CASES ALLOTED

 Hari Singh Nagra and others Vs Kapil Sibal and others 2010 (7) SCC 502 1

Facts of the Case

The case arose from public statements made by Kapil Sibal, a senior lawyer and politician, criticizing
corruption and inefficiencies in the judiciary. These remarks, made during interviews and speeches,
were widely reported in the media and were perceived by Hari Singh Nagra and others as
defamatory and harmful to their reputations.

The controversy also tied to Writ Petition (C) No.126 of 1990, filed by the State Legal Aid Committee,
J&K, which sought disclosure of the names of 90 judges allegedly involved in corruption, as
mentioned by a former Chief Justice of India. The Supreme Court had dismissed this writ, finding no
basis for the claims. Despite the dismissal, Sibal continued to comment on judicial corruption,
emphasizing systemic reform.

The appellants argued that Sibal’s statements defamed them under Section 499 of the Indian Penal
Code and scandalized the judiciary, constituting criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. They claimed his remarks undermined public confidence in the judiciary.

Sibal defended his remarks as being made in good faith and in the public interest, aiming to highlight
the need for judicial reform. The Bombay High Court dismissed the contempt proceedings, stating
the statements were constructive criticism, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860:

o Section 499: Definition of defamation and its exceptions.

o Section 500: Punishment for defamation.

2. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt as actions that scandalize or lower the
authority of the court.

o Section 13: Provides that no one shall be punished for contempt unless it
substantially interferes with the administration of justice.

3. Constitution of India, 1950:

o Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression.

o Article 19(2): Reasonable restrictions, including those for contempt of court.

Issues Before the Court:

1. Whether the statements made by Kapil Sibal amounted to defamation under Section 499 of
the IPC.

2. Whether the remarks made by Kapil Sibal scandalized the judiciary and amounted to
contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

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 3. Whether the dismissal of Writ Petition (C) No.126 of 1990 by the Supreme Court impacted
the present case.

4. To what extent freedom of speech can be used to critique the judiciary and public
institutions.

Arguments by the Appellants (Hari Singh Nagra and Others):

1. Defamation:
The appellants contended that Kapil Sibal’s public statements, alleging corruption and
inefficiency in the judiciary, were defamatory under Section 499 of the IPC. They argued that
the remarks harmed their professional and personal reputations, creating a false perception
of their involvement in corrupt practices.

2. Contempt of Court:
They asserted that Sibal’s statements scandalized the judiciary, undermining its dignity and
public trust, thereby constituting criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. By accusing the judiciary of corruption, Sibal allegedly eroded public confidence in the
institution’s impartiality and authority.

3. Malice and Recklessness:

The appellants argued that Sibal’s remarks were baseless, especially after the dismissal of
Writ Petition (C) No.126 of 1990. They claimed his statements were motivated by malice
rather than made in good faith or the public interest.

Arguments by the Respondents (Kapil Sibal and Others):

1. Good Faith and Public Interest:

Sibal argued that his remarks were made in good faith and with the intent to highlight
systemic flaws in the judiciary, aiming for reforms.

2. Freedom of Speech:
He contended that his statements were protected under Article 19(1)(a), as they addressed
issues of public importance. Criticism of public institutions is essential for accountability in a
democracy.

3. Constructive Criticism:
Sibal maintained that his remarks were general in nature, reform-oriented, and not directed
at any specific judge or case. He argued that legitimate critique, without malicious intent,
does not amount to contempt of court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the contempt petition and held the following:

The Court ruled that “any ridicule brought towards the judges and the courts, that hampers the
confidence and belief of the public thereby deteriorating the foundation of justice must be
prevented at all times. But any criticism which is reasonable, rational and sober, not coloured by any
tactics must be welcomed. In accordance with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, freedom of speech
and expression when used by the Press and the people to fairly criticise any judgment of the court,
then no criminal contempt is said to be committed in such cases. Rather it is treated as a necessary
right of the people. Therefore, fair and reasonable criticism on the working of the judges and the
courts can be made without condemning it as contempt of court”.
 1. Defamation Claim: The statements were not made with malicious intent but in good faith to
promote accountability and transparency in public institutions. They were protected under
the exceptions to Section 499 of the IPC.

2. Contempt of Court:

o The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had rightly observed that the remarks
did not amount to contempt. The court noted:

1. The entire interview appeared to have been given with the intention of
improving the judiciary.

2. The Supreme Court's dismissal of the writ petition did not preclude
discussions about judicial accountability, as such discourse is in the public
interest.

o The court emphasized that constructive criticism of the judiciary, if made in good
faith, does not amount to contempt.

3. Outcome: The contempt proceedings were dropped, notices issued to the respondents were
discharged, and the petition was dismissed.

6. Conclusion and Analysis:

Conclusion:

1. The Supreme Court struck a balance between the need to protect the judiciary's authority
and the right to freedom of speech and constructive criticism.

2. It reaffirmed that public interest and good faith are valid defenses in cases of alleged
defamation and contempt of court.

Own Analysis:

1. Judicial Accountability: This case underscores the importance of maintaining judicial

accountability while ensuring that legitimate criticism does not face undue censorship.

2. Good Faith vs. Malice: The judgment reinforces that good faith and public interest are
critical elements in determining whether statements constitute defamation or contempt.

3. Freedom of Speech: The decision protects the right to critique public institutions, including
the judiciary, provided such critique is aimed at reform rather than malice.

 M.Y Shareef v. Judges of Nagpur High Court, AIR 1955 2

Facts of the Case:

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M.Y. Shareef, an advocate, and his colleague, were involved in a contempt of court case after they
made statements against the judiciary. The controversy arose when the two lawyers filed petitions
challenging judicial decisions in a manner perceived as improper and disrespectful. They were
accused of attempting to scandalize the authority of the High Court of Nagpur by making allegations
that were deemed defamatory and insulting to the judiciary.

The judges of the Nagpur High Court held that the two counsel’s actions were not only inappropriate
but also amounted to contempt of court, as they undermined the authority and dignity of the court.
As a result, both Shareef and his colleague were fined for their misconduct.

They subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the fine and seeking a
reconsideration of the charges.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1952:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt as actions that scandalize or lower the
authority of the court.

o Section 12: Provides the penalty for contempt, including fines and imprisonment.

2. Constitution of India:

o Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees freedom of speech and expression.

o Article 19(2): Allows reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech, including those

necessary for the administration of justice.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the actions of the appellants amounted to contempt of court by scandalizing the
authority of the Nagpur High Court.

2. Whether the imposition of a fine on the appellants was justified.

3. Whether the apology offered by the appellants was sufficient to mitigate their conduct.

4. Whether the Supreme Court should intervene and modify the High Court's decision.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Appellants (M.Y. Shareef and Colleague):

1. No Intent to Scandalize the Court:

The appellants argued that their actions were not meant to scandalize or disrespect the
court. They claimed that their statements were made in good faith and were merely an
attempt to challenge certain judicial decisions, which they believed were erroneous.

2. Freedom of Speech:
They contended that their actions were protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution,
which guarantees the right to free speech. They argued that their comments fell within the
permissible limits of criticism and were aimed at improving the judicial system.

3. Apology and Regret:

The appellants presented an unqualified apology for their actions, expressing regret for any
 harm caused to the reputation of the court. They pleaded for the sentence of fine to be set
aside in light of their apology.

Arguments by the Respondents (Judges of Nagpur High Court):

1. Scandalizing the Court:

The respondents argued that the actions of the appellants clearly amounted to contempt of
court. They contended that the statements made by the appellants had the effect of
scandalizing the court and undermining the authority and dignity of the judiciary.

2. Deterrence and Penalty:

The respondents emphasized that the imposition of the fine was necessary to maintain the
authority of the court and to deter similar actions by other legal practitioners. They argued
that the fine was justified, as it was crucial to safeguard the integrity of the judiciary.

3. No Valid Apology:
The respondents also claimed that the apology tendered by the appellants was insufficient
and did not adequately address the seriousness of their conduct.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, after hearing both sides, decided to allow the appeal. It concluded that the
appellants’ actions did amount to contempt of court as their conduct had the potential to lower the
authority of the judiciary. However, the Court considered the apology tendered by the appellants,
acknowledging that they had expressed regret for their conduct and had taken responsibility for their
actions.

The Court further stated that while the conduct of the appellants was inappropriate, the imposition
of a fine was excessive. It therefore set aside the sentence of fine passed by the Nagpur High Court.
Instead, the Court accepted the unqualified apology offered by the appellants.

However, the Court issued a strong admonition and warning to both counsel regarding their
conduct, emphasizing the importance of maintaining respect for the judiciary and the need to avoid
any actions that could undermine its authority. The Court concluded that no further costs would be
imposed in the proceedings.

Conclusion:

In this case, the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of upholding the dignity and authority
of the judiciary but also recognized the value of an unqualified apology. The decision reflects a
balanced approach, where the Court considered the appellants’ remorse and the need for reform,
rather than focusing solely on punitive measures. The final verdict served as both a reprimand and a
reminder to legal professionals about the significance of maintaining respect for judicial institutions.

The appeal was allowed, the fine was set aside, and the unqualified apology was accepted. The
Court issued a strong warning to the appellants about their conduct but refrained from imposing any
additional costs in the proceedings.

 Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tanga Mazdoor Union, AIR 1979 SC 1767 3

Facts of the Case:

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The case revolves around the Aligarh Municipal Board (the appellant) and the Ekka Tanga Mazdoor
Union (the respondent). The dispute began when the Municipal Board, despite a court order, failed
to implement a direction related to the payment of wages to the workers of the Ekka Tanga Mazdoor
Union. The Union filed a contempt petition, alleging that the Board’s failure to comply with the
court’s order amounted to contempt.

The Municipal Board, which is a Corporation, argued that it could not be held in contempt of court
because a Corporation acts through its officers (natural persons), and those officers could not be held
individually responsible. The Board contended that it was not liable to be punished for contempt as it
was a corporate entity, and it had no direct control over its officers’ actions.

The Executive Officer, Demand Inspector, and others connected with the Board were individually
implicated for failing to implement the order. As a result, fines were imposed on the individuals
involved. The Board appealed the decision, arguing that it was not legally responsible.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt as any act that scandalizes or disobeys the
authority of a court.

o Section 12: Outlines the penalty for contempt, including fine and sequestration.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC):

o Section 108: Deals with abetment and criminal conspiracy, indirectly related to the
individual responsibility of officers acting on behalf of a corporation.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether a Corporation like the Municipal Board can be held liable for contempt of court
when it fails to comply with a court order.

2. Whether the officers responsible for the administration of the Corporation can be
individually held liable for contempt.

3. Whether the conviction and sentence of the officers (Executive Officer and Demand
Inspector) should be upheld or set aside.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Municipal Board (Appellant):

1. Corporation as a Legal Entity:

The Municipal Board argued that as a corporation, it acts through natural persons and
cannot be convicted of contempt of court. The Board’s officers, who are responsible for
carrying out its functions, are the ones who should be held accountable for non-compliance
with the court’s order.

2. Absence of Willful Disobedience:

The Municipal Board further contended that it did not willfully disobey the court order. It
claimed that any failure to comply was due to operational difficulties and not an intentional
disregard of the court’s directives.
 3. Imposition of Fine on the Corporation:
The Board also raised the point that the imposition of fines on the Corporation itself was
inappropriate, as it contended that the fine should be imposed on the responsible
individuals.

Arguments by the Respondents (Ekka Tanga Mazdoor Union):

1. Corporate Liability for Contempt:

The Union argued that the Municipal Board, as a Corporation, could be held liable for
contempt of court for failing to comply with the court’s order. The Union contended that
once the order was given to the Corporation, it was the responsibility of the Board’s officers
to ensure compliance. Failure to do so would make both the officers and the Corporation
liable.

2. Individual Responsibility of Officers:

The Union also argued that the officers responsible for carrying out the order should be
individually held accountable. The Executive Officer and Demand Inspector were specifically
named for not taking appropriate action to implement the court order.

3. Scandalizing the Court:

The Union emphasized that the Board’s failure to comply with the court order amounted to
contempt, as it directly impeded the administration of justice.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Aligarh Municipal Board, affirming that the
Corporation could be held responsible for contempt. The Court held that a corporation, despite being
a legal entity, is still capable of being convicted of contempt of court. The Court clarified that a
command to a Corporation is, in essence, a command to the officers responsible for its affairs. If the
officers knowingly fail to ensure compliance, they, along with the corporation, are guilty of contempt.

However, the Supreme Court also partially allowed the appeal by Executive Officer, Demand
Inspector, and other officers, setting aside their conviction and sentence. The fines imposed on these
individuals, if already paid, were to be refunded.

The Court emphasized that, despite the officers’ actions, the Corporation had a significant
responsibility in ensuring the court’s orders were implemented. As a result, the appeal filed by the
Municipal Board and the Demand Inspector was dismissed, while the appeal by the individual
officers was partially allowed.

Conclusion:

The judgment reaffirmed that corporations, as legal entities, can be held liable for contempt of court,
particularly when their officers fail to act on court orders. The Court made it clear that if the officers
of the corporation deliberately prevent compliance or neglect their duties to implement the order,
both the corporation and its officers can be punished for contempt.

While the appeal by the Municipal Board was dismissed, the Court showed leniency toward the
individual officers (Executive Officer, Demand Inspector) by setting aside their convictions,
recognizing that the failure to act may not have been entirely intentional or malicious.
Thus, the appeal by the Municipal Board was dismissed, but the appeal by the Executive Officer and
other officers was allowed to the extent that their conviction and sentence were set aside, with fines
refunded if paid.

 M.B. SANGHI, ADVOCATE v. HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA [AIR 1991 SC 1834:1991(3) SCC
600 4

Facts of the Case:

M.B. Sanghi, an advocate practicing at Narnaul, was representing the plaintiff in the civil suit Hari
Ram v. Municipal Committee. On September 20, 1985, Sanghi appeared before the Subordinate
Judge, Narnaul, on behalf of the plaintiff and made an oral request for ex-parte ad-interim stay. The
Subordinate Judge, however, declined the request and ordered that notices be issued to the
defendants, with the case scheduled for September 24, 1985.

On September 24, 1985, Shri Banwari Lal Sharma, who appeared for the defendants, requested
more time to file a reply to the plaintiff’s application. The appellant, Sanghi, did not oppose this
request but renewed his plea for an ad-interim stay. The Subordinate Judge responded by stating
that the issue of the stay would be considered after the defendants submitted their reply and
adjourned the case until September 26, 1985.

Apparently dissatisfied with this order, M.B. Sanghi allegedly uttered words in the court that were
deemed to be disrespectful towards the judge. According to the Subordinate Judge, Sanghi said: "I do
not care for the order passed by the Court. If you do not grant me the stay, I will file a complaint in
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against you." This led to the Subordinate Judge making a
complaint to the High Court, accusing Sanghi of contempt of court.

The High Court of Punjab and Haryana initiated contempt proceedings against Sanghi, and he was
found guilty. Sanghi then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt, including acts that scandalize or lower the
authority of the court.

o Section 12: Specifies penalties for contempt, which can include fines or
imprisonment.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860:

o Section 228: Punishes anyone who intentionally insults or disrespects a public

servant (including a judge) while they are discharging their duty.

3. Constitution of India:

o Article 19(1)(a): Guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, but
allows restrictions in cases where public order or the administration of justice is
threatened.
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Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the words spoken by M.B. Sanghi in court amounted to contempt of court by
scandalizing or disrespecting the authority of the judge.

2. Whether Sanghi's actions constituted an obstruction to the due administration of justice.

3. Whether the High Court was correct in holding M.B. Sanghi guilty of contempt.

4. Whether the imposition of a contempt charge and subsequent punishment was justified.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Appellant (M.B. Sanghi):

1. Freedom of Speech: Sanghi argued that his words were made in the heat of the moment and
were expressions of frustration, not an intentional or malicious attempt to scandalize or
disrespect the court. He contended that his right to freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a)
of the Constitution should allow him to express dissatisfaction without it being considered
contempt.

2. Lack of Intention to Scandalize: He further claimed that he did not intend to undermine the
authority of the court. His statement, he argued, was simply a response to the perceived
delay in justice and was not directed at insulting or humiliating the judge.

3. No Willful Disobedience: Sanghi also argued that he had not willfully disobeyed the court’s
order, as he had made his request for the stay in good faith, and his frustration stemmed
from his belief that the case was not being heard promptly.

Arguments by the Respondent (High Court of Punjab and Haryana):

1. Scandalizing the Court: The respondent (the High Court) argued that the words spoken by
Sanghi were disrespectful and amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as they were intended to undermine the authority and
dignity of the Subordinate Judge.

2. Undermining the Judicial Process: The High Court contended that the appellant’s statement
was an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice. The act of threatening to file a
complaint in the High Court was seen as an attempt to overrule or bypass the decision of the
Subordinate Judge, undermining the judicial process.

3. Integrity of the Court: The High Court stressed that the integrity and respect for judicial
decisions must be upheld, and any attempt to publicly challenge the court’s authority
without just cause should be treated as contempt to preserve the dignity of the court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, after hearing the arguments, found that M.B. Sanghi's statement did amount to
criminal contempt. The Court emphasized that the words spoken by the appellant were intended to
publicly challenge the authority of the judge. The Court held that such conduct obstructs the due
administration of justice and undermines public confidence in the judiciary.

However, the Court also considered the context in which the statement was made, acknowledging
that the appellant’s frustration arose from a perceived delay in the judicial process. Despite this, the
Court affirmed that the integrity and authority of the judiciary must be protected.

As a result, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s decision. The Court
also emphasized the need for judicial officers to be accorded the respect necessary for the proper
functioning of the judicial system. The Court stated that the law of contempt is meant to ensure that
the courts’ orders are respected and that there is no interference with their authority.

Conclusion:

The case underscores the importance of maintaining respect for the judicial system, even when a
party disagrees with a court’s decision. The Supreme Court's ruling confirmed that words or actions
that publicly challenge or undermine a court’s authority can constitute contempt of court, regardless
of the intention behind them.

In this case, M.B. Sanghi's statement, made in frustration, was interpreted as an attempt to disregard
the judge’s authority. The Court's judgment serves as a reminder to legal professionals and litigants
alike that the judiciary must be respected at all times, and any attempt to scandalize or undermine it
is punishable under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was held guilty of criminal contempt of court for
his statements in the courtroom.

 R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106 5

Facts of the Case:

The case revolves around the infamous BMW hit-and-run case involving Sanjeev Nanda, a wealthy
young man accused of killing six people, including three policemen, in a reckless driving incident in
Delhi in 1999. The trial, known for its delay and the influence of Nanda’s family, had been dragging
for eight years. In 2007, the trial had yet to make significant progress, with witnesses being dropped
and the prosecution’s case weakening.

During this period, NDTV, an English-language news channel, aired a controversial sting operation on
May 30, 2007. The program showed Sunil Kulkarni, a former key prosecution witness, meeting IU
Khan, the Special Public Prosecutor, and R.K. Anand, the defense lawyer, negotiating for a “sell-out”
in favor of the defense for a large sum of money. This program was based on a concealed camera
operation, and it implicated these individuals in attempts to manipulate the trial for financial gain.

The Delhi High Court took suo moto cognizance of the matter, considering the telecast as an act of
criminal contempt of court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The court issued show-cause
notices to R.K. Anand, IU Khan, and Bhagwan Sharma, an associate of Anand, to explain why they
should not be punished for contempt. While Bhagwan Sharma was acquitted, R.K. Anand and IU
Khan were found guilty and punished with a four-month ban on appearing in Delhi High Court and its

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subordinate courts. Additionally, they were fined ₹2,000 each and recommended for divestment of
their Senior Advocate designation.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt as the publication of material that

scandalizes or lowers the authority of the court.

 Clause (ii): Disobedience or interference with court orders.

 Clause (iii): Prejudicing or interfering with the administration of justice.

o Section 12: Deals with penalties for contempt, which include imprisonment or fines.

2. Constitution of India:

o Article 215: Provides for the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the actions of R.K. Anand and IU Khan, as revealed in the sting operation,
amounted to criminal contempt of court.

2. Whether the Delhi High Court was justified in imposing a ban on their appearance in its
courts and in recommending their divestment as Senior Advocates.

3. Whether the sting operation, conducted by NDTV, was legally admissible in implicating the
accused in the contempt proceedings.

4. Whether the punishment imposed was proportionate to the acts of contempt committed.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Prosecution (Registrar, Delhi High Court):

1. Contempt of Court: The prosecution argued that the actions of R.K. Anand and IU Khan
directly amounted to contempt, as they were attempting to manipulate the trial for personal
gain. By negotiating with a key witness to change his testimony, they were obstructing the
course of justice, thereby scandalizing the court and prejudicing its administration.

2. Violation of Judicial Integrity: The prosecution emphasized that the sting operation revealed
the unscrupulous behavior of legal professionals, attempting to derail the trial for financial
benefits. This behavior, according to the prosecution, demonstrated clear interference with
the judicial process, which must be safeguarded to maintain public confidence in the justice
system.

3. Punitive Measures: The prosecution argued that the actions of these senior advocates
undermined the credibility of the legal profession, and therefore, the penalty in the form of
suspension from appearing in court was necessary to maintain the dignity of the judiciary.
Arguments by the Defense (R.K. Anand and IU Khan):

1. No Malicious Intent: R.K. Anand and IU Khan contended that the sting operation
misrepresented the context of their conversations and that their actions did not amount to
criminal contempt. They argued that the discussion was hypothetical and did not actually
interfere with the judicial process.

2. Violation of Legal Ethics: The defense also claimed that the sting operation was a form of
entrapment and violated ethical standards. They argued that the broadcasted conversation
was a private one and did not have any actual impact on the trial’s outcome.

3. Unjust Punishment: The defense questioned the disproportionate punishment meted out to
them, particularly the ban on practicing in the Delhi High Court and the recommendation for
divestment of their Senior Advocate status, considering their long-standing professional
records.

Judgment:

The Delhi High Court found R.K. Anand and IU Khan guilty of criminal contempt of court. The court
held that their actions, as revealed in the sting operation, were attempts to manipulate the trial by
influencing a key witness and obstructing the course of justice. The Court found their actions to fall
under Sections 2(c)(ii) and (iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as they undermined the
authority of the court and interfered with the judicial process.

The court ruled that:

 R.K. Anand and IU Khan were guilty of contempt and punished with a four-month
suspension from appearing before the Delhi High Court and its subordinate courts.

 They were also fined ₹2,000 each.

 The Court recommended to the Full Court that both Anand and Khan be divested of their
designation as Senior Advocates.

Bhagwan Sharma, who was also implicated in the operation, was acquitted due to insufficient
evidence against him.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court of India, in its final ruling, upheld the findings of the Delhi High Court. The case is
significant for illustrating the power of the judiciary to hold legal professionals accountable for
actions that undermine the integrity of the judicial process. The sting operation, though
controversial, was upheld as a valid means of exposing attempts to subvert justice.

In this case, the judgment reinforced that criminal contempt of court is a serious offense that can be
committed not just by outsiders but also by legal professionals. The punishment of suspension from
court practice and divestment of Senior Advocate status served as a reminder that those who hold
positions of trust in the legal system must act in a manner that upholds, rather than diminishes,
public confidence in justice.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the guilty verdict for contempt of court was maintained.
 Re: Arundhati Roy AIR 2002 SC 1375, (2002) 3 SCC 343, [2002] 2 SCR 213 6

Facts of the Case:

The case arose from the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), a movement opposing the construction of
the Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River. The NBA filed a petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India (Writ Petition No. 319 of 1994) in the Supreme Court to address the
environmental impacts and human rights violations arising from the project. The dam’s construction
was leading to the displacement of thousands of people and submerging large tracts of land, causing
significant environmental harm.

In the course of the proceedings, the Supreme Court allowed an increase in the height of the dam to
RL 85 meters, which was opposed by the NBA. During this period, Arundhati Roy, a well-known
author and activist, who was not a party to the case, wrote an article entitled "The Greater Common
Good," which was published in Outlook Magazine and later in a book. In her article, she criticized the
decision to increase the height of the dam and the resultant displacement of people, arguing that
the decision of the Supreme Court was damaging to the public and the environment.

The Supreme Court, particularly two of its judges, felt that Roy’s comments misrepresented the
court’s orders and proceedings. They viewed her statements as contemptuous, as she was indirectly
accusing the court of acting against the public good. The court considered the statements to be
scandalizing the judicial process, and took suo moto notice of the matter, initiating contempt
proceedings against Roy for her publication.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Article 129 of the Constitution of India: Gives the Supreme Court the authority to punish for
contempt of itself.

2. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines "criminal contempt" as the publication of material that

scandalizes or lowers the authority of the court, prejudices or interferes with the
administration of justice, or otherwise disobeys a court order.

o Section 12: Provides for penalties in contempt proceedings, including imprisonment

and fines.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether Arundhati Roy’s article amounted to criminal contempt of court by scandalizing

and misrepresenting the court’s proceedings.

2. Whether the freedom of speech and expression, guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, was violated by the court’s contempt proceedings.

3. Whether the court’s action was an overreach or an appropriate response to protect the
dignity and integrity of the judicial process.
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Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Petitioner (Supreme Court and Contempt Petitioners):

1. Contempt of Court: The petitioners, including the Supreme Court itself, argued that
Arundhati Roy’s article misrepresented the court’s proceedings. Her statements were seen
as an attempt to scandalize and undermine the authority of the judiciary. By accusing the
court of failing to consider the public good and the rights of the displaced, Roy was indirectly
accusing the judiciary of bias and neglect.

2. Distortion of Facts: The Supreme Court contended that the article distorted the facts
surrounding the court’s order to raise the height of the dam. The court believed the article’s
publication could lead to public misunderstanding and a negative perception of the judicial
process.

3. Maintaining Judicial Dignity: The court emphasized that it was necessary to protect the
dignity and authority of the judiciary. Statements that misrepresent the judicial process or
undermine its authority must be addressed to prevent the erosion of public confidence in
the legal system.

Arguments by the Respondent (Arundhati Roy):

1. Freedom of Speech: Roy’s defense was based on Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which
guarantees the freedom of speech and expression. She argued that she had every right to
express her opinion on the Sardar Sarovar Dam issue, particularly since it was a matter of
public interest involving environmental and human rights concerns.

2. No Intention to Scandalize: Roy argued that her article was a critique of the government’s
policies and the impact of the dam’s construction, and not an attempt to undermine or
scandalize the judiciary. She stated that she had no intention to disrespect the court’s
authority or integrity.

3. Public Interest: Roy also contended that her article was a legitimate part of the public
discourse on an issue that affected millions of people, and thus her remarks were in the
public interest and should be protected by the right to free speech.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court, in a three-judge bench judgment, found Arundhati Roy guilty of contempt of
court. The Court observed that her article had indeed scandalized the court by misrepresenting the
facts and attempting to portray the court’s order as harmful to the public and the environment. The
Court emphasized that the integrity and independence of the judiciary must be safeguarded, and
any attempt to malign it could not be tolerated.

The judgment clarified that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute and cannot be
exercised in a manner that causes harm to the dignity of the judiciary or undermines its authority.
The court took a strong view that criticism of court decisions is permissible, but scandalizing or
misrepresenting the court’s actions is not.
As a result, the Court punished Arundhati Roy for contempt but imposed a lighter penalty. She was
fined ₹2,000 and was warned that her future conduct would be closely watched. The court also
clarified that it was not restricting her right to criticize the government or the dam project itself, but
her critique of the judicial process had crossed a line.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court’s judgment in the case reflects the tension between freedom of speech and the
need to protect judicial authority. The court acknowledged that criticism of judicial decisions is
acceptable in a democratic society, but it drew the line when the criticism led to misrepresentation
or scandalization of the court. In this case, the court balanced its need to maintain judicial dignity
with the recognition of the importance of free expression, resulting in a fine and a warning, rather
than a harsher penalty.

The ruling serves as a reminder that while freedom of speech is a fundamental right, it must be
exercised responsibly, especially when it concerns the integrity and authority of the judiciary.

 In Re: Prashant Bhushan and another (2020) SCM (CRL.) No. 000001 -/2020 7

Facts of the Case:

In 2020, a petition was filed by one Mahek Maheshwari in the Supreme Court of India, seeking
contempt proceedings against Prashant Bhushan, a prominent advocate, for his controversial
statements posted on Twitter. Prashant Bhushan had made two tweets that were perceived by
Maheshwari as scandalous and derogatory toward the judiciary.

The first tweet, posted on June 27, 2020, included an image of the Chief Justice of India sitting on a
bike with a caption suggesting that the judiciary had allowed a "destruction" of democracy in India.
The second tweet, posted on August 14, 2020, referred to the Supreme Court as "the last bastion of
democracy" and accused the court of acting in favor of the government and being influenced by
external pressures. Both tweets were seen as attacks on the judiciary’s independence and credibility.

A petition was filed, requesting that contempt proceedings be initiated against Bhushan, claiming his
tweets were deliberate, malicious, and aimed at scandalizing the judiciary. However, the matter
was placed before the Supreme Court registry, which questioned whether the petition could proceed
as the Attorney General's consent had not been obtained, as required under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt, which includes actions that scandalize or
lower the authority of the court.

o Section 15: Provides that the Attorney General's consent is necessary to initiate
contempt proceedings.

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 2. Article 129 of the Constitution of India: Grants the Supreme Court the power to punish for
contempt of court.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the tweets by Prashant Bhushan amounted to criminal contempt of court under
the Contempt of Courts Act.

2. Whether the Attorney General’s consent was necessary for initiating contempt proceedings
in this case.

3. Whether the right to free speech (under Article 19 of the Constitution) is violated by holding
the tweets as contemptuous.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Petitioners (Mahek Maheshwari and the Supreme Court):

1. Contempt of Court: The petitioners argued that Prashant Bhushan’s tweets were aimed at
scandalizing the judiciary. They claimed that the language used was disrespectful and
malicious towards the institution, causing harm to the credibility and dignity of the Supreme
Court.

2. Malicious Intent: The petitioners claimed that Bhushan’s tweets were not just criticism but
were designed to undermine the court’s authority and portray it as compromised. The
tweets were alleged to have created doubts about the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, which could harm the public perception of the judicial system.

3. Public Confidence in Judiciary: The petitioners contended that such attacks on the judiciary,
especially by a prominent lawyer like Bhushan, could erode public trust in the courts, which
is detrimental to the administration of justice.

Arguments by the Respondent (Prashant Bhushan):

1. Freedom of Speech: Prashant Bhushan argued that his tweets were a legitimate exercise of
free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which guarantees freedom of
expression. He claimed that his comments were critical but not malicious, and should be
understood as part of a healthy democratic discourse.

2. Right to Criticize Judiciary: Bhushan defended his tweets by stating that the judiciary and
judicial accountability are open to criticism, especially when concerns about judicial
independence and integrity arise. He argued that criticizing the court, particularly when it
acts in a controversial manner, is not contemptuous.

3. No Scandalizing Intent: Bhushan maintained that his statements were not meant to
scandalize the judiciary but to highlight perceived issues in the judicial system. He
emphasized that his intention was never to harm the reputation of the court but to address
larger concerns about the functioning of democracy.
Judgment:

The Supreme Court, in a two-judge bench led by Justice Arun Mishra, found Prashant Bhushan
guilty of criminal contempt of court. The Court held that the tweets made by Bhushan were
scandalous and amounted to undermining the authority of the judiciary. The Court emphasized that
such statements were not a legitimate critique of the judicial system but rather an attack on the
dignity and integrity of the Court.

Regarding the Attorney General’s consent, the Court held that consent was not required for initiating
contempt proceedings suo motu by the Court itself, as this was within its powers under Article 129
of the Constitution.

The Court imposed a token fine of ₹1 on Prashant Bhushan but also directed that he be sentenced
to imprisonment for a period of three months and disqualified from practicing in the Supreme
Court for three years. The Court’s judgment was seen as an affirmation of its commitment to
protecting the judicial authority and maintaining the public perception of the integrity of the
judiciary.

Conclusion:

This case highlights the tension between the freedom of expression and the need to protect the
dignity of the judiciary. While the Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of criticism, it took
a strict stance on comments that undermine or scandalize the judiciary. The case reaffirmed the
view that while public discourse is crucial, attacks on the judiciary that damage its authority cannot
be permitted.

The judgment also emphasized that contempt proceedings can be initiated suo motu by the Court
without needing the consent of the Attorney General, especially when the remarks are deemed to
tarnish the credibility and independence of the judicial system. It serves as a reminder that even
prominent public figures must exercise caution when expressing opinions about the judiciary,
especially when such opinions can be perceived as malicious or harmful to the institution.

 In Re: Hon’ble Justice Shri C.S. Karnan (2017) Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 1 of 2017 with
SLP (C) No. 14842 of 2015 8

Facts of the Case:

The case revolves around Justice C.S. Karnan, a sitting judge of the Calcutta High Court, who became
embroiled in a series of controversies, including allegations of misconduct and corruption. In 2015,
he was accused of making derogatory statements about fellow judges and members of the judiciary,
including allegations of corruption, and publishing these in the media.

Justice Karnan issued several judicial orders against other judges, including the Chief Justice of India,
which were widely criticized. These actions led to him being suo motu summoned by the Supreme
Court for contempt of court.

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In 2017, the Supreme Court initiated contempt proceedings against him after he failed to appear
before the Court in response to a show-cause notice. The Supreme Court took note of the tenor of
Justice Karnan’s press briefings and his purported judicial orders, which raised concerns about his
mental fitness to defend himself. In light of this, the Court decided to appoint a medical board to
examine his health and determine if he was fit to participate in the legal proceedings.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(c): Defines criminal contempt as an act that scandalizes the court or
lowers its authority.

o Section 12: Provides for the punishment of contempt, which can include
imprisonment or a fine.

2. Article 129 of the Constitution of India: Empowers the Supreme Court to punish for
contempt of court.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether Justice C.S. Karnan's actions and statements constituted criminal contempt of
court under the Contempt of Courts Act.

2. Whether mental health played a role in his ability to defend himself in contempt
proceedings.

3. Whether the medical examination of a sitting judge should be mandated to assess his fitness
to defend himself in the contempt proceedings.

4. The extent to which the Supreme Court can intervene in the conduct of a sitting judge.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Petitioners (Supreme Court and Other Judicial Authorities):

1. Contempt of Court: The petitioners argued that Justice Karnan’s actions, including his
derogatory remarks, judicial orders against fellow judges, and public accusations of
corruption, were an attempt to undermine the authority and credibility of the judiciary.
These actions amounted to scandalizing the court and lowering the dignity of the judicial
system.

2. Mental Fitness: Given the bizarre nature of the orders passed by Justice Karnan, and his
frequent media outbursts, the petitioners raised concerns regarding his mental health. They
argued that his actions were possibly influenced by a mental condition, which might have
affected his judgment and behavior, and therefore required a medical examination to assess
his fitness to defend himself in the contempt proceedings.

Arguments by Justice C.S. Karnan (Defense):

 1. Right to Defend: Justice Karnan defended himself by asserting his right to be heard and
argue against the contempt charges. He claimed that his actions were taken in good faith and
did not intend to scandalize the judiciary. He believed that his actions were meant to address
issues of corruption and mismanagement within the judicial system, not to disrespect the
judiciary.

2. Mental Health and Capacity: While the defense did not directly address mental fitness at
this stage, it was implied that any legal measures, such as a medical examination, should not
be used to discredit his capacity to act as a judge or defend himself. The defense claimed
that his actions were a form of legitimate protest against the corruption within the judicial
system.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over the conduct of Justice Karnan, finding that his
statements and orders appeared to be a direct attack on the integrity of the judiciary. The Court
took the unprecedented step of suo motu initiating contempt proceedings against a sitting judge,
which was seen as an action aimed at protecting the sanctity and independence of the judiciary.

However, before proceeding with the contempt proceedings, the Court noted that Justice Karnan’s
behavior raised serious questions about his mental fitness. The Court decided to have him medically
examined to determine if he was in a condition to defend himself properly. This was a unique move
given the high status of the individual involved, but the Court justified it based on the seriousness of
the allegations and the nature of the behavior exhibited by Justice Karnan.

The Court directed the Director Health Services, West Bengal, to set up a medical board to examine
Justice Karnan’s health on May 4, 2017, and submit a report on whether he was fit to defend himself
in the contempt proceedings. The Director General of Police, West Bengal, was also instructed to
ensure that the medical examination was conducted smoothly.

Conclusion:

This case reflects the Supreme Court’s commitment to upholding the dignity and authority of the
judiciary, even when the individual in question is a sitting judge. The action to initiate contempt
proceedings against a judge of the Calcutta High Court was an unprecedented move, demonstrating
the seriousness with which the Court viewed scandalous behavior and attacks on the judiciary.

Furthermore, the medical examination of Justice Karnan highlighted the Court’s awareness of the
possibility that his actions might have been influenced by mental health issues. This showed a
balanced approach — not only focusing on the need to maintain the integrity of the judicial system
but also ensuring that Justice Karnan was in a fit state of mind to engage in the legal proceedings
against him.

Ultimately, the case underscores the importance of accountability for judicial officers, while also
recognizing the complexities that may arise when such officers are accused of misconduct, especially
when questions about their mental health emerge.
 Indian Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee &Another AIR 1999 SC 880:1999(2) SCC 537
9

Facts of the Case:

In this case, the dispute arose over the implementation of a Supreme Court order regarding the
abolition of contract labor at the Bombay International Airport. The petitioners, who were
employees of the airport working as sweepers in the Car Parking area, contended that their services
were continued as contract laborers even after the notification abolishing contract labor came into
effect on 9th December 1976.

The six employees involved in the case—Elizabeth D'Souza, Nagubai Kurade, Shoba Babu Gurav,
Laxmi Babu Mirikar, Dwarkabai Arke, and Vishravathi Waghmare—argued that despite a Supreme
Court judgment directing the regularization of their employment, the respondents (airport
management and other authorities) had not implemented the decision. As a result, they claimed that
they were entitled to the benefits granted by the Supreme Court, and the failure to comply with the
court's judgment amounted to civil contempt.

The central issue was whether the non-implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision to
regularize the employees' positions, and provide them the benefits, constituted civil contempt of
court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:

o Section 2(b): Defines civil contempt as the willful disobedience of a court order.

o Section 12: Deals with the punishment for contempt, which includes imprisonment
or fines.

2. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:

o Deals with the regulation of labor disputes and the rights of workers, particularly in
relation to the abolition of contract labor.

Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the failure of the respondents to comply with the Supreme Court’s judgment
constitutes civil contempt.

2. Whether the employees were entitled to the benefits as per the Supreme Court's decision
regarding the abolition of contract labor.

3. What remedies, if any, are available for the workers whose rights have not been
implemented as per the Court's directions?

Arguments of Both Sides:

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Arguments by the Petitioners (Indian Airports Employees Union):

1. Civil Contempt: The petitioners argued that the respondents had willfully failed to
implement the Supreme Court's order to regularize the services of the employees. The
employees had been working as contract laborers, and the Court's judgment specifically
sought to abolish contract labor and regularize the workers under permanent employment.

2. Entitlement to Benefits: The petitioners contended that they were entitled to all benefits
that should have been given after the abolition of contract labor. They cited the fact that
other workers had received the benefits and regularization, but they had been left out
despite the Supreme Court’s directive.

3. Disobedience of Court’s Order: The petitioners further argued that the non-implementation
of the Court’s order amounted to willful disobedience, which falls under the definition of
civil contempt.

Arguments by the Respondents (Ranjan Chatterjee & Others):

1. Lack of Specificity in Implementation: The respondents argued that there were certain
technical and administrative issues that had delayed the implementation of the Supreme
Court’s order. They did not deny the Court’s directive but claimed that the delay was not
intentional or willful.

2. No Civil Contempt: The respondents contended that the delay in the implementation was
not due to contempt or willful disobedience but was due to the complexities in the
procedures involved in regularizing the workers and addressing the contractual labor issue.

3. Challenges in Compliance: The respondents also argued that the administrative machinery
required for the smooth implementation of the order was not immediately in place and that
efforts were underway to resolve the issue.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court found in favor of the Indian Airports Employees Union, agreeing that the non-
implementation of its earlier order regarding the abolition of contract labor and the regularization
of the workers' services amounted to civil contempt. The Court held that the failure to provide the
benefits directed by the Court was a clear case of disobedience of its order.

The Court emphasized that the implementation of judicial orders was crucial for the credibility of
the legal system and that delays or administrative hurdles should not be used as a pretext for
avoiding compliance with court directions.

The Court further condemned the respondents’ conduct and ordered that the benefits due to the
workers should be provided immediately. The petitioners' claims were upheld, and the workers
were entitled to regularization and other benefits as per the Court's earlier order.

Conclusion:

The Indian Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjee case highlights the importance of
judicial accountability and the need for timely implementation of court orders. It underlines that
even in complex administrative situations, the disobedience of a court order constitutes civil
contempt, and willful failure to comply can lead to legal consequences.

In this case, the Supreme Court took a firm stance against the non-implementation of its directions
and ensured that the workers' rights were protected. The judgment reinforced that justice delayed is
justice denied, and it emphasized the need for the authorities to act promptly in compliance with
judicial directions.

Ultimately, the case serves as a reminder of the Court's power to ensure the enforcement of its
orders and the responsibility of all parties involved to uphold the rule of law.

 P.K. GHOSH, I.A.S. v. J.G. RAJPUT AIR 1996 SC 513: 1995(6) SCC 744 10

Facts of the Case:

In this case, J.G. Rajput, an employee of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, filed a writ petition
(Special Civil Application No. 1497 of 1988) before the High Court of Gujarat challenging his
suspension by an order dated 14th March 1988. Initially, Rajput was represented by Shri B.J.
Shethna, a lawyer who was later elevated to the Bench of the Gujarat High Court. Following
Shethna's elevation, Shri Adil Mehta took over as Rajput’s counsel.

On 28th March 1988, the High Court granted a stay on Rajput's suspension (Annexure A).
Subsequently, a settlement was reached between Rajput and the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation, which was recorded on 28th February 1990 in the High Court, allowing Rajput to
withdraw the petition. This settlement confirmed Rajput's service in the municipal corporation,
placing him in the scale of Rs. 950-1400 and allotting him a residential quarter. The withdrawal of
the petition was done under the order of C.K. Thakkar, J. (Annexure B).

However, Rajput filed a review application on 8th April 1991 (Misc. Civil Application No. 540 of
1991) for reviewing the final order in the writ petition, claiming that the terms of settlement were
not fully complied with by the corporation. The review application came up for hearing before C.K.
Thakkar, J., who dismissed it on 2nd April 1992, concluding that the settlement terms had been
complied with by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (Annexure C).

Rajput challenged the dismissal of his review application and the enforcement of the settlement
terms.

Statutory Provisions:

1. Article 226 of the Constitution of India: Grants the High Court the power to issue writs for
the enforcement of fundamental rights and for other purposes.

2. Indian Contract Act, 1872: Governs the legality of contracts and agreements.

3. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC): Deals with the procedures related to suits, appeals, and
review of decisions.

4. Gujarat Municipal Corporation Act, 1949: Regulates the governance and operations of
municipal corporations in Gujarat, including employment-related matters.

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Issues in the Case:

1. Whether the settlement between Rajput and the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was
valid and binding.

2. Whether the High Court was correct in dismissing Rajput's review application filed in 1991.

3. Whether the terms of settlement were fully complied with by the Ahmedabad Municipal
Corporation.

4. Whether there was any breach of contract or non-fulfillment of the terms of the settlement.

Arguments of Both Sides:

Arguments by the Respondent (J.G. Rajput):

1. Non-Compliance with Settlement Terms: Rajput argued that even though the settlement
was recorded, the municipal corporation failed to fully comply with the terms of the
settlement. Specifically, he claimed that certain benefits, such as proper implementation of
the service confirmation and the allotment of the residential quarter, were not fully
provided.

2. Review of High Court's Final Order: Rajput filed a review application arguing that the final
order, which permitted him to withdraw his writ petition, was passed without giving due
consideration to the non-fulfillment of the terms of the settlement.

3. Injustice and Breach: Rajput contended that he was entitled to relief because the
corporation did not honor the settlement, and the High Court failed to adequately address
these grievances in dismissing the review petition.

Arguments by the Respondents (Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation):

1. Full Compliance with Settlement: The corporation argued that it had fully complied with the
settlement, including confirming Rajput’s service in the Rs. 950-1400 scale and allotting him
a residential quarter.

2. Settlement as Final: The corporation contended that the settlement was final, and the High
Court had properly recorded the withdrawal of the writ petition based on this settlement.
The settlement was executed in good faith and in accordance with the terms agreed upon.

3. Review Denied: The corporation defended the High Court’s decision to dismiss the review
application, arguing that no substantial ground existed for revisiting the final order.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court of India upheld the decision of the Gujarat High Court to dismiss Rajput's review
application. The Court noted that the settlement reached between Rajput and the Ahmedabad
Municipal Corporation was valid and binding and that there was no substantial ground to reopen
the matter based on the claims of non-compliance.
The Court emphasized that the terms of the settlement were adequately complied with, including
the confirmation of Rajput’s service in the designated scale and the allotment of a residential
quarter. The dismissal of the review petition was found to be in accordance with law, as the facts did
not support Rajput's allegations of non-implementation.

The Court also reinforced the principle that settlements reached between parties, especially when
recorded in a court order, should be respected unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary.
The Court further emphasized that the review jurisdiction should not be invoked merely on the
grounds of disagreement with the earlier decision.

Conclusion:

The P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput case reaffirms the importance of settlement agreements in the legal
process and emphasizes that once a settlement is entered into and recorded by the court, it is
binding on all parties involved. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of Rajput's review
application, finding no grounds for the reopening of the matter.

This case highlights the legal principle that judicial decisions, including those involving settlements,
must be respected unless there are clear violations or non-compliance with the terms agreed upon.
The Court also made it clear that the review jurisdiction cannot be used to re-litigate issues that
have already been addressed, especially in cases where compromise or settlement has been
reached.