OPLR VS TORRES

BANDA vs Ermita

A group of National Printing Office employees challenge the constitutionality

of an executive order that removes the NPO's exclusive printing jurisdiction,
but the Supreme Court rules in favor of the executive order, stating that it is
constitutional and within the President's authority to reorganize the
executive branch.
Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs-IAD

Jul 24, 2012

A petition to declare Executive Order No. 13 as unconstitutional is dismissed

by the court, ruling that the reorganization of the executive department is
within the President's authority and does not violate due process or encroach
upon the powers of the Ombudsman.

The Province of North Cotabato v. The Govt of the Republic

of the Philippines Peace Panel and Ancestral Domain GR No.
183591, October 14, 2008

The Supreme Court declares the Memorandum of Agreement on the

Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front unconstitutional and invalid,
citing violations of the Constitution's provisions on territorial integrity,
national sovereignty, and separation of powers, and emphasizing the
importance of transparency and public consultation in the peace process.

The Court reiterated the doctrine that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized, which includes the
government’s duty to disclose information on public interest transactions and
to conduct consultations on important public matters.

QUARTO v. Ombudman

The Supreme Court upholds the Ombudsman's grant of immunity to

respondents in a case involving alleged anomalous transactions in the
Department of Public Works and Highways, dismissing the petitioner's claim
of selective prosecution and abuse of discretion.
Pimentel vs. Ermita

Post under Commission on Appointments , Political Law Case Digests

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its

temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office
for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to
the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as
acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice
could assume office.

Facts:

While Congress is in their regular session, President Arroyo,

through Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, issued appointments to
respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

After the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued ad interim

appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to which
they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.Petitioners senators
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments
issued.

They assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no

appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first
having obtained its consent.

Respondent secretaries, on the other hand, maintain that the President can
issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in
session.

Issue:

Whether or not President Arroyo’s appointment of respondents as acting

secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while
Congress is in session is constitutional.

On the Nature of the Power to Appoint

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature

may not interfere with the exercise of this executive power except in those
instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to interfere.Limitations on
the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s
power to appoint is limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an
appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise
of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

However, even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members

of Congress, the exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The
Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power
to give or withhold consent to presidential appointments. Thus:
xxx The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution.
Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said
Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do
not come from Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence,
it is not an agent of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are
purely executive in nature.

Guevara vs. Inocentes, G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15,

1966

Guevara vs. Inocentes, G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966

FACTS: The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim

appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on
November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year.
The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January
23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the former
Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at
about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was
extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent
Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant
petition for Quo Warranto seeking to be declared person legally entitled to
the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of
the 1935 Constitution. which states that:

The president shall have the power to make appointments during the recess
of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress.

Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the

special session which commenced on January 17, 1966, the respondent
contended that the petitioner’s ad interim appointment as well as other
made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress
adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated that (1) the
specific provision in the Constitution which states that: “until the next
adjournment of Congress” means adjournment of a regular session of
Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine
die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative
merely ‘suspended’ its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at
10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in
continuous session without interruption since January 17.

ISSUE/S:1. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention regarding “the next

adjournment of Congress specifically provides for regular session only.

2. Whether or not, the petitioner’s contention that Congress is still in

continuous session?

HELD: 1. NO. The phrase “until the next adjournment of Congress” does not
make any reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or
special. But a well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that
‘when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to conclude that the
authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word “adjournment” had in mind
either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner
contended.

2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of
January 22, 1966, the House of the Representative is only a part of the
Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of
its Houses is considered adjournment of the Congress as a whole. And the
petitioner’s ad interim appointment must have been lapsed on January 22,
1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.

Matibag v. Benipayo (G.R. No. 149036 )

Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting

Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a
temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were
renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, all
due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act upon the
confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued

a memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning
her to the Law Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming
that their ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on
temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited

under the Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in

character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be

independent”, this provision should be harmonized with the President’s
power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the
President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the
rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect to every provision
of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution –
on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments – did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad
interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in
session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess.
However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the
reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing power
of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital
government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies
in government offices, including the three constitutional commissions.
G. R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

Emilio Gonzales III (Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other
Enforcement Offices) / MOLEO) vs. Office of the President

Political Law; Law on Public Officers

Facts:

In August 23, 2010, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza

hijacked a bus packed with tourists and killed most pf its passengers in a 10-
hour hostage drama. The brother of the hijacker said that his brother was
upset over a dismissal from the police force, without due process, no
hearing, and no complaint. In the aftemath of the hostage taking, IIRC /
Incident Investigation and Review Committee was created to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearing and
executive sessions. However petitioner refused to participate inisisting that
the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.
Nevertheless, IIRC found that the Petitioner committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules by allowing
Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration to languish for more than 9 months in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motion for
reconsiderations for administrative disciplinary cases within 5 days from
submission. Inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The
prolonged inaction precipitated the desperated resort to hostage-taking.
Petitioner was dismissed from office through Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770.
Petitioner seeks to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 “Ombudsman Act”
which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the
Office of the Ombudsman unconstitutional.

Issues:

1) whether or not the Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is constitutional

2) whether or not the administrative action of removal taken against
Gonzales is valid

Held:

Constitutional. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombudsman

and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his poeer to appoint. In giving the
President, the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecutor,
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already
implied from the President’s constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid
officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
Invalid. The motion for reconsideration which remained prolonged for nine
months cannot be simply taken as evidence of the petitioner’s undue interest
in the case considering the lack of any evidence of personal grudge, social
ties, or business affiliation with any parties to the case that could have
impelled him to act as he did. The Office of the President’s pronouncement of
administrative accountability against petitioner and imposition upon him of
the corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside as the
findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in the office do not amount to
betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President while he may be vested the
authority, he cannot order the removal of the petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious
kind amounting a betrayal of public trust.
FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code or the Procedure For
Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings, Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four
oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise
known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

In a petition, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's

resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed. Instead, it declared Section 187 of the
Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the
Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of
the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines
only the power of supervision over local governments. By citing the
distinction between control and supervision, the lower court’s concluded that
the challenged section gave the Secretary the power of control and not of
supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the
Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically
Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local
governments, 8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is

unconstitutional.

HELD:

The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is reversed insofar as it declared

Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional and affirmed the
findings of the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke
it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets
aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did
not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not
pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure
was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code.

The Court finds that Secretary Drilon had performed an act not of control but
of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of
an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.

While in supervision, it merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work
done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the act. He has no judgment on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed.
MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO

FACTS:

Petitioners Annie, Anne Marie, James John, James Francis and Anne Margareth
Manubay and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation owned a
124-hectare land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. In November 1994,
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of
coverage placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice.

In Jul 1996, petitioners filed an application at the Department of Agrarian

Reform (DAR) for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential.
On August 26, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution
approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying
the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed
residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR
Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage,
pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the property was no
longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the
ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which
must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption.

Respondent Ernesto Garilao, then DAR Secretary, denied petitioners’

application for conversion, considering that the property had already been
placed under the CARP.

In April 1998, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
(CA) assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their
application. According to them, the issuance of a mere notice of coverage
placing agricultural land under the CARP was not a ground for the denial of
such application.
The CA dismissed the petition, holding that since the issue raised by
petitioners involved the administrative implementation of the CARP, the
Office of the Prsident (OP) was more competent to rule on the issue.
Moreover, by failing to bring the matter to the said office, petitioner did not
exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to a petition
for certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not the act of a department secretary may be directly

challenged in a petition for certiorari.

HELD:

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are

alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be
those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule,
an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not
appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of
Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for
certiorari to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be

shown that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and
that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In
other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and
despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

Here, inasmuch as respondent had a valid ground to deny petitioners’

application, he did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, DAR-
AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of
conversion) to the OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy
contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an
order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher
administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this
case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no
cause of action.

Trade and Investment Devpt Corp v. Manalang-Demigillo GR

NO. 185571, March 5, 2013
[CASE DIGEST] ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS v. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE and
RAFAEL SALAS (G.R. No. L-28790)

April 29, 1968

FACTS
In 1968, Antonio H. Noblejas, then the Commissioner of Land Registration,
received a letter from Secretary of Justice Claudio requiring him to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for approving
or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-
subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by
the original titles.

In his answer to Secretary Teehankee, Noblejas said that his position was
created by R.A. No. 1151, which further provided that as Commissioner, he
enjoyed the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance. As such, he argued that he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of
First Instance, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be
submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon.

Later on, Executive Secretary Rafael Salas suspended Noblejas after finding
that a prima facie case against him existed for gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest.

Noblejas filed a petition before the SC against Secretary Teehankee and

Executive Secretary Salas for grave abuse of discretion and conduct in
excess of jurisdiction.

RULING

Is the Commissioner of Land Registration, who enjoys the same benefits as a

Judge of the Court of First Instance, subject to the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court? -- NO.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial
functions.

As Commissioner of Land Registration, Noblejas had administrative or

executive functions, not judicial. Even the Resolutions on consultas that he
signs cannot be said to be judicial rulings. In fact, the SC held that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of Noblejas's administrative
or executive functions and merely incidental to the latter.
Further, the SC pointed out the following to debunk the argument of
Noblejas:

Section 67 of the Judiciary Act provides that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless
sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The SC
pointed out that since Noblejas is not a district judge, then the SC cannot
exercise disciplinary authority over him.

Other Executive officials enjoy the same privileges as officers of the court.
The Solicitor General, for example, has the rank and privileges of a Justice of
the Court of Appeals. Despite this, the SolGen remains under the disciplinary
authority of the President.

Finally, having an official of the executive department subject to the

disciplinary authority of the SC would violate the fundamental doctrine of
separation of powers, by charging the SC with the administrative function of
supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro
tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

The grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of

the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did
not include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand
investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges
would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void.

The petition of Noblejas is denied.

Facts:

The case involves a jurisdictional dispute between the Power Sector Assets
and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) and the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) regarding the imposition of Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale
of power plants. PSALM, a government-owned and controlled corporation
created under Republic Act No. 9136 (EPIRA), conducted public biddings for
the privatization of the Pantabangan-Masiway Hydroelectric Power Plant and
Magat Hydroelectric Power Plant in 2006. The winning bidders were First Gen
Hydropower Corporation and SN Aboitiz Power Corporation, respectively. On
August 28, 2007, the BIR demanded immediate payment of P3,813,080,472
as deficiency VAT for the sale of these plants. PSALM remitted the amount
under protest and filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to
resolve whether the sale should be subject to VAT. The DOJ ruled in favor of
PSALM, declaring the VAT imposition null and void. The BIR contested this,
arguing that the DOJ lacked jurisdiction and that the sale was subject to VAT.
The Court of Appeals sided with the BIR, nullifying the DOJ's decisions. PSALM
then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Did the Court of Appeals misapply the law in giving due course to the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 108156?

2. Did the Secretary of Justice act in accordance with the law in assuming
jurisdiction and settling the dispute between the BIR and PSALM?

3. Did the Secretary of Justice act in accordance with the law and
jurisprudence in ruling that there should be no VAT on the privatization,
sale, or disposal of generation assets?

4. Does the public respondent deserve the relief of certiorari?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the Court of Appeals'
decision, and reinstated the DOJ's decisions. The Court ruled that the DOJ
had jurisdiction over the case and that the sale of the power plants was not
subject to VAT. The BIR was given an opportunity to appeal the DOJ's
decisions to the Office of the President within 10 days from the finality of the
Supreme Court's decision.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court held that the DOJ had jurisdiction over the case under
Presidential Decree No. 242 (PD 242), which mandates that disputes solely
between government agencies and offices, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, be administratively settled or adjudicated by the
Secretary of Justice. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is vested by the Constitution or by law, and not by the parties to an
action. The Court found that the sale of the power plants was not "in the
course of trade or business" as contemplated under Section 105 of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997. The sale was a governmental
function mandated by the EPIRA law to privatize NPC assets and liquidate its
financial obligations. The Court also clarified that PSALM is not a successor-
in-interest of NPC, and thus, the repeal of NPC's VAT exemption does not
affect PSALM. The Court concluded that the sale of the power plants was an
isolated transaction and not subject to VAT.

Concise Comprehensive

Facts:

The case of "Province of Pampanga vs. Romulo" involves the Province of

Pampanga as the petitioner and Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as respondents.
The dispute centers on the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 224,
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 4, 2003. This executive
order aimed to rationalize the extraction and disposition of sand, gravel, and
lahar deposits in the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales. Prior to
this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga had enacted several tax
ordinances to impose taxes and fees on quarry resources extracted within
the province. However, Proclamation No. 66, issued by President Joseph
Estrada in 1999, declared lahar-affected areas as mineral reservations under
the control of the DENR. Although Proclamation No. 66 was later revoked by
Proclamation No. 183, Executive Order No. 224 was subsequently issued to
rationalize the extraction and disposition of these resources. The Province of
Pampanga filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) to declare Executive Order No. 224 unconstitutional, arguing that
it violated local government autonomy, was an invalid exercise of
presidential control, and constituted executive lawmaking. The RTC ruled in
favor of Pampanga, declaring the executive order unconstitutional. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, leading to the current petition for
review before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 224 is valid and constitutional.

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 224 violates the principle of local
government autonomy.

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 224 constitutes an invalid exercise

of presidential control and executive lawmaking.

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 224 violates the equal protection
clause.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 224. The Court affirmed the decision
of the Court of Appeals, which had reversed the RTC's ruling.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court held that Executive Order No. 224 is a valid exercise of
the president's inherent ordinance-making power, which is part of the
executive control over officials of the executive branch. The Court
emphasized that the president's ordinance-making power is not a delegated
authority from the legislature but a consequence of executive control. The
Court found that Executive Order No. 224 did not violate the principle of local
government autonomy as it merely provided a supervisory mechanism to
ensure compliance with existing laws and regulations on quarrying activities.
The task force created under the executive order was intended to oversee
the collection of taxes and fees, ensuring that the appropriate shares were
remitted to the local government units. The Court also held that the
executive order did not constitute executive lawmaking as it did not supplant
or modify existing laws but merely implemented the provisions of the
Philippine Mining Act and the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the
Court found that the executive order did not violate the equal protection
clause as it was based on a reasonable classification, given the unique
environmental and safety concerns in the lahar-affected areas of Pampanga,
Tarlac, and Zambales.

Eduardo Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34

written by Howard

G.R. No. L-54558 – 150 SCRA 144 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of
Rights – Habeas Corpus

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and
they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa. Olaguer and his group are all
civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and
incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos;
(3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco
Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo
Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6)
attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals
Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went
to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has
the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the
military courts or tribunals during the period of martial law in all cases
involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try
and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians
for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open
and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a
civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military
tribunal concerned.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora

Facts:

In the case of "Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora," the petitioner,

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), challenged the constitutionality of the
President's deployment of the Philippine Marines for joint visibility patrols
with the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Metro Manila. The respondents
included Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, Gen. Panfilo M. Lacson, Gen. Edgar B.
Aglipay, and Gen. Angelo Reyes. The case arose from a verbal directive
issued by President Joseph Ejercito Estrada on January 24, 2000, which was
later confirmed in a memorandum. The directive aimed to address the
alarming increase in violent crimes such as robberies, kidnappings, and
carnappings in Metro Manila. The PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000
(LOI 02/2000), detailing the joint visibility patrols under Task Force Tulungan.
The IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000, arguing that the deployment
violated the Constitution as there was no emergency situation justifying the
use of military personnel for law enforcement. The case was initially heard by
the Supreme Court, which required the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition. The Solicitor General defended the constitutionality of the
President's actions, arguing that the IBP lacked legal standing and that the
issue involved a political question beyond judicial review.

Issue:

1. Does the IBP have legal standing to challenge the President's

deployment of the Marines?

2. Is the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling out

the armed forces subject to judicial review?

3. Does the deployment of the Marines for joint visibility patrols violate
the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military
and the civilian character of the PNP?

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that the IBP lacked legal standing to
challenge the President's deployment of the Marines.

2. The Court held that the President's factual determination of the

necessity of calling out the armed forces is not subject to judicial
review unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.

3. The Court found that the deployment of the Marines did not violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and
the civilian character of the PNP.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the grounds that the IBP failed
to establish a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned
act, thus lacking the legal standing to challenge the deployment. The Court
emphasized that the power to call out the armed forces is a discretionary
power vested solely in the President's wisdom, as provided under Section 18,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Court noted that it could
not overrule the President's judgment or substitute its own unless there was
a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court also highlighted that
the deployment of the Marines was a permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement, with the PNP retaining overall authority and control.
The limited participation of the Marines, as outlined in LOI 02/2000, did not
constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause or an insidious incursion
of the military into civilian affairs. The Court concluded that the President's
decision to deploy the Marines was justified given the alarming increase in
violent crimes in Metro Manila and that the deployment did not undermine
the civilian character of the police force.

Facts:

On January 15, 2009, three members of the International Committee of the

Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped near the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
The victims were Andreas Notter, a Swiss national and head of the ICRC in
Zamboanga City; Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national and ICRC delegate; and
Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer. They were inspecting a water and
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three
armed men, later identified as members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) led
by Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. In response, a task
force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which
organized a local group known as the Sulu Crisis Management Committee,
led by Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. Governor Tan also organized the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed civilians, to assist in the
rescue operations. On March 31, 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No.
1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in Sulu and calling upon
the PNP, AFP, and CEF to set up checkpoints, impose curfews, and conduct
general searches and seizures. Several individuals, including SPO1 Sattal
Jadjuli, were arrested under this proclamation. On April 16, 2009, Jamar M.
Kulayan and others filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that
Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion, violating the
1987 Constitution. They argued that only the President has the authority to
declare a state of emergency and exercise calling-out powers. Governor Tan
contended that he acted within his powers under the Local Government
Code. The Supreme Court granted the petition, declaring Proclamation 1-09
and its guidelines null and void.

Issue:

1. Does Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the Local Government

Code authorize the provincial governor to declare a state of emergency
and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation 1-09,
including the conduct of general searches and seizures?

2. Is the provincial governor authorized to convene the Civilian

Emergency Force (CEF) under the said provisions?

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of
the Local Government Code does not authorize the provincial governor
to declare a state of emergency and exercise the powers enumerated
under Proclamation 1-09, including the conduct of general searches
and seizures.

2. The Supreme Court ruled that the provincial governor is not authorized
to convene the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) under the said
provisions.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized that only the President, as the Commander-
in-Chief of the Republic, is vested with the authority to declare a state of
emergency and exercise calling-out powers. This is rooted in the
constitutional principle of a single executive, as established in Villena v.
Secretary of Interior. The Court noted that the President's emergency powers
and calling-out powers are exclusive and cannot be delegated to local
executives. The Court also highlighted that the Local Government Code does
not provide the provincial governor with the authority to declare a state of
emergency or conduct general searches and seizures, as these powers are
reserved for the President under the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the
Court found that the creation of the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) by
Governor Tan was invalid, as the Constitution mandates the dismantling of
private armies and armed groups not recognized by duly constituted
authority. The Court concluded that Governor Tan's actions exceeded his
authority and were issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.

acts:

The case of "Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo" involves Noriel H. Rodriguez, a

member of the peasant organization Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan
(Kagimungan), affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). On
September 6, 2009, Rodriguez was forcibly taken by four men in Barangay
Tapel, Cagayan, and subsequently detained and tortured by soldiers of the
17th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army. He was
accused of being a member of the New People's Army (NPA). During his
detention, Rodriguez was subjected to physical and psychological abuse,
including beatings and threats. He was released on September 17, 2009,
after being coerced into signing documents declaring his surrender to the
military. Rodriguez filed a petition for the writ of amparo and habeas data
against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several military and
police officials, alleging violations of his rights to life, liberty, and security.
The Court of Appeals granted the writs but dismissed the petition against
former President Arroyo due to presidential immunity. The case was elevated
to the Supreme Court for review.

Issue:

1. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted

after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in
his favor.

2. Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent

on the basis of presidential immunity from suit.

3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in

amparo and habeas data cases.

4. Whether the rights to life, liberty, and property of Rodriguez were

violated or threatened by respondents in G.R. No. 191805.

Ruling:

1. The Supreme Court ruled that interim reliefs, such as a temporary

protection order, are only available before final judgment. Since the
privilege of the writ of amparo was granted, there was no need for a
separate temporary protection order.
 2. The Court held that former President Arroyo could not use presidential
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny in amparo
proceedings, as her immunity was limited to her incumbency.

3. The doctrine of command responsibility was deemed applicable in

amparo proceedings to determine responsibility and accountability for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

4. The Court found that respondents Gen. Victor Ibrado, PDG. Jesus
Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Maj. Gen. Nestor Ochoa, Brig. Gen.
Remegio De Vera, 1st Lt. Ryan Matutina, and Lt. Col. Laurence Mina
were responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguez's rights
to life, liberty, and security. The case was dismissed with respect to
former President Arroyo and other respondents for lack of merit.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas data
were promulgated to protect the people's rights to life, liberty, and security,
especially in light of the prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court clarified that these writs do not determine
criminal, civil, or administrative liability but rather ascertain responsibility or
accountability for such violations. The doctrine of command responsibility
was applied to determine the accountability of military and police officials for
the abduction, detention, and torture of Rodriguez. The Court found
substantial evidence supporting Rodriguez's claims and held that the failure
to conduct a fair and effective investigation by the respondents amounted to
a violation of his rights. The Court also clarified that former President
Arroyo's presidential immunity did not extend beyond her incumbency,
allowing for judicial scrutiny of her actions during her tenure. The decision
underscored the importance of holding officials accountable for human rights
violations and ensuring the protection of individuals' rights through effective
judicial remedies.

Facts:

The case revolves around the declaration of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao by President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte on May 23, 2017, through Proclamation No. 216. The President's
decision was based on the existence of an actual rebellion in Marawi City and
the rest of Mindanao, led by the Maute group and other rebel groups, which
had pledged their allegiance to the ISIS caliphate. The rebel groups had
perpetrated several crimes and hostilities, including kidnapping, beheading,
bombing, and attacks on military and government installations. The
petitioners, led by Congressman Edcel Lagman, questioned the validity of
the proclamation, arguing that it was issued without sufficient factual basis
and that it violated the Constitution.

Issue:

The main issue raised in the case is whether the President's declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao has a sufficient factual basis and is constitutional. Specifically, the
issue is whether the President has the power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without sufficient factual
basis, and whether the proclamation violates the Constitution. The
petitioners asked the Supreme Court to determine whether the President's
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was valid and constitutional, and whether it was justified in
the face of rebellion or invasion.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court voted to dismiss the consolidated petitions, upholding

the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The Court held that the
President had reasonable belief that the hostilities in Marawi City and the
rest of Mindanao were not merely an armed public uprising, but a full-scale
rebellion aimed at establishing an ISIS caliphate in the region. The Court
ruled that the President's declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was constitutional and justified, but
only insofar as it was limited to the specific areas where there was actual
rebellion and public safety required the use of specific powers under the
Constitution.

Ratio:

The Court's decision is based on the principle of checks and balances in the
Constitution. The Constitution grants the President the power to declare
martial law and suspend the writ of habeas corpus, but it also vests in the
Judiciary the power to review the exercise of such powers.
Facts:

The case of "Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines" involves two consolidated

petitions filed by various petitioners, including Alexander A. Padilla, Rene A.V.
Saguisag, Christian S. Monsod, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Rene B. Gorospe, and
Senator Leila M. De Lima (G.R. No. 231671), and former Senator Wigberto E.
Tañada, Bishop Emeritus Deogracias Iñiguez, Bishop Broderick Pabillo, Bishop
Antonio Tobias, Mo. Adelaida Ygrubay, Shamah Bulangis, and Cassandra D.
Deluria (G.R. No. 231694). The petitions challenge the failure of the Congress
of the Philippines to convene in joint session to deliberate on Proclamation
No. 216 issued by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte on May 23, 2017, which
declared martial law and suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao. The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel
Congress to convene in joint session, arguing that it was a constitutional duty
under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that there was no
mandatory duty to convene in joint session unless Congress intended to
revoke the proclamation. The case was decided by the Supreme Court en
banc on July 25, 2017.

Issue:

1. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these
consolidated petitions.

2. Whether the petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of
its power of judicial review.

3. Whether the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon
the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18 of
the 1987 Constitution.

4. Whether a writ of mandamus or certiorari may be issued in the present

cases.

Ruling:

1. The Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of these

consolidated petitions.

2. The petitions satisfy the requisites for the Court's exercise of its power
of judicial review.
 3. The Congress does not have the mandatory duty to convene jointly
upon the President's proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Article VII, Section 18
of the 1987 Constitution.

4. A writ of mandamus or certiorari may not be issued in the present

cases.

Ratio:

The Court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the petitions as they involve the
interpretation of Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, which is
within the judiciary's prerogative to declare "what the law is." The Court also
found that the petitions satisfy the requisites for judicial review, including the
existence of an actual case or controversy and the petitioners' legal
standing. On the substantive issue, the Court held that the plain language of
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution does not mandate Congress to
convene in joint session unless it intends to revoke the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The Court emphasized that the provision only requires
Congress to vote jointly on the revocation of the proclamation or suspension.
The Court also noted that the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission did not reveal an intent to make it mandatory for Congress to
convene in joint session under all circumstances. Consequently, the Court
found no basis to issue a writ of mandamus or certiorari, as there was no
clear ministerial duty on the part of Congress to convene in joint session. The
petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.
People v. Salle

Facts:

The case "People vs. Salle, Jr. y Gercilla" revolves around the enforceability of
a conditional pardon granted to Ricky Mengote during the pendency of his
appeal from a conviction by the trial court. On November 18, 1991, Branch
88 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City found Francisco Salle, Jr. y
Gercilla and Ricky Mengote y Cuntado guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson. Both
were sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay an indemnity of
P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. The appellants filed their Notice of
Appeal, which the Supreme Court accepted on March 24, 1993. On January 6,
1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal, verified by his
counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG). Salle
signed the motion under the misimpression that it was necessary for his
early release following a conditional pardon granted by the President on
December 9, 1993. He was released from the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) on
December 28, 1993. Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon and
released on the same dates but did not file a motion to withdraw his appeal.
The Supreme Court granted Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal on March
23, 1994, and considered the case closed and terminated as far as he was
concerned. The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the acceptance of
the conditional pardon implied an admission of guilt and acceptance of the
sentence, thus the appeal should be dismissed. The Presidential Committee
for the Grant of Bail, Release, or Pardon explained that Mengote's prison
record did not show a pending appeal, leading to the recommendation for a
conditional pardon. The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that the
conditional pardon was unenforceable because the judgment of conviction
was not yet final. FLAG argued that Mengote's acceptance of the conditional
pardon resulted in the finality of his conviction.

Issue:

1. Can a conditional pardon be granted to an accused during the

pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial
court?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the conditional pardon granted to Ricky
Mengote during the pendency of his appeal was unenforceable. The Court
required Mengote to withdraw his appeal within thirty days for the
conditional pardon to take effect. If Mengote failed to comply, the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections was instructed to take him back into custody.

Ratio:

The Court's decision was based on Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution, which stipulates that the President may grant
pardons only after conviction by final judgment. The Court reviewed the
evolution of the pardoning power under Philippine law, noting that the 1987
Constitution restored the requirement of "conviction by final judgment" to
prevent the President from exercising executive power in derogation of
judicial power. The Court emphasized that an appeal brings the entire case
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court, and the President
cannot grant a pardon until the conviction is final. The Court also referenced
previous rulings, including People vs. Crisola and Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.,
but clarified that these were based on the 1973 Constitution, which did not
require final conviction. The Court declared that any application for pardon
should not be acted upon unless the appeal is withdrawn, and the
acceptance of a pardon does not operate as an abandonment of the appeal.
The Court directed relevant government agencies to ensure that pardons are
not granted during the pendency of an appeal and held that those
responsible for releasing an accused based on a pardon before the
withdrawal of an appeal would be administratively liable.
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Executive Fulgencio Factoran, Jr.

G.R. No. 78239 – 170 SCRA 190 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Powers
of the President – Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is
Prospective

Salvacion Monsanto was the Asst. Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was
charged with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found
guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by the
President Ferdinand Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of
Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position since it was still
vacant. She was also requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance
referred the issue to the Office of the President and Deputy Executive
Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must
first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her to her
former position. Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no
longer be compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her
acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.

HELD: No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no

amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why
Monsanto, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty
or commutation of sentence. Monsanto’s civil liability may only be
extinguished by the causes recognized in the Civil Code, which are: payment,
loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation.

Garcia v. Chairman, COA GR No. 75025, September 14, 1993

Vicente Garcia, the petitioner, served as a Supervising Lineman at the Region

IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. On April 1,
1975, he was summarily dismissed from service by the Ministry of Public
Works, Transportation, and Communications due to allegations of dishonesty
concerning the loss of several telegraph poles located at the Sariaya-Lucena
City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon telecom lines. Garcia did not appeal this
administrative decision. Subsequently, a criminal case for qualified theft was
filed against him in the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon, which acquitted him on January 23, 1980. Following his acquittal,
Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position, but his request was
denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications on April 7, 1980. Garcia then
appealed to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency. On
August 26, 1981, executive clemency was granted to Garcia by Deputy
Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of the
President, based on favorable endorsements from the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications and the Civil Service Commission.

Garcia subsequently filed a claim with the Commission on Audit (COA) for
back salaries effective from his dismissal date, April 1, 1975. The COA denied
his claim on October 12, 1982, stating that the executive clemency did not
include provisions for back salaries and that Garcia had not been reinstated.
Garcia was eventually recalled to service on March 12, 1984, but it was
unclear if he was reinstated to his original position. He again filed a claim for
back salaries from April 1, 1975, to March 12, 1984, which was denied by the
COA on July 23, 1985, for similar reasons. Garcia appealed this decision to
the Office of the President, which was denied on April 21, 1986, by Deputy
Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., citing legal and constitutional
constraints. Garcia then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court, seeking the extraordinary remedy of mandamus to enforce
his claim for back wages.

Issue:

1. Is Vicente Garcia entitled to the payment of back wages after being

reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Vicente Garcia, granting his petition and
ordering the public respondents to pay his back salaries from April 1, 1975,
to March 12, 1984, based on his latest salary scale.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court emphasized the nature and effects of executive

clemency, particularly when it is based on the innocence of the individual.
The Court noted that executive clemency, as granted to Garcia, effectively
nullified the adverse administrative decision that led to his dismissal. The
clemency was based on Garcia's acquittal in the criminal case, which was
founded on his innocence. The Court highlighted that executive clemency,
when grounded on innocence, restores the individual's civil rights and
entitles them to reinstatement and back wages. The Court also pointed out
that Garcia's dismissal was not due to a criminal conviction but an
administrative decision, which the President had the power to nullify through
executive clemency. Consequently, Garcia's reinstatement was automatic,
and he was entitled to back wages as a means of reparation for his unjust
dismissal. The Court awarded Garcia full back wages from the date of his
dismissal to the date of his reinstatement, without any deductions or
qualifications, to ensure justice and equity.

Trillanes IV v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 241494

The amnesty granted under Proclamation No. 75 was constitutional because

it fell within the President's legitimate authority to promote national
reconciliation after periods of conflict. The proclamation clearly outlined the
criteria for amnesty, ensuring it was not an arbitrary exercise of power, and
did not unlawfully delegate this authority to any other entity. By establishing
guidelines that included a written admission of guilt, the proclamation aimed
to facilitate healing and encourage accountability among those involved in
past uprisings, thereby supporting the broader goal of restoring peace and
stability in the nation.

Pangili vs. Cayetano

Facts:

The case of "Pangilinan v. Cayetano" involves three consolidated petitions

filed by various parties, including Senators Francis "Kiko" N. Pangilinan,
Franklin M. Drilon, Paolo Benigno "Bam" Aquino IV, Leila M. De Lima, Risa
Hontiveros, and Antonio "Sonny" F. Trillanes IV, the Philippine Coalition for
the International Criminal Court (PCICC), and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The respondents in the case are Alan Peter S. Cayetano,
Salvador C. Medialdea, Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., and Salvador S. Panelo. The
petitions challenge the unilateral withdrawal of the Philippines from the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by President Rodrigo
Duterte without the concurrence of the Senate. President Duterte announced
the withdrawal on March 15, 2018, and it was formally submitted to the
United Nations on March 16, 2018. The petitioners argue that the withdrawal
is unconstitutional as it bypasses the Senate's required concurrence. The
case was heard by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which ultimately
dismissed the petitions on the grounds of mootness, as the withdrawal had
already been acknowledged by the ICC and had taken effect.

Issue:

1. Whether the consolidated petitions present an actual, justiciable

controversy.
 2. Whether the executive can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty without
legislative action.

3. Whether the withdrawal from the Rome Statute is valid, binding, and
effectual.

4. Whether the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the
country in breach of its obligations under international law.

5. Whether the withdrawal diminishes the Filipino people's protection

under international law.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court dismissed the consolidated petitions for being moot. The
Court ruled that the petitions failed to present a justiciable controversy as
the withdrawal from the Rome Statute had already been completed and
acknowledged by the ICC. The Court also found that the petitioners lacked
the requisite standing to file the petitions and that the issues raised were not
ripe for judicial determination.

Ratio:

The Court's decision was based on several key arguments and legal
principles. First, the Court emphasized the importance of justiciability, noting
that it can only rule on actual controversies involving rights that are legally
demandable and enforceable. The Court found that the petitions were moot
because the withdrawal from the Rome Statute had already been completed
and acknowledged by the ICC, making any judicial intervention futile.
Second, the Court discussed the role of the President as the primary
architect of foreign policy, noting that while the President has the discretion
to withdraw from treaties, this discretion is not absolute and must be
exercised within the bounds of the Constitution and existing laws. The Court
also highlighted that the Senate had not taken any formal action to assert its
prerogative to require concurrence for withdrawal, further weakening the
petitioners' case. Lastly, the Court addressed the issue of standing, finding
that the petitioners failed to demonstrate a direct, substantial, and material
injury resulting from the withdrawal, which is necessary to establish standing
in court.