ETHICS-Chapter-3
ETHICS-Chapter-3
For Socrates, a person can act correctly if he knows what is good life. The
philosopher argues that knowledge and virtue cannot be considered distinct from each
other. So, a wise man, for Socrates, does what is right because he knows what is right.
Action is taken by Socrates as the extension of knowledge, just as one cannot act
correctly if one does not know what is correct action. It follows, therefore, that for Socrates
the wise man is good, and the good man is wise.
However, correct or right action does not necessarily mean good action, because
correctness is different from goodness, just as wrongness is different from badness. The
correctness and wrongness of an actions are based on existing principles, such that one’s
action is right or correct if it conforms to a given principle. On the other hand, goodness
and badness of actions are based on the quality of the act. An action is good if it bears a
good quality and bad if it yields a bad quality. Hence, an action for Socrates is right if it
serves man truly- in the sense of enhancing his authentic happiness (eudaimonism).
Now, Socrates says that knowing what is right means doing what is right. The tacit
(implied) meaning of this is that no person chooses to do evil per se. ergo for Socrates, a
person does evil out of ignorance.
Now, the query to be posited is “who is a wise person?” a wise person for Socrates
is not a type of a mentally undisciplined individual, but that of a well-cultured person. A
wise man, having known what is right, knows how to control himself; he is just and
courageous. For the thinker, a wise person is happy. The measure of this happiness is
not material possession, but in being moral. To Socrates, True pleasure (which is doing
what is right) will offer a person lasting happiness, which will eventually make him a moral
being. If one therefore wishes to be happy, he should be wise, for wisdom itself is its own
rewards.
Plato contends that happiness lies in reason, in Plato’s vein of thought, man
actualizes himself if he tries to be rational. Before we discuss platonic ethics, we shall first
of all investigate his philosophy in general, because we hope that this inquiry can give us
a comprehensive view of his ethical teaching.
Plato posits that there are two domains of reality, namely: the ideal (idea) and
phenomenal (phenomena) worlds. Idea is described by Plato as eternal, immutable, self-
existing, and indestructible. For Plato, the zenith of idea is good which he described as
something beyond truth, beyond essence, and therefore, is like the sun that shines all
throughout anything in existence.
The phenomenal world, on the other world, on the other hand, is material, mutable,
teleological, and destructible.
Plato’s concept of ideal and phenomenal worlds can be well related with his
concept of man. According to the philosopher, man is a metaphysical dichotomy between
body and soul. Man is the locus of the ideal and phenomenal worlds. In this argument,
Plato maintains that man is soul using a body. It is from this thought-construct that Plato
draws his idea that man’s soul has three parts, namely: spiritual (feeling), appetitive
(desire) , and rational. Because man is a soul using a body, each part of the soul has a
definite locus in the body. The spiritual soul is located in the chest, the appetitive soul in
the abdomen, and the rational soul in the head.
Precisely, the human body in platonic philosophy falls under the domain of the
phenomenal world for obvious reasons, i.e., it is material and changeable; it has a definite
purpose, or it is teleological, and also destructible. The human soul, on the contrary, fall
under the domain of idea or the ideal world.
Of the three parts of the soul, Plato argues that the rational parts are the part that
can establish balance in a person. Self-realization, therefore, is attainable by nurturing
reason properly. Eventually, this becomes the “ought” in Platonic ethics.
Plato, in his ethics, speaks of four basic virtues which are: wisdom, courage,
temperance and justice. Wisdom arises in the rational soul. Courage in the spiritual soul,
and temperance in the appetitive soul. Of all these virtues, it is wisdom that rules over
other virtues just as the rational soul overrules the other levels of the soul in man. Because
wisdom rules, its direct courage (here, Plato must have been hinting at courage de tete
(memory, one’s head) or intellectual courage) and temperance. For Plato, temperance
means moderation. Now, justice can only come to the fore if there is a balance among
wisdom, courage, and temperance. According to Plato, justice means” the observance of
duty and righteousness; it is what is due to or from a person.” Thus, justice covers the
whole field of the conduct of the individual as long as such conduct affects others.
In his ethical teachings, Plato develops the concept that the life of reason (rational
soul) is the happiest and the best form of life. For Plato, knowledge (function of rational
soul) makes a well- balanced, man, because as we cited earlier, the virtue called wisdom
arises in the rational soul. Reason establishes a balance because it rules passion
(spiritual soul) and desires (appetitive soul). When this happens, there is a harmonious
man. A harmonious man is a morally virtuous man who is rationally, biologically, and
emotionally balanced. If one wants to be happy one should be a harmonious man: a man
of virtue.
Now, let us evaluate Plato’s ethics. Based on our presentation, we can say that
Plato develops a universal or absolute ethical theory just like his master, Socrates.
Platonic ethics is an absolute ethical theory because of this idea that He sees virtue as
innate and knowledge as absolute, universal, and objectives. In this vein, we can say that
for Plato moral laws are universal and absolute because virtue and knowledge are parts
of the moral law.
If the good is the summit of idea and if idea involves virtues (wisdom, temperance,
courage, and justice) knowledge therefore enables a harmonious man to arrive at the
good. In this case, to arrive at the good requires one to search for knowledge so that one
would be able to establish a well-balanced personality. Since the good is the terminal
point of a morally virtuous person, Plato says that the good is:
The harmony of our native interest- to see, to know, to cultivate the affections, to
associate ourselves with the movement of the visible world, to find our true place in the
community of the social group, then join to harmony the grace of symmetry
(equilibrium/balance), where variations of temper are subject to rational control, all excess
being forbidden; and finally, to see to it that the good embodies the truth that have been
won by analysis and experience.
Indeed, Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethical theories stand in contrast to each other.
Aristotle’s theory, however, follows the same thread as that of his master (Plato) and his
master’s master (Socrates). What makes us claim this is because Socrates, Plato’s, and
Aristotle’s moral teaching stress the supremacy of man’s rational nature and teleological
or purposive nature of the universe. Yes, it is true, Aristotle’s ethics also emphasizes
virtues, i.e., moral and intellectual, but he gives more weight to contemplation which is for
him the activity that enables man to attain the highest form of happiness and the teleology
(purpose) for why man acts.
The basic premise where Aristotelian ethical theory begins is the experimental
Inquiry:” What is the fundamental object of human desire?” Here Aristotle pragmatically
posits the query:” What is that which man ultimately looks for?” “Is it honor, wealth,
achievement, or sensual pleasure?” Aristotle answer is negative; he believes that there
is something fundamental behind fame, riches, success, and sensuality. This fundamental
principle for him is happiness. Because of this conviction, he sets forth to investigate the
nature of happiness, its requisites and condition for its acquisition.
If happiness should be understood in the context of reason, where shall we put the
connection between reason and virtue? For Aristotle, there a coherent linkage between
reason and virtue inasmuch as reason is virtue and virtue is reason. Virtue, Aristotle
maintains, is of two kinds. They are intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue arises out of
teaching or intellectual virtue surfaces through one’s contemplation of theoretical moral
truths and one’s discovery of rational principles that ought to control our every action. On
the other hand, moral virtue (which for Aristotle is not natural in us) arises as a result of
habit or moral virtue comes to the fore out of one’s habitual choice of action in consonance
with rational principles. Says Aristotle
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue, in the
main, owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires
experience and time) while moral virtue comes about a result of habit, which also its name
ethike is one that is formed by slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this, it is
also plain that one of the moral virtues arising in us by nature can form a habit contrary
to its nature. In saying earlier that virtue is reason and reason is virtue, Aristotle, in effect,
is telling us that a virtuous person is a person who lives in reason and a person who lives
in reason is happy, because he is in active exercise of virtue
Virtue, for Aristotle, means the excellent of a thing to perform effectively its proper
function.
But the question is: “when can virtue occur?” “when can these moral and
intellectual virtues happen?” For Aristotle, Virtue happens in the context of the mean.
Says he: “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice lying in a mean…”
This means that if Virtue is a choice. It is, therefore, an activity in the sense that choice is
the original cause of action. So, whether it is moral or intellectual virtue, it is always a
choice: an activity. In the light of virtue as a choice or an activity, Aristotle puts forward his
idea of the mean.
Virtue is mean between two vices. The mean lies between vice in the context of
excess and vice in the context defect. In saying this, Aristotle is also quick to recognize
that this “Doctrine of the mean” cannot be applied to all actions. He, then, enumerates the
action that are immune from the clutches of the mean due to their being ontologically bad.
These actions are: shamelessness, envy, adultery, and murder.
In as much as virtue is a mean, it thus stands between two vices: one excessive,
the other deficient. This is the reasons why virtue cannot be applied to actions that are in
themselves evil, because one cannot talk are in of error and fault in ontologically bad
actions. In the same breath Aristotle properly applies his Doctrine of the mean to specific
factual cases. For our own convenience, let us attempt to group Aristotle’s concept of the
mean and apply it to specific or factual cases. After having accomplished said task, let
us, by austerely following the Aristotelian schematic presentation, indicate what certain
cases quality to each group:
1. The mean from the standpoint on conduct involves the following virtues
1.1 Concerning feeling of fear and confidence, Aristotle says courage is mean. For
Aristotle, a fearful man exceeds în fearfulness and the man who exceeds in confidence
is rash. What about the man who exceeds in fear and is deficient of confidence? To
Aristotle, this man is a coward. So, what lies in excessive and not deficient between fear
and confidence is, indeed, courage;
1.2 Concerning pleasure and pain, temperance is the mean. What is excessive in
pleasure is for Aristotle self-indulgence and insensibility with regard to deficiency in
pleasure;
1.3 Concerning the giving and taking of money, the mean is liberality. According to
Aristotle, prodigality is the excess and meanness is the defect,
1.4 Concerning honor and dishonor, the mean is proper pride, empty vanity is the excess
while undue humility is the deficiency; and
1.5 Concerning anger, the mean is good-temper. The excess is irascibility and the
deficiency is in irascibility. (annoyance/anger/impatient)
2. The mean from the standpoint of intercourse between words and actions
includes the following virtues:
2.1 Concerning truth, the mean is truthfulness while the exaggeration is boasters
(blowers/know it all) the deficiency, is modesty. (reserve)
2.2 Concerning the pleasantness in giving of amusement, the mean is ready- willedness
while the exaggeration is buffoonery (fooling around) and the deficiency is
boorishness; (rudeness) and
2.3 Concerning friendship, the mean is friendliness while the exaggeration is being
obsequious, (submissive) or a flatterer and the deficiency is quarrelsomeness.
3. Lastly, the mean from the standpoint of passions includes only one virtue:
3.1 Concerning envy and spite, (malice) the mean is righteous indignation (anger). In
Plato’s own words. Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite; and these
states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are left at the fortunes of our
neighbors; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained at the
underserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good
fortune, and the spiteful man falls so short of being pained that he even rejoices.