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To Advance Their Opportunities
Federal Policies Toward African American Workers
from World War I to the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Judson MacLaury
To Advance Their Opportunities
To Advance Their Opportunities
Federal Policies Toward African American Workers
from World War I to the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Judson MacLaury
Foreword by Ray Marshall

Newfound Press
The University of Tennessee
Knoxville, Tennessee
To Advance Their Opportunities: Federal Policies Toward African American Workers
from World War I to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
© 2008 by Judson MacLaury

Newfound Press is a digital imprint of the University of Tennessee Libraries.

Its publications are available for non-commercial and educational uses, such as
research, teaching and private study. The author has licensed the work under the
Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. To view
a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/>.

For all other uses, contact:

Newfound Press
University of Tennessee Libraries
1015 Volunteer Boulevard
Knoxville, TN 37996-1000
www.newfoundpresss.utk.edu

ISBN-13: 978-0-9797292-3-2
ISBN-10: 0-9797292-3-8

MacLaury, Judson.
To advance their opportunities : federal policies toward African American
workers from World War I to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 / Judson MacLaury ;
foreword by Ray Marshall.
xv, 293 p. ; 23 cm.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 276-293).
1. African Americans—Employment―Government policy—History―20th
century. 2. African Americans—Employment―Law and legislation—
History―20th century. 3. Discrimination in employment―Government
policy―United States—History―20th century. I. Title.
HD8081.A65 M33 2008

Book design by Jayne Rogers and Hannah Barker

 Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Part I: Crisis-Driven Federal Action from World War I Through the Great Depression,
1914-1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter 1: World War I and After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: Depression and New Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Part II: Institutionalization of Executive Action, 1940-1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Chapter 3: World War II and the FEPC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Chapter 4: Truman Administration, 1945-1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Chapter 5: Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Part III: Culmination of Executive Action, 1960-1964 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Chapter 6: Birth of the President's Committee

on Equal Employment Opportunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Chapter 7: The Committee Gets Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
Chapter 8: The Kheel Report and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Chapter 9: The Department of Labor in the
Kennedy-Johnson Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
 Foreword

I n To Advance Their Opportunities, Judson MacLaury, retired

Department of Labor (DOL) historian, traces the evolution of
federal policies toward African American workers from World War
I to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This is a valuable
contribution to our understanding of this topic, not only because of
Judson MacLaury’s knowledge of his subject, but also because this
book is based on a thorough review of the relevant literature and
unpublished materials at the DOL and the National Archives.
MacLaury’s focus is on the federal executive, which was
much more responsive to pressures from African Americans than
the Congress, where a small number of segregationists could use
Senate rules, especially the filibuster, to block civil rights legislation.
Southern segregationists were able to acquire seniority and inordinate
influence in the Democratic Party because most African Americans
in their regions were disenfranchised and, before FDR’s second term,
most black voters and community leaders supported Republicans.
African Americans’ ability to influence the federal government
began to change when migration out of the rural South greatly enhanced
their political power. These migrations accelerated significantly
during World War I, when the cessation of mass immigration from
Europe opened urban job opportunities to African Americans. Black
political power was enhanced both by their movement to urban
areas (north and south), where racial oppression was more visible,
and their movement from the one-party South, where they were
disenfranchised, to two-party areas outside the South where black

vii
voters could significantly influence close elections. The urbanization
of African Americans also strengthened civil rights organizations like
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the National Urban League (NUL), as well as unions
like the influential Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP), led
by A. Philip Randolph.
The dramatic expansion of direct and indirect federal
employment during the New Deal period enabled the Roosevelt
administration to expand African American employment. In addition,
millions of black workers participated in New Deal programs like
the National Youth Administration (NYA), the Civilian Conservation
Corps (CCC), and public employment programs. That said, African
American participation in these recovery programs was generally
below their relative unemployment rate, which approached 50 percent,
about double the overall rate. And while progress was made in
reducing discrimination against black participants, unequal treatment
characterized even the best of these programs.
There was, moreover, a continuing tug-of-war between a few
influential pro-civil rights New Dealers—like Interior Secretary Harold
Ickes, Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, presidential adviser Harry
Hopkins, and FDR’s wife Eleanor—and those who were influenced by
militant segregationist politicians. The progressives were, however,
supported by black community protests against discrimination in
New Deal programs and in federal employment. FDR, who had never
shown much interest in race matters, had to balance appeals from the
progressives and opposition from segregationists in his own party.
Because FDR thought sustainable broadly shared prosperity was
not possible unless all major groups were included, his administration
did much to help African Americans. And, despite their continuing
protests against discrimination in federal employment and by

viii
government contractors, most black leaders and voters, who had
previously strongly supported Herbert Hoover, made a dramatic
switch to the Democratic party and voted overwhelmingly for FDR in
his reelection campaign.
The depression—and most New Deal recovery programs—
ended with World War II, which opened a new chapter in the march
toward racial equality. Although discrimination continued—and was
even sometimes acquiesced to by staunch civil rights champions like
Harry Hopkins and Francis Perkins—African Americans doubled
their proportion of federal jobs from 5 percent to 10 percent. Although
most of these jobs were in lower pay grades, the administration also
increased the number of black professionals and administrators.
The tight World War II labor markets boosted the expansion
of black employment, especially among defense contractors. Under
intense pressure from the black community, including a threatened
march on Washington, FDR issued an executive order creating the Fair
Employment Practice Committee (FEPC) to outlaw discrimination by
federal contractors.
The proposed march on Washington, led by A. Philip Randolph,
was particularly embarrassing to FDR because discrimination exposed
a serious weakness in America’s fight to “make the world safe for
democracy.” Indeed, the tension between tolerating discrimination
while fighting totalitarian regimes made American leaders more
likely to act on anti-discrimination pressures. As President Johnson
remarked, “Race relations don’t look the same from the banks of the
Potomac as they do from the banks of the Pedernales” (where his
ranch was located).
The experiences of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
revealed the strengths and weaknesses of executive orders and
voluntary fair employment programs. The use of executive powers

ix
enabled administrations to combat discrimination despite Con­
gressional opposition. The executive orders were enforced mainly by
moral suasion and the threat of contract cancellation or debarment.
Presidents likewise could use their “bully pulpit” to persuade the
public that discrimination was not only bad for the economy, society,
and polity, but also weakened America’s contest against totalitarian
regimes.
Voluntary anti-discrimination programs had some advantages
in changing private employment practices. These programs were
introduced not only because of inadequate support for civil rights
legislation, but also because legal processes were more effective
against specific overt discriminatory acts than against the more
pervasive and entrenched institutional forms that permit discrimination
to persist even after it has become illegal. One of the clearest effects
of executive-order based programs was to give those employers and
unions who were inclined to adopt fair practices some protection from
adverse reactions by racist customers or members.
Despite these advantages, executive orders and voluntary
approaches had many shortcomings: they lacked the credibility
afforded by Congressional action; they were relatively ineffective
against determined defenders of the status quo; government
contracting sanctions had limited impact on unions, which were not
parties to the contracts; government agencies were reluctant to cancel
contracts because they were more interested in the goods and services
provided than combating discrimination;1 and administrations likewise
were deterred from vigorous enforcement by powerful members
of Congress, who controlled their budgets. These weaknesses, and

1 This defect was overcome somewhat by the Carter administration, which not only
demonstrated its willingness to cancel contracts, but also consolidated enforcement
in the Department of Labor.

x
subsequent experience, demonstrated that voluntary programs are
more effective when backed by the threat of vigorous enforcement.
The limitations of executive orders and voluntary programs
established the political bases for the civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965,
which were passed with strong political leadership from President
Lyndon Johnson and vigorous opposition from many Republicans and
southern Democrats. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that
the civil rights acts ended discrimination. Affirmative action programs
were required to address institutional discrimination that was beyond
the reach of statutory law.
An example of the kind of targeted affirmative action programs
that produced significant change was the apprenticeship outreach
programs that greatly increased the number of minority apprentices.
Joint employer-union apprenticeship programs had a long history
of discrimination against minorities and women, which meant
that few counselors recommended that black students prepare for
apprenticeable occupations. As a result, when the Civil Rights Act of
1964 outlawed discrimination by unions and apprenticeship sponsors,
there were very few qualified minority applicants to take advantage of
these opportunities. Institutional discrimination causes people to avoid
programs they believe will not accept them. Pragmatic civil rights
leaders like A. Philip Randolph responded to this impasse by creating
specific outreach programs to recruit, prepare, and place qualified
minority apprentices. Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz commissioned
an evaluation of these programs, which documented their success.2
The Department of Labor then funded these programs on a larger
scale, causing minorities in apprenticeship programs to approximate
their proportion of the work force by the end of the 1970s.

2 Ray Marshall and Vernon Briggs, The Negro and Apprenticeship (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967).

xi
 The outreach concept was applied successfully to the Minority
Women’s Employment Project, directed by Alexis Herman, later
Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration. Federal employment
programs provided opportunities for millions of African American
workers while the administration of these programs trained many
black leaders.
Judson MacLaury’s research leads him to three central
conclusions: “first, there were significant, measurable advances for
African American workers; second, the concept of affirmative action
was born and underwent considerable development during this period;
and third, most major actions by the executive were only taken in
response to pressure, direct or indirect, from the African American
community.”
The evidence fully supports these conclusions. Despite a
counterattack on affirmative action during the 1980s and 90s, it seems
fairly clear that reducing institutionalized discrimination requires
positive action to include those who have been excluded in tandem
with legal measures to combat specific, overt acts of discrimination.
The evidence likewise demonstrates the critical importance of
continuous pressure from the victims of discrimination; even well-
meaning political champions of equal opportunity seldom assign
as high a priority to effective remedies as the victims themselves.
Political champions are often satisfied with token breakthroughs,
while the victims rarely, if ever, are. This reality is well understood
by civil rights leaders and sympathetic politicians alike. A. Philip
Randolph, for example, demonstrated the moral power of open and
massive protests against a sympathetic but cautious president who
tolerated discrimination, despite his dedication to democracy and
broadly shared prosperity. Randolph often told his followers: “Your
friends can help you but they can’t save you; you have to save

xii
yourselves.” Similarly, in his 1963 letter from a Birmingham jail,
Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote: “freedom is never voluntarily given
by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed.” President
Johnson, the consummate politician, understood this principle very
well; he told a group of labor and civil rights leaders who called on
him to support the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that this legislation was
good for them and the country and he was all for it, adding: “Now go
make me do it.”
The lessons from To Advance Their Opportunities are as valuable
for other victims of discrimination—especially women—as they are
for African Americans. Indeed, MacLaury writes that women, for
example, were excluded from the CCC and other important New Deal
programs. It also is noteworthy that President Truman, a civil rights
champion who defied members of his party and, among other things,
desegregated the armed forces, nevertheless acquiesced to pressure
from male members of his cabinet not to reappoint Frances Perkins,
the most effective and influential Secretary of Labor in history.
The elimination of discrimination against people for reasons
unrelated to merit therefore will require a combination of strong
leadership from public and private officials, but especially from the
victims of discrimination.
The evolution of the slow march to equal opportunity reveals the
interaction between attitudes and behavior. In employment situations
discrimination is only partially responsive to attitudes. Changed
behavior is required to overcome specific overt racial discrimination.
Affirmative action and African American performance in all sectors
of American life changed racial attitudes. Barriers to further change
were created by racial politics which appealed to whites through
thinly veiled racist code words. The fact that racial appeals have to

xiii
be veiled is a sign of progress; the fact that they are made at all shows
how far we still have to go.
It could be that a number of developments will cause even thinly
disguised racial appeals to be less effective in the 21st century. After
the initial breakthroughs—the positive effects of tokenism—African
Americans’ accomplishments in all sectors of national life challenged
the enduring myth of inherent racial differences. A second important
force for change was the rise of both black political and black
economic power after the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which enabled
two pro-civil rights Southerners—Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton—to
get elected president despite losing the Southern white vote. Racist
appeals were further weakened by welfare reform and the decline in
urban violence, which made many code words much less effective,
and by growing embarrassment about the treatment of African
Americans throughout most of our history. This is not to argue that
racism is dead—only that it has become much less acceptable and
there are fewer ways to camouflage racist signals.
Judson MacLaury’s detailed study of efforts to reduce discrim­
ination against African Americans is important because it teaches the
kinds of actions and leadership required to combat the deadly effects
of discrimination against people for reasons unrelated to their personal
merit.

Ray Marshall
June 2008

xiv
 Preface

A fter the abolition of slavery, African Americans were soon

oppressed at the local level by discriminatory Jim Crow
laws and practices that made the vast majority of them second-class
citizens. Because of that, disproportionate numbers of them were
relegated to low-paying, low-prestige employment. It was not until
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, that it was made a violation of
federal statute law to discriminate against African Americans in the
workplace.
Long before the Civil Rights Act, however, the feder​al​
government had begun to recognize the importance of African
American workers to the economy and the legitimacy of their desire
for and right to an equal chance to share in its opportunities. This book
is the story of the origins and growth of the federal executive branch’s
role in addressing the emergence of black labor in the national
economy and in improving their opportunities for good jobs. It will
show that, beginning with the Great Migration of black workers out
of the rural South to the industrial North and Midwest during World
War I, the federal government slowly initiated a series of steps to deal
at least partially with the economic issues and social problems that
arose. A key finding of the book is that virtually every major step the
government took was the result of strong pressure from the growing
civil rights movement.
The story of executive branch action is divided into three eras.
“Part I: Crisis-driven Federal Action from World War I through
the Great Depression, 1914-1940” shows how the government

xv
operated initially in an ad hoc way, responding to circumstances
resulting from the two world wars that book-ended the roaring 20s
and the Great Depression. “Part II: Institutionalization of Executive
Action, 1940-1960” and “Part III: Culmination of Executive Action,
1960-1964” describe the development of policy, implemented
through presidential executive orders and other measures, into a more
continuous and systematic effort.
As the book shows, in the period from 1914 to 1964 the federal
government operated primarily in the spheres where it had the greatest
control: federal employment, whether within the bureaucracy or on
government projects; and employment by contractors providing goods
or services to the federal government. Control was implemented either
through direct administration, in the case of federal employment,
or through executive order and moral suasion, in the case of private
employers. Relevant legislation and court cases are discussed, but
the focus is on the executive branch, the main actor during the “pre-
history” of government action on civil rights before Title VII.
The federal government adopted a largely cooperative,
voluntaristic approach to seeking compliance with goals of fairness
in the workplace. Even after it developed regulations that allowed
various sanctions, it was generally reluctant to enforce them against
violators. The political and social realities of the period before the
Civil Rights Act were not conducive to mandatory enforcement
of equal opportunity rules. The government did, however, seek to
persuade private employers to take extra steps, which became known
as Affirmative Action, to hire and promote African Americans.
Governmental bodies probably carried voluntarism as far as it could
effectively go, until the Civil Rights Act introduced a paradigm shift
that ushered in a new era of mandatory compliance with federal anti-
discrimination goals.

xvi
 The literature on which I base this book is rich and extensive.
However, that literature is a bit of a patchwork. There are excellent
individual studies of civil rights under various presidents, but they do
not focus on employment. There are a few studies that do focus on the
topic, but none covers the entire period from 1914 to 1964. One goal
of the book is to synthesize this collective historical effort.
Another goal is to show, in detail, how various programs and
executive orders came about and how they were implemented.
While the literature is very rich in coverage of the macro political
and social background, there is relatively little coverage of the
micro aspects. In order to adequately address this area, I delved into
the wealth of government records in the National Archives and the
rich collections of the Wirtz Labor Library of the U. S. Department
of Labor. Hopefully, the book will provide the public with a clearer
picture of how their federal government went about promoting equal
employment opportunities for African American workers.
In the interest of full disclosure, I should note that I served as
the Department of Labor historian from 1972 until my retirement
in 2006. As the book has been completed since I left the federal
government, hopefully removal has provided additional perspective
and objectivity. I would like to acknowledge those at the Department
who made my research possible. First I wish to express my deep
gratitude to Dr. Jonathan Grossman, my predecessor as departmental
historian. He not only hired me, he encouraged me to write the book
that he always said I had in me. I also want to thank Gary Reed, a
later supervisor, who encouraged me to start work on this book and
to concentrate my time and efforts on a project that he knew would
bear fruit only years later. His only requirement was to “just write a
good book.” I hope I have met his expectations. To Linda Stinson, my
successor as departmental historian, words cannot express my thanks

xvii
for the superb developmental editing job she did. She helped me turn
an unwieldy early draft into a much more readable book. Finally, I
should credit the Department of Labor itself for giving me the idea
for the title, which I shamelessly stole from the law that created the
department in 1913. The title is part of the mission statement requiring
the new department “to advance their opportunities for profitable
employment” [emphasis added]. There was no congressional intent
to make sure those opportunities were equally available to all,
but fortunately time and change made that a preeminent national
mission.
Professor Robert Zieger, a labor historian at the University of
Florida, kindly served as my unofficial adviser throughout the project.
He reviewed my early outlines of the book and plans for research and
writing, and he provided encouragement and support as I grappled
with the daunting and, to me, unfamiliar challenges of writing a
book.
Lastly I want to thank the wonderful and talented people at
Newfound Press and the University of Tennessee Library. Linda
Phillips, chair of the press’s editorial board, shepherded my
manuscript through the review process and was a joy to work with.
Casie Fedukovich did a superb job of copy and substantive editing.
My book is a better one for her efforts. The cover design by Hannah
Barker perfectly expresses the theme and period of the book. To all,
my profound thanks.
I dedicate this book to the memory of my parents, James and
Ruth. To my wife, Judy, I can only say thank you for steadfast moral
support during the book’s ten-year, and seemingly endless, gestation
period.

Judson MacLaury
Seattle, Washington
June 2008
xviii
Part I: Crisis-Driven Federal Action
from World War I through the Great Depression,
1914-1940

T he period from World War I through the Great Depression

and the New Deal marked the first large-scale influx of
African American workers into the nation’s industrial workforce. It
also saw the initiation of significant federal involvement with and
assistance to African American workers. It was a period of mostly
ad hoc government responses driven first by the emergency of World
War I and then by the Depression. The intervening period of peace
and prosperity during the 1920s produced relatively little federal
action in this area.
Chapter 1, “World War I and After,” focuses on several factors
that came together in this period to affect black workers. First was
the widespread institution of discriminatory Jim Crow practices in
the Administration of President Woodrow Wilson, prompting a strong
backlash from the black community. At the same time that black
workers began migrating from the rural South to fill industrial jobs
in the North, the supply of white immigrant labor from Europe was
drying up because of the war. The migration and America’s entry
into the war in Europe, combined with pressure from black leaders,
led to federal efforts to assist black workers and fully integrate
them economically into the war effort. The principal federal vehicle
for these efforts was the Department of Labor’s Division of Negro
Economics, a temporary wartime agency headed by black sociologist
George Haynes.
Chapter 2, “Depression and New Deal,” covers a period of
remarkable efforts by the government to assure full and equal

1
participation by African Americans in the work and relief programs
of the New Deal. The leadership of the Administration of Franklin
D. Roosevelt included racial progressives like Harold Ickes, Harry
Hopkins, and the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt. They were joined by
an unprecedented number of senior black appointees who organized
themselves into an unofficial “Black Cabinet” that guided and
promoted equal treatment efforts.
Depression era equal opportunity efforts largely expired with
the demise of their host agencies. However, new laws like the Wagner
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Social Security Act,
which instituted Unemployment Insurance, left a long-term legacy of
benefits to the African American workforce.

2
chapter 1 : world war I and after

Chapter 1: World War I and After

O n July 28, 1914, Austria-Hungary invaded Serbia and World

War I began. This conflict set in motion a chain of events
that would have profound consequences for the African American
workforce and for federal government policies toward them. For
several decades before the war, the flow of European immigrants
was the main source of labor fueling America’s burgeoning industrial
economy. According to the federal Dillingham Immigration
Commission’s reports of 1907-1910, workers from Eastern Europe
virtually monopolized employment in many sectors of industry. By
1915 the flow was reduced from a torrent to a trickle. In 1914, more
than 1.2 million Europeans came to America; in 1915 only 327,000
entered the country.1 European armies soaked up conscription-age
workers, and many immigrants returned to their homelands from the
United States.

The Great Migration

While the influx of new laborers dwindled, the demand for

U.S. agricultural and industrial products soared. In response, the
country turned to its main underused domestic source of labor: the
black population. Concentrated largely in the rural South, African
Americans at that time were subjected to “Jim Crow” laws in that
region. Discriminatory practices instituted in the decades after the
end of Reconstruction in 1877 segregated them socially and severely
limited their economic opportunities. Consequently, the allure of jobs

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and better lives outside of the South prompted massive numbers to

move north.
The groundwork for this large-scale relocation had already
been laid by decades of the temporary movement of southern black
laborers, as they took seasonal jobs in the North and then returned
home.2 But the growing threat of racial violence, including lynching,
along with heavy flooding and boll weevil infestations that routinely
combined to ruin the cotton crops of black share-croppers and tenant-
farmers, provided African Americans with a strong motivation to
relocate permanently. During the 1910s, more than half a million
of them left the South for good, beginning the “Great Migration” of
African Americans that endured for the next half century and more.
These migrants settled mainly in the large cities of the Northeast
and Midwest. They found employment in industries that had formerly
relied on European immigrants, such as railroads, packing houses,
steel mills, and heavy manufacturing. Significant numbers also
moved to non-urban areas, such as the coal fields of the southern
Appalachians.3
The search by large numbers of African Americans for better
economic and social opportunities in the cities of the North and
Midwest brought them into contact with white workers and white
society in a much freer environment than existed in the Jim Crow
South. The result was often racial friction and, occasionally, explosive
violence. In their new homes, free of restrictions on their voting rights,
African Americans increasingly exercised their franchise in a more
balanced, two-party system, and thus they began to affect elections.
The result of these social and political pressures was that the federal
government was forced to pay serious attention to the issues raised
by the presence of large numbers of blacks in the urban industrial
workforce. Thus began fifty years of federal efforts, principally

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through the Executive Branch, to assimilate African Americans into

the industrial workforce and to attempt to satisfy, however gradually,
their growing desire for fair treatment.

The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Administration and

Blacks

Ironically, Federal engagement in the issues of working African

Americans developed under an Administration that was generally
unsympathetic, and often openly hostile, to their plight. The White
House was occupied by Woodrow Wilson, a Virginia Democrat who
took office on March 4, 1913.4 During the 1912 presidential elections,
the Wilson campaign made a strong bid for the support of the growing
block of black voters. Black groups worked vigorously for Wilson’s
election and, late in the campaign, he was endorsed by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). While
it turned out that their support was not crucial to Wilson, many blacks
felt it gave them influence in the Administration and they looked
forward to turning campaign promises into action for black rights.
However, the Executive Branch was still dominated by segregationist
Southern Democrats. As a result, Washington remained resistant to
meeting either the political or economic expectations of the black
community.5
Despite his campaign promises for racial fairness, Wilson
actually favored segregation. He shared the belief, widespread among
white Americans, that African Americans were racially distinct from
and inferior to white people. Wilson also needed the support of
Southern Democrats, who were uninterested in a goal of racial justice,
in order to win their support for his main priority: an ambitious
program of economic reform.6

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While the southern states began instituting segregation and

discrimination in the 1880s, the federal government moved in the
opposite direction, at least as regards its own employees. Blacks
began to be appointed to diplomatic posts and political positions, and
the government even held recruitment campaigns. Thirty years later,
Wilson reversed that policy. He appointed only two blacks in his first
two years in office, while allowing a total of 12 traditionally black
positions to lapse into white hands.7 In perhaps the unkindest cut of
all, Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, broke with
the tradition of appointing black ambassadors to Haiti, a tradition that
had been initiated with the selection of black abolitionist Frederick
Douglass. Bryan’s naming of a white to that position aggrieved both
American blacks and Haitians. Leaders from the National Colored
Democratic League and the National Black Democratic League
called on Wilson to resume the tradition of patronage appointments
for members of their race.8
Before the Wilson Administration, black participation in career
federal government employment had been even higher than in the
political appointment realm. Under the Pendleton Civil Service Act of
1883, most federal jobs were gradually removed from patronage and
brought under a competitive Civil Service. By law, hiring was now
to be based solely on merit. The Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which administered the Pendleton Act, saw to it that qualified blacks
had a fair opportunity to be hired. While many obtained only menial
positions, a significant number held managerial and professional
posts. The CSC also promoted fair treatment after hiring. Segregation
in federal offices was virtually nonexistent. As a result, the number
of blacks in Civil Service positions grew steadily, from about 600 in
1883 to 12,000 by 1913.9

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When the Wilson Administration took office in 1913, the

National Democratic Fair Play Association objected to a federal
landscape where white women were working alongside or even
reporting to black men and women. Southern members of the Cabinet
were very sympathetic to these concerns. At an early Cabinet meeting,
several of them complained about alleged friction between black and
white federal employees. As a proposed solution, they called for
the introduction of segregation. Wilson went along with the idea,
rationalizing it as being not only good for the government, but also in
the best interest of blacks.
Secretary of the Treasury William Gibbs McAdoo (Wilson’s
son-in-law) and Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson were
particularly strong proponents of segregation. Burleson claimed
to have the support of moderate black leaders, including Bishop
Alexander Walters, president of the National Colored Democratic
League. Wilson’s Cabinet, while not formally endorsing segregation,
did not, as a body, oppose the racist efforts of Burleson, McAdoo, and
others.10
Consequently, Jim Crow practices were soon widely adopted.
Such institutionalized racism affected black federal workers adversely
in three main ways: physical segregation in the workplace, numerous
downgrades to lower paying jobs, and outright termination. Officially,
there was no change in the CSC’s merit-based hiring policies. But
in May 1914, it began requiring that photographs be attached to
all job applications, making it easier to discriminate against black
candidates.11
Some departments adopted Jim Crow practices more
enthusiastically than others. Not surprisingly, Secretary McAdoo’s
Treasury Department instituted it widely. The impact of this
endorsement was magnified by the fact that there were Treasury

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auditors’ offices in almost every department of the government.

Because of this presence, segregation and other Jim Crow practices
often existed in buildings occupied by departments that did not
support these policies. The Treasury Department even took the
extreme step of setting up partitions in some offices so that white and
black employees would not be able to see each other. While other
federal agencies instituted Jim Crow informally and through verbal
orders, the Treasury Department was alone in issuing written orders.
Albert Burleson’s Jim Crow Post Office Department was the
largest federal employer of African Americans, and it had a wide
national reach, with post offices in virtually every county. Black
employees in post offices and railway mail cars in the South suffered
acutely from workplace discrimination. Elsewhere, rest rooms were
segregated in such agencies as the Government Printing Office,
the Marine Hospital building, and the Navy Department. In some
cases, the black rest rooms had to be used by both sexes. Even more
incredibly, at times bathrooms doubled as eating areas for blacks
excluded from the regular dining rooms.12
Segregation was not universally adopted in the federal
government, however. Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, a
Southerner, did not impose it on the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), though racial practices were far from uniformly fair from
one office to another within the USDA. Relatively few blacks were
appointed as county agricultural agents, but these small numbers
were due in part to the power of local offices to reject applicants on
racial or other grounds. On the other hand, at the Office of Public
Roads and the Bureau of Plant Husbandry, blacks and whites were
allowed to work side by side. The Labor Department also remained
relatively free of discrimination. Perhaps because adoption was not
universal, the impact of Jim Crow on the federal workforce during the

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Wilson Administration was somewhat mitigated. While the proportion

of black civil servants declined from six to five percent of the
government-wide total, their absolute numbers actually increased.13

The Response to Federal Segregation

The nascent black civil rights community did not take the
wave of federal segregation lying down. In May 1913, Ralph Tyler,
a black Treasury Department auditor and career employee working
in the Department of the Navy, called on President Wilson to speak
out against discrimination in the Bureau of Printing and Engraving
and in the auditor’s office of the Post Office. More influential voices
soon joined Tyler’s. Concerned about Jim Crow in the Wilson
Administration, the NAACP concurrently authorized New York Post
editor Oswald Garrison Villard, the chair of the body, to develop a
plan for a “National Race Commission” and present it to the President.
Villard was the leading white advocate of equal treatment for blacks
and also a personal friend of President Wilson. In May 1913, Villard
had an opportunity to present his plan to the President. At first, Wilson
approved of the idea, but months passed and nothing happened.
Villard repeatedly urged Wilson to appoint the commission, but
finally Wilson informed him that he had decided against it because of
opposition within the Senate.14
In the meantime, the NAACP collected substantial inside
information on Jim Crow in Washington, based on reports from
a special investigator and other sources. By August 15, 1913,
when it seemed unlikely that there would ever be a National Race
Commission, the NAACP sent Wilson a strong letter objecting to
the growing Jim Crow practices in the government. They followed
up with a comprehensive publicity campaign among sympathizers,

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newspapers, members of Congress, and others, encouraging them to

join the NAACP in opposition.15
On November 6, 1913, Wilson unenthusiastically received a
delegation from the National Independent Political League (NIPL),
headed by the Boston Guardian’s crusading editor, William Monroe
Trotter. On behalf of the NIPL, a black advocacy group operating
independently of the NAACP, Trotter presented the “National Petition
Against Jim Crow and Color Segregation in the Federal Government,”
signed by 20,000 supporters. At first, Wilson denied a formal Jim Crow
effort. But when confronted with the documentation of segregation
in his Administration, the president reluctantly acknowledged its
existence and vaguely promised that the situation would be “worked
out.”16
The anti-Jim Crow campaigns continued and, on November 16,
1914, a year after the 1913 meeting, Trotter led an almost identical
delegation to Washington, this time under the auspices of the
National Independent Equal Rights League. Meeting with Wilson,
the group presented resolutions from the Massachusetts legislature
protesting segregation in the federal government. Members took turns
addressing the President and urging an end to Jim Crow. Trotter spoke
last and made an impassioned plea for racial justice. He eschewed
the deference normally expected in addressing the President of the
United States, boldly rebuking Wilson for allowing rampant unfair
treatment of black employees in the federal government. Wilson
responded that these employees were not being ill-treated in their
separate work arrangements and claimed that segregation actually
helped assure racial harmony. Trotter rejected the argument and
asserted that because of these policies, African Americans might be
less likely to support the Democratic Party in the future. Wilson took
offense at this political threat and the conversation degenerated into a

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heated argument. Although the meeting ended on a calmer note, this

fiery confrontation between a black leader and the President generated
intense news coverage and enormous publicity for the movement
against Jim Crow in the government.
Presidential aide Joseph Tumulty was impressed with Trotter’s
eloquence and continued to urge Wilson to reconsider the issue
of segregation. While discrimination and segregation remained in
existence for some time, after 1914 there was little, if any, further
growth of Jim Crow in the federal establishment.17

African Americans and World War I

With the U.S. declaration of war against Germany on April 6,

1917, black support and black labor were now crucial to both war
munitions production and the military build-up. Administration
officials worried, perhaps out of a guilty conscience, that German
propagandists would find blacks responsive to their message
promoting non-intervention by the U.S. and less willing to contribute
to the war effort. Rumors abounded of German agents stirring up
black field hands. Unsubstantiated incidents were blown out of
proportion and widely disseminated. A black man was reported to
have said, “The Germans ain’t done nothin’ to me, and if they have,
I forgive ’em.”18 To help counteract this perceived threat, Wilson and
his Cabinet sought to rebuild ties with the black community that had
been damaged by the onset of Jim Crow under his Administration.
As it turned out, the loyalty of African Americans and plots to
undermine their support of the war effort were greatly exaggerated.
After hundreds of federal investigations of alleged German
subversion, there was no proof of a single bona fide plot to turn
black people against the U.S. government during the war.19 On the

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contrary, a national meeting of the NAACP and allied groups in May

1917 resolved that blacks should enthusiastically support the U.S. and
work for a victory that the delegates believed could lead to freedom
for the “darker races” throughout the world. Further, while pledging
absolute loyalty to the military’s aims, the delegates also vowed to
continue seeking equal rights for blacks. These rights included the
right to serve at all levels of the military, to fully exercise the voting
franchise, to be free from Jim Crow practices, and to be safe from
lynch mobs, an escalating problem of the early 20th century. This
resolution characterized the wartime positions of most black leaders,
who advocated loyalty to the government, but who also demanded
fairness.
Meanwhile, the most pressing need after the declaration of war
was a rapid mobilization to expand the U.S. armed forces. Hundreds
of thousands of civilian blacks freely and enthusiastically joined
patriotic rallies and volunteered to serve on the home front and in the
military.20 Consequently, it was in the military that the first serious
wartime issue involving blacks arose. The Selective Service Act of
1917 allowed the induction of black conscripts by local draft boards.
Large numbers were drafted, but the U.S. Army sought to hold to
long-established traditions of discrimination. In an attempt to break
this mold, the NAACP campaigned to convince Secretary of War
Newton D. Baker, one of the non-southern members of the Cabinet,
to try to improve conditions for black soldiers. Adding pressure on the
government, in August 1917, race riots broke out in Houston, Texas,
stemming from police brutality toward black soldiers.21
In response to the military’s discrimination and the violence in
Houston, Secretary Baker ordered the training of black officers and
created an all-black combat division, the legendary Ninety-Second.
This new division and several black regiments in existing divisions

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broke the barriers to military service by blacks in combat duty and

acquitted themselves well in battle on the Western Front.22 Despite
these opportunities, the NAACP was critical of the lack of further
progress in the Army. It objected to the fact that segregated units
remained the norm, that white officers publicly belittled the combat
abilities of black soldiers, and that blacks were discriminated against
in matters of leave and recreation.23
In October 1917, Secretary Baker sought to respond to the
NAACP and help defuse racial tensions. He met first with President
Wilson and black educator Robert Moton; later he met separately
with W.E.B. DuBois, one of the founders of the NAACP. After these
dialogues, Baker created the post of confidential adviser in the War
Department in order to address black concerns within the military. He
named Emmett Scott, an African American and long-time associate
of Booker T. Washington, to fill the post. At that time there was
only one other federal office dedicated to black affairs, an obscure
Division of Racial Groups in the Bureau of Education. Scott’s duties
included inspecting training camps and investigating discrimination
claims against the military and Southern draft boards. He also strove
tirelessly to require the U.S. Public Health Service to hire black
doctors and nurses.24
Like the military, federal civilian agencies had a mixed wartime
record of promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment of black
workers. The National War Labor Board, established to eliminate
disruptions in war production due to labor disputes, intervened in a
number of cases affecting black workers and generally supported their
rights. In a case involving white and black laundry workers in Little
Rock, Arkansas, for example, the Board ordered equal pay for equal
work, regardless of race. The U.S. Railroad Administration (USRA),
which operated the railroads after the federal government nationalized

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them in late 1917, also sought—with some success—to equalize

opportunities. On a number of occasions, the USRA defended the rights
of black workers and their unions in the historically white-dominated
realm of train operations. In one notable instance, sleeping car porters
were granted a pay increase after appealing to the USRA. On several
occasions, the agency cancelled union contracts that discriminated
against blacks. The USRA’s impact was limited, however, by the fact
that Treasury Secretary McAdoo, a leading proponent of Jim Crow,
was its director. Like McAdoo, many USRA investigators were far
from racially progressive and usually sided against the rights of black
railroad workers. Likewise, the USDA generally sided with southern
farmers who feared losing their cheap black labor to new jobs in
defense plants. The USDA helped farmers by promoting local “work
or fight” orders that forced black farm workers to remain in their jobs
or else face conscription into the Army.25
Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson and the War Labor
Administration (WLA), which he directed, had the massive and
difficult job of facilitating the mobilization of the labor force for
defense production.26 Though hampered by lack of preparedness
planning by the White House and inefficient defense procurement
procedures, the WLA and the Department of Labor placed millions
of workers in defense jobs. In the process, Secretary Wilson and
the agencies he headed were faced with the situation of hundreds of
thousands of black workers who had migrated in search of defense
work. Unlike the many government officials who favored Jim
Crow, William Wilson, a former labor leader, was sympathetic to
the plight of African Americans. The campaign against segregation
in the government had reached the Labor Department in late 1913
when Secretary Wilson received letters from groups as diverse as
the NAACP and the New York City Republican Club, calling for

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equal treatment of black federal employees. These missives found a

receptive ear at the Labor Department, which staunchly resisted the
Jim Crow tide. Wilson’s biographer, Clark Wilhelm, wrote that Wilson
“was willing to use his labor administration to help Negroes, showing
himself a courageous innovator.” Wilson’s second-in-command,
Assistant Secretary Louis Post (a white), also had a strong record of
supporting black causes. He worked for the Freedmen’s Bureau after
the Civil War, participated in the founding of the NAACP in 1909,
and maintained strong relations with the black leadership.27

The Department of Labor and the Great Migration

Even before the war, the Department of Labor became involved

with black workers and the Great Migration through the work of an
agency known as the U.S. Employment Service (USES), not to be
confused with the agency of the same name created by law in 1933.
The first USES was created in 1915 as part of a plan to find jobs
for those left without employment during a recession.28 However,
the new agency built upon a preexisting Division of Information,
established in 1907 within the Bureau of Immigration that operated
labor distribution (i.e., placement) offices at major ports to help guide
arriving immigrants to jobs.29
The recession of 1915 proved to be short-lived, but the USES
continued and played a surprising role in the Great Migration. A
Secretary of Labor’s circular in January 1915 ordered the USES
to expand the labor distribution network. The scope of the system
was also greatly extended through a strategy involving the Post
Office Department and using Bureau of Immigration field staff to
oversee operations. Every post office in the country was directed
to prominently display a notice advising employers and workers

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of a new employment program. Interested parties were to fill out

application forms and turn them in to the postmaster to be sent to
USES distribution branches where job seekers would be matched
with job offers on a nationwide basis.30
Although the job matching system was never fully implemented,
post offices did display notices from the Labor Department announcing
employment opportunities. The USES also facilitated transportation
arrangements for relocating employment candidates, many of them
southern blacks who could not afford the rail ticket North to a new
job, by asking employers to advance one-way railroad tickets when
needed. The trunks of new hires were checked straight through and
consigned to the employer as security to assure reimbursement for the
tickets.31
In this way, the Department of Labor provided an assist to
the Great Migration, just when demand for labor in the industrial
North was swelling. In its Annual Report for 1917, the Department
acknowledged that “[s]ome of the black migration northward had
been through agencies of the U.S. Employment Service.” Charles
Johnson, a leading black sociologist, might have gone a little
overboard, however, when he asserted in 1930: “Quite unwittingly
the [Department], through its practice of assisting in the movement
of labor to acute points of demand, was giving the first impetus to the
Negro migration.”32
By June 1916, southern planters were becoming intensely
concerned about the impact on production of the actual and
anticipated shortages of cheap black labor due to migration. Rising
war-time agricultural prices provided a strong incentive for them to
maintain production.33 In response, they supported “work or fight”
laws and orders to force black workers to stay in the fields. They also
complained to their elected representatives in Washington that the

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USES was encouraging migration. Several Southern Congressmen

importuned the Department of Labor to put the brakes on. In a rare
about-face on racial policies, the Labor Department, while continuing
to assist individual black workers, yielded to pressure and “withdrew
its facilities from group migration.”34
In further response to mounting criticism, generated principally
by Southerners, the Department of Labor ordered studies of the
migration’s economic and social impact. In the summer of 1916,
the Department sent Charles Hall and William Jennifer, black
investigators on detail from the Commerce Department, on a fact-
finding mission to determine the impact of the migration.35 Based on
numerous interviews with individuals of both races, the researchers
concluded, contrary to assertions by the planters, that the migration
was neither flooding the labor market in the North nor severely
shrinking the labor force in the South.36
Hall and Jennifer called for further study of the complex and
changing nature of the migration. By 1917, they wrote, it had “excited
widespread concern for its possible effect upon the prosecution of the
war.” The perceived black migration problem was now a war problem.
To look into these and other issues, Secretary Wilson commissioned
a more thorough investigation in 1917. To supervise the study, he
appointed Dr. James H. Dillard, a distinguished white academician
and president of the Jeanes-Slater Funds for Negro Education. Wilson
considered Dillard a credible investigator who had the confidence of
blacks and whites alike.37
Dillard engaged a team of investigators from both races to
conduct field work in several Southern states. He compiled their
findings in a detailed report submitted to Secretary Wilson at the end
of 1917. The report, however, was not published until 1919, but its
purpose was to uncover both the causes of the migration and also its

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effects on the economy of the South. While Dillard worried about

the impact of the migration on the South, he found that the effects
were fundamentally positive. The study asserted that the movement
of blacks to the North was a “commendable effort” that reflected
the natural desire of human beings to improve their circumstances.
In Dillard’s view, national progress depended upon broadly shared
improvement which was not confined to one class or race.38 In regard
to labor shortages in the South, he concurred with Hall and Jennifer
and wrote that “the danger seems not to have been so extensive or so
acute as was feared.”39
Despite Dillard’s findings, Secretary Wilson continued to
receive complaints about alleged labor shortages. G.S. Cullinan,
president of the Houston, Texas, Chamber of Commerce, charged that
a Pennsylvania Railroad agent sought to hire 500 blacks away from
Houston by spreading a rumor that the federal government planned
to force remaining blacks into farm work. Congressman John T.
Watkins (Democrat—Louisiana) charged that hundreds of black farm
laborers were heading to the North from his district. But it was not
only the southerners who complained. The governor of Minnesota
called on Wilson to halt the entry of blacks into his state. A group of
labor leaders from Illinois blamed a series of racial assaults in East
St. Louis on the large number of black migrants in that area. Further,
many labor unions were unhappy about the widespread use of black
migrants as strike-breakers in the North and Midwest.40
Secretary Wilson was conciliatory toward Congressman Watkins.
He responded that the Department had no authority to interfere with
the movement of workers and admitted it was “an embarrassing
situation.” Wilson expressed the hope that in the North employers
would cease using black strike-breakers and in the South they would
be “as solicitous as others for the welfare of the workers of their

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region.” The Labor Department’s policy, he wrote, was to balance the

individual interests against the “industrial interests of the country as a
whole.”41 To further address southern concerns about labor shortages,
Wilson instituted a program to temporarily admit Mexican workers,
including agricultural labor.42
Wilson was only compromising with political realities and
wartime needs, but USES Director John Densmore went beyond
practical needs in responding to southern employers. When the
operator of a sawmill charged that blacks were being lured away from
his firm to higher paying federal munitions work in Muscle Shoals,
Alabama, Densmore assured him that the government would not give
black workers any information “showing what they do at Muscle
Shoals to get [them] to move away from there. We will let [them]
alone.”43

Birth of the Division of Negro Economics

In response to the Great Migration and continuing into the war

period, African American leaders increasingly called for federal action
to assist black workers. Initially spearheading the drive was Giles
Jackson, an ambitious Virginian who was president of the National
Civic Improvement Association. Jackson advocated a self-help
program for blacks that would focus on agricultural work. Beginning
in 1916, he lobbied Washington for the creation of a “Bureau of
Industrial Aid and Economics” which his association would operate
under the umbrella of the Department of Labor with a substantial
federal funding level of $700,000. The main purpose of the Bureau
was to encourage blacks to farm in the South instead of migrating,
thereby helping to maintain food supplies and holding farming costs
down. In a region where growers were increasingly worried about

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losing low-wage black labor, this approach gained political support.

The Richmond Chamber of Commerce and Senator Thomas Martin
of Virginia endorsed Jackson’s approach.44
Jackson’s strategy, with its unorthodox mixture of private and
public resources, gained enough support to have the matter taken up in
the White House in May 1917. President Wilson’s personal secretary,
Joseph Tumulty, referred the plan to the wartime Council of National
Defense, which informed Jackson that Congressional approval of
funding would be needed. Jackson petitioned members of Congress
to approve the necessary legislation. In order to gain more support in
the Administration, Jackson joined Congressman W. Schley Howard
(Democrat-Virginia) and members of the Richmond Chamber of
Commerce to discuss the plan with Secretary Wilson. Jackson also
met with Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation
of Labor (AFL), around the same time. Gompers, concerned about
the use of black migrants as strike-breakers in the North, endorsed
Jackson’s plan and urged Secretary Wilson to join him. Additional
support came from John A. Ross, president of the Associated Colored
Employees of America, headquartered in New York City.45
Jackson’s proposal was never adopted, but it did establish the
idea of a permanent federal office dealing with black labor issues. At
the end of January 1918, the National Urban League (NUL)—long
involved in the issue of the black migration and concerned that the
exodus was about to intensify—held a conference in New York
City, with representatives of business, social service agencies, other
black organizations, and organized labor in attendance. The NUL’s
primary focus was on winning the support of the AFL for greater
union membership for black workers, who were now entering the
industrial workforce in droves and were, at the same time, subjected
to significant discrimination by organized labor. To supplement this

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effort, the conference included in its resolutions a call for “one or

two competent blacks” to be appointed in the Department of Labor to
assist in the distribution of black labor.46
On Lincoln’s Birthday, February 12, 1918, a group of black
leaders from the NUL, the NAACP, and other bodies acted on this
resolution. A preliminary meeting with Louis Post paved the way, and
the group presented Secretary Wilson with a more detailed version of
their January conference recommendation. The memo cited the war
emergency as creating “the most critical labor problem in its history.”
It noted that the Department of Labor had already set up mechanisms
to provide an adequate labor supply, deal with war production labor
disputes, and assure decent working and living conditions for war
industry workers. The petitioners made it clear that they believed it
was now time for attention to be paid to the black labor force, whose
migration posed a social challenge to the nation. Unlike Giles Jackson,
who sought to keep blacks in the rural South, this group accepted
migration as a continuing reality that required understanding and
action to prevent further social problems in the North. Specifically,
they asked for the appointment of “a black expert on labor problems” to
advise the Secretary of Labor. They cited the service of Emmett Scott
in the War Department as a precedent. To supplement the proposed
“black expert,” they called for the appointment of black assistants
in the various offices of the war labor program as recommended in
the January resolution. They also offered to suggest names for black
appointees.47
Post forwarded their request to Secretary Wilson, along with his
personal endorsement. Although Post felt that simply adding a black
to the Department of Labor’s Advisory Council would be “mere race
recognition,” or tokenism, he and Wilson agreed that the Department
should pursue the matter. Post noted that “there is an absolute

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necessity that the Department of Labor come into comprehensive and

comprehending relations with … the black race.” He recommended
to Wilson that the Department hold an “authoritative conference” to
decide how best to act on the petition. With his scribbled “Approved
Feb. 16-18, WBW” on Post’s decision memo, Wilson endorsed
the first step toward applying to black workers the broad federal
mandate stated in the Department of Labor’s 1913 Organic Act: to
“foster, promote and develop the welfare of the wage earners of the
United States, improve their working conditions, and advance their
opportunities for profitable employment.” With this action, the federal
government also began laying the groundwork for outreach efforts
that evolved over the next half-century into affirmative action.48
The recommended “authoritative conference” took place later in
February 1918 at a meeting between several signers of the Lincoln’s
Birthday proposal and the Department of Labor’s Advisory Council.
L.C. Marshall of the Council reported to Wilson that what the black
group really wanted was to have a black adviser serving within the
Department. The Advisory Council agreed with this idea. However,
it rejected the call to have the black adviser serve on the Advisory
Council itself, because of the temporary nature of the Advisory
Council’s existence. They recommended that Wilson appoint a
black expert who could provide advice and also help administer any
programs that were developed. They left open the question of where
the adviser would be located and what kind of organization, if any,
would be needed.49
Wilson followed the Advisory Council’s recommendation and
created the position of Director of the Division of Negro Economics
(DNE), the purpose of which was to advise him “in all matters
affecting Negroes.” The Director would report to Wilson. To fill this
historic post, he appointed George Haynes, professor of sociology

22
chapter 1 : world war I and after

and economics at Fisk University. James Dillard, the Urban League,

the NAACP, and others supported Haynes for the position. The
appointment was effective May 1, 1918.50
Haynes, by then, was already a ground-breaking black pioneer.
Born in 1880 to a domestic servant in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, he
graduated from Fisk University in 1903. After several years divided
between pursuing graduate studies in sociology and working to
support his mother and sister, he enrolled at Columbia University and,
in 1912, became the first black to receive a doctorate there.
During the course of his graduate studies, Haynes focused on
the causes and effects of the Great Migration. He became convinced
that it was not, contrary to the hopes of many both within and outside
of the South, about to be reversed. He believed that blacks and
whites should apply social work techniques to ease racial friction and
promote black adjustment to urban life. To that end, he helped found
the NUL in New York City while teaching at Fisk. While working
with the fledgling organization, he endeavored to develop cooperation
between white and black groups. After his service at the Department
of Labor, he returned to the field of social work, spending the balance
of his career with the Federal Council of Churches as head of the
department of race relations.51
As DNE Director, Haynes had beaten out a powerful rival: Giles
Jackson. Although Jackson’s original proposal for a black workers
program had been rejected, he received endorsements for Director of
the DNE from the AFL, both Senators from Virginia, and the White
House. Louis Post, however, derailed the nomination because of
his doubts about Jackson, both personally and professionally. These
doubts were reinforced by the NAACP and other black organizations
that considered Jackson persona non grata. W.E.B. DuBois termed

23
chapter 1 : world war I and after

Jackson “disreputable,” while The Washington Bee, a black newspaper,

charged that he was “not fit to be a dog catcher.”52
Though he failed to land the big prize, Jackson was able to secure
an appointment within the USES as Chief of its new Negro Division.
He took office on May 1, 1918, the same day Haynes became Director
of the DNE. Jackson’s Negro Division was mandated to develop a
program “for the mobilization, employment, and housing of black
labor,” a mission very similar to that of the DNE.53
Such a duplication of functions had the potential for generating
a disruptive rivalry in leadership between Haynes and Jackson. The
rivalry never materialized. The Negro Division and Giles Jackson
were briefly cited in the 1918 Annual Report of the USES, but were
not mentioned in any subsequent annual reports. The fact was that,
while Secretary Wilson had appointed Jackson to please Jackson’s
politically powerful supporters, he never intended to allow him
to play a significant role. Starved of staff and budget, Jackson was
virtually ignored. Haynes and the DNE held sole responsibility for
the Department’s efforts to mobilize black labor.54
Wilson met with George Haynes on May 1, 1918, Haynes’s
first day in office, and laid out some initial goals for the DNE. As the
Advisory Council had suggested, Haynes was to advise the Secretary
and other top Department of Labor officials “on matters relating to
black wage-earners” and to direct programs promoting cooperation
between blacks and whites in both agricultural and industrial
workplaces. Wilson asked Haynes to develop specific plans for such
programs, based on this broad mandate. Wilson also stressed his own
belief that such public programs were important because blacks were
such a significant portion of the populace, constituting one-tenth of
the U.S. population and one-seventh of the workforce.55

24
chapter 1 : world war I and after

In April 1918, just before Haynes (and Jackson) took office,

the USES prepared a memo of suggested policies for the DNE. The
main recommendation was to create within the DNE a “Farm Service
Reserve,” a cohort of black workers for “the farms in sections of the
country where farmers are dependent on colored laborers.” The Farm
Service Reserve (FSR) bore the fingerprints of Giles Jackson and was
never adopted. Nevertheless the USES memo played an important part
in the development of the DNE. Clearly aimed at the South, the FSR
also reflected the thinking of USES Director John Densmore, who was
sympathetic to southern growers. The leadership of the proposed FSR
would be chosen from the black community, with special consideration
given to leaders of secret societies who, it was believed, would be
better able to gain the cooperation of black workers. These leaders
would also counter-act racially inflammatory wartime propaganda
supposedly spread by German agents through Gypsy fortune tellers
and others. There was to be a campaign to enlist white cooperation
with the FSR, with strong reliance on publicity in the press and on
support from state government and local leadership.56
The USES memo and FSR proposal soon circulated to Wilson,
who referred it to Haynes. Haynes prepared a detailed response, in
which he expanded on its ideas and broadened its scope. Haynes’s
memo became the basis for the DNE program.57 While not fully
endorsing the FSR, Haynes did approve of many of its features.
He favored utilizing black staff tapping into black organizations,
presenting workers with a certificate and badge, and obtaining
publicity from black leaders and newspapers. Haynes pointed out,
however, that with the planting season nearly over, there was less
need for emergency farm-workers. Yet, in his view, there remained
a need for long-range planning for both agricultural and industrial
labor. Haynes also stressed that the needs of the whole country and

25
chapter 1 : world war I and after

not just the South should be considered. Furthermore, the black labor
program would have to be coordinated with the broader mandate
of the Department of Labor to improve conditions for all workers.
Finally, Haynes pointed out that, given efforts in the South to forcibly
prevent blacks from leaving, workers would probably be suspicious
of any program that sought to send them back to the farm.58
Based on these considerations and building on the USES
proposal, Haynes formulated a four-point approach to helping
blacks find jobs while maintaining peace between the races. First,
he proposed that a farm reserve-type program should be part of a
wider effort to deal with black employment in all sectors and regions.
Second, he suggested that the plan provide a mechanism for bringing
black and white representatives of various local bodies together to
promote mutual understanding and to establish permanent committees
comprised of both blacks and whites.59 Third, Haynes wanted to
mount a careful campaign to publicize the effort among both whites
and blacks, again using local leaders and organizations. Fourth, he
wished to appoint black staff members (e.g., Assistant Directors
and Examiners) to work in the field to help administer the program.
Though his plan was comprehensive, Haynes stressed that:
The most delicate and difficult problem will be
1. To have the colored people understand the large
purpose and liberal spirit of the Department,
2. The finding and securing of the right type of black
workers,
3. The approach to the local white people, especially
in the South.
The first two are the keys to the third.60

26
chapter 1 : world war I and after

Post forwarded Haynes’s proposal to Wilson. To implement

Haynes’s four-point approach, Wilson, Post, and Haynes formulated
the guiding strategy of the DNE as follows: 1) organization of local
inter-racial committees; 2) publicity campaigns to promote racial
harmony and cooperation with the Department’s war effort; and 3)
development of a staff of blacks in the DNE to assist in those efforts
and to work with other war agencies of the Labor Department. In
addition, Haynes and the USES were to work jointly to keep Wilson
informed about “industrial” (i.e., race) relations between blacks and
whites.61

A Federal-State Partnership

The Division of Negro Economics implemented its dual mission

of mobilizing black labor for the war effort and promoting fairness
and racial harmony through a federal-state partnership, with an
emphasis on the states. This effort concentrated on the regions most
affected by the migration: the South, the root homeland of most of the
nation’s blacks and the base for their exodus; and the Northeast and
Middle West, the primary destinations of that migration. Assisted by
a corps of newly appointed state Supervisors of Negro Economics,
Haynes set the stage for grass-roots action within the states. Grass-
roots action was implemented primarily by means of multi-racial
Negro Workers’ Advisory Committees (NWACs). Together the DNE
and the state Supervisors of Negro Economics complemented the
mobilization and anti-discrimination efforts of the Negro Workers’
Advisory Committees. These corresponding efforts were then, in turn,
supplemented by other federal agencies.
Haynes’s first step in the national black labor program was to
organize and set the course for the DNE. Given the triple mandate

27
chapter 1 : world war I and after

approved by Secretary Wilson, Haynes had to take into account

several factors when planning new programs and establishing his
national organization. Primary among these was the impact of the
black migration upon the balance of labor in both the North and South.
In the North, migration put the races into close contact and resulted
in deplorable living conditions for blacks. Haynes recognized that
confrontations between the races in shops and factories gave rise to
“misunderstandings, prejudices, antagonisms, fears and suspicions.”
He considered these problems to be local issues that should be
understood and remedied in their local context. He also recognized
the need to forestall both black and white suspicions about the goals
and intentions of his agency. “From the start,” he later wrote, “we
have wanted both races to understand and firmly believe that the
Department wishes to promote cooperation and to help solve local
labor problems.”62
With these factors in mind, Haynes began developing a
multi-faceted program to utilize existing governmental and non-
governmental bodies. The strategy was for the DNE to work with the
USES, which was the prime placement agency for war-related jobs,
and with other war-related agencies throughout the federal government
to deal specifically with African American issues. The DNE would
also coordinate with private welfare organizations around the country.
Finally, to improve black morale, enthusiasm for the war effort, and
race relations, Haynes planned a nationwide publicity program.63
While he planned these massive coordinations, Haynes also had
to deal with bureaucratic issues, such as planning the organization
and finding qualified candidates to serve as staff. Wilson, mindful of
suspicions about the program around the country and particularly in
the South, made it clear that the DNE was largely advisory and had no
enforcement powers. He also stressed that it was not a separate “Negro

28
chapter 1 : world war I and after

Bureau” but rather an integral part of the Office of the Secretary that
reported directly to him. The staff in the national office was kept small
to reduce the visibility of the program, but this concession was not as
crippling a limitation as it might seem. The key component of the
organization was not the national but the state segment.64 Appointing
African Americans as DNE staff, state supervisors, and racial
specialists in the USES was a priority for Haynes. Mindful that there
was “serious doubt about the expert efficiency of blacks in official
positions,” he ensured that staff members were well-trained and fully
experienced in their specialties. The job of mediating between whites
and blacks in the workplace and promoting black morale required
staff with exceptional human relations skills and sensitivities. Haynes
was convinced that his personnel measured up to these standards. Two
experts from the Bureau of the Census were appointed supervisors
in key states: Charles E. Hall and William Jennifer, the co-authors
of the Department’s 1916 study on migration, served in Ohio and
Michigan, respectively. Haynes also hired black clerks for his office
and reviewed black appointees in the USES, with whom he worked
out a joint supervisory arrangement. DNE Assistant Director Karl
Phillips supervised the Washington office and worked closely with the
Director. Haynes later praised the entire staff for their performance
under difficult circumstances. Looking at the broader context of black
people functioning in a largely white world, he wrote: “Their services
as a part of this experiment in the Federal Government’s relation to
black-wage earners has been a contribution to the experience with
blacks in important administrative positions.”65
While still developing the DNE staff and program, Haynes
began to establish contact with local leaders and groups in the states.
He embarked on a ten-day tour in early June 1918 to meet with white
and black representatives in the eight Southern states where the

29
chapter 1 : world war I and after

problems of black workers were particularly urgent. Setting the stage

for the tour was a Department of Labor press release dated May 31,
1918. Citing problems in both the South and the North resulting from
black migration, the Department called on patriotic whites and blacks
to form local alliances. In the case of the South, it asked the alliances
“to make those [blacks] who have not yet left the South satisfied.” On
his tour, Haynes developed what he called “sympathetic contacts” and
laid groundwork for local efforts. He won promises of assistance from
white and black educators, chambers of commerce, state Councils
of Defense, and local offices of the USES. In many areas, his visits
sparked the spontaneous formation of local cooperative groups that
proved useful in the national effort.66
Haynes chose North Carolina as the place to initiate the federal-
state phase of the DNE program. Two weeks after Haynes paid a
visit to Raleigh, Governor T.W. Bickett called a conference of white
and black leaders. Haynes met with the group to explain the federal
program and offer his assistance. After the conference, Bickett
appointed a working group to set up a North Carolina NWAC, with
provision for county and city NWACs as well. Haynes was particularly
pleased to see the governor accept the post of Honorary Chairman
of the State Committee. The Committee organized a wide-ranging
coalition of educators, government officials, and representatives of
the major towns and cities. While the participants were predominantly
black, many white citizens were also involved. A number of cities
and counties developed local NWACs to work with the state body.
Haynes appointed Dr. A.M. Moore as North Carolina’s Supervisor of
Negro Economics. Moore reported jointly to Haynes and the USES
and worked closely with the North Carolina NWAC system. Haynes
also helped get the USES involved in the program. The state Council
of Defense and the governor also played major roles.67 Thanks to their

30
chapter 1 : world war I and after

efforts, North Carolina was able to report that several progressive

employers asked the NWAC for advice as they voluntarily set up
programs for the welfare of their black employees.
The North Carolina system became a model for other southern
states, with numerous variations in types of participant, organizational
structure, and mission, differences which were to be expected in such
a decentralized program. Mississippi, Florida, and Virginia soon held
conferences and organized their own NWACs, followed by other
southern states. The Council of National Defense played a key role
in the development of such programs in the South, both through
endorsements and through efforts by the state Councils to bring white
members to the NWACs.
Attention then turned to the North. Haynes selected Ohio, a
major employer of black migrants, to lead the way in that region.
Jointly with the USES and Governor James M. Cox (later the
unsuccessful Democratic nominee for President in 1920), Haynes
convened a state conference. Cox, who had visited Tuskegee Institute
that year, assured an enthusiastic audience that “We … need [black]
people and need them badly in the war … [and] in the industrial life
of this country.”68 Ohio soon set up a program similar to that in North
Carolina and served as a regional leader and example.
To deal with large new concentrations of blacks in Ohio’s cities,
Charles Hall worked with the USES and also directly with the black
workforce. He sought to assure that blacks would be able to find
available work, the pay and hours of these jobs, and details on the
attitudes of surrounding white communities.69 A local Ohio committee
reported to the state conference that blacks were being denied
skilled jobs in defense work. It called on the federal government to
prohibit discrimination in contract work (see Chapter 3 on the Fair
Employment Practice Committee). An Ohio committee on black

31
Other documents randomly have
different content
 Napoléon, dès que le jour commença de luire,
Adieux de
Napoléon à la alla présenter ses adieux à la famille de Saxe. Il lui
famille royale de avait rendu un moment le rêve de ses ancêtres en
Saxe. lui donnant la couronne de Pologne, mais à ce prix
il l'avait perdue, sans le vouloir du reste, comme il
s'était perdu lui-même! Et par surcroît de misère, de la seule chose
impérissable en lui, la gloire, il ne laissait rien à cette malheureuse
famille, tandis qu'aux Polonais qu'il avait perdus aussi, il laissait du
moins une part d'honneur immortel! La cour honnête et timide de
Saxe avait en effet passé au pied des autels les dix dernières
années, que tant d'autres avaient passées sur les champs de
bataille. Napoléon avait de grands reproches à essuyer du vieux roi,
et il pouvait de son côté trouver matière à des reproches non moins
graves dans la conduite tenue la veille par les soldats saxons, mais il
avait un trop haut orgueil pour employer de la sorte les quelques
instants qu'il avait à consacrer à son allié. Il lui témoigna ses regrets
de le livrer ainsi sans défense à tout le courroux de la coalition; il
l'engagea à traiter avec elle, à se séparer de la France, et lui affirma
que quant à lui, en aucun temps il ne songerait à s'en plaindre.
Relevant fièrement son visage grave, mais non abattu, il lui exprima
l'espoir de redevenir bientôt formidable derrière le Rhin, et lui promit
de ne pas stipuler de paix dans laquelle la Saxe serait sacrifiée.
Après de réciproques embrassements, il quitta cette bonne et
malheureuse famille, épouvantée de le voir rester si tard au milieu
des dangers qui le menaçaient de tous côtés.
 Sorti de chez le roi, Napoléon essaya en vain de
Difficultés que
Napoléon se faire jour à travers les rues de Leipzig. Il fut
éprouve lui- obligé de gagner les boulevards par un détour, et
même à passer de les suivre jusqu'au pont, où la presse s'ouvrit
au pont de pour lui, car bien qu'il commençât à inspirer des
Lindenau.
sentiments amers, l'admiration, la foi en son génie,
l'obéissance étaient complètes encore. Il franchit les ponts, et alla
vers Lindenau attendre de l'autre côté de la Pleisse et de l'Elster, que
l'armée eût défilé sous ses yeux.

Pendant ce temps un nouveau combat s'était

Combat dans les
faubourgs de engagé autour de Leipzig. Les souverains et les
Leipzig. généraux coalisés ne pouvaient croire à leur
bonheur, car c'était la première victoire que depuis
le commencement du siècle ils eussent remportée sur Napoléon, et
ce n'était pas même encore une victoire que celle qui venait de leur
coûter tant de sang et tant d'angoisses, c'était une suite d'actions
violentes, dont la dernière allait seule décider le vrai caractère. Or ce
quatrième jour, ils s'attendaient à un conflit épouvantable, dont ils
étaient résolus à supporter les horreurs en vrais martyrs de leur
cause. Mais quelles ne furent pas leur surprise et leur joie, lorsque
entre huit et neuf heures du matin, le brouillard d'automne étant
dissipé, ils aperçurent l'armée française se resserrant successivement
autour de Leipzig, et s'écoulant à travers l'interminable pont de
Lindenau, dans les plaines de Lutzen! Ils remercièrent le ciel d'un
résultat qu'ils avaient à peine osé espérer, et sur-le-champ ils
ordonnèrent à leurs soldats de se jeter sur l'enceinte de Leipzig pour
essayer de rendre plus difficile et plus meurtrière la retraite de
l'armée française. Chacun marchant dans l'ordre de la veille, la
colonne du prince de Hesse-Hombourg qui formait la gauche des
coalisés, poursuivit Poniatowski dans le faubourg correspondant à la
porte de Peters-Thor. La colonne du centre, celle de Kleist et
Wittgenstein, se présenta devant le même faubourg, mais à une
barrière placée un peu à droite, celle de Windmühlen. La colonne de
droite, celle de Klenau et Benningsen, se présenta à la barrière de
l'Hôpital, aboutissant à l'ancienne porte de Grimma. Bulow, du corps
de Bernadotte, se dirigea sur le faubourg qui est situé entre les
portes de Grimma et de Halle. Blucher, Langeron et Sacken se
précipitèrent sur le faubourg de Halle, et on chargea le général
d'York qui s'était reposé la veille, de se porter par le nord sur les
rives de l'Elster et de la Pleisse, pour contrarier autant que possible
le défilé de nos colonnes. Mais partout les coalisés rencontrèrent une
résistance opiniâtre. Nos soldats étaient à leur tour
Les Français
exaspérés à leur aussi irrités que leurs adversaires, et se trouvaient
tour, repoussent autant humiliés de la prétention de les battre, que
violemment les les Allemands l'avaient été de notre prétention de
assaillants. les dominer. Fiers de leur conduite dans ces
journées, ils avaient le sentiment du malheur non
celui de la défaite, et étaient décidés à faire payer cher leur retraite
ou leur vie. Au nord et à l'est de Leipzig, dans le
Les troupes des
7e, 3e et 6e
faubourg de Halle, les restes des 7e, 3e et 6e corps
corps font un repoussèrent vigoureusement les troupes de
grand carnage Sacken et de Langeron. Ces braves gens postés
des troupes de dans un vaste bâtiment, tuèrent plus de deux à
Sacken et de trois mille hommes avant de l'évacuer, et même
Langeron dans
le faubourg de quelques compagnies légères du 6e corps fondant
Halle. par la porte de Halle sur les troupes qui
attaquaient le bâtiment, en firent un épouvantable
On traite aussi
carnage. Marmont avec une division du 6e corps et
mal les troupes une du 3e défendit la face de l'est contre Bulow, et
de Bulow, à l'est quelques têtes de colonnes ayant pénétré dans la
de la ville, et les
ville, il lança sur elles le 142e de ligne et le 23e
troupes de
Schwarzenberg léger, qui les massacrèrent presque entièrement.
au sud. Macdonald, Lauriston, Poniatowski avec leurs
troupes exaspérées, reçurent de même les
colonnes ennemies qui se présentèrent devant les faubourgs du sud.
Partout l'impatience des vainqueurs fut cruellement punie, et avec
peu de pertes nous fîmes essuyer aux coalisés un immense
dommage. Toutefois il fallait renoncer à soutenir longtemps ce
combat, par l'impuissance non pas de résister, mais de concerter nos
mouvements. Dans l'impossibilité de communiquer d'une rue à
l'autre, et de discerner la direction des feux au milieu d'une
effroyable canonnade qui embrassait les quatre faces de la ville, on
ne savait pas si partout la résistance était également heureuse, et si
on ne s'exposait pas, en tenant trop longtemps, à être devancé au
pont par l'ennemi victorieux. Quelques Saxons et Badois restés dans
l'intérieur de la ville, et tirant sur nos soldats en retraite, ajoutaient à
la confusion. Dans les rangs de Marmont, c'est-à-dire vers l'est, on
crut que du côté de Macdonald et de Lauriston, c'est-à-dire vers le
sud, la ligne des faubourgs avait été forcée; vers ces deux côtés on
crut la même chose pour le nord, où combattaient Reynier et
Dombrowski. Dans cette crainte on se mit presque
Après avoir
défendu simultanément en retraite, en débouchant sur les
longtemps les boulevards qui séparaient les faubourgs de la ville.
faubourgs, les La presse alors y devint aussi grande que sur le
troupes pont. De chaque rue des faubourgs il arrivait des
françaises, pour
colonnes qui se repliaient en combattant, et qui
n'être pas
coupées, venaient ajouter à l'encombrement, à tel point que
regagnent les l'ennemi lui-même, avec ses baïonnettes, n'aurait
boulevards. pas pu s'y faire jour. Le maréchal Marmont, obligé
à son tour de se retirer, eut une peine extrême à
Encombrement pénétrer dans l'épaisseur de cette foule qui
toujours
remplissait les boulevards. Heureusement pour lui
croissant sur les
boulevards et quelques officiers de son corps l'ayant reconnu,
sur le pont. saisirent la bride de son cheval, et lui faisant place
à coups de sabre, l'introduisirent dans le torrent
serré qui s'écoulait lentement vers les ponts.
 PONIATOWSKI.

On en était là de cette épouvantable évacuation

Catastrophe du
pont de Leipzig. de Leipzig, lorsqu'une subite catastrophe, trop
facile à prévoir, vint jeter le désespoir parmi ceux
qui pour le salut commun s'étaient dévoués à la défense des
faubourgs de Leipzig. On avait ordonné au colonel du génie Montfort
de miner la première arche de ce pont continu, qui est tantôt un
pont tantôt une levée de terrain, et embrasse, avons-nous dit, les
bras nombreux de la Pleisse et de l'Elster. Cette arche était située à
l'extrémité de Leipzig qui correspond à Lindenau, et construite sur le
principal bras de l'Elster. Le colonel Montfort l'avait minée, et y avait
placé quelques sapeurs avec un caporal qui attendaient le signal la
mèche à la main. Mais sa perplexité était grande, car du côté du
faubourg de Halle on entendait à travers les bois qui couvrent cette
partie des environs de la ville, la fusillade se rapprocher. À tout
moment on s'attendait à voir l'ennemi déboucher pêle-mêle avec nos
soldats, et on ignorait si au delà il ne restait pas d'autres troupes
françaises encore occupées à combattre. Aussi le
Le colonel
Montfort, qui colonel Montfort demandait-il à tout venant s'il y
 avait mission de avait encore plusieurs corps en arrière, dans quel
détruire les ordre ils se succédaient, quel serait le dernier, et
ponts, veut aller
prendre l'ordre
chacun sachant à peine ce qui s'était passé
de l'Empereur, immédiatement sous ses yeux, était incapable de
lorsqu'un répondre. Dans cet embarras, le colonel imagina
caporal chargé de se rendre à l'autre bout du pont, c'est-à-dire à
de mettre le feu Lindenau, où était Napoléon, pour obtenir qu'on
à la mine croit
voir arriver
l'éclairât sur ce qu'il devait faire, et, en s'éloignant
l'ennemi, et fait pour un instant, il prescrivit au caporal des sapeurs
sauter le pont. de ne mettre le feu à la mine que lorsqu'au lieu
des Français il verrait paraître les ennemis. À peine
avait-il fait quelques pas à travers la foule épaisse qui encombrait le
pont, qu'il s'aperçut de l'impossibilité d'aller jusqu'à Napoléon et de
revenir. Il voulut rebrousser chemin vers son poste, vains efforts! Au
pont qu'il avait quitté se passait la scène la plus tumultueuse.
Quelques troupes de Blucher poursuivant les débris du corps de
Reynier à travers le faubourg de Halle, se montrèrent aux abords du
pont pêle-mêle avec les soldats du 7e corps. À cet aspect, des voix
épouvantées se mirent à crier: Mettez le feu, mettez le feu!--Le
caporal, auquel de toutes parts on répétait qu'il fallait détruire le
pont, crut le moment venu, et mit le feu à la mine! Une
épouvantable explosion retentit aussitôt; les débris du pont, volant
dans les airs et retombant sur les deux rives, y firent des victimes
des deux côtés. Mais cette déplorable erreur eut
État lamentable
de vingt mille en quelques instants de bien autres conséquences.
soldats, privés Reynier avec un reste du 7e corps, Poniatowski
de tout moyen avec ce qui avait survécu de ses Polonais,
de retraite.
Lauriston, Macdonald avec les débris des 5e et 11e
corps, étaient encore sur les boulevards de Leipzig, pressés entre
deux cent mille ennemis et plusieurs bras de rivières sur lesquels les
moyens de passage étaient détruits. Plus de vingt mille de nos
soldats avec leurs généraux étaient ainsi condamnés ou à périr, ou à
devenir les prisonniers d'un ennemi que l'exaspération de cette
guerre rendait inhumain. Ils se crurent trahis, exhalèrent des cris de
fureur, et dans les alternatives d'une sorte de désespoir, tantôt se
ruaient baïonnette baissée sur ceux qui les poursuivaient, tantôt
revenaient vers la Pleisse et l'Elster pour franchir ces rivières à la
nage. Après une mêlée confuse et sanglante, les uns se rendirent,
les autres se jetèrent dans les rivières, un certain nombre réussit à
les passer à la nage, beaucoup furent emportés par la force des
eaux. Les généraux commandants, parmi lesquels il y avait deux
maréchaux, ne voulaient pas laisser de si beaux trophées à l'ennemi,
et ils cherchèrent à se sauver. Poniatowski, fait
Mort de
Poniatowski. maréchal la veille par Napoléon, pour prix de son
héroïsme, n'hésita pas à lancer son cheval dans
l'Elster. Parvenu à l'autre bord, mais le trouvant escarpé, et
chancelant par suite de plusieurs blessures, il disparut dans les eaux,
enseveli dans sa gloire, la chute de sa patrie et la nôtre. Macdonald
ayant suivi son exemple, atteignit la rive opposée,
Macdonald
sauvé par y trouva des soldats qui l'aidèrent à la gravir, et fut
miracle. sauvé. Reynier et Lauriston, entourés avant qu'ils
pussent tenter de s'enfuir, furent conduits devant
Reynier et les souverains de Russie, de Prusse et d'Autriche,
Lauriston faits en présence desquels ils n'avaient longtemps paru
prisonniers.
qu'en vainqueurs. Alexandre, en reconnaissant le
général Lauriston, ce sage ambassadeur qui avait
Accueil plein de
courtoisie de fait tant d'efforts pour empêcher la guerre de
l'empereur 1812, lui tendit la main en lui reprochant d'avoir
Alexandre au cherché à se soustraire à son estime. Il fit traiter
général avec égard les généraux français devenus ses
Lauriston.
prisonniers, dissimula pour eux son orgueil
profondément satisfait, mais voulut qu'ils assistassent à tout l'éclat
de son triomphe. En effet, les généraux, les princes victorieux
étaient réunis sur la principale place de la ville, se félicitant les uns
les autres, se complimentant réciproquement de ce qu'ils avaient
fait, en présence des habitants de Leipzig qui, pâles encore de la
terreur de ces trois jours, sortaient des caves de leurs maisons, et
poussaient des acclamations en l'honneur des souverains libérateurs.
Au milieu de ces personnages agités se faisait remarquer
Bernadotte, persuadé qu'il avait à lui seul décidé la victoire en
arrivant le dernier, étant seul à le croire, mais bien accueilli par
Alexandre, qui, dans sa politique raffinée, tenait à garder sous son
influence le futur souverain de la Suède. Tandis qu'Alexandre
accueillait si bien ce Français combattant contre la France, il se
montrait bien dur à l'égard d'un prince allemand, qu'il appelait
injustement traître envers l'Allemagne. Ce prince était l'infortuné roi
de Saxe. Deux fois depuis le matin, des officiers
Dureté de
l'empereur étaient venus de sa part demander un moment
Alexandre à d'entretien, et ils avaient été repoussés. En ce
l'égard du roi de moment il y en avait un troisième qui, le chapeau
Saxe. à la main, suppliait Alexandre de permettre au
vieux roi de lui offrir ses hommages. Ce
malheureux monarque était à quelques pas de là, tête nue,
implorant vainement un regard du vainqueur. Napoléon, il faut le
reconnaître, plus habitué à la victoire, avait mieux traité les rois
vaincus. Alexandre, cédant à un sentiment peu digne de lui, fit dire
au roi de Saxe qu'il ne voulait point le voir, qu'il était pris les armes à
la main, et dès lors prisonnier de guerre; que les souverains alliés
décideraient de son sort, et lui feraient notifier leur décision. Ainsi,
en nous abandonnant sur le champ de bataille, les soldats saxons
n'avaient pas même acheté le pardon de leur roi!

Revenons à l'armée française, se retirant mutilée à travers les bras

nombreux de la Pleisse et de l'Elster, et laissant encore dans cette
journée vingt mille de ses soldats, ou prisonniers, ou expirants dans
les rues de Leipzig, ou noyés dans les eaux ensanglantées de la
Pleisse et de l'Elster! Cette dernière des quatre
Pertes des deux
armées aux journées néfastes de Leipzig porta les pertes de
quatre journées l'armée française en morts, blessés, prisonniers,
de Leipzig. noyés ou égarés, à soixante mille hommes environ.
L'ennemi n'avait pas perdu moins en hommes
atteints par le feu; mais ses blessés allaient recevoir tous les soins
du patriotisme allemand reconnaissant: les nôtres, qu'allaient-ils
devenir?

Napoléon avait entendu de Lindenau où il était, une violente

explosion; il en connut bientôt la cause et les conséquences, se
montra fort courroucé contre tous ceux auxquels on pouvait imputer
ce funeste accident, et affecta de vouloir trouver des coupables,
quand il n'y en avait point, et quand, s'il y en avait un, c'était lui,
l'auteur de cette horrible guerre!

Telle fut cette longue et tragique bataille de

Caractère de la
campagne de Leipzig, l'une des plus sanglantes et certainement
Saxe, et causes la plus grande de tous les siècles, et qui termina si
véritables de désastreusement la campagne de Saxe,
nos revers. commencée d'une manière si heureuse à Lutzen et
à Bautzen. Sans doute on se demandera comment
après de si profonds calculs, de si savantes manœuvres, de si hautes
espérances, Napoléon put être conduit à une pareille catastrophe, et
on ne le comprendra en effet qu'en se rendant un compte exact de
tous les mobiles qui le firent agir, et tournèrent en affreux revers des
conceptions qui étaient au nombre des plus belles de sa vie. Qu'on
suppose un général moins grand, mais placé dans une situation
simple, n'ayant ni toute une fortune prodigieuse à refaire d'un seul
coup, ni cent motifs d'orgueil pour se dissimuler la vérité, n'étant pas
non plus habitué à chercher dans des combinaisons hardies et
compliquées des résultats extraordinaires, il eût certainement agi
autrement, et très-probablement s'il n'avait pas obtenu d'éclatants
succès, il aurait au moins évité un désastre. À la première menace
d'un mouvement sur ses derrières, ou par l'Elbe inférieur ou par la
Bohême, il aurait, sans perdre un instant, décampé de Dresde, en
n'y laissant que les malades impossibles à transporter. Il aurait pu
amener ainsi, outre les 200 mille nommes qui lui restaient à cette
époque, les 30 mille laissés dans Dresde, vraisemblablement aussi
les 30 mille de Meissen, Torgau, Wittenberg, et rejoindre la Saale en
une masse compacte, que les marches excessives ni les
détachements obligés sur l'Elbe n'auraient point affaiblie. Si, dans
cette situation, l'une des deux armées ennemies, celle de Bohême
ou celle de l'Elbe, avait commis la faute de devancer l'autre d'un jour
à Leipzig, il l'eût accablée, et se serait ensuite rabattu sur la
seconde. Supposez que l'occasion d'un tel triomphe ne lui eût pas
été offerte, il aurait au moins regagné sain et sauf les bords de la
Saale, et si cette ligne qui est courte, facile à déborder de tous les
côtés, n'avait pu être défendue, il aurait sagement repris le chemin
du Rhin, et par des instructions adressées à temps à toutes les
garnisons des places de l'Elbe inférieur, il leur aurait prescrit de se
replier les unes sur les autres jusqu'à Hambourg, où certainement
elles auraient pu parvenir sans accident, l'ennemi étant attiré tout
entier à la suite de la grande armée. Elles auraient formé ainsi avec
le maréchal Davout une belle armée de 80 mille hommes, qui aurait
rejoint le Rhin par Wesel, et dès lors près de 300 mille soldats en
bon état se seraient retrouvés sur la frontière de l'Empire, et y
auraient opposé à l'invasion une barrière invincible! Mais Napoléon,
par caractère, par orgueil, par habitude et besoin de résultats
extraordinaires, s'était rendu impossible une conduite aussi simple.

À la nouvelle d'une double marche de ses ennemis sur Leipzig, les

uns descendant de la Bohême, les autres remontant de l'Elbe le long
de la Mulde, il ne songea pas un instant à sa sûreté. Habitué à les
voir se dérober sans cesse, il n'eut qu'une crainte, c'est qu'ils
pussent lui échapper encore, et au lieu d'aller droit à Leipzig, par le
chemin direct, ce qui lui aurait sauvé douze ou quinze mille soldats
laissés au milieu des boues de l'automne, il descendit l'Elbe dans la
direction de Düben, pour saisir à coup sûr Blucher et Bernadotte,
toujours convaincu dans son orgueil qu'on était beaucoup plus
disposé à le fuir qu'à le combattre. À peine en marche, et toujours
en quête de combinaisons qui pussent procurer de vastes résultats,
il imagina de se jeter sur les traces de Blucher et de Bernadotte, de
les suivre à outrance au delà de l'Elbe, de les refouler sur la roule de
Berlin, puis de remonter par la rive droite l'Elbe jusqu'à Torgau ou
Dresde, de passer ce fleuve de nouveau sur ces points, et de tomber
à l'improviste sur les derrières de l'armée descendue de Bohême.
Certes la combinaison était aussi profonde qu'audacieuse, et avec les
soldats, l'ardeur et la fortune d'Austerlitz, elle devait amener des
résultats prodigieux. Mais pour cette espérance chimérique, il fallait
se résigner à laisser 30 mille hommes à Dresde, et Napoléon les y
laissa. Arrivé à Düben, sur la basse Mulde, il put bientôt s'apercevoir
que loin de vouloir fuir, Blucher et Bernadotte cherchaient à le
gagner de vitesse sur Leipzig, pour s'y réunir à Schwarzenberg, et
l'accabler. Il prit son parti sur-le-champ, rebroussa chemin vers cette
ville, et avec la sûreté ordinaire de son coup d'œil se plaça de la
seule manière propre à empêcher la réunion de ses ennemis. Mais il
revenait à Leipzig après une marche inutile de cinquante lieues, qui
avait épuisé ses soldats et fort diminué leur nombre; il revenait privé
de trente mille combattants laissés à Dresde, d'une quantité égale
laissée à Wittenberg, Torgau, Meissen, et il marchait en une longue
colonne, dont un tiers au moins ne pouvait pas assister à la première
et à la plus décisive bataille. Obligé de faire face à tous ses ennemis,
non pas présents mais pouvant l'être, il lui fut impossible le 16
d'amener Bertrand et Ney à lui, de les jeter avec Macdonald sur le
flanc droit de Schwarzenberg pour accabler ce dernier, et dès lors
n'étant pas vainqueur d'une manière foudroyante le premier jour, il
se vit tout à coup dans une position affreuse, où il était condamné à
succomber les jours suivants sous une écrasante réunion de forces.
Prendre sur-le-champ le parti de la retraite, l'exécuter sinon le 17,
puisqu'il attendait encore Reynier, du moins dans la nuit du 17 au
18, regagner au plus tôt par Lindenau, Lutzen et Weissenfels, ses
communications menacées, établir pour cela les ponts nécessaires
sur la Pleisse et l'Elster, était la seule conduite à tenir, la conduite
simple du capitaine sage, plus occupé de sauver son armée que de
conserver son prestige. Mais faire une retraite fière, imposante, en
plein jour, en se ruant sur l'ennemi qui oserait être pressant, afin
non pas de se sauver, mais de garder l'attitude du victorieux, fut, et
devait être la pensée du conquérant longtemps gâté par la fortune,
du conquérant qui ne sut pas sortir de Moscou à temps, et il
s'ensuivit la funeste bataille du 18, et la retraite plus funeste encore
du 19, exécutée avec un seul pont. La confusion inévitable qui
s'introduisit au dernier moment dans les choses ainsi conduites,
amena l'explosion du pont de l'Elster, qui marqua du sceau de la
fatalité cette effroyable bataille de quatre jours.

Ce résumé des faits montre donc la vraie cause de tous les

malheurs que nous venons de raconter. Ce n'est pas plus ici qu'à
Moscou dans l'affaiblissement des talents du capitaine qu'il faut
chercher la cause de si déplorables résultats, car le capitaine ne fut
jamais ni plus fécond, ni plus audacieux, ni plus tenace, ni plus
soldat, mais dans les illusions de l'orgueil, dans le besoin de
regagner d'un coup une immense fortune perdue, dans la difficulté
de s'avouer assez vite sa défaite, dans tous les vices, en un mot,
qu'on aperçoit en petit et en laid chez le joueur ordinaire, risquant
follement des richesses follement acquises, et qu'on retrouve en
grand et en horrible chez ce joueur gigantesque qui joue avec le
sang des hommes, comme d'autres avec leur argent. De même que
les joueurs perdent leur fortune en deux fois, une première pour ne
pas savoir la borner, une seconde pour vouloir la rétablir d'un seul
coup, de même Napoléon compromit la sienne à Moscou pour la
vouloir faire trop grande, et dans la campagne de Dresde pour la
vouloir refaire tout entière. C'était toujours l'action des mêmes
causes, l'altération non du génie, mais du caractère gâté par la
toute-puissance et le succès.

À la suite de tels revers, retourner

Après les
tragiques immédiatement sur le Rhin était la seule ressource
événements de qui restât à Napoléon. Après avoir eu 360 mille
Leipzig, une hommes de troupes actives à la reprise des
prompte retraite hostilités, sans compter les garnisons, après en
sur le Rhin était
avoir eu 250 mille encore deux semaines
le seul parti à
prendre. auparavant, et en avoir laissé 30 mille à Dresde,
un nombre peut-être égal sur la route de Dresde à
Düben, de Düben à Leipzig, après en avoir perdu 60 à 70 mille dans
les diverses batailles de Leipzig et un nombre qu'on ne peut guère
préciser par la défection des alliés, il en conservait 100 à 110 mille
tout au plus, dans l'état le plus déplorable. La seule chose qu'il eût
encore en quantité considérable et en excellente qualité, mais
malheureusement difficile à ramener, c'était l'artillerie. Il en avait une
très-belle, très-bien servie, qui avait toujours mis son honneur à
sauver ses canons, et n'avait perdu que ceux que la destruction du
pont de l'Elster avait empêché de transporter à temps d'une rive à
l'autre. Ce qui restait d'artillerie était le double en proportion de ce
qui restait de soldats. Si c'était un embarras, c'était au moins une
ressource et des plus précieuses dans un jour de combat.

Napoléon passa autour de Lutzen la nuit du 19

Marche de
l'armée sur la au 20 octobre avec les débris de son armée.
Saale. Bertrand et Mortier avaient culbuté Giulay, et
parvenus à Weissenfels s'étaient assuré la
possession de la Saale. Le 20 au matin Napoléon courut à
Weissenfels pour diriger lui-même la retraite, et devancer tous les
corps ennemis aux passages essentiels. Si on suivait à gauche
(gauche en retournant vers le Rhin) la grande route de Weissenfels à
Naumbourg et Iéna, on rencontrait le fameux défilé de Kosen, où le
maréchal Davout s'était couvert de gloire en défendant la plaine
d'Awerstaedt, et où l'on était exposé à trouver Giulay qui, repoussé
par Bertrand et Mortier, pouvait bien aller y chercher une revanche.
Napoléon, dont le malheur n'avait pas troublé la prévoyance,
imagina de faire un détour à droite, et au lieu de passer la Saale à
Naumbourg, de la traverser à Weissenfels, dont on possédait les
ponts, de gagner ensuite Freybourg pour y franchir l'Unstrutt, de
déboucher de là dans la plaine de Weimar et d'Erfurt, tandis que
Bertrand porté rapidement par un mouvement à gauche sur le défilé
de Kosen, tâcherait d'y prévenir l'ennemi, et de s'y défendre le plus
longtemps possible contre la grande armée de Schwarzenberg. Ce
plan de marche à peine conçu, Napoléon en ordonna l'exécution.
Bertrand dont le 4e corps avait été augmenté comme on l'a vu de la
division Guilleminot, fut acheminé tout de suite sur Freybourg, avec
Mortier qui commandait deux divisions de la jeune garde, avec la
cavalerie légère de Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, avec le 2e de cavalerie du
général Sébastiani. Cette nombreuse cavalerie, battant partout
l'estrade et sabrant les Cosaques, devait précéder et flanquer
l'avant-garde, puis, lorsqu'on serait rendu à Freybourg, et qu'on
aurait occupé la ville et les ponts sur l'Unstrutt, Bertrand devait
courir à Kosen, et Mortier rester à Freybourg pour protéger le
passage de l'armée.
 Ces ordres furent ponctuellement exécutés. Bertrand arriva le 21
au soir à Freybourg avec les divers corps qui escortaient sa marche.
Il n'y avait dans cette ville que quelques troupes légères ennemies
que l'on expulsa. On s'empara d'un pont de pierre sur l'Unstrutt,
solide mais étroit. On en jeta un en charpente dans la nuit, pour
faciliter le passage de l'armée, et tandis que Mortier se livrait à ces
soins, Bertrand gravissant les hauteurs à gauche alla prendre
position à Kosen. Il y parvint avant l'ennemi.

Ces mesures résolues à temps et exécutées avec

Le 21, l'armée
passe la Saale à vigueur, eurent le résultat qu'on devait en
Weissenfels. attendre. L'armée après s'être écoulée à travers les
plaines de Lutzen, arriva le 21 au soir à
Weissenfels, où elle franchit la Saale sans être poursuivie par
d'autres troupes que les coureurs de l'ennemi. Schwarzenberg et
Bernadotte étaient restés dans Leipzig, l'un à refaire son armée
épuisée par trois batailles, l'autre à passer des revues. Giulay seul
avait marché par la route de Naumbourg et de Kosen. De
l'infatigable armée de Silésie, il n'y avait que le corps du général
d'York qui eût pu nous suivre, et les moyens de passage sur la
Pleisse et l'Elster ayant été détruits à Leipzig, Blucher lui-même avait
été obligé de faire un détour, et de descendre fort au-dessous de
Leipzig pour traverser ces rivières. Nous l'avions à notre droite, mais
en arrière, tandis qu'à notre gauche nous n'avions que Giulay, lequel
pour nous atteindre était réduit à forcer le défilé de Kosen.

La Saale franchie le 21, l'armée alla coucher à

Le 21 au soir
Freybourg, où, comme on vient de le voir, les
l'armée arrive à
Freybourg, etmoyens de passer l'Unstrutt avaient été préparés.
commence à y Les quelques mille prisonniers que Napoléon avait
passer voulu mener avec lui, avaient été délivrés par la
l'Unstrutt.
cavalerie ennemie. C'était un désagrément
d'amour-propre bien plus qu'une perte véritable, mais qui prouvait
par quelles masses de troupes à cheval nous étions poursuivis, car
nous avions subi cet affront entre Bertrand, Mortier, Sébastiani,
Lefebvre-Desnoëttes. Cette cavalerie avait peu d'inconvénients
contre les corps organisés, mais la débandade qu'on avait vue
recommencer dans les corps de Macdonald, d'Oudinot et de Ney, à
la suite des revers de la Katzbach, de Gross-Beeren, de Dennewitz,
était devenue très-générale dans l'armée après l'épouvantable
bataille de Leipzig. Le premier prétexte à la sortie des rangs,
c'étaient les blessures légères qui obligeaient de marcher sans armes
à la queue des colonnes; le second c'était la faim qui autorisait à
courir çà et là pour trouver des vivres. Sorti des
La débandade
s'introduit de rangs, on n'y rentrait plus. Les habitudes militaires
nouveau parmi étaient en effet trop récentes chez nos jeunes
nos troupes, soldats pour qu'ils pussent s'éloigner du drapeau
ainsi qu'il était impunément. Une fois le cadre quitté, le dépit, la
arrivé dans la
souffrance, le goût de la maraude, le penchant
retraite de
Russie. naturel à s'épargner de nouveaux dangers,
empêchaient d'y revenir. Sur les 100 à 110 mille
hommes que Napoléon possédait encore, il y en avait plus de 20
mille qui, les uns portant le bras en écharpe, les autres boitant, la
plupart se disant blessés sans l'être, ou alléguant la perte de leurs
armes qu'ils avaient jetées, marchaient entre les colonnes armées,
ou à leur suite, se répandaient le soir dans les villages qu'ils pillaient,
et sans rendre aucun service dévoraient les ressources dont auraient
pu vivre les corps organisés. Ce qu'il y avait de pis encore, c'était
l'exemple qui menaçait de devenir contagieux, et contre lequel les
répressions de la cavalerie étaient impuissantes. La bravoure n'avait
pas fléchi un moment chez ces jeunes gens, mais les habitudes
militaires trop peu enracinées, n'avaient pas tenu contre une grande
défaite, et ils avaient presque oublié qu'ils étaient soldats. La
cavalerie qui ordinairement poursuit ce genre de vice, et le réprime,
en était atteinte elle-même, et on voyait dans la masse débandée
des cavaliers à pied, quelques-uns même à cheval. C'est sur cette
portion de l'armée que les coureurs de l'ennemi avaient surtout
prise. Ils dispersaient ces maraudeurs comme de timides bandes
d'oiseaux, et les ramassaient en grand nombre, ce qui fournissait à
la coalition l'occasion de dire qu'elle avait fait des milliers de
prisonniers. Des canons abandonnés faute de chevaux, ou des
maraudeurs enlevés dans les villages, lui procuraient de prétendus
trophées, bien plus dommageables pour nous que véritablement
glorieux pour elle. Il fallut employer toute la nuit du 21 et la journée
du 22 pour faire écouler cette masse d'hommes, armés et désarmés,
par les deux ponts de Freybourg. On y réussit pourtant, moyennant
la résistance énergique que le maréchal Oudinot opposa sur les
bords de l'Unstrutt aux Prussiens du corps d'York.
Oudinot défend
énergiquement Ce maréchal depuis Leipzig avait protégé la retraite
l'Unstrutt le 22, avec deux divisions de la jeune garde, tandis que
et donne à Mortier avec les deux autres et Bertrand avec le 4e
toute l'armée le corps étaient chargés d'ouvrir la route. Oudinot
temps de défiler.
perdit quelques centaines d'hommes dans ce
combat opiniâtre, mais en tua beaucoup plus au corps prussien
d'York. Il ne quitta ce poste que lorsque toute l'armée eut défilé. Sur
ces entrefaites, le général Bertrand arrivé à temps
Le général
Bertrand, de à Kosen pour y prévenir Giulay, lui avait livré un
son côté, combat violent, le dos tourné vers Awerstaedt, et
défend le front vers la Saale. Pendant une journée entière
vaillamment les il fut assailli par les Autrichiens, et autant de fois il
défilés de
fut attaqué par eux, autant de fois il les repoussa
Kosen.
avec la vaillante division Guilleminot, et les
précipita des hauteurs de Kosen dans les gorges profondes de la
Saale. Lorsque Bertrand sut qu'Oudinot avait évacué Freybourg, et
que toutes nos colonnes avaient défilé sur Erfurt, il abandonna son
poste, craignant que l'ennemi ne le devançât, et ne le coupât du
reste de l'armée en allant passer la Saale à Iéna. Le 22 au soir on
campa dans divers villages entre Apolda, Buttelstedt et Weimar. Le
23 toute l'armée fut réunie aux environs d'Erfurt, la cavalerie battant
le pays autour d'elle pour la protéger contre les Cosaques.

Napoléon à Erfurt voulut, appuyé sur cette place

Napoléon
qui contenait de grandes ressources, donner deux
s'arrête à Erfurt
et y donne troisou trois jours de répit à l'armée. Elle en avait un
jours de repos àextrême besoin, soit pour se reposer, soit pour
l'armée. remettre un peu d'ordre dans ses rangs. Il y avait
à Erfurt beaucoup de détachements venus en
bataillons et escadrons de marche; il y avait en abondance des
vêtements, des souliers, des vivres et des munitions de guerre. On
répartit entre les différents corps les détachements
Réorganisation
de quelques-uns qui se trouvaient à Erfurt, et que la difficulté des
des corps de communications avait empêché de diriger sur
l'armée. l'Elbe. Le corps d'Augereau réduit à la seule
division Semelé et à 1600 hommes d'infanterie, au
lieu de 8 mille qu'il comptait la veille de la bataille de Leipzig, fut par
ce moyen reporté à 4 mille. Il dut marcher avec la division Durutte,
seul reste du 7e corps. Les autres corps ne gagnèrent pas dans cette
proportion, bien entendu, car c'était neuf à dix mille hommes tout au
plus que pouvait fournir le dépôt d'Erfurt. On distribua les
vêtements, les souliers, les vivres, on réapprovisionna les parcs de
l'artillerie, et on essaya par l'appât des distributions de faire
reprendre des fusils aux maraudeurs. Le succès sous ce rapport ne
fut pas grand, car le vice de la maraude favorisé par la saison, le
mauvais temps, l'âge de nos soldats, était déjà fort répandu.

Napoléon profita de ces deux jours de loisir pour écrire à Paris, et

faire part de sa situation aux principaux membres de son
gouvernement. Tout en palliant ses revers, et cherchant pour les
expliquer des causes imaginaires, il ne dissimulait pas les besoins, et
réclamait, outre les 280 mille hommes déjà demandés, de nouvelles
levées, mais en hommes faits, pris sur les conscriptions arriérées.
«Je ne puis pas, disait-il, défendre la France avec des enfants... Rien
n'égale la bravoure de notre jeunesse, mais au premier événement
douteux elle montre le caractère de son âge.»--Napoléon sans doute
avait raison, mais des hommes faits qui auraient compté si peu de
temps de présence au drapeau, et qu'on eût, pour leur début,
soumis à de pareilles épreuves, ne les auraient pas beaucoup mieux
supportées. Ils auraient seulement fourni moins de malades aux
hôpitaux.

De même qu'il demandait des hommes et non des enfants,

Napoléon demandait des impôts, c'est-à-dire de l'argent, et ne
voulait plus de papier bien ou mal hypothéqué sur les domaines de
l'État. Il exigeait 500 millions, au moyen de centimes de guerre
ajoutés à tous les impôts directs et indirects. Les choses arrivées au
point où elles étaient, il n'y avait certainement pas mieux à faire que
ce qu'il proposait.

Aux impressions douloureuses du moment vint

Départ de
Murat; sa s'ajouter le départ de Murat. Napoléon, tout en
séparation blâmant la légèreté de son beau-frère, admirait sa
affecte bravoure héroïque, son coup d'œil sur le terrain, et
Napoléon qui de plus il était sensible à l'excellence de son cœur.
n'espère plus le
Il savait ce qui s'était passé dans l'âme de Murat
revoir.
mieux que Murat lui-même; il savait tous les
conflits auxquels le malheureux roi de Naples avait été en proie
entre le désir de garder sa couronne et le désir d'être fidèle à son
bienfaiteur. Murat alléguait pour partir la nécessité de défendre
l'Italie menacée, l'espoir de fournir au prince Eugène trente mille
Napolitains parfaitement organisés, l'utilité enfin de procurer aux
armées française et italienne, en se mettant à leur tête, un chef bien
autrement expérimenté que le prince Eugène. Napoléon admettait
ces raisons, comme il admettait aussi que si la série des revers
continuait, il se pourrait que Murat cédât à l'entraînement général, et
imitât ces princes allemands nos alliés, qui pendant dix années
gorgés par nous des richesses de l'Église allemande, prétendaient
aujourd'hui qu'ils avaient été les victimes de la France. Mais
Napoléon, malgré quelques illusions qu'il se faisait encore, malgré
les derniers mensonges de ses flatteurs, sentait bien au fond de son
cœur qu'il avait abusé et des choses et des hommes. Sachant se
rendre justice, il la rendait aux autres, et entrevoyant la prochaine
défection de Murat, il la lui pardonnait d'avance pour ainsi dire. En le
quittant et en recevant ses protestations de fidélité comme très-
sincères, il l'embrassa plusieurs fois avec une sorte de serrement de
cœur. Il lui semblait en effet qu'il ne reverrait plus cet ancien
compagnon d'armes d'Italie et d'Égypte! Hélas! si la prospérité
aveugle, l'adversité au contraire procure en certains moments une
étrange clairvoyance, et l'on dirait qu'alors, pour mettre le comble à
la punition, la Providence rémunératrice lève tous les voiles de
l'avenir! Napoléon quitta donc Murat comme s'il avait su qu'il ne
devait plus le revoir. Murat partit regretté de toute l'armée, car dans
cette campagne d'automne il s'était montré aussi habile que brave,
et malgré les légèretés de détail qu'il commettait souvent, il avait
rendu à nos armes d'immortels services.

Il fallait décamper cependant, car de tous côtés

Départ d'Erfurt.
les troupes des coalisés avançaient, et de plus on
Napoléon annonçait la présence d'un nouvel ennemi sur nos
apprend en derrières, prêt à nous fermer le chemin de la
quittant Erfurt la France. Cet ennemi n'était autre que l'armée
présence de bavaroise, si longtemps notre compagne, et
l'armée
pressée de se faire pardonner sa longue alliance
bavaroise sur la
route de avec nous par une défection qui s'approchât le plus
Mayence. possible de celle de Bernadotte et des Saxons.
Napoléon venait d'apprendre non-seulement la
Événements de défection de la Bavière qu'il avait connue
Bavière. sommairement en arrivant à Leipzig, mais la
manière dont cette défection avait été amenée.
Voici ce qui s'était passé à Munich, pendant cette seconde partie de
la campagne de Saxe.

Le roi, faible et assez attaché à Napoléon qui

Comment avait
été amenée la l'avait comblé de biens, secondé par un ministre
défection de spirituel et ambitieux qui avait cherché sa grandeur
cette cour alliée.personnelle et celle de son pays dans l'alliance de
la France, le roi était contrarié dans cette politique
par sa femme, princesse vaine, entêtée, sœur de l'impératrice de
Russie et de la reine déchue de Suède, ayant les passions de la feue
reine de Prusse et quelque peu de sa beauté. Il était contrarié aussi
par son fils, prince plus ami des arts que de la guerre, que Napoléon
avait eu à son service et qu'il avait traité durement. La reine exerçait
son opposition dans l'intérieur du palais. Le fils du roi, retiré à
Inspruck, fomentait lui-même l'esprit insurrectionnel des Tyroliens
contre la Bavière. Tant que la France avait été victorieuse, le roi avait
souri des saillies aristocratiques de sa femme et de son fils, les
laissant dire l'un et l'autre, et prenant ce que Napoléon lui donnait
après chaque guerre, comme bon à prendre d'abord, et comme bon
aussi à montrer, à titre de réponse, aux détracteurs de sa politique.
Depuis Moscou, le doute élevé sur la puissance de Napoléon, le cri
des populations, la nouvelle des pertes essuyées par les Bavarois, les
suggestions de l'Autriche, la contagion de l'esprit germanique,
avaient ébranlé le roi, que les victoires de Lutzen et de Bautzen
avaient un moment raffermi. Mais la reprise des hostilités, le
caractère tous les jours plus triste des événements, les pertes
récentes du corps bavarois à la bataille de Dennewitz, mandées et
exagérées à Munich, les efforts des trois cours d'Autriche, de Prusse
et de Russie, avaient plus que jamais remis en question la fidélité de
la Bavière à l'égard de la France. L'arrivée d'un nouveau personnage
à Munich avait surtout contribué à rendre cette situation infiniment
critique. Le général de Wrède, caractère bouillant et sans
consistance, officier brave mais de peu de discernement, plein d'un
amour-propre excessif, était revenu dans son pays profondément
blessé des dédains du maréchal Saint-Cyr, sous lequel il avait servi
pendant la campagne de la Dwina. Ayant apporté à Munich tous ses
mécontentements et les ayant manifestés imprudemment, il s'était
toutefois rapproché, comme son souverain, après Lutzen et Bautzen,
et nous avait dévoilé lui-même le secret de la défection à demi
consommée de la cour de Bavière, afin de rentrer en faveur auprès
de Napoléon. M. d'Argenteau sentant le besoin de nous l'attacher,
avait demandé pour lui le grand cordon de la Légion d'honneur,
rendu vacant par la mort du respectable général Des Roys, et
Napoléon, qui avait déjà donné au général de Wrède des titres et
des richesses, n'avait pas cru devoir y ajouter cette dernière
distinction. Le général de Wrède redevenu
Conduite du
général de mécontent, était resté en Bavière, et avait acquis
Wrède. tout à coup une grande importance en obtenant le
commandement de l'armée bavaroise placée sur
l'Inn, en face de l'armée autrichienne du prince de Reuss. Si
Augereau avec une vingtaine de mille hommes était venu le joindre
sur l'Inn, on l'aurait maintenu, et M. d'Argenteau avait fort insisté
pour qu'on prît cette précaution. Mais Napoléon avait eu besoin
d'Augereau ailleurs, et les Bavarois n'étant ni soutenus ni contenus,
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