity to feed co-
onstration effects. The increasing occurrence of non- lonial cities (Freidberg 2009, 2010). At that time, logis-
communicable diseases among Africans is evidence of tics and refrigeration systems were not sufficiently
poorer diets (higher in salt and oil), reflecting a switch developed to deliver fresh products from Africa to
from a plant-based diet to meat and processed food Europe. Freidberg (2010:277) states that “the fruits of
consumption. empire (like vegetables, meats and other fresh goods)
New consumer demand for imported food com- simply could not survive the long distances to metro-
modities has occurred in many places—for instance, politan markets.”
wheat in Nigeria. Although wheat is not part of the Efforts to diversity food production and to develop
traditional diet in most of Nigeria, by the 1980s bread new nontraditional food exports have been both costly
was among the most important food items consumed and risky. For example, in the 1990s, new green bean
by large swaths of the population, so much so that production zones were established in Burkina Faso to
Nigeria was snared into a “wheat trap” (Andrea and serve the French export market in the winter season,
Beckman 1985). High demand for bread is based on although the product had been introduced in colonial
convenience, low cost (compared to other staples), times (Freidberg 2004). The scheme brought early euphoria
compatibility with local diets, and consumer prefer- about an invigorated African effort to reap rewards from
ences. The Nigerian government allowed wheat im- serving European markets, and the possibilities for
ports to increase throughout the 1970s to ensure that African replication seemed boundless. However, this
poor urban populations had access to inexpensive new trade placed Burkinabé smallholders at the mercy
foods. Faced with financial troubles in the 1980s, the of strict international food safety and agricultural prac-
government moved to curb wheat imports and banned tice standards, fickle Western consumers (and French
its importation (1987-90), trying to unsettle the en- chefs), and delivery disruptions that could ruin the
trenched position of wheat products by encouraging product. Freidberg (2010:195) emphasizes, “if a truck
domestic consumption of indigenous alterative sta- breaks down or a plane arrives a few hours late, the
ples. It also introduced import-substitution policies to beans wither. At that point, they’re worth less than the
accelerate domestic wheat production, but returns cardboard cartons they travel in.” Typically, farmers
were disappointing and farmers found their land to be bore the brunt of these disruptions. In addition, African
poorly suited for wheat cultivation. When the wheat producers have to contend with price fluctuations,
ban was lifted in 1990, high levels of wheat imports changing international certification standards, European
resumed. In 2013, Nigeria imported 4 billion metric media food scares that cast aspersions on commodi-
tons of wheat, a staggering increase from the 385-million ties originating from Africa, and occasional food gluts;
metric tons imported in 1970. Nigeria's “wheat trap” the at-times-oversaturated Burkina marketplace meant
illustrates the entrenchment of the commodity into some product was left to rot (Freidberg 2004). To date,
the fabric of Nigerian culture, a new dependence on food production for export has not resulted in an equiv-
an imported foodstuff, and a cultural taste transfer. alent drive for developing domestic food production.
The government has since implemented a policy re- Contemporary African agriculture is beset by nu-
quirement that a certain percentage of cassava flour be merous other challenges: overreliance on primary ag-
incorporated into bread baking (10% in 2002 and in- riculture, low-fertility soils, minimal use of external
creasing to 40% in 2013) as.a novel attempt to find a inputs, environmental degradation, and minimal
substitute for wheat. value addition and product differentiation. Ninety-five
Much of the explanation of why the region became percent of the crops in Africa are rain-fed, so food pro-
a net food importer is due to the poorly developed duction is vulnerable to adverse weather conditions.
 Land and Food 247

Low yields and low productivity reduce the amount harvest years to ensure domestic production is con-
of food available and undermine domestic agricul- sumed first and also limit exports during periods of
tural competitiveness. Fertilizer use remains the low yields. Trade distortions hamper the development
lowest among world regions (10% of the world aver- of stable food markets and intra-African trade and
age). Some interpret low levels of fertilizer applica- push cross-border food trade into informal channels.
tion as a hindrance to preserving soil fertility and Furthermore, liberal market environments open econ-
controlling pests and diseases. Commitments to agri- omies for food imports from outside the region.
cultural R&D are exceptionally low by international African food policy needs revamping at all levels,
standards (except in Botswana and South Africa)— from implementation to point of sale. Typically, elites
on average less than 0.5% of agricultural budgets. within government ministries dictate food policy.
Agricultural infrastructure is lacking (e.g., irrigation There is always a willingness to accept food aid: on
dams, storage facilities, cold chains [transportation of humanitarian grounds this cannot be disputed, but
temperature-sensitive products in refrigerated packag- food aid causes market distortions. Alternative agricul-
ing through a supply chain], and modern slaughter- ture is poorly developed: most fair trade schemes and
houses), which means that the proportion of land certified organic production are geared toward export
under irrigation is low and farmers often struggle to tap markets. Traditional food markets, where most Africans
into available water. Moreover, poorly developed trans- obtain their food, are in an unhealthy state (over-
port networks make it difficult and costly to distribute crowded and lacking refrigeration, clean water, and
food beyond local markets. Road systems are so defi- sanitary facilities), and their deterioration is driving
cient that in some countries food production surpluses consumers into retail supermarket chains and fast-
can occur in one area while another area in the same food outlets and toward processed imported foods.
country suffers severe shortages. Compounding the Government investment and donor support is urgently
poor road situation, transport cartels operate through- needed to improve traditional markets and to bring
out the region, and their market dominance is a disin- them into the 21st century.
centive for other transport companies to invest in
modern trucks and logistics.
CONTEMPORARY AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA:
Astonishingly, 23% of African food production is
"THE GREAT AFRICAN LAND GRAB”?
wasted or lost (Lipinski et al. 2013:9). Food loss/waste
refers to the edible parts of plants and animal products Only a short time ago in Africa, agricultural land was
produced for human consumption that are prevented of little interest to outside investors, but times have
from entering the human food chain. Spills, spoils, changed. Many investors are now motivated by rising
bruising, and wilting cause product losses, and prod- returns in agricultural and land values. The food and
ucts are discarded routinely because they fail to meet financial crises have turned agricultural land into a
exporters’ size, length, and aesthetic criteria. For ex- strategic asset that is deemed a sound investment. By
ample, French beans that are too short or not straight many measures, agriculture is underinvested. For ex-
enough are discarded. Most product loss occurs at the ample, agricultural investment accounts for less than
site of production (e.g., crops damaged in harvesting/ 0.2% of equity market capitalization, and farming’s
picking, crops left behind in fields) and from poor and share of the global agricultural value chain is only 22%
improper handling or storage (food eaten by pests, de- (less than packing, distribution, and supplying)
graded by fungi and diseases, and damaged in storage (Deininger and Byerlee 2012:706). Abundant land (or
and transportation). even free land) is supposedly available in Africa based
National food and trade policies are outmoded. on calculations that only 20% of the region’s potential
Trade policy for food staples is ad hoc, discretionary, production is realized; for example, only 2% of land in
and unpredictable. Export/import bans are widely ap- the DRC is farmed (with basic tools), leaving 3 million
plied: for example, countries ban imports during good acres (10-12 million hectares) of potential farmland
248 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

underused (Deininger and Byerlee 2012:709). Private Africa is labeled “the new Middle East ofbiofuels,” and
equity firms market African farmland investment the Nile Valley is heralded as the world’s rice and wheat
funds to prospective investors by emphasizing that basket (Future Agricultures 2011:2).
land is “undervalued” and therefore an excellent in- Combinations of global processes, availability,
vestment opportunity. Notions such as “available,” and affordability of land drive Africa-based invest-
“idle,” or “empty” land, however, are heavily con- ments. Although average land prices conceal consider-
tested. Typically, such lands are owned collectively able within-country variation, foreign investors have
under systems of customary and traditional landhold- acquired farmland in Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia
ing arrangements, whereby communities make use of for between US$100 and US$800 per hectare (very in-
these lands for grazing, hunting, fishing, and forest expensive in international market price terms). Myriad
farming (Anseeuw, Cotula, and Taylor 2012). investors are hedging against the risks of global food
From the perspective of institutional investors, price increases and future food deficits and windfalls
most African smallholder agriculture achieves only a from biofuels. There are, however, some African inves-
fraction of its potential productivity. Countries such as tors who are propelled by a different thought process.
DRC, Mozambique, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, For example, AgriSA (the large South African agricul-
and Zambia offer high levels of available land and the tural trade association that represents agrobusiness
highest yield gaps. Such knowledge is herding investors and agroproducers), one the largest investors in Africa
toward African land, and international investors are land, is motivated primarily by its own domestic po-
partnering with a large array of local actors in securing litical context, where “white farmers” are coming
land investment deals. According to Chamberlain and under increasing political pressure and a major round
Rogerson (2012:6492), by mid-2011, nearly 9.6 million of land reform is on the horizon.
acres (39 million hectares) of African land was under The turn to Africa land investment has accelerated
negotiation or already managed by foreign investors. To since the mid-2000s, following earlier Latin American
put the scale of these land acquisitions in perspective, and Eastern European commercial successes with
the total African land under negotiation is greater than large-scale farming. Since then, large international and
the combined agricultural land of Belgium, Denmark, multiplayer land acquisition deals have gained traction
France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and show a recent acceleration, despite some well-
(Deininger and Byerlee 2012:705). publicized setbacks. Two examples of negative results
Labeled “land grabs” as well as the “foreignization are (1) Daewoo’s (South Korea) investment in Mada-
of African lands” by the media and NGOs, land invest- gascar engendered a public outcry that led to project
ments are controversial. Carmody (2012) argues that abandonment, and (2) Sun Biofuel (UK) shut down its
a “second scramble for Africa” is under way, with large project in Tanzania after four years of operation
resource-rich but land-poor countries competing to ap- due to changes in the global financial climate. (Watch a
propriate large areas of fertile land for production and video documentary from The Guardian 2011). Lease
financial return. Cotula (2013) emphasizes that these contracts typically last 30 to 99 years are heavily sought
agricultural investments will insert African production on higher-valued land (those with irrigation potential
into the global food system. Although it is difficult, if and/or proximity to markets). African land appears to
not impossible, to ascertain the full investment intent, be a lucrative investment when bundled with water
inconsistencies exist between what is specified in con- rights (projected to be the most important physical com-
tracts and what transpires and when. The majority of modity and asset in the near future, surpassing oil) and/
capital flows target land for food production, about or access tO. marine resources, wildlife, and forests. Ac- -
one third is geared for biofuel plantations, and the cording to Citigroup's chief economist, Willem Buiter,
remaining land is procured for gaming, marine fisher- “no surprise, then, that so many corporations are rushing
ies, and unspecified uses (Hall 2011:194). Regional to sign land deals that give them wide-ranging control
geographical concentrations are emerging: Southern over African water” (quoted in GRAIN 2012b:14).
 Land and Food 249

BENEFITS AND RISKS In contrast, contemporary land investment projects

OF LAND INVESTMENTS appear to be more sophisticated, aiming for horizon-
tal and vertical integration into global commodity
Land investment deals are announced as “win-win so-
chains, with projects spanning the entire continuum
lutions" for all parties involved (Deininger et al. 2010).
of financing, production, processing, and distribution.
Investors are viewed as the way to overcome the dearth
For example, Lonrho, one of the largest foreign agri-
of investment in rural economies since the 1970s.
business companies in Africa, focused traditionally on
Land investments are promoted to revitalize agricul-
processing and distribution but is expanding its opera-
tural economies, to enhance food security, and to de-
tions to engage in production in Angola, Mali, and
velop agricultural infrastructure. Land investment
Malawi (Cotula et al. 2011:s102).
stakes are high: they encompass various and complex
Information on the scale, location, players, and
processes of agrarian change and may affect the ability
project emphases is emerging via a burgeoning schol-
to feed Africa's growing populations as well as rural
arly literature on the initial effects on host communities
sustainability. Governments and other land authori-
(e.g., Allan et al. [2012] is a comprehensive handbook
ties are hoping that their “leasing” of natural resources
on land and water investments in Africa), but because
(land, soil, water) to foreign commercial interests can
of the newness of the phenomenon, researchers rely
spur national development.
heavily on NGO reporting. NGOs are at the forefront of
Land investments are running far ahead of our
compiling and producing land investment data and
knowledge on their impact (1) on local people's liveli-
providing timely on-the-ground assessments. However,
hoods and dispossession, (2) on the environment,
high levels of uncertainty surround the reported figures,
(3) on national sovereignty, and (4) on food and water
and some deals come to light only after local resistance
security (GRAIN 2012b). Tensions run highest when
and exposés. In many of the land acquisitions, details
domestic food production is converted to food and/or
pertaining to the identities of investors, terms, distribu-
biofuels for export (Hall 2011). Clearing forests for
tions of rents, and commitments made on behalf of na-
food production is less controversial as it is typically
tional and regional authorities are kept secret.
assumed that some of this food will end up in domes-
A leading reporting NGO is GRAIN, a Barcelona-
tic markets (Hall 2011).
based international nonprofit organization that works
Land grabbing, or “the farms race,” in Africa is de-
to support small farmers and social movements in
scribed as a neocolonial push by foreign investors and
their quest to secure community-controlled and biodi-
governments to annex key natural resources. Critics
verse food systems. It has compiled the most compre-
contend that rich countries are “buying poor coun-
hensive data on large acquisitions in Africa (e.g., on
tries’ soil fertility, water and sun to ship food and fuel
more than 400 land deals) (GRAIN 2012a). A second
back home, in a kind of neo-colonial dynamic” (Hall
leading nonprofit on land grab information is the
2011:194). The situation resembles settler colonialism
Oakland Institute, a California-based policy think
and anticolonial land struggles. This time around,
tank dedicated to advancing public participation in
however, new global drivers, refracted through the
and fair debate on critical social, economic, and envi-
contemporary configurations of land relations and po- ronmental issues. The Oakland Institute has complied
litical economies, are producing more geographically detailed reports on laid investment deals in the most
diverse patterns of involvement. The complexity of active investor African host states (e.g., Cameroon,
current deals and the wide array of international actors Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South
involved make the contemporary land investment sit- Sudan [e.g., Oakland Institute 2011], Tanzania, and
uation murkier and faster evolving than in preceding Zambia). A third useful source is the Land Matrix, led
periods. Colonialists appropriated considerably more by the International Land Coalition, an civil society
land, but it took time to move settlers, to establish organization headquartered in Italy with a regional
funding mechanisms, and to develop plantations that branch in Kigali (Rwanda), that seeks to monitor and
were horizontally articulated with the mother colony.
250 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

map land investments in real time online and to pro- Gulf states also participate at the vanguard. The media
vide data free to users (see Land Matrix 2013). have overly focused on the role of Chinese investors;
Figures on land deals, however, need to be treated they are significant but are not the largest player.
with caution: some deals are never recorded by invest- Claims are made (but not corroborated) that Beijing
ment agencies, others are rescinded, and the media brings all of its own inputs, including prison labor
focus their reporting on the total land associated with (Hall 2011), but these reports are misleading in terms
various deals rather than on what is currently used (e.g., of what is actually transpiring on the ground.
an investment deal may pertain to a large parcel of land, Gulf and BRIC states are motivated to acquire land
but only a small part of the parcel may be used in the to produce food beyond their borders to sustain their
early stages of production). For example, a land audit in growing populations: offshore farming is a way for
Mozambique found that one third of acquired land was countries that are highly dependent on imported food
unused, and 15% was used in ways that did not comply (e.g., India and the Gulf states) to increase their na-
with the agreed investment plans (Deininger and Byerlee tional resource base. Governments of food-insecure
2012:705). The largest land acquisitions in Africa (in countries are seeking to outsource domestic food pro-
terms of land size) are South African acquisitions in the duction by incorporating large foreign farms, thereby
Republic of Congo and Mozambique. AgriSA, for ex- extending their farming hinterlands and domestic
ample, has signed deals for 494,211 acres (200,000 hect- food supplies. For instance, the Qatari government has
ares) in the Republic of Congo with an option to expand gone as far as to establish, in 2008, an investment-
to 2.5 million acres [10 million hectares], so on-the- related company—Hassad Food—to bolster its national
ground research verification is vital to assess the status food security program.
of projects (Chamberlain and Rogerson 2012). One the Land investments in Africa reflect shifts in policy of
one hand, many of the specifics waver between agree- particular states and a new geopolitics of food. For ex-
ment and implementation: deals may be poorly con- ample, Saudi Arabia is phasing out wheat production by
ceived, without technical and financial rigor, and reality 2016, and the government has turned toward support-
always sets in during project implementation. On the ing agricultural investments (rice, wheat, sugar, animal
other hand, researchers (e.g., Carmody 2011; Cotula products, etc.) by Saudi companies in countries with a
et al. 2011) argue that the current data on allocations high agricultural potential to enhance national food
are conservative estimates and may be underestima- security. Throughout the Gulf region, cereal agriculture
tions: some land deals are concluded quickly, and is in an irreversible decline, and heavy dependence on
many are missing from data registers. food imports forced a strategic change in agricultural
policy. With a population predicted to double from
30 million in 2000 to almost 60 million by 2030, the
GEOGRAPHIES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Gulf states face a dire situation of food insecurity. Gov-
IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL LANDS
ernments are being proactive and establishing funds
There are many faces to the investor rush, but some that provide financial services and backing (subsidies,
entities prefer not to reveal themselves. The geography loan guarantees, insurance) to companies engaged in
of foreign investment in African agricultural lands is land-based international investments (e.g., the Abu
also diverse, illustrating the rise of regional powers, Dhabi Fund for Development and King Abdullah’s Ini-
private equity firms, and other joint-venture foreign tiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad). The
companies that complicates the old North-South dy- geographical proximity of Sudan and Ethiopia and the
namic and extend far beyond the periphery-metropole abundance. of affordable land have made these host
dynamic of the colonial era. There is a new South- countries attractive to Gulf investors (Cotula 2013).
South dynamic, with most of the BRIC countries Governments are taking direct roles in land acqui-
(Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, but not Russia) sitions, and government-to-government deals are evi-
prominently engaged; South Korea, Egypt, and the dent. The Khartoum government (Sudan) is signing
 Land and Food 251

land deals with other governments. Their willingness biofuel research and global powers’ establishment of
to engage with external governments has encouraged national/regional targets to increase the contribution
the Egyptian and South Korea national governments of biofuels in total energy consumption drive a biofuel
to become active players in acquiring land. For exam- tilt. For example, the European Union has established
ple, the government of Egypt fronted an acquisition of a 10% renewable energy target for 2020 and expects to
1.97 million acres (800,000 hectares) in Uganda in import 60% of its biofuels to meet that target. The
2008 and then allocated the land among seven Egyp- United States has established annual biofuel targets
tian companies with experience in cereal production. that will rise to 36 billion gallons in 2022. Southern
Some land investments combine players from dif- African countries have most embraced the biofuel
ferent countries; for example, AgriSol’s Tanzanian land trend in energy self-sufficiency drives.
acquisition is via a joint venture between Pharos Fi- Besides the growing world demand for palm oil, pro-
nancial (Qatar) and Summit Group (United States). jected future opportunities in carbon credits encourage
Often land deals are concluded via intricate arrange- oil palm plantations. In the burgeoning carbon trade
ments whereby a new subsidiary company represents market, oil palm is eligible for carbon credits related to
powerful local interests as well as international back- reforestation. It is native to West Africa, and smallholders
ers. Powerful local interests may be invited to join the dominated its production until new seed varieties and
advisory board of international management compa- investment in large-scale plantations began to transform
nies, and international companies often take a control- production in the region. West Africa has reemerged as a
ling stake in a local company that, in turn, becomes the new frontier for foreign investment in oil palm, and
local driver in land deals. For example, Gabriel Paulino mega-acquisitions by Singaporean, Malaysian, and
Matip is a major player in the South Sudan land scene Indian interests have taken place in Cameroon, Gabon,
and a member of the advisory board of Jarch Manage- and Liberia (Table 10.1). Significant investment is also
ment (US). He comes from a well-connected military occurring in an axis from Gambia to Angola and in
family and is the surviving eldest son of Paulino Matip Tanzania, Burundi, and Madagascar.
Nhial, former deputy commander in chief of the Sudan The land rush also involves domestic players (local
People’s Liberation Army, widely regarded as a found- and national elites and dynamic farmers), who have
ing father of South Sudan. This management company been acquiring areas close to urban centers as well as
is one of the largest land investors in South Sudan and other fertile areas (Cotula 2013). Africa’s growing
has acquired 988,422 acres (400,000 hectares) for middle class in sprawling cities is expanding its food re-
cereal, flower, fruit, and vegetable production. Another quirements; serving its demands is another driver of
widespread practice is for leases acquired by domestic land commercialization. Local players have been acquir-
investors to be sold to foreign, highly speculative inter- ing land to store value, run new agricultural ventures,
ests, obscuring domestic and international bases of in- and position themselves as intermediaries with interna-
vestment. As such, the eventual lessees may not be the tional players and/or as attractive ventures for external
original investor but rather other parties. Indeed, some buyouts. As such, the land rush intermingles diverse
international firms purposely operate from tax havens players in different arenas in local-global processes.
in the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Mauritius (for Ethiopia, Mozambique, Madagascar, the Republic
tax and reputation reasons), concealing their identities. of the Congo, Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, and Tan-
Overall, an occluded geography of who owns what and zania attract most investor interest (Table 10.2). Some
of who controls the land results. countries (e.g., Namibia) have not attracted foreign
Renewable fuel targets set outside of Africa are land investors. The percentage of agricultural land ear-
drivers of acquisitions of large plantations. Biofuels marked for investors can be very high. For example,
contribute 4% of total energy used worldwide in 2011 95.1% of land in the Republic of the Congo is pre-
(Cleveland and Morris 2013:401), but their share is sented to foreign investors. This implies that land cur-
expected to increase. Significant research funding for rently being used for permanent grazing (mostly
252 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

TABLE 10.1 TWENTY LARGEST LAND GRABS IN AFRICA (BY AREA)

Host Land Grabber/Base Size (hectares) Production

Benin Con Waves (Italy) 250,000 sunflowers

Cameroon posal Energy (India) 200,000 oil palm/energy

Rep. Congo Atama Plantation (Malaysia) 470,000 oil palm

Gambia Karuturi (India) 311,000 maize, oil palm, rice, sugar

Gabon Olam International (Singapore) 300,000 oil palm

Liberia Sime Darby (Malaysia) 220,000 oil palm

Golden Agri-Resources (Singapore) 220,000 oil palm

Equatorial Palm Oil (UK) 169,000 oil palm

Madagascar Madabeff (UK) 200,000 beef

Mozambique AgriSA (South Africa) 1,000,000 unspecified

Nigeria T4M (UK/Vietnam) 300,000 rice

Sierra Leone Long Vab 28 Company (Vietnam) 200,000 rice

South Sudan Jarch Management (US) 400,000 cereals, flowers, fruit/veg., oil seeds

Nile Trading (USA) 600,000 unspecified

Sudan Government of Egypt 400,000 maize, sugar, wheat

Government of South Korea 690,000 wheat

Sudan Sayegh Group (UAE) 1,500,000 unspecified

Tanzania Karuturi (India) 311,700 wheat, rice, palm, oil, sugar

AgriSol (US/UAE) 325,000 beef, biofuels, poultry

Uganda Government of Egypt 800,000 maize, wheat

-_ ll Cee ———— eee

Source: GRAIN (2012a).

communal grazing grounds) and possibly forests will increase agricultural productivity to feed growing
need to be converted into cropland (Chamberlain and urban populations. Investors compensate those relin-
Rogerson 2012). Most hosts have participation from a quishing their rights to occupy or use land during the
range of foreign investors (e.g., there are 28 different lease period via various mechanisms. Where land is
projects in Ethiopia and Madagascar), but in some owned by the state (most typical, as states acquire land
host countries, such as the Republic of Congo and prior to advertising the properties), formal lease pay-
Uganda, only a few investors dominate the scene. ments and royalties are captured by the state, but these
African states are motivated to seize investment Op- payments for the most part tend to be low, based on
portunities. Development aid deficits are driving coun- the government's anticipation that major benefits will
tries to make large tracts of land available for foreign accrue from employment generation and infrastructure
investment. Development aid for the agricultural development (e.g., irrigation systems), capital, technol-
sector has been in decline (falling from 18% of total ogy, know-how, and market access. Heavy investment,
development spending in 1979 to 4.6% by 2007), and the promise of new infrastructure (production, pro-
governments are acutely aware that they need to cessing, and transport facilities such as roads and
 Land and Food 253

TABLE 10.2 MAIN AFRICAN HOST COUNTRIES OF LARGE-SCALE FOREIGN

LAND INVESTMENT

Host jap he Area (1,000 hectares) Number of Projects Land Agriculture (%)

Mozambique “11,086 i 22 " 22.4

Republic of Canoe. 10,040 3 95.1

Madagascar : 3,719 28 8.3

DR Congo 3,048 3 13.6

Zambia : 2,677 9 tiles)

Sudan 2S 12 1c6

Ethiopia 1,456 28 4.2

Uganda 1,024 4 He

Source: Chamberlain and Rogerson (2012:6492).

ports), and social infrastructure (e.g., schools and clin- agricultural has concentrated on traditional export
ics) are most desired by host governments. As such, crops (cotton, cocoa, tea, and coffee) and has largely
land investments are meant to catalyze economic de- been based on smallholder production integrated into
velopment and alleviate the prevailing agricultural in- global commodity circuits. For the most part, attempts
vestment gap. Higher farm productivity is expected to at large-scale farming (even with subsidized credit,
improve national food security for hosts. A few African machinery, and inexpensive land) have been a failure
countries have provisions for land rental fees to be in the postcolonial era. Attempts in the 1970s and
shared at the local level. These can involve fees payable 1980s involved large investments into developing
at the local level (e.g., Madagascar) or rent-sharing large-scale farming by mechanization and extensive ir-
agreements with traditional land custodians (chiefs rigation (e.g., sorghum and sesame [Sudan] and wheat
and family heads) (e.g., Ghana). More frequently, local [Tanzania and Nigeria]), but the projects were unprofit-
direct payments at the community level are limited to able and subsequently abandoned. Encroachment on
recompense for loss of harvests; loss of access to land/ traditional users of land engendered tension and con-
water is not considered in compensation (Cotula et al. flict in Sudan, and large-scale farming did not appear to
2011). In the Office du Niger area of Mali, compensa- be more successful than the smallholders it replaced.
tion is paid in kind in the form of irrigated land (five For a considerable time, the perspective held sway
hectares per household) (Cotula et al. 2011). Impor- that smallholder farm productivity was the centerpiece
tantly, most deals involve leasing or other concessions in rural African development. Growth in smallholder ag-
rather than sale. riculture was shown to have a disproportionately higher
Foreign investors are pampered because foreign impact on poverty reduction than growth in other sec-
capital is a necessary condition for economic growth. tors. However, disillusionment with smallholder-based
Besides tax concessions, the repatriation of capital is efforts to improve productivity in Africa has set in. The
guaranteed, and very attractive compensation is offered apparent success of Brazil in establishing a vibrant
in the event of expropriation (Zoomers 2010:433). Em- large-scale mechanized farming system caught the
bassies play a key role in the support of investors: they attention of institutional investors and led some coun-
welcome potential investors and also provide a sound- tries to view this development as a faster path to mod-
ing board about risks and pitfalls. ernizing agriculture and increasing productivity. The
Large farms in Africa have a checkered past. Plan- tilt was further reinforced by the apparent export com-
tation crops such as sugarcane in Southern Africa and petitiveness of large farms in Latin America and East-
oil palm registered some successes, but commercial ern Europe.
 254 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Importantly, the World Bank appears to have re- displacements have occurred. It is wrong that Africa,
versed its long-held position that favored small the world’s hungriest region, cannot feed its own pop-
farms, expressed in an “inverse size-productivity rela- ulation but is an emerging food supplier to foreign
tionship.” At present, the World Bank contends that markets. As McMichael (2009:288) puts it, “this new
African land is underused, with low productivity international division of labor constitutes an asym-
rates, and requires intensification (World Bank 2010). metrical form of corporate ‘food security, based on a
It also maintains that land deals, if properly regulated, dialectic of Northern ‘overconsumption’ and Southern
could facilitate the transfer of land rights from less to ‘underconsumption, as the South exports high-value
more efficient producers. Agricultural intensification is goods at the expense of its own food supplies, in turn
further advocated on the basis of Africa’s low rural addressed through the imports of cheap staple food,
population density and low mobility. While not com- which destabilizes local food producers of the South.”
pletely abandoning small farms, the World Bank is Carmody (2012) claims the commodification of African
skeptical that small farm growth is the fastest path lands and their incorporation into global agroinvest-
toward poverty reduction. ment portfolios are ways for the global agroindustry to
tighten its control on the food chain from the place of
production to the place of consumption.
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
In cases where biofuel crops are planted, there is
LARGE-SCALE FOREIGN INVESTMENT
direct competition with resources for food crops
IN AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL LAND
(Chamberlain and Rogerson 2012). Biofuel plantations
Investors focus on the higher-value land with greater have introduced new crops into the region; for exam-
rainfall or irrigation potential, better soil, and access to ple, Jatropha curas (oil extracted from the seeds of this
infrastructure and markets: they are drawn to the most Latin American shrub is refined to produce biodiesel) is
fertile land. Removing the best land from local pro- being widely planted. The uptake of jatropha and sug-
duction can have disproportionate (negative) impacts arcane (for ethanol) occurs throughout the region (e.g.,
on access to resources, on food and water security, and, Angola, Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, South
in particular, on livelihood options for women. Inad- Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia). There are wor-
equate attention has been given to likely scenarios ties that large-scale biofuel monocropping will have
where entrepreneurial and skilled local people will harmful (and unknown) environmental effects.
benefit from job creation from land investment while Rather than improving the food security of the
vulnerable groups like women lose access to their host country, land deals may actually be hurting it
means of livelihood without adequate compensation. (Chamberlain and Rogerson 2012). Deals made are
Local people suffer asset losses but seldom receive ad- not only about land and agricultural potential; they
equate or even the promised compensation. Positive also incorporate water and mineral concessions and
effects might materialize at some time in the distant even extend to labor. Governments seem reluctant
future, but poor locals may end up subsidizing rich to come to grips with investors’ plans that are incon-
local and international investors: in effect, govern- sistent with local visions and national plans for
ments are trading away local livelihoods too readily development. They have no way of enforcing vague
and too cheaply. Hall (2011:205-206) argues that land commitments from investors pertaining to job cre-
is priced too low “because the property rights of those ation and infrastructure spending. Large land invest-
with uses and claims on the land are not recognized ments appear to operate according to different logic
either in law or in practice.” (compared to other foreign investment) in that a
Land grabbing forces local communities to endure country’s probability of being targeted is associated
enclosure and often triggers their relocation to more with weak governance and a disregard for the rights of
marginal areas (Zoomers 2010). Experience suggests the majority of citizens.
that if land investments fail to materialize, land trans- Land investments entail risks, and returns on in-
fers are difficult, if not impossible, to reverse after vestments are not guaranteed. Commercial risks are
 Land and Food 255

significant: operating a large plantation business in who are negotiating international land deals. This is
Africa is challenging even for a major agrocorporation not entirely surprising, as government land authorities
with extensive African experience, never mind a new- charged with promoting foreign investment in agricul-
comer with little or no regional experience. Investors tural land have incentive to conclude land deals, and
can become hostage to the host state. Politics can play they compete with other areas to attract funds. There is
a factor and land investments can be exploited by op- even evidence of land deals being made for refugee
position parties in electoral campaigns. The Daewoo settlement areas and national parks. For example, Agri-
deal in Madagascar illustrates how public opposition Sol’s land acquisitions in Tanzania involve land par-
to a deal contributed to riots that culminated in a cels in Katumba and Mishamo, areas occupied by
change of government. Extensive media coverage of Burundian refugees in the aftermath of the 1972 war
the 3.2-million-acre (1.3 million hectares) deal be- (GRAIN 2012b).
tween Daewoo Logistics (South Korea) and the gov- Africa land investment winners and losers are evi-
ernment of Madagascar to grow maize and palm for dent. Winners include complex constellations of inter-
oil, mainly for the Korean export market, came to a national financial capitalists, agrocorporations,
head. According to the plans, the land would have been national and local politicians (who benefit from op-
prepared by laborers from South Africa. The arrange- portunities in rent-seeking, patronage, etc.), rural and
ment became politically charged, and a new govern- urban elites partaking in land investments, and indi-
ment put an end to the deal. viduals and groups playing intermediary roles and
Another potential risk exists if host governments possibly consuming the fruits/products of the land,
decide to impose export restrictions to protect local particularly if the deals result in less expensive fuel and
food security and political stability in times of food food—from motorists in the United States to pension-
crises. Foreign investors usually secure commitments holders whose retirement portfolios include invest-
from host states not to impose such restrictions, but ments in African land, to the growing population of
agreements may be disregarded under intense domes- Africa’s sprawling cities and other cities around the
tic pressure. The various 2008 food protests showed world (Cotula 2013).
that governments cannot afford to ignore citizens’ de- The losers, on the other hand, are rural Africans
mands for access to food, especially when it is being whose land and livelihoods have been turned upside
produced domestically. Moreover, investors cannot down by various land investment arrangements
underestimate the international-level risks to their without having much say in the process (Cotula
reputations for being tied to corrupt political regimes 2013). Twenty-five of the deals in Africa resulted in
and for poor business practices and initiatives that dispossession of more than 25,000 people (Cotula
drive farmers off the land and into desperation. 2013:128). Most experts believe that the publicly
A growing number of investment deals collapse or available information on dispossession underesti-
never become fully operational. These failures have in- mates the aggregate impact. Adverse effects extend to
flicted considerable hurt, leaving behind a trail of groups within any given project's vicinity, for exam-
broken promises and devastated livelihoods. ple herders, fishermen, traditional healers, wood and
The Ethiopian registry of lands available for inter- water fetchers, and farmers affected by enclosures.
national investors classifies them as “wastelands” The building of support infrastructure such as dams
(Future Agricultures 2011). However, evidence indi- and irrigation canals also affects agriculture down-
cates that a good portion of the land allocated to inves- stream. Small-scale producers risk being marginal-
tors in long-term leases is not “wasteland.” Many ized by the transition to large-scale agriculture,
national land classifications are open to question, and unable to compete with large farmers and/or corpora-
land registration systems are incomplete in most of tions who are in control of the land and labor and
Africa. Moreover, shifting cultivation and dry-season who have government support (Cotula 2013). The
grazing practiced by pastoralists in some areas is not livelihoods and culture of millions of Africans are at
fully acknowledged by the government authorities risk (Cotula 2013).
256 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

URBAN AGRICULTURE over long distances are making urban agriculture very
relevant in the 21st century.
Traditionally, agriculture has been seen and assessed as
Mougeot (2005) estimates that urban agriculture
a rural activity. This perspective is so entrenched that
contributes 15% of all food consumed in African cities.
food security policies focus on rural areas, with a
Approximately 30% to 40% of households participate in
strong bias toward production-based solutions. By
urban agriculture and related sectors (Arku et al. 2012;
contrast, urban agriculture and urban food insecurity
FAO 2010). In cities such as Libreville (Gabon), Kumasi
are neglected topics.
(Ghana), and Lusaka (Zambia) more than half of urban
Urban agriculture refers to crops (grains, vegetables,
dwellers engage in agriculture, and after petty trade,
and fruit), herbs, and livestock production within the
urban agriculture is the next largest informal employ-
built-up areas of cities, towns, and peri-urban areas
ment activity, even though much is done on a part-time
(Thornton 2008). Encompassing a range of activities,
basis (Arku et al. 2012:9). The real value, however, may
from small vegetable backyard gardens on family plots
be not in monetary rewards but rather in building social
in compounds to farming activities on community lands
cohesion and community social capital, especially
by associations or neighborhood groups, they vary in
among the poorest households, which are the most
size, intensity, and contribution across social and spatial
active participants. Where women dominate in urban
contexts. Most commonly practiced on vacant plots,
agriculture (e.g., South Africa and in peri-urban environ-
urban agriculture can be found on fallow public spaces
ments), their work outside the home is critical to build-
and to a lesser extent private spaces, wetlands, and un-
ing women’s social networks (Shackleton, Pasquini, and
derdeveloped areas. Urban agriculture rarely takes place
Drescher 2009).
on lands specifically designated for agriculture.
Urban farmers produce a wide variety of staples
Given foreign investment in land and the accom-
(e.g., maize, cassava, potato, plantains, and sorghum)
panying transformation of rural lands, urban agricul-
as well as other vegetables and fruits. Urban agricul-
ture is becoming more important. If properly promoted
ture is geared mostly toward consumption within the
and supported, urban agriculture can play a critical
household, but feeding needy neighbors and selling
role in Africa’s quest for food security (Table 10.3).
“over the fence” are regular occurrences. For most
Concerns about climate change and calls to reduce
farmers, urban agriculture contributes extra income
the carbon footprint associated with transporting food
but is not the primary income source. In regions where
urban agriculture is well developed (e.g., West and East
Africa), it accounts for 20% to 50% of the urban poor’s
TABLE 10.3 THE BENEFITS OF URBAN
AGRICULTURE FOR FOOD SECURITY
household income and savings (FAO 2010). The more
sophisticated growers sell produce to informal traders
e Reduces urban food deficits in the face of Africa’s rapid
and contribute to the livelihoods of market sellers.
population growth and changing consumption patterns
e Provides household food security for those unable to-realize
Urban agriculture also benefits auxiliary businesses
food security under prevailing market conditions such as fencing, composting, transporting, processing
e Enables nutritional diversification through crop diversity (milling, packing), and storage.
e Provides nutritional security for HIV/AIDS-affected families, Urban agriculture is being reconsidered after the
thereby augmenting antiretroviral therapies
sharp increases in food prices and the global economic
e Eases the reliance on food imports and long-distance
transport of food from rural areas downturn that exacerbated unemployment. Despite
¢ Contributes to employment and household finances policy elevation in the last decade and a half, urban
e Allows for the emergence of niche markets (African agriculture is only weakly incorporated into municipal
indigenous vegetables/ wild foods) urban plans. It.suffered from various negative histori-
e Helps stabilize food market prices
cal antecedents. Colonial cities banned agriculture
¢ Plays a role in linking poor and more affluent households in
food provisioning within city limits and promoted peri-urban agriculture
as a spatial planning strategy to create a buffer separat-
Source: Arku et al. (2012:10). ing elite residential housing areas from traditional
 Land and Food 257

villages. Moreover, urban developers and industrialists There are various efforts under way to increase
with considerable political clout and economic muscle urban farming efficiency and to better integrate the ac-
shaped urban policy arenas and were successful in tivity into urban economies. A self-help group in Kibera
pressuring for the conversion of untidy, vacant, and (Nairobi) (consisting of 1,000 urban farm women) has
green spaces as well as wild lands into nonagricultural developed a “vertical garden” system (with assistance
uses. Only in more recent times is urban agriculture and training from the French NGO Solidarités Interna-
being pro-actively incorporated in urban planning: tional) for producing wild spinach and other indige-
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), Bulawayo (Zimbabwe), Cape nous vegetables. Vertical gardening involves growing
Town (South Africa), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), crops on the vertical surfaces of structures that are either
Durban (South Africa), Kampala (Uganda), and freestanding or part of a building. This method allows
Kumasi (Ghana) represent the urban agricultural more crops to be grown on the same area. Their vertical
policy and planning vanguard. However, despite its farming effort uses recycled sacks or biodegradable
potential, urban planning regulations constrain the cement bags filled with soil and punctured with holes
contribution that urban agriculture could make to the for growing seedlings. More organized community
food supply and food security in the region. A neglect groups are engaging in commercial production, selling
of the potential of urban agriculture to feed the poor to informal markets and selling weekly or biweekly or-
means that food insecurity can loom large even in ganic produce to subscriber clients. Generally referred
cities (e.g., Cape Town) that are proximate to vibrant to as community-supported agriculture initiatives,
agricultural areas where food is produced for wealthy “fresh organic produce boxes,” as they are colloquially
domestic and international consumers (See Box 10.4 known, are being sold to affluent, environmentally con-
for a discussion of the paradox of food insecurity in scious urban consumers. Profits are invested back into
the Cape Town). projects, and in the process, important bonds are

BOX 10.4 CAPE TOWN: THE PARADOX access to food is a constitutional right. Cape Town's burgeoning
OF URBAN FOOD INSECURITY IN A food-insecurity problem remained largely invisible to policymak-
FOOD-SECURE COUNTRY ers until recently (Crush and Frayne 201 1a). Evidence from Cape
Town and other African cities overturns the view that food inse-
Cape Town is one of wealthiest cities in Africa as well as one of curity is largely a rural phenomenon.
the most unequal (McDonald 2007). Inequality is expressed in Many Capetonians experience recurring shortages of food.
food consumption patterns and access to food. The city boasts Not everyone is food insecure every day; the majority of resi-
a vibrant food scene with trendy restaurants, well-stocked su- dents experience food insecurity once a week or once a month.
permarkets, and diverse specialty “foodie” establishments. In Cape Town, 11% of the population experience food shortages
There is an array of food markets, from gourmet markets to every day, 35% more than once a week, and 35% once a month
community fruit and vegetable markets to informal food mar- (Battersby 2011b:20). Hunger forces people to beg in the streets,
kets. The city is also home to several major horticultural areas. a common scene in the Cape Town central business district and
The largest and best known is the Philippi horticulture area, more affluent suburbs. Food insecurity is concentrated in town-
which contributes half of the city’s soft vegetables (Battersby ships and informal settlements. For example, 89% of Khayelit-
2011b). Moreover, the city is close to an agriculture and viticul- sha’s residents lack secure food supplies (Battersby 2011b); by
ture heartland that produces for domestic and, especially, inter- contrast, food security is concentrated in “white” suburbs.
national markets. Grapes, pears, apples, olives, and, of course, Food is the largest single expense for many urban residents,
wine are produced for wealthy consumers. accounting for 39% of monthly expenses. Though food may be
Paradoxically, poor Capetonians experience food insecurity widely available, access is a critical issue, and constrained access
despite their proximity to an agricultural area that produces 21% affects the composition of diets. Half of the population rarely or
of the national agricultural output (Battersby 201 1a). Almost half never consumes eggs or meat, 47% of diets do not contain fresh
of Capetonians have insecure food supplies, and their diets are fruit (even though fruit is grown throughout the region), and
deficient in nutrients. It is a surprise to many that urban food in- 34% of the population rarely consumes vegetables (Crush and
security is so evident in South Africa, which is considered to have Frayne 2011a:535). The diet of those in poverty shows move-
a secure food supply: it is the richest country in Africa, and ment away from traditional high-protein sources, such as samp
(Continued)
 258 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 10.4 (Continued)

(cornmeal) and beans, and toward nonnutritive food groups such to raise the importance of urban farming and to improve the
as fats, sugar/honey, and coffee/tea, with a reliance on maize meal health of poor urban residents.
products (e.g., sorghum porridge and white bread) (Battersby The “supermarket revolution” is a countertrend, transforming
2011b). Only small amounts of protein food are consumed (e.g., the foodscape dramatically (Crush and Frayne 2011b; Weather-
chicken, meat stews, and soybeans) and fresh fish is not con- spoon and Reardon 2003). Supermarkets are at the end of a
sumed despite proximity to the sea (Battersby 201 1b). Poverty is large-scale agroindustrial complex that has taken over food pro-
manifested in skipping meals, limiting portion sizes, borrowing duction, processing, marketing, and retailing. The leading play-
food, purchasing food on credit, consuming less expensive and ers (e.g., Pick n Pay, Shoprite, Woolworths, and Spar) have
less nutritious meals, and peddling assets to pay for food. aggressively targeted all consumers, including the poor, and this
NGOs, faith-based organizations, and schools are stepping in effort has been accompanied by a drive to locate outlets in town-
alleviate some of the food deficits. Indeed, rural networks par- ship shopping centers, often near highways and away from pop-
ticipate in transferring food to migrant family members in Cape ulation concentrations. Physical access is difficult, and the cost of
Town (Frayne 2007). Cape Town's escalation of food insecurity food and transportation to the store is likely prohibitive for poor
challenges the myth that people in urban areas are healthier and Capetonians. Trade liberalization allows supermarkets to pack
wealthier and fare better than people in rural South Africa. their shelves with products, where the originating area is occluded,
Rapid urbanization and suburban sprawl in Cape Town are en- excluding local smallholder production. This has ramifications
gulfing agricultural land, and the land with the highest agricul- because supermarket shopping is becoming more common in
tural potential is disappearing more quickly than the land with the everyday lives of the urban poor, peaking at payday and de-
medium or lower potential (Geyer et al. 2011). For example, clining thereafter. Supermarkets are encroaching on the market
Somerset West, a suburban development, now threatens Philippi share of informal retailers, street traders, and small local produc-
and other urban agricultural areas. Urban agricultural land use ers. Supermarkets and fast-food outlets are gaining market share
cannot compete with the more lucrative land use of residential and having a major impact on the nutrition of the poor.
development. Cape Town may be the African city furthest along the super-
A large disconnect exists between the local urban food econ- market food source path. Consumption patterns of food among
omy, in which fresh fruits and vegetables go directly to consum- the poor are drifting toward poorer-quality and energy-dense
ers, and the modern, integrated, large-scale farm/food economy, foods. Supermarket penetration is still in the early stages in most
which centers on supermarket chains. Despite the newly recog- African countries, but some are hurrying along this path. Shop-
nized importance of sustaining urban agriculture, the activity is rite, for example, is active across the southern African region
undermined by various negative perceptions, and smallholder and is making inroads in West Africa (Ghana and Nigeria), and
production is not integrated into agroindustrial commodity Massmart (the African affiliate of Walmart) had established op-
chains. Cape Town initiated an Urban Agriculture Policy in 2007 erations in 12 African countries by 2013.

cemented between informal urban farmers and well-off farming activities consume greater quantities of food
households within a sustainable urban agriculture (up to 30% more), meaning greater dietary diversity
system—an important urban agriculture coalition in (FAO 2010). Consumption of greater quantities of veg-
the making. For example, Harvest of Hope, a nonprofit etables, fruits, and meats translates into higher energy/
community organization of informal organic producers caloric intake and better diet composition. Local urban
based largely in the Cape Flats (Cape Town), organizes agricultural production for local markets helps reduce
urban farmers (mostly women in small groups of three the transport costs involved in shipping goods over
to eight producers) to grow vegetables for their own long distances to markets. Local. production also
households, township schools, and community sub- hedges against supply disruptions due to market fail-
scriber projects. ures and bottlenecks. Urban farming can preserve local
There are several benefits of urban agriculture. It biodiversity, especially wild crops and seedlings that
makes significant contributions toward ensuring food are at risk of extinction due to uncontrolled urban ex-
security and providing employment opportunities for pansion and by the introduction of alien species into
the urban poor. It allows access to additional and agricultural production. Indigenous wild crops (eg.,
more nutritious food. Urban households engaging in sweet potatoes [Central Africa], yams, pumpkin, and
 Land and Food 259

wild spinach [Southern and Eastern Africa]) could be When cholera outbreaks have occurred (e.g., Dar es
preserved through sustainable wild urban farming Salaam in 2007), urban farming has been banned tem-
(Shackleton, Pasquini, and Drescher 2009). Indige- porarily, even though a direct connection between
nous varietals often contain higher levels of nutrients standing water/wastewater and this disease was never
and minerals and require less water and fertilizer substantiated.
(Shackleton, Pasquini and Drescher 2009). Institutional intransigence needs to be overcome
There are some negative aspects to urban agricul- before urban agriculture can be elevated within policy
ture, however. Health and environmental issues pre- arenas. Officials need to rethink urban planning
dominate (exposure to diseases and pesticides and policy, provide stewardship informed by science and
increases in mosquitoes, flies, pests, and odors from social science, and coordinate multiple levels of re-
cattle rearing), there are administrative concerns (non- sponsibility (i.e., health, agriculture, water, environ-
compliance with zoning and city ordinances), and ment). Integration of urban agriculture into African
perceived social concerns surface from time to time city planning needs to be accompanied by further de-
(criminals using the cultivation areas as well as squat- velopment of water supply infrastructure. Also, inclu-
ters being drawn to the area) (Arku et al. 2012). Many sive zoning codes are needed so that urban agriculture
urbanites perceive urban cultivation and urban live- can be incorporated into land-use plans. Current inse-
stock husbandry as holdovers of rural habits rather cure tenure and eviction fears undermine the entire
than as 21st-century activities. Other skeptics maintain activity. Clearly, urban agriculture can reduce vulnera-
that urban agriculture is an unproductive use of land bility to food price hikes, contribute to local food
(compared to high-rent uses) and makes only a movements, and provide a more sustainable use of the
modest contribution to the city’s financial base. natural resource base that also assists in “greening” the
The overall negative health-related effects of urban city. It is high time for African urban planners to deal
agricultural practices are inconclusive, but there have with the food and land-use realities of cities and to
been food scares and anxieties. Crops can be potential move away from ideas inherited from colonial sys-
pathways for biological and chemical contaminants. tems. However, the soil and water used in urban agri-
The use of chemicals by urban farmers can be danger- culture are often contaminated, and urbanites know it.
ous. Pathogens have been found on vegetables irti- Therefore, the entire urban agriculture infrastructure
gated by wastewater, but typically levels are below needs attention if local food is to be a trusted alterna-
those posing a threat to human health (Shackleton, tive and a critical component of food security.
Pasquini, and Drescher 2009). Some urban farmers
have skin problems associated with handling wastewa-
CONCLUSIONS
ter (Shackleton, Pasquini, and Drescher 2009:23).
There is no way to assess the chemical residue on food Population growth, urbanization pressures, and in-
grown and distributed in informal economic circuits, creases in meat and dairy consumption are making
where there is no monitoring for pesticides and food food a critical global issue. Power shifts and the larger
and hygiene regulations are lax. roles of China, India, and the Gulf states in Africa
Of critical importance is the availability of reliable are adding more pressures on the region’s land and
and clean water for urban farming. Unfortunately, food systems. Middle Eastern and Asian entities are
urban agriculture operates within environments where engaging in offshore production, and South African
other industries (formal and informal) have been farmers are commencing onshore farming beyond
known to discharge pollutants and contaminate local their home state. Foreign investors and their African
water supplies. For example, e-waste dumping and business partners are acquiring potentially high-
burning contaminates the Korle Lagoon, where cattle producing food lands and removing some from the
drink in the city of Accra (Ghana). It is well docu- food economy by using them for biofuel and oil palm
mented that desperate and hungry people grow vegeta- plantations. The consequences of contemporary de-
bles near sewers and that there is no oversight in place. velopments are far-reaching: plantation agriculture
 260 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

is squeezing local landholders, and once land is In the second half of the 20th century, a consensus
under foreign control it may be very difficult and was built around promoting small-scale African agri-
even catastrophic to reverse the process by canceling culture because of higher productivity rates and an as-
international agreements. sumption that small-scale farming was the best way to
It appears that most new food and biofuel produc- alleviate rural poverty and to provide local food. This
tion is being geared for export markets, and new pro- consensus has broken down: there are still efforts to
duction systems lack local integration (e.g., machinery promote small-scale agriculture, but the tilt toward
and seeds are imported). Until recently, the majority large farms is gaining ground. If all of the land deals
of Africans had been heavily reliant on agriculture for under negotiation come into full operation, large
their livelihood, but if the contemporary land invest- farms will dominate the African agricultural landscape.
ment trend continues, the poorest members of agrar- This trend in Africa’s agricultural and food systems will
ian societies risk losing their major assets: land, water, lead to a different (and perhaps a global) norm.
and homes. Clearly, this is the time for critical reflection. A more
These developments are all part of the global finan- sensible approach is to acknowledge and plan for a va-
cial shakeup that has resulted in a shift in focus toward riety of diversified agricultural systems and to recog-
land and food: Africa is targeted heavily as an underin- nize that each plays a unique role. Agriculture does not
vested agricultural region. Consequently, fresh food from have to be viewed as involving only large modernized
Africa will be added to the list of crops controlled by farms that are part of global commodity chains.
agroindustrial complexes, and Africa-produced food will The land investment story currently unfolding re-
travel outside the region. The conversion of large parcels flects deep global economic and social transforma-
of land to biofuel development (particularly jatropha) is tions and will have profound repercussions for the
another significant development. Many of the biofuel region. African agriculture is moving toward more
projects are controlled by British, Italian, and Chinese capital-intensive, mechanized, and labor-saving pro-
entities. That so much land is being offered to foreign duction systems and away from smallholder labor-
investors or sovereign wealth funds is evidence that intensive production. Decisions and agreements being
many African governments do not have a clear land and/ put in place will have major impacts on many people’s
or food policy in place (Chamberlain and Rogerson livelihoods and food and water security; both rural and
2012). They appear to be gambling on foreign investors urban societies will be affected. The processes under way
to provide the infrastructure to catalyze rural develop- may well develop into the corporatization of African
ment. Furthermore, it appears that governments believe agriculture, and negotiated deals may turn out to be
that other sectors can provide the growth, employment, irreversible (even at times of local food and water
and incomes that will enable food security that is not shortages).
contingent only on what is produced locally. This raises Food and land are multidimensional arenas that
the critical question: where will Africa’s food come from, affect other policy domains such as health, economy,
and at what costs? and development. Clearly, a future challenge for Africa’s
In addition, governments of investor counties have land and food systems lies in greater transparency as
an ethical obligation to consider the effects of policies well as greater coordination of local, national, and in-
that directly or indirectly increase pressures on land in ternational interventions and of the various stakehold-
Africa (Cotula 2013). They have a responsibility to ers, including small farmers, communities, governments,
regulate and consider the African operations of their and NGOs. Alternative agricultural visions and sustain-
home-based companies on the basis of long-term sus- able models need to be promoted. In particular, urban
tainability. Developing a more balanced international agriculture should receive more attention in policy
investment legal framework would greatly facilitate arenas so that the practice is better incorporated into
the process, but public opinion can put more pressure urban planning and food and health policies. To date,
on governments to persuade their companies to act governments have been reluctant to consider land
more responsibly. reform to bolster food security, so land reform and
 Land and Food 261

food security remain poorly integrated (Kepe and Carmody, P. 2012. “A Global Enclosure. The Geo-Logics
Tessaro 2012). Investing in farmers rather than farm- of Indian Agro-Investment in Africa.” In Handbook
land seems a better and safer route to provide long- of Land and Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct In-
term food security. It is time for rural and urban vestment and Food and Water Security, eds. T. Allan,
Africans to become central to the decision-making M. Keulertz, S. Sojamo, and J. Warner, pp. 120-132.
processes shaping the future of African agricultural New York: Routledge.
and food systems (Cotula 2013). Chamberlain, W., and C. Rogerson. 2012. “Agricul-
tural Land Grabs in Africa: Scope, Patterns and In-
vestors.” African Journal of Agricultural Research
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CLIMATE CHANGE

INTRODUCTION
cope with these changes (Boko et al. 2007; Parnell and
Climate has always been featured prominently in Walawege 2011). The region’s vulnerability is partly
African development research (Toulmin 2009). The driven by geography but also by its low adaptive capac-
region’s population has lived and adapted to a high ity resulting from dysfunctions in national economies
degree of climate variability and its associated risks, and health, education, infrastructure, and governance
moving in time and space from hunter-gatherers to systems. There is also mounting evidence that African
pastoralists to more modern agricultural and urban environments are changing in profound ways—and
livelihood systems (Yanda and Mubaya 2011). As in not just in climate terms: environmental health is
other world regions, the ever-changing climate has deteriorating in both urban and rural contexts.
dramatically altered Africa’s environments. For exam- The scientific basis of global climate change and its
ple, several thousand years ago, a much moister Sahara African impacts has gathered momentum in recent
contained lakes and forests (Toulmin 2009). However, decades. Almost 100 years ago, Swedish scientists cal-
changes in the Earth’s atmosphere are occurring at an culated that human activities could warm the earth by
historically unprecedented speed and scale. Acceler- adding more carbon dioxide. A warming trend was
ated changes in climate over the past century have led mentioned at the first United Nations (UN) Confer-
to a new consensus on the rate of climate change in ence on the Human Environment in 1972 in Stock-
the current global warming trend. holm, but environmental experts were more
Two processes drive climate change in Africa preoccupied with other natural resource issues
(Parnell and Walawege 2011). First are slow-onset (e.g., oil and pollution). In the 1980s, policymakers
changes, such as increasing atmospheric temperature viewed an emerging global warming challenge (if they
and humidity levels, changing precipitation patterns, did not ignore it altogether) as an environmental issue
sea-level rise, and desertification. These changes occur of peripheral concern that could be handled by envi-
over several decades, and the environmental impacts ronmental ministries. It was not until 1988 that the
are regarded as semi-permanent. Second, there is an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
increasing frequency and severity of extreme events was established to assess and synthesize the latest
like droughts and floods that amplify the effects of the scientific, technical, and social sciences literature on
first set of changes and extend their cumulative effect. global warming. By the 1990s, climate modeling had
It is now widely acknowledged that Africa is the most become more sophisticated, actual patterns of change
vulnerable world region and the least equipped to in regional climates were being observed, and a

265
266 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

consensus developed around reducing greenhouse gas on quantitative data analysis and computer modeling.
(GHG) emissions. By the early years of the 21st cen- The diversity of data required and the need for consis-
tury, the climate change conundrum was seen not only tency among different scenarios pose substantial chal-
as an emerging threat to international security and lenges for climate researchers. This is especially the
peace but also as a grave threat to humanity. case in African contexts, where limited data from the
The IPCC is the most influential and authoritative past and present are available.
agency on climate change science. In 2007, the panel The climate change debate is very complex, and
and former U.S. Vice President Al Gore were jointly many expert knowledge communities promote differ-
awarded the Nobel Prize for their efforts to integrate ent agendas. Climate change is an international
and disseminate greater knowledge about anthropo- research priority area, a hot topic in publishing, and a
genic (human-induced) climate change, and for laying subject that receives increasing media coverage in
the foundations for the development of measures to Africa and elsewhere. The range of climate perspectives
counteract these changes. Thousands of the world’s is expanding all the time (Table 11.1).
leading scientists and experts have worked under the The Carbon Map is an excellent primer for visualiz-
auspices of the IPCC to produce major updated assess- ing and making sense of climate change responsibility
ments in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, and 2014. IPCC and vulnerabilities (KILN 2013). Climate change has a
reviews and assessments are based on the most recent large following on social media, and trends are always
scientific, technical, and socioeconomic information changing. The Guardian (2011) newspaper, which rep-
produced worldwide for comprehending climate resents a vanguard of climate change coverage, has
change. Importantly, the IPCC publishes syntheses of developed a list of the top 50 climate Twitter accounts
the most recent accumulated knowledge, but it does to follow.
not conduct research or monitor climate data itself. Nevertheless, climate skeptics and deniers abound
IPCC reports are based on published materials, two to (see climate skeptic website). Skeptics are generally
three years old, and some worry that climate change is distrustful of global climatic modeling and reason that
occurring faster than the scientists are able to study, the weather cannot be predicted five days in advance,
record, and publish the changes. never mind 50 years or more into the future. Indeed,
Governments have tended to regard the IPCC as climate modeling does involve huge data gaps. For
the authoritative source of information and analysis example, the surface temperature record is woefully
on climate change. IPCC assessments of climate inadequate: climate models are based on a surface
change, for the most part, are based on the runs of temperature database that covers only 40% of the
models as well as a range of data and scenarios. Not landmasses and misses huge swathes of the world’s
surprisingly, IPCC reports and protocols are criticized oceans. Skeptics attack the climate change consensus
heavily for privileging an understanding of climate on different fronts: some argue that global warming is
change at the global scale produced by Western scien- caused by physical rather than human-induced
tists and elite institutions, and for most heavily relying changes; some remain unconvinced that we have

TABLE 11.1 COMMUNITIES IN THE DEBATE ON CLIMATE CHANGE

¢ The conspiracy community

¢ The denial community
e The catastrophe community
¢ The funding community (we're interested but we need to steer climate research according to our mandates)
¢ The scientific community (use my data but | am not self-aware)
¢ The social science community (we understand people but which model should we use?)
¢ The African government community (wait to see what global experts tell us)
¢ Adaptation community (make adjustments and hope for the best)
¢ Mitigation community (try to steer it according to climate modeling scenarios)
eee
 Climate Change 267

identified the causes of warming global temperatures; 8,494 square miles [22,000 km?] to a meager
and others see it as part of a conspiracy theory perpetu- 115 square miles [300 km/?]), affecting fisheries, farm-
ated by opportunists (seeking political, financial, ideo- ing, freshwater supplies, and the livelihoods of
logical, or institutional gain). A leading mainstream 20 million people in the basin. Less potable water
climate skeptic, Richard Lindzen, Professor of Atmo- from the lake is resulting in an increasing number of
spheric Sciences at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- cases of diarrhea, cholera, and typhoid fever through-
nology (MIT), argues that the atmospheric system is out the basin. The rate of decline of snow on Mount
more robust than given credit insofar as the system has Kilimanjaro is so high that local inhabitants could be
fluctuated considerably throughout human history. deprived oftheir main supply of freshwater within two
Lindzen and other skeptics also believe that carbon decades (see next section).
dioxide is overemphasized as a climate engine in Some campaigners and members of the media
global warming science. Meanwhile, proponents of contend that climate change is an intractable force, a
conspiracy allegations refer to scientific consensus as a “fifth horseman of the apocalypse” that could lead to
“global warming hoax” or “global warming fraud” an age of ruin. Climate change has also attracted major
(Solomon 2008; Spenser 2010). interest and leadership from civic organizations. One
The climate change debate reached a fever pitch in such prominent civil society organization (affiliated
2009 when the climate research unit at Britain’s Uni- with 300 nonprofit organizations that span the globe)
versity of East Anglia had its emails hacked, and claims is Tck Tck Tck. It has orchestrated very successful media
were made, but never substantiated, that climate campaigns to raise awareness of global climate change.
researchers manipulated and concealed data (suppos- Ahead of the UN’s Copenhagen climate talks (COP15)
edly of a global cooling trend) and suppressed critics in 2010, they organized a petition of 17 million signa-
by failing to publish their claims in scientific journals. tures in a worldwide call to action. Preceding the
The controversy blew over, but “Climategate” (as it Durban COP17 talks, they organized a convoy from
became known) had the effect of tarnishing climate Dar es Salam (Tanzania) to Durban (South Africa)
research yet did not disprove the central climate (a 4,350-mile [7,000 km] trek across 10 countries) and
change argument. Certain supporters of the so-called carried 229 African farmers, pastoralists, and members
mainstream consensus responded, alleging that some of women’s and youth groups to raise awareness of
conspiracy proponents were part of a well-funded mis- global warming in Africa.
information campaign aimed at stirring up contro- It is not easy for the general public to come to grips
versy, undercutting scientific consensus, and with climate change. First, global environment change
downplaying global warming’s projected effects. is extremely complex, involving interactions between
Greenpeace, for instance, initiated the Exxon Secrets two profoundly different worlds: science and human
Project to show that the energy industry explicitly affairs. Second, the politics of climate change makes it
funds climate change denial. difficult to forge connections between different politi-
Authoritative IPCC reports contain numerous dire cal arenas: multilateral-civil society, national-local,
predictions about the impact of climate change on and so forth. Third, there is concern that climate
Africa. IPCC (2007) warns about heavier precipitation, change is becoming a Global North-driven agenda and
storms, and droughts that could wipe billions off yet another vehicle for external interference with
economies and destroy lives. Some of the most impor- Africa. Fourth, there is a possibility (expressed in the
tant predictions advise that global warming could United Kingdom’s 2006 Stern Report) that climate
reduce crop yields in some African countries by half by change might be happening faster than thought and
2020; water stresses will be aggravated; the spread of that climate-induced damages in Africa may be under-
diseases will increase due to more heavy precipitation estimated. Fifth, there is a real danger that the general
events in areas with poor water supplies and overtaxed public will become “climate fatigued” in the long pro-
sanitation infrastructure; and water volume is decreas- cess of discovery (as data collection is improved and
ing dramatically in Lake Chad (shrinking from expanded and scenarios are refined, and as the best
268 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

mirids in physical science, social sciences, government, important source of water for local agriculture as well
and civil society come to grips with climate change). as a magnet for tourists (the mountain is a major for-
eign currency earner, attracting about 20,000 tourists
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES [and their money] annually). Gore claimed that Kili-
ON MOUNT KILIMANJARO
manjaro’s glacier would be gone “in a decade,” and
global experts emphasized that if current climatic con-
Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania’s iconic volcanic moun-
ditions persist the remaining ice field would likely
tain, carries an 11,700-year-old glacier even though the
disappear sometime between 2015 and 2020 (IPCC
mountain is situated near the Equator. Kibo summit,
2007:440). The shrinking snows were shown widely to
soaring almost four miles into the sky, is the highest
warn humankind about impending rapid environ-
point on the African continent and often referred to as
mental changes. However, this icon of global warming
“the roof of Africa.” Hemingway famously wrote about
became embroiled in a heated scientific controversy
the mountain in 1934 in his novel The Snows of
that attracted global attention and illustrates the com-
Kilimanjaro (later turned into a film), capturing the
plexities in understanding the science of environmen-
world’s imagination (Fig. 11.1). The mountain took
tal change. Despite their dire predictions, the glacier is
center stage in 2006 as a riveting example of how the
still very much in evidence atop Kilimanjaro today.
natural environment was being altered in compressed
Scientists with more extensive Kilimanjaro glacier
time. Al Gore’s movie, An Inconvenient Truth, detailed
expertise than IPCC specialists are uneasy about the
an impressive series of then-and-now images that doc-
volcano’s poster-child status. They concur that global
umented the widespread retreat of many glaciers over
warming is indeed responsible for nearly every other
the past century, most dramatically illustrating that
glacier around the globe melting away; however, Kili-
Mount Kilimanjaro icecaps had almost disappeared
manjaro just happens to be the exception. Glacier-
(the icecap was once 164 feet [50 m] deep). Kiliman-
climate interactions in the tropics exhibit very differ-
jaro became a poster child for demonstrating climate
ent patterns and peculiar characteristics compared
change on the African continent.
with mid- and high-latitude glaciers. Indeed, there are
Scientists confirmed that during the 20th century
many competing ideas about why Kilimanjaro’s snow
the extent of Kilimanjaro’s ice fields decreased by 80%
is melting so rapidly. Some posit that declining snow
(NASA imagery confirmed a 26% contraction between
there is more a result of declining moisture since the
2000 and 2007 alone). This physical transformation
1880s than increasing temperature (Kaser et al. 2004).
also has human consequences: the glacier is an
Scientists note that temperatures on Kilimanjaro’s
summit are always below freezing, so a singular warm-
ing explanation of glacier loss seems unlikely. Instead,
it is argued that a combination of factors, including
changes in weather elements (humidity, temperatures,
and precipitation), fewer clouds, and more sunlight
hours, creates a layer of warmer air at the glacier’s sur-
face, which is considered to govern the fluctuations of
tropical glaciers. Scientists emphasize ice loss is attrib-
uted to sublimation (ice turning directly into water
vapor at below-freezing temperatures without pro-
ceeding through the liquid-water stage), which occurs
when temperatures are cold and the air is extremely
dry, as is the case at the top of Kilimanjaro (where the
FIGURE 11.1 Snow-capped Kilimanjaro. Source: © Charles glacier is subjected to a moisture-sapping “freezer
Bowman/Robert Harding World Imagery/Corbis. Corbis burn”). This process is constant, but when there is less
42-30873449. precipitation to rebuild the glaciers, the result is a net
 Climate Change 269

loss of ice. This diverging scientific opinion hypothe- forecasts. According to leading economists, climate
sizes that glacial retreat on Kilimanjaro may well be a change will have a unique and catastrophic impact on
response to the drying of the atmosphere and lack of Africa (Collier, Conway, and Venables 2008).
precipitation, as part of a natural process of alternating To begin with, Africa is warming faster than the
wet and dry periods, rather than a consequence of global average (in all seasons), with drier subtropical
global warming per se (Verschuren et al. 2009). regions warming more than moister tropics, a trend
Many questions about Kilimanjaro remain. Glacial likely to continue. Median temperatures will have
melting occurred in previous centuries, so it is hard to risen between 3 and 4 degrees Celsius from 1900 to
pinpoint what triggered the present ablation. Local- 2100, roughly 1.5 times the global mean (Christensen
ized processes may be linked to temperature variations et al. 2007:867). Second, Africa is an enormous land-
in other world regions (e.g., the Indian Ocean, where a mass that lies squarely astride the Equator, stretching
large-scale connection between sea-surface tempera- from 35N to 35S. These climatic effects are heteroge-
tures and East African rainfall has been observed [Kaser neous and vary by region; there is no single Africa-
et al. 2004]). Recent field research has shown that Kili- wide climate effect. Two thirds of Africa’s land surface
manjaro’s glacial contraction is not accelerating; abso- is classified as arid or semiarid, and the region is home
lute loss has decreased more in the past few years. to myriad fragile land and coastal ecosystems. Moving
Climate scientists have long maintained—and empiri- south or north from the Equator, there is a sharp
cal evidence confirms—that warming does not result decline in average annual rainfall, accompanied by an
only in higher temperatures: it leads to changes in increase in variability. Africa is subdivided into numer-
weather patterns, including more precipitation in ous climatic regions, producing a geographical mosaic
some areas and more droughts in others, and this is of climate change that is highly complicated, both
what may be occurring on Kilimanjaro. Additional within subregions and even within large countries.
drivers of change on the mountain include fire, land- Third, agriculture accounts for the dominant share of
cover transformation, and human modification. For economic activity in Africa (approximately 60%-70%
example, deforestation on its slopes sucks moisture of employment and up to 50% of gross domestic prod-
out of the upslope winds and helps dry out the snow. uct [GDP] in some countries), making the region’s
The Kilimanjaro debate is far from resolved and economy particularly sensitive to climate. Further-
may become even more complicated on the basis on more, current African agriculture activity may be near-
future climatic models that predict global warming ing the limits of plant tolerance, and further change
and increasing rainfall in eastern Africa, which could could push farmers to the brink. Fourth, Africa’s econ-
paradoxically be what saves Kilimanjaro’s snowy omies are unequipped to adapt to climate change.
crown. In the meantime, farmers near Kilimanjaro Technical progress has been slower than in other world
slopes have found water bountiful and have begun regions, and most national economies concentrate on
to produce water-hungry crops (e.g., tulips) for export a narrow range of export commodities. Households
to Europe. However, this horticulture concentration have coped with temporary shocks, but current liveli-
cannot be sustained if the glacier/groundwater waters hood strategies are not readily able to adapt to new
dry up or if climate change brings significant increases circumstances that require adoption of new technolo-
in precipitation in the region. gies (mobile phones are an exception).
Large parts of Africa have always been exposed to a
high degree of climate variability on an annual or
CLIMATE IMPACTS ON AFRICA inter-annual basis, and further climate change is pro-
Climate modeling suggests that no major area of Africa jected to accentuate variability, resulting in greater
will be a winner as the natural environment changes. In climatic extremes. Annual precipitation variability can
contrast, other regions of the world—for example, parts be 40% in the Sahel and almost 25% in most parts of
of Russia and China—will experience more favorable Africa (Fig. 11.2). In the 20th century, African tempera-
farming conditions based on 20- to 30-year climatic tures as a whole warmed by approximately 0.7 degrees
270 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

gees
ICTIC CIRCLES

TROPIC OF CANCER
20° % 20°
PACIFIC
PACIFIC
OCEAN
OCEAN
INDIAN EQUATOR
PERCENTAGE PRECIPITATION SOUTH
OCEAN wh
>
VARIABILITY
f
ATLANTIC.
OCEAN
20°
TROPIC OF CAPRI

40°
SOUTHERN OCEAN SOUTHERN OCEAN *
o° 20 40 60 100° 120° 140° 160°
60° 60° 605

<=
Fez Under 10 ANTARCTIC CIRCLE

(ee No data

FIGURE 11.2 Annual Precipitation Variability in Africa. Source: Map 1 from De Blij et al., 2013:190.

Celsius, but climate change is far from uniform. For severely criticized because of the absence of peer-
instance, in South Africa and Ethiopia, minimum tem- reviewed sources, relying too heavily on “gray” materials
peratures increased slightly faster than maximum or (e.g., reports from government agencies or scientific
mean temperatures, and the number of warm spells in research groups, working papers from research groups
Southern and Western Africa has increased while the or committees, white papers). The highly respected In-
number of extremely cold days has decreased. Need- terAcademy Council (IAC), an umbrella organization
less to say, observed temperature changes cannot be of national academies of sciences, reported that 84%
applied beyond their monitoring areas. Climate sta- of the sources for the physical sciences sections of the
tion coverage in severely limited throughout Africa, IPCC 2007 report were peer-reviewed, but only 59%
and the paucity of observational data is a constant and of the social sciences content (IAC 2010:16). This
critical challenge. Even in South Africa, which has the means that 41% of the latter content was based on less
region’s most geographically extensive network of sta- rigorously reviewed materials. The IAC notes that
tions, there are gaps in coverage (Rouault, Sen Roy, and IPCC authors report a high confidence in statements
Balling 2013). Africa has eight times fewer weather sta- for which there is little evidence: for example, the
tions than the minimum recommended level, with widely quoted statement that agricultural yields in
vast areas in Central Africa completely unmonitored Africa might decline by up to 50% by 2020. There have
and sparse coverage in the Horn of Africa (Fig. 11.3). been other criticisms about how the IPCC appoints
Moreover, knowledge about climate change in its regional expert panels. The government-research
Africa rests on a lower scientific base than elsewhere. nexus is always politicized, and politicians do not
Until recently, many writings on climate change in always nominate the best researchers in the author se-
Africa were highly speculative. In Aftican contexts, lection process. Moreover, the sometimes-questionable
social sciences research on climate change is emerging selection of experts can be compounded as the re-
but is so far well behind the quality of natural science gional chapters do not make use of experts outside
research. For example, the IPCC reports (particularly the region (IAC 2010:18). The bottom line is that
the Africa chapter of the 2007 report) have been the IPCC may be the body undertaking the most
 Climate Change 271

FIGURE 11.3 Distribution of Hourly Weather Stations in Africa. Source: Generated from National Climate Data Center 2013.

comprehensive reporting on the region, but its current policymakers released in 2013 is unequivocal about
climate models and the data leave much to be desired human-induced change on rising global temperature
in terms of forecasting accuracy and geographical in the range of 1.5 to 4.5 degrees Celsius and argues
precision. The Fifth Assessment Report is scheduled that the global 2-degree-Celsius threshold will be
for release in 2014, but the advance summary for breached within 30 years and that sea-level rises could
272 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

reach 3.3 feet (1 m) sometime between 2100 and 2300 crops such as maize and sorghum. Therefore, carbon
(IPCC 2013). fertilization, combined with rainfall increases, could
Climate science on Africa is patchy, with a large yield higher agricultural productivity. Also, other crops
amount ofextrapolation based on modeling. Some as- such as cassava prosper in hotter climates.
pects of climate are known and relatively well under- There appears to be increased confusion over in-
stood, but there is still uncertainty about the key formation about climate change in Africa. Datasets are
climatic processes, and much remains simply un- incomplete, climate models rely on varying databases,
known. For example, it is not well understood how and data intervals and assumptions are not always well
three of the global drivers of African climate (the inter- explained. As for findings and conclusions, most of
tropical convergence zone, the El Nifio-Southern os- them are opaquely written. Media and civic organiza-
cillation, and the West African monsoon) interact and, tions often communicate technical details in overly
and, in turn, are affected by climate change. There also simplified and non-nuanced ways, so it is difficult to
are major gaps in the scientific understanding of Afri- gauge what the general public understands.
ca’s regional climate systems (e.g., the Congo Basin).
THE HUMAN IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
To make matters worse, African researchers have so far
contributed minimally to the literature on global envi- Model projections of the physical effects of climate
ronmental change, so most established research was change in Africa are highly uncertain, particularly at
conducted outside the region. the national and subnational scales where political
There is, however, increasing agreement on some processes operate. Within states, forecasting global
general region-wide scenarios. In Eastern Africa, the environmental change becomes highly complex be-
Horn, and parts of Central Africa, average rainfall is cause the consequences of such change have the poten-
expected to increase (by 15% or more). Southern tial to combine and multiply. Security experts are now
Africa will become hotter and drier, with precipitation advancing the concept of “threat multipliers,” whereby
falling by 10% to 20% or more. Warming (in the range negative impacts create stressors that threaten to un-
of 0.2-0.5 degrees Celsius per decade) will be greatest dermine both national and international security. The
over the interior and semiarid margins of the Sahara Pentagon, for example, predicts that flows of refugees
and most of central Southern Africa. The extent of arid from climatically challenged areas will be a major 21st-
and semiarid land in Africa will increase within the century security threat (Schwartz and Randall 2004).
range of 148 million to 173 million acres (60 million- Climate change also will exacerbate many existing
70 million hectares). Droughts and floods will occur problems. For example, African governments are al-
with greater frequency and intensity: flooding is antici- ready dealing with weak institutions, rapid population
pated in the Nile Delta and along parts of the eastern growth, widespread problems of water supply and
and western African coastlines. quality, and the prevalence of malaria and diarrheal
There is still considerable uncertainty about the diseases. With heavy reliance on rain-fed agriculture,
broad regional impacts of climate change. There is no which accounts for a large share of most countries’
consensus on what its effects will be in the pivotal economic production, pastoralists are already grap-
Sahel region—drier or wetter? How climate will affect pling with the effects of warmer temperatures, decreas-
the drainage of Africa’s great river basins is unknown; ing rainfall, and more frequent droughts (See Box 11.1
for example, conflicting models of the Nile Valley show on whether the Darfur crisis was the first African
greater and lesser flows. Most analyses emphasize a climate change war?). They may need to be far more
long list of adverse impacts, but there are a few that flexible in the future and increase their mobility in the
could be potentially favorable. For instance, a carbon search for sufficient water and grazing lands for live-
fertilization effect on plant growth produced by ele- stock. Competition among pastoralists and cultivators
vated levels of carbon dioxide is capable of producing for scarce resources is likely to intensify and spark
a substantial increase in crop yields for responsive resource wars.
 Climate Change 273

BOX 11.1. IS THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR emphasize that adaptation to current and impending climate
THE WORLD'S FIRST CLIMATE CHANGE WAR? change is the key conflict trigger. Decreased rainfall and a bur-
The 2003-07 conflict in Darfur is etched in people’s minds as an geoning population mean that pastoralists were migrating to

atrocious conflict during which at least 300,000 people were better-watered areas, pitting them against the farmers to gain
access to newly scarce resources. A case in point is wealthier
killed and more than 2 million displaced. John Aston, the UK
Special Representative for Climate Change, labeled Darfur the Arab camel nomads who ranged farther south not because they
faced starvation but because they were attempting to take
“first modern climate change conflict.” A climate conflict expla-
advantage of the southward retreat of the tsetse fly belt and the
nation has gained traction with the UN and the global media. In
opening up of new grasslands. The exceptional drought and
April 2007, the UN Security Council held its first-ever debate on
famine of 1984-85 were responsible for killing a large number of
climate change as a global security issue, noting Darfur as a con-
cattle, left many farmers and herders destitute, and shifted the
flict driven by resource shortages in the context of climate
migration contours again. Young pastoral men found themselves
change. Jeffrey Sachs (2008:248-249) summed up the environ-
in the demeaning position of having to find work as hired herd-
mental basis of the conflict: “The only reliable growth in Darfur
ers and wage laborers, creating, for some, an economic incen-
was its population, from less than one million at the start of the
tive for banditry. Violence intensified during the 1985-86 dry
20th century to an estimated six to seven million today. But as
season, when the Baggara Arab tribes initiated large-scale raids
the population has soared, the carrying capacity of the land de-
into southern Sudan to seize cattle to make quick profits. As it
clined because of long-term diminished rainfall. . . . The striking
turns out, the government's military intelligence leadership had
pattern is the decline of rainfall starting at the end of the 1960s,
orchestrated these raids. In response, rebels from the agricul-
a pattern that is evident throughout the African Sahel. The
tural community ratcheted up tensions by attacking government
results have been predictably disastrous. Competition over land
installations in 2003 to protest the Sudanese government's dis-
and water has become lethal.” Repeated periods of drought
regard of the western region and its non-Arab population.
were heightened by the intensification of human misuse of land
Heavy-handedly, the Khartoum government responded by cre-
and environmental degradation; increasing population pres-
ating a new Arab militia force—the Janjaweed. This group origi-
sures resulted in greater stress on land cultivation; and overgraz-
nated as a coalition of Chadian militia and their Sudanese hosts
ing and forest clearing worsened the predicament. Some forests
(mainly failed nomads), with arms supplied by Libya, and they
around cities such as Nyala and El Geneina have disappeared
began attacking sedentary groups in Darfur. Within a year, tens
entirely. Pastoralists in the region were designated as the first
of thousands of people (primarily Fur and other agriculturalists)
group unable to sustain their way of life in the current climate
were killed, hundreds of thousands fled westward to refugee
situation. The ruling elite in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, also
camps in neighboring Chad, and many others remained, inter-
touted the climate/conflict explanation of the events in Darfur,
nally displaced. More than 400 villages were destroyed in the
but this account requires closer examination.
war years (see Amnesty International [2011] before-and-after
Darfur (Arabic: “Land of the Fur”) has historically been called
maps of villages: http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/
Billad al-SGdan (Arabic: “Land of the Blacks”) and corresponds
aiusadarfursatelliteevidence.pdf). Darfur's violent conflict wors-
to the westernmost portion of present-day Sudan. Sudan is a
ened its ecological crisis.
complex mosaic of hundreds of ethnic groups, and the vast The calamitous events in Darfur have been interpreted as an
majority of population embraces Islam and speaks Arabic
omen of the climate-security connection: a bleak future of
(in addition to local dialects). Religious diversity is suppressed.
people fighting for dwindling resources around the world in the
The ethnic geography of the Darfur region is marked by a major context of radical environmental change. The security commu-
fault line that corresponds to livelihood patterns: Arabs domi- nity predicts that in the climate change era violence will erupt
nate pastoralism, and African ethnic groups (Fur, the Zaghawa, both between countries and within countries, particularly in
and Massalit) dominate in subsistence farming. Geographically, resource-poor regions of the world (for example, many parts of
the Fur and other agriculturalists are concentrated in the south- Africa).
ern portion of Darfur and the Marrah highlands, an agriculturally There is an opposing and entirely different narrative on the
rich area suitable for cereal, rice, and fruit cultivation. Northern causes of conflict in Darfur. This is far more thanan academic
Darfur, by contrast, is arid and dominated by Arabs whose liveli- debate because the explanation affects the kinds of develop-
hoods revolve around herding (camels, goats, and sheep). ment options that are being implemented at present and, in
Ethnic tensions have long simmered between the nomadic Arab turn, shapes the development trajectory that will determine
herders and the sedentary Fur farmers, but large-scale violence Sudan's future. The opposing argument emphasizes the internal
was not unleashed until the 1980s. political situation and reduces climate to no more than a contrib-
Darfurians had adapted to environmental change for centu- uting factor. An emphasis on national and local power struggles
ries, but changes since the late 1960s occurred at a faster pace shows how the climate/conflict narrative masks the real
and on a wider scale. Proponents of the climate/conflict thesis
(Continued)
274 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 11.1 (Continued) the climate/conflict narrative is that it overlooks the winners in
the Darfur crisis—the Khartoum elite and their international
political-economic dynamic that underpinned the crisis. Accord- investment partners.
ing to de Waal (2007:7), “in all cases, significant violent conflict Any single-cause explanation of Darfur's conflict is misguided
erupted because of political factors, particularly the propensity and represents an oversimplification of reality. Indeed, the
of the Sudanese government to respond to local problems by opposing narratives suggest very different solutions: (1) climate
supporting militia groups as proxies to suppress any signs of adaptation and (2) regime change. In the case of Darfur, the
resistance. Drought, famine and the social disruptions they former has held sway but does not explain the level and intensity
brought made it easier for the government to pursue this strat- of violence. This perspective has also led to solutions emphasiz-
egy.” Depleted natural resources and livelihood transformations ing economic development and climate adaptation while leav-
cannot on their own account for armed conflict. The fighting in ing internal power dynamics underexamined and intact. The
Darfur was racially motivated, pitting Arab pastoralists against solution implemented supports Darfur with much outside devel-
African farmers, but land envy more than tribal and ethnic hatred opment funding that is deployed through Khartoum patronage
determined the events. In 2004, President George Bush de- networks (Verhoeven 2011). Khartoum’s elite is now tapping into
scribed the events unfolding in Darfur as genocide, and civil so- the climate change and global food crisis narratives to go on an
ciety organizations such Save Darfur, an international pressure offensive to recalibrate Sudan‘s political economy in order to
group, tried to keep the focus on the genocide, which occurred increase patronage, foreign partnerships, and financial resources
in waves of intensity followed by calm. Some of the most barba- for the party elite to command. However, this depoliticized
rous acts included torture, the murder of pregnant women, the development solution fails to address the underlying problems.
rape of young girls, the abduction of individuals during attacks, On balance, it appears that climate change is an insufficient ex-
and kidnapping of persons for sexual slavery (see Amnesty Inter- planation of the conflict, but it does exacerbate current tensions
national 2004). Ethnic strife alone is not a satisfactory explana- and inequalities. The critical factor leading to violence appears
tion of the conflict. Most villages are multiethnic, and, despite to be the degree of political and economic marginalization. As
ethnic differences, there is a history of peaceful coexistence. Far such, biophysical events (e.g., droughts) are not straightforward,
more critical was the failure of the government on many levels: and the way they play out can only be understood within their
failure to adapt to climate change and failure to stem the conflict particular local, national, and international contexts.
(instead, the government instigated violence). An outcome of

Africa's leading vulnerabilities to climate change climate change or how best to measure it. Approaches
are outlined in Table 11.2. have proliferated and extensive suites of vulnerability
There is no way that we can assign precise values to maps have been produced. Human vulnerability cen-
the impacts of climate change, and experts in different ters on the exposure of individuals, communities, and
disciplines focus on particular dimensions of climate societies and their susceptibility to losses, all of which
impacts. UNEP (2005) undertook a preliminary effort are highly context-dependent. Development and pov-
to map those regions of Africa that are most vulnerable erty researchers operationalize vulnerability as an
to specific impacts of climate change (Fig. 11.4). Itis a aggregate measure of human welfare and integrate
useful starting point for broader dimensions of the environmental, social, economic, and political expo-
regional impacts of climate change, but it tells us little sure with a range of harmful situations (Bohle, Down-
about the impacts within regions and/or how states ing, and Watts 1994). Considerable challenges remain
might cope with those challenges. General regional as to how to develop robust yet practical maps that
trends are not uniformly distributed within the incorporate climate change and diverse attributes of
regions or even within countries. Prioritizing limited risk and vulnerability.
resources and targeting climate hotspots (areas facing Busby, Raleigh, and Salehyan (2014) map vulnera-
particularly severe impact from climate change and bility in Africa based on four criteria: physical expo-
most vulnerable to its deleterious effects) would help sure, household and community resources, governance
to more precisely identify the most vulnerable places. and political violence, and population density (See
Mapping vulnerability and its connections to Figure 11.5). Based on these indicators, areas with the
human security is a frontier in climate research. There greatest vulnerability are concentrated in the Horn of
is no agreed definition of human vulnerability to Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea) and the
 Climate Change 275

TABLE 11.2 IMPACTS OF AFRICA’S CHANGING CLIMATE

Biodiversity and forests: 20% to 30% of plant and animal species are at risk of extinction. Certain bird
and reptile species face
outright extinction: in the Congo Basin, the world's second largest rainforest, 80% of its plant species are found
nowhere else.
The livelihoods of millions of Africans who depend on trees and wood products (rope from
baobab bark; fuel; foodstuffs based on
leaves and fruit; medicinal ingredients; tools [e.g., mortars and pestles used in food preparation such as millet]) are
at risk.
Food security: Rain-fed agriculture employs 60% of the population, and a high percentage of the population relies on livestock.
A decrease in inland fisheries (e.g., Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika) threatens millions of livelihoods. A severe drop in crop
yields
from their current levels and a disappearance of wheat production by the 2080s threaten segments of the population. The nutrient
content of food may diminish due to increased levels of pests and diseases, leading to malnutrition in poor populations. Changes
in
food access affect health and susceptibility to disease.
Health: There is an increased likelihood of climate-sensitive disease outbreaks (e.g., malaria, cholera, and meningitis) and
malnutrition; a southward and eastward expansion of the malaria transmission zone; and malaria incursion into the previously malaria-
free highland zones of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi. The distribution of the tsetse fly (which can cause trypanosomiasis or
sleeping sickness) may extend from Central Africa’s heart (the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]) into Western and Eastern Africa.
Diarrheal diseases may increase. Animal health is also impaired by heat stress. The pollen season may be lengthened.
Water: Higher temperatures increase evaporation from rivers, lakes, and ponds; increase soil drying and intensify evapotranspiration;
and enhance crop stress. Moderate to extreme decreases in water flow via runoff are projected, with an extreme increase projected
for Eastern Africa. 75 million to 250 million Africans will be exposed to water stress. Inadequate water supply infrastructure (e.g., the
small number of dams [Tanzania has only two]) puts many at risk. The mismatch between water availability and need increases.
Water-sharing agreements will be even more important in major river basins (e.g., the Niger Basin, which spans ten countries).
* Cities: Fragile urban areas are undergoing rapid expansion. A range of challenges will be triggered by sea-level rise, heat waves,
urban heat island effects (particular parts of cities experiencing elevated temperatures), flooding, wildfires, pollution, and widespread
poverty (66% of residents live in slumlike conditions). Urban governments lack the resources, infrastructure, and information to be
able to cope. Lack of effective planning exposes urban residents to a range of hazards, such as the expected frequency of storms,
floods, epidemics, constraints on water supply, and higher food prices. Urban pollution would be amplified.
* Coastal zones: Rising sea levels and more frequent storm surges and flooding threaten coastal and riverine habitats in Western and
Eastern Africa, especially mangrove-rich shorelines. 25% of Africans live within 6.2 miles (10 km) of a coast. The Accra-Niger Delta
corridor, with a projected population of 50 million in 2020, faces serious flood problems.
¢ Conflict or cooperation? Water and climate change wars? Armed conflict would further complicate climate-change risk
management. However, it appears that intercommunal conflict tends to be resolved without erupting into warfare and that
violence is not the norm.
e Migration: States and urban governments have minimal capacities to manage climate-induced migration. Movements of
large numbers of climate refugees can enhance tensions, increase competition and distrust, and aggravate existing stresses
(e.g., economic degradation, disease, and conflict), which can exacerbate conflict or spark new outbreaks in receiving areas.

Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda population is concentrated in the drought-prone west-
Tanzania, Uganda), both regions with a long history of ern highlands of the country, where a lack of irrigation
civil strife, political violence, health epidemics, famine, infrastructure means that people depend on rain-fed
and economic instability. Pockets of coastal vulnera- agriculture; the government has exhibited both weak
bility occur in Western Africa, Mozambique, and Mad- responses to disaster and low adaptability to changing
agascar. Somalia and Ethiopia stand out with the conditions. In general, areas with political conflict ex-
largest zones of composite vulnerabilities. Somalia has hibit very high vulnerabilities to climate change. For
been an anarchic state since civil war in the early 1990s, example, DRC and the Central African Republic are
and the prolonged period of violent conflict, endemic less exposed to natural disasters than other parts of
poverty, lack of viable government, poor land-use prac- Africa, but these countries score very low on gover-
tices, and increasing climate variability (including a nance and political violence and are less likely to be
very intense drought in 2011) have exacerbated existing able to adapt to climate-related crisis under changing
problems and aggravate potential climate change ef- conditions of the future.
fects. With an estimated population of 94 million in More specialized vulnerability maps show how
2013, Ethiopia is a very populous state, and much of its food insecurity heightens under different climate
 Climate Change Vulnerability in Africa-
Se

¢, 8
North Africa

Central Africa

Southeeh Africa a .
Ger

ob
Western Indian
Ocean Islands_

aN

Desertification :Con Spread of malaria

Sea level rise Impacts on food
security
Reduced freshwater
availability

Cyclones =“

Coastal erosion

‘ DELPHINE DIGOUT
UNEP Aren atl al ~~ JUNE 2002

FIGURE 11.4 United Nations Environmental Programme, Climate Change Vulnerability, Africa. Source: UNEP MAP
2005. Reprinted courtesy of GRID-Arendal Maps and Graphics Library.

276
 Climate Change 277

FIGURE 11.5 Climate Vulnerability in Africa Composite Map. Source: Reprinted courtesy of Busby, J., C. Raleigh, and
I. Salehyan. 2014. “The Political Geography of Climate Vulnerability, Conflict, and Aid in Africa.” In Peace and Conflict, eds.
D. Backer, P. Huth and J. Wilkenfield. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers. Forthcoming.
278 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

scenarios (Ericksen et al. 2011). Mapping food insecurity programs in Africa.) The major emphases in climate
indicators and relating them to projected climate change adaptation programs have been agriculture and disas-
in 2050 reveals a number of hotspots. The most vulner- ter risk management, water resource use management,
able areas include parts of West Africa, the Nile Delta, and coastal resources; in contrast, urban adaptations
and Southern Africa (in addition to South Africa). The have barely been examined (McGray et al. 2007). In
distribution of food insecurity hotspots changes accord- general, the links between climate change adaptation
ing to different temperature scenarios; the maximum and policy were quite tenuous before this decade. Few
present-day temperature during the primary growing projects set out to have a climate change focus from
season is 30 degrees Celsius but this temperatures will the initial planning stages. Rather, adaptation con-
tise by 2050 producing significant crop stresses. Most cerns are more serendipitous or are presumed to be
climate models predict enhanced food insecurity in addressed with existing policy, as opposed to imple-
Southern Africa and for the countries of the Central Af menting climate adaptation strategies in a more
rican Republic, Ethiopia, and Cameroon. focused manner.
Vulnerability mapping is useful for grounding dis- There is an adaptation deficit throughout Africa,
cussions of climate change and its human spatial con- meaning the inability to deal with climate change
sequences. Although such mapping is based on soft (i.e., weak institutional capacity, minimal linkages be-
data and numerous assumptions, it does provide a tween public and private sectors, and governance
starting point for policymakers to think about the cli- structures not organized to deal with climate change).
mate change conundrum at the local level, and it is One of the core issues is inadequate physical infra-
likely that vulnerability mapping will become more structure (e.g., lack of all-weather roads, unreliable or
sophisticated over time. nonexistent electricity, the poor quality of buildings),
Climate change has the potential to alter Africa as and it is impossible to “climate-proof” infrastructure
we know it today. It may redraw the maps of water that is not there. Not surprisingly, African policymak-
availability, food security, disease incidence, and ers have prioritized urgent development challenges
coastal boundaries. It could increase involuntary such as endemic poverty, lack of capital, and responses
migration, escalate tensions, and trigger conflicts—or to natural disasters. Concerns about climate change
it could foster more cooperation between nations. that will manifest their full effects in 30 to 100 years
Climate change has not featured prominently in are of low priority and beyond the electoral calendar.
development programs in Africa (e.g., Millennium African policymakers have yet to begin to integrate
Development Goals [MDGs] and National Poverty climate change into their development agendas.
Reduction Strategies were developed around the turn
of the century without reference to climate change).
AFRICAN CITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
Nevertheless, a vast case-study adaptation literature
has emerged in each of the climate-impact areas listed AN URGENT AGENDA

above, and important lessons have been learned. There For years, the focus of proposed strategies for dealing
is a wide spectrum of adaptation strategies, from indig- with climate change has been the nation-state
enous modifications to urban flooding in Accra (e.g., IPCC approaches provide advice to national gov-
(Ghana) slums (furniture makers have designed ward- ernments). Nevertheless, countries have been mostly
robes that allow residents to sit on top of them in unsuccessful in brokering comprehensive agreements
times of flood) to an internationally funded farmers’ and in taking action. City-based climate change activ-
helpline in Kenya (“M-Kilimo”), where farmers can re- ism has emerged as a new approach, and progress has
ceive expert agricultural advice, climate and weather been quite rapid.
information (in Swahili and other local languages), Several international city-based climate networks
and advice on climate-related adaptations for land have come into existence. The C40 Cities Climate
preparation, pest management, and the like. (See Leadership Group, launched in 2005 (with 40 original
UNEP 2009 for a listing of other types of adaptation members but now expanded to 56), is the foremost
 Climate Change 279

reporting group on large cities and climate. Johannes- are poor and engage in informal economic activities
burg is on the elite steering committee, and Addis that contribute fewer GHG. The large carbon footprint
Ababa and Lagos also participate in the in Lagos, the most populous and leading economic
C40 group. The World Mayors Council on Climate center in the oil-producing state of Nigeria, is largely
Change, a 60-member group, was also launched in due to vehicular traffic, which contributes the lion’s
2005 and includes several African mayors, from cities share of emissions. Government petroleum subsidies
in South Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, and and the spatial organization of Lagos, with extensive
Uganda. In addition, international urban research net- urban sprawl, add to its high emissions profile.
works with African links have become more promi- Beyond the C40 cities, the city of Cape Town has
nent in contributing knowledge and data on a range of conducted the most comprehensive African profile of
cities and climate change issues. For instance, the local emissions (UN-HABITAT 2011). The Cape Town
Urban Climate Change Research Network, led by the study determined that electricity use accounted for the
Earth Institute at Columbia University, focuses on in- largest share of emissions (69%), mainly because most
tegrating climate risk into city development strategies electricity was coal-fired and inefficient. Transport
and plans. This group engages leading Africa-based accounted for the second highest GHG amount (pe-
researchers in smaller African cities, for example Kam- troleum 17%, diesel 9%) (UN-HABITAT 2011:50).
pala, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Durban, and Nairobi. Emissions in Cape Town were distributed very
Climate change is already affecting cities and their unevenly across the city. Areas of the urban poor
residents, and greater impacts are projected as climate accounted for very low levels of GHG emissions.
extremes and variability increase. Africa’s urban poor Indeed, informal urban livelihoods that center on re-
are more likely to live in high-risk zones and are less cycling waste may actually generate negative emissions
able to move in the event of a disaster. A sea-level rise (using recycled materials for building dwellings
of 39.4 inches (1 m) could displace 3.6 million people [shacks], and arts, crafts, and curios, and for extracting
in Lagos alone (Rosenzweig et al. 2011) and change components and materials from discarded computers,
the spatial distribution and density of both formal phones, and other electronic devices). In comparison,
and informal urban settlements. Two critical urban cli- affluent Capetonians consume a disproportionate
mate change issues are (1) how cities contribute to share of resources (e.g., fuel for heating, cooling, trans-
climate change and (2) how cities are affected by cli- portation, and other items with embedded carbon,
mate change. such as imported food). The Cape Town study illus-
It is estimated that cities contribute in the range of trates that urban environments display highly differen-
31% to 41% of total GHG (UN-HABITAT 2011:51). tiated industrial, residential, and income patterns, with
African cities contribute less to global GHG than other each producing complex carbon footprint mosaics.
cities, based on available data. The latest C40 African Three categories of impacts of urban climate
city data show that Johannesburg releases 34 metric change can be distinguished. The first involves physi-
tons of emissions, followed by Lagos at 27 metric tons cal risks, such as sea-level rises and frequency of ex-
and Addis Ababa at 3 metric tons (World Bank treme weather events (cyclones, heavy precipitation,
2010:68). Comparatively, New York City releases 196 flooding, landslides, and heat waves and droughts).
metric tons, Tokyo 174, and Beijing 110. Lagos is For example, Johannesburg is likely to become signifi-
among the C40’s most inefficient cities in producing cantly hotter and inore humid in the future, with aver-
GHG as a share of GDP, just behind the world’s least age maximum temperatures rising by 2.3 degrees
efficient large cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Moscow). Celsius in the near future and projected increases in
The three most inefficient cities share a similar global extreme storm events and the length of the rainy
manufacturing concentration, which is absent in season (City of Johannesburg 2011).
Africa. Instead, most emissions in urban Africa result Second, cities may face difficulties maintaining
from the transportation and energy sectors. Further- basic services. African cities are already severely
more, by necessity, the majority of urban populations stretched in terms of supplying basic services such as
280 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

water and sanitation to urban residents: many residen- GLOBAL CLIMATE STALEMATE AND FUNDING
tial areas are not served by municipalities and must INTRANSIGENCE: AFRICAN VOICES
rely on informal delivery operators. Climate change the least to
It is unjust that Africa has contributed
will most likely have negative effects on water supply,
world carbon emissions yet is the most vulnerable to
sanitation systems, energy provision, and transporta-
the effects of climate change. Africa is responsible for
tion systems, collectively triggering great disruptions in
4.67% of global emissions, and if South Africa is
urban livelihoods (many of which are already focused
excluded (the country accounts for 42% of Africa's
on mere survival). In some cases, massive migration
emissions), the region’s contribution to GHG is only
induced by climate change could take place; climate
3.2%. Western European carbon dioxide emissions per
forecasting, however, is not yet able to effectively pre-
person are 4.5 tons compared with Africa's (excluding
dict when and how cities could empty and where
South Africa) 0.6 per person. Africa is also unique in
migrants would go—to rural areas, to bigger or smaller
that more than 60% of its emissions result from defor-
urban centers, and/or across international borders.
estation and land degradation.
A third challenge is how to deal with existing and
African emissions are out of sync with the global
ongoing urbanization in conjunction with future
climate change consequences that Africans are already
climate-related issues. For example, a key concern is
facing. For example, Namibia contributed 0.05% of
how to plan for new infrastructure, taking climate
global emissions, but temperatures there rose at three
change adaptation and mitigation into account while
times the global average during the 20th century. In a
retrofitting existing infrastructure to make it more
fair world where all people have equal rights, Africa
climate-resilient.
would have considerable rights to emit GHG; although
Cities must play a more central role in global re-
these have not been exercised, they could have a trad-
sponses to climate change. At present there are limited
able value (this has been called the cap-and-trade
pathways for cities to engage directly in global climate
system). Meanwhile, the largest polluters, the Euro-
change policy and to receive funding for adaptation
pean Union (26%), the United States (23.3%), and
and mitigation activities. UN-HABITAT is piloting a
China (15.3%), continue to produce the lion’s share
climate change initiative in four cities, two of which
of global emissions and to promote coping and resil-
are in Africa: Kampala and Maputo. Maputo is a coastal
ience for Africans.
city affected by frequent flooding and thus at risk from
For the most part, the Global North favors a market
sea-level rise; Kampala lies in the interior but is also
ideology of emissions quotas, but these may not be
affected by flooding and the degradation of precarious
agreed upon before 2015: and, in the best-case sce-
hill slopes. A key goal of the UN-HABITAT initiative is
nario, would not become effective until 2020. Despite
to share knowledge on adaptation strategies with
the warnings of scientists, the policy dimension of
cities, but a broader and larger concerted effort is
global climate binding agreements is a procrastinator’s
needed. Urban governments still have a limited pres-
paradise. Climate justice activists contend that stalling
ence in global climate talks (e.g., COP17). Clearly, the
on emissions agreements is detrimental for Africa.
linkages among climate change, cities, and develop-
Their slogan at the COP17 meetings was “Don’t Kill
ment require much rethinking about the future and
Africa.” They argue that corporate interests are drown-
how to connect with more diverse groups in Africa.
ing out the voices of ordinary people in the ears of
UN-HABITAT (2011:183) is now boldly calling for new
global leaders as the world sleepwalks toward temper-
approaches to ensure that responses to climate change
atures that average several degrees higher than today’s.
are “catalysts of socially inclusive, economically pro-
In the meantime, the Global North colonializes at-
ductive and environmental friendly development.” In
mospheric space in the same manner that they colo-
the past, urban planning could be based on a fairly
nized land space some time ago (Bassey 2012).
constrained set of predictable futures, but not any-
Obviously, the climate change challenge is not
more: climate change has driven humanity into
strictly a technical one: serious ethical issues are
uncharted territory.
 Climate Change 281

involved. Industrial activities are an important engine existing development projects. At present, some
ofthe global economy, but they cause serious environ- 20 climate funds operate without any central authority
mental problems; many of these are most evident in to coordinate the distribution of their monies. Missing
poor countries, which are the least equipped to deal is global climate leadership that can marshal world-
with them. A central dilemma of climate change is that wide climate financing, reduce duplicate efforts and
the rich and the poor have different perspectives. The ensure an adequate balance among adaptation, miti-
wealthy emphasize mitigation and adaptation strate- gation, and vulnerable places.
gies, which transmits the message to the children of African leaders already dealing with the conse-
Africa that their inheritance will be environmental di- quences of climate change are acutely aware that future
sasters and offers advice on how to cope and adapt. climate change threatens to roll back recent develop-
One could not imagine the wealthy Global North ment gains. Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda,
sending a signal of gloom and doom to its own chil- labels climate change as “an act of aggression by the
dren. It is in Africans’ interest to reverse the argument developed world against the developing world” and de-
on global climate change, from being a threat to being mands compensation for Africa for global warming-in-
an opportunity to address and resolve a host of urgent flicted damage (quoted in Brown, Hammill, and
problems to allow for a better and brighter future. Mcleman 2007:1142). Kaire Mbuende, the Namibian
From an African perspective, the critical question is representative to the UN, has called developed coun-
whether the Global North, after reaping long and sus- tries’ GHG emissions “low intensity biological or chem-
tained industrialization benefits without emissions ical warfare.” African leaders routinely make strong
controls, owes anything to African countries, which arguments to alert the Global North to forget about
will experience the harshest impacts of climate change. “making poverty history” as climate change will “make
An answer to this question raises serious financial ob- poverty permanent.” However, global interests are
ligations. It is often quoted that US$60 billion to known to attempt to assign a lower priority to African
$65 billion would be necessary annually to fund miti- unity than climate summits. For example, the media
gation and adaptation in developing countries, and report (Bassey 2010) that Kenya’s prime minister had a
some suggest US$100 billion if climate-proofing the key climate speech written by a Japanese economic ad-
MDGs becomes the priority (Frankhauser and visor on secondment to the prime minister's office, and
Schmidt-Traub 2010). Whatever the total, the costs are Wikileaks cables suggest that promises of aid were tied
going to be extraordinarily high. The Durban COP17 to Ethiopian support of the Copenhagen Accord.
talks produced an agreement to set up a Green Climate Leading Nigerian environmental activist Nnimmo
Fund; however, monies have yet to be allocated to the Bassey (Right Livelihood Laureate—“the Alternative
fund. Africans are now calling for direct transfers; non- Nobel Prize”) argues that failure to reach an interna-
governmental organizations (NGOs), however, argue tional agreement on carbon emissions and delays in
that the transfers should be directed to communities decisions on emissions until 2020 are akin to “a death
rather than to national governments. sentence for Africa.” Bassey describes the UN climate
African leaders are vocal about the obligations of change conference in Durban in December 2011 as “a
the Global North to Africa and call for more funding big platform of hypocrisy, a lack of seriousness, a lack
for adaptation and mitigation. Funding priorities of recognition that Africa is so heavily impacted.”
differ: African leaders prefer to see a large amount Indigenous declarations on behalf of groups within
allocated to adaptation, whereas the Global North pre- countries (e.g., pastoralists and slum-dwellers) are now
fers mitigation and wants to extract something in more frequent as civilian society organizes to speak out
return for any financial contributions. According to on climate issues (See Box 11.2). Activists in Kenya and
Oxfam (2010), less than 10% of climate funds are South Africa have played a leading role in articulating
spent on helping people in vulnerable countries adapt positions centering on climate justice. The indigenous
to the impacts of climate change. Most of the money vision of nature centers on a spiritual and cultural con-
goes toward climate research and to climate-proofing nection: Mother Earth is to be respected and revered
282 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 11.2 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE overcultivation, deforestation, and mismanagement of irrigation),

IN CLIMATE CHANGE: MITIGATION even though traditional methods had been employed success-
AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES fully for millennia. Desertification received much attention, con-
IN THE AFRICAN SAHEL juring up images of the Sahara advancing southward, smothering
villages and engulfing farmlands and pastures. Encroachment
The Sahel is a transitional semiarid region of Africa that lies was recorded as so advanced ‘that large swathes of Mali and
across major parts of ten countries (Senegal, the Gambia, Mau- Mauritania were forecasted to become uninhabitable (peri-urban
ritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Eritrea, residents now take on a daily chore of shoveling sand to keep the
and Sudan). The word “Sahel” is derived from Arabic and means desert at bay) (De Blij et al. 2013). However, evidence from field
"shore or border,” describing the appearance of vegetation observations in the area have suggested that the desertification
that borders the southernmost fringes of the Sahara. The term theory was disseminated even in a situation of scientific uncer-
was added to the geography lexicon in the 1970s following tainty; it has proven hard to dislodge even when new evidence
widespread famine in the area (250,000 people and 3.5 million undermined that interpretation. It is not so much that desertifica-
cattle perished), caused by rapid and unforeseen desiccation in tion did not exist (there are well-defined areas that have suffered
this area known as the Sahel. Much earlier, however, Stebbing from land degradation), but that it is not prevalent over the entire
(1935) had written a pioneering article to warn colonial govern- area. The fringe of the Sahel is more akin to an ebbing and flow-
ments about the “encroaching Sahara” as one of the principal ing tide, shifting south with dry spells and moving north in wetter
environmental challenges that West African colonials will periods.
encounter. In the 1990s, a counter-narrative emerged on the basis of first-
The Sahel extends from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the hand observations of dryland farmers and herders who showed
Red Sea in the east, and the belt averages 200 to 700 miles wide adaptation strategies in various regional contexts with regard to
(320 to 1,120 km) (roughly twice the size of Texas). A zone of dynamic and unpredictable environments. Case studies in vari-
often-extreme conditions, the Sahel has two hot seasons—from ous subareas of the Sahel emphasized the role of indigenous
approximately February to April and September to October— knowledge bases passed on by word of mouth from one genera-
punctuated by a short rainy season between May and August. It tion to the next.
is a transitional area of semiarid grasslands, pocked with shrub- Indigenous knowledge systems (which integrate intricate sub-
bery and occasional trees; vegetation density increases mark- systems of gathering, predicting, interpreting, and decision
edly in a southerly direction. Perhaps most critically, the Sahel making) are applied to weather forecasting. Farmers have been
experiences major weather variations and fluctuations with a shown to conserve soil carbon by using no-tilling practices in
highly irregular rainfall: annual rainfall varies from around cultivation, mulching, and other soil management techniques.
7.8 inches (200 mm) in the north to 23.6 inches (600 mm) in the For example, natural mulches moderate soil temperatures and
south. Since the 1960s, rainfall has been gradually declining, but extremes, suppress diseases and harmful pests, and conserve
whether this trend indicates that the Sahel is undergoing soil moisture. Adaptation strategies used by pastoralists in
desertification (human-induced degradation of land in dry areas) severe droughts include the use of emergency fodder for live-
is a subject of scientific debate. stock, culling weak livestock for food, and shifting toward multi-
Despite its harsh climate, the Sahel is home to nomadic pasto- stocking herds (when affordable), whereby herd composition
ralists, notably the Tuareg and the Fulani. There are several can be rebalanced from cattle to sheep and goats because of
prominent Sahelian cities (e.g., Bamako, Ouagadougou, and their smaller feed requirements. Nomadic mobility reduces pres-
Niamey), and urban residents have long depended on rain-fed sure on low-carrying-capacity grazing areas through cyclical
agriculture, irrigation from year-round water sources (e.g., Lake movement from dry northern areas to wetter southern areas.
Chad and Niger River), and long-distance trade. Rapid popula- Farmers recognize and respond to changes in climate by main-
tion growth (about 3.1%) is under way in the region, and urban- taining flexible strategies with short- and long-cycle crop variet-
ization is increasing at very high rates (about 7%) (Nyong, ies. Some Malians collect wild foods and consume the less
Adesina, and Elasha 2007). Growth rates in the context of recent palatable ones during droughts (Baro and Batterbury 2005). The
experiences with severe droughts raise concerns about the sus- baobab tree, for instance, is a source of food (leaves are used for
tainability of the Sahel to support its populations, especially vegetable sauce and the fruit pulp is used to make porridge and
since most inhabitants rely on land-based livelihoods. Food to flavor drinks), clothing, and medicine, and the root bark is
insecurity, malnutrition, and chronic poverty are endemic. For used to making fishing nets, mats, and sacks. Coping with the
example, the 2012 drought put more than 16 million people 1997 drought in Burkina Faso, farmers implemented a range of
directly at risk (FAO 2012). food-saving strategies and borrowed and mortgaged against
Up to the 1980s, scientists and researchers conventionally the following year’s crops. In subsequent years, they readjusted
placed the blame for climatic and environmental change in the their farming strategies and planted more varieties of drought-
Sahel on indigenous land-use practices (overgrazing,
resistant crops (Mertz et al. 2009).
 Climate Change 283

Some farmers, however, misinterpreted short-term weather their incomes (twice the rate of migrants from other developing
changes and established land-use practices that accentuated countries) (Scheffran, Marmer, and Sow 2011:123). Rural liveli-
environmental damage. Some farmers desperate to earn extra hoods are negotiated within the context of climatic and
income and feed growing populations expanded cash cropping economic uncertainty, conflict, and poor governance in many
and cattle herding into marginal lands during wetter years, parts of the region. Petty trading and handicrafts are among the
plowing furiously and introducing too many grazing animals. nonfarm diversification and coping strategies. In Sudan and
Such careless practices, deviating from indigenous customs, led Ethiopia, farmers have diversified livelihoods with income from
to swift soil erosion and overly intensive agricultural methods gum and resins. In Sudan, gum is obtained from Acacia senegal,
that were unsupportable in dry years (De Blij et al. 2013). a tree that grows throughout the Sahel, and gum arabic is a cash
There is a growing consensus that agricultural adaptation crop sold mainly to European and North American markets as an
practices are only part of livelihood diversification strategies. ingredient for soft drinks and medicines. Overall, livelihood
Within the region, migration is a common diversification strat- research has shown a mixing and matching of strategies that
egy during the dry seasons, but recently there has been an explore both local and more distant opportunities. Whatever
increase in population flows out of the Sahel, and not just to the successes of short-term adaptation, there can be no doubt
neighboring countries. For example, Sahelians are employed as that, over the longer term, reducing vulnerability to drought will
mine workers in South Africa and as oilfield workers in Gabon. depend further on developing the region's national and urban
Remittances are critical for many families; one research study economies, which remain among the poorest and least diversi-
reported that Sahelian migrants in France remitted up to 15% of fied in the world.

rather than dominated and controlled. Climate justice state responses is that they underplay complex rela-
advocates recognize a planet in crisis and lay the blame tionships and spatial flows across borders: peoples,
on the global economic system that drives unsustain- technology, pollution, ideas, financial resources, etc.,
able industrialization, food raising, forestry, and agri- all move with ease, and responses to climate change
cultural practices. Declarations made by indigenous may trigger significant international movement. Far
groups focus on local attachment rather than on more creative thinking is needed. Tackling climate
detached disregard for local activities and decisions change requires that people both act together and act
(O’Lear 2010). At the Durban climate talks, activists differently. The C40 climate leadership group is one
argued (invoking the spirit of the Occupy movement, small step in the right direction, but there is a pressing
as Occupy COP17) that the voices of 99% of the need for city networks to be expanded.
world’s population were not being heard, and that UN For Africans to deal effectively with climate change,
climate talks were taken over by governments cor- they should be not merely the recipients of advice but
rupted by corporate influence. also participants in discussions on how best to deal
with the challenge. Africans suffer from an excess of
advice and a paucity of opportunities for real engage-
CONCLUSIONS ment in global issues. Africa's low level of climate
Climate change is a complex and multidimensional science expertise needs to be remedied. Few African
global challenge. Scientific studies on Africa are patchy, scientists publish regularly in international journals.
and current regional climate models need consider- Expertise on Africa (which includes a large number of
able refinement. A general acceptance that global cli- expatriates) is located outside the region, with African
mate and regional models are the best way to experts on the human dimensions of climate change
understand climate change is mismatched to the needs scattered across the world. The leading cutting-edge
of communities and individuals and their support climate research centers are all now located in the
structures (e.g., civil society), all acting locally (O’Lear Global North. Severely lacking are climate research
2010). Current climate models prioritize state-level centers on the African continent, beacons that could
data and decision making even though it is apparent attract the brightest African minds, boost self-
that climate change is not confined to national territo- confidence, and help Africans find their own voices on
ties. A glaring weakness of state-centered analyses and climate change issues. The first African-based center
284 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES
OF CHANGE

for climate research, the Climate Systems Analysis no reason why they should not be able to adapt
Group at the University of Cape Town, only came into to climate change and improve climate resilience
existence in 2009. A more concerted effort to tackle everywhere—but the process is only just beginning.
climate understanding in Africa will require several
additional and even competing centers of Africa-based
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 CARNE WEAR. il

CHINA AND AFRICA

INTRODUCTION
investor, the major aid donor (surpassing the World
In September 2000, when Chinese President Jiang Bank), a significant migrant-sending region, and a
Zemin attended the United Nations (UN) Millennial holder of significant interests in oil leases, mining,
Summit in New York (which led to the Millennium and timber concessions. Its two-way trade with Africa
Development Goals [MDGs]), no doubt he kept in reached US$200 billion in 2012 and is overwhelm-
mind that Beijing would hold its own meeting a ingly based on the extraction of oil and strategic min-
month later to launch the new Forum on China-Africa erals, which are exchanged for manufactured and
Cooperation (Brautigam 2009). Such a parallel mode consumer goods. Questions are being asked about
of operating outside of Western international frame- whether China is displacing the United States and
works characterizes the China—Africa dynamic. European powers as a major influence in the region
The Forum on China—Africa Cooperation has set (Carmody and Owusu 2007). At the very least, the
the stage for institutionalizing Sino-African relations. “Washington consensus” is now counterbalanced by
Over the years, its activities have expanded to include an alternative approach known as the “Beijing consen-
commitments to increase trade, investment, and aid; sus,” the essence of which is a more malleable infra-
strengthen development cooperation; facilitate debt structural investment-with-aid engagement (Cheru
forgiveness; build a broad range of infrastructure (roads, and Obi 2010)—although it must be acknowledged
schools, hospitals); and cooperate in natural and that China does not require African states to emulate
human resource development (from mineral extrac- its values.
tion to education). The rising importance of the region There is widespread belief among African policy-
to China was further codified in the first-ever “White makers and some scholars that increased global eco-
Paper on China’s Africa Policy” in 2006, and regular nomic interest in the region can provide strategic
updated white papers have been issued since (the most options and a policy space for Africans that they had
recent in 2013). Since 2000, there appears to be a de- been compelled to surrender in the 1980s with the in-
liberately constructed convergence between Africa's troduction of punitive structural adjustment programs.
development needs and Chinese economic interests China’s engagement with African countries has helped
(Alden 2012). reignite the region’s economies, and it has made some
China's position in Africa has surged; it has headway toward restoring Africa's agency within the in-
become Africa’s largest trading partner (moving from ternational system (Alden 2012). South-South engage-
modest trade relations 20 years ago), the leading ment offers a different enabling environment, options

287
288 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

for maneuverability, and the possibility for Africans to Relations between China and Africa bring excite-
chart a different development course and, many hope, ment and anticipation as well as unease and suspicion
their own. about Chinese aid and state-sponsored projects. China
China's engagement with Africa is a provocative has many things going for it: Beijing can engage
topic. There have been waves of misinformation, hype, African governments without the colonial hangover,
anecdotal reporting, and hasty and speculative conclu- and its stellar economic performance over the last 25
sions about what the Chinese are doing in Africa. years and significant advances on many development
Hyperbolic media describe the relationship as “a love indicators provide a different set of ideas for informing
affair,” wou “a fatal attraction,” “China’s African safari,” “a African leaders. China has become the world’s largest
Chinese takeaway,” “new colonialism,” “a new scramble,” holder of capital, with over US$2.4 trillion in foreign
“a partnership,” a “mixed blessing,” and so forth. There is reserves, so it seems logical that it would deploy some
clearly a continuity of historical tropes for understand- of these funds in capital-starved and resource-rich re-
ing China’s relations with Africa, and China’s actions gions like Africa (Alden 2012). Chinese interests are
are rarely framed within a 21st-century context of a dif- propelled by Africa’s resource bounty (oil, natural gas,
ferent time and place, and a world where Africans have timber, coltan, copper, land, etc.) and by its own scar-
agency. Added to this, many hold a cultural bias and city of resources (oil, food, land, strategic minerals).
expect China to operate and behave in a similar way to China’s return to Africa (see next section) also coin-
Western powers (despite their different language and cides with the improved economic performance of
cultural traditions and lack of familiarity with Africans many African states and the “Africa rising” narrative.
and vice versa). Clearly, East Asia and the United States Indeed, China’s investments have contributed to
rank as higher investment priorities for China, but African economic growth, and a growing Chinese
Sino-African relations are becoming increasingly im- media presence has helped shape a new narrative of
portant, making Africa a pivotal theater for China's Africa—“a land of opportunity.”
emerging 21st-century role. Some analysts claim it is China’s growing footprint is transforming Africa in
ushering in Africa’s second liberation from Western dramatic ways. The willingness of the Chinese govern-
dictates. ment to provide an entire package of inducements,
At the same time, evidence is accumulating that alongside a range of leasing or supporting agreements
African leaders are pulling back from specific Sino- designed to meet elite-defined needs (ranging from
African arrangements; reconfiguring mining and ex- sports stadiums to large-scale infrastructure projects),
ploration territories and renegotiating agreements has proved to be crucial to securing all sorts of deals,
with Chinese corporations; enforcing laws that restrict many of which pertain to resource access. The Chinese
non-national artisanal mining activity; and expelling interest in Africa also happened at a time when
Chinese residents engaged in illegal activities. An in- Africans were pondering their failure to develop over
tensified crackdown on illegal non-national mining the past half-century and to keep pace with the Asian
activities in Ghana has resulted in the repatriation of success stories. The search for an alternative transfor-
many Chinese nationals, the exact number of which mative development model has led many Africans to
is not public (somewhere in the range of 166 to inspect closely and learn from the lessons of Asian
4,592 persons) (Hirsch 2013). African governments giants. Chinese companies are investing heavily in the
(e.g., Niger, Chad, and Gabon) are directly challenging neglected African infrastructure (building major trans-
Chinese oil companies over environmental destruc- port, communication networks, dams) and filling crit-
tion. For instance, the Gabonese government with- ical infrastructure gaps with less bureaucracy and less
drew a Chinese permit for a significant oil field and funding and in less time. As a result, the West no
handed the territory over to a newly created national longer has a monopoly over contemporary and future
company (Nossiter 2013). This evidence indicates that development in the region.
African governments are no longer the passive partners Even though China’s footprint in Africa is exten-
they were 10 years ago. sive, data are sparse and notoriously unreliable. As a
 China and Africa 289

result, there is lots of conjecture about the develop- Scholarly literature on China’s emerging relation-
ment impacts of increased Chinese trade and invest- ship with Africa can be divided into five prominent
ments as well as about Chinese migration to Africa. The themes: (1) China’s image of the new face of global-
China-Africa arena is very large and dynamic, and ization; (2) its role in African development vis-a-vis its
major new initiatives and pullbacks occur almost own development trajectory; (3) its quest for allies and
monthly. Some excellent sources include The China friends; (4) its counterbalance to the West; and (5) its
in Africa Podcast (http://china.buzzsprout.com) and emergence as a responsible power, taking its rightful
Deborah Brautigam’s blog China in Africa: The Real place in the international community.
Story. This chapter reviews the history of China in Africa There are several reasons for China’s deepening of
and concentrates on examining high-profile Chinese links to Africa. First, after the Tiananmen Square incident
infrastructure projects (e.g., roads, stadiums, large resi- of June 4, 1989, China's attitudes toward the African
dential developments), and it assesses Chinese entre- region changed from benign neglect to renewed interest.
preneurs’ forays into African informal economies and Former Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qian Qichen
Africans’ attempt to better position themselves in their stated in his memoirs that “it was .. . our African friends
own informal economies by establishing a toehold in who stood by us and extended a helping hand in the
an African enclave in Guangzhou, China, that has difficult times following the political turmoil in Beijing,
become known as “Chocolate City.” Specific dyads such when Western countries imposed sanctions on China”
as the China—Zambia one are examined in detail to (quoted in Taylor 2012:26).
show how this relationship between China and Africa is Second, the incredible expansion of the Chinese
ever-evolving. economy in the 1990s and 2000s compelled Chinese
firms and corporations as well as ordinary Chinese en-
CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA
trepreneurs to embark on a concerted effort to discover
China’s engagement with Africa has a longer history markets and commercial opportunities overseas. In
and different origins than that of the Europeans. The 1999. the Chinese government initiated a “Go Out”
Chinese recount how during the Ming Dynasty its policy to encourage Chinese companies to invest over-
mighty fleet (63 vessels and 28,000 men, each ship seas, and it became a cornerstone of China’s own de-
larger than Christopher Columbus’) sailed to East velopment strategy after 2001. This policy encourages
Africa several times between 1418 and 1433 (Brautigam Chinese firms to do business abroad while making
2009). However, the Chinese neither colonized Africa Chinese firms more competitive by acquiring strategic
nor took “one inch of land, not a slave, but a giraffe for assets, securing access to natural resources, and estab-
the emperor to admire” and the “giant ships also took lishing new markets for Chinese exports. Initially,
back African herbs and local medicinal compounds, large state-owned construction companies led the way,
perhaps to combat a series of epidemics raging in but recently private firms in all sectors have been par-
China at that time” (quoted in Brautigam 2009:23). ticipating. For example, telecommunication giants
In a modern epilogue to this nonintrusive narra- (Huawei and ZTE) are building telecom infrastructure
tive, a Chinese delegation traveled to an ancient trad- and networks throughout Africa, enabling wide net-
ing town off the coast of Kenya, Lamu, in 2002 and work coverage even to rural locations.
confirmed the claims of a local girl, Mwamaka Sharifu Third, China solicited the support of African states
Lali (“Chinese Girl”), that she was descended from at the UN, acquiring a numerical advantage that pre-
15th-century Chinese sailors shipwrecked in the ar- vented hostile votes against China vis-a-vis its human
chipelago (Brautigam 2009:23). Subsequently, the rights record and ensuring that the Republic of Taiwan
Chinese Embassy in Nairobi awarded Mwamaka a trip remains an unrecognized international outcast (Taylor
to her ancestral homeland and provided a scholarship 2012). Beijing maintains a One-China Policy that re-
for her to study medicine (Brautigam 2009). This ges- quires aid recipients to break official relations with
ture signals the changing face of Chinese engagement Taiwan (the Republic of China) and to engage exclu-
in Africa. sively with the People’s Republic of China (China) as
290 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

the sole and legitimate representative of all of China, China has disbursed aid to almost every country in
and, further, to accept Beijing as the legitimate repre- Africa, except Swaziland because of its position on
sentative of Taiwan or at least acknowledge its stance Taiwan. Chinese economic cooperation emphasizing
on the issue. China wages its diplomatic battle against infrastructure with complete project financing is at
Taiwan on African soil with ample enticements, and it odds with traditional donors, who have moved away
has led to many defections. Only four African coun- from these “traditional” instruments toward more eso-
tries recognize Taiwan (Burkina Faso, Swaziland, teric development goals such as good governance,
Gambia, and Sao Tomé and Principe). African support transparency, and lack of corruption. China maintains
for China in the International Olympic Committee a non-interference policy with aid recipients, which
helped Beijing secure the hosting of the 2008 means that Beijing pays less attention to the negative
Olympics. effects of aid spending and that China is willing to
Fourth, China wants to counterbalance the United support both rogue regimes (e.g., Zimbabwe and Sudan
States as an unchallenged hegemon. Beijing is keenly in the past) and authoritarian governments (eg.,
aware that China needs support from African and Angola); human rights violations within African states
other developing world countries to enhance its global are never questioned.
status and to avoid U.S. coercion and outside interfer- Beijing’s contribution to Africa is a matter of inter-
ence in internal Chinese affairs. pretation. A key problem stems from China’s lack of
Fifth, China has political ambitions to be taken se- transparency about its aid disbursements. Official aid
riously as a responsible power, and Africa plays a key in China is regarded as a state secret, which heightens
role in achieving this. China’s capital infrastructural Western and (some) African concerns. Foreign aid is
spending in Africa and its media infrastructure (print, sensitive due to the ongoing diplomatic dispute with
Internet, and TV) are moving in tandem. Indeed, Chinese Taiwan, and it is culturally insensitive to call attention
media coverage of the region is expanding while to overseas assistance given that China is also a devel-
Western coverage is decreasing. China’s news agency, oping country with its own poor. Brautigam (2009)
Xinhua, established an African presence in Nairobi in calculates that China committed US$2.5 billion in
1986 and now operates in 28 African countries, and its 2009 to Africa (which includes debt relief), a contribu-
services have expanded into the free mobile phone tion considerably lower than reported in the Western
and African news market. Chinese news media in media. Nevertheless, China surpassed the World Bank
Africa enlarged in 2012: China Central Television as a lender to Africa in 2006 and overtook the United
launched CCTV Africa, and the newspaper China Daily States as Africa's major trading partner in 2009. Africa
launched Africa Weekly. There is now an impressive now supplies 25% of China’s oil.
array of Chinese media presenting diverse Chinese Although Beijing has issued an official Africa
viewpoints on Africa. They offer an alternative to, and policy, there are actually many “Chinas”—as, indeed,
come into tension with, traditional Western media there are many “Africas” (a major argument of this
and content. There is considerable debate about the book). Disaggregating them is essential when assess-
Chinese media and whether it is a vehicle for pro-China ing what the Chinese are doing in Africa. The notion
agendas or whether it operates through a different cul- that China or the Chinese are “colonizing” Africa—
tural lens emphasizing positive reporting, with some an allegation raised by some Western and African
censorship (e.g., Dalai Lama, Falun Gong, Tiananmen commentators—is misleading. Such a claim is based
Square). Chinese media deliberately portray Africa ina on the assumption that there is an overarching grand
more positive light, with narratives of the continent strategy on the part of Beijing. It is reasonable to ac-
as a land of opportunity, contrasting sharply with knowledge that there are certain aspirations focused
the despair-and-tragedy narrative. In many ways, the on quite specific facets of Sino-African ties (Taylor
Chinese news media narrative may be seeking to rebal- 2011). The most obvious example is state-owned enter-
ance the negative Africa narrative that has prevailed for prises’ (SOEs’) investment in African resource indus-
so long. tries clearly connected with China’s own present and
 China and Africa 291

future energy demands, but even here there are rival- Contemporary China-to-Africa migrations have
ries and competition between different energy compa- their roots in China’s geopolitical strategy for Africa
nies. Beyond the energy sector, rivalries among Chinese during the Cold War, when Beijing supported inde-
provinces, municipalities, companies, and individuals pendence struggles. In the colonial aftermath, China
play out on a daily basis, revealing as a myth the idea promoted solidarity with newly independent African
of a monolithic China relentlessly pursuing a single countries, and between 1960 and the 1980s, Beijing
agenda (Taylor 2012). sent over 150,000 technicians and workers to engage
Sino-African relations are more accurately under- in agricultural and infrastructural development.
stood as processes of globalization and the reintegra- The current phase of Chinese migrations is linked
tion of China and Africa into the global economy, to Beijing’s economic reforms, the liberalization of
projects that initially enjoyed the enthusiastic support emigration legislation after 1985 (Park 2009), and the
of Western capitalism. Paradoxically, the West now “Go Out” policy. Simultaneously, domestic Chinese
criticizes the Chinese for expanding into Africa and for perceptions of overseas Chinese switched from view-
using market principles. ing them as traitors to treating them “as new vanguards
The idea of China as a model for prosperity has cap- of Third World anti-colonialism” (Mohan 2012:13).
tured the imagination of many ordinary Africans, al- Chinese aid disbursements are linked to the temporary
though others worry about being overrun by the Chinese migration of Chinese project workers. China has sent
industrial juggernaut and swamped by dominant Chi- approximately 20,000 health professionals, 10,000 agro-
nese traders in African informal markets (Brautigam technicians, hundreds of teachers, and tens of thou-
2009). It is prudent for Africa’s policymakers and schol- sands of workers for large-scale projects (e.g., the
ars to approach China as an alternative development Lagos-to-Kano railway [11,000 workers] and the Sudan
model realistically and with caution. The stages of pipeline) (Park 2009). This migration activity is eco-
growth/modernization model emphasized in the 1960s nomically rather than ideologically driven.
based on the U.S./Western experience was an abysmal Several heterogeneous streams of Chinese migrants
failure. The intensification of ties with China may over- in Africa coexist. Importantly, Chinese workers do not
state the ability of Beijing to shepherd an alternate de- enter the local wage labor markets but work for Chinese
velopment model. Indeed, China’s extraordinary growth businesses or establish their own businesses. Six types
was achieved with a capable strong state, nothing com- of Chinese workers can be discerned: (1) SOE person-
parable to which exists in Africa. Indeed, some scholars nel managing projects, contracts, and investments;
(Taylor 2012:30) think that “China’s model in Africa is (2) owners of private sector formal firms; (3) tempo-
not having a model,” and it has widespread appeal be- rary labor migrants involved in public building and
cause the ideology of neo-liberalism is widely resented, large infrastructural development projects undertaken
but a Chinese model per se does not exist. by SOEs; (4) entrepreneurs, consisting of import/export
agents, wholesalers, small business owners, and large
numbers of small-time traders; (5) transit individuals
CHINESE MIGRATION TO AFRICA who enter the region (but explore relocation opportu-
Early Chinese migration to Africa is associated with nities in Europe and North America) because of
the Dutch East India Company and its business inter- less stringent regulations; some are legal entrants but
ests in the Cape (South Africa). Small numbers of many are not; and (6) agricultural workers (Spring and
company slaves, contract workers, and convicts were Jiao 2008).
sent to the area in the later part of the 17th century. A Mung (2008) calculates that Chinese firms bring
larger stream of 63,000 contract workers arrived in the in 80,000 contract workers, but others (e.g., Park
late 19th century during the gold and diamond mining 2009) believe that the real number is more than
boom (Park 2009). Most contract miners were repatri- double that. Most Chinese contract workers stay for
ated to China, but those who stayed were gradually the duration of their assignment (typically one to three
integrated into South Africa’s mixed-race population. years) before returning home. Labor migrants can be
292 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

further subdivided by profession: most are semiskilled in African workplaces, and self-segregation of Chinese
workers, and a smaller number are managerial and workers in employer-built compounds. Part ofthis ten-
professional staff. A proportion of higher-skilled pro- sion is fueled by cultural differences. Another part is
fessionals stay on in host countries when their con- driven by surges in economic nationalism, which is a
tracts end, joining the swell of migrants opening small response, in part, to the erosion oflight manufacturing
businesses (Mung 2008). jobs (especially textiles) in the African region in the
The 700 to 800 large Chinese companies operating face of global competition. This competition is saliently
in Africa hire local labor but rely heavily on Chinese expressed by the presence of immigrant entrepreneurs
migrant labor for public works and oil, timber, and who benefit from international networks that enable
mining operations. Of this group, about 150 are SOEs cheaper imports with more variety but that decimate
that report directly to the central Chinese government. local industries. Besides trade, the tension is mani-
The remainder fall into a gray area, as subsidiaries of fested in fierce competition between Chinese and local
SOEs, companies owned by provincial and municipal professionals, seen, for example, in medical services
governments, and partially privatized companies with between Western-trained versus Chinese-trained medi-
the state participating as an influential shareholder. cal professionals/clinics (Spring and Jiao 2008).
For example, the China National Offshore Oil Corpo- Xenophobia can be exploited by individuals seek-
ration and the State Grid Corporation of China are ing to gain (politically and in other ways) from an
clearly state-owned enterprises under the SOE rubric, anti-Chinese undercurrent. There have been flash
whereas the situations of the computer maker Lenovo points in several locations in the Democratic Republic
and the appliance giant Haier are less clear-cut: al- of Congo (DRC), Angola, South Africa, and Ghana—
though the state is the dominant shareholder, they op- and in Zambia, in particular. Most commonly, the ten-
erate more like private companies. In contrast, the sion is expressed by union opposition. In 2012, South
West generally has a black-and-white definition of African transport unions thwarted a large Chinese in-
companies as government owned or privately owned. vestment for a Johannesburg manufacturing plant to
Since 2005, thousands of Chinese firms entered the produce minibus taxis for South African/Africa mar-
region as private firms (Gu 2011). More than 80% of kets, despite backing from the South African govern-
Chinese firms with African operations are private small ment, which courted the investment as part of a
and medium-sized enterprises. These firms are more national reindustrialization strategy. Opinion polls
motivated to develop a new market or a manufacturing about the Chinese in Africa taken among Africans
base rather than concentrate on resource extraction and reveal complex perceptions, with both positive and
infrastructural development (the focus of SOEs). Many negative responses (with more positive overall percep-
private sector firms have no parent firm on the main- tions). Pew opinion polls show that most Africans
land, and others are only marginal players in the Chi- (except South Africans) perceive Chinese influence as a
nese market. These firms are motivated by profit and positive development and more positive than ULS. in-
compete intensely with each other. They are driven to fluence (Sautman and Hairong 2009).
tap African market opportunities and/or to establish It is difficult, ifnot impossible, to obtain an accurate
positions to gain preferential market access to the Euro- global picture of Chinese migrants in Africa (Ma 2008)
pean Union and United States (Gu 2011). They cannot due to the scarcity of data, misidentification, poor base-
be seen as conforming to a grand Chinese strategy. line data, illegal entry, and the temporary status of many
The use of Chinese contract laborers is a hot-button Chinese in Africa. Neither African nor Chinese govern-
issue in the China-Africa dynamic, given high unem- ments produce reliable data on the number of Chinese
ployment rates among Africans, the low salaries paid immigrants in the region. Scholarly estimates of the
by many Chinese companies, accusations of unfair number of Chinese in Africa range from 580,000 to
labor practices, poor track records in corporate social 800,000 (Park 2009). The media and Africans, in gen-
responsibility, disregard for health and safety standards eral, often speak about a larger Chinese invasion.
 China and Africa 293

Many Africans cannot distinguish people from dif- migrants were not entrepreneurs in China but became
ferent East Asian countries and routinely categorize entrepreneurs in the process of moving to Africa. Chinese
Japanese, Koreans, and others all as Chinese, perhaps traders have led the way in introducing high volumes of
resulting in inflated numbers. The numbers of Chinese low-cost goods to African markets, often for the first
workers even in very high-profile projects like the con- time, illustrating how Africa’s poor communities are
struction of the new African Union headquarters being integrated into international economic circuits
building in Addis Ababa (which was a gift) produced anchored to China. Traders and high penetration rates
widely varying reports on the ratios of Chinese to of Chinese goods into the informal economies repre-
Ethiopian workers, ranging from unspecified mixes of sent a different Chinese presence in Africa. To date, the
Chinese managers and Ethiopian workers; for exam- Chinese government has not defined its relationship
ple, from all Chinese labor (Al-Jazeera) to equal par- with Chinese traders on the ground in Africa, and they
ticipation (Chinese press) to one quarter Chinese of rarely speak for themselves or are given a voice in
the total workforce (academic field research) (Brauti- media coverage, so they remain an enigma.
gam 2012). What happens in lower-profile, remote Imports of low-cost Chinese goods have led to the
projects is unknown. Differences in national labor establishment of “China shops” all over Africa. Imports
laws, work permits and their enforcement, the avail- contribute to China’s burgeoning trade with Africa, and
ability and cost of domestic skilled labor, and the revenues generated from them and traders’ permits
structuring of individual investment deals also need to benefit national and local governments. China shops
be taken into consideration. sell almost identical entry-level merchandise through-
The largest concentrations of Chinese immigrants are out the region: for example, China-made textiles and
in South Africa (200,000-400,000), Nigeria (100,000), clothing, imitation leather goods (shoes, belts, hand-
Zambia (80,000), and Mauritius (40,000) (Park bags), sportswear, luggage, baby accessories (strollers,
2009). Communities of over 10,000 Chinese are found playpens, feeding chairs), small household appliances,
in Sudan, Angola, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe (Mohan electronic goods, and so forth. Shops are typically single-
2012; Park 2009). Still, even in South Africa, the Chi- room establishments in city centers to begin with, close
nese account for less than 1% of the entire population, to Chinese-owned warehouse facilities, and are often
and immigrant Chinese communities are concentrated operated by a single family or several families. Chinese
in the Johannesburg and Pretoria areas. Cyrildene, in entrepreneurs also establish restaurants, herbal shops,
eastern Johannesburg, is a recent Chinatown, having laundries, and medicine clinics or outlets. Chinese
made the transition since 2000 from a predominantly businesses are known for having extended trading
Jewish neighborhood. Older Chinatowns are found in hours, more points of sale, and smaller margins.
Port Luis (Mauritius) and Antananarivo (Madagascar). Chinese entrepreneurs enter the African market-
place in two main ways. First, they undertake site re-
connaissance, traveling to the region to gauge the
CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS IN AFRICA’S market, return to the mainland to produce high-
INFORMAL ECONOMIES demand goods, and subsequently relocate and set up
Chinese SOEs capture international media and schol- shops retailing made-in-China goods. This cycle is re-
arly attention, but there is an equivalent drive by small peated over and over throughout markets in the region
companies and individual entrepreneurs into the and is predicated on access to cheap supplies and
region that may be just as consequential. Chinese trad- labor in mainland China and flexible product lines.
ers may number several hundreds of thousands across Second, Chinese entrepreneurs obtain information
Africa, but neither accurate nor reliable data exist about business opportunities from overseas families
(McNamee 2012). Most saliently, their swelling pres- or members of their kinship networks, maneuvering
ence is expressed in the proliferation of Chinese retail on the basis of chain migration. Much of the merchan-
shops in urban and rural communities. Most of these dise is sourced directly from manufacturers in China,
294 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

reducing the number of intermediaries, the cost, and Wholesalers (Chinese) Market occupies a five-story
ultimately the selling price ofthe final good. building and sells 200,000 low-cost Chinese (mainly
Some alarmists claim that “China Inc.” is pursuing counterfeit) mobile handsets per month (Hu 2012). In
a bottom-of-the-pyramid strategy to corner all parts of Accra in 2006, the Chinese Wholesale Market opened
the African marketplace. However, most contend that within Makola Market and in a short time cornered the
there is no coordinated strategy and that Chinese market on low-value (and low-quality) merchandise.
entrepreneurs are doing what they have done for At the same time, some bonds have developed be-
centuries—developing small businesses wherever op- tween Chinese and Accra traders based on similarities,
portunities exist and profiting from them. Not all resourcefulness, and social networking, contrasting
Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa are successful; some with more established immigrant traders, such as the
return home with less money than they had taken with Lebanese, who have remained separate (Liu 2010). In
them. Many, however, report making three times what Dakar, Senegal, Chinese traders organized the regional
they would earn in China (McNamee 2012). supply, marketing, and transport of goods, eliminating
Chinese wholesalers have become dominant play- the need for many customers to travel to the city to
ers in supplying low-cost merchandise, establishing shop (Marfaing and Thiel 2011). The remarkable suc-
entrenched positions in import trade, much like the cess of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa has encouraged
Lebanese, Syrians, and others accomplished in earlier more entrepreneurial migrants to relocate for business
times. Chinese suppliers have been able to reach deep ventures and jobs (which were plentiful until recently).
into Africa’s informal economies: made-in-China Chinese firms prefer Chinese workers and hire locals
goods are now ubiquitous, hawked by Chinese and only sparingly, typically for front-of-the-shop duties.
Africans traders alike. Chinese supply chains rarely Job opportunities for Chinese workers in Africa stand
connect with local firms or local supply chains. Bring- in stark contrast to the predicament of most Africans,
ing in new goods to the market has enabled Chinese who find it difficult to secure any work. Chinese domi-
wholesalers to stimulate new booms in a range of nance in the consumer retail trade has driven many
items (e.g., mobile phones, bicycles, radios, watches, Africans out of business.
motorcycles) previously out of the reach of the major- Some African companies have reacted by launch-
ity of the poor. For instance, Chinese plastic sandals ing marketing campaigns to persuade consumers to
within a few years have conquered the entire Africa buy African-made products. For example, Holmes
market, altering the daily life of ordinary women and Bros, a Durban-based South African clothing com-
children and relegating a shoeless citizenry to the his- pany, puts a tag on all of its T-shirts saying, “Holmes
torical past. Bros say Cheers China. Thanks for choosing a locally
The Chinese commercial presence is changing the inspired and made product, there’s a whole factory
face of streets and towns throughout Africa. The Chinese of South Africans who're stoked [excited] you did.
footprint is well established in South Africa, where Bye-bye China” (Fig. 12.1).
Chinese wholesalers in Johannesburg operate shop- Chinese penetration into the informal economies
ping hubs that serve suppliers and consumers. across of Africa is a source of considerable resentment among
South Africa and the southern African region. Of African traders, shopkeepers, unions, and activists.
course, this has been facilitated by an earlier Chinese While customers are largely tolerant, many complain
immigrant presence in the country, and opportunities that Chinese merchants do not respect consumer or
in the lucrative South African market have attracted worker rights. Resentment has ignited xenophobic at-
well-financed Chinese entrepreneurs (McNamee tacks against Chinese traders on several occasions
2012). Johannesburg is home to several large Chinese (e.g., in South Africa, Angola, and Zambia in particu-
wholesale complexes (e.g., China City, China Mart, lar). In other places (e.g., Nairobi), the poor quality of
Hong Kong City, African Trade Center, Burma Orient Chinese mobile (counterfeit) handsets has led to anti-
City) that are major suppliers to both formal and in- Chinese demonstrations. Chinese traders have become
formal enterprises. In Nairobi, the Luthuli Avenue the whipping boys for Africa’s politicians, merchants,
 China and Africa 295

fragmentation among Chinese migrants run deep in

Africa, further dispelling a myth of amonolithic China.

CHEERS
Growing tension is observed among Chinese compa-
nies aiming to produce goods with brand recognition
and those specializing in counterfeit global or Chinese
brands. Some Chinese firms are directly counterfeiting

CHINA
other Chinese companies’ merchandise.
Most analysts assume that the Chinese trader phe-
nomenon in Africa will continue on a cyclical path.
When the current crop leave Africa, they will be re-
placed by new immigrant entrepreneurs who will
endure similar hardships to earn incomes that would
have been very difficult to secure back home. At
Thanks for choosing a locally inspired and made
the same time, the lower circuit in Africa’s informal
economies is becoming more crowded with Pakistani,
product, there’s a whole factory of South Africans
Bangladeshi, Vietnamese, and Korean traders, as well
who're stoked you did. Bye-bye China ... by not buying
as Somalis. Somalis have consolidated their positions
something from China, you're preventing massive
in many markets (e.g., townships in South Africa and
carbon emissions that they produce shipping their
inner-city Johannesburg) outside their own country. It
products all over the world! Home is where the heart is
remains to be determined whether the networks and
... So keep it real and keep buying Holmes. Schweet
structures that have expedited the Chinese flow to
FIGURE 12.1 Anti-Chinese Backlash: Holmes Bros Africa will remain as potent and profitable. Some
“Cheers China” Campaign, South Africa. African countries have undercurrents of growing popu-
lar support for indigenization strategies. For example,
Ugandan local shopkeepers unsuccessfully petitioned
and unions. These incidents have not gone unnoticed the government to impose stiff regulation on Chinese
in China. Chinese companies and the Chinese media traders, but in Malawi, a 2012 law bars Chinese traders
have complained that Chinese fly-by-night operators from operating outside of the four main cities.
selling counterfeit goods (e.g., US$10 mobile phones) The Chinese have been made significant inroads
in African markets are souring Africans’ image of into the economic life of ordinary Africans in an ex-
China (Hu 2012). In South Africa, the xenophobic at- traordinary short period of time. Indeed, the rapidity
mosphere prompted many Chinese retailers to display with which Chinese actors adapt to changing circum-
and sell “proudly made in South Africa” merchandise. stances in African locations—no doubt a reflection of
Cutthroat competition among Chinese migrants how the Chinese themselves are able to adapt to fast-
and African firms is driving down prices in the market- paced change in China—continually challenge as-
place, and profit rates are in decline. Chinese traders sumptions about their standing in Africa, and it means
can face uncooperative environments on the ground, that the narrative of the Chinese in Africa is always in
encountering xenophobic and/or corrupt local offi- need of updating (Alden 2012).
cials, and they compete directly with other Chinese and
African firms in a difficult environment. Chinese trad-
THE AFRICAN DIASPORA IN CHINA: AFRICAN
ers in Africa are forging their own pathways, and there is
ENTREPRENEURS IN THE “DRAGON'S DEN”
no way for Beijing to control the multitudes of Chinese
migrants (McNamee 2012). Surveys of Chinese traders Chinese entrepreneurial successes have spilled over
in Africa reveal that many feel abandoned by Beijing and enticed large numbers of Africans to get involved
and Chinese Embassy officials in their host countries in China-Africa trade. A counterflow of African mi-
(McNamee 2012). Indeed, competition and social grants and itinerant traders (mainly West Africans,
296 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGI

especially Nigerians) centering on the fast-growing city traders in Chinese cities indicates that some Africans
of Guangzhou, in southern China, has emerged since are playing an increasingly important role in the ex-
the late 1990s, African migrants arrive despite difficul- change of goods between China and Africa (Haugen
ties in obtaining travel documents and/or short-term 2011). Significantly, North Americans, Argentinians,
visas. By contrast, Chinese entrepreneurs enjoy unob- Filipinos, and others also travel to Guangzhou and
structed travel between Africa and China (Haugen 2011). other Chinese cities to engage in trade relations, but
Steady Africa-to-Guangzhou migration has led to only Africans have created immigrant enclaves. The ex-
the emergence of “Africatown” (locally, districts are la- perience of Africans in China is monitored by Roberto
beled “Chocolate City,” “Little Africa,” and “Guang- Castillo in his blog Africans in China.
zhou’s Harlem”) (Fig. 12.2). Guangzhou’s African Besides entrepreneurial motivations and learning
immigrant population numbers between 20,000 and by replicating the successes of Chinese entrepreneurs,
50,000 permanent residents, most of them bachelors Africans migrate to China because they mistrust
(Haugen 2011). Tens of thousands (60,000 in 2007) of Chinese intermediaries and want to avoid the commu-
other Africans are sojourners arriving for extended nication difficulties involved in arm’s-length trade.
stays to purchase goods, wait on order fulfillments African entrepreneurs who travel to China can gain an
(often six weeks or more), and complete shipment lo- edge in trade back home because they are informed
gistics (check goods to avoid being cheated and com- buyers and understand local African fashion tastes and
plete customs paperwork to their advantage, so as to styles, even though they are at a well-recognized bar-
reduce import duties) (Haugen 2011). Some African gaining disadvantage when dealing with Chinese sup-
traders use networks back home to smuggle goods, pliers compared to the Chinese traders, who drive hard
especially counterfeit merchandise, into their coun- bargains with suppliers. Once in China, African entre-
tries (Yang 2012). The presence of enclaves of African preneurs can obtain product samples and use their
African networks to obtain consumer feedback before
committing to bulk purchases (Haugen 2011). Staying
in China allows African traders to establish direct rela-
tions with Chinese factory showroom people and
wholesalers. Importantly, Africans in China are buyers
and intermediaries but never producers. Some African
entrepreneurs operate as the middle people skilled
in dealing with clients arriving from Africa and/or
Africans switching sourcing points (e.g., from Bangkok
to Guangzhou). ;
There is some evidence that African traders based
in China are shifting their focus to higher-quality
goods, targeting the African middle-class market, and
moving more toward complementary trade (Haugen
2011). It is reported that African traders are more easily
able to hide the origins of goods imported from China
(because of customs contacts), and creative labeling
allows them to pass goods off as European at higher
prices (Haugen 2011). Made-in-China goods have a
reputation for low quality, so African consumers are
unwilling to pay higher prices for “Fong Kong,”
FIGURE 12.2 Africans Seeking their Dream in Guangzhou, whereas European and North American merchandise
China (“Chocolate City”). Source: © Imaginechina/Corbis. enjoys a much better reputation. However, newer
Corbis 42-50360355. Chinese brands such as Huawei and ZTE are building
 China and Africa 297

stellar reputations with African consumers, so reputa- African Highway (across nine countries along the
tion is also subject to change. coastlines of a region stretching from Senegal to Nigeria)
Researchers have documented African entrepre- and rehabilitating the Zambia-to-Tanzania (Tazara)
neurs traveling to China to diversify their portfolios. A railway. China’s infrastructural investments rose steadily
direct China link provides an informed opportunity to from US$500 million in 2001 to US$7 billion in 2006
diversify manufacturing and sales back home. They (Foster et al. 2009), and Beijing has pledged US$20
detail it as happening in the following way: a Nigerian billion for investments in infrastructure and farming
producer manufactures shirts in Port Harcourt, but be- for 2013-15.
cause he cannot compete with Chinese prices and Importantly, in several cases, Chinese infrastruc-
quality, he buys one run in China and produces a tural finance is packaged with natural resource develop-
lower-quality imitation of this run in his own factory ment, making use of the mechanism referred to as the
back home (Lyons, Brown, and Zhigang 2012). “Angolan mode.” With such resources-for-infrastructure
Business and life are hard for African entrepre- swaps, African governments do not have to wait for
neurs in China. Many struggle and live in humble their infrastructure until they have the money; instead,
single rooms with cramped conditions and operate building starts immediately on the basis of a natural
within a very different cultural context. There is a strik- resource guarantee. China has underwritten a diverse
ing similarity with the way many Chinese traders oper- range of infrastructural projects (e.g., dams, govern-
ate in Africa. African entrepreneurs have to deal with ment buildings, stadiums, roads, railway lines, housing,
currency fluctuations vis-a-vis their national currency industrial estates), gaining the goodwill of African gov-
and the dollar, and the dollar and the Chinese yuan. ernments, and has supplied some of the infrastructure
Thus, a Nigerian entrepreneur has to convert nairas to that allows the resources to be exported (See Box 12.1
dollars and dollars to yuans, and currency fluctuations for a case study of China’s stadium spending and
can be a boom or boon depending on exchange rates Box 12.2 for China’s lead in developing an industrial
(Neuwirth 2012). Despite all the odds, some Africans estate or special economic zone just outside Lagos
are making it and reaping considerable profits from (Nigeria)). This has helped fuel a commodity boom
this dimension of China—Africa trade. and windfall to African governments and has provided
needed supplies to Chinese industries. Some Chinese
infrastructural projects have been caught up in corrup-
CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS
tion scandals, and questions about the quality of con-
TO AFRICA: BUILDING BRIDGES? struction often surface, but for the most part, Chinese
Chinese infrastructure investments capture most of the funding is delivering badly needed infrastructure in a
news headlines about China’s engagement in Africa. timely manner.
Despite the importance of Chinese finance for African Infrastructure is a key priority in Africa, and im-
infrastructure projects, relatively little is known about proving the base is critical to achieving the MDGs. The
their precise value and about surrounding infrastruc- region suffers from critical infrastructure deficits com-
tural commitments. China has invested in more than pared to its world peers. The absence of infrastructure
50 infrastructure projects with over a half a million (from roads to railways, ports, airports, dams, electri-
dollars. Thirty-five countries are negotiating with city, sanitation, and informational systems) deters for-
China on infrastructural finance deals (Foster et al. eign investment, hinders economic development, and
2009). Some of the highest-value projects include an shaves 2% off countries’ per capita gross domestic
US$8.5 billion railway modernization project in Nigeria; product (GDP) growth rates per year (Foster et al.
a US$1.5 billion transport infrastructure upgrade (in- 2009). Infrastructure deficits make it difficult to achieve
cludes 754 roads) in Angola, and the building of the economic diversification and they impede national
US$500 million Entebbe-to-Kampala highway in and regional integration efforts. As a consequence,
Uganda. Several recent announcements have been Africans pay a premium for power, water, phone,
made for regional projects, such as building the West mobile phone, and Internet services compared to other
298 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 12.1. CHINA’S STADIUM DIPLOMACY as a source of national pride and achievement that allows for
hosting international spectacles and provides opportunities for
Turnkey stadium projects funded and built by Chinese aid dol- place promotion. A stadium with a capacity of 42,000 was built
lars are now common throughout Africa (and Latin America and by the Chinese in Maputo (Mozambique) (Fig. 12.3). Outside this
Asia). China has been building sports arenas in Africa (referred stadium, a sign proclaims, in Chinese and Portuguese, that “the
to as “Friendship Stadiums”) since the 1970s. The Chinese built friendship between China and Mozambique will last forever like
the Stade des Martyrs de Pentecost (formerly Kamanyola Stadium) heaven and earth” (quoted in Will 2012:37).
in Kinshasa, DRC, in 1993. It was regarded as “the African cathe- Despite these benefits, China’s stadium diplomacy has been
dral of football” until South Africans built state-of-the-art facili- heavily criticized. Chinese-built stadiums serve as catalysts for
ties for the 2010 Fédération Internationale de Football advancing Beijing's One-China policy. Although the Chinese are
Association [FIFA] World Cup. In terms of total costs, stadiums admired for their engineering expertise and efficient construc-
are a minor component of Chinese infrastructural investments, tion practices to deliver stadiums on time (or ahead of time),
but they are immensely symbolic and popular. many observers note that local workers are involved sparingly
China had built 58 stadiums in 31 African countries by 2012. and only in unskilled capacities. For example, in an Angolan sta-
Its stadium diplomacy intensified after 2000 and stadium sup- dium project, the Chinese brought in 700 overseers, engineers,
port is now enlarging. Beijing built the stadiums for the most and laborers and hired only 250 Angolan laborers (Will 2012:37).
recent African Cup of Nations (e.g., Mali, 2002; Ghana, 2008; Beijing justified its disproportionate reliance on imported pro-
Angola, 2010; Equatorial Guinea/Gabon, 2012), which is the fessional staff and skilled labor on the basis that few skilled
regional international soccer competition held every two years. workers were available in Angola,-a country that only recently
China is also behind stadiums for the All-African Games (Abuja, emerged from civil conflict. (Other SOEs also operate with few
2003, and Mozambique, 2011), a multisports international com- local linkages to domestic suppliers and without the training of
petition held every four years. In addition, Beijing funds the up- domestic workers.) Stadiums appear to be components of
grading of old stadiums (e.g., US$12 million to upgrade Moi secret swap agreements that repay the investor with natural re-
International Sports Stadium in Nairobi, Kenya). Typically, nomi-
sources. Besides the architectural feat and display of a shiny new
nations to host pan-African sports spectacles are put forward by stadium, it is not clear that stadiums actually benefit sports in
bidders who have already obtained a commitment from the respective countries. Sport teams have not been able to change
Chinese to underwrite the costs of new stadiums. The state- their operating models to make the large venues viable. National
owned Shanghai Construction Group and Beijing Construction and club teams cannot afford to take on maintenance of these
are the big players in building these stadiums. Five stadiums
stadiums, and many become expensive white elephant projects,
were completed in 2012; among them were two stadiums in
falling into decay and disrepair after staging showcase interna-
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to enable them to co-host the
tional events. Questions have also been raised about construc-
2012 African Cup of Nations, and Ndola Stadium was com-
tion standards. For example, FIFA pointed to serious flaws and
pleted in the regional capital of the copper belt in Zambia. More
weaknesses in DRC’s national stadium and threatened to close it
stadiums are slated for construction (e.g., a 40,000-seat stadium
until substantial improvements were made.
in Lilongwe, Malawi).
The construction of stadiums is included under a public build-
ing rubric, one of six key areas prioritized in Chinese foreign aid
budgets. The Chinese assume responsibility for the entire pro-
cess, from initial planning to completion. They take responsibil-
ity for feasibility studies, design and construction, proof of
reliability of equipment and construction materials, and provi-
sion of technical and construction experts to organize, lead, and
execute the project.
New stadiums benefit both recipient and donor. The recipient
state and its people obtain a new stadium, which would other-
wise be unaffordable or possible only through a reallocation of
national spending priorities. In most cases, China gifts the stadi-
ums or provides interest-free assistance so that the recipient
does not have long-term interest repayment obligations. The re-
cipient gets immediate access to capital and technical expertise,
which is valuable to governments with an eye on the electoral FIGURE 12.3> National Stadium, Maputo,
calendar. Moreover, the physical structure holds symbolic signifi- Mozambique. Source: © Liu Dalong/Xinhua Press/Corbis.
cance, serving as a permanent reminder of China’s goodwill and Corbis 42-27129159.
 China and Africa 299

China's stadium diplomacy is a vehicle for soft power and a ways. Indirect benefits to Chinese companies were seen, for in-
bargaining chip for access to African markets and resources. stance, when the Angolan government contracted Zoomlion (a
China conveniently responds to African elites’ desire for show- Chinese waste management subsidiary company headquartered
case tangible deliverables and to the oversupply of infrastructure in Ghana) for stadium waste collection during the 2010 African
firms/labor within its own country by offering them opportunities Cup of Nations. China's stadium policy delivers tangible projects
to enter new markets. Many Chinese companies are successful that have high visibility and initially are viewed positively. How-
in staying on after projects end, when they can compete for ever, over the longer term, if stadiums fall into decay, China may
work in infrastructural projects (Alden 2012). be viewed as carting off African raw materials and neglecting to
China deliberately assumes a low profile during sporting train domestic laborers. Bad feelings about broken gifts may
events hosted on African soil; its benefits are realized in other well arise.

BOX 12.2 A PATHWAY TO ECONOMIC The most ambitious SEZ in Africa is the Lekki Free Trade
DEVELOPMENT: CHINA'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC Zone, located 37 miles (60 km) east of Lagos. Lekki, with the
ZONE IN LEKKI, NIGERIA Atlantic Ocean to the south and the Lekki Lagoon to the north,
represents an area that is prime for tourism and real estate de-
The export of Chinese special economic zones (SEZs) to Africa
velopment. Lagos state government provided the land (40,772
was adopted as an official policy at the Forum on China-Africa
acres [16,500 hectares]), and a Chinese consortium is building
Cooperation in 2006. Six experimental Chinese SEZs were, as of
the project. The free trade zone is a key component of an ambi-
2012, in the development phase: two in Nigeria (Lekki and Ogun),
tious multiuse development plan on the Lekki Peninsula (four
two in Zambia (Chambishi and Lusaka), one in Mauritius (Jinfei),
times the size of Manhattan) that includes a plan for a new city
and one in Ethiopia (Oriental Eastern). A framework for introduc-
(the estimated future population of metropolitan Lagos is
ing Chinese SEZs evolved through a working relationship among
110,000), serviced by major infrastructure to be completed by
the Chinese government, African governments, and Chinese en-
2015, including a new airport (Lekki-Epe International Airport),
terprises. China’s light manufacturing as an emerging footprint is
a deepwater port (Lekki-Tolarum Port), and a modern express-
the latest chapter in China's engagement with the region: it sig-
way directly linked to Lagos (a new light rail link is also under
nals an entirely different development phase (Gu 2011). consideration). The Lekki development aims to be the Nigerian
Chinese SEZs were introduced despite the lackluster prior ex- future, “the Dubai of West Africa.” US$1.1 trillion has been re-
periments by African governments to implement 90 national portedly invested by 48 international/domestic investors (Busi-
export-processing zones in 20 African countries. Export-processing ness & Maritime West Africa 2012), but reports on the ground
zones in Mauritius and Madagascar are regarded as African suc- indicate a much slower uptake than one would expect.
cesses and exceptions. In some countries (e.g., Ghana, Senegal), The Lekki Free Trade Zone is a joint venture between Chinese
zones are operating partially, and in other countries (e.g., Kenya, companies (60% share) and Nigerian interests (40% share) (di-
Zambia), zones have been abandoned. Nigerian export-processing vided between the Lagos state government and Lekki World-
zones have not delivered to date. Poor infrastructure, limited wide Investments). The Chinese consortium comprises the China
political support, planning shortfalls, lack of a critical mass of Railway Construction Corporation, the Nanjing Jiangning
investors, and deficiencies in the skill levels of local labor explain Economic and Technological Development Corporation, and
many of the major problems encountered in the early African Nanjing Beyond Investment.
export-processing zone experiments. The zone targets four sectors: (1) light industry (e.g., furniture,
Chinese motivations are multidimensional. Officially, Beijing textiles, garments, footwear, household appliances, construction
touts the mutual benefits and partnership for development, but and building materials, and other consumer products); (2) motor
it is clear that Chinese small and medium-sized enterprises face vehicle assembly; (3) warehousing and logistics for a range of indus-
intense competition in their home markets, motivating their tries, including petroleum; and (4) real estate development. The
strong entrepreneurial spirit and investment in African zones (Gu aim is to revitalize the Nigerian manufacturing sector and to diver-
2011). Enclave development is not part of China’s “Go Out” sify the economic base to help reduce the country's dependence
strategy because the latter was aimed at SOEs and market lead- on imports (90% of consumer goods are imported). Lagos officials
ers. Instead, SEZs are pitched at small and medium-sized enter- believe that they can benefit from Chinese experience and exper-
prises, offering an alternative for these manufacturers in the tise in zone development and management as well as from Chinese
context of rising land and labor costs on the mainland. More- investments in manufacturing and services, which offer the poten-
over, clustering Chinese firms within a new industrial enclave tial to link domestic manufacturers to China’s global supply chains.
offers benefits of mutual support and synergy.
(Continued)
300 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGI

BOX 12.2 (Continued) products” in order to take advantage of trade concessions and
gain access to U.S. and European markets. There is evidence that
Generous incentives are offered to attract firms (100% tax Chinese private firms prefer to locate outside China's zones to
holiday from all Nigerian duties, permission to sell 100% of remain free from Chinese authorities’ oversight. Moreover, many
goods in the Nigerian market, 100% repatriation of profits and Chinese and international firms are reluctant to bear the cost of
royalties, duty-free imports, raw materials, and components for the zone (rents and utilities) should Lekki remain underpopulated.
goods to be re-exported, and, controversially, a prohibition on It may take more than trophy projects to solve African manu-
strikes and lockouts for 10 years) (World Bank 2011). Developers facturing problems. To begin with, African political and economic
tout the geographical advantages of Lekki, which can provide contexts are very different than China’s, and the conditions that
excellent access to serve as a gateway to the growing West dictated the success of SEZs in China are not present in Africa.
African middle-class market. These include long-terms coordination between development
Still under development, it is premature to assess the this proj- authorities and provincial and national governments, integration
ect. Developers acknowledge struggling to attract Chinese private of industrial policy within national development, a well-developed
investors as well as others. It remains to be determined whether manufacturing base, and good transportation infrastructure.
Chinese expertise can be harnessed to jump-start local investment Nevertheless, the prospect of China shifting some of its manufac-
and boost manufacturing capacity. Development experts are turing base to Africa is not as far-fetched as it sounds: deindustri-
skeptical about Chinese zones’ ability to contribute to an African alization and reindustrialization have been consistent features of
industrial revival. Many fear that Lekki may be primarily used for global industrial geographies for some time now.
the reshipment of Chinese products to be relabeled as “African

consumers in the developing world. Substantial invest- in Africa has greatly facilitated the resource boom in
ments (over US$100 billion per year) are needed to Africa, and some of this infrastructure will be impor-
build new infrastructure, refurbish dilapidated assets, tant to kick-starting manufacturing industry in the
and maintain all existing and new installations. region. Mutual benefit seems to drive these infrastruc-
Sectors that have been heavily targeted include ture deals, where new infrastructure will generate busi-
power (mainly hydropower), transport (especially rail- ness that will be important to both Africans and the
ways), and telecommunications. According to the U.S. Chinese. Most importantly, China has built infrastruc-
intelligence analysis company Stratfor, since 2010 rail- ture at a time when Western countries have shifted
roads and roads account for 19% of total Chinese in- their emphasis away from large-scale development
frastructural investments, followed by hydroelectric projects.
dams at 9% and civic construction projects at 6% of Nova Cidade de Kilamba is a new town being built
total foreign development investment (Fig. 12.4). 18 miles (30 km) outside Luanda, the capital of Angola
Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia have over US$10 billion (See Figure 12.5). The site is close to a Chinese interna-
of projects under current development, and the DRC, tional airport under construction that, upon comple-
Angola, and South African, all resource-rich countries, tion, will be largest international airport in Africa.
are also prioritized. Despite high levels of Chinese FDI Built by the SOE China International Trust and Inter-
anti-Chinese feelings intensify from time to time in national Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC),
numerous African countries, especially Zambia (See this US$3.5 billion project involves 12,000 Chinese
Box 12.3 for a case study of China-Zambia relations). workers (CITIC Construction 2012). The development
Chinese investments in African infrastructure have spans 12,355 acres (5,000 hectares) and is the first of
produced a complementarity among (1) African eco- Angola’s new “satellite cities.” Consisting of 750 eight-
nomic needs, (2) China’s large globally competitive story apartment buildings (2,000 will eventually be
construction industry, which was encouraged to “go built), a dozen schools, and 100 retail units in 2012
out” given competition in China’s markets, and (3) the (Redvers 2012), the project will be the largest new resi-
emergence of what some media have called China's dential project on the continent when complete.
own “ghost projects,” where the construction market Most facts about the project are murky. Reports
appears to be saturated as projects have been built far vary on how many people will be accommodated in
ahead of demand. China’s infrastructural investment Kilamba. (The BBC estimates 500,000, whereas CCTV

t
 China and Africa 301

CHINESE INVESTMENT OFFERS IN AFRICA SINCE 2010

(@ MAURITANIA

cunea 3) an
SIERRA e,, @
LEONE
LIBERIA
NIGERIA gy)
CAMEROON ~

PERCENT OF CHINESE
ESTIMATED OFFERS INVESTMENT BY SECTOR

© Less than $500 million 19.00% €) Oil and natural gas

$500 million to $1 billion 18.55% @ Rail/road
3 $1 billion to $5 billion
BB $5 billion to $10 billion
10.00% €} Other mining
More than $10 billion 9.20% (% Hydroelectric dams
*Estimated offer total: $101 billion 7.40% @ Iron ore
6.90% @ Copper
5.90% Civil construction
3.70% (® Manufacturing
2.30% @ Uranium
NAMIBIA >
2.00% GY Airports
1.80% © Aid
1.60% @ Port construction
0.70% @ Gold
0.50% © Water
11.00% © Other
SOUTH
@ Complete AFRICA

Note: The data in this map is based on an estimate of high-level Chinese

Investment, loan and aid deals with Africa.

FIGURE 12.4 Chinese Sector Investments in Africa, 2010-2012. Source: Adapted from Stratfor 2012.

puts the number at 210,000 people.) CITIC and the The slow uptake in purchases (due to costs, lack of
Angolan government claim that the project is a social mortgages, and delays in titling) has given rise to media
housing effort (to provide housing for the poor), but claims of “Africa's first ghost city” (Medina 2012).
it seems otherwise: apartments are listed at between The project is mired in controversies on both sides.
US$125,000 and US$200,000, out of the reach of Initially promoted as a government social housing
most Angolans (who earn on average US$2 per day). project, it was handed over to the state-run oil company
302 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 12.3 CHINA AND ZAMBIA RELATIONS

China became a major investor in textiles in Zambia, establish-
Zambia is a high-profile player in China—Africa relations. It is one ing the Mulungushi textile factory in Kabwe in the 1980s. In its
of the most urbanized countries in Africa yet one of the poorest. heyday, the plant was the largest textile mill in the country, man-
GDP per capita is US$1,500, and approximately two thirds of ufacturing 17 million meters of fabric and 100,000 pieces of
Zambians live below the poverty line. Zambia is landlocked and clothing annually, employing 2,000 workers, and linking thou-
is highly dependent on resource exports, copper accounting for sands of cotton growers; in addition, the factory won interna-
74% of them (Gadzala 2012:43). Mining has traditionally been tional acclaim for the quality of its cloth. Initially the factory was
the engine of economic growth. Following independence in a turnkey operation for the Zambian government, but it was run
1964, the country made great strides in developing the copper as a joint venture after 1997, when it ran into operational difficul-
belt from an area of bush to a dynamic industrial region. By ties. By 2007, the factory could no longer compete with cheaper
1969, Zambia was classified as a middle-income country, with textiles coming out of Asia, and it closed its doors (2007-14). In
one of highest GDPs in the region. At the time, Zambia was 2014 a Tanzanian private investor leased the Mulungushi textile
labeled an African success story in industrial development. factory and plans to resume full production.
Despite this early progress, development halted in the early Chinese investments in Zambia intensified after 2000, and
1970s with the collapse of copper prices. Zambia was forced to more than 200 Chinese companies operated in the country as of
borrow heavily, leading to serious indebtedness. Between 1974 2009 (Carmody 2011:161). Chinese investors target mining, but
and 1994, per capita income declined by 50%, and Zambia became they are also pouring money into construction (roads, railways,
the 25th poorest country in the world (2012). The country became airports, schools, hospitals), tourism, and agriculture. Chinese
heavily reliant on foreign aid conditioned on the privatization of investments in agricultural land have accelerated in recent years;
state-owned enterprises. Complying with the new policy environ- at least 23 Chinese farms are operational in Zambia (Spieldoch
ment, the Zambian government implemented liberal investment and Murphy 2009:42). An investment to grow jatropha on 2 mil-
acts in 1995 and 2006, allowing the repatriation of all profits and lion acres (809,271. hectares) has generated significant contro-
royalties and permitting investors to bring in labor. These policy versy (Carmody 2011:162). Older investments, however, have
inducements opened up the economy to outside investors at the been deemed successful; for example, China State Farm and
time when China’‘s “Go Out” strategy was in full swing. Agribusiness Corporation’s investment in the China-Zambia
Beijing has an early track record of engaging people in this “friendship farm,” a 1,648 acres (667-hectare) farm located out-
part of Africa. Ties began when China provided financial assis- side Lusaka that produces wheat, soybeans, and corn for the
tance and support to the liberation struggle against Britain, the local market. China’s SEZs in Chambishi (concentrating on
colonial ruler of the territory known at that time as Northern copper/cobalt processing and electronics) and Lusaka (concen-
Rhodesia. China deepened its ties by providing assistance to trating on garments, appliances, tobacco, and electronics) are
newly independent Zambia. A benchmark in Sino-Zambian col- mixed success stories, with slower-than-expected uptake of in-
laboration was the 1965 bilateral agreement to build the Tanzania- vestors (Brautigam and Xiao Yang 2011).
to-Zambia railway (Tazara), linking the port of Dar es Salaam Zambian presidents (e.g., President Mwanawasa in 2007) have
(Tanzania) to the town of Kapiri Mposhi (Zambia). Project financ- routinely described China as an “all-weather friend.” Despite
ing was shared in equal parts, and work began in 1968 and was China's official declarations of “mutual friendship and coopera-
completed by 1976. Construction of this 1,160-mile (1,860 km) tion,” investments totaling US$21 billion in 2012, and the pur-
railway system involved 50,000 Chinese laborers. The railway ported creation of 50,000 jobs (Embassy of the People’s
line established a direct connection between the landlocked Republic of China in the Republic of Zambia 2012), anti-Chinese
Zambian copper belt and a port, thereby avoiding transporta- tensions have been simmering for years, and Sino-Zambian rela-
tion across territories controlled by white governments in tions have trouble spots. For example, in 2005, an explosion at
Rhodesia and South Africa. Tazara facilitated the export of a Chinese explosives company serving the Chambishi mines
copper, providing an important mineral to China, and helped killed 51 workers, making it one of the Zambia’s worst-ever
Zambians obtain good port access, which became very impor- accidents. In 2011, two Chinese managers were charged with
tant following the closure of traditional routes when sanctions 13 counts of attempted murder after firing into a crowd of
were imposed on apartheid South Africa and Southern Rhodesia miners during a pay dispute riot. Even though the charges were
(Carmody 2011). More recently, Beijing forgave some of the dropped, rumors about the mine owners settling out of court
debt associated with Tazara’s construction, no doubt motivated with the families of the victims have fanned anti-Chinese senti-
by China’s (the world’s largest consumer of copper) strategic ments (Taylor 2012). In 2012, relations threatened to plummet
need to maintain access to Zambian copper and by its consider- again when Zambian miners killed a Chinese manager and shot
able on-the-ground mining investments. The latter appear to be another during a wage protest at a Chinese privately owned coal
intensifying since the 2008-09 global economic downturn, when mine in Sinazongwe, 200 miles (325 km) south of Lusaka. Re-
Chinese capitalists moved to acquire many foreign operations. ports confirm that miners in Chinese-owned operations are paid
 China and Africa 303

between one-third and one-sixth less than workers at non-Chinese Perhaps the greatest problem in Sino-Zambian relations stems
operations (but still above national minimum wage levels) from the confidential nature of the bilateral agreements between
(Human Rights Watch 2011); wage differentials serve as a basis the two countries; the details are not available for public scrutiny,
of ongoing labor tensions. Human Rights Watch (2011:1) pro- even though both countries are, on paper, committed to public
duced a scathing report of conditions in Chinese mining oper- transparency and accountability. Analysts consider these bilateral
ations throughout the country, emphasizing poor health and agreements to be tilted in China’s favor, and project identifica-
safety standards and labor conditions: “poor ventilation that can tion and selection are based more on ad hoc consultations rather
lead to serious lung diseases, hours of work in excess of Zambia than on any coherent development strategy. It is worrisome that
law and the threat of being fired should workers refuse to work many or most Zambian authorities lack the capacity and skills for
in unsafe places. Injuries and negative health consequences are national plan formulation, coordination, and monitoring.
not uncommon, although many incidents are not reported to the There are winners and losers on the Zambian side of Sino-
government, in violation of Zambian and international labor law. Zambian relations. The Zambian government reaps increased
The troubling situation stems largely from the attitudes of Chinese- investments, improved infrastructure, and more trade taxes, but,
owned and run companies in Zambia, which have tended to in the process, it forgoes income tax revenues and undermines
treat safety and health measures as trivial.” Furthermore, popu- domestic companies and jobs that cannot compete with global
lar claims that the Chinese create the least-skilled jobs persist; competition. The key losers are local producers, who in the short
for example, in building the Ndola “China-Zambia Friendship term benefit from less expensive Chinese inputs but in the long
Stadium,” “the bricklayers for the project were Chinese while term cannot compete with Chinese producers, who dominate
Zambians were confined to mixing cement” (Carmody 2011:172). the local market with cheaper imports. Local labor, trade unions,
Routinely, workers employed by Chinese firms work 78 hours domestic firms, and their workers lose out because they cannot
per week—some 30 hours in excess of the national law—and compete. Local contractors also lose out on the basis of the con-
working 365 days per year is not atypical. ditions written into the bilateral deals and, in turn, are disadvan-
Anti-Chinese feelings have become a consistent theme is taged by their lack of access to inexpensive capital. Academics
recent national Zambian elections. Michael Sata, a challenger and some civil society organizations take a more middle-ground
in several presidential elections, took an anti-China stance in perspective, realizing the balance of positive and negative fac-
campaigning, feeding on popular sentiments about the under- tors involved in China’s engagement (Mwanawina 2008).
payment of Zambian workers and the unfair competition that Although Zambia is an interesting case study and is often used
forces Zambian firms out of business. Sata’s campaigning was as a telling example in Western media’s negative portrayal of
especially popular in the copper belt and among the urban China—Africa relations, it cannot be taken to represent all of
poor. He claimed that “Zambia was becoming a province—no, Africa. Indeed, Kenyans, Sudanese, and Nigerians, to mention a
a district—of China” and noted that “the Chinese are not here few, have highly positive and nuanced views of Chinese activi-
as investors but invaders” (quoted in Sautman and Hairong ties in their respective countries (Sautman and Hairong 2009).
2009:756, 751). Sata toned down his rhetoric in successive Sautman and Hairong (2009) contend that negative attitudes
campaigns (especially the 2011 campaign), and after several toward the Chinese have more to do with opposition parties
attempts, he won the presidency in 2011. On taking office, playing the China card, Western media picking up on this and
however, he moderated his anti-China platform and adopted a reinforcing it, and then the African media reaffirming the bias in
pragmatic approach to the broad relationship, moving more the Western media. Indeed, studies show that the British media
toward constructive engagement after two years in office. Nev- are generally positive about Western actions in Africa and dispar-
ertheless, the Sata government has raised minimum wages and aging about Chinese activities (Mawdsley 2007). Critical reflection
is pushing for increasing the government's share in mining shows that the media have a geographically uneven and partial
ownership. Chinese companies are keenly aware that using focus by which positive elements are downplayed (debt cancella-
Chinese labor is controversial but justify their use of mainland tion, investment, commodity price impacts, support for a greater
China workers based on their productivity levels, higher skills, international voice) and problems are highlighted (in line with
and cultural affinity. Western media coverage of the general region) (Mawdsley 2007).

Sonangol, which in turn contracted its real estate arm, the government decided to speed up occupancy of the
Delta Imobilidria, to sell the units (see http:// units by publishing a list of 550 priority-access indi-
deltaimobiliaria.co.ao/detalhe_emp.aspx?empid=1). viduals (academics, doctors, journalists, and entertain-
Opposition newspapers and political party members be- ers). However, none on the list qualified for social
lieve high-ranking government officials have usurped the housing, and inclusion on the list of a deceased newspa-
project and claim that the government is paying for the per editor raised alarm bells (Mail and Guardian 2012).
project with oil credits. Attempting to deflect criticism, It is further alleged that Manuel Vicente, the vice
304 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

West has continuing influence). There are no historical

precedents in the region. We cannot compare China’s
engagements in Africa to those of France, Britain, or
the United States: Chinese activities in the region are
simply different and exceptional. It is not productive
to label China’s relations with Africa as either positive
or negative; the reality is very complicated, with both
challenges and opportunities (Table 12.1). As Chinese
players become further entrenched in Africa affairs,
they, too, will undergo the learning processes that
other external powers have experienced. Many under-
lying issues and tensions in the China—Africa dynamic
FIGURE 12.5 Kilamba Kiaxi Housing Development. remain to be examined and managed.
Source: © SIPHIWE SIBEKO/Reuters/Corbis. Corbis
42-49899646.
TABLE 12.1 WEIGHING UP CHINESE ENGAGEMENTS

Opportunities
president and potential successor to President Dos
Santos, is a major shareholder in Delta (Mail and e Investment
¢ Infrastructural projects (e.g., establishment of key intra- and
Guardian 2012).
interstate trade routes where none previously existed and of
Chinese players in the project have also faced con- an information superhighway)
troversy (Murray et al. 2011) regarding the role of a ¢ Special economic zones
mysterious Hong Kong-based company, the China In- e Business acumen (work ethic, entrepreneurial spirit, global

ternational Fund, which offers financing for infra- supply networks, business planning)
e Expertise and global supply models and access to European
structure projects for oil and mineral concessions.
and U.S. markets and trade concessions
The China International Fund is allegedly linked to the ¢ Increase in consumer purchasing power (availability of a range
Chinese government and is criticized heavily in the of affordable Chinese goods)
Chinese media for not delivering on its infrastructural ¢ Creation ofjobs (limited)
promises. e Counterbalance to the idea that the West is best or knows
best
Kilamba is a vanity project that the government
e Possibility for South-South cooperation
shows off to many visiting dignitaries, such as the
Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki-moon. Many crit- Challenges

ics charge that high-rise apartment living is unsuited © Poor labor relations ‘
for larger Angolan families and cultural contexts. The ¢ Poor environmental and health and safety standards
project appears to have been rushed to serve a political ¢ Displacement of African workers and offloading of formal
workers into the informal economy, thereby increasing
agenda, and local architects and communities were not unemployment
consulted. Bad press about the project on social net- ¢ Lack of skills transfer
working sites raises a question about whether this type ¢ Competition with local industries and limited local supplier
of project improves Angola’s or China’s reputation. linkages
¢ Use of second-hand industrial equipment, resulting in
CONCLUSIONS lower-quality production
e Enclave developments
The pace and scale of Chinese undertakings in Africa ¢ Lack of transparency and bilateral deals with the elite (civil
are breathtaking. For the first time in the region’s his- society is excluded)
tory, countries’ development trajectories are being ¢ Uncertainty about who is in charge and what the role of
driven by another developing country and its citizens Africans is
e Reproduction of dependency relations
rather than by developed countries (even though the Ee
a ee
 China and Africa 305

The official language of China—Africa engagement in the context of global integration, but we know that
has been updated over time and differs greatly from Africa is a different region and that what worked in
the language that was associated with European China may not work, directly applied, to Africa.
powers’ colonial incursion into Africa. The 2013 White China's extending footprint raises many important
Paper by Beijing's China-Africa Trade Cooperation in- issues. Who in Africa is engaging with whom in or
cludes language about expanding foreign investment from China, and where, is a critical consideration. The
and trade cooperation to support sustainable develop- prospect of Chinese engagement can be a tantalizing
ment in Africa, increasing development assistance to opportunity or a terrifying threat (Naidu and Mbazima
benefit more African people, supporting the African 2008:759). For some of Africa's citizens, it decreases
integration process, helping Africa enhance its capacity livelihood security. For some political elites, Chinese
for overall development, and strengthening people-to- investment levels the playing field and enhances
people friendships to lay a solid foundation of public Africa’s international leverage. For others, China’s in-
support for enhancing common development and volvement is yet another example of an outside coun-
promoting African peace and stability (The Peoples’ try appropriating Africa's resources while consolidating
Republic of China 2013). its own power. Ultimately, as Sino-African relations
Engagements by China and other BRIC (Brazil, deepen, the complex interactions must be assessed in
Russia, India and China) nations with Africa offer an terms of how they contribute to poverty reduction and
unprecedented opportunity to deploy all means achievement of the MDGs and how they affect Africans’
available to achieve development. Chinese ties can lives and agency at home as well as in the international
provide a welcome alternative to entrenched patterns arena.
of trade for investment in the region. While Sino- Some aspects of the Africa-China trade and invest-
African relationships come without the historical ment dynamic appear to be in an early process of re-
baggage of the West, they bring other challenges; for structuring, which may mean that Chinese investments
example, cultural differences, shorter histories of in African mineral resources will not increase at the
face-to-face interactions, unrealistic expectations, and accelerated rate that they did from the 2000s onwards.
international pressures to conform to Western devel- As China’s economy slows, its priorities are shifting
opment policy advice. Official Chinese government from resource capital spending to domestic consumer
engagement has operated via African government spending. Already this switch is decreasing many com-
elites, and this is a contentious and potentially explo- modity prices (e.g., copper and iron ore). Africa’s
sive issue that has so far been deflected. There will be resource economies are likely to be doubly affected by
mounting pressures from diverse constituencies, es- reductions in Chinese resource investments and declines
pecially civil society, to engage with the China-Africa in commodity receipts (except oil). Slowdowns in the
dynamic. Brazilian and Indian economies could add additional
Change and adaptability are going to be the hall- pressures and undermine Africa’s growth trajectory.
marks of African development in the 21st century. African However, Beijing's emphasis on consumer spending
governments and civil society must learn quickly from could result in different adjustments, such as increas-
experiences on the ground and ensure that dynamism ing Chinese demand for African oil and natural gas
is built into development partnerships. A shift is well and switching from an emphasis on resource invest-
under way: the Chinese state is being superseded by ment toward African light manufacturing and textile
the Chinese private sector in Africa. This dynamism is production.
very different from relationships of the past, which Although China has an African policy and indi-
tended to be static (e.g., colonial and Development vidual African country strategies, African states do not
Assistance Committee relationships). In many ways, have the equivalent. African states must develop
China’s own development experience shows that it is a China strategy to manage the challenges and oppor-
possible to adapt and to tackle national development tunities. To date, Africans have been acting toward
306 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

China’s expansion in a reactive and ad hoc manner 1YTAWMDEscDosYTosbTo=/show.vsml (accessed

rather than within national development frameworks. December 25, 2012).
There is mounting evidence that many aspects of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the
China-—Africa dynamic are dependent relationships in Republic of Zambia. 2012. H.E. Chinese Ambassa-
the making: African agency is much less evident. Given dor Zhou Yuxiao lecture for Zambian University
this tilt, it may be productive for African states to move students, April 3, 2012. Available at http://zm
beyond dealing with China bilaterally. Perhaps there .chineseembassy.org/eng/sgzxdthxx/t920669.htm
would be some room for maneuverability and agency (accessed December 5, 2012).
if African states engaged China on a regional basis as Foster, V., W. Butterfield, C. Chen, and N. Puhak. 2009.
well as bilaterally (within a national development Building Bridges: China's Growing Role as Infrastruc-
framework). However, the prospect for civil society en- ture Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington,
gagement with China appears unlikely at this point. D.C.: World Bank.
Gadzala, A. 2012. “From Formal- to Informal-Sector Em-
ployment: Examining the Chinese Presence in
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Taylor, I. 2011. The Forum in China-Africa Cooperation WEBSITES

, (FOCAC). New York: Routledge. Lekki Free Trade Zone. http://www.youtube.com/
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Will, R. 2012. “China’s Stadium Diplomacy.” World guardian.com/global-development/video/2013/
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World Bank. 2011. Chinese Investments in Special (accessed December 6, 2013). Video on China’s
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Lessons Learned. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Roberto Castillo. Africans in China. http ://afticansinchina |
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G. Ribeiro, and C. Vega, pp. 154-170. ‘New York:
Routledge.

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AFRICAN FUTURES

INTRODUCTION
choosing. Such enhanced agency has enabled Africa
2018 will be a benchmark year for Africa: the contem- states to become full-fledged players in international
porary independence era (1951-2018) will have lasted relations rather than remaining objects of other nations’
as long as the colonial interlude (1884-1951). Despite foreign policies (Severino and Ray 2011). This new era is
the passing of time, the broad subordinate and asym- the dawn of a second independence for Africa.
metrical relationship that tied Africa to the great Long perceived as marginal to international rela-
powers of the 20th century, including the United States tions, Africa is becoming a strategic region. There is in-
and the former Soviet Union as well as the Europeans creasing competition among an enlarged group of powers
(in terms of economic specializations, trade, foreign to engage Africa at a scale not witnessed since the original
investment, brain drain, and external oversight), has “scramble for Africa.” Important decisions are still made
remained intact until recently. in London, Paris, Berlin, and Washington, D.C.—capitals
There are encouraging signs that some elements of 20th-century great powers—but equally consequential
are changing. The rise of the Brazil, Russia, India and decisions are now made in BRIC capitals—Brasilia,
China (BRIC) and the waning of the Western develop- Moscow, New Delhi, Beijing, and Pretoria. China, in par-
ment model as the only game in town mean that ticular, is pursuing a spectacular expansion and rise.
African leaders currently enjoy more options in inter- These days, there is not a middle-ranking power
national relations. BRIC membership even includes (rapidly developing powers with growing interna-
one African country—South Africa—that has been tional influence) that is not deepening its ties with
elevated within the elite group of Southern powers Africa. Brazil's embassy footprint in the region in 2013
(even though Pretoria is the much lesser power within (operating diplomatic embassies in 37 countries) is as
the grouping). BRICs are promoting South-South co- large as the United Kingdom’s (with missions in 39
operation to shape the 21st century. African countries). The Gulf states are increasing their
In the 2000s, African states brought the decoloniza- investments in Africa, particularly in terms of land and
tion episode to a close (Severino and Ray 2011). Casting other natural resources, and trade between the two re-
off the Western development model and oversight from gions is growing. Canada and the Nordic countries are
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, maintaining their ties with strong humanitarian sup-
African leaders took control of their own economic and port. Moscow is reengaging with Africa (after turning
international policies. This allows African leaders to away at the end of the Cold War) and has written
form economic and political alliances of their own off US$11.3 billion of sovereign debts accumulated

309
310 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

between 2005 and 2012. Even nontraditional partners peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003), Darfur
are firming up ties. Tehran declared 2008 as the year of (2004), Somalia (2007), and Mali (2012) and creating
expanding relations between Iran and Africa, and in the African Standby Force (a 15,000-person force) are
the same year Ankara hosted the Turkey—Africa Coop- noteworthy achievements. Importantly, the AU spoke
eration Summit (Taylor 2010). Largely unnoticed, in with one voice at the 2009 United Nations (UN)
2011, Malaysia became the third largest investor in the Climate Change Conference (Copenhagen Summit).
region: almost 25% of Malaysian foreign development The most important statement of intent is AU’s adop-
investment flows to Africa (Miles 2013). tion of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,
For their part, African leaders are extending their a blueprint for economic development that confirms
horizons. Some African oil producers are cementing African leaders’ faith in foreign development invest-
partnerships with the United Arab Emirates to learn ment and global partnerships. The AU, however, stills
from Abu Dhabi’s vast experience in oil production. needs considerable development and resources to
Kenya's Vision 2030 strategy document borrows heay- become a regional force.
ily from the experiences of Malaysia and Singapore. Africa countries are enjoying a greater ability to
Mozambique is implementing a staff-training partner- influence bilateral relations. The postconditionality
ship with Brazil to learn from its experience. African era has ushered in greater divergences in African states’
countries are sending numerous delegations to partici- relations with various donors. For instance, Uganda,
pate in Chinese training programs (more than 129 Rwanda, and Ethiopia are taking ownership of aid
programs have been offered in railway construction, agendas and priorities. Kigali has demonstrated con-
planning and development, coastal region economic siderable successes in steering Development Assistance
development, “commercial Chinese” language instruc- Committee donors toward its aid priorities and in
tion, etc.) (Brautigam 2012). substituting Chinese aid for Western aid following
The African tilt toward democratization has also Development Assistance Committee (the twenty-nine
broadened opportunities for society's input into various wealthy Organization for Economic Cooperation and
policy arenas. The first generation of African presidents Development donors) aid cuts in 2012 after accusations
pursued foreign policies strongly tied to the interests of of Kigali’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of
former colonial rulers. The current generation of leaders Congo (DRC).
is more willing to accommodate demands of their own Africa is a sought-after diplomatic partner. In a
populations in determining the best interests of the world where numbers matter, the votes of 54 African
state. More swayed by popular sentiment, governments states count in such areas as trade, climate, and inter-
these days, in particular instances, have canceled Chi- national security negotiations. Moreover, as democ-
nese building contracts, advocated for the indigeniza- racy makes further headway throughout the world and
tion of industries, and established curbs on foreign as the principle of democratic representation becomes
ownership of business operations. more entrenched, Africa’s burgeoning population (by
Over the past decade, African leaders have become 2050 Africans will outnumber U.S. and European pop-
more prominent actors in high-level international pol- ulations by two to one) and number of national states
itics, for example in climate negotiations and a range will make it harder for a handful of 20th-century great
of South-South coalitions (China-India-Brazil-South powers to justify their monopoly. Democratization of
Africa known as the Basic Group and South America- world governance will have to be reapportioned to in-
Africa Cooperation Forum). More prominence is also clude more historically underrepresented regions such
accompanied by a rising assertiveness of Africa-based as Africa.
institutions, for instance the African Union (AU) since According to Ian Taylor (2010:6), “Contra to the
its 2002 launch. AU's vision is for an “Africa integrated, notion that Africa is a passive bystander in global
prosperous and peaceful, an Africa driven by its own processes, African elites have generally proven them-
citizens, a dynamic force in the global arena” (African selves excellent arch-manipulators of the international
Union Commission 2004:7). Registering successes in system.” Nevertheless, the collective presence of Africa
 African Futures 311

on the international stage is still a work in progress. African leaders as operating in a space somewhere be-
Indeed, historical legacies still weigh heavily. African tween these extremes.
states remain minor powers shackled by a high level of
poverty and underdevelopment, degraded urban and WASHINGTON’S ENGAGEMENT WITH AFRICA

tural environments, inadequate institutional capacity, The United States is Africa’s largest foreign aid provider.
corrupt political systems, and subservient roles in Its support of the region increased from US$1.4 billion
setting global agendas. Despite increased space and in 2001 to US$9.2 billion in 2010, a level equivalent to
maneuverability produced by significant shifts such as more than one quarter of all U.S. international eco-
the rise of the BRICs and of Gulf states’ investments in nomic assistance (U.S. GAO 2013:31) (Fig. 13.1). The
the region, African leaders operate in a tight space leading category of development assistance is health
bequeathed by the state system inherited at indepen- (Washington is the largest contributor to the Global
dence, their colonial incorporation into the global Fund, which targets combating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
economy, and the structure of weighted voting alloca- and malaria) followed by humanitarian aid. Support
tions at the World Bank and the International Monetary for infrastructure is only a minor part of U.S. foreign
Fund (approximately 6% in 2011) (Brown 2012). While aid. The U.S. strategy is driven not only by African de-
the media flip-flops between simplified notions of velopment concerns: Washington is also motivated to
extremes of “hemmed in” or “seizing the 21st century” secure access to Africa’s natural resources (Carmody
(eg., The Economist magazine's flip from “hopeless” 2011) and to combat pandemics that could pose global
[2000] to “rising” [2013a]), it is more accurate to portray security threats (Taylor 2010).

Dollars in billions
10

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year

iti All other assistance | Governance and civil-society assistance

V//ZA, Agriculture assistance eS Humanitarian aid

Economic infrastructure and services [os Health assistance

FIGURE 13.1 U.S. Government Development Assistance to Africa, 2001-2010. Source: U.S. GAO, p. 32, Fig. 10.
312 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

By comparison, the Chinese government aided fits into the United States’ newer energy security nexus,
Africa to the tune of US$6 billion between 2001 and whereby increasing oil flows from the region allow for
2009 (Brautigam 2011), but Beijing is more deeply reduced dependence on Middle Eastern oil.
engaged in infrastructure-for-mineral swaps and in fi- Post-9/11, Washington became preoccupied with
nancing African infrastructural projects (roads, build- terrorism and especially the influence of Al-Qaeda in
ings, stadiums, dams) via interest-free loans and gifts. the region. A good example of the recent upgrading of
When available national data are compared (e.g,, Africa’s strategic place in U.S. geopolitical calculations
Angola, Ghana, Kenya), Chinese government loans is the establishment of Washington's Africa Command
and related financing exceed the level of U.S. aid (U.S. (AFRICOM). The Pentagon originally planned to base
GAO 2013). Moreover, Chinese loans are more attrac- AFRICOM within the region (Liberia and Botswana
tive to host governments: the borrower's costs are were considered), but African opposition resulted in
lower, and Beijing allows for greater flexibility in using the command being relocated to Stuttgart, Germany.
such local resources as labor and materials. China's However, two field operational sites—Ascension
more intense involvement is focusing global attention Island and Djibouti—serve as forward region supply
on Africa and thwarting U.S. regional interest. bases. The United States operates two drone bases in
Despite a surge of involvement by middle powers the region, one in Djibouti and the other in Mali, and
(i.e., states with considerable international power but Washington may be running drone missions out of
lesser than superpowers) in the region, the United other African states but the details are classified.
States still exerts substantial hard-power advantages on However, using drones for surveillance in Africa’s con-
the basis of its longstanding relationships, generous flict zones is becoming more common. For example,
development assistance, economic prowess, and the UN is deploying drones in the DRC to monitor
global status. It also maintains a soft-power advantage militias and cross-border movements. For the most
from its African diaspora ties and from the African part, the United States is engaging in focused counter-
heritage of its commander-in-chief. President Barack terrorism. This involves relying on units within the
Obama (his father was born in the Kenyan village of U.S. First Infantry Division (known as the Big Red
Kogelo) is an extremely popular leader with many One, based in Fort Riley, Kansas), a regionally aligned
Africans, underscored by his 2009 and 2013 visits to brigade that conducts counterterrorism and rapid-
the region. The U.S. president's name is prominent response missions in Africa. This brigade has been
throughout rural and urban Africa, from President deployed for commando raids, embassy protection,
Barack Obama High School (Benue State, Nigeria) to and UN peacekeeping training and to help develop
Hotel Obama (Accra, Ghana) to Barack Obama Drive national counterterrorism capacity in state-state coop-
(Dar es Salaam, Tanzania). eration. Counterterrorism rather than eliminating
Still, the context of Washington’s reengagement terrorist groups is the core U.S. anti-terror strategy
with Africa is occurring after two decades of disengage- for Africa.
ment after the end of the Cold War. At that time, the Despite increasing the disbursement of aid and
absence of nuclear weapons, low levels of economic elevating the geopolitical importance of the region,
activity, and a minimal role in international trade rel- the American diplomatic presence in the region has,
egated Africa to secondary importance in U.S. geostra- surprisingly, contracted (de Walle 2010). The United
tegic calculations (de Walle 2010). The broad thrust of States’ commercial footprint in the region is dispro-
U.S. interests in the region since 2001-13 centered on portionally low compared to Asia’s and Europe's, and
advancing a neoliberal economic agenda and counter- an equivalent institutional infrastructure is lacking.
ing threats to U.S. security interests (most notably For example, the U.S. government maintains only six
terrorism after 9/11 and energy security). The U.S. gov- Foreign Commercial Service officers in the entire
ernment estimates that one in five barrels of oil enter- region (limited to Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa,
ing the global stream will originate from the Gulf of although a new office was scheduled for reestablish-
Guinea, West Africa (Carmody 2011:48), so Africa now ment in Ghana in August 2013) (Coons 2013:13).

e
 African Futures 313

Commercial Service officers play a key role in provid- Chinese leaders have been doing for years). Howard
ing information on potential African opportunities for French (2013:3) observes that the Obama administra-
U.S. businesses (e.g., evaluating potential in-country tion “must put an end to the belittling, small ball ritual
partners, facilitating U.S. business contacts with local whereby African leaders are invited to Washington in
firms, and providing local financing options). groups of three or four (as if an African country by
Washington is raising the importance of U.S. com- definition does not merit a one-on-one discussion), of-
mercial engagement in its Africa strategy, calling for in- fered a quick photo opportunity, a few homilies about
creased trade and investment. This is motivated by a democracy and governance and sent on their way.”
perception that Washington has lost ground in Africa,
having already surrendered economic opportunities AFRICA’S TERRORISM THREATS

(China became Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009, Africa has a recent history ofterrorist strikes on Western
overtaking the United States), and is in danger of ceding targets that precede the 9/11 attacks in the United
political leadership to its global competitors. According States in 2001. For example, in East Africa, the bomb-
to Chris Coons, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations ings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in
Subcommittee on African Affairs, the United States “has 1998 killed 224 people—including 12 Americans—
been asleep at the wheel” in its Africa policy and has and injured 5,000. Intermittent attacks have occurred
failed to implement “a more aggressive approach to since on diverse domestic as well as Western targets.
economic engagement in sub-Saharan Africa.” As a con- An attack on soccer fans watching the 2010 World Cup
sequence, “Chinese competitors are securing long-term final on TV in Kampala killed 74 people, but most
contracts that could lock American companies and have been smaller, lower-risk attacks on churches,
interests out of fast-growing African markets for decades nightclubs, bars, and police and army officials. Terror-
to come” (Coons 2013:2, 13). Some (e.g., de Walle ism has also been accompanied by various efforts to
2010) claim that American foreign policy in Africa generate funds for extremist agendas, such as the
“lacks ambition” and that Washington is ineffective kidnapping and abduction of Westerners (e.g., Kenya,
at developing policies toward regions regarded as sec- Mali, Nigeria and Somalia), payment extortions from
ondary in importance. aid organizations, bank robberies, and human traffick-
Quite surprisingly, President Obama distanced ing. Remittances, donations, and contraband smug-
himself from Africa during his first term. To date, a gling raise the bulk of terrorism funds.
distinctive set of Obama Africa policies is barely dis- The attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi
cernible, even though the Senate Foreign Relations on September 21, 2013, by Al-Shabaab insurgents
Subcommittee on African Affairs has articulated a new (“Shabaab” means youth in Arabic) killed 67 shoppers
policy with economic engagement as the centerpiece. and sent shockwaves about African terrorism around the
The prospect of continued and sustained economic world (Fig. 13.2). A week later, a radical Islamic group
growth in the region, abundant supplies of minerals murdered 40 college students while they slept in their
and other natural resources, and the emergence of an dorm in Gujba, northern Nigeria, showing another
African middle class is behind a U.S. reprioritization of vicious side of African extremism. In the same week
its Africa goals, but to date a bold and attentive Obama Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) detonated a
policy for Africa is missing. The Obama administration car bomb in Timbuktu, killing two people, an incident
is planning, in 2015, to reauthorize and strengthen the that followed their series of kidnappings of Westerners
African Growth and Opportunity Act, a set of measures in Mali that began in 2003. Figure 13.3 shows the most
to extend trade preferences, but unfortunately the active terrorism corridors in Africa.
economic and fiscal crises of the second Obama term Some consider Africa to be a new frontline for
are inhibiting a more expansive U.S.-Africa engage- international terrorism. Contributing factors to this
ment. Reenergizing U.S.-Africa policy will require viewpoint are fears about new attacks on soft targets, an
much more contact with African leaders (and not just African momentum for jihad, a growing international
the youth) and regular visits by senior U.S. officials (as dimension to African terror organizations, cooperation
314 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

among terrorist groups, and the possibility of a coordi- groups affiliate with global terror groups only when
nated and catastrophic event. they are on the wane. Accordingly, the Westgate bomb-
Others warn us not to jump to conclusions about ing and other terrorist incidents should be interpreted
the geographical shift of terrorism to Africa. One coun- as desperate efforts to elevate weakened groups. Ac-
tering viewpoint emphasizes that African extremist cording to another viewpoint, political rebellions and
criminal networks are intertwined in controlling
routes for contraband trade and other activities, and
although alliances may be brokered at times with
jihadist extremists, the main undercurrent remains
unresolved national political issues rather than an
African spiral toward a jihad.
News stories tend to reflect emotions and fear
more than informed research. Naming African extrem-
ist groups and giving them a coherent identity makes
them scarier. The reality is that many of Africa’s current
extremist groups are not uniform entities but faction-
alized organizations that are constantly evolving in
response to internal power struggles and global re-
sponses. Hard data about these groups are rare: contact
FIGURE 13.2 ‘Terrorism, Westgate Mall, Nairobi, 2013. with these organizations is difficult and their agendas
Source: © GORAN TOMASEVIC/Reuters/Corbis. Corbis image change and are kept secret. Hansen’s (2013) fascinat-
42-51574593. ing study of Al-Shabaab reveals that it is constituted

ALGERIA

AL-Qaeda, affiliates
and fellow travellers
Core al-Qaeda
Laskhor-e-Taiba
Taliban
Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN)
Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS)* H
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian |
Pe a: ° Peninsula (AQAP)
LA EAGAN
TRC He The Shabab
on Al-Qaeda in the
[o>]
arwon—

as
Anser al-Sharia
eS sf Ri:
10 Boko Haram

FIGURE 13.3 ‘Terrorist Corridors in Africa. Source: Adapted from The Economist 2013b.
 African Futures 315

by loose ties, political/security alliances of clans, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Algeria. This amorphous
sub-clans, sub-sub-clans, pseudo warlords, and global group thrives in areas weakly controlled by govern-
jihadist networks. Extreme localism, nationalism, pan- ments. Vast distances, dispersed populations, and deep
Islamism, and global networks are intermingled, poverty enable AQIM to engage in cross-border crime
making it hard to decipher the goals of the network. As and insurgency. This group emerged out of the Algerian
a result, the subject of terrorism in Africa is always civil war in the 1990s. AQIM was placed on the list of
going to be a highly speculative one, driven by particu- U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organizations in 2002
lar partial readings of African complexity and heavily and it announced its global jihad in 2007. In 2012
influenced by emotion and perception of risk. AQIM allied with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali and
Several hotspots of terrorism activity are evident in exported its power center to the vast ungoverned north
sub-Saharan Africa. First, there is an East African corridor of Mali. The Tuareg, a nomadic group that represent
where Al-Shabaab operates. This organization has been 10% ofthe population of Mali, have been engaged in a
a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization since political campaign for self-determination since the
2008. Al-Shabaab emerged during a period in 2006 end of the French colonial presence in the region, A
when Ethiopia invaded Somalia. The organization was French-led military intervention in 2013 was needed
attractive to recruits, and in a power vacuum it consoli- to thwart the southward advance of the joint AQIM-
dated an extensive geographical base. From 2007 to Tuareg group; at its peak they controlled 60% of the
2011, the organization controlled much of south and national territory. More hardline AQIM extremists
central Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu and the broke away from the Tuareg in January 2013. AQIM
port city of Kismayo. Controlling Kismayo was very aspires to rid the region of Western influence and to
profitable for all kinds of trade ventures. For example, install fundamentalist regimes that will function under
the illegal charcoal trade, which resulted from burning Islamic religious (Sharia law), whereas the Tuareg are
the acacia tree (prohibited in Somalia) and shipping it more moderate Islamists with political ambitions
to the Arabian Peninsula, brought in US$25 million focused on states with a Tuareg presence (e.g., Mali,
per year (Gettleman and Kulish 2013). Al-Shabaab has Niger, Algeria, and Libya). AQIM, in contrast, main-
become involved in the illegal ivory trade, which has tains transnational ties and has global ambitions.
grown in recent years to become one of the organiza- Some AQIM volunteers were active in the Iraq war and
tion’s main funding sources. Repeated Kenyan and Participated in suicide bombings against the U.S.
Ethiopian troop invasions, combined with a 2010 in- armed forces. AQIM also participates in international
tervention by the UN-backed AU force, eventually narcotic smuggling, providing a secure waystation be-
weakened Al-Shabaab’s geographical control of urban tween suppliers in South America and the European
centers but not its rural grip. Subsequently, under the market.
leadership of Anmed Abdi Godane, the organization Groups under the banner of the “Congregation
shifted its focus from territory to terrorism. The organ- of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad”
ization is very successful in recruiting and operat- operate in a third corridor. The Nigerian government
ing internationally, even within the United States labels these groups “Boko Haram,” a label that has
(40 Americans are known to have joined Al-Shabaab stuck. Boko Haram is a Hausa translation of “Western
as fighters, and several U.S. citizens have been con- education is sinful.” To be fair, there is neither one
victed of raising funds for the organization), and it has group (but several) nor a single platform but rather a
had some successes in exporting jihadists (e.g., Kenya political and religious Islamist agenda to prevent people
and Nigeria) (Hansen 2013). Since 2010, the organiza- from being influenced by Western values, corruption,
tion has received strong backing from Al-Qaeda as well and easy money. Loose groupings of radical Islamists
as support from Eritrea. operate within a zone centering on northeast Nigeria.
AQIM operates in a second corridor, largely in the The group emerged in 2002 and set up a separatist com-
Sahel, with a logistical base centered in northern Mali munity on the basis of Islamic fundamentalism in the
and a zone of activity that extends to Mauritania, village of Kanama on the Nigeria—Niger border. Labeled
316 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

“the Nigerian Taliban,” the following year the group forth operating outside of government control and
began to attract notoriety. A 2011 suicide bomber attack purview are potential hotbeds for radicalization (Davis
on a UN compound in Abuja killed 23 people and 2010a). Obi’s (2007) assessment that the Sahel could
launched Boko Haram onto the international stage as serve as a trans-African highway and recruitment
an outfit with the technical and doctrinal capacity to ground for terrorists to move back and forth between
upscale its activities. At that time many considered the Africa and other regions to attack Western interests
UN bombing to be an outlier event that detracted from and/or to destabilize African states is being realized.
the group’s central mission to advocate for an Islamist Examples ofpariah states that serve as hotbeds and
state as a response to the moral and financial corrup- refuges for terrorists include Somalia and Sudan. One
tion of Nigeria’s establishment, widespread poverty, U.S. official referred to Sudan (1991-96) as a “Holiday
and the poor economic situation in northern Nigeria. Inn for terrorists” (quoted in Menkhaus 2009:97).
However, an escalation of attacks on government insti- A number ofinternational terrorists, including Osama
tutions, churches and secular schools since has resulted bin Laden, used Sudan as a safe haven and operations
in the killing of over 4,000 people (2011-2014) and base until the notoriety of pariah status became too
student abductions are on the rise. A good proportion costly for the Khartoum government in the mid-1990s.
of recent deaths have been students so that government At that time, Islamist leader Hassan al Turabi was side-
has been forced to close five high schools in March lined and “foreign guests” were requested to move on.
2014 (Council on Foreign Relations 2014). Mainly sup- Given the complexity of political and development
ported through bank robberies this group has neither challenges in the region, infiltration of terrorists in
attracted support nor financing outside of northeastern search of sanctuary is always a strong possibility.
Nigeria. During its first decade the group mainly fo- It is important to emphasize that poverty does not
cused on internal northern Nigerian targets, and this breed terrorists. Many Africans have long experienced
kept them off the list of U.S.-designated terror groups. conditions of prolonged and extraordinary poverty and
However, in 2013 Washington designated the group a have still managed to survive. Nevertheless, frustration
foreign terrorist organization, signaling a shift in U.S. is growing over a lack of employment options and op-
intelligence thinking about the evolution of terrorist portunities (especially as perceived by an enlarged
activities in Nigeria and Africa in general. Analysts youthful cohort) as macroeconomic conditions im-
differ, however, over whether Boko Haram maintains a prove and rising expectations fail to materialize. As a
jihadist agenda or not (Walker 2013). consequence, alienation, marginalization, and (possi-
There are widely diverging perspectives about the ble) radicalization are new challenges for Africans and
emergence of Africa as a base for terrorism. Beyond the international community to manage.
these three zones, terrorist activity has been recorded A second perspective points to the radicalization of
in other African states. For example, Al-Qaeda cells in Africans both within and beyond Africa (Menkhaus
Ethiopia have been dismantled, and Tanzania and 2009). One Minneapolis-based member of the Somali
South Africa have ongoing counterterrorism efforts diaspora, Shirwa Ahmed, served as a suicide bomber as
focusing on Al-Shabaab activity. Military and security part of a series of terrorist attacks in Somalia in 2008.
experts have been warning for years that the region will He was among a dozen or so Somali-American young
assume a more central role in international terrorism men who suddenly went missing in Minneapolis but
(Chillers 2003), and this is reflected in the perspective resurfaced in Somalia after being allegedly indoctri-
that Africa has emerged as a terrorism front. The nated and trained by the Somali jihadist group Al-
specter of terrorism in the region is enhanced by an Shabaab. According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of
abundance of physical safe havens, porous borders, Investigation (FBI), Ahmed was the first U.S. citizen to
and endemic poverty, all against a background of pro- commit an act of terror for an Al-Qaeda-affiliated
tracted ethnic and other conflicts and undertrained group. There is considerable speculation about how
and underequipped national military forces. Specific this group of young men in the United States become
spaces in slums, rural deserts, maritime zones, and so radicalized and mobilized. Other American jihadists
 African Futures 317

have fought and died for Al-Shabaab. No doubt Wah- army reservist in 2013, a botched London subway
habist and jihadist websites exposed Somalis and bombing in 2005, and the 2008 recruitment of ULS.-
others to this worldview, and such exposure appears to based Somali diaspora members to the Al-Shabaab
have been important in radicalizing the Minneapolis jihadist group in Somalia, a few of whom participated
group, in combination with other drivers of radicaliza- in the Westgate 2013 bombing.) The global picture is
tion (e.g., after-school youth group leaders or clerics in that Africans in the diaspora demonstrate “exception-
local mosques). The Minneapolis misfits may have alism” in that its poor members suffer from the same
been a precursor to the rise of homegrown terrorists conditions conventionally cited to explain the rise of
taking on extremist jihadist worldviews. The Boston radicalism and terrorism (segregation, isolation, mar-
Marathon bombings of 2013 indicate that individuals ginalization, victimization) among some members of
with extremist tendencies (or weakly connected to in- the Muslim diaspora, but Africans are far more likely
ternational extremist groups) may act independently to shun radical activism and to participate only in
and carry out heinous acts. mainstream political and civil society. Indeed, guest
A far greater terrorist threat emanates from non- workers’ exposure to more radical Islam in the Gulf
African operatives (or non-African diasporas) exploit- states has not radicalized them once they return home.
ing weak state security, high levels of corruption, a The African Muslim diaspora in the United States
booming illicit economy, and myriad soft (Western) enjoys greater levels of social and economic mobility,
terrorism targets. The region provides a permissive op- whether arriving as a privileged elite or not: a positive
erating environment for terrorists from other regions immigrant experience yields very different results in
of the world, and terrorist networks are engaging in the United States as opposed to the United Kingdom
illicit economic activities to generate funds. Smuggling (where radical activism is more frequent).
of precious metals is a lucrative endeavor that attracts In general, it seems that Africans’ obligations to
various clandestine networks, including terrorists. send remittances to their homeland requires them to
Al-Qaeda has been active in the smuggling of conflict concentrate on working and earning income and
diamonds in West Africa. Hezbollah, an organization avoiding any activities that could jeopardize their
often perceived as supporting or engaging in terrorist ability to send and receive remittances. Thus, any
acts, has participated in diamond smuggling and other activity that undermines the flow of remittances faces
illicit economic activities in the DRC via a small a strong, knee-jerk reaction in their host and home
network of Lebanese members of the diaspora. Non- communities. Generally, African diaspora involve-
African terrorist networks also engage in “legitimate” ment in Al-Qaeda is nowhere near the level generated
African commerce to provide cover, to build local con- by diasporans originating from North Africa, the
tacts, and to use local partnerships to launder money. Middle East, and South Asia.
A third perspective contends that the prospect of However, the African exceptionalism thesis does not
Africa emerging as a critical arena in global terrorism is explain the existence of longstanding subnational
overblown (Davis 2010a). This appears to be the case terrorism. Spectacular attacks have captured the global
especially in regard to jihadist extremism. Africans, of imagination, and Africa (1990-2002) recorded the
whatever faith, exhibit very low rates of suicide and are second highest number of casualties from internal
culturally averse to suicide attacks as a terrorist tactic. terrorism of any region after Asia (Davis 2010a:135).
The dominant African version of Islam (Sufism) is Ethnic-based insurgencies, classified as terrorist acts in
more resistance to radical interpretation, and this may, their own right, reveal that Africa's most lethal terrorists
in part, explain why African Muslims in the diaspora are not Islamic jihadists but pathological insurgents.
are less predisposed toward radicalization. It is signifi- Examples abound, including the activities of the
cant that Africa’s large numbers of Muslim emigrants Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone), the Lord’s
have produced few recruits (leaders or foot soldiers) Resistance Army (Uganda), various warlord conflicts
for Al-Qaeda and other international terrorism net- in DRC, numerous ethnic manifestations of terrorism
works. (Aberrations include the London killing of an such as clan/sub-clan violence in Somalia, and the
318 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Interahamwe, which perpetrated the Rwandan genocide. systems, science, and governance. Others maintain that
Notably, Africans have been far more willing to support more steadfast support can be marshaled by setting
and fund terrorist activities linked to local and national “Zero targets” (e.g., zero hunger and zero food waste) as
movements than international/global agendas. opposed to goals that aim for 50% reductions (the stan-
In African policy contexts, issues that result in dard target of various MDGs in 2000).
more deaths, such as HIV/AIDS, ethnic conflict, and One perspective argues for moving toward an
endemic poverty, eclipse terrorism. Nevertheless, a “MDG-minus” framework (Nayyar 2012). Duplication
concern about the destabilizing role of terrorism has and overlapping targets confuse the development pro-
risen on national and regional agendas. It is widely cess, so the case is made to reduce the number of indica-
acknowledged that terrorism exacerbates the difficul- tors and to eliminate subtargets where there is a paucity
ties of economic and sustainable development. Attacks of data. However, the opposing perspective—an MDG-
or even threats of attacks discourage trade, investment, plus framework—has greater momentum (Nayyar
and tourism, deplete national income, and displace 2012). MDG-plus proponents have come up with vari-
African communities. Not surprisingly, this vast region ous lists of what should be incorporated into the post-
has provided ample opportunities for attacking soft MDG agenda. Table 13.1 lists the most important
Western targets—hotel and mall bombings (Kenya), recommendations. Obviously, 18 goals are too many, so
tourist abductions (Mali), oil worker kidnappings hard decisions will have to be made about priorities.
(Nigeria, Sudan), and the like—but the landscape of At the same time, there are durable strengths that
terrorism in Africa is constantly changing. Africans can draw on (Table 13.2), and African agency
and ownership must be part and parcel of a new global
framework.
POST-MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS:
WHICH ALTERNATIVES?
TABLE 13.1 MDGS POST-2015
Most policymakers, academics, and practitioners be-
1. Sustainable cities (including sustainable transport, carbon-
lieve it essential to develop a global consensus around
neutral buildings, air quality, no toxic waste, zero waste)
a framework to update and/or replace the Millennium 2. Global warming stabilization and renewable energy
Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015. There is consid- Protection of biodiversity and habitats (forests, mineral-rich
erable discussion about whether the MDG framework environs, rivers, deltas, oceans)

should continue along the same lines, be expanded, or Civil society empowerment and participation
Capacity building at all levels
be restricted. There is a consensus that the post-2015
Education
framework needs to include more African ownership Be
3)
Gas Food and land security (hunger elimination, nutrition,
by diverse African stakeholders, but widely diverging sustainable agriculture, organic farming, land reform)
views exist on how to realize this. 8. Green economy (sustainable production, consumption, and
A compelling case is made to allow African states to livelihoods)
9. Health (disease control, reproductive health, public health
set their own goals and to have external powers align
systems, mental health, preventive medicine, and
their development support and financing with these integration of Western and traditional systems)
local agendas. Changing general MDG targets to geo- 10. Open migration (borders, remittances, reduce
graphically sensitive targets in time and specific places to environmental refugees and human trafficking)
reflect the diversity of conditions in Africa is also 11. Poverty elimination and inequality reductions
12. Social justice (human rights, income equality, gender equity,
suggested. Broadening the engagement of stakeholders
democracy, transparency, accountability, social security)
(civil society, trade unions, environmentalists, busi- 13. Water access and community rights
nesses, etc.) in the post-MDG process seems essential to 14. Decent work, worker protection, job security
move beyond the reliance on expert insiders, particularly 15. Global tax reform and elimination of tax havens
beyond the donor communities in the Global North. 16. Information access to technology
17. Industrial and small-enterprise development
Some argue that more of the indigenous knowledge
18. Sustainable agriculture and sustainable farmer livelihoods
base should be integrated into economies, agricultural
 African Futures 319

TABLE 13.2 DURABLE STRENGTHS THAT AFRICA Large-scale property developers are embarking on
CAN DRAW ON
ee ee ee far-reaching projects designed to reshape the configu-
¢ Complex and resilient agro-pastoral systems ration ofseveral African cities. Africa has not witnessed
¢ Rich indigenous knowledge
e¢ Water, land, forests, fisheries, animal and mineral wealth
such a surge of new planning since the construction of
¢ Cultural, linguistic, and heritage assets colonial cities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
* Creative and talented populations and a connected diaspora These new visions are expressed in two types of urban
¢ Long history of resistance in the face of adversity (e.g., slave projects with some overlap: (1) satellite cities, (2) new
trading, colonialism and the struggle for independence) central business districts, and there is also some effort
° Strong collective structures at family and village levels
to retrofit existing development through new green
¢ Vigorous entrepreneurship in the informal economy
¢ Effective and vocal civil society initiatives. Most projects make liberal use of “eco-city”
* Vocal and active women and women’s groups characteristics (e.g., wind and solar power, energy-
¢ Solidarity among African governments and South-South efficient building, green space).
partnerships Many new developments involve building satellite
¢ New initiatives in African regional economic cooperation
cities for tens of thousands of workers outside the
¢ New impetus for African peacemaking and
peacekeeping roles
boundaries of existing metropolitan areas. There is a
¢ Growing democratization West African corridor of projects stretching from King
City to Eko Atlantic as well as an East African cluster
Source: Excerpted from Samatar et al. 2005:331. that pivots around Tatu City and Konza Techno City
(on the outskirts of Nairobi). There is competition be-
tween West and East Africa to build Africa’s new leading-
NEW URBAN FUTURES
edge technological city. Hope City in Ghana and
Thanks to its resource boom, emerging middle class, Kenya’s Konza Techno City are major rivals in this
and rapid urbanization, Africa is being marketed as a regard: Hope City is touted as “Africa’s Silicon Valley”
new real estate frontier (Watson 2014). Property devel- and Konza is promoted as a “Silicon Savannah” and
opers; architecture, planning, and engineering firms; both seek to replicate Bengaluru’s rise to global promi-
and investment funds have turned to Africa after the nence in the information technology field. Satellite
property crises in the Global North. Many developers cities tend to be located approximately 18 to 37 miles
are partnering with international architecture and en- (30-60 km) from major capital cities, although La Cité
gineering firms and local property development firms du Fleuve (DRC) and Malabo II (Equatorial Guinea)
with financial institutions to contribute to the future are island developments closer to existing urban
of cities in Africa. Many urban projects in Africa are centers. Many satellite cities are envisaged in the con-
inspired by cities like Dubai, Singapore, and Shanghai. text of polycentric development that will relieve con-
Until recently, global cities of the North (London, gestion around the city center while offering new
Paris, New York) were the places to aspire to, but con- world-class infrastructure and unlimited possibilities.
temporary ambitions now look East. Broadly coherent in structure but distinct in design,
Numerous large property development companies these elite self-contained developments will be sepa-
have launched prototype mixed-use development rate from the “mother city.”
projects that draw on the expertise of urban designers East Africa is the continent's most active region in
from South Africa, Brazil, Europe, and the United States. planning satellite cities. This may be explained, in part,
Some projects have obtained jump-start financing from by the fact that many of the fastest-growing cities in
Chinese, Russian, and/or South African investors, who the world are located here (e.g., Kigali, Kampala, and
join with local speculators and developers. A few Dar es Salaam) (Society for International Develop-
projects even involve Chinese construction companies ment 2010). Most notably, there are plans to build sev-
and others are entirely African entrepreneurial efforts. eral satellite cities around Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.
Figure 13.4 presents the highest-profile projects in terms These developments would offer greenfield sites for
of area, investment, and international publicity. mixed-use developments complete with ultramodern
320 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

coo —
Eko-Atlantic

Mombasa §
éI
2.
_Dar
: es Salaam.
Mm

Lubumbashi 4
Windhoek
seem (e)

Pretoria Midrand ©

Johannesburg y
L Cape Town 4

250,000
workers

aBi tuano city

Luano Ci
Kiswishi

FIGURE 13.4 New Mega Urban Projects in Africa.

 African Futures 321

services, high-quality infrastructure, safe and secure earlier decades (based on Western planning experi-
environments, and a lack of land disputes. The use of ences). The African shift is a reaction to retrofitting that
private investors reduces overall costs for governments was never brought up to scale and represents an invigo-
and, on paper at least, allows governments to concen- rated effort to bring positive attention to African urban
trate their resources on providing services. projects.
Anticipating the future of urban development in So-called eco-cities are very much in vogue in
Africa, Johannesburg-based Rendeavour Africa—a sub- Africa. A precise global or African definition of an eco-
sidiary of the Russian investment bank Onexim, one city does not exist. The UN Environmental Programme
of the foremost urban land developers in Africa—has (2012:VI) distinguishes eco-cities from conventional
quietly purchased land exclusively for building satel- cities on the basis of “their superior urban environ-
lite cities. Four coffee plantations have been acquired mental quality and livability to be achieved inter alia
close to Nairobi as well as agricultural lands on the through compact, mixed-used developments, low-
urban fringes of Accra, Lubumbashi, and Lusaka. energy transportation, renewable energy generation
Other property developers have negotiated substantial and a reduced overall ecological footprint.” Virtually
land purchases around capital cities such as Dar es all of Africa’s eco-city projects use boilerplate language
Salaam, Harare, Kampala, Kigali, and Luanda. Real about the high quality of buildings and infrastructure,
estate developers are positioning these new satellite connectivity, and livability compared to existing urban
cities to maximize their value in anticipation of the settlements.
property booms in areas experiencing rapid popula- Implementing green urban projects has become
tion and high economic growth rates. Local elites, “an (almost) ubiquitous global phenomenon” (Joss,
successful expatriates, and affluent members of the Cowley, and Tomozeiu 2013:1), although the intensity
African diaspora are particularly being targeted as of greening efforts varies from project to project. Joss,
likely investors. Tomozeiu, and Cowley (2011) report 174 eco-city proj-
Proposals to construct entirely new city centers are ects in 2011 globally (developments at least the size of a
increasingly popular. Most projects aim to replace the neighborhood, encompassing several green policy areas
current central business district with a 21st-century including transport, energy, housing, and the environ-
globally-connected one. For example, Malabo II (Equa- ment). A substantial proportion of eco-city initiatives are
torial Guinea) will be an area anchored by government currently at the planning stage or under construction,
facilities and global corporations. In the DRC, La Cité with implementation typically anticipated to be 10 to
du Fleuve (“River City”) is an exclusive development to 15 years (but longer in practice).
be situated on two artificially islands in the Congo River Many eco-city projects are under development in
that will serve as the “mirror city” of Kinshasa, just off- Africa. The highest profile project is Eko Atlantic
shore from Kinshasa’s central business district. The (Lagos), a project that has received international ac-
planners are attempting to build “an oasis of tranquil- claim and was awarded a Clinton Global Initiative
ity” linked to Kinshasa by causeways. Commitment Certificate (See Box 13.1 for a detailed
Whereas most projects focus on new developments, description of Eko Atlantic). Propelled by the growing
efforts to retrofit existing development are also evident desire of the Nigerian government and private-sector
(e.g., Nakawa [Uganda] and Menlyn Maine [South project designers to put such new projects on the
Africa]). Not surprisingly, the scale and scope of urban- global map; Eko Atlantic is promoted as a green devel-
ization in Africa have led many visionaries to point out opment creating a world-class city in the heart of
that retrofitting is inadequate, essentially a Band-Aid for Africa, and, at the same time, it seeks to update and
a broken leg. The pace and intensity of urbanization re- transform Lagos’ notoriously bad international reputa-
quire African responses that diverge from European and tion as a poster-child of crime and urban dysfunction.
North American experiences. Accordingly, many African Africa’s new urban projects have been roundly criti-
proposals represent a movement away from the urban cized as “fantasy projects” (Murray 2011; Watson 2014).
upgrading and regeneration, which predominated in Some projects have already displaced people. Filip
322 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 13.1 EKO ATLANTIC (NIGERIA)

Popularly called Eko, the original name of the sleepy coastal

settlement on the Atlantic coast of Nigeria, this area was
transformed into the megacity of Lagos. Estimated to house
15 million residents in 2013, Lagos is projected to contain
25 million people by 2025, which will make it one of the biggest
metropolitan areas in the world (Africa Research Bulletin 2013).
Despite losing its status as federal capital in 1993 (when Abuja
became Nigeria's capital), Lagos has continued to grow (60,000
settlers arrive every day), even as national urban development
projects are being concentrated elsewhere. For the most part, it
has evolved independent of urban planning through a process
of “amorphous urbanism” (Gandy 2005). As a result, Lagos has
a burgeoning population marked by high rates of poverty; resi-
FIGURE 13.5 Eko Atlantic, Nigeria. Source: © Sunday
dents are crowded into a limited space threatened by sea-level
Alamba/AP/Corbis.
rise, ocean surges, and extreme weather events. Despite these
massive challenges, the city remains the economic pulse of the
second-largest economy in Africa (many believe it will soon rail, and anetwork of roads designed to encourage free-flowing
overtake South Africa’s as the largest one). traffic within its borders. When complete, Eko Atlantic will
Eko Atlantic (Eko is the Yoruba word for Lagos) is the most accommodate 250,000 residents and 190,000 commuters, re-
ambitious urban development project in all of Africa (Fig. 13.5). ducing pressure on the already-crumbling infrastructure of
Promoters expect the mini-city to refute negative images by Lagos. This Dubai-like project is controversial. It will be privately
showcasing a different side of Nigeria (Eko Atlantic 2013). Eko administered throughout and provide its own security. There has
Atlantic is promoted nationally and internationally as a model been no effort to incorporate green (energy-efficient) building
public-private partnership between the Lagos state government design into the project, which was conceived as a standalone
and South EnergyX Nigeria (a subsidiary of Chagoury Group, a development, neither part of the Mabogunje Lagos Master Plan
sprawling industrial and financial conglomerate operated by a (2006) nor the adjacent Lekki Master Plan.
highly influential family of Lebanese origin) to protect Lagos from The project has not always followed the letter of the law. An
storm flooding and rising sea levels. It is managed by a 78-year environmental impact assessment (EIA) was not undertaken
lease, based on funding from local financial institutions (e.g., before dredging commenced in 2008. An EIA took place subse-
First Bank and Guaranty First Bank) as well as international banks quently, and approval was granted only in 2012, in violation of
(e.g., BNP Paribas Fortis and KBC Bank). Participants include the 2004 EIA Act. Moreover, the EIA acknowledges that the
various experienced international architectural design and engi- project may shift the erosion of barrier islands to the east of the
neering firms (e.g., Dar Al Handasah Nazih Taleb & Partners, MZ project, with adverse effects radiating outward up to 6 miles
Architects [Lebanon], and Dredging International [Belgium]). (10 km). Local residents blame the project for causing storm
This model city project aims to develop a new space for surges and flooding at nearby beaches (16 people were killed in
businesses and residents and to boost employment opportuni- a 2012 storm surge on Kuramo Beach). It is discouraging that
ties. When completed, the development will accommodate stakeholder consultation was limited to communities on the
3,000 new buildings zoned in 10 separate districts over 6 square eastern side of the project and that the western-side communi-
miles (10 km?) on land reclaimed from the Gulf of Guinea. The ties were not included. Moreover, there is no provision to hold
mini-city is expected to emerge as the gateway to Africa, the the developers responsible for any negative environmental im-
financial hub of Nigeria and the rest of West Africa. Promoters pacts. Left to fend for themselves, poor communities in adjacent
seek to develop an “ocean-front city that will be one of the areas have neither the resources to elevate their homes nor the
wonders of the 21st century” (Eko Atlantic 2013). Presidents ability to evacuate in times of disaster. There will also be reper-
of Nigeria and Lebanon, as well as former U.S. President cussions on land: neighboring communities will experience
Bill Clinton, have strongly endorsed Eko Atlantic. greater traffic congestion created by the four-lane access road
Inaugurated in 2006, most work to date has been preparatory: linking the mainland to Victoria Island.
dredging, constructing a sea wall 4.3 miles (7 km) long around Indeed, the lessons of dredging in Dubai reclamations may be
the reclaimed land (colloquially termed “the Great Wall of misapplied to Lagos. The rate of sand replenishment along the
Lagos”), and preparing foundations at the site for high-rise, West African Atlantic coast is entirely different than it is in the
high-density urban development. The next stage involves build- Persian Gulf (where there is no lack of sand, and alternative sup-
ing power-generating and sewage management facilities, light plies are plentiful in nearby desert environments). The Gulf of
 African Futures 323

Guinea's rougher waters behave differently near the West

Group) was a financial confidant to former Nigerian dictator Sani
African coast, and erosion is more challenging. Furthermore, the
Abacha and was found guilty of money laundering in Switzerland
current sand supply offshore from Lagos is not being replen-
in 2002 in a complex financial web that siphoned funds from
ished naturally: sand drifts eastward along the West African
Nigeria’s treasury. Chagoury eventually agreed to return US$66
coast and port construction to the west (e.g., Lomé and Coto- million transferred out of Nigeria in return for immunity from pros-
nou) reduce the quantity of sand available for deposition. ecution (Africa Research Bulletin 2013). The Chagoury Group is
Beyond the employment generated by the project's construc- also a major contributor to the Clinton Global Initiative (Africa
tion, it is unclear how many jobs will be created: the model city Research Bulletin 2013).
appears to absorb and centralize existing financial and service There are questions about whether Eko Atlantic will become
employment within the new activity center. The needs of support yet another symbol of the gap between poor Nigerians (most of
staff (e.g., security guards, housekeepers, clerical workers) are not whom live on US$2 per day) and the corrupt elite. The project may
part of the master plan, so access to affordable housing, transpor- be emblematic of Africa's new urban frontier with global cachet,
tation, and food and basic services will be virtually impossible. stable electricity, clean water, private security, and world-class
Some of the project’s backers have been implicated in past im- buildings and amenities, but this kind of enclave development will
proprieties. For example, Gilbert Chagoury (Chair of Chagoury not improve the livelihoods of the vast majority of Nigerians.

De Boeck (2011:272) notes that certain government and and time, marked by colonial functions, smaller popu-
municipal authorities are participating in heavy-handed lations, and nonintegrated spaces. Colonial ideas about
“politics of erasure,” tearing down the informal city as the ordering and layering of social and economic space
well as unruly business and residential structures, tidy- bear little resemblance to contemporary urban real-
ing urban spaces by banning containers/kiosks that ities, but continuities and legacies of the colonial spa-
typically accommodate informal enterprises, and con- tial framework prompt modern visionaries to start
centrating on grandiose new developments. Huchzer- anew. However, the new cycle of spatial fragmentation
meyer (2011) emphasizes that privileging showcase based on walls, patrols by private security firms,
private sector projects reinforces the urgency of the per- and skyrocketing prices are segregating people by
ceived need to free African cities of “slums” and/or to income and represent the contemporary equivalent of
abandon the city housing the majority of Africans.Col- the colonial regulations that mainly segregated people
lectively, these projects may be producing a landscape by race.
of elite enclaves and splintering urbanism, thus initiat- The eco-city rubric comprises considerable diver-
ing resettlement processes that widen the spatial exclu- sity in green initiatives, forms, and functions, but the
sion of the poor. Satellite cities could incorporate eco-city label is too loosely applied. There is no unifor-
affordable housing, but planners opt not to focus on mity of minimum green standards. Many project pro-
this. Thus, low-paid workers will not be able to afford to posals are given a “green sheen” by designers who
live in satellite developments and will need to commute want to create autonomous sustainable cities for elites,
long distances, thereby adding a cross-commuting com- who, in turn, desire to secede from unsustainable
ponent that indirectly enlarges the overall carbon cities and to live in safe, low-carbon cocoons with the
footprint. latest green gadgets and buildings. Such bold urban
Martin Murray (2011:1) labels these “fantasy- visions run the risk of providing only a thin green
projects” as “city doubles” because these projects repre- veneer on developments, privileging the developers’
sent diametrical opposites of existing African cities. profit motivations and short-term goals. Some projects
Constructing entirely new urban landscapes enables city fail to gain traction beyond their launch (e.g., Sseesa-
builders to bypass the problems associated with every- mirembe Eco-City, or Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone)
day urbanism in Africa: inadequate infrastructure and as adequate foreign and domestic investment failed to
inferior service delivery, overcrowding, poor aesthetics, materialize (See Box 13.2 for a discussion of the stalled
lack of zoning and code regulations, traffic gridlock, Sseesamirembe Eco-City project).
and burgeoning informal economic activity. Colonial The strong technological focus of eco-city projects
planners developed master plans for a different place (given the central concern to effect a rapid transition to
324 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

BOX 13.2 SSEESAMIREMBE, UGANDA:

SUSTAINABLE UTOPIAS GOING AWRY
IN A GLOBAL WORLD
” (Lake /Albert
Sseesamirembe Eco-City, or Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone,
was initiated in 2006 by the Ugandan government with UGANDA
local partners and Chinese backing of US$1.5 billion,
making it one of the largest Chinese investment projects in
Africa. The project was located in the Rakai District in
southwest Uganda on the border with Tanzania (Fig. 13.6).
Sseesamirembe /
The proposed sustainable project was to be implemented
Lake Victoria
in a large area (200 square miles [323 km*]), and the develop-
Free Trade Zone
ment plan integrated multiuse urban developments, an air-
port, a port on Lake Victoria, sustainable agriculture and
forests, green belts, and nature reserves. Planned as a low-
Lake Victoria
carbon zone with efficient infrastructures (pedestrian-friendly,
A “te ay
energy-efficient urban design and solar power), administra- \. TANZANIA /
tive support, and high-tech services, the development was to i ¢
aN f
serve as a hub for attracting new businesses to the region. 7
Promoters claimed it would be a “new Hong Kong of Africa” RWANDA /0 50 100 kmo~
and “another Dubai” (Sseesamirembe 2013).
y Velen
t
The project was suspended in December 2009 following
a presidential commission of inquiry’s investigation into FIGURE 13.6 Sseesamirembe, Uganda.
rumors about the healing practices of the project's promot-
ers: members of the Sserulanda Foundation religious group with In 2000, the Sserulanda Foundation established the Sseru-
a following in the Rakai District (officially registered as a religious landa Development Association (SDA) and the religious leader-
group in Uganda in 1987) and the United States (headquartered ship took on an economic development role, no doubt with
in Fairfax, Virginia). The group is described both as a local “sect” others pulling many strings. Subsequently, the SDA asked Ugan-
based on cult leadership and rituals (e.g., the preservation of da’s government for permission to operate the Lake Victoria
bodies in special rooms, akin to the preservation of mummies in Free Trade Zone as an autonomous territory. The Sseesa-
Egyptian pyramids) and as a “new-age religion” linking African mirembe city charter proposed that the Ugandan government
and Asian traditions that subscribe to vegetarian diets and living secede to the SDA the authority to administer the 200 square
by ecological principles. miles (322 km?) under a separate governmental structure, with
Its spiritual leader, Joseph Mugonza, later renamed Bambi powers to enact separate laws, ordinances, and procedures and
Baaba, reportedly had a vision in early childhood of a modern to maintain its own security force.
city linking ecology and urban development. During the civil war In 2011, local residents, farmers, and ranchers demanded
in Uganda, the area served as a refuge, and notable Ugandans access to and use of their former lands and denounced the
such as current Uganda President Museveni allegedly took mega-project as a Chinese land grab. The designation of
refuge there. On this basis, it is claimed that some members of Chinese financial front man Liu Jianjun raised alarms. This larger-
the current Ugandan government (2011-present) cemented than-life character was fond of dressing in African garb for inter-
contacts with Sserulanda religious leaders and that behind-the- views and prone to boasting about his African credentials,
scenes brokering resulted in the unveiling of a highly ambitious principally his leadership and self-reported successes in Baoding
business venture, which gained traction and publicity but fell villages (the supposed sites of 10,000 transplanted Chinese
apart under closer scrutiny. farmers, but Sino-African experts dispute their existence) and
The project took off because the Sserulanda Foundation as- throughout Africa as well as his honorary title of African chief
sembled and obtained title to a large tract of land. Leaders of (albeit it from an unnamed African country). Liu’s grand plans to
the religious movement claimed to control 46 square miles of spearhead China's new export to Africa—farmers—heightened
land (75 km?) of land by 1995, but their actual acquisition was concerns and galvanized opposition to the mega-project, resis-
more in the range of 3 to 31 square miles (5-50 km?) (Médard tance that has taken on a distinctively anti-Chinese tone.
and Golaz 2011). During the government inquiry, a witness ac- Despite a farcical element to Mr. Liu’s persona, he appears to
cused the foundation of robbing its followers and new converts have become the private face of Beijing’s interest in African ag-
and of organizing the confiscation of their land by hired legal riculture land. To many people's surprise, Liu held a press confer-
experts (quoted in Médard and Golaz 2011:14). ence in Beijing (2008) to announce the Lake Victoria Free Trade
 African Futures 325

Zone, an event that included representation and speeches from Neither is there anything extraordinary about shadowy foreign
high-ranking officials from both the People’s Republic of China investors getting involved in new mega-projects. Entanglements
and the Ugandan government. Liu and his Baoding villages of religious and “development” utopias—the association of
seemed to have official support. business investors, government officials, religious leaders, fol-
The Sseesamirembe story reflects a phenomenon that is oc- lowers, and hustlers—create a milieu where each actor tries to
curring with greater frequency in 21st-century Africa: the mixing use the others by feeding into different utopian desires with es-
of virtual and real worlds, the entanglement of players from dif- sentially virtual elements. Sseesamirembe, as conceived in the
ferent worlds and with different visions of sustainable develop- original master plan, may never see the light of day. However, its
ment. There is nothing extraordinary about a religious movement short history from unveiling to implementation (though the proj-
wanting to construct an ideal city, but getting the project off the ect was suspended in 2009, media reports indicated it restarted
ground is another matter. Project promotion (or exaggeration in 2011) is a harbinger of the immense challenges in putting into
and vagueness concerning details such as the amount of land action green mega-urbanism. Ultimately, suspended or failed
under control) is a convenient ploy to attract interest and foreign green experiments undermine the global tilt toward sustainable
investors seeking to profit from selling sustainable utopias. development.

low-carbon urban infrastructures and economies) trans- URBAN SUSTAINABILITY

lates into high-risk endeavors. At present, urban sustain- The World Commission on Environment and Devel-
ability is being primarily advanced by technological opment (1987:43) defined sustainable development
systems, innovation, and corporate investment. Outside as that “which meets the needs of the present without
of academic circles, the sociocultural and political di- compromising the ability of future generations to meet
mensions of the livability of eco-cities are overlooked. their own needs.” Its Brundtland Report (after Gro
If the projects mapped in Figure 13.4 are imple- Harlem Brundtland, who led the commission) ad-
mented, major metropolitan areas will be fundamen- dressed the interconnections among population
tally restructured. New satellite-cities will reshape the growth, resource depletion, pollution, and excessive
urban hierarchies established in earlier times. There is consumption and emphasized that current patterns of
a real danger of abandoning the traditional African development were unsustainable. The report attempted
city by promoting detached projects geared explicitly to reconcile the ecological limits to growth articulated
toward serving elites and satisfying the desires of the by the Northern green movement and the need to
leisure classes. Despite the claims of promoters, whose eliminate poverty as voiced in the Global South (Swill-
projects still need to raise investments, investor short- ing and Annecke 2012). Absorbing “sustainable de-
falls may be compensated through buy-ins from gov- velopment” into global development discourse, the
erments desperate to realize 21st-century urban term reconciled the tension and opposing interests
visions in the high-stakes global arena. Fear of failure of North and South. This highly influential report pro-
and negative international publicity may result in mu- vided the strategic foundation for subsequent high-level
nicipal and regional infrastructure budgets being di- global forums that produced agreements to implement
verted away from service provision for the poor. sustainable development (e.g., Earth Summits and UN
Moreover, satellite developments will add to urban Climate Change Conferences).
sprawl by doing little to reduce urban Africans’ depen- The sustainable development rubric has been ac-
dence on automobile transportation, and will exacer- companied by a burgeoning literature on sustainabil-
bate the difficulties of everyday Africans who travel on ity, with African perspectives represented (Burns and
foot. Watson (2014) contends that the scale envisioned Weaver 2008). Within this discourse, there is a consen-
in these new plans might be sufficient to mobilize a sus that in African contexts sustainability must incorp-
broad-based coalition of slum dwellers, unemployed orate improvements in housing, living, and working
youth, and business and civic organizations in order to conditions of the poor to complement environmental
effectively counter these interventions and advocate initiatives (Satterthwaite 2001). Sustainable develop-
for a more democratic and representative agenda of ment as it is framed within Western thought processes
urban priorities. and based on Global North experience cannot be
326 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

directly applied to African contexts. Initiatives that Asomani-Boateng (2011) calls for recovering the
are not well adapted to local contexts will be neither positive characteristics of early African cities (eg.,
resilient nor sustainable. Development experience is Kumasi, Great Zimbabwe, Kano) and for adapting as-
littered with examples of failed projects that underesti- pects of indigenous urban form and architecture to
mated the realities of existing cultural, political, help shape thinking about Africa-imbued sustainable
environmental, and economic environments. For ex- development. Development strategies based on indig-
ample, technological fixes introduced without ad- enous urban forms, embodying the culture, aspira-
equate maintenance and supplies of spare parts will tions, experiences, and values of local people, are
break down and lead to abandonment and stalled de- consistent with the central tenets of sustainable devel-
velopment. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, sus- opment and can be adapted to the 21st century. Unfor-
tainable prototypes such as ishacks and solar-powered tunately, for too long anything indigenous has carried
toilets are being developed by local and international a negative connotation: a perspective sorely in needs
collaborations to make development contributions. of reexamination.
There are four major critiques of the Brundtland The indigenous urban forms and architecture in
conception of sustainable development (McMichael early African cities were sustainable, incorporating
2009; Pieterse 2011). First, it assumes that all conflicts dense, mixed, and multiuse development, principles
and contradictions can be resolved through rational, championed by today’s green proponents but not
democratic deliberation. Pieterse (2011:310) argues widely attributed to their precolonial African anteced-
that “the prevailing discourses provide a foil for biased ents. Several key elements—for example, urban agricul-
and shallow policy decisions that generally reinforce ture, indigenous architectural models such as traditional
the status quo in unsustainable and unjust situations.” compounds, active grassroots participation, green
A second problem is that it reinforces assumptions of urban boundary buffers—especially pertinent to an Af-
mainstream development economics and the empha- rican sustainable development agenda. This involves
sis on economic growth. Third, “urban sustainability” transplanting elements of the rural village into an urban
has been hijacked as a real estate development project environment. Agriculture was a pervasive activity in in-
with urban-ecological security provided to enclave digenous cities, and “the greening of these cities with
consumers at a premium price and not available to edible plants for both the aesthetics and nutritional
many. Fourth, the concept is popular precisely because needs of the city residents remains one of the most sus-
it lacks definition and measurability: malleability tainable innovations by indigenous urban builders”
allows for a wide variety of interpretations and manip- (Asomani-Boateng 2011:258). In a total rupture with
ulations to jump on the green bandwagon. the past, colonial and contemporary municipalities
The Global North’s conception of sustainable de- have provided no policy role for urban agriculture. In-
velopment may not be directly transferable to Africa. stead, they undermined urban farming, clinging to the
A key question is whether African traditions can con- view it is a transitory, interim, and traditional rural ac-
tribute to an indigenous or more authentically African- tivity with no place in modern cities and economies. In
rooted conception of sustainable development. reality, urban agriculture can provide fresh, locally
Aspects of African historical traditions and social grown food, clean air, and jobs for urban dwellers.
values (e.g., group mutuality, spirituality, self-help, Courtyard architecture in traditional compound
communal bonding, and social responsibility) should housing, with rooms organized around an open-sky
be recovered and appropriated for an African ap- courtyard, maximized urban space and facilitated
proach to sustainable development. An African sense mixed and multiple uses of spaces in a compact form.
of being human has at its core values of ubuntu: com- This housing was affordable, and the economics of
passion, hospitality, and generosity (Dei 1993). Such compound construction remain intact (one room ina
a value system emphasizes human interactions with compound costs approximately 33% of a comparable
nature and the environment as opposed to controlling room in a standard villa/bungalow) (Asomani-
them. Boateng 2011). Lower construction costs are due to the
 African Futures 327

incorporation of local building materials and basic Swilling and Annecke (2012:27-28) summarize
and efficient building techniques, perfected by infor- seven global documents in the policy domain that
mal artisans. Compounds promote higher urban den- confirm the looming threats to society. These threats
sities due to the large number of rooms contained in a challenge the wisdom of continuing along a business-
single courtyard. Some compound housing in the past as-usual capitalist development path.
(e.g., Benin City) incorporated roof technologies that First, the UN's Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
allowed for the collection of surface water, which was (2005), compiled by 1,360 scientists from 95 countries,
used for drinking, cooking, and planting. Of course, confirmed for the first time that 60% of the ecosystems
compound architecture would need to be adopted to upon which humans depend for survival are becoming
incorporate a vertical element to accommodate higher degraded. For example, marine ecosystems are used
densities. Project developers of the Hope City Project unsustainably and are becoming degraded because of
in Accra, aiming to build the tallest building in Africa overfishing, pollution, warming, acidification, and
(75 stories) in a US$10 billion project, describe it as other factors driven by human-induced change (UN
a 21st-century realization of the African compound in 2005). To meet demands for food, fresh water, timber,
a tall vertical structure. fiber, and fuel, humans have altered the ecosystem more
extensively over the past 50 years than in previous mil-
lennia (UN 2005). Degradation is forecast to worsen
EVIDENCE OF AN UNSUSTAINABLE WORLD
over the next 50 years.
Human activity is breaking through dangerous thresh- Second, global warming has been scientifically
olds by its destructive and wasteful practices. Biophysi- established. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
cal limits are being breached on several counts, and Change (IPCC) confirms that the warming trend re-
more affluent populations continue to expand rather sults from human activity, especially the release of
than reduce their ecological footprints. Overconsump- greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, largely attribut-
tion by a minority elite ultimately translates into less able to the burning of fossil fuels, deforestation, and
being available for the majority by degrading and agricultural production. The IPCC (2013) warns that
using up natural resources. The elite’s unsustainable the average temperature will rise by between 0.3 and
usage of the world’s primary resources and ecosystems 4 degrees Celsius (0.5-8.6 degrees Fahrenheit) by the
is undermining the ability of all countries to achieve late 21st century, triggering major ecological and socio-
sustainable development. economic changes. Extensive destructive consequences
Global society has been operating under an as- will occur in Africa: 75 to 250 million Africans will
sumption of infinite resources. Economic growth, suffer the consequences of increased water stress by
profit, and expansion drive the global capitalist system. 2020; output from rain-fed agriculture will decline by
Cities and industries depend heavily on access to half by 2020; and sea-level rise will damage most low-
resources, and planning runs on assumptions of limit- lying African coastal cities by 2099.
less supplies. The current trajectory (based on present- Third, oil discoveries as well as oil production have
day widely used technologies) is driving environmental peaked in some countries, but new discoveries in the
degradation that is bound to result in decline, a rever- United States and Mexico and several Africa countries
sal in standards of living, and eventual collapse. A (e.g., Kenya and Uganda in 2012) are impeding the
world threatened by famines and floods, scarcity of transition toward alternative energy. There are now
fresh water and energy, and displacement of popula- 50 countries in Africa with active oil and gas explora-
tions is not the brave new world typically imagined. tions. Such activity has forced a revision of the peak oil
Ultimately, the vitality and survival of people and their thesis (popular 2000-11). The sustained and increasing
homelands will be compromised. These threats are demand from industries and consumers (e.g., fuel for
real: some African countries, especially in the Sahel, transport and production of cement for buildings,
are already experiencing the staggering impacts of various other oil derivatives, such as polymers in man-
human-induced environmental change. ufacturing plastics, and fertilizers and herbicides for
328 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

growing food on commercial farms) may perpetuate Finally, the global economy used 7 billion tons of
our reliance on oil. For example, oil is used for 60% of primary resources (biomass, metals, industrial and
the global economy’s energy needs. construction minerals) in 1900; consumption in-
Fourth, inequality is rampant: 20% of the global creased to 60 billion tons by 2005, with the rate of
population (largely residing in the Global North) increase accelerating rapidly after 1980 (quoted in
account for 86% oftotal private consumption expen- Swilling and Annecke 2012:44). The UN Environmen-
diture (UN Development Programme 1998). Oxfam tal Programme’s International Resource Panel (2013)
(2013) reported that “the richest 1 percent has in- notes that extracted materials of the Earth’s resources
creased its income by 60 percent in the last 20 years, should be around 6 tons per capita as opposed to the
with the financial crisis accelerating rather than slow- current 8 tons. An expanding population will only add
ing the process,” while the income of the top 0.01% to the pressures. The International Resource Panel is
increased even more. Sharp divergences in consump- developing quantitative assessments of absolute re-
tion patterns illustrate the degree of inequality. For source limits, but in the meantime, prices will in all
example, the wealthiest 20% of the global popula- likelihood increase due to this resource depletion.
tion consume 45% of the total meat and fish, 58% of Global society thresholds may be breached unless
the energy, 84% of the paper, and 84% of the motor there is a shift to low-carbon energy; use of water,
vehicles; the poorest 20% consume relative shares of energy, and other resources becomes more efficient;
less than 5%. Conspicuous consumption has been and sustainable technologies are adopted in building,
taking precedence over meeting basic needs on a transport, and agriculture. Unfortunately, there is scant
global scale. evidence that policymakers are heeding or registering
Fifth, the majority (62%) of urban Africans reside the full implications of these warnings and their mul-
in slums (UN-HABITAT 2012). UN-HABITAT’s land- tiple impacts. Economic growth, human settlement
mark publication The Challenge of Slums reveals that expansion, and exploitation of natural resources con-
most people are living in appalling conditions in self- tinue almost unabated. Reversing the current trends
or community-built dwellings without many opportu- will require significant changes in policy, institutions,
nities to improve their living conditions. Governments, and practices related to global development.
international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations are failing to provide decent housing
POST-MDGs: THE SUSTAINABLE
and decent jobs. Population and urbanization projec-
tions predict that the number of people living in Afri- DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

can cities will increase, particularly the portion of new The Millennium Declaration (2000) put forth a central
residents who will reside in slums, trapping the latter focus with key goals. Although the MDG targets will
in deep poverty with few escape routes (Cazzavillan, not be met when the implementation timetable expires
Donadellu and Persha 2013). in 2015, this global policy framework demonstrated
Sixth, food insecurity is a longstanding problem that the power of universal goals for building momentum
will worsen in the context of various resource impair- to coordinate global, national, and local action. The
ments. Almost one quarter of global land is degraded to process of MDG implementation is revealing the need
some degree, and declining soil fertility is a major driver to improve the quality of data to track progress and to
of food price increases (Watson, Wakhungu, and Herren support capacity-building efforts.
2008). In addition, rising oil prices affect industrial agri- There is a groundswell to declare a sustainable de-
culture, which depends heavily on fertilizer and pesti- velopment agenda for 2015-30. The Rio+20 Summit
cide inputs derived from the oil supplied by global in 2012 concluded by outlining a sustainable develop-
chemical conglomerates. Agricultural experts propose ment framework with four dimensions: economic de-
diverging solutions that rely on an African green revolu- velopment (including the end of extreme poverty),
tion or indigenous agricultural practices. social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and
 African Futures 329

good governance. At the same time, UN Secretary- parts per million in May 2013. Our scientific under-
General Ban Ki-moon launched the UN Sustainable standings confirm that humans are having a greater
Development Solutions Network to mobilize global impact on Earth (along critical dimensions of climate,
scientific and expert knowledge to turn sustainable ecosystems, land use, and food and primary commod-
development aspirations into practical actions that ity scarcity) than any other agent, and social scientific
could be applied to all countries while respecting na- research confirms that inequality, social exclusion, and
tional policies, priorities, and differences as well as dif- gaps in educational attainment are widening.
ferent national, regional, and local capacities. The Key sustainable development challenges include
special session of the UN General Assembly in Sep- (1) how to harness available technologies to decouple
tember 2013 concluded by agreeing on a two-year road economic growth and living standards from environ-
map of negotiations about sustainable development mental resource use and pollution; (2) how to decou-
goals. The year 2014 will be used to identify sustain- ple agricultural productivity from unsustainable
able development priorities, and these will be opera- land-use conversion and wasteful uses of water, energy,
tionalized; in 2015 global sustainable development and fertilizers; and (3) how to create greener cities and
goals will be launched, and these goals will be carried more environmentally friendly infrastructure.
forward to 2030. Africa’s current development does not follow a
A greater effort is under way to mobilize a broader sustainable development pathway. Even though the
constituency, drawing on national and local govern- region is experiencing high economic growth rates,
ments, academia, science, civil society, and business. many Africans are falling deeper into poverty, which
Business engagement is regarded as key to achieving may feed into resentment that could be potentially ex-
sustainable development because it is directly respon- plosive. There are numerous distressed subregions (the
sible for two thirds of natural resource use. It remains Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes), where
to be determined whether business goals can be re- underdevelopment, conflict, natural resources deple-
aligned with sustainable development; that is, to move tion, and disease challenges are compounded by land-
beyond profit as the sole or main motivation, which locked status (but not in the Horn) and insufficient
more realistically will happen as the changing political domestic resources to end extreme poverty. Africa’s
climate compels businesses to realign their operations vulnerable regions need special international support
to sustain their profits. Mobilizing diverse stakehold- to break vicious cycles of underdevelopment, poverty,
ers (e.g., government at all levels, civil society, interna- insecurity, environmental degradation, and rapid pop-
tional organizations, businesses, local communities) ulation growth.
is the only way to build collective partnerships to real- Property developers in Africa are looking to Asia to
ize sustainable development. provide fast-track urban transformation, with projects
The case for moving to a sustainable development based on the experiences of Shanghai, Singapore, and
pathway is predicated on scientific evidence that the Dubai. Unfortunately, lessons from China’s urban
world’s current trajectory is dangerous and that re- transformations have not been heeded: Chinese cities
maining on that track is unsustainable. Many key eco- have been built in ways that waste energy and create
systems essential for human and societal well-being traffic congestion. The Chinese approach to urban
are under threat or have already been destroyed, and layout, with “superblocks” (0.3 square miles [0.5 km?])
an unprecedented mass extinction of species is well interspersed with large boulevards and the separation
under way. Climate change is no longer a future threat of residential, business, and shopping districts, compli-
but a stark present reality for Africa and elsewhere. For cates travel patterns and creates traffic congestion and
example, the measurement of carbon dioxide concen- hostile environments for pedestrian and bicycle traffic.
trations in the atmosphere at the Mauna Loa Observa- The unheeded urban planning lesson is that smaller
tory (Hawaii) were at the highest recorded levels since blocks, combined with smaller streets and mixed uses,
measurements began in 1958, with a reading of 400 produce more livable cities.
330 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Africa’s urban populations will continue to grow, “Happiness Index,” proposed by Nobel Prize winners
and cities will continue to use massive amounts of re- Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz (Stiglitz, Sen, and
soutces (water, food, energy, minerals, timber, con- Fitoussi 2009)—are movements in the right direction.
sumer and industrial commodities). New city land use Swilling and Annecke (2012) argue for a “double
and spatial infrastructures (e.g., buildings, energy, movement”: a turn toward sustainable development as
water, and transportation) last for decades, so plan- well as a “just” transition. The latter embraces every-
ning decisions are vital in determining the trajectory of one’s needs, in particular those of the poor, and con-
carbon dioxide emissions, water use, etc. Well-designed nects their basic needs to the global challenge of
green buildings with proper insulation and ventilation innovating, investing, and intervening to use resources
and energy-efficient systems use only 25% of the more sustainably. Mahatma Gandhi's comment that
energy of their non-green counterparts, and the energy there is enough in the world to provide what we need
savings last for decades. African investment in top- but not enough to satisfy human greed is certainly rel-
quality green buildings, backed by strong building evant to our times.
codes and the discipline to enforce them, will be
RETHINKING URBANISM
necessary.
Adequate financing is also essential. One painful Cities contain a dense concentration of overlapping
lesson of the MDGs is that many goals were under- actors engaged in imagining, mediating, contesting,
funded. Moreover, sustainable development goals and deploying sustainable development architecture
need to be bolstered by significant improvements in (Swilling and Annecke 2012). Nevertheless, the bur-
data collection and processing (e.g., incorporating ex- geoning literature on environmental sustainability
isting tools such as geographic information systems, focuses heavily on climate change, deforestation, and
remote sensing, and social networking) to provide desertification and has only begun to grapple with
place-based, real-time information that is gender and urban environments and their role in broader processes.
culturally sensitive to analyze progress and to promote At the same time, the urban studies literature is a late-
fairness and inclusion. Even these combined efforts comer in acknowledging the physical-environmental
may fall short. Global regimes of trade, finance, taxa- foundations of urbanization processes (Heynen, Kaika,
tion, business accounting, and intellectual property and Swyngedouw 2006).
may need to be reformed to be in harmony with sus- Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, various
tainable development. urban movements (e.g., Garden City, New Town, Techno
Implementing sustainable development policies City, New Urbanism) attempted to reinvent the city.
and practices across the globe will require a significant Green urbanism is the urban movement of the 21st cen-
transformation of energy, industrial, urban, and agricul- tury. It encompasses a wide array of approaches: eco-cities
tural systems and a movement away from resource- and (discussed earlier), smart cities (emphasizing informa-
energy-intensive growth. Such a transition will represent tion technology networks and efficiencies in utility and
one of the greatest technical, organizational, and soci- service provision), carbon-neutral/low-carbon cities (fo-
etal challenges that humanity has ever faced. These chal- cusing on energy, transportation, infrastructure, and
lenges are monumental and require a recalibration from building efficiencies), as well as broader approaches such
our current thinking and behavior toward nature toward as ecoregions (prioritizing city sustainability within the
a creative process for imagining and operating within context of natural flows, such as in river basins) and nar-
more livable parameters and spaces. Finding ways to rower approaches such as solar cities (where solar energy
validate and use qualitative measures is essential, but replaces fossil fuels).
quantitative measures of progress must also be consid- Green urbanism has its origins in the mid-1970s,
ered. The emergence of new indicators—for example, when it emerged in the context of the rising environ-
the “extended Human Development Index” (adding en- mental movement. Throughout the 1980s and early
vironmental sustainability, gender inequality, and 1990s, it remained mainly an innovative concept with
human security to the development toolkit) and the few practical examples. The UN’s 1992 Earth Summit

=
 African Futures 331

in Rio de Janeiro and the resulting sustainable devel- building materials, forests for charcoal, and fossil fuels
opment program (Agenda 21) formed the background for accessing mobility and supplying power for refrig-
for the first wave of green urban initiatives. Curitiba eration, lighting and mobile phone recharging) (Swill-
(Brazil), Waitakere (New Zealand), and Schwabach ing and Annecke 2012). The urban modernity of the
(Germany) are examples of first-generation green poor is, therefore, another costly affair that works
urban initiatives. Since 2005, the green city phenom- against sustainability, but on balance, slum dwellers
enon has become mainstream, and numerous green live more within the carrying capacity ofthe planet. To
initiatives are under way in Africa. their credit, slum dwellers recycle, reuse, and repur-
Green urbanism aims to curb the environmental pose materials to construct shacks; they engage in
impacts of cities (greenhouse gas emissions, water pol- urban agriculture by capturing nutrients from sewage
lution, wastes), to reduce dependence on increasingly and reuse it as fertilizer. The global nongovernmental
costly and insecure long-distance inputs (fossil fuels, organization Shack/Slum Dwellers International (de-
minerals, food, and construction materials), and to tailed in Chapter 2) and others (reviewed in various
roll out ecological modernization (efficiency, smart issues of Environment and Urbanization) are major play-
grids). Green urbanism spans a range of initiatives ers in the quiet greening of the activities of the poor
from soft mitigation efforts such as retrofitting build- (e.g., setting up waste management systems that col-
ings for energy efficiency, expanding mass transit and lect, sort, and recycle materials) that goes largely un-
freight rail, and constructing smart grids to manage noticed outside of nongovernmental organization and
electrical systems to medium mitigation initiatives certain scholarly circles. Any future sustainable devel-
(e.g., alternative energy investments in wind, solar, opment framework needs to harness the positive green
biofuels) to the complete greening of entire cities. aspects of slum dwellers’ community initiatives.
There are major challenges in greening African Moving toward sustainable urbanism will require
cities. African governments are challenged to provide fundamental changes in how society operates. Table 13.3
more jobs and prefer to focus on jobs now rather than highlights sustainable development aspirations.
the long-term employment that may be created from
green urbanism (Simon 2013). It is complicated to
TABLE 13.3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
move green urbanism from a technical piecemeal fix, ASPIRATIONS
emphasizing greening elite residential enclaves and
¢ No travel by privately owned automobiles
business parks, to focus on the most deprived high- e Penalties for long-distance travel by automobile and air travel
density areas (lacking amenities and green open space). ¢ Compulsory living in high-density buildings that generate
Pieterse (2009) calls for the conceptual inversion more energy than is consumed
to understand the city from the bottom-up, or through e Local food production and intensification of urban agriculture
e Enforced waste separation at source
the eyes of the majority of residents who appropriate
e Ban on pollution and transshipment of hazardous materials
the city for their own ends. Slum urbanism can be (which could result in bans on certain kinds of plastics and
better understood as the quiet encroachment of the compounds, or in incentives to move to greener technology)
masses to build their own neighborhoods piece by e Price hikes for energy-intense food items (e.g., meat) and for
piece, needs to be incorporated into green urbanism. consumer goods that incorporate rare metals (e.g., mobile
phones)
Slum dwellers are active manipulators of their envi-
e Massive investments in “green-collar” jobs in clean-tech
ronments for good as well as bad. Their lack of access industries and technologies
to various infrastructures means they must devise ways ¢ Regulatory/market interventions to restrict carbon-intensive
to access water, energy, food, transport, and outlets for imports and to enforce zero waste
their sewage and solid waste. As such, slum dwellers e Encouragement of green slum urbanism
e Massive investments in the restoration of ecosystems services
participate in appropriating cities’ ecological resources
(e.g., aquifers, rivers, coastal areas, soils, forests, wetlands,
(eg., rivers for conveying water and waste, soils for and other biodiverse sites)
planting food as well as platforms for erecting dwell-
ings and commercial facilities,, biomass for fuels and Source: Swilling and Annecke (2012:129).
332 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGI

LIVABLE URBANISM built-up urban area—from 124,000 square miles

(200,000 km?) in 2000 to 372,000 square miles
Pieterse (2011) advocates an alternative conceptualiza-
(600,000 km2) in 2030 (Suzuki et al. 2009:1). An added
tion of sustainability that focuses on sustainable lives
248,000 square miles (400,000 km?) will be constructed in
and livelihoods rather than just sustaining development
just 30 years. Humankind is building a whole new urban world
and specific techno-green fixes. A sustainable livelihood
at warp speed. Africa is ground zero in this urban revolution,
approach is sensitive to processes of social and ecologi-
and the region faces severe resource constraints—fiscal, ad-
cal reproduction within diverse contexts. These pro-
ministrative, technical, and natural—not to mention under-
cesses are nonlinear and context-specific and can be
development, increased inequalities, rapidly growing
attained through multiple pathways; thus, there is not a
populations, and a perception that extremist groups are be-
single overarching model or pathway to sustainable de-
coming more active and embedded in the region.
velopment. People and locales cannot fully escape their
A paradigmatic shift toward a greener frontier is
contemporary conditions, but this is all the more reason
occurring. Sustainability in its various forms is being
to work on locally specific agendas and solutions.
mainstreamed in policy and practice. Perhaps the
Allen (2002:16-17) argues that we should focus
greatest achievement of agreeing on sustainable devel-
on five interrelated dimensions of sustainability and
opment goals will be the creation of a new norm.
for thinking of the interrelationship among the di-
Several features will be salient; for example, centrality
mensions as the most fruitful way to tackle sustainable
of carbon and climate change discourses, increased
development:
transfer of knowledge and cooperation, and a prepon-
e Economic sustainability: the ability of a local econ- derance of green-smart technological solutions. Critics
omy to sustain itself without causing irreversible from the region (eg., Pieterse 2011; Swilling and
damages to the natural resource base on which it Annecke 2012) believe the shift to sustainability does
depends and without increasing the city’s ecologi- not go far enough. Davis (2010b:29) believes it is little
cal footprint more than “green washing” and poses a profound
¢ Social sustainability: a set of actions and policies question: “Who will build the ark” to save humanity
aimed at improving the quality of life but also at from the impending tragedy? Certainly, the focus on
fair access and the distribution of rights over the economic growth as the basis of development has not
use and appropriation of the natural and built been displaced. Instead, the emphasis is on incorpo-
environment rating more environmentally sensitive, technological,
¢ Ecological sustainability: the impact of urban produc- and design solutions to slow unsustainable processes
tion and consumption on the integrity and health rather than on making a fundamental shift to a com-
of the city region and global carrying capacity pletely different way of thinking, operating, and living.
¢ Physical sustainability: the capacity and aptitude of Multiple urban projects are under way in the
urban and rural environments and techno-structures region. Ambitious to varying degrees, some have a
to support human life and productive activities high chance of realization (e.g., Eko Atlantic) and a
¢ Political sustainability: the quality of governance few (e.g., Sseesamirembe) are struggling to gain trac-
systems guiding the relationships and actions of tion. But most are not sufficiently emboldened to
different actors among the other four dimensions; make more than an isolated sustainable development
involves the democratization and participation of impact within their project borders. Each project pro-
civil society in all areas of decision-making poses one solution in a limited geographical area, as
opposed to solutions to the extensive challenges that
face contemporary African metropolitan areas. Al-
CONCLUSIONS
though isolated projects are important, there is little
Urbanization in developing countries represents the evidence that they can be scaled up and integrated,
single greatest transformation of this century. It is pro- even though comprehensive sustainable urban devel-
jected that developing countries will triple their opment plans are urgently needed. :

E
 African Futures 333

Various city vision plans (e.g., Nairobi 2030 and Jo- a framework for connecting diverse projects and goals
hannesburg 2040) seek to address urban development in a bigger intellectual project for rethinking Africa’s
in more holistic ways, but critics contend that existing future.
plans reproduce top-down thinking and are not inclu- The sustainable development discourse evokes
sive ofall stakeholders. Regardless oftheir specific limi- strong references to partnerships, and such a track is
tations, the track records of implementation for the going to require steadfast commitment from all par-
plans of urban visionaries have been particularly weak ties. To be true partnerships, they must involve mutual
since the colonial interlude. Current heavily promoted responsibilities for genuine, people-centered sustain-
“showcase” urban projects are unsustainable in the ex- able and socially just development. It is, however, dif-
treme. By ignoring slums, poverty, and the appalling ficult to envisage how many existing international
deficiencies in overall urban infrastructure, the sum of partnerships related to Africa can be reconfigured as
these projects will hardly make a dent in developing real partnerships in practice as opposed to in rhetoric,
more sustainable urban environments. given the heavy hand of history and the prevailing
Cities provide a plethora of opportunities to solve asymmetrical relations. Accordingly, for sustainable
such pressing global issues as poverty and education development to actually take root, it is of the utmost
and to initiate sustainable development. Cities are envi- importance to scrutinize all partnerships to ensure
ronments where services can be morte efficiently deliv- that the rhetoric of partnership is not just a more
ered because of their density. Access can be provided to subtle form of external power imposition.
better-quality education and health services, and jobs
can more easily be created within metropolitan concen-
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(idjeSa7:

i
 INDEX

A concept of, 8-13, 25, 29-54

Abacha, Sani, 41 definition of, 10
ABC approach. See abstain, be faithful, as divided continent, 96-97, 106
use a condom approach Europeans dividing, 81-84
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, 76 on maps, 8, 11-12
abstain, be faithful, use a condom (ABC) approach, 220 as millennium development frontier, 20-21
Abuja, Nigeria, 316 misconceptions of, 1, 25
Abuja Declaration, 217, 234 as net food-importing region, 245-47
AC-360, 31 New, 14-20
acacia tree, 61, 315 origin of, 8
academia, 32, 33-35, 39 overview of, 1-25
Accenture, 19 as region, 9
Accra, Ghana, 101f, 142f, 199f. See also representations of, 11, 29-54
Hope City, Ghana size of, 1, 2f
graveyard in, 192 unchaining, 40
lagoon in, 259 Africa Command (AFRICOM), 312
market in, 294 Africa Good News, 38
obesity in, 214 Africa Journals Online (AJOL), 33-34
slum in, 51-52 African Arguments, 38
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). African Center for Strategic Studies, 38
See human immunodeficiency virus/acquired African Centre for Migration and Society, 176
immunodeficiency syndrome African Economic Union, 3
activism, cross-border, 51 Africans. See also futures; rural
activists, 15-16 bungalows adopted by, 99
Adams, W., 64 in China, 295-97, 296f
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 192 in cities, 6, 105
adult mortality, 213f colonialism influencing, 87-88
Africa. See also Central Africa; dark continent; East Africa; corporations influenced by, 15
futures; rural; scramble for Africa; West Africa disempowered, 48-49

337
338 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Africans (Continued) Allen, A., 332

ecological footprints of, 76 Allen, T., 220
educated, 162t Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), 111
elite, 105 Alma-Ata Declaration, 216
entrepreneurs, 295-97, 296f Al-Shabaab, 313, 314-15, 314f, 316-17
in EU, 178 Alternative Water Forum, 186
as farmers, 110 Amin, Samir, 40
migration of educated, 162t Anderson, D., 88
revisioning of, 38-40 Anglo-Belgian Boundary Commission, 96
suicide rates of, 317 Angola, 31, 34, 196f, 249, 298, 300-301,
Africans in China, 296 303-4, 304f
African Traditional Medicine Day, 233 Angolan mode, 297
African Union (AU), 3 An Inconvenient Truth, 268
Abuja Declaration signed by, 217 Annan, Kofi, 113, 113f
Headquarters, 16f Annecke, E., 327, 330
rise of, 310 anthropogenic vegetation, 59
Africa Water Vision 2025 (UN-Water Africa), 206 Anti-Homosexuality Bill, 220
AFRICOM. See Africa Command apartheid laws, 104
Afrobarometer opinion polls, 20 AQUIM. See Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Agbogbloshie slum, 141, 142, 142f archaeology, 88
AGRA. See Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa architects, 34
agricultural lands in Africa. See land; land investments artisanal fishers, 73
agriculture artisanal mining, 67, 70-72, 72f
coerced, 105 Ascension Island, 312
contemporary, 247-48 Asia, tilt towards, 17
defined, 109 Asians, 102
gender in, 125-27 Asiwaju, A., 96
organizations emphasizing, 111 Asomani-Boateng, R., 326
overview of, 239-45, 243f, 244f, 259-61 asset recovery efforts, 41
plantation, 94 Atlantic coast, 73
as rural economy backbone, 109 AU. See African Union
structural adjustment policies influencing, 110
transformation, 109 B
urban, 256-59, 256t Baaba, Bambi, 324
women in, 125-27 Baggara Arabs, 273
AgriSA, 240, 241, 248, 250 Bamako, Mali, 190
AgriSol, 251, 255 Ban Ki-moon, 304, 329
Ahmed, Shirwa, 316-17 banking, mobile, 148, 148f
aid, 49-50 banks, 41
AIDS. See human immunodeficiency virus/acquired baobab tree, 61
immunodeficiency syndrome Barclays Bank PLC, 41
AJOL. See Africa Journals Online Bassey, Nnimmo, 281
Akaki, Ethiopia, 192 bauxite, 68
Ake, C., 38-39 Bedouins, 146f
Albertine Rift, 62-63 beeping, 147
Allan, Tony, 202 Belgian Congo, 215
 Index 339

Belgians, 94, 218 British

Benin City, Nigeria, 199 bungalows used by, 98
Bent, Theodore, 92 forced labor employed by, 190
Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885, Brundtland Report, 325
81, 81f, 96-97 Buiter, Willem, 248
big five management consultancy firms, 19-20 bungalows, 98-99, 98f
biodiversity. See also plant biodiversity Burkina Faso, 163-64, 246, 282
GMOs supporting, 117 Burundians, 255
in Mediterranean biome, 62 Busby, J., 274-75, 277f
small farmers nurturing, 118 Bush, George W., 225, 274
in TRFs, 59-61 business environment, 19t
biofuels, 242, 248, 251 business leaders, 15-16
biomes by-catch, 73
definition of, 59
desert, 61-62 C
map of, 60f Caillié, René, 86
Mediterranean, 62 Canada, 309
montane, 62-63 Cape Floral Kingdom, 62
overview of, 59 Cape Town, South Africa, 201, 230, 231f,
temperate grassland, 62 257-58, 279
TRE, 59-61 capitals
tropical savanna, 61 colonial, 97
types of, 59-63 national, 6-7
Biwater, 192 The Carbon Map, 266
Blatter, Sepp, 161 Carmody, P., 248, 254
blood diamonds, 66-67 Carr, E120
Boko Haram, 315-16 Castillo, Roberto, 296
Bond, Patrick, 40 Catholic priests, 34
Bongo, Omar, 44-45 Center of Socio-Political Analysis, 176
borders, villages bisected by, 96 Central Africa
Borlaug, Norman, 112 archaeology in, 88
Boserup, Ester, 124 HIV prevalence in, 219
Boston Consulting, 19 water in, 186, 189
Boston Marathon bombings, 317 Central African Republic, 275
Botswana, 68, 68f, 221, 233 Central Bank of Ghana, 170
boundaries, 96-97. See also borders C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group,
Brautigam, D., 290 278-79
Brazil, 309, 310 Chabal, P., 224
Brazil, Russia, India, China (BRIC), 16-17, 309 Chad, 4-5
Brazzaville, DRC, 104 Chadwick, Edwin, 229
Breman, J., 140 Chagoury, Gilbert, 323
BRIC. See Brazil, Russia, India, China The Challenge of Slums (UN-HABITAT), 328
bridge, 104 Chamberlain, W., 248
Britain, 267 Chavagneux, C., 42
indirect rule used by, 94 cheetah generation, 15-16
Leopold’s agreement with, 96 Chin, J., 218
340 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

China. See also Brazil, Russia, India, China in postcolonialism, 53-54

Africans in, 295-97, 296f precolonial, 90
effect, 16 satellite, 319-25, 320f, 322f, 324f
emissions, 280 science evidence, 90
entrepreneurs in, 295-97, 296f segregation in, 103-4
influence of, 16-17 society influenced by, 104-5
infrastructure investments, 297-304, 298f, 301f, 304f states’ relationships to, 90
map from, 11-12 as synthesis examples, 103
overview of, 287-89, 304-6, 304t trade creating, 93
return of, 289-91 whites in, 102
SEZ of, 299-300 city-regions, 24
urban transformations of, 329 civil society
U.S. counterbalanced by, 290 civic energy provided by, 51
China International Fund, 304 criticism of, 52-53
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 292 definition of, 50
Chinese GMOs and, 117
companies, 212 overview of, 50-53
entrepreneurs, 293-95, 295f Clapham, C., 96
in informal economies, 293-95, 295f climate change
medicines, 210-11 as anthropogenic, 63-64
migration, 291-93 changes caused by, 64-65
Wholesale Market, 294 cities and, 278-80
Christianity, missionary work, 34, 84, 215 communities debating, 266t
circular migration, 163-65 Darfur influenced by, 273-74
La Cité du Fleuve, DRC, 321 debate on, 266t
cities. See also Great Zimbabwe; villages as established, 327
Africans in, 6, 105 flooding caused by, 65
ancient, 90, 91, 92-93 funding, 280-83
centers, 321 human impacts of, 272-78, 275t, 276f, 277f
climate change and, 278-80 impacts, 269-72, 270f, 271f
colonial, 93, 97-104, 100f, 101f indigenous knowledge in, 282-83
colonial headquarters, 102, 103 maps of vulnerability to, 274-78,
commonalities, 90 276, 27 7F ;
as creativity examples, 103 overview of, 265-68, 266t, 283-84
debate on, 90 precipitation and, 63-65
development of, 88-93, 89f, 91f, 319-25, Sahel influenced by, 282-83
320f, 322f, 324f stalemate, 280-83
eco-, 321, 323-25, 324f wat, 273-74
as European power symbols, 103 Climategate, 267
Europeans in, 102 climatic zones, 63
European values spread by, 105 Coca-Cola, 15
industrial, 88 Cohen, Michael, 25
leadership emerging from, 99 colonial capitals, 97
migration influencing, 102-3 colonial governments
planning, 97-104, 100f, 101f direct rule of, 94
port, 97 indirect rule of, 94
 Index 341

infrastructure provided by, 94, 99 copper, 66

primary responsibility of, 94 Coquery-Vidrovich, C., 88
colonial headquarters cities, 102, 103 corporations, Africans influencing, 15
colonialism, 1, 9. See also colonial governments cosmopolitan urban theory, 53-54
Africans influenced by, 87-88 Cote d'Ivoire, 76
benefits of, 105 Cotula, L., 240, 248
as benign, 88 counterterrorism, 312
boundaries demarcated by, 96-97 Cowley, R., 321
cities, 93, 97-104, 100f, 101f Craddock, S., 224
colonial headquarters city extending reach of, 103 creativity, informality and, 145-46
commonalities, 94 crisis-driven journalism, 9-10
development influenced by, 93-94 Crisp, Jeff, 166-67
economies influenced by, 105 cross-border activism, 51
Europeans justifying, 105-6 cultural areas, boundaries dividing, 96-97
as evil, 88 cultural exploitation, 10
health system legacies of, 215-16 cut flowers, 205
legacies, 93-94, 105-6, 215-16
migration and policies of, 162-63 D
motivations, 87-88 Daewoo, 248, 255
pharma-, 224 Dakar, Senegal, 192
resistance to, 99-101 dancing, 104
roads built by powers of, 95 Darfur, 273-74
sanitation in, 190-99, 191f, 193t-195t, 196f, 199f dark continent representation
territories demarcated by, 96-97 legacy of, 29-33
water in, 190-99, 191f, 193t-195t, 196f, 199f overview of, 29
women confronting, 125 Davis, M., 137
coltan, 70-72, 71f, 72f Davos, Switzerland, 186
“The Coming Anarchy” (Kaplan), 32 Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There
commodities, virtual water needed for, 204t Is A Better Way for Africa (Moyo), 49-50
communities, in climate change debate, 266t deagranization thesis, 118, 121-24
community-based research, 53 deaths, 75-76. See also mortality
community-led enumerations, 51-52, 153-54, 154f in Cape Town, 231f
concurrency, 221 causes of, 213t, 231f
conflicts South Africa and, 214-15
coltan, 70-72, 71f, 72f vehicular, 227
in Darfur, 273-74 DeBlij, H., 5-6, 5f
Congo. See Democratic Republic of the Congo De Boeck, Filip, 321, 323
Congregation of the People of Tradition for debt crisis, 16
Proselytism and Jihad, 315-16 Declaration of Alma-Ata, 216
Connah, Graham, 88, 89 deforestation
Conrad, Joseph, 29, 30f annual rate of, 68
Coons, Chris, 313 as controversial, 69
Cooper, Anderson, 31 in montane, 63
Cooper, F.,, 105 pressures, 61
co-opting, 52 TRE, 60-61
Copenhagen, Denmark, 267 wildlife influenced by, 69
342 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Deloitte, 148 grains in, 112-13

Delta Imobiliaria, 301, 303 green revolution influenced by, 112-13
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 96, 189, HIV/AIDS influencing, 223
PANT, PX PSO), PLUS PAS, Sie migration influencing, 172
city center development in, 321 poor, 214, 230
coltan, 70-72, 71f, 72f poverty associated with, 214
cultural restrictions imposed in, 104 rural, 69
environments in, 59 from sewage, 331
IDP camp, 165f transformation, 245-46
land used by, 251-52 water and, 196
uranium, 66 of women, 196
demographic dividend, 18-19 direct rule, 94
demolition, 103-4 diseases, 75-76
Denmark, 267 burden, 211-14, 213f, 213t
dependency claim, 23 double burden of, 212-14, 213f, 213t
desert, 61-62 health and, 215-16
De Soto, H., 138 tropical, 226-27, 227t
development. See also rural development; sustainable displacement, 24
development diversity, 31
big push ideas dominating, 20-21 of environments, 59
chronology of, 91f of informal workers, 143-44, 144f
of cities, 88-93, 89f, 91f, 319-25, 320f, 322f, 324f urban centers showing, 88
colonialism influencing, 93-94 Divine Chocolate, 242-43
Europeans directing, 93 Djibouti, 312
ideas, 40 donors, 16
leaders influencing, 48-49 Dos Santos, José Eduardo, 34
perceptions, 39 DRC. See Democratic Republic of the Congo
poor at center of, 51-53 drones, 312
of railways, 95 Dr. Seuss. See Geisel, Theodor
structural adjustment policies as, 21 drumming, 104
sustained, 110-11 dry savanna, 61
urban, 88-90, 97-104, 100f, 101f Dubai, 322-23
US. assistance for, 311f Duesberg, Peter, 224
Western model of, 20-21 Duignan, P., 101
Deviers-Joncour, Christine, 44 Durban, South Africa, 267, 283
de Waal, A., 274 dynamism, informality and, 145-46
diamonds, 66-67
Diamond Trading Company, 68f E
diaspora, 34, 35, 147 earthship model, 152
diet and nutrition Earth Summit, 330-31
animal protein in, 73 East Africa
in Cape Town, 257-58 HIV prevalence in, 219
farming influencing, 258 satellite cities, 319, 321
fish in, 73 terrorism in, 313
forest foods in, 69 urbanization of, 18
genetically modified crops, 115 urban population of, 6
 Index 343

eco-cities, 321, 323-25, 324f human, 74, 75-77

ecological footprints Mount Kilimanjaro changes, 267, 268-69, 268f
of African citizens, 76 narratives of, 57-58
urban environments and, 75-76 population influencing, 75
economies as resource frontier, 57-58
agriculture as backbone of rural, 109 sustainability progress, 58f
colonialism influencing, 105 threats, 58-59
growth, 14-20, 25 urbanization transforming, 75-76
integration, 105 epidemiological transition, 212-14, 213f, 213t
success, 33 Epsteinal isn 21) 225
turnaround, 16-17 Equatorial Guinea, 102
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 217, 218 Eritrea, 315
education Ernst & Young, 19
ofgirls, 127-29, 128f ethical trade, 244-45
transactional sex and, 128 Ethiopia, 81-82, 129t, 192, 210, 255, 275, 283
as work preparation, 105 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic
educational systems, information disseminated Front, 17
by, 87 Ethiopians, 175-76
Egypt, 251 ethnic groups, 1-2, 3f
EIA. See environmental impact assessment Eto’o, Samuel, 160-61
EIU. See Economist Intelligence Unit EU. See European Union
Eko Atlantic, 321, 322-23 Europe
Elf Aquitaine, 44-45 cities as power symbols of, 103
Elf scandal, 44-45 migration to, 177, 178
emissions, 280-81 trade influenced by, 94-95
empire, geographies of, 94-97, 95f Europeans
e-Network Project, 212 Africa divided by, 81-84
English Town and Country Planning Act of in cities, 102
1932, 104 cities spreading values of, 105
entrepreneurs colonialism justified by, 105-6
African, 295-97, 296f development directed by, 93
in China, 295-97, 296f direct rule of, 94
Chinese, 293-95, 295f indirect rule of, 94
in informal economies, 293-95, 295f in Kenya, 102
Nigerian, 297 knowledge of, 83-84
environmental impact assessment (EIA), 322 land acquired by, 203
environmentalism, of poor, 47-49 views of, 83-84, 86, 87
environmental migrants, 24 water consumption of, 203
environments European Union (EU)
change, 59 Africans in, 178
diversity of, 59 biofuel use of, 251
in DRC, 59 emissions, 280
ecological footprints and urban, 75-76 flowers exported to, 205
of fisheries, 73 Everett (captain), 96
as fragile, 57-58 e-waste, 140, 140f, 141-45, 142f
health of, 104 exceptionalism thesis, 317-18
344 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

exchanges Flower Valley Conservation Trust (FVCT), 244

horizontal, 52 flying toilet phenomenon, 199
poor practicing, 52 food. See also agriculture
vertical, 52 insecurity, 257-58
explorers, 84 overview of, 239-45, 243f, 244f, 259-61
export-processing zones, 24 production, 20
security, 256t
F Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
fair trade, 242-43, 243f Nations (FAO), 240
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations (FLO), 242, 243 Food and Drug Administration, U.S. (FDA), 225
Fanon, Frantz, 9 Food Price Index. See Food and Agriculture
FAO. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the Organization of the United Nations
United Nations forced labor, 190
Farah, Mo, 161f forced migrants, 165-69, 165f, 166f
farmers, 8. See also large farmers; small farmers foreign aid. See aid
Africans as, 110 Foreign Commercial Service, 312-13
GM seeds used by, 118 Foreign Direct Investment, 19, 24, 300
Kuapa Kokoo, 242-43 forest resources, 68-70, 73
South African, 240-41 419 scams, 31-32
farming. See also green revolution France, 44-45
methods, 113-14 Fraser, Craig, 155
offshoring, 8 Freetown, Sierra Leone, 216
fashion industry, 10 Freidberg, S., 246
FBI. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. French, 102
FDA. See Food and Drug Administration, U.S. cultural restrictions imposed by, 104
Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. (FBI), 316 Gabonese coerced by, 105
Fédération Internationale de Football Association Sahara irrigated by, 190
(FIFA), 298 French, Howard, 313
Ferguson, James, 33 French West Africa, 95
FIFA. See Fédération Internationale de Football Freund, B., 88
Association frontier roads, 95
financial secrecy index (FSI), 42-43, 43t FSI. See financial secrecy index
financial services, 126 fuel wood, 76
First Infantry Division, U.S., 312 Fulani, 196
fish futures
protein provided by, 73 overview of, 309-11, 332-33
smoking, 76 terrorism in, 313-18, 314f
fisheries, environments of, 73 urban, 319-25, 320f, 322f, 324f
fishing, 73, 74 U.S. influencing, 311-13, 311f
flaring, 68 FVCT. See Flower Valley Conservation Trust
flashing, 147 fynbos, 62, 244-45
FLO. See Fairtrade Labelling Organizations Fynsa, 244
flooding, climate change causing, 65
floral kingdom, 62 G
flowers, 205, 244-45, 244f Gabon, 44-45, 105, 288
Flower Valley, South Africa, 244-45, 244f Gabonese, 105
 Index 345

Gaborone, Botswana, 68, 68f great trek, 240-41

Gambia, 97 Great Zimbabwe, 87, 92-93
Gambia River, 97 Green Belt Movement (GBM), 47-48
Gandhi, Mahatma, 330 green revolution (GR)
Gann, L., 101 advantages of, 112t
Garlake, Peter, 92 definition of, 112
Gaud, William, 112 disadvantages of, 112t
GBM. See Green Belt Movement as failed, 112-13
GDP. See gross domestic product Indian, 115
Geisel, Theodor, 86 new, 113-15
gender overview of, 112
in agriculture, 125-27 green urbanism, 330-31, 331t
in rural Africa, 124-27, 124f gross domestic product (GDP)
genetically modified (GM) crops, 115-18, 118f growth, 14f, 15, 24
genocide, Rwandan, 94 infrastructure influencing, 24
German East Africa, 100-101 Guangzhou, China, 296, 296f
Germans, 94, 102 The Guardian, 10, 37, 266
Germany, 204 Guinea, 68, 69
Ghana, 41, 66, 73, 142f, 192, 199f, 204, 212, 214, Gujba, Nigeria, 313
215-16, 217, 233, 259, 288, 294, 319, 327.
See also Accra, Ghana; Hope City, Ghana H
Central Bank of, 170 Hadley cells, 186-87
fair trade in, 242-43 Haier, 292
railways benefiting, 95 Haiti, 218
settlement profile, 51-52 Haitians, 218
Gilliam (major), 96 Hall, R., 254
girls, 127-29, 128f, 129t Hansen, D., 314-15
Global Burden of Disease (WHO), 214 Harpham, T., 230
Global Fund, 226 Harsch, E., 20
Global North, 11, 21, 23 Hart, Keith, 135, 136
information flow to, 31 Harvest of Hope, 258
migration to, 160-62 Harwood, 175
global shadows metaphor, 33 Hassad Food, 250
global warming. See climate change hawala system, 170
GM crops. See genetically modified crops HDI. See Human Development Index
Godane, Ahmed Abdi, 315 healers, 232-33, 232f
gold, 66 health
Good News About Africa, 38 data lacuna, 214-15
Go Out policy, 289 disease and, 215-16
Gore, Al, 266, 268 of environments, 104
Goudie, A., 64 funding, 226-28, 227t
Govindarajan, Vijay, 152 mental, 227, 228
GR. See green revolution mobile, 212
GRAIN, 197, 198, 249 overview of, 209-11, 210f, 233-34
graveyard, 192 sickness and, 215-16
Great Ming Amalgamated Map of 1389, 11-12 urban, 228-33
346 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

health policies human trafficking

international, 216-18 smuggling and, 173-77f, 176f
national, 216-18 in South Africa, 177f
priorities, 218f “Human Trafficking in South Africa” (UNESCO), 177f
health systems, colonial legacies of, 215-16 hydrocolonialism, 197-98
Heart of Darkness (Conrad), 29, 30f
Hemingway, Ernest, 268 I
Hezbollah, 317 IASB. See International Accounting Standards Board
HIV-1, 218-19 Ibrahim, Mo, 33, 45
HIV-1, group P, 219 Ibrahim Prize, 45
HIV-2, 219 iCow, 8
HIV/AIDS. See human immunodeficiency virus/ IDPs. See internally displaced persons
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome IDUs. See intravenous drug users
Holmes Bros, 294, 295f Igbo women’s revolt, 101
hookworms, 226-27 IME. See International Monetary Fund
Hope City, Ghana India, 115
architecture of, 327 Indians
construction of, 17 companies, 212
rival of, 319 GR, 115
Hop on Pop (Geisel), 86 medicines, 210-11
horizontal exchanges, 52 indirect rule, 94
Horn of Africa, 170 industrial cities, 88
Horvaka, A., 126 inequality, 328
houses, transnational, 172 inflows, 42
How to Live in Tropical Africa (Murray, J.), 98 informal economies, 23
“How to Write About Africa” (Wainaina), Chinese in, 293-95, 295f
12-13 debates, 138
HSRC. See Human Sciences Research Council entrepreneurs in, 293-95, 295f
Huchzermeyer, M., 323 evolution of, 136-37, 137f
Human Development Index (HDI), 23 e-waste entanglements, 141-45, 142f
human environments, 74, 75-77 on ground, 138-40, 140f
human immunodeficiency virus/acquired informality, 53
immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS), complications, 140
211-12, 214, 215, 216 creativity and, 145-46
fatigue, 220 dynamism and, 145-46
funding, 226 engagement with, 140
mental health consequences of, 228 informals, designing sustainable prototypes for,
1990-2008, 222f 151-55, 152f, 154f
orphans, 223-24, 223f informal workers, diversity of, 143-44, 144f
overview of, 218-26, 219f, 222f, 223f information
prevalence, 219f, 222f archaeology contributing, 88
in South Africa, 230 educational systems disseminating, 87
sparks of, 218 missions disseminating, 87
in Uganda, 220 infrastructure
humanitarian groups, 10 China’s investments in, 297-304, 298f, 301f, 304f
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 176 colonial governments providing, 94, 99
 Index 347

expenditure, 24 Joly, Eva, 44-45

GDP influenced by, 24 Jonglei Canal, 201-2, 201f
investments, 297-304, 298f, 301f, 304f Joss, S., 321
urban, 24 journalism
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), crisis-driven, 9-10
265, 266, 327 photo, 10
internally displaced persons (IDPs), 165-69, 165f, 166f
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), 45 K
international development Kaduna, Nigeria, 104
agendas, 58-59 Kahuzi-Biéga National Park, 71
environment and, 58-59 Kalipeni, E., 225
International Diabetes Foundation, 214 Kampala, Uganda, 220, 313
international health policy, 216-18 Kanama, Niger, 315-16
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 16, 216 Kanama, Nigeria, 315-16
International Resource Panel, 328 Kaplan, Robert, 32
Internet Katoro, Tanzania, 18
NGOs on, 38 Kenya, 96, 103, 115, 149f, 154f, 175, 176, 186f, 190,
scammers, 31-32 205, 212, 215-16, 220, 230, 289, 294, 310, 313,
intravenous drug users (IDUs), 218, 219 314f, 319
Inventing the AIDS Virus (Duesberg), 224 community-led enumeration, 153-54
investments. See also land investments Europeans in, 102
growth in, 19 map, 153-54
infrastructure, 297-304, 298f, 301f, 304f Kenyans, 175
Invisible Children, 11 Kibera, Kenya, 153-54, 154f, 205
IPCC. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Kibera News Network, 154
Iran, 310 Kigali, Rwanda, 310
ishack, 152, 152f Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
Islam (KPCS), 67
cities created through, 93 King, A., 98
groups, 314-17 Kingsley, Mary, 84, 85-86
in Sudan, 273 Kinshasa, DRC, 321
Timbuktu as center of, 86 Kipling, Rudyard, 87
zone, 5-6 Kisarawe, Tanzania, 198
Italians, 102 Kismayo, Somalia, 315
“It's Time for Africa” (Ernst & Young), 19 Kiva, 154
kleptocrats, 41t
J knowledge
Janjaweed, 273 archaeological, 88
Jassini, Kenya, 96 as changing, 54
Jassini, Tanzania, 96 climate change indigenous, 282-83
jatropha, 204, 254 of Europeans, 83-84
Jiang Zemin, 287 gap, 31-33
Johannesburg, South Africa, 104, 143-44, 144f, 175, Kony, Joseph, 11
#76; 1766189, 1925196; 202 Kony 2012, 11
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS Konza Techno City, Kenya, 319
(UNAIDS), 220 Koolhass, Rem, 137
348 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Korle Lagoon, 259 Leopold (king), 96

KPCS. See Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Lesotho, 171, 189, 202
Krause, M., 8 Lesotho Highland Water Project, 202
Kruger National Park, 123-24 Liberia, 81-82
Kuapa Kokoo farmers, 242-43 Lindzen, Richard, 267 ,
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and “Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of
Technology (Ghana), 233 African Economies” (McKinsey), 19, 20
KwaMhlanga, South Africa, 233 Liu Jianjun, 324-25
Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine, 216
L livestock, 126
Lagos, Nigeria, 98, 137, 145-46, 299-300, logging, 69-70, 73
321, 322-23 Lonrho, 249
Lake Chad, 267 looting
Lake Naivasha, 205 aid causing, 50
Lake Tanganyika, 187 ending, 40-45
Lake Turkana, 186f, 198 opponents of, 43, 45
Lake Victoria, 187 overview of, 40-45
Lake Victoria Free Trade Zone. See Sseesamirembe, Looting Africa: The Economics of Exploitation
Uganda (Bond), 40
Lamb, C., 96 Lord's Resistance Army, 317
Lamu, Kenya, 289 Louis Vuitton, 10, 10f
Lancet, 121 Lugard (lord), 104
land. See also agriculture Luthuli Avenue Wholesalers (Chinese) Market, 294
DRC’s use of, 251-52
Europeans acquiring, 203 M
grabs, 247-48, 252t Maalin, Juma, 101
ownership, 125-26 Maasai, 10, 10f
land investments Maasai Intellectual Property Initiative (MIPI 2013), 10 2
arguments, 254-55 Maathai, Wangari, 47-49
benefits of, 249-50 Mabogunje, Akin, 90
foreign, 250-55, 252t, 253t MacDonald, A. M., 190
geographies of, 250-54, 252t, 253t Madagascar, 248, 255, 299,
risks of, 249-50 Madikwe Game Reserve, 123
Land Matrix, 249-50 Maitima, Severino, 205
land ownership, 82-83 maize, 116, 117, 204
large farmers, small farmers as more efficient Makuleke model, 123-24
than, 110 Malabo II, 321
Larson, P., 4f Malawi, 70, 249
laws, apartheid, 104 Malaysia, 310
leaders, 38-39, 45-47 maldevelopment, 40
at Berlin Conference, 81 Mali, 84, 86-87, 190, 198, 249, 282, 312, 313
cities, emerging from, 99 Mallows, W., 92
development influenced by, 48-49 management consultancy firms, 19-20
Lekki, Nigeria, 299-300 Mandela, Nelson, 45, 46-47 q
Lekki Free Trade Zone, 299-300 manuscripts, 86-87, 87f
Lenovo, 292 Map Kibera, 153-54, 154f
 Index 349

mapping, community-led enumerations of educated Africans, 162t

and, 153-54, 154f environmental, 24
maps to Europe, 177, 178
Africa on, 8, 11-12 to Global North, 160-61
archaeological, 88 in MDGs, 180t
of biomes, 60f negative effects of, 162t
from China, 11-12 overview of, 159-62, 161f, 178, 180-81, 180t
climate change vulnerability, 274-78, 276f, 277f positive effects of, 162t
Kenya, 153-54 trans-Saharan routes for, 179f
of main climatic divisions, 64 to U.S., 177-78
of resources, 65 Millennium Declaration, 217, 328
Maputo, Mozambique, 240, 298f Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 21, 22,
marketing, 15 SNe), Iss, AOL, Qi, BSS)
Marks & Spencer, 244 alternatives, 318-19, 318t, 319t
Martin, Chris, 242 migration in, 180t
Marxism, 39 post-, 318-19, 318t, 319t, 328-30
Matip, Gabriel Paulino, 251 for rural development, 111
Mauritania, 196, 282 sustainable development agenda and, 328-30
Mauritius, 41, 299 “Millennium Ecosystems Assessment: Ecosystems
Mbeki, Thabo, 224 and Human Well-Being” (UN), 327
Mbuende, Kaire, 281 Millennium Villages Organization, 120, 121f
McKinsey, 19, 20 Millennium Villages Project (MVP)
McMichael, P., 254 aims of, 111
m-commerce, 148 overview of, 119-21, 119f, 120f, 121f
MDGs. See Millennium Development Goals Minaya, J., 197
The Meaning of Africa (Nicol), 10 mineral resources, 65-68, 94
media, 9-10, 31. See also social media mines, artisanal, 67
medicines Ming Dynasty, 289
Chinese, 210-11 mining companies, 67
Indian, 210-11 Ministry of Health (Botswana), 233
traditional, 232-33 Ministry of Health (Uganda), 220
Mediterranean biome, 62 Ministry of Overseas Development, 104
mega-slums, 24 Minneapolis terror group, 316-17
mental health, 227, 228 MIPI 2013. See Maasai Intellectual Property Initiative
mHealth. See mobile health missionaries, 84
middle class, emergence of, 17 missions, information disseminated by, 87
Middle Eastern groups, 102 m-money, 150
migrants mobile health (mHealth), 212
forced, 165-69, 165f, 166f mobile phones, 7-8
journeys, 175-76 banking, 148, 148f
remittances, 170-73 coltan, 70-72, 71f, 72f
migration overview of, 135-36, 146-50, 146f, 148f, 149f
Chinese, 291-93 as talking drums, 146-50, 146f, 148f, 149f
circular, 163-65 toilets as like, 206
cities influenced by, 102-3 model of epidemiological transition, 212-14,
colonial policies and, 162-63 DUS FP2U3D
350 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

moist savanna, 61 Nhial, Paulino Matip, 251

Mombasa, Kenya, 115, 190 Nicol, Abisoeh, 10
Monga, C., 39 Niger, 210, 315-16
Monitor Group, 19 Niger Delta, 67-68
monopolies, 40 Nigeria, 101, 104, 137, 145-46, 199, 204, 212,
Monsanto, 117, 118, 118f DN, 246, 3137 321
montane, 62-63 bungalows in, 98
mortality entrepreneurs, 297
adult, 213f growth of, 17
in Cape Town, 231f hookworms in, 226-27
Mougeot, L., 256 population of, 17
Mount Cameroon, 85 satellite city of, 322-23, 322f
Mount Kilimanjaro, 267, 268-69, 268f SEZ in, 299-300
Moyo, Dambisa, 49-50 terrorism and, 315-16
Mozambique, 240, 241, 250, 298f, 310 Niger River, 198
MPedigree, 212 Nijman, J., 5f
M-Pesa, 148 Nile Basin, 198, 201-2, 201f
Mugonza, Joseph. See Baaba, Bambi Nile Basin Reforestation Project (Uganda), 70
Muller, P., 5f Nile Delta, 241
Mung, M., 291 Nobel Prize, 33
Murdock, George, 1, 3f, 4f noble savage, 11
Murphy, R., 42 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Murray, John, 98 forest resource use assistance of, 70
Murray, Martin, 323 on Internet, 38
Museveni, Yoweri, 281 rural development gap filled by, 110-11
MVP. See Millennium Villages Project North Americans, 203
Myers, G., 101 North West Province, South Africa, 123
Nova Cidade de Kilamba, Angola, 300-301,
N 303-4, 304f
NAFDAC. See National Agency for Food Drug NTDs. See neglected tropical diseases
Administration Control Nugent, P., 96
Nairobi, Kenya, 102, 103, 175, 176, 230, 294, NUHDSS. See Nairobi Urban Health and
313, 314f Demographic Surveillance System
Nairobi Urban Health and Demographic Surveillance Nyanza, Kenya, 220
System (NUHDSS), 230, 232
Namibia, 280 O
narratives, 11-12, 57-58 Oakland Institute, 198, 249
National Agency for Food Drug Administration Obama, Barack, 177, 225, 312, 313
Control (NAFDAC), 212 obesity, 214
national capitals, 6-7 Obi, C., 316
national health policies, 216-18 OECD. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation
National Stadium, 298f and Development
natural resources, 17. See also mineral resources Office du Niger, 190, 198
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs), 226-27, 227t Offshore, 40-45
New Africa, 14-20 oil, 66, 67-68, 327-28
Ngiro River, 205 Oju-Elegba market, 145-46
NGOs. See non-governmental organizations Okapi Wildlife Reserve, 71
 Index 351

Okavango Delta, 187 plantation agriculture, 94

Okugo (warrant chief), 101 plant biodiversity
Old Fadama community, 51-52 in Mediterranean biome, 62
Olopade, O., 21 in TRFs, 60-61
Omran, Abdel, 212 platinum, 66
One-China Policy, 289-90, 298 policymakers, 15-16
Operation Phoenix, 123 pollution, regulation influencing, 75
opinion polls, Afrobarometer, 20 poor
oral histories, 53 at development’s center, 51-53
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and environmentalism of, 47-49
Development (OECD), 41, 136 exchanges practiced among, 52
organizations, agriculture emphasized by, 111 population, 6
Orme, A., 64 distribution, 75
orphans, AIDS, 223-24, 223f environment influenced by, 75
Ouagadougou Declaration, 217-18 of Equatorial Guinea, 102
outflows, 42 growth rates, 75
Outpost, 123 increase in, 17-19
overfishing, 73, 74 of Nigeria, 17
over-urbanization argument, 23 in rural areas, 109
Owomoyela, O., 39 of Sahara, 62
Oxfam, 281, 328 of Togoland, 102
urban, 75
P Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 218
Palen, R., 42 port cities, 97
Palermo Protocol, 174 Portugal, 34
Pambazuka, 38 Portuguese, urban model of, 93
Paris Geographical Society, 86 postcolonialism
Park, Mungo, 86 cities in, 53-54
Parkhurst, J., 220 definition of, 53
Parnell, S., 19 overview of, 53-54
peace dividend, 15 urbanists, 53-54
peak oil, 327 Potts, D., 165
PEPFAR. See President's Emergency Plan poverty, water and, 199-201, 200f
for AIDS Relief power shedding, 24
Peri-urban fringe, 8 precipitation
colonial cities promoting, 256-57 climate change and, 63-65
migration’s importance in, 176 in tropical savanna, 63
pharmacolonialism, 224 variability, 270f
pharmacovigilance, 212 predictive science, 90
photojournalists, 10 pregnancy, 128
The Physical Geography of Africa (Adams, Goudie, preservation, 104
and Orme), 64 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
physicians (PEPFAR), 225
global distribution of, 210f priests, 34
working, 210f private equity firms, 197-98
Pieterse, E., 19, 326, 331, 332 Project Masiluleke (Project M), 212
piracy, 74 pro-poor tourism, 123-24
352 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

protein, fish providing, 73 colonial powers building, 95

prototypes, 151-55, 152f, 154f frontier, 95
Prunus africana, 233 Rogerson, C., 248
public health. See health Ross, Ronald, 216
Punjab, India, 115 Roundup-tolerant maize, 117
Royal African Society (RAS), 86
Q The Ruined Cities of Mashonaland (Bent), 92
Al-Qaeda, 312, 315, 316 rural, 105
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQUIM), affairs, 7
86-87, 313, 315 debates in, 111
Qatar, 250 gender in, 124-27, 124f
Qian Qichen, 289 girls in, 127-29, 128f, 129t
livelihoods, 118-24
R overview of, 109-10
Radar Technologies, 190 perspectives on, 110
railways population, 109
development of, 95 women, 124-27, 124f
in French West Africa, 95 rural development
Ghana benefiting from, 95 challenges, 109
trans-African, 95 MDGs for, 111
rainfall. See precipitation NGOs filling gap in, 110-11
Raleigh, C., 274-75, 277f overview of, 129-30
Rand, 66 policy emphases, 110-11
rape, 70 policy neglect, 110
RAS. See Royal African Society on small farms, 110
Rathbone, R., 88 sustainable livelihoods approach to, 111
Reader, John, 81, 96 themes, 110-11
rebellion, in German East Africa, 100-101 topics of, 109-10
refugees, 165-69, 255 ruralization, 8
regimes, 38-39 rural revolution
regions, 2-6, 9 debates about, 8
regulation, pollution influenced by, 75 key elements of, 7
remittances, 34, 170-73 urban revolution and, 6-8
Rendeavour Africa, 321 Russia, 309-10. See also Brazil, Russia, India, China
resources. See also forest resources; mineral Rutshuru, DRC, 165f
resources; natural resources Rwanda, 94, 212, 310
as curse, 67-68 Rwandan genocide, 94
frontier, 57-58, 65 Rwandan Ministry of Health, 212
map of, 65f
revolts, Igbo women’s, 101 S
Reynolds, Michael, 152 Sachs, Jeffrey, 50
Rhodes, Cecil, 92, 95, 95f Sahara, 61-62, 146f, 190, 265
Rhodesia, 92-93, 96 Sahel, 61, 282-83
Rio+20 Summit, 328-29 Salehyan, I., 274-75, 277f
road density, 24 Sanitary Conditions of the Laboring Population in the
roads Great Britain (Chadwick), 229
 Index 353

sanitation small farmers

overview of, 204, 205-6 biodiversity nurtured by, 118
water and, 190-99, 191f, 193t-195t, 196f, 199f large farmers as less efficient than, 110
Sarkata, Christina, 152 suicide rates among, 115
Sarkozy, Nicolas, 44 small farms
Sartre, J.-P., 9 rural development on, 110
satellite cities, 319-25, 320f, 322f, 324f rural livelihoods as challenge to, 118-24
Saudi Arabia, 250 Smith, Mike, 90
Sauer, C., 62 smuggling, human trafficking and, 173-77f, 176f
savannas. See tropical savannas The Snows of Kilimanjaro (Hemingway), 268
scammers, 31-32 social media
science advantages of, 35
cities’ evidence of, 90 downside of, 35, 37, 38
predictive, 90 examples, 36-37
scramble for Africa, 81-84, 82f image influenced by, 33
SDA. See Sserulanda Development Association overview of, 35-38
SDI. See Slum Dwellers International society, cities influencing, 104-5
segregation, in cities, 103-4 Somalia, 73, 74, 275, 315
selective primary health care (SPHC), 216-17 Somalis, 170, 175-76
self-help, 51f Sonangol, 301, 303
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African South Africa, 104, 175-76, 176f, 189, 192, 196,
Affairs, 313 201202216, 2177 21992317033 02620}
Senegal, 97, 173, 192 W335, 232, WS), M5, DSi
Senegal River, 97 death and, 214-15
Séralini, G., 117 farmers, 240-41
settlement profile, 51-52 flowers and, 244-45, 244f
sex, 128 food insecurity in, 257-58
sexual abuse, 128 frontier roads in, 95
SEZs. See special economic zones gold produced by, 66
shack, 140, 154-55, 155f HIV/AIDS in, 230
Shack Chic (Fraser), 155 human trafficking in, 177f
Sharifu, Mwamaka, 289 informal workers in, 143-44, 144f
Shell Foundation, 244 mining companies reinvesting in, 67
Shiva, Vandana, 112 platinum produced by, 66
sickness. See disease tourism in, 123-24
Siemens, 15 South African Migration Project, 176
Sierra Leone, 70, 81-82, 216 South Sudan, 189, 197-98, 201-2, 201f, 251
Simone, A., 145-46 South-West Townships, South Africa, 104
Singapore, 310 Soweto, South Africa, 104, 143-44, 144f
skilling, 20 Soyinka, Wole, 9
Slum Dwellers International (SDI), 51-53, 51f, 331 sparks, 218
slums special economic zones (SEZs), 299-300
in Accra, 51-52 SPHC. See selective primary health care
growth of, 24 spheres of influence, 81, 94
mega-, 24 Sseesamirembe, Uganda, 324-25, 324f
tourism, 154-55 Sserulanda Development Association (SDA), 324
354 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Sserulanda Foundation, 324, 324f, 325 Thiés, Senegal, 192

Stade des Martyrs de Pentecost, 298 Think Africa Press, 38
stadium diplomacy, 298-99, 298f Thokoza Township, South Africa, 176f
State Grid Corporation of China, 292 Tiananmen Square incident, 289
states, 10-11, 90 timber, 69-70, 73
stereotypes, 9 Timbuktu, Mali, 84, 86-87, 313
Stratfor, 300 TJN-A. See Tax Justice Network-Africa
strengths, 319t Togoland, 102
structural adjustment policies, 21, 110 toilets, as status symbol, 206
subregions, 2 tomato, 204
Sudan, 187, 189, 197-98, 241, 250-51, 273-74, 283, 316 Tombouctu Manuscript Project, 87
Sudd, 202 Tomozeiu, D., 321
Sufism, 317 tourism
suicide, 115, 317 pro-poor, 123-24
suicide bombing, 316 slum, 154-55
Sun Biofuel, 198, 248 in South Africa, 123-24
superblocks, 329 town planning, 104
superpests, 118 trade
superweeds, 118 cities created by, 93
sustainable development, 47-49 Europe influencing, 94-95
agenda, 328-30 traditional medicine, 232-33, 232f
aspirations, 331t Trafigura case, 76
definition of, 325 transactional sex, 128
dimensions of, 332 trans-African railway, 95
MDGs and, 328-30 transition zone, 5-6, 5f
requirements of, 77 transnational houses, 172
urban, 325-27 transport networks, 95
sustainable livelihoods approach, 111 trans-Saharan migration routes, 179f
sustainable prototypes, 151-55, 152f, 154f Trashy Bags, 199
Swaziland, 219 Travels in West Africa (Kingsley), 85
Swilling, M., 327, 330 TRE. See tropical rain forest
Swiss, 215 tribes, boundaries dividing, 96-97
Switzerland, 186 tropical diseases, 226-27, 227t
tropical rain forest (TRF), 59-61
T tropical savannas, 61
Taiwan, 289-90 TrueScan monitoring, 212
Tanzania, 18, 96, 192, 198, 217, 241, 251, 255. Truvada, 225
See also German East Africa Tuareg, 315
Tax Justice Network-Africa (TJN-A), 42 al Turabi, Hassan, 316
Taylor, Ian, 310 Turkana Desert, 190
Tck Tck Tck, 267 Turkey, 310
technology sector, 17 Turner, John, 153
temperate grasslands, 62 Turok, I., 23
territories, colonialism demarcating, 96-97 Tutsi, 94
terrorism, 312, 313-18, 314f 2009 Kampala Convention, 168
 Index 355

U futures, 319-25, 320f, 322f, 324f

Uganda, 104, 201, 220, 251, 313, 324-25, 324f infrastructure, 24
UNAIDS. See Joint United Nations Programme past, 88-93, 89f, 91f, 92f
on HIV/AIDS Portuguese model, 93
UNEP. See United Nations Environment projects, 319-25, 320f
Programme settlements, 89f
UNESCO. See United Nations Educational, sustainable development, 325-27
Scientific and Cultural Organization Urban Agriculture Policy, 258
UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 225 Urban Climate Change Research Network,
UN-HABITAT, 280, 328 279, 284
UNHCR. See United Nations High Commissioner urban health, 228-33
for Refugees urbanism
United Nations (UN), 185-86, 265, 267, 327, 329 green, 330-31, 331t
United Nations Development Programme, 245 livable, 332
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural rethinking, 330-31, 331t
Organization (UNESCO), 177f urbanists, postcolonial, 53-54
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), urbanization
205, 274, 321, 328 as abnormal, 23-24
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees claims, 23
(UNHCR), 167, 168 environments transformed by, 75-76
United States (U.S.) informality as mode of, 53
biofuel use of, 251 overview of, 21, 23-24, 332-33
China counterbalancing, 290 periods of, 90, 91f, 93
development assistance, 311f as representative, 109
emissions, 280 resistance to, 99-101
engagement, 311-13, 311f urban revolution
futures influenced by, 311-13, 311f of China, 329
migration to, 177-78 rural revolution and, 6-8
overview of, 311-13, 311f Ushahidi platform, 135, 150-51, 151f
terrorism from, 316-17
university graduates, 34 V
University of East Anglia, 267 Vaal River, 192
unsustainability, 327-28 vacant trees niche, 62
UN-Water Africa, 196, 206 Van Beck, W., 148, 150
Upper Volta. See Burkina Faso vegetation
up-skilling, 20 anthropogenic, 59
uranium, 65-66 in montane, 62
urban. See also eco-cities; satellite cities Sahara, 61-62
agriculture, 256-59, 256t savanna, 61
bias claim, 23 TRE 60-61
centers, 88-90, 89f vehicular deaths, 227
convergence hypothesis, 25 veldt. See temperate grasslands
corridors, 24 Verona Pires, Pedro, 45
development, 88-90, 97-104, 100f, 101f vertical exchanges, 52
ecological footprints and, 75-76 Vicente, Manuel, 303-4
356 AFRICA: GEOGRAPHIES OF CHANGE

Victoria Nyanza. See Lake Victoria women, 84, 85-86. See also girls
villages, borders bisecting, 96 in agriculture, 125-27
virtual water, 202-4, 203f, 204t colonialism confronted by, 125
“Vision 2030” (Kenya), 310 Igbo revolt, 101
Nobel Prize received by, 33
Ww rural, 124-27, 124f
Wainaina, Binyavanga, 12-13 work
Wallstr6m, Margot, 70 education as for, 105
war, climate change, 273-74 spatiality of, 143-44, 144f
waste management, 76 workers
water informal, 143-44, 144f
in Central Africa, 186, 189 skilling of, 20
Europeans’ consumption of, 203 up-skilling of, 20
footprints, 202-4, 204t, 205 World Bank, 16, 111, 254
grabbing, 197-98 World Commission on Environment and
in 1990s, 193t-195t Development, 325
overview of, 185-90, 186f, 187t-188t, 204-6 World Cup, 298, 313
poverty and, 199-201, 200f “World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for
sanitation and, 190-99, 191f, 193t-195t, Development” (World Bank), 111
196f, 199f World Economic Forum, 186
sources, 193t-195t World Health Assembly, 209-10
stores of, 191f World Health Organization (WHO), 209-10, 214,
transboundary issues, 201-2, 201f 219,226,233
virtual, 202-4, 203f, 204t World Heritage Sites, 71, 86
in West Africa, 186 World Mayors Council on Climate Change, 279
water-efficient maize, 116 World Toilet Organization (WTO), 206
Water Footprint Network, 203 World Water Assessment Program, 185
Watson, V., 325 World Water Forums, 185-86
Weah, George, 161 writing, 12-13
weather stations, 271f wrong-bus syndrome, 48-49
West Africa, 85, 186, 199, 219 WTO. See World Toilet Organization
West African Health Organization, 233 :
West African Studies (Kingsley), 85 xX
Western aid cartel, 17 Xinhua, 290
Western Cape, South Africa, 175
Westgate shopping mall attack, 313, 314f
“The White Man’s Burden” (Kipling), 87 Y
White Nile, 187 youth bulge, 20
whites Yoza Project, 150
in cities, 102
Papers, 287, 305 Z
WHO. See World Health Organization Zaire, 218
Wilderness Safaris, 123-24 Zaire River, 189
wildflower trade, 244-45 Zambezi River, 189
wildlife, deforestation influencing, 69 Zambia, 244
Wilkinson, R., 230 Zoomlion, 299
 - THE MOST FOCUSED, BALANCED, AND REALISTIC
PORTRAIT OF MODERN AFRICA
“Africa Rising’ is the watchword of the mo- Population growth, business interests, and global connec-
ment for the continent. Richard Grant's ex- tions are transforming Africa from a “lost” continent to
cellent new text explodes all of the old clichés one of “strategic opportunity”in the worldwide geopolitical
about the African crisis and digs deep into sphere. A timely synthesis of current thinking on this di-
contemporary realities: the urban trans-
verse, complex, and changing region, Africa: Geographies of
formation, the mobile phone revolution,
Change offers students the most realistic portrait of modern
the new scramble for resources, the grow-
Africa available.
ing presence of Chinese, Brazilian, Indian,
and South African capital, the contours of
the land grab, new patterns of continental
and global labor mobility, and not least, the FEATURES
deepening challenges of water scarcity and * Integrated cutting-edge topics—such as China in Africa, the
global climate change. In short, Grant offers mobile-phone revolution, sustainable development, informal
a new reframing and a new set of represen- livelihoods, and food security—keep the text relevant and
tations of Africa without obscuring the po-
thought-provoking .
litical and economic failures that continue
» Emphasis on contemporary Africa motivates students to
to afflict parts of sub-Saharan Africa. An
exemplary undergraduate textbook.” consider alternative and more positive possibilities for African
—Michael Watts, development
University of California, Berkeley * Historical knowledge underpins the assessment of contem-
porary issues and helps students to envision future develop-
“Richard Grant is onto something import- ment and policy outcomes
ant by developing a text that emphasizes *» Uniquely African perspectives enhance each chapter
the contemporary and future eras more
* Carefully selected sidebars and case studies vividly illustrate
than most books do. It is a new approach,
the topics being discussed
and this is an era where new approaches
are needed to engage students. There is still
classic geography here, but set within the
context of a vibrant, ever-changing conti- ABOUT THE AUTHOR
nent that is ripe for a do-over for textbooks Richard Grant is Professor of Geography and Regional Studies at the
in the discipline.” University of Miami. He is also Adjunct Senior Research Scientist to
—Garth A. Myers, the Earth Institute’s Millennium Cities Initiative at Columbia Uni-
Trinity College versity and a Visiting Professor at the University of Johannesburg.

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS ISBN 978-0-19-992056-3
www.oup.com

Cover design by Michele Laseau

Cover art © Yann Arthus-Bertrand / Altitude