Illusion of Knowing Without Authors Details
Illusion of Knowing Without Authors Details
1 The Effects of Factual Knowledge and the Illusion of Knowing on Knowledge and Pro-
3 Abstract
4 As the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter, the Chinese public’s understanding of
5 climate change is crucial for mitigation. Drawing on the Positive Illusion Model and the
6 Knowledge Deficit Model, this study examines the effects of the illusion of knowing and
8 over time. A two-wave longitudinal survey with a final sample of 427 participants was
9 conducted from November 2021 to January 2022. The illusion of knowing positively
10 predicted knowledge change, while the pathways from the illusion of knowing and factual
12 groups, with a positive relationship in the high pro-environmental self-identity group and a
13 negative in the low. The findings of this study offer crucial theoretical contributions by
14 advancing the Knowledge Deficit Model and revealing the moderating role of pro-
15 environmental self-identity, which may guide future effective communication campaigns and
16 policy initiatives.
17
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18 1. Introduction
19 Climate change, driven by rising greenhouse gas emissions, is a pressing global issue
20 with severe environmental impacts (Arbuckle et al., 2013; Bostrom et al., 2019; Jørgensen &
21 Termansen, 2016; Metag & Schäfer, 2018). China, the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter,
22 plays a crucial role in addressing this challenge (Copsey et al., 2013; Gong et al., 2020).
23 Despite the Chinese government’s commitment to achieving carbon neutrality by 2060 and
24 peak emissions by 2030, which has sparked increased media coverage and public discussion
25 (Pan et al., 2021), some segments of the Chinese population remain skeptical or hold negative
26 attitudes toward climate change due to factors such as economic concerns, lack of
27 knowledge, and conspiracy beliefs (Hoekstra et al, 2024; Otto & Pensini, 2017; Pan et al.,
28 2022, 2023; Wang et al., 2019). Therefore, exploring the Chinese public’s knowledge and
30 Recent studies have highlighted a concerning trend where many individuals possess
31 limited factual knowledge about climate change, leading to an illusion of knowing (i.e.,
32 overconfidence about their knowledge) (Glenberg et al., 1982; Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2021;
33 Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). Factors such as attention to media messages, message elaboration,
35 (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2021; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). However, the consequences of the
37 consequences could provide insights into the cognitive processes underlying climate change
38 knowledge, perceptions, and actions, offering conceptual evidence for future theoretical
39 development and informing the design of communication campaigns and policy initiatives
41 Another notable limitation in the existing literature is the static nature of previous
43 knowledge at a single point in time (e.g., Lu, 2022; Ma et al., 2023b; Steg et al., 2023; Xu et
44 al., 2022). Our focus shifts towards understanding the changes in behavior and knowledge
45 over time. The distinction is crucial as determinants of behavior at a single point may differ
46 from those driving behavior change over time (David & Rundle-Thiele, 2019; Kriznik et al.,
47 2018; Michie et al., 2008). Existing communication and behavioral theories centered on
50 Therefore, this study has two purposes. First, we examine the effects of the illusion of
51 knowing about climate change on changes in knowledge and behavior over time. Second, we
52 explore how factual knowledge leads to behavior changes over time based on the Knowledge
53 Deficit Model. Answering these two questions makes three interconnected contributions.
54 First, innovatively employing changes in knowledge and behaviors as the dependent variable
55 advances the Knowledge Deficit Model by validating it from the perspective of behavioral
57 and behaviors longitudinally, offering a crucial theoretical contribution. Lastly, we reveal the
60 2. Literature Review
62 The concept of the illusion of knowing, originating from the Cognitive Miser Model
63 in cognitive psychology, posits that individuals, as “cognitive misers,” often rely on cognitive
65 make decisions in order to conserve cognitive resources (Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2010;
66 Glenberg et al., 1982; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). However, this self-
70 knowledge (Brosowsky& Egner, 2021; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Trémolière & Djeriouat,
73 (Avhustiuk et al., 2018; Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2021; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). Scholars
74 argue that this illusion may impact how individuals interpret and respond to information,
76 understanding and engagement are crucial for fostering meaningful behavioral changes
77 (Moser, 2010, 2016; Steg et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2020a). The multifaceted nature of climate
79 cognitive challenge for individuals to fully comprehend (Metag & Schäfer, 2018; Moser,
80 2016; Steg et al., 2023). Given this complexity, individuals may rely on heuristics or mental
82 informed.
85 attitudes and behaviors towards mitigation efforts, potentially impacting the effectiveness of
86 strategies promoting informed public engagement and actions (Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2021;
87 Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). The Positive Illusion Model suggests that despite the inaccuracies,
90 debates, potentially fostering a conducive environment for collective climate action (Betts et
91 al., 2009; Taylor & Armor, 1996; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b).
92 However, the illusion of knowing may also present challenges in climate change
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93 communication and public policy. Individuals with an illusion of knowledge might be less
99 their level of support or adherence, thus hindering the effective implementation of climate
100 policies.
101 In sum, while the Positive Illusion Model sheds light on the potential advantages of
102 illusory knowledge, the prevalence and potential impacts of the illusion of knowing warrant
103 more scholarly attention in climate change communication research (Betts et al., 2009; Taylor
104 & Armor, 1996; Trémolière & Djeriouat, 2021; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). With a better
105 understanding of this illusion and its impacts, policymakers and communicators can devise
106 more effective strategies to promote informed public engagement and support for climate
107 change mitigation efforts. The next section reviews previous research and gaps in
109 2.1.2 Previous Research on the Illusion of Knowing about Climate Change
110 Yang et al. (2020a, 2020b) have delineated the cognitive, media-related, and
111 demographic factors that contribute to the illusion of knowing in the context of climate
112 change. They found a positive relationship between individuals’ attention to climate change
113 messages in media, elaboration of these messages, and the illusion of knowing, with
114 elaboration moderating the relationship between media attention and the illusion of knowing
115 (Yang et al., 2020a). Additionally, Yang et al. 2020b identified demographic disparities in
116 climate change knowledge and illusion distributions, with males exhibiting more actual
117 knowledge, while less educated individuals, those from low-income households, and middle-
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118 aged and elderly adults had more illusion of knowing but less factual knowledge about
120 Despite the potential dual effects of the illusion of knowing in the context of climate
121 change, there is a scarcity of research examining its consequences, which stifles further
122 theoretical development and the establishment of evidence-based policies and practices.
123 Trémolière and Djeriouat (2021) addressed this gap by investigating the role of analytic
124 cognitive style, knowledge, overconfidence, and political partisanship, revealing a significant
125 relationship between overconfidence in climate change knowledge and climate change
126 skepticism. However, the paucity of research and their cross-sectional design highlight the
128 By exploring the outcomes of the illusion of knowing in the climate change scenario
129 using a longitudinal design, this study aims to enrich the understanding of this phenomenon
130 and its consequences, potentially guiding future research, theory-building, and policy
131 development. As the illusion of knowing stems from individuals’ inaccurate estimation of
132 factual knowledge about climate change, the following section reviews the Knowledge
133 Deficit Model and the role of factual knowledge in climate change communication.
135 The Knowledge Deficit Model, also known as the Information Deficit Model, is a
136 one-way communication model and has been an integral part of science communication
137 research and practice (Davies, 2008; Hetland, 2014; Suldovsky, 2017; Tøsse, 2013). This
138 model posits that information flows from experts to the public, and gaining knowledge could
139 change individuals’ attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors regarding a particular topic, such as
140 climate change. At the core of this model lies the assumption that a deficit in understanding
141 or knowledge is the primary reason for insufficient concern or engagement in addressing the
142 issue. Also, this model assumes that the public is inherently either ignorant of or hostile
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143 towards science and technology (Hansen et al., 2003; Suldovsky, 2017)
145 The historical basis of science communication on the Knowledge Deficit Model has
146 been critically re-evaluated on empirical evidence (Hetland, 2014; Suldovsky, 2017; Yang et
147 al., 2020b). Three major counterarguments have been directed toward this model. First, an
148 oversimplification of the issue is challenged, with numerous studies highlighting that other
149 factors, including social, political, affective, cognitive, and cultural aspects, significantly
150 impact individuals’ attitudes and actions (Hansen et al., 2003; Poortinga et al. 2011;
151 Suldovsky, 2017; Tøsse, 2013). Second, many studies have found a weak or non-significant
152 relationship between increased knowledge and subsequent behavioral intentions (Fabrigar et
153 al., 2006; Holland et al., 2007; Suldovsky, 2017). Lastly, the model has been criticized for
154 unfairly portraying those opposed to scientific activities as lacking knowledge or ill-informed
156 Specific to the climate change context, various studies have noted the limitations of
157 applying the model (e.g., Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Moser, 2016; Poortinga et al., 2011;
158 Suldovsky, 2017). For instance, research conducted by Poortinga et al. (2011) in Britain
159 revealed that climate skepticism is significantly tethered to individuals’ core values and
160 worldviews rather than just a deficiency in information concerning climate change. Similarly,
161 Hart and Nisbet (2012) identified that using the deficit model in climate change
162 communication can induce a boomerang effect among those ideologically opposed to climate
163 change. This scenario presents a particular challenge, given that communication efforts are
165 Despite the consensus on the limitations of the Knowledge Deficit Model, two
166 significant gaps remain: the reliance on cross-sectional evidence, which only allows for
167 inferring correlations and limits understanding of the directional relationships between
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168 knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors over time, and the focus on predicting behavioral
169 intentions or behaviors at a single point rather than actual changes over time. The following
170 section draws insights from contemporary social marketing research (David & Rundle-
171 Thiele, 2019; Kriznik et al., 2018) to argue why behavior and change of behavior are distinct
172 constructs, emphasizing the need to shift focus toward understanding behavioral changes. It
173 also explores how knowledge and illusion of knowledge could potentially drive these
174 changes, laying the groundwork for revising the Knowledge Deficit Model with fresh
175 perspectives.
177 In communication research, even social sciences research in general, the prevailing
178 conceptual and methodological emphasis is placed on behavior, such as smoking, health
180 than behavioral change over time (e.g., Chen & Yang, 2019; Ma et al., 2023b; Shi et al.,
181 2023). However, many communication studies and practices aim to instigate behavioral
182 change, in essence, such as encouraging individuals to quit smoking, seek more health
183 information, or engage more in pro-environmental behaviros than before. Given these goals,
184 it is surprising that a scant amount of research attention is directed toward understanding
187 To understand the difference between behavior and behavioral change and to
188 recognize the value of this distinction, it is essential first conceptually to delineate the two.
189 Behavior can be viewed as a specific action executed at a given time. An example is the
190 Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB, Ajzen, 1991), a springboard from which numerous
191 communication theories have developed. The TPB suggests that attitudes, subjective norms,
192 and perceived behavioral control collectively contribute to intentions that drive behavior
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193 (Ajzen, 1991). Nonetheless, Ajzen (2015) acknowledges that while TPB is a helpful
194 framework for interventions, it does not qualify as a theory of behavioral change since the
195 TPB was crafted to explain and predict intentions and behavior at a single point in time.
196 Behavioral change examines behaviors across multiple instances in time. It is defined
197 as altering the targeted behavior over time (Sarafino, 1996; Sundel & Sundel, 2017). The core
198 difference between static and dynamic behavior is temporal (David & Rundle-Thiele, 2019;
199 Rundle-Thiele et al., 2019; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Behavioral change is often
200 operationalized by calculating a change (or difference) score. This score serves as an
201 estimation of actual change, determined by the difference (T2-T1) between time point 1 (T1)
202 and time point 2 (T2). For instance, researchers may be interested in discerning whether the
203 public engages in more pro-environmental behaviors following exposure to specific climate
204 change information compared to their actions before (i.e., desired behavior change).
205 David and Rundle-Thiele (2019) explored data from 161 caregivers reporting changes
206 in their child’s walking behavior after a month-long social marketing program. They found
207 that while intentions and barriers explained behavior at a single time point (i.e., T2),
208 injunctive norms explained the change in walking behavior over time (i.e., T2-T1). Similarly,
209 David et al. (2019) investigated a food waste program aiming to reduce fruit and vegetable
210 waste through a two-week intervention. They identified attitudes and self-efficacy as possible
211 driving factors behind the transition of 43.8% of participants from fruit and vegetable wasters
213 Past research has primarily focused on predicting behaviors using cross-sectional
214 designs (Gustafson & Rice, 2020; Ma et al., 2023a; van Giesen et al., 2018), which falls short
215 of offering insights into the antcedents of behavior change over time. These time-invariant
216 methodologies overlook changes in behaviors and cannot establish the time order among
217 variables of interest. Due to the conceptual and operational differences between behavior and
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218 behavior change, factors influencing behavior at a singular time may differ from those
219 driving behavior change (Rundle-Thiele et al., 2019; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). The
220 following review delves into the concept of factual knowledge change stemming from these
223 Introducing the concept of change in factual knowledge as a new variable in our study
224 is a pivotal step to deepen the understanding of knowledge acquisition and its subsequent
225 influence on pro-environmental behavioral changes. This initiative stems from a similar logic
226 applied to the concept of behavioral change in the preceding section (David & Rundle-Thiele,
227 2019; Rundle-Thiele et al., 2019). The essence of this new variable lies in capturing the
228 evolution of knowledge over time, which potentially plays a critical role in shaping
229 individuals’ attitudes and behaviors toward environmental protection. Unlike a static
230 measurement of knowledge at a single time, the notion of change in factual knowledge aims
232 Examining factual knowledge changes over time, instead of merely focusing on
233 knowledge levels at a single time, opens up multiple benefits (Diamond & Urbanski, 2022;
234 Gustafson & Rice, 2020; Milfont, 2012). It accurately depicts how individuals’ understanding
235 matures and adapts. Also, this longitudinal lens allows us to move beyond a snapshot view to
236 a more flowing narrative of knowledge acquisition and adjustment. Moreover, it aligns with
237 the real-world scenario where individuals continually interact with new information, reassess
240 The illusion of knowing could positively drive factual knowledge changes over time
241 by various mechanisms (Milfont, 2012). The first one is competence. The illusion of knowing
242 may initially motivate one to engage in climate change. This motivation could lead to
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243 pursuing more factual knowledge over time as individuals seek to align their perceived and
244 actual knowledge levels (Gifford & Comeau, 2011). Also, the illusion of knowing might
245 propel individuals into discussions, debates, or further reading to defend their perceived
246 knowledge, inadvertently leading to more factual knowledge over time (Moser, 2014; van der
248 In addition, according to the positive illusion model, the illusion of knowing could
249 foster a sense of self-efficacy and control, encouraging individuals to engage more with
250 environmental topics (Betts et al., 2009; Taylor & Armor, 1996; Yang et al., 2020b). This
251 engagement may, in turn, lead to a gradual accumulation of factual knowledge over time.
253 H1: The illusion of knowing in time 1 is positively related to changes in factual
254 knowledge.
257 actions over time rather than merely influencing static behaviors for two reasons. First,
258 acquiring factual knowledge may catalyze change, prompting them to re-evaluate their
259 actions and possibly adopt more environmentally friendly practices. However, the impact of
260 factual knowledge may not be typically immediate or direct on a specific behavior. Instead, it
261 may foster a gradual change, nurturing a more informed and conscious approach to pro-
262 environmental actions as individuals continue to learn and adapt over time.
263 On the other hand, simply possessing factual knowledge at a single point in time may
264 not directly translate to pro-environmental behaviors due to various intervening factors such
265 as personal beliefs and social norms (Hansen et al., 2003; Poortinga et al., 2011; Suldovsky,
266 2017; Tøsse, 2013). The knowledge might not be enough to override these factors and lead to
267 a change in behavior at that particular moment. However, as individuals assimilate this
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268 knowledge, reflect on it, and perhaps encounter supportive social contexts or additional
269 information, they may alter their actions towards more pro-environmental practices over
270 time.
271 Exploring the relationship between factual knowledge at an initial time and the
272 changes in pro-environmental actions helps advance the Knowledge Deficit Model with a
273 new perspective, which shifts the examinations from merely understanding the immediate
274 effects of knowledge on behavior to a more profound comprehension of how knowledge can
275 instigate a continuous change in pro-environmental actions over time. Therefore, we present
277 H2: Factual knowledge in time 1 positively relates to the changes in pro-
280 The concept of the illusion of knowing may uniquely impact the change of pro-
281 environmental actions over time. Based on the Positive Illusion Model, the illusion of
282 knowing could foster a heightened sense of control and self-efficacy regarding one’s ability
283 to contribute to environmental conservation (Betts et al., 2009; Taylor & Armor, 1996; Yang
284 et al., 2020b). This increased self-efficacy may fuel the motivation to initiate and sustain
285 changes in pro-environmental actions over time (Taylor & Brown, 1994).
286 Also, individuals with the illusion of knowing may adjust their behaviors to align with
287 their perceived knowledge about environmental issues. For example, suppose someone
288 erroneously believes they know a lot about recycling. In that case, they might adjust their
289 recycling behaviors to match this perceived knowledge, possibly leading to more
290 environmentally friendly behaviors over time as they seek consistency (Gehlbach et al., 2019;
292 H3: The illusion of knowing in time 1 positively relates to changes in pro-
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294 Following the discussion of our core hypotheses, we will transition in the next section
297 Self-identity is forged by the descriptors individuals choose for themselves, shaped by
298 personal drives and social interactions, encompassing the anticipations of others and the roles
301 and can sway one’s attitudes and actions, propelling them to act accordingly with this self-
302 image (Dermody et al., 2015; van der Werff et al., 2013; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010).
304 attitudes and intentions has been acknowledged in various studies (Carfora et al., 2017;
305 Tarinc et al., 2023). For instance, Carfora et al. (2017) found that pro-environmental self-
306 identity significantly moderated the impact of perceived behavioral control on intentions and
307 the influence of past behavior on both intentions and actions across pro-environmental
308 behaviors using a two-wave longitudinal design. The influence of pro-environmental self-
309 identity as a moderating variable is intriguing, given its potential to impact the relationships
310 delineated in our hypotheses (Carfora et al., 2017; Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010), and how
311 self-identity interacts with the elements of each hypothesis could vary based on the degree of
313 Specifically for Hypothesis 1, which posits that the illusion of knowing in time 1 is
314 positively related to the change of factual knowledge, the mechanism may be that individuals
315 with a high pro-environmental self-identity may be driven by their values and self-concept to
316 seek information and update their climate change knowledge (Dermody et al., 2015;
317 Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). This drive might lead them to correct their illusion of knowing
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318 over time as they gather more factual knowledge through exposure and learning. However,
319 individuals with a low pro-environmental self-identity may lack the motivation to amend
320 their understanding, thus exhibiting a weaker relationship between the illusion of knowing
322 Specifically for Hypothesis 2, which posits that factual knowledge at time 1 is
323 positively related to changes in pro-environmental intentions, the mechanism could work as
324 follows: individuals with a strong pro-environmental self-identity might be more apt to
325 translate their factual knowledge into changes in pro-environmental actions due to an internal
326 sense of responsibility towards environmental protection (van der Werff et al., 2013;
327 Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). Conversely, those with a weaker pro-environmental self-
328 identity may lack the motivation to alter their actions despite possessing similar levels of
329 factual knowledge, as their internal identification with environmentally responsible behaviors
331 For Hypothesis 3, which suggests that the illusion of knowing in time 1 is positively
332 related to the change in pro-environmental intentions, the mechanism could be that
333 individuals with a high pro-environmental self-identity may find their illusion of knowing
334 bolstering their confidence regarding climate change understanding, thereby encouraging
335 their engagement in more pro-environmental actions. On the other hand, individuals with a
336 low pro-environmental self-identity may not exhibit a significant change in pro-
337 environmental actions driven by the illusion of knowing, given their inherently lower
340 we present the following research question 1 and Figure 1 for all hypotheses and the research
341 question 1:
342 RQ1: Are there any differences between the Chinese public’s high and low levels of
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345 intentions?
346 Figure 1
348
349 3. Method
351 A longitudinal study design was employed, comprising two waves of data collection.
352 A three-week interval was established before conducting the second wave to mitigate the
353 potential influence of memory on responses and minimize attrition. The data were gathered
354 via an online survey administered through Credamo, which provides access to a diverse panel
356 The study consisted of two waves of data collection, with the initial wave conducted
357 from November 20 to December 3, 2021, and the follow-up survey from December 22, 2021,
358 to January 3, 2022. A total of 891 participants provided their demographic information and
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359 responses in the first wave. The research protocol was approved by the Research Ethics
361 In the second wave, 634 participants returned, and after stringent data cleaning
362 procedures, including removing participants who failed attention check questions or provided
363 inconsistent demographic data across the two waves, a final sample of 427 participants was
364 obtained, corresponding to a retention rate of approximately 48%. The final sample
365 comprised 59% female participants, with an average age of 29.30 years (SD = 6.39),
366 predominantly well-educated (71% with bachelor’s degrees), and a median monthly
367 household income between 10,000 to 20,000 CNY (approximately USD 1,572 to USD
368 3,144).
372 an 8-item scale from Bradley et al. (2020). Participants rated their likelihood to engage in
373 each behavior on a 5-point scale, with 1 representing “very unlikely” and 5 representing
374 “very likely.” The behaviors focused on two main areas: transportation (including walking or
375 cycling, using public transportation, driving electric vehicles, and minimizing unnecessary
376 travel) and waste management (including going paperless, using recyclable bags, avoiding
378 Consistent with prior research, the individual scores across the eight behaviors were
379 aggregated to form an overall intention score for pro-environmental actions (Bradley et al.,
380 2020; Shi et al., 2023). Mean intention scores were calculated at both time points (MT1 =
381 34.14, SDT1 = 3.14; MT2 = 33.80, SDT2 = 3.05). To determine changes in pro-environmental
382 behavioral intentions, the scores from time 2 were subtracted from those at time 1, yielding a
385 To measure participants’ factual knowledge about climate change, a set of 5 items was
386 employed (Hart et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b). Respondents were presented with
387 statements about climate change and asked to judge their accuracy using a 3-point scale: “1 =
388 true”, “2 = false”, “0 = don’t know.” Sample statements included misconceptions and facts
389 such as the role of the ozone layer in global warming, the impact of solar output compared to
390 human-produced greenhouse gases, and the effect of climate change on sea and ocean water
391 levels. The respondents’ scores were averaged across all items to produce a knowledge score,
392 reflecting the proportion of correct responses from the total items presented.
394 To calculate the change in factual knowledge about climate change, we subtracted the
395 score of factual knowledge at time 1 from the score at time 2. This difference score reflects
396 the participants’ factual knowledge changes over the study period. A positive score indicates
397 an increase in knowledge, whereas a negative score suggests a decrease. The mean change in
398 factual knowledge across participants was minimal (M = 0.01, SD = 0.19), indicating a slight
399 overall increase in actual knowledge of climate change issues between the two-time points.
401 The illusion of knowing in the context of climate change is identified when an
402 individual’s perceived knowledge exceeds their actual knowledge. To measure this
403 phenomenon, we asked participants to self-assess their knowledge about climate change on a
404 10-point scale, with 0 representing “knowing nothing” and 10 representing “knowing
405 everything.” The perceived knowledge scores were converted to a percentage format to align
406 the factual and perceived knowledge scales for comparative analysis. This format mirrors the
407 factual knowledge measurement, thus allowing a direct comparison between perceived and
408 actual knowledge levels. The illusion of knowing at time 1 was calculated by deducting the
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409 factual knowledge score from the perceived knowledge score, yielding a mean illusion of
412 We utilized a four-item scale adapted by Whitmarsh and O’Neill’s (2010) work to
413 measure pro-environmental self-identity. Responses were gathered on a 7-point Likert scale,
415 consumer” and “I am very concerned with environmental issues,” as well as reversed items
416 such as “I would be embarrassed to be seen as environmentally friendly” and “I don’t want to
417 be viewed by family or friends as someone concerned about environmental issues.” After
418 reversing the necessary items, higher scores corresponded to a stronger identification with
419 pro-environmental behaviors. The average score for our participants was moderately high (M
420 = 4.39, SD = 0.45, α = 0.78). We then categorized this variable into two groups: those scoring
421 above the mean were placed in the high identity group, while those scoring below the mean
422 were classified as having a low pro-environmental self-identity (high group: n = 249; low
425 The Cross-Lagged Panel Model (CLPM) is a widely used approach for analyzing
426 longitudinal data, particularly when the research aims to examine the directional influences
427 between variables over time (Hamaker et al., 2015; Newsom, 2015). The CLPM allows for
428 the simultaneous estimation of autoregressive effects (the effect of a variable on itself at a
429 later time point) and cross-lagged effects (the effect of one variable on another variable at a
430 later time point) while controlling for the stability of the constructs (Hamaker et al., 2015).
431 However, in the current study, the use of CLPM was not feasible due to the nature of
432 the variables and the research objectives. First, one of the key variables in the study, change
433 in factual knowledge, was computed by subtracting the knowledge scores at time 1 from the
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434 scores at time 2. This change score does not exist as a separate variable at each time point,
435 making it impossible to include in a CLPM analysis, which requires all variables to be
436 measured at each wave. Second, the primary outcome variable of interest, change in pro-
437 environmental actions, was only measured at time 2, as it represents the difference in pro-
438 environmental actions between the two-time points. Since this variable does not have a
439 corresponding measure at time 1, it cannot be incorporated into a CLPM model, which
440 assumes that all variables are assessed at each time point (Hamaker et al., 2015).
441 Given these limitations and the study’s focus on predicting changes in pro-
442 environmental actions using variables from time one, a path analysis approach was deemed
443 more appropriate for addressing the research questions. We utilized path analyses in Mplus
444 version 8.3 to address our research question and hypotheses. We first constructed a base
445 model to test the three hypotheses. Then, to explore RQ1, we performed a multi-group path
446 analysis. Notably, since the change of factual knowledge is derived from the knowledge
447 scores, we assumed a correlation between these two variables in our analyses. Also, a Pearson
448 correlation matrix for all involved variables in the study is presented in Table 1.
449 The models’ fits were assessed using several indicators: the χ2 goodness-of-fit
450 statistic, the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), the standardized root
451 mean square residual (SRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
452 Acceptable thresholds for a good model fit were set at RMSEA ≤ .06, CFI and TLI ≥ .95, and
454 Table 1
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Age -
2. Gender -.222 -
3. Education .031 .048 -
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457 4. Results
459 The fit indices reported suggest a perfect fit of the model, with perfect scores for CFI
460 and TLI at 1.000 and an RMSEA and SRMR of 0.000. This is probably due to the model’s
461 simplicity, as it contains a limited number of variables and uses path analysis, often resulting
462 in better-fit indices, consistent with previous research that has a similar number of included
463 variables (Ma et al., 2023c). The Chi-Square Test of Model Fit value is significant, common
464 in large samples, and does not necessarily reflect a poor model fit.
465 As shown in Figure 2, the illusion of knowing was a significant predictor for the
466 change in factual knowledge, with a standardized coefficient of .441, p < .001, indicating that
467 a greater perceived understanding of climate change is associated with increased knowledge
468 over time. Age negatively predicted the change in factual knowledge (β = −.134, p = .005),
469 suggesting younger participants showed more significant changes in factual knowledge.
470 Furthermore, income level was positively related to the change in factual knowledge (β
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471 = .159, p = .001), indicating that higher income levels correspond with more substantial
472 changes in knowledge. Education level also significantly influenced the change in factual
474 Figure 2
476
479 predicted by the illusion of knowing (β = −.028, p = .753) or by factual knowledge at time 1
480 (β = −.068, p = .444), suggesting that neither the perceived nor the actual initial knowledge
481 about climate change were influential in changing intentions to engage in pro-environmental
482 behaviors. Additionally, all the demographic variables, including age, gender, education, and
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483 income, did not significantly impact changes in pro-environmental behavioral intentions.
485 Similar to the base model, the reported fit indices for the multi-group model indicate
486 an exceptional fit for the structural model, with perfect scores for CFI and TLI at 1.000 and
487 an RMSEA and SRMR of 0.000. The Chi-Square Test of Model Fit value is significant,
488 common in large samples, and does not necessarily reflect a poor model fit.
490 As shown in Figure 3, for individuals with a low pro-environmental self-identity, the
491 illusion of knowing is significantly associated with the change in factual knowledge (β
492 = .423, p < .001). However, the illusion of knowing did not significantly predict changes in
493 pro-environmental behavioral intentions (β = -.234, p = .087), showing a negative trend that
494 did not reach statistical significance. Factual knowledge at time 1 was a significant negative
496 suggesting that those with lower factual knowledge initially were more likely to change their
497 intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviors. Demographic factors did not show
498 significant effects on either of the dependent variables for this group.
499 Figure 3
501
504 As shown in Figure 4, for those with a high pro-environmental self-identity, the
505 results indicate that the illusion of knowing had a strong positive relationship with the change
506 in factual knowledge (β = .443, p < .001). This finding suggests that individuals who believed
507 they knew more about climate change were more likely to increase their knowledge over
508 time. Age was negatively associated with the change in factual knowledge (β = -.174, p
509 = .004), with younger individuals showing a more substantial increase in knowledge. Higher-
510 income levels were positively associated with the change in factual knowledge (β = .233, p
511 < .001), indicating that wealthier individuals experienced more significant knowledge
512 changes. Education level also negatively influenced the change in factual knowledge (β =
24
513 -.183, p = .001), with those with lower education levels showing greater knowledge gains.
514 Figure 4
516
519 knowing was a significant positive predictor (β = .470, p < .001), indicating that those with a
520 greater illusion of knowing of climate change were more likely to change their intentions
521 towards pro-environmental actions. Similarly, factual knowledge at Time 1 was a significant
523 showing that individuals with higher initial knowledge were more inclined to change their
524 intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviors. For this group, demographic factors,
25
525 including age, gender, education, and income, did not significantly predict changes in pro-
527 Overall, in our multi-group comparison, the coefficients from the illusion of knowing
528 to change of factual knowledge were almost identical across groups, at .443 for the high
529 identity group and .423 for the low. Conversely, the pathways from the illusion of knowing
530 and factual knowledge to changes in pro-environmental intentions differed significantly, with
531 a positive relationship in the high self-identity group and a negative in the low. This
533 significant differences between these two paths between the groups are unnecessary and
534 redundant.
535 5. Discussion
536 5.1 Illusion of Knowing as a Motivator for Changing the Current Knowledge
537 Based on a longitudinal investigation, our study found a positive correlation between
538 the illusion of knowing about climate change and knowledge change over time, regardless of
539 individuals’ environmental identity. This result aligns with the Positive Illusion Model
540 (Taylor & Armor, 1996) and is consistent with prior cross-sectional evidence with the notion
541 that the illusion of knowing can propel individuals to engage with the focal issue, thus
542 leading to more knowledge (Milfont, 2012; Moser, 2014; van der Linden et al., 2015).
543 Similarly, our research indicates that possessing the illusion of knowing may contribute to
544 individuals’ perceived capacity to confidently engage in related activities such as campaigns,
545 interpersonal discussions, and media exposure, ultimately leading to accumulating more
547 Previous studies have argued that trust beliefs and enhanced self-efficacy prompt
548 individuals to seek more information, acquire knowledge, and develop skills (Artino, 2012;
549 Ter Huurne & Gutteling, 2009). Additionally, early scholarship has suggested that individuals
26
550 adjust their informational behaviour to avoid cognitive dissonance and maintain self-
551 perception (Bem, 1967), evidenced by increased learning and acquisition of climate change
552 knowledge resulting from the illusion of having mastered related knowledge. Hence, our
553 evidence longitudinally documents that change in factual knowledge, which was introduced
554 as a novel concept in this study, can be positively predicted by illusory knowledge.
555 Importantly, our findings demonstrate a consistent effect of the illusion of knowing on
556 knowledge change across two groups, elucidating that illusion motivates individuals to align
557 their factual and illusory knowledge about climate change, irrespective of their environmental
558 self-identity. This conclusion enriches the Positive Illusion Model from the perspective of
559 audience segmentation, encouraging environmental campaigners that aims to increase public
562 According to the results of our base model, the illusion of knowing overall exhibited a
563 null effect on the change of pro-environmental behavioral intention; however, the pattern of
564 this effect significantly differed between low-identity and high-identity groups. While prior
565 literature (Betts et al., 2009; Taylor & Armor, 1996) have identified a positive relationship
566 between illusion and behavior conduction, our findings suggest a nuanced relationship.
567 Unlike learning more about environmental facts, explicit, more pro-environmental behaviors
568 demand higher internal motivations. Individuals with high environmental identity, seeking
569 action-perception consistency (Bem, 1967; Zanna et al., 1981), are likely motivated by
571 Additionally, in line with the TPB (Ajzen, 1991), perceived behavioral control functions as a
572 crucial antecedent for forming behaviors. In our context, it is reasonable to expect individuals
573 who self-identify as environmentalists to understand correct approaches better and have
574 access to possible solutions (i.e., efficacy) to individually and collectively mitigate
27
575 environmental problems (Shi et al., 2023). Thus, this study contributes to a deeper
578 5.3 High Environmental Self-Identity Help Translate Knowledge into Actions
579 Another hypothesis of this study focused on the longitudinal relationship between
580 factual knowledge levels and subsequent behavior change. The findings of our base model
581 revealed an insignificant relationship between factual knowledge at T1 and the subsequent
582 change in pro-environmental behavioral intention at T2. This result supports the notion of
583 ‘cognitive misers’ (Glenberg et al., 1982; Orbell & Dawes, 1991; Yang et al., 2020a, 2020b),
584 suggesting that holding heuristics and mental shortcuts play a significant role in forming
585 opinions and decision-making, rather than science literacy or knowledge deficit (Davies,
587 Our multi-group analysis revealed that environmental identity moderated the
588 relationship between knowledge and pro-environmental behavior over time. For individuals
589 with high environmental identity, their knowledge about climate change positively related to
591 subsequent behavior change at T2 among low-identity individuals. This contradictory pattern
592 suggests that environmentally knowledgeable individuals with high identity are more inclined
593 to mitigate environmental hazards due to their awareness of climate change causes and
594 consequences, with knowledge and identity becoming the impetus for pro-environmental
595 actions.
596 However, for knowledgeable individuals indifferent about the environment (low
597 identity), their knowledge might translate into a negative belief in changing the environment,
598 decreasing their pro-environmental actions and viewing climate change as unchangeable.
599 This aligns with prior studies indicating that individuals with greater science literacy and
28
600 education may hold more polarized beliefs on controversial science topics (Drummond &
602 Our findings suggest that factual knowledge can only positively influence pro-
603 environmental action promotion when individuals' self-identity aligns with the issue. This
604 implies that scientific knowledge alone may not sufficiently influence or change beliefs and
605 behavior about climate change; future research and environmental campaigns should consider
608 As the first study to unveil the longitudinal relationship between the illusion of
609 knowing and changes in factual knowledge, as well as pro-environmental actions over time,
610 our findings carry multiple implications. Theoretically, the Positive Illusion Model (Taylor &
611 Armor, 1996) has been tested and validated in the context of climate change. Our research
612 documents the desirability of the illusion of knowing in promoting factual knowledge about
613 climate change. Additionally, our conclusions demonstrate an interaction between two crucial
614 sound models in science communication—the Cognitive Miser Model and the Knowledge
615 Deficit Model—advancing the debatable evidence of previous studies. Our multi-group
617 understand the conditional effect of illusion and factual knowledge on pro-environmental
618 behavior changes, enriching explanatory power from the perspective of audience
619 segmentation.
620 Practically, our findings suggest that cultivating the illusion of knowing about climate
623 campaigns. Thus, environmental practitioners are encouraged to cover the climate change
624 issue more frequently and proportionately to elevate the public’s confidence and efficacy
29
625 derived from the illusion of knowing about climate change through strategic climate
626 communication (Yang et al., 2020a). This positive psychological solution has received much
627 scholarly attention recently (Ojala, 2023). Furthermore, given the vital characteristic of
628 environmental self-identity in the relationships between illusion, factual knowledge, and pro-
629 environmental behavior, future sustainable development interventions can boost public
630 environmental concerns and incorporate more environmentalists to yield the intended effects
631 of environmental campaigns. This includes leveraging their peer influence on social
633 In terms of limitations and suggestions for future research, several aspects should be
634 acknowledged. First, as an initial exploratory study, we focused solely on direct effects in the
635 path model. Future research should explore potential mediating and moderating processes
636 using multiple waves of data collection to enhance understanding of the mechanisms between
637 the illusion of knowing and its outcomes. Second, this study only considered intrapersonal
638 illusion (i.e., self-reported illusion of knowing). Researchers have noted that the illusion of
639 knowing in comparison with others also deserves scholarly attention (Yang et al., 2020a).
640 Including an interpersonal perspective might enable future studies to better understand how
641 illusory knowledge operates in a collective context between individuals. This aspect may be
642 related to collective risk perception and efficacy in climate change mitigation on both an
645 report questionnaires, we only collected participants’ intentions to engage in individual and
646 collective pro-environmental actions. Although scholars argue for a strong link between
647 behavioral intention and actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Webb & Sheeran, 2006), future
648 studies are warranted to measure people’s pro-environmental behavior using alternative
649 methods (e.g., field observations, lab observations, or digital traces, Lange & Dewitte, 2019).
650
30
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