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BRITAIN AND THE WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
This page intentionally left blank
Britain and the World in the
Twentieth Century
Ever-decreasing Circles

Michael J. Turner
 Continuum UK, The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX
Continuum US, 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038

www.continuumbooks.com

Copyright © Michael J. Turner 2010

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission
from the publishers.

First published 2010

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 1 44118 983 7 [hardcover]

ISBN 978 1 44111 157 9 [paperback]

Typeset by Pindar NZ, Auckland, New Zealand

Printed and bound by MPG Books Ltd, Cornwall, Great Britain
 Contents

Introduction vii
Acknowledgements ix

1 The Era of the Two World Wars 1

2 Post-war Adjustments 29
3 Asia, the Middle East, Europe: No Respite (I) 51
4 Defence and Diplomacy 71
5 East of Eden 95
6 Finding a Role? 113
7 Losing a Role? 137
8 Asia, the Middle East, Europe: No Respite (II) 157
9 Years of Frustration 179
10 Towards a New Order 201
Conclusion 227

Endnotes 247
Index 349
This page intentionally left blank
 Introduction

‘As I look out upon the future of our country in the changing scene of human
destiny, I feel the existence of three great circles among the free nations and
democracies . . .’ This is how Winston Churchill prefaced the statements he
repeatedly made about the international situation after the Second World War.
Addressing the Conservative Party’s annual conference, on 9 October 1948, he
went on to describe the ‘three circles’ of world power and to suggest that Britain
would continue to play a leading role in international affairs. The first ‘circle’
was the empire-Commonwealth. The second was the ‘English-speaking world’,
in which co-operation between Britain and the United States of America had
become so important. The third was ‘United Europe’.

These three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are linked together there is no
force or combination which could overthrow them or ever challenge them. Now, if you
think of the three interlinked circles you will see that we are the only country which has
a great part in every one of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and . . .
we have the opportunity of joining them all together.1

Churchill was not alone in thinking that this unique position, as a participant
in each of the ‘three circles’ and as the only means of connecting them, would
guarantee Britain’s survival as a great power. Many people at home and abroad
expected Britain to maintain its role and influence after 1945, just as it had done
in previous times. It proved to be more difficult to do this than anyone could
have predicted, and the twentieth century is generally seen as a century of relative
decline for Britain.
One of the core premises of this book is that if we want to understand British
foreign policy, we need to consider the multiple pressures and possibilities fac-
ing those who made the key decisions. It is easy to assume that Britain’s great
power status was lost because the resources were not available for extended
commitments in each of the ‘three circles’, and that British leaders would have
done better to concentrate on only one of the ‘circles’ (probably, in view of the
way things turned out, Europe); but all of the ‘circles’ were problematic in their
own way, and long-term trends in policy were not necessarily based on the
wrong choices.
viii INTRODUCTION

This book balances those accounts that exaggerate or otherwise misrepresent

the nature of Britain’s decline as a world power. What might be called the
‘literature of decline’ has emerged as an important part of the historiography of
modern Britain. Much of this work has been extremely influential, and rightly so,
but there has been a tendency to go too far, with analyses that are unwarrantably
negative and condemnatory. It has become almost axiomatic that ‘a hard-headed
calculation of national interest . . . was neglected in favour of unrealistic ambi-
tions and ideals’.2 The suggestion is that Britain’s main problem was a failure of
leadership; that British policy making was fundamentally flawed; and that Britain
lost influence and status in the world because of decisions made by blinkered
and foolish individuals. These interpretations must be challenged. British leaders
were not uninformed, or unreflective, or unsuccessful in managing decline and
sustaining Britain’s influence. By examining the circumstances in which they were
placed, the options that were available to them, the goals they had in view and
the international environment that conditioned all, this book demonstrates that
British leaders did a much better job than many historians have recognized.
Diplomacy has been compared to a game of cards: the point is to play one’s
hand to best effect. In analysing Britain’s foreign policy in the twentieth century,
this book explains how and why the cards were played as they were, and casts light
on the alternative courses that might have been available at critical moments.
The book is presented as a contribution to ongoing debates about British
decline. It is concerned with Britain’s changing position in the world. It places
British policy making in the appropriate domestic and international contexts;
stresses the interconnectedness of events; explores the various determinants of
political, military, economic, strategic, diplomatic and other decisions; and makes
use of primary sources while also synthesizing the work of other historians in
order to provide a fair and detailed account of Britain’s involvement in the ‘three
circles’. These were decreasing circles in that the scope for British activity in
each of them gradually narrowed. Nevertheless, what is most noteworthy is not
Britain’s relative decline, but Britain’s ability to manage and minimize decline.
 Acknowledgements

I would like to thank everyone connected with the commissioning, production

and publication of this book, especially Tony Morris, Michael Greenwood, Alice
Eddowes and Kim Pillay. I would also like to thank those students who have taken
my courses in international history over the years. For good or ill, my decision to
write about British foreign policy was a direct response to their comments and
questions in class.
I am very grateful to colleagues and friends at Appalachian State University.
They have provided a wonderfully supportive environment in which I was able
finally to complete the manuscript. Most of all I want to thank Catherine, Grace,
Jill and Ethan, and the rest of the family across Britain and America. Nobody
could wish for better allies!
Any errors or shortcomings in this book are entirely my own responsibility.

MJT
Boone, North Carolina
June 2009
This page intentionally left blank
 1

The Era of the Two World Wars

At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain was one of the leading world
powers with a large empire and strong navy, a tradition of political stability and
diplomatic influence, and the ability to defend its interests in all the strategically
important parts of the globe. The ascendancy of the mid-Victorian period had
given way, however, to more challenging circumstances.1 The rise of Germany
reduced Britain’s involvement in European affairs, and Britain’s economic
strength relative to that of its main competitors – the United States, Germany
and France – was not what it had been.2 Tensions were building up, notably in
central Europe and the Balkans, where longstanding rivalries were exacerbated
by sovereignty disputes and the pursuit of colonies. Instability was spreading in
those parts of Africa, the Middle East and Asia where the European powers had
been constructing territorial and trading empires.3 British leaders had for years
presented Britain’s ‘isolation’ from European quarrels as a virtue, but there had
to be a reassessment at the beginning of the twentieth century, in part because
of the Boer War of 1899–1902.4
This war was fought by Britain to maintain its authority in southern Africa.5
It showed up some weaknesses, especially in military organization, and led
to much talk of the dangers of ‘isolation’ in a world that was changing. Lord
Salisbury, who served as Conservative prime minister between 1895 and 1902,
once remarked that ‘isolation’ rarely entailed serious practical inconvenience, but
he added that British governments had never denied the need for co-operation
with other powers in certain circumstances. In the early 1900s, in many parts of
the world, new ways had to be found to shore up Britain’s position. It would be
an exaggeration to suggest that there was a dramatic change in policy, however,
for Britain was still reluctant to enter into formal alliances and take on extra
military responsibilities.6 Britain did not suddenly become vulnerable, but
remained a world power and was in many regions pre-eminent.7 Though there
was some ambivalence about Europe, this was less a sign of weakness than a
continuation of traditional routines. The key was to keep options open for as long
as possible.8
The Far East was identified by Salisbury as an area of special concern. An
understanding here with the United States9 or with Germany10 might have
been preferable, but with neither of them disposed to be helpful, London had
2 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

to look elsewhere – to Japan, an increasingly assertive regional power. Japan

posed a potential threat to Britain’s interests, but by far the biggest threat in the
region was posed by Russia, and Japan shared Britain’s suspicions about Russian
expansionism. In 1901 the Japanese proposed a formal alliance. Britain agreed
and the alliance was concluded in 1902. This was the first modern pact between
a European power and an Asian power. Britain and Japan agreed to co-operate in
China and the Yellow Sea and to respect the independence of China and Korea,
though Japan’s special interest in the latter was recognized. If Britain or Japan
went to war, the uninvolved ally was to remain neutral, but if another power
joined in against Britain or Japan, the uninvolved ally would be obliged to fight.
The alliance gave Japan a free hand in Korea, Britain did not have to spend so
much defending its Asian possessions, and Russia’s advance was countered. The
alliance was renewed in 1905 and 1911.11
In Europe, meanwhile, London’s main concern was the rapid growth in
Germany’s military capability, combined as it was with Berlin’s confrontational
tone. Particularly alarming was the expansion of the German navy. Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, secretary of state for the imperial navy from 1897 to
1916, wanted to use the navy to intimidate the British and push them into an
accommodation.12
Though British governments wished to trim the defence budget and were
reluctant to engage in an arms race, they could not allow their freedom of action
to be limited. Edward Grey, who was foreign secretary in the Liberal governments
of 1905–15, saw a strong fleet as an essential for Britain, with its overseas empire
and dependence on maritime trade, whereas Germany was really a continental
power, needing a strong army but not the navy that was being built. Winston
Churchill, who had defected from the Conservatives to the Liberals in 1904
and was appointed as first lord of the admiralty in 1911, agreed with Grey.
More money was provided for the Royal Navy and the idea spread that it might
become necessary to resolve disagreements with Germany’s enemies France
and Russia.13
France and Russia had concluded an alliance in 1894. French leaders were
suspicious of Germany and the memory of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War
of 1870–71 continued to affect French policy in the early twentieth century.
The alliance with Russia was essential to French strategy and for Germany it
raised the possibility of having to fight a war on two fronts. Alliance with France
suited the Russians, all the more so after they were embarrassed by defeat in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5. According to Russia’s foreign minister (1906–10)
Alexander Isvolsky, the way to restore prestige was through gains in the Balkans.
The alliance with France, it was hoped, would prevent Germany from interfering
when Russia made its move, for the Russians were bound to clash with Austria-
Hungary, Germany’s ally since 1879.14
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 3

In the late nineteenth century Britain came close to war with both France
and Russia because of imperial struggles.15 Seeking to improve relations with
France, in view of the danger posed by Germany and the need to stabilize
spheres of influence outside Europe, British foreign secretary (1900–5) Lord
Lansdowne negotiated the entente of April 1904. This agreement was not the
same as the Anglo-Japanese alliance, for it involved no military commitments,
and there was still some reserve in London’s dealings with Paris. French foreign
minister (1898–1905) Theophile Delcasse wanted a change, however, believing
that France could not stand up to Germany in Europe and Britain in Africa at
the same time. The entente recognized Britain’s interests in Egypt and French
interests in Morocco, and arrangements were settled with respect to frontiers in
West Africa, fishing rights off Newfoundland, and involvement in South East
Asia, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. From the outset the French attached
more importance to the entente than did the British.16
When Grey became foreign secretary in December 1905, he inherited improv-
ing Anglo-French relations. Co-operation was soon reinforced by the Algeciras
Conference of January to April 1906. Germany had been complaining about
French involvement in Morocco, but when representatives of the great powers
met at Algeciras in Spain to discuss the situation, only Austria-Hungary backed
Germany. London and Paris had already agreed to work together on Morocco,
and although the Russians were angry because France had not assisted them dur-
ing the Russo-Japanese War, there was no chance that Russia would act against
the French. The Moroccan crisis made Britain and France psychologically closer,
and they became closer still as Germany tried to separate them. The Liberal
government in Britain – led by Henry Campbell-Bannerman until April 1908
and thereafter by H.H. Asquith – valued the entente, and under its prime minister
(1906–9) Georges Clemenceau, the French government avoided colonial friction
with Britain and directed nationalist sentiment against Germany. There was still
no formal, binding commitment to France, but Grey sanctioned Anglo-French
military conversations. He did not inform his cabinet colleagues.17 At the same
time a process of reform began, to improve Britain’s fighting capacity, initiated
by the secretary of state for war (1905–12) Richard Haldane.18
Though contacts with Germany continued, German unfriendliness led the
British to pay more attention to the causes of Anglo-Russian antagonism. An
entente with Russia was concluded in August 1907. The Russians were wary of
ongoing British resistance in frontier regions, feared the long-term implications
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and hoped to prevent a pact between London and
Berlin to extinguish Russian influence in the Middle East. By the entente Persia
was partitioned into spheres of influence and the neutrality of Afghanistan was
recognized, as were Britain’s special interests in the Persian Gulf. Tibet was to be
a buffer zone. Britain and Russia agreed to respect the integrity of the Ottoman
4 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

Empire, and there was a vague statement about access for Russian vessels from
the Black Sea into the Mediterranean.19 Consultation with the French became
an established feature of British foreign policy, whereas contact with Russia was
less frequent and less useful. Despite its limitations, however, the Anglo-Russian
entente angered German leaders.20
Alleviating some of the tension in Anglo-Russian relations was a reasonable
goal for the British government with regard to the balance of power in Europe,
yet imperial considerations were probably paramount and it is also possible that
Lansdowne had favoured an entente with France not because he feared Germany
but because he wanted to secure the empire and, in particular, defend India
from Russia. London may have decided that the Anglo-Japanese alliance did not
represent a sufficient deterrent, and it was likely that Indian nationalists would
try even harder to throw off British authority if they saw that it rested, even in
part, on Japanese assistance.21
The ententes assumed greater importance to Britain because of Germany’s
policy. Grey was not prepared to sacrifice good relations with France or Russia,
especially the former, and could make no bargain with Berlin that cut across these
relations. He was increasingly concerned about Europe, but he thought that the
main effect of the ententes was to enable Britain to retain its naval superiority
and its empire. These advantages might be lost if Britain sided with Germany.
Early in 1907 the senior clerk in the western department of the foreign office,
Eyre Crowe, remarked that German policy could be interpreted either as a
calculated bid for hegemony or as a confused set of measures, drifting along by
its own momentum. Either way, the result would be war. Grey was of a similar
opinion. He believed that the isolation of Germany would lead to war, and that
German domination of Europe would also mean war. There was a wide area of
possibility between these two scenarios, and Grey wanted to keep great power
relations within this space. As time passed, he thought that the Germans were
preventing him from doing so.22
To his detractors Crowe was unduly pessimistic and his warnings made war
more likely, but Crowe was only one of many experts who had a role in the shap-
ing of British policy, and policy was not made exclusively in the foreign office
but owed something to a variety of political, economic, military and strategic
imperatives.23 Crowe’s wish for a harder line was satisfied in some respects, for
this was a period in which more ruthlessness crept into Britain’s approach to
international issues.24
Fear and tension increased. Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1908, with German approval, caused further instability in the
Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina had been administered by the Austrians since
1878, though it was nominally part of the Ottoman Empire. Russian foreign
minister Isvolsky had been working on a deal whereby Russia would accept
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 5

formal annexation in return for Vienna’s support for the opening of the Bosporus
and Dardanelle Straits to Russian ships, but Vienna announced the annexation
while he was still preparing the ground. The result was more ill feeling between
Russia and Austria-Hungary. The strongest Balkan state, Serbia, condemned
Austria-Hungary’s action and appealed to Russia, but the latter had to limit its
response because Britain and France refused to intervene.25
Willing to see Russia challenged in the Balkans, the Germans also continued
their coercive tactics with respect to the French in Morocco. The arrival of a
German gunboat at Agadir in June 1911 alarmed the British, who feared the
establishment of a German naval base on the Atlantic coast of North Africa.
What Germany really wanted was compensation for accepting French control
of Morocco, and soon Berlin was offered territory in central Africa, but before
the crisis passed Britain issued a clear warning. Chancellor of the exchequer
David Lloyd George declared that although Britain wanted to remain at peace,
if pushed too far Britain would fight. The Agadir crisis augmented Anglo-French
co-operation and Grey told the cabinet of the military conversations that had
been going on since 1906. Some of his colleagues were uneasy, especially Asquith,
but Grey stood firm. If an expectation arose in Paris that Britain would assist
France in war, he argued, this could not be helped, and it would not be to Britain’s
benefit to abandon the military conversations.26
The possibility of war was accepted in sections of the British government. An
awareness of danger was also spreading among the public. Some newspapers,
notably the Daily Mail, recommended that Britain had to strengthen itself in
order to prevent war. Prominent intellectuals mused over changing times, among
them the writer H.G. Wells, who in 1909 used the first aeroplane flight across the
English Channel (by French aviator Louis Blériot) to make the point that Britain
was being drawn towards the continent. There was a schism among British
socialists. Some opposed war while others actively contributed to anti-German
sentiment. Public opinion was also affected by the way the media depicted war.
There was a tendency to gloss over the negative aspects.27
That suspicion of Germany continued to grow was due primarily to the arms
race. This was the age of the ‘Dreadnoughts’, which were more powerful than
all previous battleships. In 1909 there were claims that Germany had secretly
accelerated its construction programme and that the development of new vessels
made Britain’s superiority in pre-‘Dreadnought’ battleships irrelevant. The gov-
ernment decided to build four new ‘Dreadnoughts’. Naval chiefs wanted six, the
popular cry was for eight, but the government was reluctant to spend so heavily.
Diplomatic initiatives came to nothing. Britain promised to offer no opposition
to Germany’s colonial expansion and to join no aggressive combination against
the Germans if they slowed down their naval building. Berlin insisted that the
arms race could only be suspended if Britain undertook to remain neutral in the
6 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

event of a European war. This meant that Britain would have to desert France in
return for German friendship. Grey ruled this out.28
The situation was not helped by rising Anglophobia in Germany.29 In contrast,
anti-German opinion in Britain was not so much a cause of the First World War
as the result of it, and it was widely thought that Britain and Germany drifted
apart from the 1890s not because they were inevitable enemies but because their
interests diverged: Germany could not help Britain to preserve its empire, and
Britain could not protect or threaten Germany’s position in Europe. Though
questions relating to trade and colonies might have been settled by negotiation,
the snag was Germany’s determination to increase its influence, which involved
ending British naval supremacy.30
In the aftermath of the Agadir affair, Italy took advantage of instability in the
Ottoman Empire to seize Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Dodecanese Islands.
Italy’s success intensified nationalist fervour in the Balkans. Serbia was intent
on freeing the area from the control of both Istanbul and Vienna, which for
generations had stood at the head of two great multi-national empires. Serbia
made gains in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13 and the country’s prime minister,
Nikola Pas̆ić, satisfied that the Turks had effectively been dealt with, planned next
to break Austria-Hungary’s influence in the region. The Balkan Wars surprised
the great powers, forced Turkey to cede almost all of its territory in Europe, and
greatly inconvenienced Grey, who was hard pressed to localize the conflict and
arrange for mediation.31
National self-determination was one of the popular causes of the period, and
as Turkish rule in south-eastern Europe ended, it seemed likely that Austria-
Hungary would have to make a similar adjustment. Vienna tried to resist. In
February 1913 the chief of the German general staff, Helmuth von Moltke, sug-
gested to his Austrian counterpart that the next war would pitch German against
Slav. Moltke looked forward to this, though he stressed that public opinion in
Germany, Austria-Hungary and elsewhere would be more easily managed if
Russia could be presented as the aggressor.32
To Austrian emperor Franz Joseph and his advisers, a satisfactory settlement
in the Balkans could only be achieved by a general war. On 28 June 1914, Franz
Joseph’s nephew and heir Franz Ferdinand was murdered in the Bosnian capital
Sarajevo. Since the assassins had links with a secret society in Belgrade, the
Austrians blamed Serbia. Here was an opportunity to exterminate the Serbian
challenge and deal also with the nationalities issue within the empire, and in this
determination Vienna was backed by Kaiser Wilhelm II and the government of
Germany.33
Grey called upon France, Italy and Germany to join Britain in an effort to
broker an agreement, but the Austrians declared war on Serbia, and Belgrade
was bombarded on 28 July 1914. The Russians mobilized when Serbia appealed
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 7

for help and Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August. Berlin offered France
the opportunity to remain neutral, provided the military bases at Toulon and
Verdun were handed over to Germany. The French response was to mobilize, and
Germany declared war on France on 3 August.34
The great powers had lost control over events. From the late nineteenth
century the pattern of alliances changed, states feared war less than they feared
standing alone when war broke out, and a formerly stable international states
system crumbled.35 A confused mixture of ambiguity and rigidity made it
impossible to solve the final crisis. The Germans believed that their security was
at stake. The Russians believed that Austrian intervention in the Balkans would
undermine Russia’s security. All the interested powers thought that delay would
rob them of the initiative. Mobilization plans were inflexible and alliances largely
unconditional and offensive. Britain and France could not demand that the
Russians limit themselves to defensive actions only, and needed to preserve their
relationship with Russia for their own protection. French security depended on
the maintenance of Russian power. Britain did not realize that German mobiliza-
tion would mean war and that, in order to prevent this, Britain would need to
stop Russia from mobilizing first. Perhaps British policy was not sufficiently firm,
and this misled the Germans, yet British leaders were unsure about the German
policy to which they were reacting and the Germans had necessarily to keep their
plans secret, particularly the intention to attack France through Belgium.36
Britain refused a German proposal at the beginning of August 1914 because it
would have entailed abandoning France and bargaining away the longstanding
British interest in the integrity of Belgium, which in turn affected the approaches
to the North Sea and English Channel, vital to British security. Grey persuaded
the cabinet to authorize the Royal Navy to defend French coasts and shipping
from the Germans. Then Belgium appealed for British protection. Britain was a
signatory to the international convention of 1839 that guaranteed Belgium, and
had reasserted its commitment to Belgium in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian
War. Now German forces invaded Belgium in order to facilitate their offensive
against France. In Britain, popular sympathy for Belgium and outrage at German
aggression created a wave of support for war. The invasion of Belgium also united
the Asquith government, some members of which had insisted that Britain
should not join in the European conflict. The government sent an ultimatum to
the Germans, requesting their withdrawal from Belgian territory. Germany did
not comply and the ultimatum expired at midnight on 4 August.37
Grey had tried to prolong the peace while preserving for Britain the freedom to
make decisions up to the last minute should war break out. He had also ensured
that if the British had to fight they would not lack friends. Though the ententes
were not alliances, Anglo-French co-operation in particular had developed in
such a way as to make it unlikely that Britain would stay out of a war in which
8 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

France and Germany faced each other. The German invasion of Belgium had
a bearing on cabinet deliberations, but by itself it did not bring Britain into
the war. The cabinet decided on 29 July that the commitment to Belgium fell
collectively, not individually, upon the five signatories to the 1839 agreement
(Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia). Asquith informed King George V
that if Britain went to war, it would be a matter of policy rather than obligation.
In London, during the weekend of 1 to 3 August, there were mass demonstrations
in favour of war, and by 3 August the cabinet had agreed that Britain would
fight. The main reasons for this were the sense of duty to France, anxiety about
control of the English Channel, and the idea that if Britain stayed out of the
war, and Germany won, sooner or later Britain would have to confront a greatly
strengthened adversary.38
This decision was not easily reached, though, and there was much confusion
in late July and early August 1914, in Berlin as well as in London. The German
government had for some time been listening to advisers who doubted Britain’s
will to fight, while nobody in Britain except Grey knew how far Britain was
committed to France.39 Uncertainty went hand in hand with error. On the British
side, wider strategic questions were not properly addressed in the months before
August 1914. For the Liberal party leadership the primary task was to avoid a
government split.40
Grey had no doubt that Britain was bound to fight alongside the French, but he
could never be sure how far cabinet, parliament and public opinion would be willing
to go. In his speech in the House of Commons on 3 August 1914, he admitted that
Britain had made no binding promises to France. There was friendship, however,
and this had evolved so far that Grey considered it to equate to a commitment,
one that accorded rather than clashed with British objectives. Indeed, self-interest
coincided with moral duty. To stand aside, Grey declared, would be to forfeit
Britain’s good name and to jeopardize the nation’s essential interests.41
After the war, a defeated Germany took responsibility for causing it. The ‘war
guilt clause’ was included in the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and was controversial
at the time and afterwards.42 While it is clear that Germany acted in a way that
made war more likely, it is also the case that war was greeted enthusiastically at
élite and popular levels in all the belligerent nations, which indicates that they
all believed they had a reason to fight. Some historians have suggested that the
war began because governments wished to turn attention away from domestic
problems by means of an adventurous foreign policy.43
It is true that Asquith’s government faced difficulties at home (social welfare,
Ireland, votes for women, the prerogatives of the House of Lords, the economy,
industrial relations). But if the government really wanted to divert attention with
a war, the prime minister would hardly have objected as he did to Anglo-French
military conversations; Grey would not have tried so hard to prevent escalation
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 9

in the Balkans, and the cabinet would not have been divided on the question of
going to war until the last moment in the summer of 1914.44 There were prob-
lems in the empire,45 and the war was partly fought for imperial reasons, but this
is not the same as fighting a war to take attention away from domestic issues.
Still, one might ask why the statesmen of the day were so sensitive about war
guilt. This was a constant theme in both wartime propaganda and post-war
claims. For Britain and its allies, freedom from blame was needed in order to
justify the peace terms. For the Germans it was important to deny responsibility
for the war in order to bolster allegations about unfair treatment by the victorious
powers. It is probable that Germany had not wanted a major war of the kind that
broke out in 1914.46
The idea that Britain should have stayed out of the war runs counter to the
view taken at the time and afterwards that Germany had to be prevented from
dominating Europe.47 Questions might still be asked, however, about the choices
made by Grey. Under Salisbury and Lansdowne, British policy was flexible,
and by the time the Liberals took office in 1905, Britain’s diplomatic position
was stronger than it had been for some time. These facts were not sufficiently
appreciated by Grey, according to modern critics who think that he was wrong
to see Germany as a threat and wrong to attach such importance to co-operation
with France and Russia.48
One problem here is that British policy was directly influenced by German
policy. Grey did not simply act on his own whims. He had to take account of what
was happening in Europe and beyond. Berlin might genuinely have wanted an
agreement with Britain, but the German government made a mistake in think-
ing that the way to get this was to expose British weaknesses. Since London was
convinced by 1914 that the Germans would not rest until they were ascendant in
Europe, it made sense to help France and fight against Germany when war broke
out. The Germans had added naval strength to their existing military power on
the continent and seemed to believe that war was necessary if their nation was
to fulfil its destiny.49
Germany’s determination to challenge Britain cannot be discounted, and in
1914 the German government did not opt for war only because of British policy.
Remaining neutral was not a viable prospect for Britain, meanwhile, and Grey
had grounds to regard Germany as dangerous. He was not alone: members of the
Conservative opposition in parliament were even more suspicious of Germany.
Moreover, to exaggerate the difference between pre- and post-1905 British policy
and to accuse Grey of a rigid, proactive approach that contravened the non-
committal methods perfected by Salisbury, without taking proper account of
changes in the international environment, is to do a serious disservice to Grey.
It must also be remembered that Britain fought in 1914 for imperial reasons,
alongside the concern about the future of Europe. The British had to safeguard
10 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

their far-flung territories, not just the home islands, and believed that victory
for Germany and its allies would endanger the whole empire. The government
called on the colonies and dominions to help, and help they did, with troops
and resources.50
To suggest that there was a fundamental shift in British policy in the early
twentieth century – the relinquishing of ‘isolation’51 – is to overstate what hap-
pened, and it is no less misleading to exaggerate the change than it is to argue
that everything stayed the same. As international circumstances made it more
difficult for Britain to sustain its global position, no government and no foreign
secretary could afford to ignore the needs and opportunities of the day.
The title of a book published by H.G. Wells in 1914 set the tone for post-war
attitudes in Britain: The War That Will End War. The political failures, social
hardship, moral disorder and terrible carnage associated with the ‘Great War’
made people think that it could never be allowed to happen again, which helped
to create the appeasement mood of the 1920s and 1930s. Appeasement has come
to have negative connotations, yet appeasement was meant to keep the peace, an
aspiration of which few did not approve. It was not an admission of weakness.
In fact, its supporters saw it as a policy of strength and honour. It was meant
to pacify and satisfy other states. The context in which British governments
tried to do this changed enormously as the relatively calm 1920s became the
hazardous 1930s.52
Many historians have disparaged appeasement. To Correlli Barnett, for
example, appeasement is best defined as a preference for so-called ‘morality’ over
power, and a readiness to yield to pressure.53 Measures of appeasement seemed
appropriate to contemporaries, however, and with respect to Germany were
widely accepted as necessary. The main impulse in the 1920s stemmed from the
shocking impact of the First World War and the feeling that the war had been
futile, disastrous and wrong.54
In the 1920s there was real faith in international harmony and stability. In
January 1919 the peace conference in Paris approved a proposal for the formation
of the League of Nations. This body was dedicated to disarmament, arbitration
and collective security. Its influence proved in the long run to be limited, for it
lacked an army and depended on the great powers to implement its resolutions,
and it suffered considerably from the stance of the Americans, who did not join
the League and minimized their involvement in European affairs in the interwar
period. Still, in the mid- to late 1920s there was the ‘Locarno spirit’, a reference to
the Locarno conference of October 1925, which demonstrated that the victorious
powers of 1918 were committed to a normalization of their relations with the
new democratic republic of Germany, ruled from Weimar. Locarno was taken as
proof that disputes could be resolved amicably. Britain was an active participant,
and international co-operation was a principal goal of successive governments,
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 11

irrespective of their party complexion. The Conservatives were in office under

Andrew Bonar Law in 1922–23 and under Stanley Baldwin in 1923–24 and
1924–29. Labour was in office from January to November 1924 under James
Ramsay MacDonald, and again under MacDonald in 1929–31. Conservative-
dominated national coalition governments were in office under MacDonald in
1931–35 and Baldwin in 1935–37.55
In this era of peace and promise it seemed appropriate for the British to scale
down their armaments. Ironically, in view of his later reputation as an anti-
appeaser, the retrenchment drive was presided over by Winston Churchill, who
served as chancellor of the exchequer, 1924–29, after rejoining the Conservatives.
At the time the reductions had much support, but they put Britain at a disad-
vantage when it came to efforts to influence others in the 1930s. The First World
War had transformed international affairs and problems of adjustment were
particularly acute in the foreign office. Whatever the difficulties facing policy
makers, though, public opinion was for peace and this was clearly reflected in
sections of the British press.56
British power after the First World War was still considerable. Some historians
argue that economic, political and military circumstances prompted compro-
mises, with the result that Britain’s influence and independence were eroded.57
In fact, the 1920s saw no headlong retreat on Britain’s part. In terms of prestige,
geopolitical position and the skill of its statesmen, Britain continued to do well.
Economic problems were increasing, but influence rested on more than the
performance of the economy.58
German foreign policy in the time of the Weimar Republic was designed
above all to amend the Treaty of Versailles, which, it was felt, had been unduly
harsh on Germany. The Versailles terms were evaded in various ways, sometimes
prompting Britain and especially France into retaliation, but with the rise of the
‘Locarno spirit’ there was more willingness in London and Paris to negotiate,
and this was exploited by the leading figure in German politics between 1923 and
1929, Gustav Stresemann.59 Germany joined the League of Nations in 1926. In
1927 Britain and France agreed that the occupying force in the Rhineland should
be reduced in size and declared that the rights of German minorities outside
Germany must be respected. In 1928 Germany was one of sixty-five states to sign
the Kellogg Briand Pact, which rejected war as an instrument of national policy
(Frank Kellogg was US secretary of state and Aristide Briand French foreign
minister). The vexed question of war reparations was settled in 1929. These
were useful developments, but the economic and political chaos engendered by
global depression, at its worst between 1929 and 1932, had a dramatic impact in
Germany, where Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were able to overturn the Weimar
Republic in 1933. Hitler left the League of Nations and massively increased
Germany’s military spending.60
12 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

This exacerbated the difficulties British leaders had been experiencing when
trying to decide on the best course to take in Europe and beyond. Some thought
of withdrawing from Europe after the First World War and focusing on the
empire; others insisted that Britain must play a leading role in Europe, but could
not agree on whether to pursue stability through the League of Nations or to
arrange for smaller bargains to improve relations between France and Germany.
Although a detailed scheme of disarmament did not arise in the 1920s, in part
because Germany resented the limits placed on its military capacity,61 British
leaders wanted Germany to be admitted to the League and there was less talk
of war guilt and more talk of the need to rehabilitate Germany.62 Co-operation
between Germany and the Soviet Union brought complications. These two
outcast states had concluded the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922. They established
diplomatic and economic links and renounced financial claims arising from the
First World War, and secretly agreed to assist each other with military training
and weapons testing. British concerns about the impact of this relationship
increased the eagerness to act as mediator between France and Germany, so as to
stabilize Western Europe and turn Germany away from the Soviets. The Locarno
conference was important to Britain for these reasons,63 but it left many matters
unresolved and there were quarrels between Britain and France before and after
the conference, indicating a fundamental disagreement about how to handle
European problems.64
The main terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the British view that Germany
had a right to complain about them have prompted much debate.65 International
relations in the 1920s and 1930s were materially shaped by differing opinions
about revisions to Versailles, and these in turn were related to the ongoing
problem of disarmament. After the lack of progress in the 1920s, a new effort
was made at the Geneva disarmament conference of 1932–34. The British were
reluctant to press for a substantial treaty, however, because after downsizing their
own military establishment they required other governments to follow Britain’s
example. They were not prepared to make further reductions themselves.66
As Hitler established himself in power in Germany, the British grew concerned
about his intentions, but they were much more worried about Japanese expan-
sion in Asia and about the schemes of Josef Stalin, dictator of the Soviet Union.
Japan had fought in the First World War against Germany and its allies, and
subsequently in the Russian civil war against the Bolsheviks. Political, economic
and cultural influences combined to increase Japan’s wish for territory and
influence, while Britain, France and the United States pressed Japan to abide
by collective agreements and, in particular, to keep out of China. The Anglo-
Japanese alliance was allowed to lapse. By treaties signed in Washington DC in
1921–22, a ratio of 5:5:3 for naval strength was agreed for America, Britain and
Japan; these three powers plus France guaranteed one another’s possessions in
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 13

the Pacific; and China’s independence was recognized. The idea spread among
Japanese leaders, and especially its army chiefs, that friendship with the Western
powers was incompatible with Japan’s needs and ambitions, and this notion
was reinforced as economic depression hit the West in 1929–32 and appeared to
weaken its ability to withstand Japanese designs in Asia. A puppet state was set
up in Manchuria in 1932 and in 1933 Japan left the League of Nations.67
British suspicion of Russia, which had been so strong in the nineteenth cen-
tury and was not entirely allayed in the years before the First World War, quickly
revived as a result of the Bolshevik coup of 1917 and the establishment of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. Stalin became leader of the USSR
in 1924. In his statements on foreign policy he stressed his desire for peace and
trade while warning other powers not to interfere in Soviet affairs. After 1933 he
treated Nazi Germany as the main threat. In this he was correct, but otherwise
Stalin’s decisions owed a lot to his own paranoia. Determined to prevent the army
from becoming a rival power base within the Soviet Union, he removed more
than half his generals during the purges of the mid-1930s. He was also convinced
that Britain and France were willing for Germany to grow strong because they
hoped in due course to turn Germany against the Soviet Union.68
Worried about Germany and Japan, suspicious of the Soviet Union, conscious
of US isolationism and unsure about the reliability of France, Britain became
more apprehensive. In the 1920s, circumstances had been different and measures
of appeasement – constructive efforts to promote agreement, solve problems and
reduce tension – had been successful. In Europe, the primary task was to control
Germany’s post-war revival and gradually to bring Germany back into the comity
of nations. Britain was ready to reduce the reparations bill and grant Germany
equal rights. After 1933 reparations had been stopped and Hitler had left the
League on the grounds that Germany was being denied equal rights, so these
bargaining tools were gone. The need now was to find out what Hitler wanted.
There were hopes that in making agreements with Germany, a concession on
one side would be met with a concession on the other. Under the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement of June 1935, Germany promised not to build more than 35
per cent of the Royal Navy’s strength in all classes of vessel, and Britain agreed
that submarines would not be subject to this ceiling. While London viewed this
bargain as a measure of arms limitation that would help in restraining Germany,
Berlin, on the other hand, saw it as a means of pressurizing France and the Soviet
Union. It was controversial because it contradicted the disarmament clauses in
the Treaty of Versailles, and the French and Italian governments complained
about Britain’s failure to consult them.69
If the appeasement policy was to remain robust, it was important to bargain
from a position of strength and to obtain something back for everything offered.
As circumstances changed, the policy fell apart. So anxious were they to keep
14 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

the peace that the chief appeasers were prepared to make unilateral concessions.
The motives remained correct, it might be argued, but the methods were flawed.
It is not easy to see how matters could have been better managed: the Germans
pretended to be appeaseable.
The task of reaching an understanding with the Nazi regime was hindered by
internal problems. Negotiations often involved economic incentives, for instance,
and the foreign office wanted to be more proactive in this. In the treasury and the
Bank of England there was resistance. Although economic aid offered a possible
antidote to German extremism, there was no agreement about the way it should
be used.70 International economic relations formed the essential backdrop and
it is possible that assessments of the general situation were unduly pessimistic.71
If this is true, Britain’s diplomacy in the 1930s must have been affected more
by political errors than by economic failures, a supposition that reinforces the
claims of those historians who wish to attach blame to particular individuals or
government bodies.
The treasury was the most influential department because it controlled the
public purse. Alfred Duff Cooper, secretary of state for war 1935–36 and first lord
of the admiralty 1936–38, considered the treasury’s influence excessive. More
recently it has been argued that the treasury determined defence priorities, and
that senior Conservative ministers attached more importance to financial stability
than to national security. Some historians have defended the treasury, pointing
out that careful supervision was needed to ensure that resources were not wasted.
By setting limits the treasury made sure that all available funds had not already
been spent when war came in 1939. The treasury’s main concern in the 1930s was
to maintain Britain’s economic competitiveness and future earning capacity.72
In addition to fear of distorting the economy and losing exports, there was
concern about the shortage of skilled labour in Britain and a determination
to avoid a cycle of boom and bust. The depression of 1929–32 was like a
spectre that haunted legislators and there was no wish to jeopardize recovery
through incautious measures of intervention. This was the position of Neville
Chamberlain, who was chancellor of the exchequer from November 1931 and
succeeded Baldwin as prime minister in May 1937. Only after the ‘Anschluss’
of March 1938, the union of Germany and Austria, forbidden at Versailles, was
Chamberlain willing to abandon the principle that rearmament should not
encroach on Britain’s foreign trade. The treasury’s assumptions were really those
of the established order in politics and society. One had only to look abroad to see
that extremists thrived in times of economic distress. An ambitious rearmament
programme would cost too much, and if money had to be printed to pay for it,
inflation would set in and business confidence would plummet. Conservative
ministers, MPs and supporters in the country did not want to endanger the social
and economic structures from which they benefited.73
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 15

Nevertheless, the situation in Europe required a more energetic response on

Britain’s part. When he was in office, many observers thought Baldwin inattentive
when it came to international affairs. Meanwhile the Germans continued to be
inconsistent and awkward. Hopes were raised towards the end of 1934 and it
seemed that negotiations might be leading somewhere. Permanent under-sec-
retary at the foreign office (1930–38) Robert Vansittart thought so, but then the
Nazi leadership became more truculent.74 Britain’s dealings with Germany were
also affected by the attitude of the French, who became nervous and demanding.
After the First World War they had expected to make Germany harmless, and this
had not happened. France might have been more confident had the old alliance
with Russia remained intact, but the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in
Russia meant that some other way had to be found to create the prospect of war
on two fronts for Germany if it resorted to aggression. Links were established in
the 1920s with Poland and with the ‘Little Entente’ of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia
and Rumania, but these were no substitute for Tsarist Russia when it came to
deterring Germany. In 1934 the Polish government agreed a non-aggression pact
with Germany. As for the ‘Little Entente’, it was never a robust alliance and from
1935 Yugoslavia pursued a pro-German policy.75
Anglo-French relations were hampered by errors on both sides. On naval
construction, disarmament, intelligence, economic links, co-operation in and
outside Europe, and on what to do about Germany and Italy, London and Paris
had common interests and yet worked together intermittently. Partly this was due
to British insularity and the traditional notion that Britain should rise above the
European powers and arbitrate between them.76
Without a strong eastern ally the French became more dependent on Britain.
Since Eastern Europe was not strategically important to Britain, and since it had
been tensions there that had triggered off the First World War, the British were
unwilling to get involved in the region or to make any commitments concerning
it, and they warned the French not to provoke Berlin. The French put together
a security plan that they thought would ensure peace in Europe. British leaders
initially went along with it, hoping to promote what they really wanted: Anglo-
French-Italian co-operation against Germany. The French envisaged a system
of pacts covering Eastern Europe; an air pact; Germany’s return to the League
of Nations, and a relaxation of the limits on German rearmament. Much to
their disappointment, nobody else approved of this package in its entirety. The
British ambassador in Berlin (1933–37) Eric Phipps commented that the real
need was for a bargain that would have enough ‘teeth’ to satisfy the French, while
being sufficiently ‘toothless’ to satisfy the Germans. Phipps did think that an
understanding with Hitler was possible; his main proviso related to territorial
concessions, which he did not consider appropriate. In the mid-1930s, evidently,
the right mix of teeth and toothlessness was not within reach. It is also clear that
16 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

the Nazis did not have to contend with a united opposition as they pursued their
schemes for German revival. Washington DC distanced itself from European
problems. London and Paris did not see eye to eye, and neither trusted Stalin,
though France signed a treaty with the Soviet Union in May 1935 that provided
for mutual aid in case of unprovoked aggression. The British hoped to preserve a
common front with France and Italy, but Italian leader Benito Mussolini decided
that he could get more out of friendship with Hitler.77
The French could obtain no guarantees from Britain while the Germans
stepped up their propaganda relating to frontier disputes and the presence of
German minorities in Eastern Europe. Fortunately for Hitler, Britain, Poland
and the Soviet Union did not combine together. They each thought that security
would come not through multilateral co-operation but through better relations
with Germany, and they did not explore the interdependency of their policies
and the potential for collective restraints on Germany.78
As for Mussolini, one of his aims was the extension of Italy’s possessions in
Africa. Tension on the border between independent Ethiopia and neighbouring
Italian areas led to an incident in December 1934. The matter was referred
to the League of Nations, but the League procrastinated because Britain and
France wished to avoid alienating Italy. Mussolini’s forces invaded Ethiopia in
October 1935. The League condemned Italy and imposed sanctions, but these
inconvenienced the Italians hardly at all. Hitler took advantage of the controversy
to send German troops into the Rhineland, which Versailles had demilitarized.
The British were annoyed; they had planned to bring up the Rhineland in new
talks with Germany. Foreign secretary (1935–38) Anthony Eden remarked that
once again, by taking something that was about to be offered, the Germans had
robbed Britain of the initiative.79
Attempts to accommodate Hitler were complicated by the machinations of
Mussolini, who thought that victory in Ethiopia could be used to challenge the
British in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Mussolini grew bolder because
of the prospect of an alliance with Hitler. He expected to clash with Britain and
France and knew that Italy, too weak to win alone, needed German support.80
Officials in London reasoned that Hitler wanted territory. Versailles had
stripped Germany of its empire and some former German colonies were being
administered as League of Nations mandates. Perhaps they could be returned to
Germany. Perhaps the French would agree to hand over some of their posses-
sions. Perhaps there could be a repartitioning of Africa. These ideas developed
in the mid-1930s and demonstrate how serious the British were about pacifying
a resurgent Germany. The belief was that peace could be maintained, but that
this would require territorial adjustments. In February 1936 Vansittart wrote that
a settlement with Germany could not be made unless it provided for German
expansion, and, since an offer could not be made at the expense of others
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 17

in Europe, it would have to be at Britain’s own expense in Africa. Vansittart

insisted that this transaction would have to be conditional on concessions from
Germany. In return for territory, he thought, the Germans should agree to limit
their armaments, abandon territorial claims in Europe and return to the League.
Eden went further and argued that the colonial question was one for Germany,
not Britain, to raise.81
Military planning was central to the policy of appeasement. With faith in col-
lective security relatively strong in the 1920s, British defence spending fell both in
absolute terms and as a share of national wealth. The largest share of the available
money went to the Royal Navy, essential for the protection of trade and empire,
although aircraft carriers were neglected. The Royal Air Force was developed
primarily as long-range artillery for the destruction of enemy cities. This focus on
bombers, however, meant that air defence was largely overlooked. As for the army,
its main function was to provide for the internal security of British possessions.
Little was spent on mechanization and new weapons and equipment. In the 1930s
there was a change. Concerns about Japanese policy in Asia and German policy
in Europe prompted the service chiefs to demand more money. Chamberlain’s
budget of 1937 was the first to make serious provision for rearmament.82
Still, there was inertia and delay, and for too long conciliation, not deterrence,
was the goal. In some quarters there was a wish for closer co-operation with
France. In others this was opposed, in case it encouraged the French to make
demands of Germany. There were disagreements about the bomber force, seen
as necessary by some but as a hindrance to diplomacy by others. The bombers
gave Britain the ability to damage Germany, yet this could not prevent Germany
from launching a first strike and made an arms race inevitable. Appeasement, if
it could deliver a reduction in armaments, seemed preferable.83
British planning rested on a global system. The entire empire had to be
defended and the principal threat to the empire was posed by Japan. After
consolidating their position in Manchuria in 1931–32, the Japanese coveted the
whole of northern China and the colonies of the European powers in South East
Asia and the Pacific, especially those that had oil, iron ore, tin and rubber. For the
British, Japanese expansionism endangered Australia and New Zealand, Malaya,
Burma, India, and potentially also the Persian Gulf and British East Africa. In
this context, one advantage of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 was
that it freed the Royal Navy to meet commitments in the Far East. Navy chiefs
did not want to take on extra responsibilities in European waters. Army chiefs
also prioritized the empire: this was an actual commitment, whereas Europe was
a hypothetical commitment. These opinions were strengthened when Germany
and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936. The pact provided
for joint action against international communism (Comintern had been set up by
the Bolsheviks in 1919 to guide revolutionary movements abroad). Italy signed in
18 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

November 1937. Even as the situation in Europe became more ominous, global
concerns were still taking precedence. The actions of Japan in Asia and those of
Italy in Africa put at risk Britain’s imperial possessions and communications.
So did instability in the Middle East. From 1936 there was serious disorder in
Palestine, which Britain administered as a League mandate.84 Japan’s conduct in
the Far East worried the Americans as well as the British, and there was some
co-operation there, but it was mostly limited and informal, and it did not make
up for China’s inability to resist Japan.85
If limited resources, the needs of imperial defence and events in the Far
East appeared to make appeasement appropriate in Europe, so did Britain’s
vulnerability to attack from the air. Until 1937 it was assumed that no effective
air defence was possible. The bomber deterrent represented the military side of
appeasement. The plan was to use it alongside diplomatic efforts to bring the
Germans to the negotiating table, and the favoured concept between 1934 and
1937 was parity deterrence: numerical equality with the Germans to show them
that they would never be allowed air superiority.86
Britain lacked the means greatly to increase its responsibilities in Europe and
in the wider world. The cardinal necessity, as the defence requirements sub-
committee made clear in a report of 1935, was to avoid simultaneous hostilities
on three fronts: with Germany in Europe, Japan in Asia and Italy in Africa. The
minister for the co-ordination of defence (1936–39), Thomas Inskip, declared in
February 1938 that it was beyond Britain’s capacity to provide for the defence of
Britain and the empire against three powers in three different theatres.87
The defence requirements sub-committee had been appointed by the cabinet
in October 1933 to investigate deficiencies in Britain’s global system. Its reports
indicated that navy, army and air force all had to be improved, but initially it
focused on the Far East as the area that was most in need of attention. A quarrel
developed as a result of the German threat closer to home. For the treasury,
naval spending could be minimized by means of a thaw in relations with Japan.
The foreign office disliked this idea, not least because it would offend the United
States, but chancellor of the exchequer Neville Chamberlain was less concerned
about offending the Americans than he was about the strength of the German
air force. He advocated a rapprochement with Japan, which never materialized,
and such influences on rearmament policy had consequences later on as Britain
was reduced to a weaker bargaining position.88
British policy was directly shaped by intelligence. During the 1930s the British
government had little accurate information about the strength of potential
aggressors. There were breaches of security, and assessments about the course of
events in Europe, the Far East and elsewhere varied wildly. The regimes that the
British were trying to keep tabs on – in Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow and Rome – were
unpredictable and deceitful. Neglect did not help, for the intelligence service was
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 19

not properly funded and the machinery for collecting and evaluating informa-
tion was inadequate. This encouraged misconceptions: an underestimation of
German air power, for instance, and the belief that the German navy would oper-
ate primarily in the Baltic. Britain’s navy chiefs lacked details about the capability
of German vessels and put their faith in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement,
which Berlin eventually repudiated in April 1939.89 Better information would
probably have altered British policy in the 1930s.
Intelligence failings with regard to Japan matched those concerning Germany.
Racial prejudice played a part in British underestimation of Japan’s military
strength, for assumptions about British superiority merged with an old impres-
sion that Japan was essentially cautious. In addition, the system for gathering
information in Asia was not only under-resourced but was directed against Soviet
influence in Asia and especially against anti-British activity in India, not just the
activities of Japan.90
If appeasement rested on poor intelligence, another influence was the mindset
of Britain’s political and social élites. Within the governing class there was an
abhorrence of communism and the idea of co-operation with the Soviet Union
had little backing. The French were not liked or trusted, and there was in some
quarters an affinity with Germany, a sense of Anglo-Saxon kinship that had
cultural and historical supports. The change of regime in Germany in 1933 was
seen by many as akin to a normal change of government in Britain. Hitler was
an elected national leader. If encouraged, it was thought, he would be reasonable,
and the case for revision of the Treaty of Versailles was incontestable. When
Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, Lord Lothian suggested that the
Germans were merely walking into their own back garden. Lothian, who had
been a member of the British delegation at the Paris peace conference and served
briefly in government in 1931–32, considered appeasement a decent, pragmatic
and helpful policy in the mid-1930s, and many people agreed with him.91 Lord
Londonderry, who had been secretary of state for air (1931–35), thought that
the Germans had right on their side when they marched into the Rhineland.
Londonderry later declared the ‘Anschluss’ to be justifiable, since Austrians were
Germanic and wanted to be part of Germany (in fact, some estimates indicate
that fewer than half of the Austrian people favoured union with Germany).
Londonderry believed in appeasement and was sure that it would work.92
Appeasement had a reasonable and constructive side to it, especially before
Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937. Among foreign policy profession-
als it seemed proper for Britain to admit that Versailles was flawed. Vansittart
approved of the ‘war guilt clause’ while also, in 1931, suggesting that the military
clauses in the treaty could be dispensed with so as to allow Germany to introduce
conscription and to build up to French naval strength. In November 1935, a joint
memorandum by Orme Sargent and Ralph Wigram, the heads of the central
20 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

department in the foreign office 1928–33 and 1933–36 respectively, described

parts of the Treaty of Versailles as untenable and indefensible. Such remarks show
that the need for a settlement was recognized and that Versailles was seen as the
logical place to start.93
These ideas and admissions do not mean that Britain was weak, and it is
not the case that Germany was uninfluenced by British policy. Britain in the
1930s was certainly a great power, with its empire and global reach; its role in
the League of Nations; its active foreign policy; its determination to maintain
stability in important parts of the world and to co-operate with other powers
when necessary to do this; its large navy and network of bases, and its economic
and financial strength, which was still considerable despite the First World War
and Great Depression. Senior Nazis thought of Britain as the main obstacle to
their designs, though British leaders were conscious that their influence over
Germany would be limited until rearmament was well under way.94
Appeasement was shaped at crucial times by the personnel involved, among
them Nevile Henderson, the ambassador in Berlin from the spring of 1937.
Henderson believed that Hitler was amenable, and when the crisis over
Czechoslovakia developed in 1938 and it was clear that the Nazis would be
satisfied with nothing less than annexation of the German-speaking areas of that
country, Henderson insisted that this was not worth fighting over. He thought
that if Britain was going to rearm, it should do so secretly rather than publicly
in order to avoid any suggestion that Britain was prepared to go to war with
Germany.95
On the Czech issue Henderson argued that Hitler wished to avoid war and
that German claims were morally justified. For Henderson, and for others who
thought as he did, there was a danger that Britain might be used as a pawn by
France. Henderson thought that there need be no direct clash between Britain,
dominant on the oceans, and Germany, which wanted to dominate Europe, and
he made this point more than once to foreign secretary (1938–40) Lord Halifax.
Even after the outbreak of the Second World War there were some who wanted
to come to terms with Hitler. This was partly because of British suspicion of the
Soviet Union.96
Britain’s failure to conclude an agreement with the Soviets in this period has
been called one of the greatest mistakes in the history of British diplomacy.97
There was no enthusiasm for an agreement in London, however, while in
Moscow there was anger at the tendency of British policy in the 1930s and
particularly the failure to restrain Germany. From 1935 the British knew that
their relations with the Soviets would be ruined if Britain tried unilaterally to
negotiate with Hitler using territory in Eastern Europe. This, in effect, is what
happened over Czechoslovakia in 1938. By the Munich Agreement of September
1938, Britain and France accepted Germany’s annexation of the Sudetenland, the
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 21

German-speaking parts of Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain thought that he

had ensured peace and that Hitler had given up any designs on the rest of
Czechoslovakia, but Germany invaded in March 1939. In April Chamberlain
offered to guarantee Poland, thought to be Hitler’s next target. This guarantee
could not possibly be effective without Soviet assistance, and Chamberlain lost
leverage in that the agreement with Poland was simultaneously a guarantee for
the Soviets, since the Germans could only attack the USSR through Poland.
During April and May Britain also made agreements with Greece, Rumania and
Turkey, but nothing was agreed with the Soviet Union. Chamberlain did not
consider the Soviets to be militarily strong, and to his mind they needed Britain
more than Britain needed them. Stalin hoped to postpone war between Germany
and the Soviet Union, which coincided with the German desire to avoid a war on
two fronts. Hitler did not want to fight the Soviets until he was ready. Therefore,
in August 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union, to general surprise, concluded
a non-aggression pact.98
Chamberlain was accused of a serious blunder. By the spring of 1939, for
instance, Winston Churchill was urging the government to make friendly over-
tures to Moscow. Yet Stalin would probably not have chosen Britain and France
over Germany. He doubted that the British and French were strong enough to
deter the Germans.99
Until the summer of 1939, most people in Britain opposed involvement in
another European war. Efforts to keep the peace were widely supported. Signs
of the public mood during the 1930s include the East Fulham by-election of
October 1933, which resulted in what was hailed as a ‘victory for pacifism’ (the
Labour candidate won the seat, overturning a large Conservative majority).
During the early 1930s the League of Nations Union, which had been formed
in 1918, organized a ‘peace ballot’ based on house-to-house canvassing. More
than eleven million people participated, and when the results were published
in 1935 they revealed overwhelming support for peace and disarmament. A
Peace Pledge Union was established in 1936. At a debate in the Oxford Union
in February 1933, the majority voted against fighting ‘for king and country’,
which attracted enormous attention at home and abroad. The Daily Express
considered it ‘contemptible and indecent’, while the Manchester Guardian argued
that Oxford students were right to wonder why Britain had fought wars in the
past and to consider the basis upon which they might be justified in the future.
Public opinion polls, though they must be treated cautiously, indicate that British
people did not want war and, when war came, had mistaken notions about what
it would entail. Chamberlain and his colleagues believed that they were faith-
fully reflecting the nation’s preferences in their measures of appeasement. After
Munich Chamberlain was a national hero, although the joke went round that he
had turned all four cheeks to Hitler.100 One of the leading peace campaigners in
22 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

Britain, Lord Cecil, a strong supporter of the League of Nations who had been
in government during and after the First World War, later wrote of the peace
ballot as a highly significant endeavour that had some influence on British policy,
though not as much as he had hoped.101
For the chiefs of staff the most important consideration was that Britain could
not fight a war on three fronts. Appeasement was therefore in the nation’s best
interests. The chiefs wanted as little to do with European problems as possible.
They stressed that Britain did not have a continental-sized army. Disheartened
by financial constraints, they considered Britain unprepared for war and in their
annual reports of 1932 and 1937 stressed the under-spending since the First
World War and the military strength of potential enemies.102
When serious problems arose, the government and chiefs of staff tried to
find a way out, one that would restore calm and keep up appearances so that
domestic and foreign observers would continue to believe in negotiation. The
Czech crisis brought this endeavour to the point of collapse. London realized that
the ‘Anschluss’ of March 1938 made more likely a German effort to dismember
Czechoslovakia, especially as demonstrations broke out in the Sudetenland
and Berlin accused the Czech authorities of mistreating German people there.
Chamberlain asked the chiefs of staff to consider the military implications. The
resulting assessment utilized outdated information and made Czechoslovakia
seem more vulnerable than it really was. In August 1938 Chamberlain sent
Walter Runciman, who had previously served in Liberal and national coalition
governments, on a mission to the Sudetenland, ostensibly to listen to both sides
but in fact to put pressure on the Czech government. Runciman agreed with
Chamberlain on the need to avoid war: Britain was not ready to fight and war
would ruin Britain’s world position. The Runciman report was worded so as to
justify the meeting at Munich. German interests apparently mattered more than
the survival of Czechoslovakia, and what London really wanted was to remove
impediments to peace and trade with Germany. But Munich had unfortunate
consequences. It marked the abandonment of a democratic country and a well-
defended frontier; it meant that France could no longer count on the Germans
being distracted in Eastern Europe; and the loss of Czechoslovakia was the loss
of a small but strong army, a thriving armaments industry, and a considerable
amount of modern equipment and military stocks.103
When the Czech crisis demanded a solution, Chamberlain honestly believed
that he was the man to take charge. He had been a successful mayor of Birmingham
and entered parliament relatively late in life, but he had a sense of what mattered
most to prosperous middle-class Conservatives and he rose quickly, serving as
minister of health during the 1920s and then as chancellor of the exchequer, a post
in which he won renown for paring down the defence estimates. Chamberlain
was a strong debater and highly confident in his own judgement, but as prime
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 23

minister this made him stubborn. Trusting in the ability of intelligent men to rea-
son together, he thought of diplomacy as a series of businesslike dealings, for this
was his experience in English provincial politics. His attitude, and his meddling
in foreign policy, prompted the resignation of foreign secretary Anthony Eden in
February 1938. Chamberlain was insisting on the need to keep Germany and Italy
apart, which for him necessitated negotiations with Mussolini. Eden did not trust
the Italian dictator, pointed to Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and intervention in the
Spanish civil war, which had broken out in 1936, and argued that Chamberlain
was wrong not to seek the help of US president Franklin D. Roosevelt and wrong
to turn his back on the League of Nations and on the possibility of co-operation
with the Soviet Union.104
To Chamberlain, the League was not fit for purpose. He did not respect the
foreign office much, either, and this led to a break from the past in diplomatic
concepts and methods.105 The prime minister had some fixed ideas about the
international order. He believed that his predecessor Baldwin had neglected
European affairs and that this had damaged Britain’s standing. He was convinced
that Britain had no reliable allies and that the collective security sponsored by the
League was obsolete. He had little confidence in the French or the Americans and
did not trust the Soviets. Stalin’s purges made him think that the Soviet Union
was weaker than it appeared, and he thought that the price of Soviet help would
be the spread of communism in Eastern Europe. In addition, the government was
aware that opinion in the empire was very much against war. Indeed, it was not
clear that the dominions would help if Britain fought in Europe for European
reasons. In view of all this, Chamberlain thought that peace had to be preserved
through personal diplomacy.106
Chamberlain treated the dispute between Berlin and Czechoslovakia as an
obstacle to appeasement. In November 1937, British and French representatives
met to discuss German policy and it was agreed that if Hitler proceeded with
the ‘Anschluss’ no action would be taken, but French foreign minister (1936–38)
Yvon Delbos pointed out that France and Czechoslovakia were allies. If the
Czechs were attacked, France would have to fight. British leaders saw that, rather
than risk another German conquest of France, which would lead to even greater
difficulties in the future, Britain would also have to fight. The only way to avoid
this was to put together a bargain that was acceptable to both the Czechs and the
Germans. As the weaker party, it was Czechoslovakia that had to be pushed into
making concessions. With the Munich Agreement Chamberlain assumed that
the crisis had passed, that his approach had worked, and that Hitler’s signature
on an Anglo-German declaration of friendship reflected the German leader’s
prudence and good faith.107
The Labour MP Jack Lawson, who accepted the post of deputy commissioner
for civil defence in the northern counties of England in April 1939, later recalled
24 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

the sense at that time that war was coming and could not be averted. Labourites
opposed Chamberlain’s appeasement, but Lawson reckoned that a different
policy would not have worked because Hitler could not be swayed by ‘any com-
bination of wisdom or power on this earth’. Lawson did not allow his opposition
to Chamberlain to prevent him from serving his community: ‘What I thought of
Mr Chamberlain was one thing: the need for preparing shelters and succour for
the people among whom my life had been spent, was another thing.’108
The Munich Agreement did allow Britain more time to prepare. Between
September 1938 and September 1939, the country became more united; the
Labour Party accepted rearmament; appeasement was discredited; the dominions
became more likely to assist Britain, and defences were strengthened. Fighter
aircraft and radar stations, in particular, helped to preserve Britain from inva-
sion in the early part of the war. On the other hand, in the same twelve months
the German army doubled in size, Czechoslovakia was lost, all chance of Soviet
assistance was forfeited, French morale was undermined, and the reputations of
Britain and France suffered all over the world.109
Britain and France lacked the will to fight Germany in 1938. By September
1939 the French were stronger militarily, but there were political divisions and
economic problems.110 It is not easy to see any great improvement in Britain’s
military position relative to Germany’s in 1938–39, a year during which Germany
spent five times more than Britain did on defence. Even radar was not effective
until after the war started. Indeed, Britain was stronger militarily in 1940 than
in 1939. It is true that the British were unprepared for war in 1938, but it does
not follow that they were at a bigger disadvantage then than they were in 1939,
when Germany was also better armed and no longer had to worry about an
attack from the east.111 The idea that September 1938 was a lost opportunity is
not very sound. Perhaps March 1936, when Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland,
better fits the bill. Germany was certainly more beatable in 1936 than in 1938 or
1939. Again, though, the probable outcome of war in 1936 is open to debate, as
is the outcome of war in 1938.112
The pros and cons of Munich, and of Chamberlain’s policy as a whole, will
continue to be contested. In the 1940s Chamberlain was strongly condemned, but
he was also defended, and in the 1960s there were both negative and sympathetic
treatments.113 Attempts were made thereafter to validate what Chamberlain did.
The idea that he was weak and naïve was rejected; appeasement was presented as
the best available policy and one that was realistic and had popular support. The
prime minister, it was argued, knew that Britain needed time to rearm. Britain’s
strategic situation was worse than it had been in 1914, and, according to this
interpretation, Chamberlain should not be reproached for trying to prevent
war and then to postpone it when it became more likely.114 As chancellor of the
exchequer he had realized that Britain’s resources had to be husbanded carefully,
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 25

and he was also aware of the impact of the First World War and Great Depression
and of the British public’s aversion to high taxes and rearmament. The longer war
was delayed, the better chance Britain had of surviving it.115 Recent biographers
of Chamberlain admit to his arrogance and impatience, but a plea is also made
that it would have been beyond anyone (not only Chamberlain) to advance
Britain more quickly towards war readiness.116
The revised, kinder assessment of Chamberlain’s appeasement does not
enjoy universal approval. In negative accounts, much is made of the pitfalls of
personal diplomacy and of Chamberlain’s inability to avoid them. He was too
quick to rule out other options, it is thought, and erroneously presumed that he
alone could remedy international problems.117 Despite a growing appreciation
of the political, economic and imperial problems and the cultural influences
that shaped the thinking of Chamberlain and his colleagues, it is suggested that
personality and individual choice cannot be discounted and that blame should
not be removed from Chamberlain and placed elsewhere. Another claim is that
Chamberlain engaged in misrepresentation and manipulation, controlling the
public relations side of foreign policy and making it seem that government and
nation were more solidly behind appeasement than they really were.118
Before he became prime minister, appeasement was on firmer ground and
had more support. Its priority was to keep the peace by addressing genuine
German grievances. Under Chamberlain, however, appeasement became more
of a personal crusade, and he persisted with it after many in government, parlia-
ment and the nation had turned against it. He believed it was working. Though
not weak or foolish, he deceived himself. The desire for stability was not in itself
discreditable, but the premise here is that it would have been possible to stop
Hitler had British policy been different.119
Since it is difficult to tell whether alternative options were viable, we cannot be
certain that they would have worked, which also means that we cannot be certain
that Chamberlain’s policy, in the circumstances of the time, was incorrect. Any
British prime minister would have faced the same problem that Chamberlain
did: how to preserve Britain’s global interests at a time when resources were
already overstretched.120 It is important also to remember that responsibility
for what happened in 1938–39 was not Chamberlain’s alone. In government and
society it was a fundamental precept that war must be avoided, for war would
mean economic ruin and the break-up of the empire. It was difficult to think
differently.121
Appeasement failed because Nazi foreign policy was assertive and destabilizing,
but this failure does not automatically mean that appeasement was unrealistic.
It only became so later on, in 1938–39, when the Hitler regime proved itself to
be bent on aggrandizement through military aggression. No settlement with the
Nazis was possible. In the course of international relations, though, it has to be
26 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

admitted that this was an unusual situation. The normal assumption was that
agreements were possible. While this assumption remained intact, appeasement
had necessity, morality and expediency to recommend it. Once it became obvious
that appeasement would not work, thoughts turned to its abandonment, but it
was not unreasonable to try to salvage something first.122
After the outbreak of war there were calls for Britain to make an early peace
with Germany. Churchill became prime minister in May 1940. Some historians
have emphasized his failure to ensure Britain’s survival as an independent world
power. They think he could have negotiated an end to the fighting, or fought a
limited war so as to avoid the exhaustion of Britain’s resources. As it turned out,
declaring for total victory committed the nation to a conflict that cost more than
Britain could afford to pay. Victory may have had noble connotations, but with
it came the end of Britain’s role and status in the world.123
Privately, Churchill did consider a negotiated peace with Germany. In public,
however, he appeared resilient, which was essential if he was to bolster the
national spirit. Unconditional surrender did not become a war aim until 1943,
when the Americans and Soviets as well as the British were fighting against
Germany. In 1940 it would have been impossible for Britain alone to win total
victory.124 Negative assessments of Churchill’s war leadership are outnumbered
by more favourable accounts, although these often allow Churchill’s own version
of events to determine the interpretative agenda.125
The ramifications of a long and exhausting war in terms of Britain’s control
over its empire are also important here, for an early peace with Germany
might have allowed Britain to defend key possessions in Asia, which fell to the
Japanese.126 Military defeat at the hands of Japan weakened Britain’s authority
when the colonies were regained after the war. On the other hand, it is not clear
that British reinforcements could have been transferred from Europe to Asia
in sufficient numbers, and post-war independence movements in the empire
had wider foundations than simply the previous territorial expansion of Japan.
Britain’s future international role would also be significantly affected by the
massive expansion of American and Soviet power in the 1940s.127
During and after the Second World War there was a shift in focus, for the main
threat to the security of Britain and the empire was seen to be the Soviet Union
rather than Germany, and debates in London about deterrence, Europe and
future strategy were increasingly shaped by assumptions about Stalin’s designs.
In some ways this marked a reversion to tradition. Before the 1910s Russia had
been regarded as Britain’s most dangerous geopolitical rival.128
As the world’s leading power at the end of the nineteenth century, Britain
wanted stability. Major change in international relations and the reorientation of
political and economic networks across the globe were bound to inconvenience
Britain: as top nation, the only way was down. To maintain the established order
 T H E E R A O F T H E T W O W O R L D WA R S 27

was to ensure continued primacy, but wars tend to be motors of change, and this
is certainly true of the conflicts of 1914–18 and 1939–45. Though Britain did not
lose these wars, it did lose its ascendancy. The governments of the late nineteenth
century knew that wars could happen. Much thought was given to such questions
as how to win wars when they could not be avoided, and how to make sure that
the changes wrought by war did not damage Britain’s economic and military
strength in the long term. By 1945 Britain’s future as a world power was at stake,
but Churchill appeared confident – and not without reason. Each of the ‘three
circles’ offered Britain the scope and opportunity to exercise influence, maintain
status and so shape power relationships as to demonstrate continued independ-
ence, initiative and importance. As a contingent and relative quality, however,
there could be no guarantee that Britain’s power would not decrease. Indeed, it
was clear by 1945 that in some parts of the world, Britain would need the help of
allies, especially the United States. Uneven patterns of economic progress and the
reconfiguration of international politics between the late nineteenth century and
the mid-twentieth century, accelerated and accentuated by wars, greatly affected
the economic basis of British power and relationships within the empire. Yet
recovery was expected, and substantially achieved within five years of the end of
the Second World War. Then events intruded and challenges arose to cast doubt
on the long-term viability of the global role.
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 2

Post-war Adjustments

On 19 February 1947, British foreign secretary Ernest Bevin instructed Lord

Inverchapel, Britain’s ambassador in Washington DC, to inform the US state
department that, owing to financial constraints, Britain could no longer sup-
port Greece and Turkey against communist insurgency and external pressure.
The Americans would have to step in and take over. This was a turning point in
post-war history. Bevin’s success in persuading the United States to commit itself
to security arrangements in Europe was regarded at the time and afterwards as a
notable accomplishment, but was it a sign of British influence and ingenuity, or
of failure and weakness? The desire to obtain American support did not mean
that Britain was no longer a great power. London was able to provide for the
security of Britain, the empire and a range of global interests, and to promote
a European settlement after the Second World War, pursuing these ends both
independently and in league with others. In Europe and beyond Britain played a
leading role in post-war international relations, but economic problems imposed
limitations, as did the need to work with allies. The British had to reassess aims
and methods because they could not afford not to, but in the circumstances they
did well. Prestige and influence were sustained.
This was a period in which the international order was rapidly changing. The
disruption wrought by the Second World War necessitated adjustments on the
part of all the great powers. The desire for peace and co-operation had led to the
establishment of the United Nations on 24 October 1945, but the existence of the
UN did not mean that the post-war years were free of tension.
In the historiography of the Cold War, most attention is paid to the United
States and the USSR, though the focus is often on Europe, where the distinc-
tion between rival political and economic systems became most pronounced.
Europe was the front line.1 Some historians are of the opinion that Britain shares
responsibility for the beginning of the Cold War, and this concentration on the
actions of Britain (and other states) has drawn attention away from the USA
and USSR and given rise to a more ‘de-polarized’ framework.2 British leaders
regarded the USSR as dangerous before the Americans did, and although the
Cold War developed into a mainly US–Soviet contest, Britain influenced its
course. Sometimes the British even prompted actions in the West before the
purposes of the Soviet Union had been properly assessed. Anti-Soviet attitudes
30 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

in the foreign office and the continuation of imperial concerns meant that the
Cold War carried forward an already established enmity.3
Britain’s imperial agenda was one of the causes of the Cold War. By 1945
the need to protect the empire had fostered the belief that Britain must have a
say in what happened across Europe as well as in Asia, Africa and the Middle
East. Britain had also to take into account American hostility towards British
imperialism, as well as US opposition to Soviet aggrandizement. There could
be no bargain with Stalin, even if he insisted that he would be satisfied with a
security buffer in Eastern Europe and would not meddle in Britain’s spheres of
influence. Although the British had less influence than the United States and
the USSR in the post-war world, they still had the potential to exercise power,
especially through the empire, a global system upon which Britain could base its
effort to regain equal status with the Americans and Soviets.4
The two superpowers could not ignore Britain. It is true that the Second
World War had stretched Britain to the limit and that the military and economic
resources needed to compete with the USA and USSR were not available, but
past successes, trade, empire and high levels of defence spending gave the British
a prominence in the world, and a sense of autonomy, that their real strength
probably did not merit.5
In Britain, before and after the Second World War, the USSR was thought to
represent an ideological, military, imperial and power-political threat.6 During
the war Churchill, who held the premiership until July 1945, knew that the
Soviets’ co-operation was necessary, but he hoped to prevent the formation of a
closed Soviet bloc after the war. On this point he tried hard to win over the US
president, Roosevelt, whose attitude was more equivocal.7 Mistrust of Britain
increased during 1944–45 in the US Congress and press, where it was claimed
that the British would not repay their war debts and that their goal was to trick
the United States into sustaining Britain’s international position.8
At the Yalta conference early in 1945, Roosevelt sought to reassure the Soviets
that the United States and Britain were not acting together against them. In
return for the promise that American troops would leave Europe within two
years, Stalin agreed that Poland and other parts of occupied Eastern Europe could
choose their own forms of government.9 It soon emerged that Stalin would not
stick to this. Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov admitted as much in
March 1945. Roosevelt died in April. Instead of waiting until American troops
had left Europe, and allowing British and American suspicions to decrease, the
Soviets began to tighten their grip in Eastern Europe.10
Roosevelt’s successor as president was Harry Truman, who declared that Stalin
must abide by the Yalta agreements. Even so, the new president did not wish to
annoy the Soviets, believing that their military help was still needed in Europe
and against Japan. Truman later admitted that he had been too hasty in rejecting
 P O S T - WA R A D J U S T M E N T S 31

Churchill’s advice, and Churchill regretted that he had not gone to America to
meet Truman immediately after Roosevelt’s death.11
Germany surrendered in May 1945, and in July a Labour government took
office in Britain. If there were great expectations at home for reform and
improvement, the Cold War meant that changes in policy would not be so dra-
matic abroad. The new prime minister, Clement Attlee, and the foreign secretary,
Bevin, shared Churchill’s concern about the Soviets.
As one of the victorious allies, Britain shared in the occupation of Germany,
and, despite emerging weakened from the war, Britain was incontestably the
strongest regional state, spending more on defence in 1948 than all the other
European countries combined. Political leaders, whether Conservative or Labour,
saw Britain as a global power. Europe was important, but British interests were
not confined to Europe.12 Since the Soviets appeared to be intent on undermin-
ing not only European security but also the British empire, there was no option
but for British forces to remain stationed all over the world, whatever the drain
on resources. In December 1947 Bevin suggested to the US secretary of state
(1947–49) George Marshall that there should be an English-speaking alliance to
counter the Soviets everywhere, and Bevin began negotiating along these lines
with Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
Stalin did not see Britain and America as inevitable partners. The Truman
administration’s abrupt ending of lend-lease, by which the Americans had pro-
vided aid to their wartime allies, was taken by the Soviets as a sign of American
ruthlessness and was certainly a serious blow to Britain.13 Ill feeling between
Britain and the United States increased in 1945 and 1946.
Britain sought enhanced security for the empire and for Europe, and US help
in achieving this. Attlee wished to balance continental commitments with the
preservation of the empire. This meant refusing to commit substantial forces
to Europe unless the obligation was shared by the United States. Bevin agreed.
He wanted to show that Britain could be a reliable ally to America and to use
this position to influence US policy. He was a tough negotiator. ‘He talks a bit,
rather rambling and portentous’, noted the under-secretary of state for foreign
affairs, Christopher Mayhew; ‘I don’t think he’s got at all a disciplined mind. It’s
all shrewdness, experience and personality.’ The anti-communist Bevin disliked
the Soviet regime and decided that British interests would not be served if he
tried to hold a balance between the two superpowers, or play them off against
each other. He saw stability in Europe as the basis for lasting peace throughout
the world. Therefore it was vital to persuade the Americans not to withdraw from
European affairs.14
The Truman administration and US armed service chiefs were initially reluc-
tant to commit. It looked as if there would be no special favours for Britain. Not
only had lend-lease been ended as soon as Japan surrendered in August 1945, but
32 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

the McMahon Act of 1946 ended atomic co-operation with Britain. Although
British forces had helped to defeat Japan, moreover, the Americans directed occu-
pation policy and the restoration of the Japanese economy had implications for
Britain’s own economic prospects.15 Meanwhile the Soviets continued to interfere
in Poland, the Balkans and central Asia, and to make demands about the future of
Germany and Europe. Stalin had already made gains, particularly on occupation
zones in Germany, at the ‘Big Three’ conferences in Teheran (November 1943),
Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July 1945), and these offered a foundation
on which to build.16 British disappointment about American policy deepened.
Instead of demonizing British imperialism, it was thought, America should be
doing something about Soviet expansionism. There was consternation at the
rapid demobilization of US forces.17
Before his death, Roosevelt had decided to join with Britain in confronting
Stalin. Truman and his advisers reversed this plan, preferring a more independent
line. Until 1947 the US government chose not to challenge Stalin directly on such
matters as democratic elections across Eastern Europe. This frustrated Bevin,
who wanted Anglo-American co-operation against the Soviet Union. Bevin was
also hindered by Britain’s need for financial aid. Washington DC was ready to
provide funds, but not to the extent that Britain desired, and American leaders
saw an opportunity to weaken Britain’s empire and British trade. Some accused
the British of exaggerating their problems and insisted that Britain with its
colonies must not be allowed to rise and challenge the United States economi-
cally. A loan of $3.75 billion was agreed in December 1945, but the Americans
charged commercial rates (2 per cent interest over fifty years). They also argued
that Britain should abandon imperial preference, yet retained their own high
tariffs to protect US industries.18
Anglo-American relations further deteriorated as Britain was excluded from
the USA’s treaty with Nationalist China in November 1946, as the Americans
exploited Britain’s withdrawal from India in 1947 with a massive expansion
in US exports to the former British possession, and as Britain tried in vain to
gain US assistance in the eastern Mediterranean and Palestine. A civil war was
raging in Greece, with British forces assisting the Greek government against
communist rebels, while in Palestine, which Britain held as a UN mandate after
1945, there was violent conflict between Jews and Arabs. Britain decided to give
up this mandate in 1947, and partition was agreed for 1948. London’s pleas for
US help were rebuffed. Bevin favoured the establishment of a single, bi-national
Palestinian state. When circumstances ruled this out, his main concern was that
the British should not lose Arab friendship. He also feared an increase in Soviet
influence in the Middle East. But the Palestinian crisis was costing Britain £40
million a year by 1947 and was tying down 10 per cent of Britain’s armed forces.
Withdrawal was unavoidable.19
 P O S T - WA R A D J U S T M E N T S 33

Christopher Mayhew thought that the British were undone by the actions of
others, so that it became impossible to keep order in Palestine while trying to
fulfil the pledges made in the Balfour Declaration of 1917: that is, promoting the
establishment of a Jewish state while safeguarding the interests of the indigenous
population. The Americans and Soviets both supported partition at the UN,
probably because each hoped to replace Britain as the leading power in the
Middle East.20
Britain still had worldwide commitments, and the strain of these prompted
Attlee’s government to look for ways to save money. The prime minister, treasury
and board of trade recommended a rapid scaling down of overseas activity, but
Bevin and the foreign office, and the chiefs of staff, warned that the Soviets would
move into areas evacuated by Britain. Keeping imperial communications open,
protecting investments and Britain’s oil supply, defending free peoples against
communism and Soviet aggrandizement, upholding British prestige and influ-
ence in the world: these and other needs had to be weighed carefully in order
to make best use of the money and manpower available. The withdrawal from
Palestine was difficult to accept. Might Britain not be pushed out of the Middle
East altogether, and the empire cut in half? The chiefs of staff laid particular stress
on air bases in the Middle East, which were within striking distance of Soviet oil
fields and industrial centres.21
Unfortunately for Britain, extreme nationalism was developing in the Middle
East and its leaders and beneficiaries were not in the mood for negotiation.
Bevin’s plans for regional economic development had little impact: Britain lacked
the funds to make them work and most Arab leaders were so annoyed by what
was happening in Palestine that they rejected proposals for a new Anglo-Arab
understanding. Nationalism placed the ruling élites under pressure, as did
religious militancy and fears about the spread of communism. For domestic
reasons, some Arab rulers had to turn against Britain.22
In London, considerations of world status possibly mattered more than the
perceived need to protect the Middle East or remain within striking distance of
the USSR, although it is true that Egypt assumed a new strategic importance to
Britain in the early Cold War. Britain was determined to maintain air bases in
Egypt, and the Americans approved, despite their suspicions of British imperial-
ism.23 Then again, was the intention really to deter the USSR? Perhaps policy was
only presented this way in order to build consensus at home and win US support
for Britain’s imperial objectives. The government did not wish to abandon too
many commitments too quickly. There was an enduring belief in Britain’s great-
power status: hence the successful resistance to Attlee’s notion of abandoning the
Middle East and holding instead to a defensive line across Africa from Nigeria
to Kenya.24 There was still a determination to remain strong in the Middle East
and to exclude others, the Americans as well as the Soviets.
34 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

While Attlee hoped that the Soviet Union would negotiate, and Bevin and
the chiefs of staff opposed radical retrenchments in the belief that these would
erode influence, nobody could deny that Britain’s global position was weaker
than before. Concern about the Middle East was matched by concern about Asia.
Japanese victories in the war had a huge impact on Asians, for the European
colonial powers lost their image of superiority. India gained its independence in
1947. Though it joined the Commonwealth, the loss of the Indian army depleted
the manpower Britain required to defend the empire. Other former colonies did
not join the Commonwealth, notably Burma.25
The link between metropolis and colonies was changing, but decolonization
was not the straightforward result of any one factor. Britain’s effort to remain a
global power ruled out a hasty retreat from empire. Rather, there was a careful
reordering of relationships, and in many places this went according to plan.26
The dilemmas of empire were not unique to Britain, but they brought into
sharper relief the need to reassess military and financial capabilities and manage
commitments accordingly.
In Europe there were ongoing anxieties. Cold War mentality developed quickly
before, during and after the Potsdam conference. The Soviets had refused to give
way on many issues, and the British and Americans hoped that agreements on
these could be worked out later as part of a full peace settlement. At this stage they
still wanted to preserve ‘Big Three’ co-operation. During 1945 the Soviets were
willing to talk. They wanted security guarantees and US economic assistance, but
by February 1946 Stalin was suggesting that nothing much could be gained by
compromising with the capitalist West.27
European recovery was retarded and tension increased. Stalin’s demand
for an enlarged Poland had implications for Germany. Although London and
Washington DC decided that hindering Germany’s economic recovery would be
disastrous for the rest of Europe, there was also a desire to avoid a final breach
with Stalin, and some policy makers in Britain and the United States were more
worried about German revival than about Soviet expansion. There was much
discussion about how to penalize Germany. Occupation zones had been agreed
at Yalta but disputes arose with the Soviets on reparations and the most suitable
system of government for post-war Germany.28
Moscow wanted maximum reparations from Germany and wished to prevent
the incorporation of Germany into a military-economic bloc led by America.29
The reparations issue was never settled. US secretary of state (1945–47) James
Byrnes suggested that a deal could be postponed. In the meantime, the occupying
powers would use resources from their own zones and the western zones would
send industrial material into the Soviet zone in return for food. Despite discus-
sions over following years, no progress was made.30
Alec Cairncross, head of the Economics Advisory Council in Berlin in 1945 and
 P O S T - WA R A D J U S T M E N T S 35

subsequently an adviser to the British government, later argued that the occupy-
ing powers ought to have made separate arrangements because the attempt to find
common ground merely increased rancour. London and Washington DC were
moved by German protests. The British and Americans wanted, in time, to make
Germany self-supporting and this was not compatible with heavy reparations
demands. The French made difficulties. They wanted to strengthen themselves
and weaken Germany. The Soviets preferred centralization and a command
economy, with an opportunity for German communists led by Walter Ulbricht
to dominate, while the United States and Britain wanted a federal system and free
enterprise. In the summer of 1946 the British, Americans and French stopped
sending reparations to the Soviets and arranged for the economic union of their
three zones. In September Truman announced that US forces would remain in
Germany until stability was assured.31
European co-operation was widely regarded as the most promising basis for a
new post-war order. American leaders were in favour of this because they wanted
Europeans to be self-reliant, so that US involvement could be reduced. In contem-
plating European unity, the British wanted limited collective agreements with no
loss of independent action. To Bevin, and to the senior Conservatives Churchill
and Eden, Britain was still a world power. Co-operation with the Europeans was
appropriate, but it was not the priority. Bevin’s main goal remained unchanged:
binding the Americans to Europe.32
As Bevin told the House of Commons in February 1947, Anglo-American
friendship was an end in itself, but it was also part of the bigger picture. Without
it, what hope could there be of restoring economies and establishing peace and
security in Europe? A reinvigorated West would discourage the Soviets from tak-
ing risks, Bevin thought; but if the West appeared weak and divided, the Soviets
would seek to control all of Europe.33
The fact that Washington DC was exhibiting greater unease about Stalin’s
plans led Bevin to contemplate a firmer Anglo-American alliance, based on
history, ideals and strategy. The American attitude was more pragmatic: the key
was to decide how useful Britain could be. Soviet leaders, though they knew that
the Americans were more powerful than the British, regarded Britain as the more
astute and so the more implacable enemy.34
For a time Bevin’s policy was not overtly or automatically anti-Soviet. There
were serious disagreements between London and Washington DC and it still
seemed possible to create an independent British-led ‘third force’ in world affairs
that would be the equal of the United States and USSR. As events unfolded,
however, Bevin abandoned all hope of a deal with Stalin, and in the foreign office
it became axiomatic that the Soviet Union was intent on ascendancy.35
Churchill’s ‘iron curtain’ speech, delivered in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March
1946, reinforced opinions that were already taking shape. Seeking to alarm the
36 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

Americans and threaten Moscow, Churchill reiterated earlier points about the
Soviet menace and spoke of a divided Europe, whereupon Bevin stepped up
his efforts to make the Americans realize that they had to be more proactive if
they wanted security for themselves and their friends. Coincidentally, some of
Truman’s advisers had been recommending a more assertive attitude, notably
George Kennan, head of the policy planning staff at the US state department.
This set the scene for the exchanges of February 1947, when the British informed
Washington DC that they could no longer combat communist pressure in Greece
and Turkey.36
Within the British government there had been arguments about defence
expenditure. Chancellor of the exchequer Hugh Dalton led the demand for cuts,
and although Attlee decided not to go as far as Dalton wanted, some activities
had to be dropped in order for others to continue. Withdrawal from Greece did
not mean that the British presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East
would cease. Moreover, the decisions of early 1947 about Greece and Turkey, and
about Palestine and India, were taken before ministers knew the full extent of
Britain’s financial problems, which suggests that imperial strategy – and not just
retrenchment – affected their thinking.37
Attlee still envisaged a settlement with Stalin after Bevin had decided it was
impossible. This added to the pressure on Bevin, who was already worried about
Palestine and India. He complained that the prime minister and others in the
government and Labour Party did not appreciate what was at stake in Greece
and Turkey. A communist Greece would transform the regional situation, and
British withdrawal might damage Anglo-American relations.38 Bevin and the
chiefs of staff objected to the ending of aid to Greece and Turkey, but with Dalton
warning about the costs, and Attlee unconvinced that vital British interests were
at stake, Bevin accepted that economic assistance should cease. He expected
British support for the Greek army to continue in some form. The Americans
were surprised by the British message of February 1947, but the state department
decided to use it to rally Congress and the American people behind a more active
policy. Truman now favoured such a course, as did the heads of key government
departments, the joint chiefs of staff, and US ambassadors in Athens, Moscow
and elsewhere.39
Willingness to act, however, did not mean that the Truman administration was
pleased about Britain’s message. Some US officials objected that the problem had
been dumped on them. Some took the British intention to withdraw from Greece
and Turkey as proof of the impending disintegration of Britain’s empire. British
leaders did not see it this way. Specifically, there was no question of leaving the
Middle East, or of inviting America in. Far from being on the point of collapse,
it was thought, the empire would be strengthened by a reallocation of resources.
In later years, as expected, the Americans found that sustaining British power in
 P O S T - WA R A D J U S T M E N T S 37

specific regions was an expedient way of waging the Cold War.40

This lay in the future. In the early weeks of 1947 the main concern of the
British government was to manage a limited disengagement in a way that would
save money and satisfy the Labour Party, parliament and public opinion. At
the same time, it had to be accomplished in a manner that did not lead other
governments to think of Britain as a spent force. Clearly, disengagement would
be much easier with American help. As The Times noted: ‘The old complaint that
British chestnuts are being pulled out of the fire will be heard again, to which the
response that they are as much American as British in the world of today may lack
effectiveness.’ In the event, Britain could rely on the growing American realization
that Soviet expansion had to be checked and that Britain was an indispensable
ally in this endeavour.41
In an address to Congress on 12 March 1947, Truman announced that the United
States would assist free peoples to resist armed minorities and outside pressure.
This was the basis of the Truman Doctrine. It involved a guarantee of military
and diplomatic support for America’s friends and a clear warning to America’s
foes. The situation in Europe was its essential context, for purges and trials across
Eastern Europe indicated that the Soviets were taking firmer control.42
Whether it was the product of genuine fear or of political and territorial
ambition, Soviet intransigence had pushed the United States and Britain closer
together.43 American resolve was further demonstrated by the 1947 Defence
Act, which created a combined department of defence to co-ordinate military
organization, and the establishment of the National Security Council and Central
Intelligence Agency.44 The US commitment to Europe was formalized by collec-
tive security arrangements of 1947 to 1949. The Truman Doctrine was just the
beginning. American personnel and $400 million in aid were made available for
Greece and Turkey. This period saw the end of US isolation and the adoption (at
least in official circles) of containment and the ‘domino theory’: the idea that if
one state fell to communism, others in the vicinity would follow.45
It was not inevitable that Truman’s speech of 12 March 1947 would give life
to a global anti-communist effort.46 Yet the controversy surrounding it in the
United States indicates that many people thought he had gone too far. Truman’s
critics claimed that he was commencing an ideological crusade and destroying
all hope of agreement with the Soviets. Perhaps he was: the American response
to the British note of February 1947 owed a lot to deliberations that had already
taken place.47
In parliament, meanwhile, the Attlee government was pressed to explain
its position. On 5 March 1947 Christopher Mayhew confirmed that Anglo-
American discussions were taking place. On 13 March there were calls for a
full debate on Truman’s address to Congress, and on 17 March MPs demanded
information about the talks with the Americans. Hector McNeil, minister of
38 B R I TA I N A N D T H E W O R L D I N T H E T W E N T I E T H C E N T U R Y

state at the foreign office, admitted that the British government had not been
informed beforehand about Truman’s address. Related issues would continue to
be pursued through the usual diplomatic channels, however, and McNeil said
that, as far as he knew, the Americans would provide aid with no strings attached.
Some MPs suggested that the Americans should be urged to reconsider, because
US involvement in Greece and Turkey would be ‘inflammatory’, but McNeil did
not accept this.48
Bevin was relieved that the Americans were responding to his appeal and that
Greece would be protected, but it would be wrong to assume that the Truman
administration had been tricked into taking a course it would not otherwise
have taken. For Britain, the pleasing outcome came as much by luck as by design.
British machinations should not be underestimated, though, for Bevin, Attlee
and their colleagues knew what they were doing, and they knew what they wanted
to happen. The Times saw far-reaching principles behind Truman’s offer of aid
to Greece and Turkey, argued that British exertions in Greece were now being
rewarded, and commended those American commentators who had decided
that American and British interests in the region were identical. The Manchester
Guardian hailed a ‘revolutionary change in US policy’.49
The gap between British and American thinking had closed as US-Soviet
relations worsened during 1946. Truman shared Britain’s desire to prevent a
communist triumph in Greece, though he had to be wary, if only for domestic
political reasons.50 The Truman Doctrine was partly but not solely a response to
Britain’s conduct. It was also a response to the actions of the USSR. Soviet policy
opened the way for closer collaboration between the United States and Britain.
Perhaps the Truman Doctrine gave the British more than they really desired.
The ideological aspects and worldwide implications of what Truman said were
unsettling because Britain’s interests were bound to be affected by an expansive
US foreign policy.
That 1947 marks a turning point is underlined by the events that followed
Truman’s speech. In May 1947 Dean Acheson, the US under-secretary of state,
spoke of long-term help for any people seeking to preserve its independence,
and on 5 June 1947 secretary of state George Marshall promised economic aid to
European governments if they made proposals for reconstruction. The Marshall
Plan was based on the premise that there could be no security without prosperity.
A related concern was that if recovery was delayed, communist parties would
attract support in Europe and Soviet influence would spread.51
The main point of Acheson’s speech of May 1947 was that American eco-
nomic muscle should be used abroad for political purposes. As for Marshall,
a difficult foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow in April 1947 had convinced
him that America should take the initiative in Europe. There was a slight hitch
when Christopher Mayhew responded to Soviet claims about British economic
 P O S T - WA R A D J U S T M E N T S 39

weakness by declaring that all was well, but the resulting controversy abated
once American legislators accepted that Soviet provocation had led Mayhew to
exaggerate.52
Marshall soon confirmed that the USSR was included in the offer of economic
aid. The US government wanted to present the plan as a collective effort, realizing
that it would be useful to emphasize concert and goodwill. As expected, the
Soviets refused to join in. Stalin had no wish for co-operation along the lines
Marshall had indicated, and would have preferred to keep Western Europe weak
and divided. Moscow condemned Marshall Aid and ordered satellite regimes
in Eastern Europe to stay out of the plan. Despite the USSR’s need for assist-
ance, Stalin decided that to join the Marshall Plan would be to fall into a trap.
Participation would reveal the true condition of the Soviet economy and make
the USSR dependent on the United States.53
The Marshall Plan encouraged the Soviets to strengthen their position in
Eastern Europe. They suspected that the United States, Britain and Germany would
form a revived capitalist system, and that Germany’s restored military-industrial
strength would be directed against the USSR. Poland and Czechoslovakia were
less hostile to the Marshall Plan and wanted to accept American help, but Stalin
could not allow their economies to be integrated with those of Western Europe.
There had to be a closed buffer zone between Germany and the USSR. The
solution was to impose more restrictions. Communists in Eastern Europe who
protested were removed from office; some were imprisoned. Cominform, the
Communist Information Bureau, was established in September 1947. It was
designed to bind the satellites together and also included the French and Italian
communist parties as members. Soviet thinking came to rest on the ‘two camp’
doctrine. The world was now divided into the imperialists led by America and
the anti-imperialists led by the USSR.54
The Marshall Plan convinced Moscow that the two camps were irreconcilable.
Stalin had tried to gain as much as he could within the wartime framework of co-
operation with Britain and the United States. This framework had disintegrated,
mainly because of the deadlock over Germany, and the Marshall Plan led Stalin to
think that his security agenda was in jeopardy. The consolidation of the eastern
bloc proceeded apace with mutual assistance treaties and then the establishment
of Comecon, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, in 1949. There was
some resistance to Soviet control, though, especially from the Yugoslavian leader
Josip Broz Tito.55
Integration in the eastern bloc was organized around the needs of the USSR,
and Moscow was quick to use repression when necessary. This was repeatedly
emphasized in the West, where there was considerable alarm after the Czech coup
of 1948, when communists seized power in a state with an established democratic
tradition, and when Cominform organized strikes in France and Italy to dissuade
Other documents randomly have
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The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Annual Report on the Health of
the Parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, during the year 1874
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at
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Title: The Annual Report on the Health of the Parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensington, during the year
1874

Author: T. Orme Dudfield

Release date: May 9, 2020 [eBook #62066]

Language: English

Credits: Transcribed from the 1875 J. Wakeham edition by David Price

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE ANNUAL REPORT ON THE HEALTH OF THE
PARISH OF ST. MARY ABBOTTS, KENSINGTON, DURING THE YEAR 1874 ***
Transcribed from the 1875 J. Wakeham edition by David Price, email [email protected]

THE ANNUAL REPORT

ON
THE HEALTH
OF THE
Parish of St. Mary Abbotts,
KENSINGTON,
DURING THE YEAR
1874.

BY
T. ORME DUDFIELD, M.D.,
MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH.

KENSINGTON:
J. Wakeham, Printer, 4, Bedford Terrace, Church Street.
1875.
 CONTENTS.

PAGE

Prefatory Remarks 5–13

Mortality, higher rate of, in 1874, accounted for 5
Death Rate, Metropolitan and Local 6
Kensington “Registration District”—what it comprises 6
„ Parish of, division into Wards 6
„ Town and Brompton “Sub-registration Districts,” contrast in the vital statistics of 7
Sexes, relative rate of mortality in the 7
Sub-districts, character of the prevalent fatal diseases in the 8
Kensington Town, greater fatality of Zymotic, Tubercular and Lung diseases in 9
Deaths, (whole Parish) numbers of, from classes and orders of diseases 9
Death Rate and Mean Temperature, monthly record of 10
Scarlet Fever, outbreaks of, supposed to depend on Contamination of Milk 10
Dysentery and Diarrhœa, supposed to be due to the use of the Milk of diseased Cows 11
Dairies, undesirable Multiplication of 13
Population 13
Males and Females, ages of, living at the Census, 1871 13
„ great disproportion in the relative numbers of 13
Parish, area of, density of Population, number of inhabited houses, &c. 14
„ growth of Population: increase in Rateable Value of Property 14
Marriages and Marriage-rate 14
Births and Birth-rate 15
Deaths and Death-rates of sexes and in Sub-districts 15
Death Rates at all Ages, the true method of calculating 17
„ Special causes of 17
Zymotic Diseases, deaths from 17
Measles, Epidemic of 18
Scarlet Fever 18
Puerperal Mortality 22
Public Institutions, Deaths in 24
Inquests, facts in relation to, requiring explanation 25
Deaths, “not certified” 28
Death, Certificates of the cause of, abuse of 29
Vaccination 30
Meteorology 30
Sanitary Work 31
Boiling offal for pigs’ food, nuisances from 31
Swine, convictions for keeping, on prohibited premises 32
Diseased Animal, conviction for allowing carcase of, in a Licensed Slaughter House 32
Diseased Animal in slaughter house, no offence under certain circumstances 33
Blood, Conviction for allowing offensive accumulation of, in a Licensed Slaughter House 33
Diseased Meat, seizure of 33
Iron Foundry, nuisance at an 33
Slaughter Houses 34
Cow Sheds 38
Bakehouses 39
Dust Removal 39
Water Storage, domestic 40
Mortuary 41
Disinfecting Chamber 42
Baths and Wash-houses 43
Sewer Ventilation 43
Water Supply 44
Gas 49
Mortality, weekly returns of, services of the Sub-district Registrars, in connection with the 51
Conclusion 51
Tables, Statistical (Appendix) 55
 NINETEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE

MEDICAL OFFICER OF HEALTH,

Being for the year 1874.

To the Vestry of the Parish of St. Mary Abbott’s, Kensington.

Gentlemen,
I propose in this, the Nineteenth Annual Report of the Medical Officer of Health, to follow the plan
adopted in my previous reports: that is to say, the vital statistics will be made up to the end of the
registration year (January 2nd, 1875), for the sake of comparison with the Registrar-General’s figures
for the entire Metropolis: the Tables, showing the sanitary work carried out by your very competent staff
of inspectors, will be made up to the end of the Vestry year (March 25th, 1875); while, with respect to
other matters calling for notice, I shall bring the report down to the latest possible period, no useful
purpose being served by delay; it being, moreover, in every way the better plan to refer to subjects
while they are tolerably fresh in recollection, and before they have lost their interest. I shall, as usual,
preface my report with some general remarks, which, I trust, will be found worthy of perusal. And I
may here mention that the first Six Tables in the Appendix are given in the form settled last year by the
Society of Medical Officers of Health, with a view to ensure uniformity in statistical returns. The subject
was brought under the notice of the Society by myself, and a great deal of thought and labour devoted
to it, in order to make the tables generally acceptable. I now pass on to observe that the public health
in this Parish, as gauged by the gross mortality, was not so good during the year 1874 as in the
previous year, the deaths registered (2,696) showing an increase of 260. The increase in the rate of
mortality, however, was not large in proportion, for as the population increased by 5,000, 91 deaths
have to be deducted on that account, while 32 deaths are accounted for by an increase in the number
of deaths of non-parishioners registered at the Brompton Hospital for Consumption and the Diseases of
the Chest. The real excess of mortality, therefore, was 137, and of these deaths 98 belong to the group
of zymotic diseases, and were due to a severe and prolonged epidemic of measles, leaving 39 deaths to
be spread over the remainder of Table 3 (Appendix); but as a matter of fact the higher rate of mortality
from chest diseases, which will be referred to hereafter, more than accounts for this number. If we
assume that the deaths of Kensington parishioners outside the parish were as numerous as the deaths
of non-parishioners at the Brompton Hospital, which is situated within the parish, the rate of mortality
during the year would be 19.5 per 1,000 persons living—a rate that compares not unfavourably with the
rate for the entire metropolis, which was 22.5 per 1000. If, however, in the absence of definite
information respecting deaths of parishioners taking place out of the parish, we restrict our view to the
deaths of parishioners registered within the parish—deducting 125 deaths at the hospital and 36 at St.
Joseph’s House—the rate of mortality was only 18.3 per 1,000. The subjoined table shows the rate in
the several great divisions of the metropolis, as given by the Registrar-General in his annual summary,
and in Kensington:—
DEATH RATE, 1874.

per 1,000
Kensington 19.5
 All London 22.5
West Districts 20.9
North 21.8
Central 25.6
East 25.4
South 21.5

For registration purposes, Kensington [6a] is divided into two sub-districts of very unequal size and
population, and which, as we shall see, are not less remarkable in other respects. The Kensington Town
sub-district embraces everything north of the Kensington main road, and a good deal south of it. The
Brompton sub-district completes the map of the parish, which, I may say, is exceedingly awkward in
shape, being very long from north to south and very narrow from east to west, and therefore present
considerable difficulties in the task of sanitary administrations. The Town sub-district comprises two
wards, respectively named the Ward of St. Mary Abbott’s, Kensington, and the Ward of St. John, Notting
Hill, and St. James, Norland. [6b] The latter ward contains the largest proportion of poor inhabitants.
The greater number of poor comprised in this sub-district, as a whole, helps to explain the marked
difference in the vital statistics of north and south, to which, I wish, in the present report, to give some
prominence. The birth-rate of the parish in 1874 was 31.7 per 1,000 persons living, that of all London
being 35.7, and of All England (1872) 35.8. But the birth-rate in the Town district was 33.6, and in
Brompton only 24.8 per 1,000. The death-rate of the whole parish being taken at 19.5 per 1,000 (and
the necessary redistribution of deaths in hospital and workhouse, in proportion to population, being
made), it appears that the annual rate of mortality in the Town sub-district was 20.4 per 1,000 and in
Brompton only 16.6. The above facts may be made more clear by a comparative statement. If the
births and deaths in Brompton had been as numerous in proportion to population as they were in the
Town sub-district, 1,122 children would have been born and 681 persons would have died; whereas, in
fact, only 815 children were born, and the deaths, after correction, were only 548. Or, to put it the
other way, if the births and deaths in the Town sub-district had been on the Brompton scale only 2,567
instead of 3,536 children would have been born, and only 1,726 persons, in place of 2,147, would have
died. These remarkable discrepancies, quoad the birth-rate, may be in part explained by the somewhat
larger proportion of females per 1,000 of the population in the Town sub-district compared with
Brompton. The total estimated population in July was 138,000, viz., males 56,240, and females
81,760. In every 1,000 living, females were approximatively as 593 to males 407. In the Town sub-
district there were, at the census in 1871, 587 females to 413 males; in Brompton the females were 608
and the males 392 per 1,000 persons living. We must assume, therefore, that there are fewer
marriages in Brompton, and that those marriages are less fruitful than in the more densely-populated
and poorer northern section of the parish. [7]
Less difficulty is experienced in accounting for the lower rate of mortality in Brompton, it being well
known that the death-rate of females is considerably less than that of the male sex. Taking the whole
parish, it appears that the rate of mortality was 23.9 in the male, and only 16.5 per 1,000 in the female
sex. The magnitude of this difference may be illustrated by the statement that if the mortality in the
entire population had been at the female rate, the deaths would have numbered only 2,208 instead of
2,696, while they would have been no fewer than 3,298 at the rate that prevailed amongst males.
The difference between the two districts is not confined merely to gross numbers of deaths. It is seen
in the character of the prevalent fatal diseases, and points to a generally better state of health in
Brompton, and to a better prospect of life for its inhabitants. This difference depends, no doubt, on the
superior status of a large proportion of the population in the latter district, and on their possession of
those necessaries and comforts of life to which the prolongation of existence is so largely due. I do not
propose to enter at length upon this interesting subject now. I shall content myself for the present with
putting on record the facts at which I have arrived, leaving them for the most part, to speak for
themselves. The subjoined table shows the number of deaths from certain diseases in the two sub-
districts, and the number that would have occurred in the Town sub-district had the mortality been on
the same scale as in Brompton, due regard being had to population:—

Name of Disease Actual No. of Deaths in the Calculated No. of Excess or Deficiency in
Deaths in the Brompton Sub- Deaths in Town on the Town compared with
Town Sub-District. District. Brompton scale Brompton.
The Seven principal 332 66 176 + 156
Zymotic Diseases
Measles 115 6 20 + 95
Diphtheria 24 2 6 + 18
Scarlet Fever 28 4 12 + 16
Typhus Fever 9 0 0 +9
Enteric Fever 19 9 28 -9
Simple Continued 11 4 13 -2
Fever
Hooping Cough 36 9 28 +8
Diarrhœa 90 22 69 + 21
Puerperal Fever 18 6 19 -1
Croup 25 1 3 + 22
Erysipelas 14 8 25 - 11
Cancer 51 16 50 +1
Tuberculous 268 59 186 + 82
Diseases (phthisis,
scrofula, &c.)
Brain Disease, 127 46 144 - 17
(Apoplexy and
paralysis)
Convulsions 50 9 28 + 22
Heart Disease 102 33 103 -1
Lung Diseases 461 93 292 + 169
Enteritis and 34 5 16 + 18
Peritonitis
Liver Disease 30 7 22 +8
Bright’s Disease 14 8 25 - 11
Atrophy of children 143 20 63 + 80
Premature birth 35 11 34 +1
Childbirth 11 3 9 +2
Teething 26 9 28 -2
Old age 79 15 47 + 32

The greater fatality of the zymotic diseases generally, and of measles in particular, in the Town sub-
district, cannot fail to be noticed; as well as the high mortality from tuberculous and lung diseases,
atrophy of children, croup, &c. It is obvious, in fact, that the diseases which depend on a lowered
condition of vitality, or on hereditary taint, are more prevalent in the Town sub-district than in
Brompton. So are the diseases that may be correctly described as of a more or less preventable
character, such, for example, as the lung diseases which are so fatal at the extremes of life, when the
influences of neglect and poverty, on the one hand, and of care and comfort on the other, are so strong
for evil or for good in the exposure of young and old to, or their preservation from, the predisposing
causes of disease. The diseases which mark the later periods of life are, as might be expected,
prominently noticeable in the Brompton mortality, such, for instance, as the brain diseases, apoplexy
and paralysis, and heart disease. Cancer was equally fatal in both districts. Croup, on the other hand,
was most fatal in the “Town,” and Bright’s disease, by comparison, in Brompton. I say nothing on the
relative numbers of deaths attributed to “old age,” as the employment of that term generally implies
failure of diagnosis rather than death without disease.
Under the heads of the various diseases, and in Tables 3 and 3a (Appendix), I have specified in detail
the causes of death; but in these introductory general remarks it will not be out of place to refer to the
mortality in the parish as a whole from some of the principal classes and orders of diseases. Thus the
seven principal diseases of the zymotic class (or rather six, for there was no death from small-pox) were
accountable for 388 deaths—a mortality equivalent to 2.8 per 1,000 persons living, and to 144 out of
every 1,000 deaths. Chest diseases, other than phthisis, killed 554 persons (an increase of 71 over
1873), equivalent to 4 per 1,000 of the population, and to 208 per 1,000 deaths. Tuberculous diseases
(including phthisis, scrofula, rickets, and tabes) were the causes of 326 deaths, or 2.3 per 1,000 living,
and 121 per 1,000 deaths. Nearly allied to these diseases, if not identical in origin, are the wasting
diseases of children, viz., those registered as marasmus, atrophy, debility, want of breast milk, and
premature birth. These killed 209 children under five years of age, equal to 1.5 per 1,000 living, and to
77 per 1,000 deaths. The convulsive diseases of infants (hydrocephalus, infantile meningitis,
convulsions, and teething) were fatal to 161 infants under five, or 1.1 per 1,000 living, and 59 per 1,000
deaths (vide Table 4, Appendix). Constitutional diseases caused 591 deaths = 4.2 per 1,000 living, and
232 per 1,000 deaths. Local diseases caused 1,143 deaths = 8.3 per 1,000 living, and 434 per 1,000
deaths. Developmental diseases caused 356 deaths = 2.5 per 1,000 living, and 138 per 1,000 deaths.
Violent deaths (50) were equal to .3 per 1,000 living and to 18 per 1,000 deaths. The deaths of which
the causes were not specified, or were ill-defined, were 22 in number = .1 per 1,000 of the population
and 7 per 1,000 deaths.
The subjoined table shows the death-rate in the parish for 13 periods of four weeks corresponding to
my monthly reports, the deaths of non-parishioners in the Brompton Hospital being excluded:—

Date of Report. Rate of Mortality Mean temperature

Four weeks ended per 1,000 living. of the air.
January 31 19.8 41.6
February 28 23.2 38.7
March 28 22.0 43.0
April 25 16.8 49.5
May 23 16.8 48.2
June 20 14.1 58.4
July 18 17.5 62.8
August 15 19.9 61.1
September 12 14.7 59.4
October 10 13.7 55.3
November 7 15.3 51.6
 December 5 21.4 39.1
January 2 (1875) 24.7 32.7
Average 18.4

Before concluding these general and prefatory remarks, I think it right to say a few words on the
subject of certain outbreaks of disease due, it is not unreasonably believed, to a contaminated condition
of that important article of diet, milk. It is true that the facts to which I am about to advert belong
rather to the sanitary history of the current year than to 1874; I feel, however, that it would not be right
to defer the publication of them, and the subject can be referred to again, if necessary. With reference
first, then, to scarlet fever, a remarkable outbreak occurred in the month of June (1875) in South
Kensington. Within sixty hours after a dinner party of sixteen in one of the most splendid streets in the
metropolis, and in a house which had no sanitary defect and no infected inmates, six of the party were
prostrate with scarlet fever. There was a large assemblage at the “at home” after the dinner, and four
or five of the guests were stricken either with primary scarlatina or with characteristic sore throat.
Some of the servants and others, likewise, were similarly affected. A vigorous enquiry excluded all
suspicion of personal contagion as the cause of the outbreak. The one fact clearly proved was that all
the sufferers had partaken of cream in some form or other, cream being of course more largely
consumed at the dinner than at the “at home.” Many persons, doubtless, who partook of cream
escaped, and their immunity may be accounted for in a variety of ways; but it is certain that every one
who was attacked had partaken of cream. There were several curious not to say crucial cases, pointing
to the cream as the nidus of infection. But how the contagium found its way into the milk-pot, if there,
is a question that has hitherto baffled enquiry. The dairy—in town, but not in Kensington—whence the
offending fluid was obtained was carefully scrutinised as to the state of health of the cows and of the
employés, but no fact was elicited to explain the occurrence. [11]
As bearing on this subject, I may remark that it is not very long ago that a number of cases of sore
throat, occurring in families supplied from a certain dairy, were brought under my notice; and I
ascertained that illness of a similar character had prevailed in the house of the dairyman.
Referring to this subject, Professor Parkes, in his “Practical Hygiene,” states that scarlet fever has
appeared to get into milk from the cuticle or throat discharges of persons affected with scarlet fever
who were employed in the dairy while ill or convalescent. Remarkable cases of this kind have already
been reported, and the fact that another zymotic disease—viz., enteric or typhoid fever—has been
spread widely through the medium of milk, only serves to increase the importance of the subject in a
sanitary point of view. It is well ascertained, however, that enteric fever has been conveyed in the foul
water used in diluting milk—a double evil being thus inflicted on unwary purchasers.
At about the same time as the scarlatina outbreak my attention was again directed to milk as a probable
source of disease by a leading practitioner, who gave me the particulars of a very interesting series of
cases of dysentery, attributed on apparently sufficient grounds to the use of milk from diseased cows;
and of a further series of cases of diarrhæa, attributed to some change in the character of milk
supposed to depend on the food on which the cows were being fed. The information came too late to
admit of an investigation of the subject, but the facts deserve to be put on record for future guidance.
In the first set of cases, seven in number, the symptoms were generally of a severe character. Three of
the patients were young children, and the other four adults. The child first attacked, aged 2½ years,
died after seventeen days’ illness. The dysenteric symptoms were sharp and constant, and marked on
the first evening by a strong convulsion. The little patient sank, worn out by incessant tenesmus and
exhausted brain-power. The body temperature was high throughout. This was the only fatal case. The
second case was that of the child’s nurse. She was sent home showing signs of fever, and was ill a long
time. In the third case the child, aged six years, had dysenteric straining of almost pure blood. There
was little constitutional disturbance, and the attack soon yielded to treatment. The fourth case was that
of a middle-aged gentleman attacked with diarrhæa, which assumed a dysenteric character, as many as
twenty-five motions being passed in a day. The attack, which left marked debility; lasted ten days. The
next case was that of an old nurse, who, ridiculing the idea of the milk being the cause of illness, drank
all that was left after tea one day, and was rewarded with a violent diarrhæa that lasted a whole week.
Another case was that of a child (who, however, was teething, and) who, after partaking of milk from
the same source, suffered during six or seven days under a severe dysenteric attack. The seventh case
was that of a lady, who after some days of bowel irritation, was prostrated with acute dysentery which
was long in yielding and left great debility.
Upon enquiry being made of the dairyman who supplied the affected families with milk, he
acknowledged that two, if not three, of his cows were “wrong in their quarters”—i.e., they had diseased
udders; but he hoped that the small amount of bad milk they yielded would not be felt with the large
quantity of good milk with which it was mixed! In each case the supply of milk from that particular
dairy was cut short, and as regards the families interested, a limit was thus set to the endemic. But
what mischief, if any, was done in other directions does not appear, and it is too late to enquire.
The other cases referred to were eleven of diarrhæa, which occurred at about the same period of time.
The milk supply was derived in part from a dairy and in part from cows kept for private use, the one
point in common between the two sheds being that “distillers’ wash” formed part of the food of the
cows. There is no history of any illness or disturbance of the secretion of the cows themselves.
I regret that I had not an opportunity of investigating these cases—and especially the first series—at
the time of their occurrence, as they might have thrown some light on an obscure but very important,
an increasingly important subject—viz., that of disease in animals as a factor of disease in man.
Professor Parkes states, inter alia, that milk contaminated with pus from an inflamed udder will give rise
to stomatitis (inflammation of the mouth) in children and to apthæ (thrush) on the mucus membrane of
the lips and gums. But there is no mention of these symptoms in the cases under review. Parkes also
refers to the power of milk which contains large quantities of the fungus Oidium lactis, or Pennicillium,
to produce dyspeptic symptoms, and even cholera-like attacks. Gastric irritation and febrile gastritis are
also enumerated among the effects following the ingestion of impure milk.
But, after all the most important question is, how to prevent the occurrence of such cases? And here
the difficulty is apparent of getting such regular skilled inspection of cowsheds (in Town, for it is
hopeless, I fear, to attempt any supervision of the extra metropolitan sources of milk-supply!) as would
suffice to detect disease in cows or employés, and secure effectual separation of diseased men and
animals from the dairy. Probably nothing would have a greater effect in breeding caution in the vendors
of milk than legislative enactment imposing severe penalties (not pecuniary only!) for the offence of
selling for human food the milk of diseased cows.
In the case before us, it would appear that the dairyman knew that some of his cows were “wrong in
their quarters,” and yet, though their milk could be of small value (for disease diminishes the yield
rapidly and greatly), families were exposed to the risk of illness, and in one case the calamity of death
was brought on a household, that no portion of the profits of business might be lost. We may
charitably and reasonably believe that the dairyman anticipated no such consequences; but what so
likely to prevent the recurrence of such a catastrophe as a consciousness of the risk incurred by vending
diseased milk?
Before quitting this subject I may express my opinion that dairies are multiplied more than is desirable,
and as a consequence (I have adverted to the subject in another part of this report), the sheds are
often of a very unsatisfactory character. Large dairies, under careful supervision, managed with a due
regard to sanitary requirements in man and animals, and situated in the suburbs or outskirts of the
metropolis, would be a boon the value of which is likely to be the more appreciated as facts such as
those noted above accumulate.

POPULATION, &c.
The estimated population of Kensington at the middle of the year was 138,000, an increase of 5,000
over 1873. The Town sub-district contained about 105,000, and the Brompton sub-district about 33,000
in round numbers. The males numbered about 56,240, and the females 81,760:—excess of females
over males, 25,520. In every 1,000 there were approximatively 407 males and 593 females. The
subjoined table shows the number of persons of each sex, arranged in groups of ages, at the Census,
1871:
AGES OF MALES AND FEMALES, 1871.

All Ages. Under 5 to 15 to 25 to 35 to 45 to 55 to 65 to 75 to 85 to 95 and

5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 94 upwds.
Males, 7065 10198 8948 8317 5963 4339 2464 1270 378 33 2
48977
Females 7147 11527 16585 14203 9080 6241 3768 2000 667 97 7
71322
Total, 14212 21722 25533 22520 15043 10580 6232 3270 1045 130 9
120299

From the above table it appears that there are an almost equal number of the sexes under the age of
5. Between 5 and 15 the excess of females begins, amounting to 1,329—this representing the “school”
age, and the preponderance of females being explained, with probability, by the large number of girls’
schools in the parish. In the next three decades (15 to 45) there is a further large increase of females,
viz., 7,637, 5,886, and 3,117 = (16,640), a considerable proportion of which doubtless consists of
domestic servants. The increase is maintained throughout the table, but on a diminished scale,
amounting in the three following decades (45–75) to 3,936, viz., 1,902, 1,304, and 730. Of persons
above 75 years of age, 1,184 were enumerated; the excess of females being 358. The preponderance
of females at middle life and in old age is probably due to the residence from choice of many
independent persons, attracted by the salubrity and by the social and other advantages of Kensington;
and to the greater longevity of women.
The superficial area of the parish is 2,190 acres, viz., 1,497 in the Town sub-district, and 639 in
Brompton. Some 300 or 400 acres are still uncovered by buildings. The density of the population is
about 74 persons to an acre. The total number of houses, including empties and those in course of
erection, slightly exceeds 20,000. The inhabited houses at the middle of the year were about 17,667,
an increase of 747 over the previous year. There were about 7.8 persons to each house on an average
throughout the parish; but at the census, 1871, it appeared that the average in the Brompton Sub-
district was only seven.
The subjoined table is of interest, showing as it does the remarkable growth of the parish in wealth and
population during the present century:

The Year. Population. Rateable Value. The Year.

1801 8,556 £75,916 1823
1821 14,428 93,397 1833
1841 26,834 142,772 1843
1851 44,053 257,103 1853
1861 70,108 375,333 1860
1871 120,299 590,711 1865
1874 (estmtd.) 138,000 817,326 1870
£1,119,442 (April) 1875
 MARRIAGES.
The marriages celebrated during the year were 1,311; one marriage to 105.2 of the population.
Nineteen persons were married out of every 1,000 living. The marriage rate in all England in 1872 (last
year of publication) was 17.5. The marriages in Kensington were celebrated as follows:

In Churches 1077
At Nonconformist Places of Worship 71
At Roman Catholic 70
At the Superintendent-Registrar’s Office 93
Total 1311

The marriages in the three previous years were: 1871, 1,131; 1872, 1,132; 1873, 1,241.

BIRTHS.
The births registered—registration not being compulsory—were 4,351. The annual birth rate in
Kensington was 31.7 per 1,000 persons living, and in the Metropolis 35.7. The births in the Town sub-
district were 3,536, and in Brompton 815: 2,216 males and 2,135 females were born. The males
formed about 51, and the females 49 per cent of the births—104 males being born to 100 females:
about the same proportion as in all England. One child was born to 31.6 of the population. The birth
rate in the Town sub-district was 33.6, and in Brompton 24.8 per 1,000. The deficient birth rate, as
compared with that of the Metropolis and England, is the result of the great disproportion in the relative
number of the sexes already alluded to; the rate, however, is slightly increasing, as may be seen by
reference to Tables 1 and 2 (Appendix.)
The subjoined table shows the quarterly number of births in each sub-district:

Kensington Town Brompton

Sub-District. Sub-District.
Males. Females. Total. Males. Females. Total. Grand Total.

1st Quarter 484 475 959 94 111 205 1164

2nd 464 409 873 102 95 197 1070
3rd 435 405 840 84 103 187 1027
4th 448 416 864 105 121 226 1090
Total 1831 1705 3536 385 430 815 4351

DEATHS.
The deaths registered in 1874 were 2,696, viz., 2,102 in the Town sub-district and 594 in Brompton.
After re-distribution of the deaths in the Workhouse and Hospital (the deaths in the latter institution
remaining as a compensation allowance for the deaths of parishioners occurring outside the parish), the
numbers in the respective districts stand thus: Town, 2,147; Brompton, 548. The death rate was 19-5
per 1,000 (all London 22.5), the death rate in the Town sub-district being 20.4, and in Brompton 16.6.
Thirteen hundred and forty-seven males died, and 1,349 females; the deaths of females being only two
above the males, although the females exceed the males in the population by no fewer than 25,520.
The death rate of males was 23.9, of females 16.5 per 1,000. The general death rate in the parish,
excluding the deaths of non-parishioners at the Brompton Hospital and the deaths at St. Joseph’s
House, Notting-hill, was 18.3 per 1,000. The subjoined table shows the number of deaths in each
quarter and in each district, excluding the deaths of non-parishioners in the Hospital at Brompton:

Kensington Town Brompton

Sub-District. Sub-District.
Males. Females. Total. Males. Females. Total. Grand Total.

1st Quarter 295 307 602 63 64 127 729

2nd 218 227 445 55 53 108 553
3rd 238 245 483 49 56 105 588
4th 294 278 572 58 71 129 701
Total 1045 1057 2102 225 244 469 2571

The deaths under one year of age (762) bear the proportion of 17.5 per cent. on the registered births
(London 15.5), and they were equal to 28.5 per cent. of the total deaths (London 24.6.) The deaths
under five (1,188) were equal to 27.7 per cent. on the number of births, and to 45.4 per cent of the
total deaths; the relative proportions in all London being 26.3 and 41.6. The deaths at 60 years of age
and upwards (582) formed 21.7 per cent. of the total mortality in Kensington, the relative proportion in
all London being 21.6.
Impressed with the imperfections of mere general death rates and proportional relations as given
above, I have, at considerable labour, estimated the population in groups of ages, and worked out the
death rate for each group—showing the number of deaths per 1,000 persons living, as follows:

Age. Estimated Population. Actual number Deaths per 1,000

of deaths. persons living.
Under 1 3,762 762 202.8
1 and under 2 3,153 223 70.9
2„ 5 9,413 203 21.6
(0 „ 5) (16,328) (1,188) (73.)
5„ 15 24,910 105 4.2
15 „ 25 29,262 105 3.6
25 „ 35 25,822 148 5.7
35 „ 45 17.267 151 8.7
45 „ 55 12,145 198 16.3
55 „ 65 7,154 199 27.8
65 „ 75 3,754 232 62.1
75 „ 85 1,199 183 153.8
85 „ 95 149 54 400
95 and upwards 10 8
138,000 2571

Since the preceding Table was worked out I have become acquainted with an interesting and valuable
paper by Mr. Thomas A. Welton, F.S.S., on “The Effect of Migrations upon Death Rates,” read before the
Statistical Society on the 15th June, 1875, and which enables me to supplement it by the following
Table, in which are contrasted the death rates at certain ages in England and Wales, and in the
Metropolis during the 10 years 1861–70, and in the Parish of Kensington in 1874, calculated on the
number of deaths per 1,000 persons living at the several ages.

Place. Age.
0–5 15–25 25–35 55–65 65–75
England & Wales (10 years) 68.5 7.3 .. .. ..
London ( 1861–70) 81.9 6.3 9.8 38.8 75.4
Kensington (1874) 73.0 3.6 5.7 26.8 62.1

It must be obvious that the truest mode of calculating death rates is that used in the above Tables, and
the result of such calculations is by no means unfavourable to the character for salubrity of the parish of
Kensington. Did time permit of following out the method for the sexes, and in the two sub-districts, the
results would, I doubt not, be very much more favourable for Brompton, and for the female sex, than
they are for the entire parish, and for both sexes.

SPECIAL CAUSES OF DEATH.

Zymotic Diseases.—The deaths from the seven principal diseases of the zymotic class, named below, were
388 in number, viz.: 332 in the Town sub-district and 56 in Brompton, an increase of 98 over the
previous year: 96 of the additional deaths belonging to the Town sub-district. Nevertheless, the
mortality from these maladies was little above the average of the previous 10 years (380), and
considerably below the corrected number, after due allowance for the increase of population. The
deaths were equivalent to 2.8 per 1,000 persons living, and to 144 per 1,000 deaths, as against an
average of 178 in the 10 years 1864–73. The deaths in London in 1874 from the same diseases were
147 per 1,000 deaths, and in all England in 1872 (the latest year of publication), 188.
Deaths from the seven principal Zymotic Diseases.

Town. Brompton. Total. Per 1,000 deaths.

Small Pox 0 0 0 0
Measles 115 6 121 45
Scarlet Fever 28 4 32 11.8
Diptheria 24 2 26 9.6
Whooping Cough 36 9 45 16.7
Fever 39 13 52 19.3
Diarrhœa 90 22 112 41.6
Total 332 56 388 144.0

It will be observed that there was no fatal cases of small-pox during the year: the first time during the
decade of such immunity. But, on the other hand, the year was marked by an epidemic of measles of
extraordinary severity, and confined entirely to the Town sub-district. During the year 1873 the deaths
from this affection were 38, of which 31 occurred during the months of November and December, the
commencement of the epidemic. Of these 38 deaths, 28 belong to the Town sub-district. The mortality
in Brompton was 10 during the whole of 1873 but fell to 6 last year; while the deaths in the Town Sub-
district rose to 115. Of the total of 121 deaths, 119 occurred under the age of 5 years. The highest
total in the previous 10 years was noted in 1864, when 100 children died of this complaint (vide Table 5
Appendix). The total mortality during the last epidemic was 148, viz., 16 in November and 15 in
December 1873, and 107 during the first five months of 1874, viz., January, 25; February, 31; March,
25; April, 16; and May, 10. Measles is always more fatal when it occurs as an epidemic, and especially
during the winter months, the immediate cause of death being, in the majority of cases, some
intercurrent complication affecting the lungs. The brunt of the epidemic fell on the poorer classes in the
northern parts of the parish.
Scarlet Fever was fatal in 32 cases—an increase of 22 over the mortality of the previous year. 28 of the
deaths took place in the Town sub-district, and 4 in Brompton—21 of the victims being under 5 years of
age. The disease was, to a certain extent, epidemic in the Autumn, and, fears being entertained that it
might spread, through the agency of the Board Schools, precautions were taken by the London School
Board, acting on the suggestions I laid before your Vestry, to prevent children attending school from
infected houses. The evil blew over as the winter advanced; but, in accordance with the usual course
of epidemic scarlet fever, a more severe outbreak may be looked for during the current year, the signs
of which are not wanting at the present writing.
I have already referred (p. 10, ante) to a curious outbreak of scarlet fever following on a dinner-party at
South Kensington, and it may be here mentioned that a report of the occurrence having found its way,
with more or less inaccuracy, into some of the papers, a good deal of alarm was created, and an
impression got abroad that the disease was very prevalent in Kensington, his impression was not
confined to the immediate locality, and the effect of it was to cause a considerable exodus of the
wealthier classes at a prematurely early period of the “season,” as well as more or less consequent
injury to trade. Some suspicions connected with the state of the Knightsbridge Barracks and the health
of the soldiers’ families, including those that lived outside, added fuel to the fire, if indeed they did not
kindle it. I had no reason, myself, to suspect any extensive prevalence of scarlet fever, for I knew that
the deaths though rather above the average were still few in the aggregate, and I was aware, after
repeated enquiry, that the cases under treatment at the three charitable dispensaries and by the five
district Poor Law Medical Officers were astonishingly few. In fact, on several occasions when enquiry
was made, it turned out that only one or two, or at the most three cases, were under the care of the
Medical Officers, although they have many thousand cases of sickness among the poorest classes under
their care during the year. I also ascertained from many medical men that they had very few cases
under their care, most of them none at all. I stated these facts in my June report, but as the alarm was
really great I thought it well to address a circular letter to the two hundred and fifty medical men whose
names appear in the Medical Directory as residents in Kensington, asking for information and stating all
I knew as to the actual dimensions of the epidemic, if it could be so called, and the comparative
abeyance of scarlet fever in dispensary and parochial practice. To this letter I had fewer than fifty
replies, including those that were viva voce. As I had asked for positive information only, it is probable
that many of those who did not favor me with any reply were silent for the best of reasons, viz., that
they had nothing to communicate. Of those gentlemen to whose courtesy I am indebted for their
replies only six had any cases under treatment. The testimony of all my correspondents excepting two
was unanimous in this—that the disease generally assumed a mild form, and the correctness of this
view was supported by the fact that although adults formed a large proportion of the cases, the few
deaths that occurred were those of young children. The exceptions referred to went to prove the rule.
The first-named was a group of seven cases in one house of a person in good circumstances, in which it
was subsequently discovered that the cistern was not only in untrapped connection with the drains but
was also in a disgusting condition of filthiness, to which cause my informant attributed the outbreak.
This fact, however, may perhaps with greater probability be the explanation of the severity of the
disease, and the sharp sequelœ in all the cases. There were no deaths. In the second group of cases,
eleven in number, occurring in three families of 21 persons occupying rooms in two small houses in a
street at Notting Hill, there were five deaths, but, as I stated in my July report the causes of the severity
and the fatality of the outbreak were to be found in the circumstances of the people and in their
dwellings, “The fatality of the disease,” I remarked, “has been great in proportion to the number of
cases . . . and this I attribute to the want of proper accommodation, etc., for the sick, the spread of the
disease being the direct and necessary result of the retention for home treatment of first cases. It is
practically impossible to isolate the patients in the crowded houses of the poor, and the parents are
generally unwilling to allow their children to be removed to the hospital, the prejudice against which,
however rarely survives actual experience.” In the same report I alluded to the concealment of cases,
and to the fact that the registration of a death is oftentimes the first clue to the existence of the
disease, and the information then comes too late for practical, i.e., preventive purposes. It is obvious,
also, after repeated experience that some of the poor who can ill afford to pay a doctor, employ the
services of private medical men for fear that if they applied for Parish relief the sick child, or children,
will be sent to the hospital. Private practice, is, under such circumstances, conducted under great
disadvantages, for the payment of the small fees with which the medical man is content in such cases,
deprives the poor of the means of purchasing those comforts, not to say necessaries, of the sick
chamber, on which, inter alia, recovery so largely depends. It is heart-breaking to see the wan faces of
little sick children in their miserable rooms, especially when the contrast is mentally made between the
condition prevailing “at home,” and the well-ordered hospital, with its staff of doctors and nurses, and
all requisites for every stage of illness and convalescence. Another case that came under my notice in
the course of the enquiry may be mentioned. The child was attended by a non-qualified practitioner;
the parents, however, believing him to be a duly qualified medical man, for how should a poor ignorant
Irish labourer know the difference between “Doctors”?

“The child died at the end of the second week, and the existence of scarlet fever in the house
became known to us only on the registration of the death: too late, in fact, for the mischief was
done. The two rooms occupied by this family contained seven persons, viz., the parents and five
children. Successively the father and two more children fell sick, and were removed to the hospital,
where they are all doing well. The rooms and clothing were disinfected, and the mother and two
remaining children were reluctantly compelled to leave the house; but no sooner had they done so
than the elder child fell sick, and was sent to the hospital. The mother and her infant are at
present well. The day following the burial of the deceased child another family of nine persons left
the house. They have been traced, and two children found to be ill. They are tolerably well
isolated, however, and seem likely to do well. I am trying, nevertheless, for the sake of the rest of
the family, to have them removed. The lessons taught by this story are too obvious to need
recapitulation; I will only observe, therefore, what the facts have strongly suggested to my own
mind, viz., that among the many requirements in sanitary legislation, none is more needed than
power to provide quarantine for the apparently healthy members of poor families in which
infectious disease has broken out.”

The other cases that have occurred up to the present time are too few, and otherwise offer nothing to
call for special notice. All the fatal cases occurred in streets wholly occupied by the poorer classes. But,
as I observed in my report,—

“A principal source of danger in the future lies in the carelessness or ignorance which leads to the
premature exposure of convalescents, to which cause several cases have been referred by my
correspondents. A case of this kind occurred a short time ago. I ascertained that a boy, who had
been ill only a few days and whose skin was actively peeling, had not only, by inadvertence,
attended at the waiting room of a public dispensary, but had also been to one of the largest and
most crowded of our parochial schools, while other members of the same family, and out of the
same room, had been in the other departments of the same school, which moreover I found on
inspection to be in a very unsanitary condition. I am doing what I can to prevent the recurrence of
such a case by putting the teachers of schools on their guard; and, mindful of the steps which the
School Board for London took, on our suggestion last year, with a view to prevent the spread of the
malady through the medium of Board Schools, I addressed the Clerk to the Board lately, stating the
facts as they are known in this parish, and urging a repetition of the precautions adopted last year;
and I have had the satisfaction of receiving a communication from that gentleman to the effect that
‘the notices on the subject of scarlet fever, issued to the respective teachers in the autumn of last
year, will be re-issued to the teachers by the time the various schools commence their work, after
the summer holidays.’”
Before concluding my remarks on this subject, I may mention that I availed myself of the opportunity
afforded by sending the circular letter to medical men to place in their hands the “Suggestions for
preventing the spread of infectious diseases,” and other sanitary notices, pointing out that copies were
always available for the use of their patients; asking their co-operation in aid of the efforts which it is at
all times my duty to make, with a view to arrest the spread of infectious diseases, urging the
importance of isolation of the sick, and the propriety of sending patients to the hospital when the home
accommodation does not allow of isolation; offering the services of your sanitary staff in all such cases,
and explaining the arrangements made for the disinfection of clothing, etc., in the absence of a public
disinfecting chamber. It, of course, remains to be seen to what extent the epidemic will grow, and
judging by past experience the disease may during this year and the next be expected to prove fatal
above the average, but come what may I have the satisfaction of knowing that no means have been
spared, or will be, which it is in the power of your Vestry to adopt with a view to arrest its progress.
Diphtheria.—This disease was the cause of 26 deaths (Town, 24; Brompton, 2), an increase of 15 over
1873—entirely in the Town sub-district. The deaths under five years were 14.
Whooping Cough.—The mortality from this complaint was 45, in the Town sub-district 36, and in
Brompton 9. The deaths under five were 44.
Fever.—Typhus, was fatal in 9 cases, all in the Town sub-district. The number in the previous year was 6
—all likewise in the Town.
Enteric Fever.—The registered deaths from this disease were 28—viz., 19 in the Town and 9 in
Brompton. The numbers in 1873 were 19 and 8 respectively. The term Typhoid is often employed to
designate this disease, and leads to error in the tabulation of the mortality returns. I have good reason
to believe that some of the cases returned by the Registrar-General as typhoid fever were not cases of
enteric fever, the word typhoid having been employed in medical certificates of the cause of death to
describe a condition of the patient in the last stages of fatal illness of a nature entirely distinct from
enteric fever.
Simple continued fever caused 15 deaths (8 under five years), viz., 11 in the Town sub-district and 4 in
Brompton. The deaths in 1873 were 7 and I respectively in the two districts.
Diarrhœa was less fatal than in 1873, the deaths being in that year 145, and in 1874 only 112. The
annual average number in ten years was 111, without allowances for increase of population. The
deaths last year in the two sub-districts were 90 and 22; in the previous year 121 and 24. The large
majority of fatal cases occurred in infancy, viz., 100 under one year and 8 between one and five. Above
65 years of age the deaths were 4. At intermediate ages there was no death. The principal mortality
was experienced in the warm summer weather, viz., in July 38, and in August 31. Five deaths from
Cholera were registered, viz., 3 in the Town and 2 in Brompton.
Other Zymotic Diseases.—Croup was the cause of 26 deaths, 25 under five years, and all save one in the
Town sub-district. The deaths in the previous year were 20.
Erysipelas caused 21 deaths, viz., 13 and 8 in the Town and Brompton respectively. The deaths in 1873
were 24.
Puerperal Mortality.—Some difficulty is experienced in procuring a correct record of the deaths arising
out of or connected with childbed, owing to the fact that reference to the previous occurrence of
childbirth is sometimes omitted in the medical certificate of the cause of death. Some of the deaths,
therefore, registered as Peritonitis, Pyæmia, Erysipelas, and even under less suggestive headings, may
have been connected with the puerperal state. The deaths actually ascribed to childbed diseases were
24, other 14 being set down to the various accidents incident to that critical period. These numbers
together represent a mortality somewhat below one per cent. (0.87) on the births registered. Dr.
Matthews Duncan, the successor of Sir James Simpson at the University of Edinburgh, has promulgated
an opinion that the true average mortality of the puerperal state is one per cent., i.e., one death in
every hundred confinements; an estimate which a practitioner in this parish, who has a most extensive
midwifery practice, tells me coincides with his personal experience. The causes of death as registered
were:—Puerperal fever, 4; Puerperal peritonitis, 9; Pyæmia, 5; Septicæmia, 1; Metritis, 4; Pelvic
cellulitis, 1. Eighteen of the deaths occurred in the Town sub-district, the mortality being pretty evenly
spread over the parish, and none of the cases being traceable to contagion. They occurred in the four
quarters respectively as follows—9, 6, 5, and 4. The ages at death were: 20–30 years, 18; 30–40
years, 4; 40 years and upwards, 2.
Syphilis nominally caused 12 deaths—a number we may well believe below the actual mortality from
this Protean disease.
Constitutional Diseases.—Cancer was the cause of 67 deaths, viz., 51 in the Town and 16 in Brompton.
Fifty-four of the deaths took place between the ages of 45 and 75.
The Tubercular Diseases caused 408 deaths, viz., 325 in the Town and 73 in Brompton. Scrofula was the
registered disease in 27 cases, Tabes mesenterica in 53, Phthisis in 245, and Hydrocephalus or
Meningitis in 82 cases. The numbers of deaths in the several quarters were—1st, 113; 2nd, 104; 3rd,
88; and 4th, 103:—216 in the winter and 192 in the summer quarters. One hundred and fifty-seven of
the deaths were those of children under the age of five years. This mortality is exclusive of those brain
affections, Convulsions, &c., and those diseases called developmental which, under the names of
Atrophy and Premature birth, are nearly allied to the tubercular diseases specially so-called.
Local Diseases.—The diseases of the nervous system were fatal in 256 cases, viz., 199 in the Town and
57 in Brompton. Eighty-five of the deaths occurred under five years of age. Apoplexy was fatal in 64
cases, Paralysis in 47, Epilepsy in 13, Convulsions in 59, and Brain disease in 62. Apoplexy and Paralysis
are diseases of old age; Convulsions, as a rule, of infancy. The deaths from this order of diseases were
very equally spread over the whole year, the quarterly numbers being 66, 63, 61, and 66 respectively
The Diseases of the Organs of Circulation caused 149 deaths, viz., in the Town district 115, and in
Brompton 34. Nine only of these deaths occurred under the age of five years. Pericarditis was the
registered cause in 5 cases, Aneurism in 7, and “Heart disease” in the remainder, 137.
Diseases of the Respiratory Organs.—The deaths from this important order of diseases were 554, viz., 462
in the Town sub-district, and 92 in Brompton. Under five years of age the deaths were 244. The
mortality from these affections is greatly influenced by season, more deaths occurring in winter than in
summer, and a higher mortality prevailing in proportion as the winter is severe. These facts are
illustrated by the subjoined figures, which show the mortality to have been in the four quarters of the
year respectively 189, 80, 58, and 227. Thus in the winter quarters the deaths were 416, and in the
summer quarters only 138. The deaths in the summer quarters of 1874 were seven less than in 1873;
but there was an excess of 78 in the winter quarters of the former year, due to the long-continued cold
weather that prevailed in the latter months. The several diseases of this order were the registered
causes of death as follows:—Laryngitis 6, Bronchitis 300, Pleurisy 10, Pneumonia 176, Asthma 12, and
Lung disease 41. The increased fatality of Bronchitis and Pneumonia helps to explain the higher
mortality of 1874 as compared with 1873.
Diseases of the Digestive Organs were fatal in 118 cases (18 under five years), viz., 93 in the Town and 25
in Brompton. They include Enteritis 19, Peritonitis 20, and Liver disease 37.
Diseases of the Urinary Organs were fatal in 51 cases, including Kidney disease 12, Blight’s disease 22;
Cystitis 7, and Diabetes 5.
Diseases of the Organs of Generation caused 7 deaths, 6 of them registered as Uterus disease, &c. These
deaths are exclusive of malignant affections of the organs included under the head of Cancer.
The Diseases of Children were fatal in 75 cases, including Premature birth 46, Teething 25, and
Malformations 4.
The Diseases of Adults include 14 deaths returned as Child-birth, these deaths being irrespective of those
already alluded to under the head of Puerperal Fever.
Diseases of Old People (so described) were returned under the head of Old Age as the cause of 94
deaths.
Diseases of Nutrition, viz., Atrophy and Debility, were the cause of 163 deaths, all under five years of
age, (153 in the first year of life) viz., 143 in the Town sub-district and 20 in Brompton.
Violent Deaths, 48 in number, were registered, including 10 due to fractures and contusions, 17 (all
under one year) to suffocation, and four to drowning.
Causes not Specified or Ill-defined.—Twenty deaths registered came under this description.

DEATHS IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS.

The Hospital for Consumption and Diseases of the Chest. At this important institution 131 persons died, viz.,
80 males and 51 females. All the deaths, with the exception of eight, were due to that hitherto
incurable malady phthisis, or as it is popularly known, consumption. Five deaths were caused by heart
disease, one by aneurism, and two by lung disease. The deaths in the four quarters respectively were
26, 30, 30, and 45. Six only of the deaths properly belong to the parish. Seventy-five of the deceased
came from other parishes in London and the suburbs, and 50 from other than metropolitan counties. If
the truth were known, it is not improbable that some few deaths from phthisis outside the hospital
properly belong to other districts, the patients having come to town for medical treatment attracted by
the fame of the institution, and being attended as out-patients.
St. Joseph’s House.—This large charitable establishment of the Roman Catholics, situated in Portobello
Road, Notting Hill, is not classed as a public institution, although its inmates (about 200) are drawn
from all parts. The deaths last year numbered 36—males 21 and females 15—all above 60 years of
age, and due to the more common diseases of senility, as Brain disease 8, Lung and Heart disease 16,
Cancer 3, Intestinal diseases 3, “Old Age” 2, other diseases 4.
The Parish Infirmary.—At this large and important hospital there were 221 deaths, viz., in the four
quarters respectively 61, 40, 44, and 76; males 117, females 104. The deaths included 37 of infants
under one year of age, and 86 of persons above 60 years of age, viz., between 60 and 70, 36; 70–80,
38; 80–90, 11; at 97, 1. Inquests were held in three cases, the verdicts returned being (1) “Sudden,
apoplexy, natural causes,” (2) “Fall from a window, accidental,” (3) “Fall from a ladder, accidental.”
The causes of death may be summarised thus:—

Brain disease, Apoplexy, Paralysis, &c. 26

Lung diseases 37
Heart disease 7
Scrofulous or Tuberculous diseases, Phthisis, &c. 41
Wasting diseases, Debility, &c., of Children 21
Atelectasis (Imperfect expansion of lungs at birth) 5
Cancer 8
Enteric fever 2
Measles 4
Diarrhœa 3
Intestinal diseases, &c. 13
Kidney disease 4
Uterine diseases 2
 Ulcer 3
Childbirth, &c. 3
Violent 2. Privation 1. 3
Old Age 23
Various 16
Total 221

INQUESTS.
A large proportion of deaths form the subject of enquiry in the Coroner’s Court. Last year the number
was 172, viz., 152 in the Town sub-district and 20 in Brompton, equal to 6.4 per cent. of the total
deaths. One hundred of the subjects of enquiry were below the age of five years, 80 being less than a
year old, mostly in fact infants of a few hours, days, or weeks. Forty-eight inquests were held on
persons between the ages of 5 and 60, and 24 on persons above the age of 60. The great majority of
the deaths were due to disease. Thus of the 99 sudden deaths the causes of death as found by post
mortem examination (and post mortem examinations were made in 154 out of the total of 172 cases)
were as follows:—

Brain, Diseases of the 13

Apoplexy 11
Lungs, Diseases of the 24
Heart „ „ 20
Scrofula 4
Convulsions 4
Spasm of the Glottis 7
Diarrhœa 3
Diphtheria 2
Syphilis 2
Premature birth and infantile debility 3
Visceral diseases (of Liver, Kidneys, &c.) 3
“Fever” 1; Thrush 1; “Sudden” 1 3
Total 99

Various diseases were specified in other six cases in which the deaths were not returned as “sudden.”
Death was found to be caused by disease in many of the cases in which the deceased were “found
dead,” either in bed or otherwise, viz., from

Lungs, Diseases of the 6

Heart „ „ 6
Convulsions 4
Brain, Diseases of the, 2; Apoplexy 1 3
Laryngitis 1; Spasm of the Glottis 1; Scrofula 1 3
 “Found Dead,” &c. 4
Total 26

The accidental and violent deaths were caused as follows:—

Falls 7
Barns 1
Drowned 4
Suffocation 16
Cut throat 2
Pistol shot 2
Hanging 2
Run over by railway train 1
Wilful Murder 4
“Accident,” “Violence” 2
Total 41

With respect to the accidental or violent deaths it may be remarked that the 16 from suffocation were of
infants and due to “accident.” One of the newly born infants was found in a box and another up a
chimney; these being, as were some of the others, the children of single women. On four newly-born
children the verdict of “murder” was found. In one case there had been “exposure,” in a second the
child was found dead, and in the other cases the verdict was simply “wilful murder.” Of the four
drowning cases one was suicidal. By hanging, cut-throat, and pistol-shot all the deaths recorded (two
from each cause), were suicidal, making a total of seven suicidal deaths during the year. The remaining
deaths by violence were accidentally caused.
Having carefully analysed the facts relating to these deaths as they appear in the weekly returns of
mortality, I submit the results, which are, I think, worthy of attention. Of course the primary cause of
an inquest being held is the absence of a medical certificate showing the cause of death. The reasons
why certificates are not forthcoming, and therefore why inquests become necessary, may be inferred
from certain particulars which appear in the returns, and may be summed up as follows:—

Sudden Death 99
Found dead in bed (22) or otherwise (26) 48
Accident 3
Violence 15
Doubtful (none of the above reasons stated) 7
Total 172

It is to the deaths from disease that I would draw particular attention, the bare facts appearing to point
to a large amount of neglect of the sick, which, without explanation, would seem to border on the
criminal. Fatal visceral diseases, it need hardly be said, present symptoms which the most ignorant
cannot altogether overlook—fever, pain, exhaustion, &c.; and each disease has a more or less prolonged
course, varying with the importance of the organ affected, and with the amount of care bestowed on
the sufferer. It is not credible that any medical man would be unable to diagnose the existence of such
a disease, e.g. as pneumonia, or would refuse to certify the cause of death of a patient who had died
under his care. We are driven to the conclusion, therefore, that, in a great number of cases of disease,
many of the victims being infants, no effort is made to obtain medical advice for the sufferers, and
hence, when death ensues, an inquest becomes necessary, as there is no medical certificate to show
the cause of death. A post-mortem examination is made, and then it becomes known that death was
caused by a disease that might have been cured, and that certainly must have had a well-defined and
often a lengthened course. Passing over such maladies as apoplexy and heart disease, it is only
necessary to mention, in support of this view, such diseases as pneumonia, &c. (30 deaths); brain
diseases (15); convulsions—a symptom rather than a disease (8); scrofula (5); syphilis (2); diarrhœa,
diphtheria, &c. The question then arises, in connection with such cases as these, whether it is sufficient
to record the cause of death? whether, in fact, some one should not be made responsible for the
neglect to provide medical advice for a child who ultimately dies “suddenly” or is “found dead” as a
consequence of an attack of pneumonia, that may have extended over one, two, or three weeks, or
even a longer time? Not many weeks before this present writing one of the “Peculiar People” was found
guilty of manslaughter, having neglected to provide medical attendance for his child, who died of
pneumonia, although it was admitted that every care, otherwise, had been bestowed on the patient;
and, notwithstanding the well-known fact that with such care a very large proportion of the cases,
especially if one lung only is affected, will recover. It need scarcely be added that the parents’ neglect
had its origin in conscientious motives, however mistaken and absurd. Can such a plea be made in all
or many of the cases to which I have here alluded: and should negligent parents escape without
punishment—without censure even?
True, the facts I have thus briefly brought under notice may be explained—and they certainly need
explanation; for as they baldly appear in the returns of mortality they would seem to indicate an
indifference to life which is not only shocking, but may be in some degree the cause of that terrible
infantile mortality which all thinking persons deplore. I will only add that it is notorious that medical
men are constantly called in to see children sick beyond the hope of recovery, in order that no fuss may
arise after death—the death certificate being all-sufficient. No doubt in many cases, where the
diagnosis is quite clear, the certificate is given, although the practitioner may be conscious of the
neglect of the parents in applying for assistance when “too late;” and, I dare say, that in some at least
of the cases which come before the Coroner the inquest has been brought about by the judicious
refusal of medical men to give certificates under such circumstances. I venture to think, however, that
a certificate should not be given in any such case, and that not only should an inquest be held, but that
the mere fact of the responsible person in charge of the infant having failed to obtain that medical
advice and assistance which the poor may have for the asking, should be regarded as establishing a
prima facie charge of neglect, for which he or she should appear and answer at another tribunal in the
absence of exculpatory evidence.

DEATHS “NOT CERTIFIED.”

The number of deaths “not certified,” that is, of persons who were attended in their last illness by non-
qualified practitioners—generally professing to hold unregisterable foreign degrees, often obtained by
purchase, in absentia, was 33. The numbers in the two previous years were 30 and 21. In my annual
report for 1872 I mentioned that I had some time previously called the attention of the Registrar-
General to the desirability of an addition to the form of certificate of death provided for the use of
medical men, whereby it would be made clear whether the subscriber was or was not duly qualified,
i.e., registered. The Registrar-General approved the suggestion, and his attention having, at my
instance, been again directed to the subject by the Society of Medical Officers of Health last year, he
has, in the new form of certificate brought into use at the commencement of the current year, added a
line immediately below the place for signature on which the subscriber is required to enter his
“registered qualification.” It is not probable that any unregistered practitioner would venture to use the
certificate, should he inadvertently become possessed of it, as might happen through the almost
unavoidable ignorance in which the sub-district registrars are left, from the want of an official list of
registered practitioners. Not long ago I ventured to direct the attention of the Registrar-General and
the Registrar to the General Medical Council to the importance of these officers being supplied with the
Medical Register, issued annually by the Council; but these gentlemen, while appreciating the
suggestion, were unable to hold out any hope that it would or could be carried into effect, inasmuch as
the Government are unwilling to incur the necessary expense, and as the Register is too inaccurate to
be implicitly relied on in doubtful cases. But now that medical men are required, under a penalty for
neglect, to give certificates of the cause of death, some means ought to be found of restricting the use
of them in any form, to registered practitioners. The sub-district Registrars do not knowingly accept a
certificate from a non-qualified practitioner, but in some cases where a medical title is used by a
stranger, “invalid” certificates obtain currency. In all other irregular cases the registrar returns the death
as “not certified,” making use, nevertheless, of the information as to the cause of death contained in the
certificate! If it were made an offence at law for any unregistered practitioner to give a certificate of
death, the difficulty would probably be met. At present I do not know what course would be best to
adopt, unless to hold inquests on the bodies of all persons who die under the treatment of non-qualified
practitioners. This course was adopted in some cases in the northern part of the parish last year, and it
led, in at least one instance, to the unsatisfactory, not to say discreditable result, of the Philadelphian
M.D. who attended a sick child, calling in a registered practitioner at the last gasp, so that he might
certify to the cause of death. An inquest, however, was held on the body, and the death was found to
be due to quite a different disease to that entered in the certificate. I may add that the Board of
Guardians, laudably anxious to put a stop to the scandal, took proceedings at the Hammersmith Police
Court against an unregistered practitioner for signing a vaccination certificate, and thus “falsely
pretending to be registered.” The case was dismissed, however, and no further steps have been taken
in the matter. But something should be done for the protection of the poor, who are almost exclusively
the patients of the unqualified man, being unable to realize the distinction; and action is rendered the
more necessary by the fact that children—infants of tender age—are most commonly the victims of the
practice. Thus, of the 33 cases of uncertified deaths referred to, 25 were children, of whom 18 were
less than one year old. The causes of death returned included such diseases as typhus fever, scarlet
fever, measles, diarrhœa, inflammation of the lungs and of the brain, and scrofulous maladies.

METEOROLOGY.
The mean temperature of the air at Greenwich during the registration year was 49.4° F., the average of
35 years being 49.3°. The averages of the four quarters were 41.6°, 53.5°, 60.6°, and 41.8°. The
hottest week was that which ended on the 11th of July, mean temperature 66.8°; and the coldest week
was that ended on the 2nd of January, 1875, mean temperature 28.8°. The highest reading of the
thermometer was on the 9th of July, 92.0°, and the lowest on the first day of the current year 18.2°.
The dryness of the atmosphere (i.e., the difference between the dew point temperature and air
temperature) was 5.6 (average in 30 years 5.5.) The rainfall was 24.1 inches.

VACCINATION.
I am indebted to Mr. Shattock, the energetic Vaccination Officer, for the interesting particulars contained
in Table IX, (Appendix), on the important subject of Vaccination. From it we learn that during the year
4,357 births were returned to him by the sub-district registrars, and that the successful vaccinations
numbered 3,588. Twenty-three infants were certified as insusceptible of successful vaccination; in 74
cases the postponement of vaccination was sanctioned by medical certificate on account of the state of
health, &c.; 27 children were removed to other districts, the vaccination officer of each district being
duly apprized of such removal; 9 cases were still under proceedings (at the date of the report), by
summons or otherwise; while 464 children died unvaccinated. The cases unaccounted for—either
through the removal of the children to places unknown, or which cannot be reached, and cases not
having been found—amounted in all to only 172, or a fraction below 4 per cent. of the total births—a
result that must be considered very satisfactory, highly creditable to the vaccination officer, and, I would
add, to the Board of Guardians; while I can hardly believe it has been surpassed in any other district of
the Metropolis.
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