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The document discusses the concepts of information and knowledge, emphasizing their significance in information science and their historical roots in Shannon's information theory. It distinguishes between data, information, and knowledge, highlighting that while information is tied to physical signals, knowledge exists independently. The text also explores the relationship between subjective and objective knowledge, referencing Popper's theory of three worlds and the dynamic nature of information as it facilitates the transmission of knowledge.

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20 Part A.

Introduction to Information Science

A.2 Knowledge and Information

Signals and Data

“Information” and “Knowledge” are concepts that are frequently discussed in the
context of many different scientific disciplines and in daily life (Bates, 2005; Capurro
& Hjørland, 2003; Lenski, 2010). They are crucial basic concepts in information
science.
The concept of information was decisively influenced by Shannon (1948), during
the advent of computers and of information transmission following the end of the
Second World War. Shannon’s interpretation of this concept was to become the foun-
dation of telecommunications, and continues to influence all areas of computer and
telecommunication technology. Wyner (2001, 56) emphasizes Shannon’s importance
for science and technology:

Claude Shannon’s creation in the 1940’s of the subject of information theory is arguably one
of the great intellectual achievements of the twentieth century. Information theory has had an
important and significant influence on mathematics, particularly on probability theory and
ergodic theory, and Shannon’s mathematics is in its own a considerable and profound contribu-
tion to pure mathematics. But Shannon did his work primarily in the context of communication
engineering, and it is in this area that it stands as a unique monument. In his classical paper of
1948 and its sequels, he formulated a model of a communication system that is distinctive for its
generality as well as for its amenability to mathematical interest.

Let us take a look at Shannon’s model (Figure A.2.1). In it, information is transmitted
as a physical signal from an information source to a receiver via a channel.
Signals are physical entities, i.e. newsprint (on the paper you are reading), sound
waves (from the traffic outside that keeps you from reading) or electromagnetic waves
(from the television). The channel is prone to disruptions, and thus contains “noise”
Copyright © 2013. Walter de Gruyter GmbH. All rights reserved.

(e.g. when there is an error on one page).

An “encoder” is activated in the transmitter, between the source and the channel,
transforming the digits into certain physical signals. Concurrently, a “decoder” that
can interpret these signs is established between channel and receiver. Encoder and
decoder must be attuned to each other in order for the signals to be successfully trans-
mitted. As an illustrative example, let us consider a telephone conversation. Here,
the information source is a person communicating a message via the microphone of
their telephone. In the transmitter (the telephone), acoustic signals are transformed
into electronical ones and then sent forth via telephone lines. At the other end of the
line, a receiver transforms the electronical signals back into acoustic ones and sends
them on to their destination (here: the person being called) via the second telephone.

Stock, Wolfgang G., and Mechtild Stock. Handbook of Information Science, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/bsb/detail.action?docID=893252.
Created from bsb on 2020-03-25 07:08:56.
A.2 Knowledge and Information 21

Figure A.2.1: Schema of Signal Transmission Following Shannon. Source: Shannon, 2001 [1948], 4.

The information content of a sign is calculated via this sign’s probability of occur-
rence. Signs that occur less often receive high information content; frequently occur-
ring ones are assigned a small value. When a sign zi has the probability pi of occur-
ring, its information content I will be:

I(zi) = ld 1/pi bit or (mathematically identical):

I(zi) = – ld pi bit.

The logarithm dualis being used (ld) and the measure “bit” (for ‘binary digit’) can
both be explained by the fact that Shannon considers a sign’s probability of occur-
rence to be the result of a sequence of binary decisions. The ld calculates the expo-
nent x in the formula 2x = a (e.g. 23 = 8; hence, in the reverse function, ld 8 = 3). Let
us clarify the principle via an example: we would like to calculate the information
content I for signs that have a probability of occurrence of 17% (like the letter e in the
German language), of 10% (like n) and of 0.02% (like q). The sum of the probabili-
ties of occurrence of all signs in the presupposed repertoire, which in this case is the
German alphabet, must always add up to 100%. We apply the values to the formula
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and receive these results:

I(e) = –ld 0.17 bit = –(–2.6) bit = 2.6 bit

I(n) = –ld 0.10 bit = –(–3.4) bit = 3.4 bit
I(q) = –ld 0.0002 bit = –(–12.3) bit = 12.3 bit.

A q thus has far higher information content than an e, since it is used far less often by
comparison.
The following observation by Shannon is of the utmost importance for informa-
tion science (2001 [1948], 3):

The fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either exactly or
approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the messages have meaning; that

is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual
entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.

Here he is merely talking about a probability-theoretical observation of signal trans-

mission processes; the meaning, i.e. the content of the transmitted signals, does not
play any role at all (Ma, 2012, 717-719). It is the latter, however, which forms the object
of information science. In so far, Shannon’s information theory is of historical inter-
est for us but it has only little significance in information science (Belkin, 1978, 66).
However, it is important for us to note that any information is tied to a signal, i.e. a
physical carrier, as a matter of principle.
Signals transmit signs. In semiotics (which is the science of signs), signs can be
observed more closely from three points of view:
–– in their relations to each other (syntax),
–– in the relations between signs and the objects they describe (semantics),
–– in the relations between signs and their users (pragmatics).
Shannon’s information theory only takes into consideration the syntactic aspect. From
an information science perspective, we will call this aspect data. Correspondingly, the
processing of data concerns the syntactical level of signs, which are analyzed with
regard to their type (e.g. alphanumerical signs) or their structure (e.g. entry in a field
named “100”), among other aspects. This is only information science from a periph-
eral point of view, though. This sort of task falls much more under the purview of
computer science, telecommunications and telematics (as a mixed discipline formed
of telecommunications and informatics). Boisot and Canals (2004, 43) discuss the dif-
ference between “data” and “information” via the example of cryptography:

Effective cryptography protects information as it flows around the word. ... Thus while the data
itself can be made “public” and hence freely available, only those in possession of the “key” are
in a position to extract information from it (...). Cryptography, in effect, exploits the deep differ-
ences between data and information.
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In information science, we analyze information as data and meaning (knowledge) in

context. For Floridi (2005), information consists of data, which is well-formed as well
as meaningful.

Information, Knowledge and Documents

The other two sub-disciplines of semiotics, semantics and pragmatics, investigate the
meaning and usage of signs. Here the concepts of “knowledge” and “information”
enter the scene. Following Hardy and Meier-Oeser (2004, 855), we understand knowl-
edge to be:

partly a skill, i.e. the skill of conceiving of an object as it really is on the one hand, and that of
successfully dealing with the objects of knowledge on the other. It is partly the epistemic state
that a person occupies as a consequence of successfully performing his or her cognitive tasks,
and partly the content that a cognitive person refers to when doing so, as well as the statement in
which one gives linguistic expression to the result of a cognitive process.

Here, knowledge is assigned the trait of certainty from the perspective of a subject;
independently of the subject, knowledge is accorded a claim for truth. We should re-
analyze the above definition of knowledge and structure it simplistically. Knowledge
falls into the two aspects of skill and state:
(1) Knowledge as the skill
–– (1a) of correctly comprehending an object (“to know that”),
–– (1b) of correctly dealing with an object (“to know how”);
(2) Knowledge as the state
–– (2a) of a person that knows (something),
–– (2b) that which is known itself, the content,
–– (2c) its linguistic expression.
Knowledge has two fixed points: the knowing subject and what is known, in which
aspects (1a), (1b) and (2a) belong to subjective knowledge and (2b) and (2c) are objec-
tive knowledge—of course, (2c) can only be objective if the linguistic expression is
permanently fixed on a physical carrier, a document.
The warrantor of the distinction between subjective and objective knowledge is
Popper (1972; see also Brookes, 1980; Ma, 2012, 719-720). According to him, objec-
tive knowledge is knowledge that is fixed in documents, such as articles or books,
whereas subjective knowledge is the knowledge that a person has fixed in their mind.
This distinction is embedded within Popper’s theory of the three worlds:
–– World 1: the physical world,
–– World 2: the world of conscious experience,
–– World 3: the world of content.
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World 1 is material reality; this world contains the signals that are known as data
or documents when bundled accordingly. Subjective knowledge (World 2) is clearly
fixated on objective knowledge (World 3): practically all subjective knowledge (World
2) depends upon World 3. It is also clear, conversely, that objective knowledge devel-
ops from knowledge that was formerly subjective. There is a close interrelationship
between the two: subjective knowledge orients itself upon objective knowledge, while
objective knowledge results from the subjective. And without the physical world—
World 1—”nothing goes”, as Brookes (1980, 127) emphasizes:

Though these three worlds are independent, they also interact. As human living on Earth, we are
part of the physical world, dependent for our continued existence on heat and light from the Sun
… and so on. Though our mentalities we are also part of World 2. In reporting the ideas Popper
has recorded in his book, I have been calling on the resources of World 3. Books and all other

artifacts are also physical entities, bits of World 1, shaped by humans to be exosomatic stores of
knowledge which have an existence as physical things independent of those who created them.

Objective knowledge, or our point (2b) above, exists independently of people (in Pop-
per’s World 3). Semiotically speaking, we are in the area of semantics, which is known
for disregarding the user of the sign, the subject. How does the transition from World
3 to World 2, or within World 2, take place? The (formless) content from World 3 must
be “cast into a mould”, put into a form, that can be understood in World 2. The same
procedure is performed when attempting to transmit knowledge between two sub-
jects in World 2. We are thus dealing with inFORMation, if you’ll excuse the pun. It
is not possible to transmit knowledge “as such”, we need a carrier (the “form”) to set
the knowledge in motion. “Information is a thing—knowledge is not,” Jones (2010)
declares.
Indeed the word information, etymologically speaking, has exactly this origin:
according to Capurro (1978) and Lenski (2010, 80), the Latin language uses “informa-
tio” and “informo” to mean education and formation, respectively. (Information is
thus related to schooling; for a long time, the “informator” referred to a home tutor.)
Information makes content move, thus also having a pragmatic component (Rauch,
2004). The groundbreaking work of economic research into the information market
is “The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States” (1962) by
Machlup. Machlup was one of the first to formulate knowledge as static and informa-
tion as dynamic. Knowledge is not transmitted: what is sent and received is always
information. Machlup (1962, 15) defines:

to inform is an activity by which knowledge is conveyed; to know may be the result of having
been informed. “Information” as the act of informing is designed to produce a state of knowing
in someone’s mind. “Information” as that which is being communicated becomes identical with
“knowledge” in the sense of which is known. Thus, the difference lies not in the nouns when
they refer to what one knows or is informed about; it lies in the nouns only when they are to refer
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to the act of informing and the state of knowing, respectively.

Kuhlen (1995, 34) proceeds similarly: “Information is knowledge in action.” Kuhlen

continues:

Correspondingly, from an information science perspective we are interested in methods, pro-

cedures, systems, forms of organization and their respective underlying conditions. With the
help of these, we can work out information for current problem solutions from socially produced
knowledge, or produce new knowledge from information, respectively. The process of working
out information does not leave knowledge in its raw state; rather, it should be regarded as a
process of transformation or, with a certain valuation, of refinement … This transformation of
knowledge into information is called the creation of informational added value.

Knowledge has nothing to do with signals, since it exists independently of them,

whereas information is necessarily tied to these physical carriers.

Bates (2005; 2006) distinguishes three levels of information and knowledge in

regard to matter and energy (“information 1”; e.g., genetic information), to beings,
especially to men (“information 2”) and to meaning and understanding (“knowl-
edge”). These levels are similar to the three worlds of Popper. Bates (2006, 1042)
defines

Information 1: The pattern of organization of matter and energy.

Information 2: Some patterns of organization of matter and energy by a living being (or its con-
stituent parts).
Knowledge: Information given meaning and integrated with other contents of understanding.

If we put knowledge into carriers of Popper’s World 1 (e.g., into a book or a Web page),
the meaning is lost. A reader of the book or the Web page has to create his under-
standing of the meaning on his own. Bates (2006) emphasizes:

Knowledge in inanimate objects, such as books, is really only information 1, a pattern of organi-
zation of matter and energy. When we die, our personal knowledge dies with us. When an entire
civilization dies, then it may be impossible to make sense out of all the information 1 left behind;
that is, to turn it into information 2 and then knowledge.

According to Buckland (1991b), information has four aspects, of which three fall
under the auspices of information science and one (at least additionally) to com-
puter science. Information is either tangible or intangible, it can either be physically
grasped or not; in Popper’s sense, it is either tied to World 1 or it is not. Additionally,
information is always either a process or a state. This two-fold distinction leads to the
following four-field chart (modified following Buckland, 1991b, 352):

Information Intangible Tangible

State Knowledge Information as thing
Process Information as process Information processing
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Information is tangible as a thing in so far as the things, i.e. the documents, are
always tied to signals, and thus to World 1. They are to be regarded—at least over a
certain period of time—as stable. Processes for dealing with information can also be
physically described and must thus be allocated to World 1. Here Buckland locates the
domain of information processing and data processing, and hence a discipline that
is more a part of computer science. Knowledge is intangible; it falls either to World
2 (as subjective knowledge) or World 3 (as objective knowledge). In the process of
informing or being informed (information as process), Buckland abstracts from the
physical signal and only observes the transitions of knowledge from a sender to a
receiver. Buckland is also aware that such transitions always occur in the physical
world (Buckland, 1991b, 352):

Knowledge ... can be represented, just as an event can be filmed. However, the representation is
no more knowledge than the film is the event. Any such representation is necessarily in tangible
forms (sign, signal, data, text, film, etc.) and so representations of knowledge (and of events) are
necessarily “information-as-thing”.

Here the great significance of documents (in Buckland’s words: information as thing)
for information science becomes clear, since they are what shelters knowledge. In
the documents, knowledge (which is not tangible as such) is embedded. For Mooers
(1952, 572), the knowledge is a “message”, and the documents containing those mes-
sages are the “channels”:

(A) “channel” is the physical document left in storage which contains the message.

As knowledge is not directly tangible, how can it then be fixed and recognized? Appar-
ently, this requires a subject to perform a knowledge act: knowledge is not simply
given but is acquired on the basis of the respective subject’s foreknowledge.
How can knowledge be recorded and presented, and what are its exact charac-
teristics? In the following sections, we will investigate the manifold aspects of knowl-
edge. At first, we will concentrate on the question: can only texts contain knowledge,
or are other document types, such as pictures, capable of this as well?

Non-Textually Fixed Knowledge

Knowledge fixed in documents does not exclusively have to be grounded in texts.

Non-textual documents—images, videos, music—also contain knowledge. We will
demonstrate this on the example of pictures and Panofsky’s theory (2006). The reader
should call to mind Leonardo da Vinci’s famous painting The Last Supper. According
to Panofsky, there exist three levels on which to draw knowledge from the painting.
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An Australian bushman—as an example for “everyman”—will look at the picture and

describe its content as “13 persons either sitting at or standing behind one side of
a long table.” For Panofsky, this semantic level is “pre-iconographical”; it only pre-
supposes practical experiences and a familiarity with certain objects and events on
the part of the viewer. On the second semantic level—the “iconographical” level—
the viewer additionally requires foreknowledge concerning cultural traditions and
certain literary sources, as well as familiarity with the thematic environment of the
painting.
Armed with this foreknowledge, a first viewer will identify 13 men, one of which
being Jesus Christ and the other 12 his disciples. Another viewer, with different fore-
knowledge (perhaps nourished by Dan Brown’s novel The Da Vinci Code), however,
sees 12 men and a woman, by replacing the depiction of John—to Jesus’ left as seen
from the viewer’s perspective—with that of Mary of Magdala. On this level, it also

depends upon who is looking at the picture, or more precisely, what background
knowledge the viewer has of the picture. On the iconographical level, one recognizes
the last supper of Christ with his disciples (or with 11 disciples and a woman).
The third, or “iconological” knowledge level can be reached via expert knowl-
edge. Our exemplary image is now interpreted as a particularly successful work of
Leonardo’s (due, among other aspects, to the precise rendering of perspective), as a
textbook example of the culture of the Italian Renaissance, or as an expression of the
Christian faith. Panofsky (1975, 50) summarizes the three levels in tabular form:

I Primary, or natural subject—(A) factual, (B) expressive—that forms the world of artistic motifs.
II Secondary, or conventional subject, which forms the world of pictures, anecdotes and allegories.
III Actual Meaning or content, forming the world of “symbolic” values.

In correspondence to these three levels of knowledge, there are the three interpreta-
tive acts of (I) pre-iconographical description, (II) iconographical analysis and (III)
iconological interpretation. The three levels of pictorial knowledge thus described
should, analogously, be distinguishable in other media (films and music). In certain
texts, too, particularly in fiction, it seems appropriate to divide access to knowledge in
three. The story of the fox and the grapes (by Aesop) contains the primary knowledge
that there is a fox who sees some grapes dangling above him, unreachable, and that
the fox then rejects them, citing their sour taste. The secondary knowledge sees the
fable as an example of the way people develop resentment out of impotence; and level
three literary-historically places the text into the context of antique fables.

Knowing That and Knowing How

A simple initial approximation regards knowledge as instances of true propositions.

The following definition of knowledge (Chisholm, 1977, 138) holds firm in some varie-
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ties of epistemology:

h is known by S =Df h is accepted by S; h is true; and h is nondefectively evident for S.

h is a proposition and S a subject; =Df means “equals by definition”. Hence, Chisholm

demands that the subject accepts the proposition h (as true), which is in fact the case
(objectively speaking) and that this is so not merely through a happy coincidence, but
precisely “nondefectively evident”. Only when all three determinants (acceptance,
truth, evidence) are present can knowledge be seen as well and truly established. In
the absence of one of these aspects, such a statement can still be communicated—as
information—but it would be an error (when truth and evidence are absent), a sup-
position (if acceptance and evidence are given, but the truth value is undecided) or a
lie (when none of the three aspects applies).

Is knowledge always tied to statements, as Chisholm’s epistemology suggests? To

the contrary: the propositional view of knowledge falls short, as Ryle (1946, 8) points
out:

It is a ruinous but popular mistake to suppose that intelligence operates only in the production
and manipulation of propositions, i.e., that only in ratiocinating are we rational.

Propositions describe “knowing that” while neglecting “knowing how”. But knowl-
edge is not exclusively expressed in propositions; and knowing how is most often
(and not only for Ryle) the more important aspect of knowledge by far. Know-how
is knowledge about how to do certain things. Ryle distinguishes between two forms
of know-how: (a) purely physical knowledge, and (b) knowledge whose execution is
guided by rules and principles (which can be reconstructed). Ryle (1946, 8) describes
the first, physical variant of know-how as follows:

(a) When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort (e.g., make good jokes, conduct
battles or behave at funerals), his knowledge is actualised or exercised in what he does. It is
not exercised (…) in the propounding of propositions or in saying “Yes” to those propounded by
others. His intelligence is exhibited by deeds, not by internal or external dicta.

In the second variant of know-how, knowledge is grounded in principles, which can

be described at least in their essence (Ryle, 1946, 8):

(b) When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort (e.g., cook omelettes, design dresses
or persuade juries), his performance is in some way governed by principles, rules, canons, stand-
ards or criteria. (…) It is always possible in principle, if not in practice, to explain why he tends to
succeed, that is, to state the reasons for his actions.

According to Ryle, it is not possible to trace such “implicit” know-how (Ryle, 1946, 7)
to know-that, and thus to propositions. In the know-how variant (b), it is not impos-
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sible to reconstruct and objectify the implicit knowledge via rules etc.; this is hardly
the case in variant (a).

Subjective Implicit Knowledge

Polanyi enlarges upon Ryle’s observations on know-how. According to Polanyi,

people dispose of more knowledge than they are capable of directly and comprehen-
sibly communicating to others. Polanyi’s (1967, 4) famous formulation is this:

I shall consider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we can
tell. This fact seems obvious enough; but it is not easy to say exactly what it means.

Implicit, or tacit, knowledge consists of various facets (Polanyi, 1967, 29):

The things that we know in this way included problems and hunches, physiognomies and skills,
the use of tools, probes, and denotative language.

This implicit knowledge is basically “embedded” within the body of the individual,
and they use it in the same way that they normally use their body (Polanyi, 1967, X
and XI):

(The structure of tacit knowing) shows that all thought contains components of which we are
subsidiary aware in the focal content of our thinking, and that all thought dwells in its subsidiar-
ies, as if they were parts of our body. …(S)ubsidiaries are used as we use our body.

We must strictly differentiate between the meaning that the person might ascribe to
the (implicit) knowledge, and the object bearing this meaning. Let the person carry an
object in their hand, say: a tool; this object is thus close to the person (proximal). The
meaning of this object, on the other hand, may be very far from the person (distal)—it
does not even have to be known in the first place. The meaning of the object (unex-
pressed or inexpressible) arises from its usage. Polanyi (1967, 13) introduces the two
aspects of implicit knowledge via an example:

This is so ... when we use a tool. We are attending to the meaning of its impact on our hands in
terms of its effect on the things to which we are applying it. We may call this the semantic aspect
of tacit knowledge. All meaning tends to be displayed away from ourselves, and that is in fact my
justification for using the terms “proximal” and “distal” to describe the first and second terms
of tacit knowledge.

Explicit knowledge can also contain implicit components. The author of a document
has certain talents, is well acquainted with certain subjects and is steeped in tradi-
tions, all of which put together makes up his or her personal knowledge (Polanyi,
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1958). Since these implicit factors are unknown to the reader, the communication
of personal knowledge—even in written and thus explicit form—is always prone to
errors (Polanyi, 1958, 207):

Though these ubiquitous tacit endorsements of our words may always turn out to be mistaken,
we must accept this risk if we are ever to say anything.

Here Polanyi touches upon hermeneutical aspects (e.g. understanding and preunder-
standing).
How can implicit knowledge be transmitted? In the case of distal implicit knowl-
edge, transmission is nearly impossible, whereas proximal implicit knowledge,
according to Polanyi, is communicated via two methods. On the one hand, it is pos-
sible to “physically” transmit knowledge via demonstration and imitation of the rel-
evant activities (Polanyi, 1967, 30):

The performer co-ordinates his moves by dwelling in them as parts of his body, while the watcher
tries to correlate these moves by seeking to dwell in them from outside. He dwells in these moves
by interiorizing them. By such exploratory indwelling the pupil gets the feel of a master’s skill
and may learn to rival him.

The second option consists of intellectually appropriating the implicit knowledge of

another person by imitation, or more precisely, by rethinking. Polanyi (1967, 30) uses
the example of chess players:

Chess players enter into a master’s spirit by rehearsing the games he played, to discover what
he had in mind.

According to Polanyi, it is important to create “coherence” between the bearer of

implicit knowledge and the person who wants to acquire it—be it of the physical or
intellectual kind (Polanyi, 1967, 30):

In one case we meet a person skillfully using his body and, in the other, a person cleverly using
his mind.

For implicit knowledge to be communicated without a hitch, it must be transformed

into words, models, numbers etc. that can be understood by anyone. In other words,
it must be “externalized” (ideally: stored in written documents). Externalized knowl-
edge—and only this—is accessible to knowledge representation, and hence informa-
tion science. In practice, according to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), this is not achieved
via clearly defined concepts and statements that can be understood by anyone, but
only via rather metaphorical and vague expressions. Should it prove impossible to
comprehensibly externalize a person’s implicit knowledge, we will be left with four
more ways toward at least conserving some aspects of their knowledge:
–– firstly, we regard the person themselves as a document which is then described
via metadata (e.g. in an expert database),
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–– secondly, we draw upon those artifacts created by the person themselves and
use them to approximate their initial knowledge (as in the chess player example
above), or we attempt—as in Ryle’s scenario (b)—to reconstruct the rules govern-
ing the lines of action,
–– thirdly, we “apprentice” to the person (and physically appropriate their knowl-
edge),
–– fourthly, it is possible to compile information profiles of the person via their
preferences (e.g. of reading certain documents), and to extrapolate their implicit
knowledge on this basis (with the caveat of great insecurity).
Variant (1) amounts to “Yellow Pages”, which ultimately become useless once the
person is no longer reachable (e.g. after leaving his company), variant (2) tries to
make do with documenting the artifacts (via images, videos and descriptions) and
hopes that will be possible for another person to reconstruct the original knowledge

on their basis. Variant (4) is, at best, useful as a complement to the expert database.
The ideal path is probably variant (3), which involves being introduced to the subject
area under the guidance of the individual in question. Here, Nonaka and Takeuchi
(1995) talk about “socialization”. Memmi (2004, 876) finds some clear words on the
subject:

In short, know-how and expertise are only accessible through contact with the appropriate indi-
viduals. Find the right people to talk to or to work with, and you can start acquiring their knowl-
edge. Otherwise there is simply very little you could do (watching videos of expert behavior is a
poor substitute indeed).

Socialization is an established method in knowledge management, but it has nothing

to do with digital information and very little with information science (since in this
instance, knowledge is not being represented at all, but directly communicated from
person to person). From the purview of information science, then, implicit knowledge
creates a problem. We can approach it in the context of knowledge representation
(using methods 1, 2 and 4), but we cannot conclusively resolve it. Implicit knowledge
already creates problems on the level of interpersonal relationships; if we addition-
ally require an information system in knowledge representation, the problem will
become even greater. Thus, Reeves and Shipman (1996, 24) emphasize:

Humans make excellent use of tacit knowledge. Anaphora, ellipses, unstated shared under-
standing are all used in the service of our collaborative relationships. But when human-human
collaboration becomes human-computer-human collaboration, tacit knowledge becomes a
problem.

Knowledge Management
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In Nonaka’s and Takeuchi’s (1995) approach, we are confronted with four transitions
from knowledge to knowledge:
–– from the implicit knowledge of one person to that of another (socialization),
–– from the implicit knowledge of a person to explicit knowledge (externalization)—
which includes the serious problems mentioned above,
–– from explicit knowledge to the implicit knowledge of a person (internalization,
e.g. by learning),
–– from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge (combination).
Information science finds its domain in externalization (where possible) and combi-
nation. Explicit, and thus person-independent, knowledge is conserved and repre-
sented in its objective interconnections. For Nonaka, Toyama and Konno (2000), the
ideal process of knowledge creation in organizations runs, in a spiral form, through
all four forms of knowledge transmission and leads to the SECI Model (Socialization,
Externalization, Combination, Internalization) (see Figure A.2.2). In order to exchange

knowledge, the actors must occupy the same space (Japanese: “ba”), comparable to
the “World Horizon” of hermeneutics (Nonaka, Toyama, & Konno, 14):

ba is here defined as a shared context in which knowledge is shared, created and utilised. In
knowledge creation, generation and regeneration of ba is the key, as ba provides the energy,
quality and place to perform the individual conversions and to move along the knowledge spiral.
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Figure A.2.2: Knowledge Spiral in the SECI Model. Source: Modified from Nonaka, Toyama & Konno,
2000, 12.

In enterprises, several building blocks are required in order to adequately perform

knowledge management (Figure A.2.3). According to Probst, Raub and Romhardt
(2000), we must distinguish between the work units (at the bottom) and the strategic
level. The latter dictates which goals should be striven for in the first place. Then,
the first order of business is to identify the knowledge required by the company. This
can already be available internally (to be called up from knowledge conservation) or
externally (on the Web, in a database, from an expert or wherever) and will then be
acquired. If no knowledge is available, the objective will be to create it by one’s self
(e.g. via research and development). Knowledge is meant to reach its correct recipi-

ents. To accomplish this, the producers must first be ready to share their knowledge,
and secondly, the system must be rendered capable of adequately addressing, i.e.
distributing, said knowledge. Both knowledge compiled in enterprises and crucially
important external knowledge must be kept easily accessible. The central aspect is
the building block of Knowledge Use: the recipient translates the knowledge into
actions, closes knowledge gaps, prepares for decisions or lets the system notify him—
in the sense of an early-warning system—about unexpected developments. Finally,
Knowledge Measurement evaluates the operative cycle and sets the results in relation
to the set goals.

Figure A.2.3: Building Blocks of Knowledge Management Following Probst et al. Source: Probst,
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Raub, & Romhardt, 2000, 34.

Types of Knowledge

For Spinner (1994, 22), knowledge has become so important—we need only consider
the “knowledge society”—that he places the knowledge order on the same level as the
economic order and the legal order of a society:

The outstanding importance of these three fundamental orders for all areas of society results, …
in the case of the knowledge order, from the function of scientific-technological progress as the
most important productive force, as well as from extra-scientific information as a mass medium
of communication and control, i.e. as a means of entertainment and administration.

Such a knowledge order contains “knowledge of all kinds, in every conceivable quan-
tity and quality” (Spinner, 1994, 24), which is granted by the triad of form, content
and expression, as well as via the validity claim. Studying the form involves the
logical form of statements and their area of application, where Spinner distinguishes
dichotomously between general statements (statements in theories or laws, e.g. “All
objects, given gravitation, fall downward”) and singular existential statements with
reference to place and time (“My pencil falls downward in our office on December
24th, 2007”). Knowledge, according to Spinner, is devoid of content if it has only slight
informational value (e.g. entertainment or advertisement). On the other hand, it is
“informative” in the case of high informational value (e.g. in scientific statements
or news broadcasts). The expression of knowledge aims for the distinction between
implicit (tacit knowledge, physical know-how) and explicit (fixed in documents). The
application of knowledge can also be considered as an epistemic “additional quali-
fication” (Spinner, 2002, 21). An application can be apodictic if the knowledge con-
cerned is presupposed to be true (as in dogmas), or hypothetical if its truth value is
called into question.
Can all knowledge be equally well structured, or represented? Certainly not. A
well-formulated scientific theory, published in an academic journal, should be more
easily representable than a microblog on Twitter or a rather subliminal message in an
advertising banner. Spinner (2000, 21) writes on this subject:

We can see that there are knowledge types, knowledge stores and knowledge characteristics that
can be ordered and those that resist being ordered by looking at the species-rich knowledge
landscape. This landscape reaches from implicit notions and unarticulated ideas all the way to
fully formulated (‘coded’) legal texts and explicit (‘holy’) texts that are set down word for word.

Normal-Science Knowledge
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Let us restrict our purview to scientific knowledge for a moment. According to Kuhn’s
(1962) deliberations, science does not advance gradually but starts its research—
all over again, as it were—in the wake of upheavals, or scientific revolutions. Kuhn
describes the periods between these upheavals as “normal sciences”. We must under-
stand these normal sciences as a type of research that is accepted by scientists of
certain schools of thought as valid with regard to their own work. Research is based
on scientific accomplishments of the past and serves as a basis for science; it repre-
sents commonly accepted theories which are applied via observation and experimen-
tation. The scientific community is held together by a “paradigm”, which must be
sensational in order to draw many advocates and adherents, but which also offers its
qualified proponents the option of solving various problems posed by the paradigm
itself. The researchers within a normal science form a community that orients itself on
the common paradigm, and which disposes of a common terminology dictated by the

paradigm. If there is agreement within the community of experts as to the specialist

language being used, it is easily possible—at least in theory—to represent the special-
ist language via exactly one system of a knowledge order. Kuhn (1962, 76) emphasizes
the positive effects of such a procedure of not substituting established tools:

So long as the tools a paradigm supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it
defines, science moves fastest and penetrates most deeply.

For the record: In normal sciences, specific knowledge orders can be worked out for
the benefit of science. But there is more than just the normal sciences. Sometimes,
anomalies arise—observations that do not fit the paradigm. If these anomalies pile
up, the scientific community enters a critical situation in which the authority of the
paradigm slackens. If the scientists encounter a new paradigm during such a crisis, a
scientific revolution is to be expected—a paradigm shift, a change in perspectives, the
formation of a new scientific community. The new paradigm must offer predictions
that differ from those of the old (anomalous) one, otherwise it would be unattractive
for the researchers. For Kuhn, however, this also means that the old paradigm and
the new one are logically irreconcilable: the new one supplants the old. Both para-
digms are “incommensurable”, i.e. they cannot be compared to each other. For the
knowledge order of the old paradigm, this means that it has become as useless as the
paradigm itself, and must be replaced.
There are sciences that have not (yet) found their way toward becoming normal
sciences. These are in their so-called “pre-paradigmatic” phase, in which individual
schools of thought, or “lone wolves”, attempt to solve the prevalent problems via their
own respective terminologies. Since there is no binding terminology in such cases, it
is impossible to build up a unified knowledge order.
Brier (2008, 422) emphasizes the importance of different languages in scientific
fields for information practice:
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(A) bibliographical system such as BIOSIS will only function well within a community of biolo-
gists. This means that both their producers and the users must be biologists—and so must be the
indexers.

If for example a chemist is looking for biological information, he cannot use his
chemical terminology but must speak the language of biology (Brier, 2008, 424):

(C)hemists must use the correct biological name for a plant in order to find articles about a chem-
ical substance it produces.

Kuhn’s observations only claim to hold true for scientific paradigms. However, in
spite of his caution, it seems that they can be generalized for all types of knowledge.
It is only possible to create a binding knowledge order when all representatives of a
community (apart from scientists, these may include all employees of a company, or

the users of a subject-specific Web service) speak a common language, which then
makes up the basis of the knowledge order. If there is no common paradigm (e.g. in
enterprises: the researchers have their paradigm, the marketing experts an alternative
one), the construction of one single knowledge order from the perspective of exactly
one group makes little sense. “Revolutionary changes” that lead to a paradigm shift
require equally revolutionary changes in the knowledge order. It is a great challenge
in information science “how to map semantic fields of concepts and their signifying
contexts into our systems” (Brier, 2008, 424).

Information as Knowledge Put in Motion

Let us turn back to Figure A.2.1, in which we are discussing the process of signal trans-
mission. If we want to put knowledge “into a form”, or in motion, we cannot do so by
disregarding this physical process. Information is thus fundamentally a unit made
up of two components: the document as signal, and the content as knowledge. For
the purposes of information science, we must enhance Shannon’s schema by adding
the knowledge component. The triad of sender—channel—receiver is preserved;
added to it are, on the sender’s side, the knowledge he is referring to and wants to
put in motion, and on the receiver’s side, the knowledge as he understands it. The
problem: there is no direct contact between the knowledge that is meant by a sender
and that which is understood by the receiver; the transmission always takes a detour
via encoding, channel (including noise) and decoding. And this route, represented
schematically in Figure A.2.4, is extremely prone to disruptions.
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Figure A.2.4: Simple Information Transmission.

Apart from the physical problems of information transmission, several further bundles
of problems must be successfully dealt with in order for the understood knowledge
to at least approximately match the meant knowledge. First, we need to deal with
the characters being used. Sender and receiver must dispose of the same character
set, or employ a translator. (As a self-experiment, you could try speaking BAPHA out

loud. If this appears to yield no meaning at the first attempt, let us enlighten you that
it includes Cyrillic characters.) Secondly, the language being used should be spoken
fluently by both sender and receiver. A piece of “hot information”, written in Bulgar-
ian, will be useless to someone who does not speak the language. Thirdly, natural lan-
guages are by no means unambiguous. (Another experiment: what are you thinking
of when you hear or see the word JAVA? There are at least three possible interpreta-
tions: programming language, island and coffee.) Fourthly, there must be a common
“world horizon”, i.e. a certain socio-cultural background. Imagine the problems of an
Eskimo in explaining to an Arab from Bahrain the various forms of snow. When infor-
mation transmission is successful, the knowledge (carried by the information) meets
the pre-existing knowledge of the receiver and changes it.
According to Brookes (1980, 131), the connection between knowledge and trans-
mitted information can be expressed via a (pseudo-mathematical) equation. Knowl-
edge (K) is understood as a structure (S) of concepts and statements; the transmitted
information (Δ I) carries a small excerpt from the world of knowledge. The equation
goes:

K[S] + Δ I = K[S + Δ S].

The knowledge structure of the receiver is modified via Δ I. This effects a change to the
structure itself, as signified by the Δ S. The special case of Δ S = 0 is not ruled out. The
same Δ I, received by different receivers with different K[S] than each other, can effect
different structural changes Δ S. The process of information differs “from person to
person and from situation to situation” (Saab & Riss, 2011, 2245). So the “understand-
ing of a person’s knowledge structure” (Cool & Belkin, 2011, 11) is essential for infor-
mation science.
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Figure A.2.5: Information Transmission with Human Intermediator.

The intermediation is set between instances of the chain of information transmission;

this is where the specific informational added value provided by information science
is being developed.
When interposing a human information intermediator, the blurry areas between
the knowledge that is meant and that which is understood are widened due to the
addition of the intermediator’s subjective knowledge. Let us discuss the problems via
an example: Over the course of this chapter, we will talk about Bacon’s “Knowledge
is Power”. Bacon (Sender) has fixed his knowledge in several texts (Channel 1), from
which we can hardly work out exhaustively what he “really” meant (meant knowl-
edge). An information intermediator (in this case, we will assume this role) has read
Bacon’s works (Channel 1) and, ideally, understood them—on the basis of the exist-
ing knowledge base (this knowledge base also contains other sources, e.g. Schmidt’s
(1967) essay and further background knowledge). An opinion about Bacon’s “Knowl-
edge is Power” has been developed and fixed in this book (Channel 2). This is where
you, the reader (Receiver), come into play. On the basis of your foreknowledge, you
understand our interpretation of Bacon’s “Knowledge is Power”. How much of what
Bacon actually meant would have reached you in its unadulterated form? To clarify:
Information science attempts to minimize such blurry areas via suitable methods
and tools of knowledge representation and information retrieval, and to provide for a
(possibly) ideal information flow.
From Kuhlen we learned that the objective in information science is not only to
put knowledge in motion, but also to refine it with informational added value. We
now incorporate into our schema of information transmission a human intermedia-
tor with his or her own subjective knowledge (Figure A.2.5) on the one hand, and an
automatic mechanical intermediator (Figure A.2.6) on the other.
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Figure A.2.6: Information Transmission with Mechanical Intermediation.

The situation is slightly different in the case of mechanical intermediation. Instead

of a human, a machine is set between sender and receiver; say, a search engine on

the Internet. The problems posed by the human intermediator’s (meant and under-
stood) knowledge no longer exist: the machine stores—in Popper’s sense—objective
knowledge. The questions are now: How does it store this knowledge? And: How does
it then yield it (i.e. in what order)? If the receiver wants to search comfortably and
successfully, he must (at least to some extent) grasp the techniques used by search
engines. Information science provides such techniques of Information Indexing and
also makes sure users find it as easy as possible to search and retrieve knowledge. Is it
possible to replace a subjective bearer of knowledge—say, an employee with valuable
know-how or know-that—with an objective one in such a way that the knowledge is
still accessible after the employee has left the company? The answer is: yes, in princi-
ple, only such a current employee must dispose of a knowledge structure that allows
him to adequately understand the stored knowledge.
What are the characteristics of information? Does information have anything to
do with truth? Is information always new? “Knowledge is power”, Bacon says. Are
there any relations between knowledge and power?

Information and Truth

Knowledge has a truth claim. Is this also the case for information, if information
is what sets this knowledge in motion? Apart from knowledge, there are further,
related forms of dealing with objects. Thus we speak of belief when we subjectively
think something is true that cannot be objectively explained, of conjecture when we
introduce something as new without (subjective or objective) proof, or of lies when
something is clearly not true but is communicated regardless. If beliefs, conjectures
or lies are put in motion, are they not information? For predominantly practical
reasons, it would prove very difficult, if not impossible, for information science to
check every piece of informational content for its truth value. “Information is not
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responsible for truth value,” Kuhlen (1995, 41) points out (for a contrary opinion cf.
Budd, 2011). Buckland (1991a, 50) remarks, “we are unable to say confidently of any-
thing that it could not be information;” and Latham (2012, 51) adds, “even untrue,
incorrect or unseen information is information.” The task of checking the truth value
of the knowledge, rather, must be delegated to the user (Receiver). He then decides
whether the information retrieved represents knowledge, conjecture or untruth. At
the same time, though, it must of course be required of the information’s user to be
competent enough to perform this task without any problems, i.e. he is well trained
in information literacy.

Information and Novelty

Does information have anything to do with novelty? Must knowledge always be new
to a receiver in order to become information? And conversely, is every new knowl-
edge always information? Let us start off with the last question and imagine we are
at the airport, planning to board a plane to Graz, Austria. There is a message over
the PA system: “Last call for boarding Flight 123 to Rome!” This is new to us; we find
it to be of no interest at all, though, and will probably hardly even notice it before
immediately forgetting we heard it at all. Now another announcement: “Flight 456 to
Graz will board half an hour late due to foggy weather.” This is also new, and it does
interest us; we will modify our actions (e.g. by going for a bite to eat before boarding)
accordingly. This time, the announcement is useful information to us.
We now come to the first question. Staying with the airport example (and sitting
in the airport restaurant by now), the repeated announcement “Flight 456 to Graz
will board half an hour late due to foggy weather” is not new to us, but it does affect
our actions, as it allows us to continue eating in peace (after all, the fog could have
lifted unexpectedly in the meantime). By now it should have become clear that
novelty does not have to be an absolute requirement for information; it is still a rela-
tive requirement, though. By the fourth or fifth identical announcement, however,
the knowledge being communicated loses a lot of its value for us. A certain quantum
of repetition is acceptable—it is sometimes even desirable, as a confirmation of what
is already known—but too much redundancy reduces the information’s relevance to
our actions. In this context, von Weizsäcker (1974) identifies the vertices of first occur-
rence and repetition as the components of the pragmatic aspect of information: the
“correct” degree of informedness lies between the two extremes.

What does information yield its receiver? The knowledge that is transmitted via
information meets the user’s pre-existing knowledge and leads to the user having
more know-how or know-that than previously. Such knowledge enhancement is
not in service of purely intellectual pursuits (at least not always); rather, it serves to
better understand or be able to do something in order to gain advantages vis-à-vis
others—e.g. one’s competition. Knowledge and having knowledge is thus related to
power. The classical dictum “Knowledge is Power” has been ascribed to Bacon. In his
“Novum Organum” (Bacon, 2000 [1620], 33), we read:

Human knowledge and human power come to the same thing, because ignorance of cause frus-
trates effect. For Nature is conquered only by obedience; and that which in thought is a cause,
is like a rule in practice.

A further reference in the “New Organon” shows the significance of science and tech-
nology (“active tendency”) to power (Bacon, 2000 [1620], 103):

Although the road to human knowledge and the road to human power are very close and almost
the same, yet because of the destructive and inveterate habit of losing oneself in abstraction, it
is altogether safer to raise the sciences from the beginning on foundations which have an active
tendency, and let the active tendency itself mark and set bounds to the contemplative part.

Bacon’s context is clear: he is talking about scientific knowledge, and about the
power that allows us to reign over nature with the help of this (technological) knowl-
edge. The aspect of knowledge as power over other people cannot be explicitly found
in Bacon, but it is—according to Schmidt (1967, 484-485)—an implication hidden in
the text.

The power that Bacon speaks of is the power of man to command nature; we must, however, pay
attention to the dialectical nuance that man is not outside of nature, but a part of it. Every victory
of man over nature is, by implication, a victory of man over himself. Power over other people can
only be gained because every man is subject to natural conditions.

Uncertainty

What is the power that can be obtained through knowledge, and which is what we talk
about in the context of information science? Ideally, a receiver will put the transmitted
information to use. On the basis of the experienced “discrepancy between the infor-
mation regarded as necessary and that which is actually present” (Wittmann, 1959,
28), uncertainty arises, and must be reduced. The information obtained—thus Witt-
mann’s (1959, 14) famous definition—is “purpose-oriented knowledge”. For Belkin
(1980) such “anomalies” lead to “anomalous states of knowledge” (ASK), which are
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the bases of a person’s information need. Belkin, Oddy and Brooks (1982, 62) note:

The ASK hypothesis is that an information need arises from a recognized anomaly in the user’s
state of knowledge concerning some topic or situation and that, in general, the user is unable to
specify precisely what is needed to resolve that anomaly.

Wersig (1974, 70) also assumes a “problematic situation” that leads to “uncertainty”.
Wersig (1974, 74) even defines the concept of information with reference to uncer-
tainty:

Information (…) is the reduction of uncertainty due to processes of communication.

Kuhlthau (2004, 92) introduces the Uncertainty Principle:

Uncertainty is a cognitive state that commonly causes affective symptoms of anxiety and lack
of confidence. Uncertainty and anxiety can be expected in the early stages of the information
search process. The affective symptoms of uncertainty, confusion, and frustration are associated
with vague unclear thoughts about a topic or question. As knowledge states shift to more clearly
focused thoughts, a parallel shift occurs in feelings of increased confidence. Uncertainty due
to a lack of understanding, a gap in meaning, or a limited construction initiates the process of
information seeking.

What does “purpose-oriented knowledge” mean? What is “correct” information,

information that fulfills its purpose and reduces uncertainty? Information helps us
master “problematic situations”. Such situations include preparations for decision-
making, knowledge gaps and early-warning scenarios.
In the first two aspects, the information deficit is known: decisions must be pre-
pared with reference to the most comprehensive information available, knowledge
gaps must be filled. Both situations are closely linked and, for the most part, coincide.
In the third case, it is the information that alerts us to the critical situation in the first
place. The early-warning system signals dangers (e.g. posed by the competition, such
as the market entry of new competitors). The “correct” internal knowledge (including
the “correct” bearers of knowledge, i.e. the employees), combined with the “correct”
internally used and externally acquired knowledge shows up business opportunities
for the company and at the same time warns of risks. In any case, it leads to conscious
action (or forbearance). This is the practical goal of all users’ information activities:
to translate knowledge into action via information. For a specific information user
in a specific situation (Henrichs, 2004), information is action-relevant knowledge—
beyond true or false, new or confirmed. Similarly, Kuhlen (2004, 15) states:

Corresponding to the pragmatic interpretation, information is that quantity of knowledge which

is required in current action situations, but which the current actor generally does not personally
dispose of or at the very least does not have a direct line to.

Once an actor has assembled the quantity of knowledge that he needs in order to
perform his action, he is—in Kuhlen’s sense—“knowledge-autonomous”. Under the
term “information autonomy”, Kuhlen summarizes the activities of gathering relevant
knowledge (besides mastery of the relevant retrieval techniques) as well as assessing
the truth and innovation values of the knowledge retrieved.
To put it in the sense of Bacon’s adage, we are granted the ability to act appro-
priately on the basis of knowledge if and only if we have informational autonomy.
The totality of a person’s skills for acting information-autonomous (e.g. basic IT and
smartphone skills, skills for mastering information retrieval and skills for controlling
the uploading and indexing of documents) is called information literacy (see Ch. A.5).

The power of information literacy is constrained. Even information that is ideally

“correct” is generally not enough to reduce any and all uncertainty during the deci-
sion-making process. The information basis for making decisions can only be smaller
or greater. However, increasing the size of the information basis brings enormous
competitive advantages in economic life, compared to the competition. Imperfect
information and the respective relative uncertainty are key aspects of information
practice: in an environment that as a matter of principle cannot be comprehensively
recorded, and which is in constant flux to boot, it is important for individuals, enter-
prises, and even for entire regions and countries, to reduce the uncertainties result-
ing from this state of affairs as far as possible. However, complete information and
thus the complete reduction of uncertainty can never be attained. Rather, information
creates a state of creative uncertainty. The perception and assessment of uncertainty
lead to information being used as a strategic weapon. By disposing of and refining
knowledge, companies and individuals can stand to gain advantages over their com-
petitors. The competitive advantage is given for as along as any party monopolizes
certain information, or at least for as long as the information is asymmetrically dis-
tributed in favor of our person, our company or our country. The other competitors
must necessarily follow suit, until there is once more an information equilibrium in a
certain field. Then, information in other fields or new information in the original field
is used to work out a new information advantage etc. Information thus takes center
stage in the arena of innovative competition.

Production of Informational Added Value

Information activities process knowledge, present it in a user-friendly manner, rep-

resent it via condensation and the allocation of information filters, and prepare it for
easy and comprehensive search and retrieval. All aspects that go beyond the original
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knowledge are informational added values, which can be found in private as well as
public information goods. In addition to knowing how and knowing that the informa-
tional value added is knowing about. Information activities lead to knowledge about
documents and about the knowledge fixed in the documents. For Buckland (2012),
knowing about is more concerned with information science than knowing how and
knowing that. Buckland (2012, 5) writes,

in everyday life we depend heavily and more and more on second-hand knowledge. We can
determine little of what we need to know by ourselves, at first hand, from direct experience. We
have to depend on others, largely through documents. ... In this flood of information, we have to
select and have to decide what to trust. What we believe about a document influences our use of
it, and more importantly, our use of documents influences what we believe.

Figure A.2.7: Intermediation—Phase I: Information Indexing (here: with Human Indexer). DRU: Docu-
mentary Reference Unit, DU: Documentary Unit.

In an initial, rough approximation of theoretical information science, we distinguish

between three phases of information transmission (Figures A.2.7 through A.2.9). In
Phase 1, the objective is to represent knowledge fixed by an author in a document
(e.g. a book, a research article, a patent document or a company-internal memo). This
document is called a “documentary reference unit” (DRU). Then comes an informa-
tion specialist or—in the case of automatic indexing—an information system, reads
this unit and represents its content (via a short summary) and its main topics (via
some keywords) in a so-called “documentary unit” (DU), also called “surrogate”.
In the ideal scenario, this DU (as an initial informational added value) is saved in
an information store together with the DRU. Warner (2010, 10) calls the activities of
knowledge representation “description labor” as the labor involved “in transforming
objects into searchable descriptions”. This process, sketched just above, proves to be
far more complex than assumed and is what forms the central object of the second
part of this book.
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The DU may be sent to interested users by the respective information system itself,
as a push service; until then, it remains in the knowledge store awaiting its users and
usage. One day, a user will feel an information need and start searching, or let an
information expert do his search for him. Via its pull service, the information system
allows users to systematically search through the documentary units (with the infor-
mational added value contained within them) and also to simply browse through the
system. The language of the searcher is then aligned with the languages of the DUs
and DRUs, and the retrieval system arranges the list of DUs according to relevance.
The searcher will select some relevant DUs and through them acquire the DRUs, i.e.
the original documents, which he will then transmit to his client (of course client and
searcher can be the same person). For Warner (2010, 10) the processes of information
retrieval are connected with “search labor”, which is understood as “the human labor
expended in searching systems”. Information retrieval is where the second amount

of informational added values is worked out. The entire first part of this book is dedi-
cated to this subject.

Figure A.2.8: Intermediation—Phase II: Information Retrieval.

Figure A.2.9: Intermediation—Phase III: Further Processing of Retrieved Information.

Figure A.2.9 seamlessly picks up where Figure A.2.8 left off. The receiver has received
the relevant documentary reference units containing his action-relevant knowledge.
The transmitted information meets the receiver’s state of knowledge and, in the ideal
case, merges with it to create new knowledge. The new knowledge leads to the desired
actions and—if the actor reports on it—new information.

Conclusion

–– “Information” must be conceptually differentiated from the related terms “signal”, “data” and
“knowledge”. The basic model of communication—developed by Shannon—takes into consid-
eration sender, channel and receiver, where the channel is used to transmit physical signals.
Sender and receiver respectively encode and decode the signals into signs.
–– General semiotics distinguishes between relations of signs among each other (syntax), the
meaning of signs (semantics) and the usage of signs (pragmatics). When we neglect semantics
and pragmatics and concentrate on the syntax of transmitted signs, we are speaking of “data”;
when we regard transmitted signs from a semantic and pragmatic perspective, we are looking at
“knowledge” and “information”, respectively.
–– Knowledge is subjective, and thus forms part of Popper’s World 2, when a user disposes of it
(know-that and know-how). Knowledge is objective and thus an aspect of World 3 in so far as the
content is stored user-independently (in books or digital databases).
–– Knowledge is thus fixed either in a human consciousness (as subjective knowledge) or another
store (as objective knowledge). Knowledge as such cannot be transmitted. To transmit it, a physi-
cal form is required, i.e. an inFORMation. Information is knowledge put in motion, where the
concept of information unites the two aspects of signal and knowledge in itself.
–– Knowledge is present not only in texts, but also in non-textual documents (images, videos,
music). Panofsky distinguishes between three semantic levels of interpretation: the pre-icono-
graphical, the iconographical and the iconological level.
–– Knowledge—as one of the core concepts of knowledge representation—allows for different per-
spectives. Knowledge can be regarded as both (true, known) statements (know-that) and as the
knowledge of how to do certain things (know-how).
–– According to Polanyi, implicit knowledge is pretty much physically embedded in a person, and
hence can be objectified (externalized) only with difficulty.
–– Knowledge management means the way knowledge is dealt with in organizations. According to
Nonaka and Takeuchi, the knowledge spiral consisting of socialization, externalization, combi-
nation, and internalization (SECI) leads to success, even if externalization (transforming implicit
knowledge into explicit knowledge) can hardly be achieved comprehensively. Probst et al. use
several building blocks of corporate knowledge management.
–– According to Spinner’s knowledge theory, we are confronted by a multitude of different types
of knowledge, amounts of knowledge and qualities of knowledge, which all require their own
Copyright © 2013. Walter de Gruyter GmbH. All rights reserved.

methods of knowledge representation.

–– Only knowledge in normal sciences (according to Kuhn) can be put into a knowledge organiza-
tion system. In normal sciences, there are discipline-specific special languages (e.g., the termi-
nologies of chemists or of biologists).
–– Information does not (in contrast to knowledge) have a truth claim, and neither does it claim to
be absolutely new; ideal informedness is achieved between the extreme poles of novelty and
repeated confirmation.
–– The meant knowledge of a sender does not have to match the understood knowledge of a
receiver. If we interpose further instances between sender and receiver (besides signal transmis-
sion via the channel), i.e. human and mechanical intermediators, the problems of adequately
communicating knowledge via information will become worse.
–– Information science allows knowledge to be put in motion, but it also facilitates the development
of specific added values (knowledge about), which, at the very least, reduce problems during the
transferral of knowledge.
–– “Knowledge is Power” refers, in Bacon, to man’s power over nature. Thinking further, it can also
be taken to refer to power over other people. The negative consequences of “Knowledge is Power”

can be counteracted by granting everybody the opportunity of requesting knowledge. The goal is
the subjects’ information autonomy, guaranteed by their information literacy.
–– In problematic situations, when there is uncertainty, purpose-oriented knowledge will be
researched in order to consolidate decisions, close knowledge gaps and detect early-warning
signals. The goal of the information-practical value chain is to translate knowledge into concrete
actions via information. Information, however, is never “perfect” and cannot reduce uncertain-
ties to zero. What it can do is to create relative advantages over others.
–– Humans as well as institutions require information autonomy in order to be able to research and
apply the most action-relevant knowledge possible.
–– Both information science and information practice work out informational added values (knowl-
edge about). This is accomplished over the course of professional intermediation, both in the
input area of storage (knowledge representation) and during the output process (information
retrieval).

Bibliography
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Create the Dynamics of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Copyright © 2013. Walter de Gruyter GmbH. All rights reserved.

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20 Part A.

Introduction to Information Science

A.2 Knowledge and Information

Signals and Data

(e.g. when there is an error on one page).

I(zi) = ld 1/pi bit or (mathematically identical):

and receive these results:

I(e) = –ld 0.17 bit = –(–2.6) bit = 2.6 bit

Here he is merely talking about a probability-theoretical observation of signal trans-

In information science, we analyze information as data and meaning (knowledge) in

Information, Knowledge and Documents

to the act of informing and the state of knowing, respectively.

Kuhlen (1995, 34) proceeds similarly: “Information is knowledge in action.” Kuhlen

Correspondingly, from an information science perspective we are interested in methods, pro-

Knowledge has nothing to do with signals, since it exists independently of them,

Bates (2005; 2006) distinguishes three levels of information and knowledge in

Information 1: The pattern of organization of matter and energy.

Information Intangible Tangible

Non-Textually Fixed Knowledge

Knowledge fixed in documents does not exclusively have to be grounded in texts.

An Australian bushman—as an example for “everyman”—will look at the picture and

Knowing That and Knowing How

A simple initial approximation regards knowledge as instances of true propositions.

h is known by S =Df h is accepted by S; h is true; and h is nondefectively evident for S.

h is a proposition and S a subject; =Df means “equals by definition”. Hence, Chisholm

Is knowledge always tied to statements, as Chisholm’s epistemology suggests? To

In the second variant of know-how, knowledge is grounded in principles, which can

Subjective Implicit Knowledge

Polanyi enlarges upon Ryle’s observations on know-how. According to Polanyi,

Implicit, or tacit, knowledge consists of various facets (Polanyi, 1967, 29):

The second option consists of intellectually appropriating the implicit knowledge of

According to Polanyi, it is important to create “coherence” between the bearer of

For implicit knowledge to be communicated without a hitch, it must be transformed

Socialization is an established method in knowledge management, but it has nothing

In enterprises, several building blocks are required in order to adequately perform

Raub, & Romhardt, 2000, 34.

paradigm. If there is agreement within the community of experts as to the specialist

Information as Knowledge Put in Motion

Figure A.2.4: Simple Information Transmission.

K[S] + Δ I = K[S + Δ S].

Figure A.2.5: Information Transmission with Human Intermediator.

The intermediation is set between instances of the chain of information transmission;

Figure A.2.6: Information Transmission with Mechanical Intermediation.

The situation is slightly different in the case of mechanical intermediation. Instead

Information and Truth

Information and Novelty

Information (…) is the reduction of uncertainty due to processes of communication.

Kuhlthau (2004, 92) introduces the Uncertainty Principle:

What does “purpose-oriented knowledge” mean? What is “correct” information,

Corresponding to the pragmatic interpretation, information is that quantity of knowledge which

The power of information literacy is constrained. Even information that is ideally

Production of Informational Added Value

Information activities process knowledge, present it in a user-friendly manner, rep-

In an initial, rough approximation of theoretical information science, we distinguish

Figure A.2.8: Intermediation—Phase II: Information Retrieval.

Figure A.2.9: Intermediation—Phase III: Further Processing of Retrieved Information.

methods of knowledge representation.

Create the Dynamics of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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