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Quest for Identity America Since 1945 1st Edition
Randall Bennett Woods Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Randall Bennett Woods
ISBN(s): 9780521840651, 0521840651
Edition: 1
File Details: PDF, 7.96 MB
Year: 2005
Language: english
QUEST FOR IDENTITY
Quest for Identity: America Since 1945 is a survey of the American experience
from the close of World War II through the Cold War and 9/11 to the present.
It helps students understand postwar American history through a seamless
narrative punctuated with accessible analyses. Randall Bennett Woods ad-
dresses and explains the major themes that highlight the period: the Cold War,
the civil rights and women’s rights movements, and other great changes that
led to major realignments of American life. While the narrative political history
is featured, the book also fully discusses cultural matters and socioeconomic
problems. Dramatic new patterns of immigration and migration characterized
the period as much as the counterculture, the growth of television and the Inter-
net, the interstate highway system, rock and roll, and the exploration of space.
The pageantry, drama, irony, poignancy, and humor of the American journey
since World War II are all here.
Preface page xi
v
vi Contents
Index 557
Preface
The study of any period in history is in part defined by what came before
and by what came after. What makes an inquiry into postwar American
life unique and somewhat problematic is that there is no postscript, no
epilogue. Consequently, there is in such chronicles an inevitable lack of
perspective. Nevertheless, the case for writing a history of the recent past
is compelling. Students are fascinated by it; the half century since World
War II is the frame of reference for their parents and grandparents. For
many it will be the gateway to the study of history as a whole. It is the
period that, for better or worse, is most likely to inform the present and the
future. And surely, the recent era is as full of change, drama, and complexity
as any other period in human history.
Perhaps the three most obvious themes for a book on postwar Amer-
ica are the Cold War, the struggle of nonwhite Americans for their full
rights under the Constitution, and the women’s movement. The fifty-
year battle that the United States and its allies waged with the forces of
international communism affected virtually every aspect of American life.
Most obviously, it dominated foreign affairs, forcing policymakers to view
every problem through its distorting prism. The East–West confrontation
involved the United States in two hot wars, Korea and Vietnam. That latter
conflict shattered the New Deal–Fair Deal–New Frontier–Great Society re-
form coalition, marking a break in a cycle of reform-consolidation-reform
and introducing one of reaction-consolidation-reaction in domestic affairs.
Because it seemed to many Americans that only a monolith could defeat
the monolithic communist threat, the Cold War made change for women
and minorities more difficult. At the same time, because the ongoing con-
flict with the Soviet Union and Communist China continually forced the
nation to reexamine its values and identity, it actually facilitated change.
The Cold War spawned the military–industrial complex and the national
security state. And finally, it gave rise to periodic domestic witch hunts by
extremists convinced that the greatest danger to the nation’s survival was
posed not by the threat of external communist aggression but by the threat
xi
xii Preface
from World War II as the most powerful nation in the world, both economi-
cally and militarily. It controlled most of the former Japanese islands in the
Pacific, took an active role in the occupation of Germany and Japan, and by
virtue of its massive gold reserves and industrial plants was in a position
to act both as the world’s banker and its chief supplier of manufactured
goods.
Joining the neo-imperialists in pushing for an activist American role in
world affairs were Wilsonian internationalists who believed that, if only the
United States had joined the League of Nations and acted in concert with
the western democracies, fascist aggression could have been nipped in the
bud. In the spring of 1945, the United States led the way in establishing
a new collective security organization, the United Nations, whose stated
goals were the prevention of armed aggression and the promotion of pros-
perity and democracy throughout the world. Most Americans believed that
the lessons of the past had been learned and that the world would never
again have to confront a Hitler, Mussolini, or Tojo.
war on the working woman was demographic. From the beginning of the
industrial era in America, the typical working female was single, young,
and poor. But during World War II, almost 75% of those who took jobs
for the first time were married, and 60% were older than 35. Two thirds of
the women who joined the labor force during the war listed their previous
occupation as housewife, and many had preschool-age children. Margaret
Hickey, head of the Women’s Advisory Committee to the War Manpower
Commission, declared that “employers, like other individuals, are finding it
necessary to weigh old values, old institutions, in terms of a world at war.”
Prior to World War II, women had served in the Army and Navy Nurse
Corps, but they had received neither military rank nor pay in return for their
services. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, however, the War Department, at
the prodding of Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers, backed legislation
creating the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps, later changed to Women’s
Auxiliary Corps (WACS). Subsequent measures in 1942 and 1943 created
a women’s naval corps (WAVES), the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve, and
expanded versions of the nurses corps. The 350,000 women who served
in the armed services during World War II were barred from combat but
not immune to danger. The vast majority of those in uniform remained in
the United States working primarily as communications, clerical, or health
care experts. In France, Italy, and North Africa, however, Army and Navy
nurses performed their duties close to the front lines, and more than 1,000
women flew planes in a noncombat capacity.
Ironically but not surprisingly, the new woman continued to encounter
stereotyping and discriminatory treatment even in service to their country.
Virtually without exception, females were excluded from top policy-making
bodies charged with running the wartime economy. Although the National
War Labor Board endorsed the principle of equal work for equal pay in
1942, it was never enforced. In 1945 as in 1940, women workers in the
manufacturing sector made only 65% of what men earned. Although an
estimated 2 million children were in need of child care services, federal and
state governments proved extremely reluctant to provide them. The private
sector was equally recalcitrant. The notion that “a mother’s primary duty is
to her home and children” and fears over the breakup of the nuclear family
proved to be powerful inhibiting factors. Overall, the American woman’s
mass participation in the workforce did not significantly affect popular
attitudes toward sexual equality. “Legal equality . . . between the sexes is
not possible,” declared Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, “because men
and women are not identical in physical structure or social function.”
of slaves. One black man recalled being “born in poverty” in Georgia where
“white people virtually owned black people.” White farmers would not al-
low black farmers to raise tobacco, he said, “cause there’s a lot of money
in it.” Two million blacks moved out of the former Confederacy, mostly to
urban areas in the Midwest and Northeast. They were prodded by the per-
sistence of lynching, disfranchisement, and discrimination in their native
region and lured by the prospect of government and defense industry jobs.
Overall, the number of African Americans employed in industry grew from
500,000 to 1.2 million.
In 1941, black activist and labor leader A. Philip Randolph called for “ten
thousand Negroes [to] march on Washington” and “demand the right to
work and fight for our country.” He then founded the March on Washington
Movement (MOWM). Prompted by the MOWM, his wife Eleanor, and other
liberals, President Roosevelt at least paid lip service to equal rights. In
1941, he established the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC)
and encouraged African Americans to seek redress of their grievances in
court. But as was true of women and other groups, the black experience
was a case of small progress in the midst of mass discrimination. Most
national trade unions excluded blacks from membership. The FEPC had
only “persuasive” powers, and these were generally ignored. Despite some
improvement in job opportunities, most openings were at low levels, with
blacks hired primarily as laborers, janitors, and cleaning women. Although
African Americans enlisted at a rate 60% higher than their proportion of the
population, they encountered discrimination at every turn in the military.
Segregation was still the official policy in the armed forces, and blacks had
to struggle to persuade the Army and Air Force to allow them entry into
combat units.
Yet, the war unquestionably brought about new opportunities and new
freedoms for African Americans. The Army agreed to train black pilots,
and some integration took place on an experimental basis. Thousands of
African American servicemen experienced life without prejudice during
their overseas tours of duty. Despite the fact that the multitudes of south-
ern blacks who moved north to find positions in munitions industries found
themselves living in squalid ghettos, they also enjoyed greater psycholog-
ical and political freedom than they had in the South. Northern political
machines sought their votes and granted favors in return. The very acts
of physical mobility and enlistment contributed to a sense of control and
generated a rising level of expectation. In the face of continuing oppres-
sion and even violence – the worst example of which was the Detroit race
riot of 1943 – black protest mounted. During the war, membership in the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) in-
creased nine-fold to more than 450,000 individuals. Black newspapers took
up the cry for a “Double V” campaign – victory at home as well as victory
abroad. But the growing activism among African Americans, coupled with
The Republic in Transition 7
1.3%
10.6% 3.8%
13.4%
11.0%
14.8%
68.0%
77.0%
South
North Central
1940 1950
Northeast
5.8% 7.5%
West
16.0%
19.2%
1960 1970
Figure 1–1. Regional distribution of the black population, 1940–1970.
of the Pendergast political machine, which dominated Kansas City and its
environs, Truman was elected a county judge, rising to the post of presiding
judge in 1926.
Again with machine support, Truman captured the Democratic nomi-
nation for the U.S. Senate in 1934 and won easily in the Democratic land-
slide of that year. He was, however, received coldly by the nation’s politi-
cal elite. The Washington, D.C., press referred to Harry Truman derisively
as “the gentleman from Pendergast.” He was, according to one Roosevelt
aide, a “small-bore politician of county courthouse caliber.” It seemed that
Truman’s career had come to an end when, in 1939, Big Tom Pendergast
was sentenced to federal prison for income tax evasion. Valuing personal
loyalty above all else, Truman refused to distance himself from his discred-
ited benefactor. In 1940, the Roosevelt administration threw its support
behind one of Truman’s rivals in the senatorial primary. Incredibly, without
either White House or machine support, Truman won reelection in 1940.
Stumping in every city and village in Missouri, he put together a coali-
tion of farmers, blue-collar workers, and ethnic voters, including African
Americans. Because of Truman’s toughness, his unwavering support for the
New Deal, and his work during World War II as chair of a Senate Commit-
tee supervising the awarding of government contracts, President Roosevelt
selected the Missourian to be his running mate in 1944.
As he readily admitted, Harry Truman came to the highest office in the
land ill equipped for his new job. The vice presidency, he declared, had
turned him into a “political eunuch.” He was somewhat undereducated
and had no experience in foreign affairs. Roosevelt had compounded the
problem by shutting his vice president out of crucial policy deliberations
during the first months of 1945. Uninitiated at the outset, Truman tended
toward the view that great power relationships were analogous to Kansas
City politics. Dean Acheson complained that the new president favored
action over contemplation and wanted to simplify the complex. He some-
times seemed “to think only in primary colors,” as Fred Siegel has written.
In fact, Truman deliberately cultivated the image of a no-nonsense, tough-
minded man of action. Aphorisms such as “The Buck Stops Here” and
“If You Can’t Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Kitchen” adorned his office.
That aura of decisiveness masked a deep-seated insecurity. One part of
Harry Truman was convinced that in education, experience, and intelli-
gence he was unprepared to be president. Another part believed that if a
man of the people could not do the job there was something fundamentally
wrong with the system. Unfortunately, the new president’s overvaluation
of personal loyalty made him prone to cronyism. Indeed, Truman replaced
much of Roosevelt’s cabinet with personal friends, a practice that infuriated
many members of the old administration. After his resignation as secretary
of the interior, Harold Ickes retorted, “I am against government by crony.”
The Republic in Transition 9
Future social analysts would give the name “baby-boom generation” to this
bubble in the demographic curve.
Matured by the war, young Americans in the latter part of the 1940s
were serious and focused beyond their years. Veterans returning to col-
lege under the GI Bill of Rights were in a hurry; they rushed through
the curriculum to begin raising families and making livings. They were
more security conscious than the previous generation, a tendency that had
as much to do with the Great Depression as World War II. These young
men and women shunned risk and preferred to work for large corpora-
tions rather than opening their own businesses. “Security had become the
big goal,” declared Fortune magazine. “[They] want to work for somebody
else . . . preferably somebody big.” The pessimism and quest for security
bred by depression and war were partially counterbalanced by optimism
spawned by technology. In a brief five-year span from 1945 to 1950, Amer-
ican engineers and scientists gave consumers the automatic car transmis-
sion, the long-playing record, the electric clothes dryer, and the automatic
garbage-disposal unit. With the lifting of controls, families were able to
buy refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, electric ranges, and freezers stocked
with frozen foods at unprecedented rates. One of the most important, but
least noticed, breakthroughs came in 1945 when the American Gas Associ-
ation persuaded manufacturers to standardize the size of kitchen cabinets
and appliances. The counter workspace would extend 36 inches from the
floor and 25 1/4 inches from the wall with a “toe cove” to prevent stub-
bing. No longer would housewives have to cope with unsightly gaps and
bumps, and they could buy new items without having to remodel their
entire kitchens.
Crisis in Housing
The preoccupation of returning veterans and the Truman administration
was the massive housing shortage. The crisis began in December of 1945,
when the first of thousands of returning veterans reached the United States.
Because of the depression and the war, there had not been a good year
for new housing starts since 1929. Pollster Elmo Roper estimated that al-
most 19% of all American families were doubled up and 19% were looking
for housing. Another 13% would have been in the hunt, he estimated, if
prospects had not been so dim. Over the next decade, Americans would
require 16 million new homes, Life magazine estimated. To deal with the
problem, Truman named former Louisville mayor Wilson Wyatt to be fed-
eral housing expediter. Wyatt set a production target of 1.2 million units
for 1947, but starts fell well below that number. Building materials contin-
ued to be in short supply, and the housing industry, burdened by outdated
building codes, archaic technology, and lack of capital, could not keep up
with demand. For a time, industry leaders even opposed federal subsidies
on the grounds that they would lead to “socialized housing.” Those units
The Republic in Transition 11
that were built, even the ghastly prefabricated variety, were too expensive.
Fortune magazine estimated that veterans would have to earn $58 per week
to afford the average new house, but the average weekly wage was only
$46 per week.
The problem was eventually solved by a private–public sector partner-
ship. Traditionally, banks and other lenders had followed a very tight mort-
gage policy, demanding as much as 50% of the total cost of a dwelling as a
down payment and allowing no more than 10 years for the note to be paid
off. Following the war, however, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
began insuring housing loans for up to 30 years and requiring only 5% to
10% as a down payment. Reassured by government guarantees of repay-
ment, private lenders eased mortgage terms, bringing them in line with the
guidelines set by the FHA. As a result, by 1950, the housing industry had not
only revived but had also become one of the primary engines of the flour-
ishing national economy. New home construction jumped from 117,000 in
1944 to 1.7 million in 1950. The keys to recovery were the healthy avarice of
the American entrepreneur and 30-year mortgages at 4.5% interest made
available through the FHA and the Veterans Administration (VA).
The needs of returning veterans meshed with a consolidation movement
among construction firms to produce not only a boom in the housing in-
dustry but also a new phenomenon in American residential life – suburbia.
In 1946, construction tycoon William Levitt began work on a revolutionary
project that would change the way Americans lived. Building on his experi-
ence as a maker of prefabricated housing for the Navy during World War II,
Levitt purchased a 1,200-acre tract of flat, open land on Long Island, New
York. Within just a few months, his workers had built 10,000 inexpen-
sive, separate standing, individual family homes. Levitt transferred the
assembly-line techniques pioneered by Henry Ford in the auto industry
to the housing business. Teams of semiskilled workers went up one street
and down the other laying concrete foundations. They were followed by car-
penters, spray painters, and roofers. Levitt purchased appliances en masse
and cut costs by using linoleum instead of hardwood floors. To the aston-
ishment of the construction industry, nearly all of the homes in Levittown,
as the project came to be known, sold within days. Total cost ranged from
$7,000 to $10,000; veterans could get into one of Levitt’s inventions and
pay as little as $56 per month. The developer moved on to establish even
larger communities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
Suburbia was based on an irony. Although developments required the
felling of trees and pouring of concrete, those who moved out of the city
were self-consciously moving to “the country” to enjoy the pleasures of
an idyllic pastoral existence. Hence, the names of eastern developments:
Stonybrook, Crystal Stream, and Robin Meadows. In fact, suburban hous-
ing was dreadfully uniform and monotonous. Floor plans varied little, the
lots were small and either square or rectangular, and the neighborhoods
12 Quest for Identity: America Since 1945
generally treeless and flat. One popular song described suburban dwellings
as “little boxes made of ticky-tacky.” Lewis Mumford, author of The City
in History, declared the move to suburbia was doing more to destroy the
western city than all the strategic bombing of World War II. Instead of the
rich, varied culture of ethnic neighborhoods, Americans were opting for a
lifestyle in which everybody barbecued, played bridge, mowed their lawns,
watched television, and wore the same clothes.
There is no doubt, however, that suburban developments filled a need.
the New York Times architecture critic Paul Goldberger chided the whole
concept as an “urban planning disaster,” but admitted that “Levittown
houses turned the detached, single-family house from a distant dream to a
real possibility for thousands of middle-class American families.”
Undoubtedly, suburbia contributed to racial polarization in America and
the impoverishment of its inner cities. Major population centers lost in-
habitants after the war. As white upwardly mobile families moved to the
suburbs, they were replaced by African Americans, Puerto Ricans in the
East and Midwest, and immigrants from Mexico and Central America in
the West. The outflow of well-to-do whites and businesses that catered to
them cut the tax base of the inner city, leading to a decline in housing and
public services. Racism prevented middle-class blacks and Hispanics from
moving into the white doughnuts that surrounded America’s urban cen-
ters. “We can solve a housing problem, or we can solve a racial problem,”
declared William Levitt, “but we cannot combine the two.” In fact, Levitt’s
houses came with closed covenants that limited purchasers to members of
“the Caucasian race.”
Meanwhile, organized labor, which tended to favor price but not wage
controls, set out not only to increase their portion of the economic pie,
but also to transform the face of American capitalism. Labor leaders were
convinced that workers had not shared equitably in wartime prosperity.
Concerned about the return of the 40-hour week, with the accompanying
loss of overtime, and by the prospect of an end to the OPA and ensuing
runaway inflation, union leaders set about getting everything they could
for their members. During the winter of 1945/1946, the nation was racked
by strikes in the electrical, automobile, steel, and meat-packing industries.
Angry and frustrated by these work stoppages, Truman asked Congress for
legislation giving him the authority to declare an emergency and assume
direct control over any industry he might deem vital to the national in-
terest, to order all workers back on the job, to subject any resisting labor
leader to fine and/or imprisonment, to set wages and prices, and to draft
anyone refusing to work into the military. “Let’s put transportation and pro-
duction back to work, hang a few traitors and make our country safe for
democracy,” he wrote in an unused draft of his speech to Congress. United
Autoworker head Walter Reuther proclaimed that the proposal “would
make slavery legal” and organized labor pressured Congress into rebuffing
the White House. Denied a legislative remedy, the Truman administration
intervened and mediated a series of settlements in which labor achieved
approximately two thirds of its wage demands and made substantial gains
in fringe benefits. Management agreed to these concessions with the tacit
understanding that they could pass the costs on to consumers.
No sooner had this crisis been averted than the nation faced in the spring
of 1946 another series of potentially paralyzing strikes from the railway
brotherhoods and the coal miners. John L. Lewis, the burly, beetle-browed
leader of the United Mine Workers, led his men out of the pits on April 1.
Genuinely popular with the workers, Lewis told them, “I have pleaded
your case not in the quavering tones of a mendicant asking alms, but in
the thundering voice of the captain of a mighty host, demanding the rights
to which free men are entitled.” The strike by the 400,000 mine workers
threatened to bring every steam-driven apparatus in America from heaters
to locomotives to a halt. The walkout seemed to threaten not only the do-
mestic economy but also European recovery. Citizens began hoarding fuel
and food, while the Truman administration warned that hundreds of thou-
sands of Europeans would starve if vital grain and meat shipments were
delayed. Management refused to negotiate, whereupon Truman seized the
mines. After 59 days, the president brokered an agreement in which the
miners received a $1.85-per-day raise and owners agreed to finance a re-
tirement and welfare system. Then, in the midst of the coal strike, the
railroad brotherhoods called a nationwide walkout. Under the provisions
of the Smith–Connally Labor Disputes Act, the president had the power to
14 Quest for Identity: America Since 1945
seize strikebound plants that were crucial to the war effort. Although his
move was of dubious legality, the president invoked this measure and took
over the roads, whereupon all the brotherhoods except the Locomotive
Engineers and Railroad Trainmen agreed to a compromise settlement.
When Truman threatened to go before Congress and seek legislation further
restricting the right to strike of workers in occupations vital to the national
interest, they too gave in. The strikers remembered that the House and
Senate had rebuffed the president in late 1945, but opinion polls showed
that Truman’s disciplining of Lewis was immensely popular with the public
and that antiunion sentiment was building across the United States.
national origin, from American life.” The president’s February 1948 mes-
sage urged Congress to convert the committee’s recommendations into law.
In the first special civil rights message by a president, Truman depicted
an America where “not all groups are free to live and work where they
please or to improve their conditions of life by their own efforts.” The pres-
ident called specifically for a federal law to combat “the crime of lynching,
against which I cannot speak too strongly.” As he anticipated, it failed to
respond. On July 26,1948, through executive order, the president banned
racial discrimination in federal hiring and four days later ordered an end
to segregation in the armed forces.
Perhaps the most significant development in race relations in the United
States during the immediate postwar period was the integration of major
league baseball. The wave of racism that swept the United States in the
1890s and that led to the disfranchisement and segregation of African Amer-
icans affected the national pastime. Blacks were barred from established
professional organizations and relegated to teams in the Negro League,
some of which were owned by the proprietors of major league clubs. In
spite of the fact that black athletes such as Satchel Paige possessed talents
equal or superior to their white counterparts, they were forced to labor in
relative obscurity.
During World War II, black activists pushed for the integration of
baseball. One who responded was Branch Rickey, owner of the Brooklyn
Dodgers. In 1945, he decided that the time had come to break the racial
barrier in the nation’s national pastime. The man he handpicked to do the
job was a remarkable person named Jack Roosevelt Robinson. The child
of southern sharecroppers who emigrated to California, Jackie Robinson
attended UCLA where he starred in a number of sports. His college creden-
tials helped him land a commission in the military during the war. To break
the color barrier in baseball, Rickey wanted a person with the courage to
challenge segregation and with the poise to withstand the abuse that would
surely accompany that challenge. He was impressed by the fact that Robin-
son had confronted and overcome efforts to segregate him while he was in
the military.
In 1946, Robinson was assigned to the Dodgers’ top farm team in Mon-
treal where he proceeded to lead the league in hitting. In April 1947, he
made his debut in Brooklyn. He was generally well received in New York,
particularly after hometown fans saw what he could do with the bat and
glove. On the road, however, he was subjected to verbal and even physi-
cal abuse from racist fans. The Saint Louis Cardinals, the major league’s
southernmost team at that time, even threatened to forfeit rather that take
the field with a “Negro.” However, the black star persevered. Just after he
was picked up by the Dodgers, the press had questioned Robinson on what
his future career might prove. He responded, “It proves, or at least it in-
dicates to me, that once the ice is broken and the idea accepted, the thing
20 Quest for Identity: America Since 1945
as spies because they were closely scrutinized by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI), which had thoroughly penetrated the organization. Nev-
ertheless, Americans recoiled from Marxism-Leninism, which they equated
with Soviet communism. It was godless, authoritarian, repressive, aggres-
sive, and socialistic. This long-standing ideological aversion, coupled with
the military might of the Soviet Union and the superpatriotism spawned
by the war, made Americans susceptible to anticommunist hysteria.
The principal instrument available to those who wanted to promote
and profit from a campaign against communist subversion was the House
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Established originally to com-
bat fascism, the committee was given permanent status and broad pow-
ers to investigate domestic subversion in 1945. The legislation converting
HUAC to a standing committee was the work of Representative John E.
Rankin (D-Mississippi), who had denounced the decision by the Red Cross
not to label blood according to race as a communist plot and who had ac-
cused “enemies of Christianity” – in particular, Jews – of attempting to take
over the national media. Liberals protested. The Nation denounced HUAC
and pleaded that “the only way to save the country from the indignity
of these repeated witch-hunts is to abolish the committee.” But nativism,
nourished by the burgeoning East–West confrontation, proved too strong.
In 1947, following the Republican victory in the midterm congressional
elections, Representative J. Parnell Thomas (R-New Jersey) became chair
of HUAC. No sooner had he taken up the gavel than he announced the
existence of a conspiracy to overthrow the government, a conspiracy cen-
tered in Hollywood. As historian Walter Goodman put it: “[T]o Rankin,
Hollywood was Semitic territory. To Thomas it was New Deal Territory. To
the entire Committee it was a veritable sun around which the press wor-
shipfully rotated. And it was also a place where real live Communists could
readily be found.”
Judging from the products that the motion picture industry turned out,
it was a hotbed of red-blooded Americanism. It had enthusiastically coop-
erated with the government in producing wartime propaganda films such
as Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo. Only three releases, including the absurdly
flawed Mission To Moscow, could have been interpreted as pro-Soviet. But,
as Goodman pointed out, there were communists in Hollywood, principally
among members of the Screen Actors Guild. Scriptwriters were mercilessly
exploited by ruthless studio heads such as Sam Goldwyn and Jack Warner.
They had no control over their scripts, which producers cut and spliced to
suit their whim, and they were paid a pittance.
On October 20, 1947, HUAC began hearing testimony from “friendly
witnesses” encouraged by Goldwyn and Warner to cooperate with the com-
mittee. Actor Gary Cooper denounced communism for “not being on the
level.” Others, including Adolph Menjou, declared that Hollywood was rid-
dled with reds and fellow travelers. These anticommunists were followed
22 Quest for Identity: America Since 1945
by 10 writers and directors, including Ring Lardner, Jr., and John Howard
Lawson, who were or had been members of the CPUS. Upon the advice of
their lawyers, they decided to seek refuge in the First Amendment, which
guaranteed freedom of speech and political association rather than the
Fifth Amendment, which protected citizens from giving self-incriminating
evidence. Several were defiant, unrepentant, and abusive in their testimony.
The Hollywood Ten were convicted of contempt of Congress and, after the
Supreme Court upheld their convictions, sentenced to one year in prison.
HUAC’s investigation completely intimidated the motion picture indus-
try. Following the hearings, the heads of all major studios pledged not to
hire communists or communist sympathizers. The industry created an un-
official blacklist and dozens of writers, directors, and actors were barred
forever from practicing their trade in the United States. Refusing to cooper-
ate in Congress’s investigation or being mentioned in another’s testimony
was frequently enough to earn a writer, actor, or director a place on the
blacklist. Soon the witch-hunt spread to New York City, where it contami-
nated the burgeoning television industry. After refusing to cooperate with
HUAC, actor Zero Mostel said, “I am a man of a thousand faces, all of them
blacklisted.”
While red-baiters in Congress were laboring to rid the entertainment
industry of subversive influences, the courts were moving against the CPUS
itself. In July 1948, a federal grand jury indicted Gus Hall, Eugene Dennis,
and 10 other party officials on charges of violating the Smith Act. Passed
in 1940 and then directed primarily against fascists, the Smith Act made
it a federal crime to conspire to overthrow the government or to belong
to a group advocating its overthrow. The trial, which began in January
1949, quickly degenerated into a shouting match between the defendants
and the prosecution. Hall, Dennis, and their lawyers argued that the court
had no right to try them because the jury excluded racial minorities and
poor people. In the fall, Judge Harold Medina sentenced not only the CPUS
officials to prison for violating the Smith Act, but also their lawyers for not
curbing their courtroom outbursts.
In a landmark civil liberties decision, in 1951, the Supreme Court upheld
the conviction of the Communist party officials. Writing for the majority
in Dennis v. United States, Chief Justice Fred Vinson ruled that citizens
of the United States had no right to advocate violent rebellion when av-
enues for peaceful change were open to them. Justices Hugo Black and
William O. Douglas argued in vain that the CPUS did not advocate force-
ful overthrow of the federal authority. Determined to leave no room for
doubt, Congress in 1950 passed the McCarran or Internal Security Act. That
measure proclaimed the existence of an international communist conspir-
acy, which posed an immediate threat to the United States. Members of
communist-affiliated organizations were required to register with the fed-
eral government or face a fine of up to $10,000 and imprisonment for up
to four years. Registrees could be denied passports and were barred from
The Republic in Transition 23
holding jobs with the federal government or in the defense industry. The
McCarran Act authorized the government to deport naturalized citizens
and alleged subversives during periods of national emergency. President
Truman denounced the McCarran Act as a gross violation of civil liberties
and vetoed it. “In a free country we punish men for the crimes they com-
mit,” Truman charged, “but never for the opinions they have.” Congress
promptly overrode his veto in 1951.
In an effort to safeguard the “purity” of American culture and society,
nativists attempted to maintain and even strengthen the nation’s already
rigorous immigration statutes. They were only partially successful, how-
ever, because the war had caused tens of thousands of American service
people to become intertwined with peoples of other cultures. That inter-
mingling, in turn, had created a refugee problem of horrific proportions.
In 1946, Congress passed the War Brides Act, which over the next four
years opened America’s doors to some 100,000 wives and children of U.S.
veterans. Congress was more divided about the 1 million displaced people
living in squalid refugee camps in Europe.
World War II had ripped the fabric of European society, uprooting mil-
lions of French, Dutch, Belgians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, and
Russians from their homes. Many died, many others were able to return
home, and others simply had no place to go. As of 1946, Allied occupation
authorities in Western Europe operated squalid camps that housed Poles,
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians who had fled in the wake of Soviet
occupation; Russians who did not want to return home to imprisonment
or death; Germans expelled from Eastern Europe; and some 200,000 Jews,
many of them survivors of Nazi death camps. In an effort to relieve the
suffering of these victims of Nazi and Soviet persecution, Congress in 1948
passed the Displaced Persons Act, which increased immigration quotas by
2,000. Anti-Semites in Congress added restrictive language intended to bar
Jewish immigration. A defiant President Truman ordered immigration and
naturalization agents to bend the rules as far as possible, but the result
was negligible. By the time Congress got around to passing a more liberal
displaced persons measure in 1950, a majority of the death camp survivors
had immigrated to Israel. Relatively few of the 400,000 people who came
to America under the displaced persons legislation were Jewish. In 1952,
Congress passed the McCarran–Walter Act, which restored the restrictive
provisions of the 1920s immigration legislation, including a quota of 100
for each Pacific and Asian nation.
but many of the rank and file feared that his dour, humorless personality
would turn off voters. The eastern wing of the party, moderately progres-
sive in domestic affairs and internationalist in foreign policy, struggled to
develop an alternative. They approached the immensely popular Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the hero of the Normandy invasion then serving as president
of Columbia University, but he had not yet decided whether he was a Re-
publican or a Democrat. Although Thomas E. Dewey had lost to Franklin
Roosevelt in 1940, anti-Taftites decided that he deserved another chance.
His progressive record as governor of New York and his advocacy of
military alliances and foreign aid seemed to put him in the political main-
stream, while his attractive appearance and sophistication seemed to make
him the perfect alternative to Truman. The Republican convention nomi-
nated Dewey on the first ballot and chose California governor Earl Warren
as his running mate. The platform endorsed most New Deal reforms as well
as the bipartisan foreign policy the Truman administration was then im-
plementing. Like Alfred M. Landon, the Republican presidential candidate
in 1936, Dewey just promised to run things more efficiently.
Meanwhile, internecine warfare was wrecking the Democratic Party. The
chief rebel in the field was former vice president and secretary of com-
merce, Henry A. Wallace. During World War II, Wallace had become the
preeminent champion of social justice within the Democratic Party. He had
declared that the era following the end of hostilities would be “the century
of the common man.” No longer would government be dominated by polit-
ical and economic elites. Democracy and equality of opportunity would at
long last become realities and, as a result, the good life would come within
the reach of everyone. Falling out with the Truman administration over its
efforts to discipline organized labor and to resist the spread of communism
in Europe, Wallace organized the Progressive Citizens of America in 1947
and worked to rally former New Dealers to his banner.
As the date for the Democratic National Convention approached, lib-
erals struggled to choose between Wallace and Truman. In the end, labor
leaders and former New Dealers decided they could not embrace the Pro-
gressive Party. Many agreed with Wallace’s call for nationalization of basic
industries and full and immediate civil rights for African Americans, but
they could not tolerate his stand on foreign policy. Wallace’s 1946 Madison
Square Garden speech, in which he had called for free trade with Eastern
Europe and accommodation with the Soviet Union, had convinced many
hard-line anticommunists within the Democratic Party that he could not be
trusted. Indeed, Cold War liberals had formed their own organization, the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), to fight for social justice at home
and freedom and democracy abroad. This organization included social
justice advocates such as Eleanor Roosevelt, intellectuals such as Reinhold
Niebuhr and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and labor leaders like CIO chief Walter
Reuther. After briefly casting about for an alternative to the unpopular
The Republic in Transition 25
Wallace. The principal problem with this strategy, as it turned out, was the
fidelity of the South.
Alienated southerners met in Birmingham, Alabama, “the cradle of the
Confederacy,” on July 17, waved the stars and bars, consumed immense
amounts of bourbon and branch water, paid homage to John C. Calhoun,
and formed the States’ Rights Democratic Party, subsequently labeled “Dix-
iecrats” by the press. The new party pledged to do whatever was necessary
to preserve the South’s “unique” social system and nominated Governor
J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina for the presidency and Governor
Fielding L. Wright of Mississippi for the vice presidency. The Dixiecrats
hoped to capture enough electoral votes to deny either of the major parties
an electoral college victory, thus throwing the election into the House of
Representatives where, they hoped, they would be the deciding factor.
Republican confidence mounted as the left and right wings of the Demo-
cratic Party pummeled the center. Governor Dewey conducted a mild and
dignified campaign, avoiding controversy whenever possible. Disgusted
with the GOP candidate’s blandness, the Louisville Courier-Journal ob-
served that Dewey’s four major speeches could be condensed into four
“historic” sentences: “Agriculture is important. Our rivers are full of fish.
You cannot have freedom without liberty. The future lies ahead.” As his
campaign began, Harry Truman was one of the few people in the United
States in 1948 who believed that he could win. He set out on a 31,000-mile
whistle stop campaign, during which he discarded his prepared speeches –
he tended to deliver set-pieces in a rather wooden fashion – and employed
instead short, fiery, off-the-cuff talks in which he invariably castigated the
“do-nothing” Eightieth Congress. “Give ‘em hell Harry” became the first
presidential candidate to campaign in Harlem. Meanwhile, Clifford, Hu-
bert Humphrey, and various ADA members did their best to link Henry
Wallace with communism. He obligingly played into their hands by re-
fusing to criticize Stalin and the Soviet Union, attacking Democrats who
had supported the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, and refusing to
repudiate the Communist Party of the United States (CPUS) when it of-
fered to aid his candidacy. Late in the campaign, conservative journal-
ists, picking up on the alleged mystical strain in Wallace’s personality,
asked the independent candidate if he were not the author of the so-called
“guru letters,” correspondence between Wallace and a Russian theosophist
that were filled with references to the occult and referred to Franklin D.
Roosevelt as “The Flaming One.” When Wallace refused to deny authorship,
he became something of a laughingstock.
On election eve, all observers picked Dewey to win; the Chicago Tribune
went so far as to print extras with a banner headline proclaiming “Dewey
Defeats Truman.” In one of the most stunning political upsets in Ameri-
can history, Truman captured 303 electoral votes to Dewey’s 189. He gar-
nered 24 million popular votes to his Republican challenger’s 22 million.
The Republic in Transition 27
8 4
4
11
5
4 12 3
6 4 4
3 19 47 16
10
6
35 4
28 13 25 8
3 4 16
6 8 15 8
11 11 3
25 1 11 8
10 14
9
4 4 8
9 11 12
10
23
1 8
11 Divided
Democratic
303 24,105,812 49.5%
Harry S. Truman
Republican
189 21,970,065 45.1%
Thomas E. Dewey
States’ Rights
39 1,169,063 2.4%
Strom Thurmond
Wallace and Thurmond trailed far behind with 1 million each. The Dix-
iecrats captured the electoral votes of Mississippi, Alabama, South Car-
olina, and Louisiana, but their total fell far short of the number needed to
throw the election into the House. The revolt of right and left had actually
worked to Truman’s advantage. The Dixiecrat rebellion reassured black vot-
ers who had questioned the Democrat’s commitment to civil rights, while
the existence of the Progressive Party made it difficult to accuse Truman of
being “soft on communism.” The Republicans were bitter and frustrated;
never again, they swore, would they wage a “metoo” campaign.
Truman’s Fair Deal included an increase in the minimum wage from $0.40
to $0.75 per hour, an extension of Social Security benefits, repeal of Taft–
Hartley, a federal health insurance plan, civil rights legislation, federal
funds for the construction of low-cost housing, and a guaranteed income
for farmers. Although the president was fresh from a stunning victory and
could count on Democratic majorities, a number of factors cast long shad-
ows on the prospects for enactment of his program. Southern Democrats
were alienated from the party leadership and were much more likely to
cooperate with Taft and the Republicans on domestic legislation than
the White House. Harry Truman lacked the political skills of his illus-
trious predecessor. Perhaps most importantly, despite pockets of poverty,
Americans were enjoying an unparalleled period of prosperity. The depriva-
tion and social insecurity that had fueled the New Deal were almost entirely
lacking in 1948 and 1949. Finally, Congress and the public were increas-
ingly distracted by Cold War crises abroad and the search for communist
subversives at home.
The administration’s campaign to repeal Taft–Hartley quickly stalled,
primarily because the White House, fearful of losing union support, was un-
willing to accept a compromise bill. One of the few areas in which Truman
and Taft saw eye to eye was federal aid to education, but even their power-
ful alliance was not enough to overcome the conflict between Protestants
and Catholics over whether aid should be extended to private, parochial
schools as well as to public institutions. A $300 million bill that would have
made direct grants to the states for the support of public education died in
the House. The administration’s health insurance plan called for prepaid
medical, dental, and hospital care to be funded through payroll deductions,
employer contributions, and federal subsidies. As in 1945, the American
Medical Association (AMA) chose to view the plan as a conspiracy to limit
doctors’ incomes and their freedom of action. It denounced Truman’s health
care scheme as “socialized medicine” and launched a multimillion dol-
lar lobbying campaign. Congress once again succumbed to AMA pressure
and, as a result, one of the principal goals of the social justice movement
remained unfulfilled.
In April 1949, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan presented
the administration’s farm security plan to Congress. With the goal of main-
taining a minimum income for American farm families, the Brannan plan
would keep high, fixed subsidies for basic commodities in place. For other
perishable products, the Agriculture Department would make up the differ-
ence between the market price and what it deemed a fair price. Opponents,
including the major farm organizations, criticized the quota provisions of
the program, and charged that it would regiment and “socialize” Amer-
ican farming. Even small farmers were concerned because the adminis-
tration’s approach would abandon the concept of “parity,” the practice of
The Republic in Transition 29
using the relatively prosperous period from 1909 to 1914 to measure farm
supports. Similar to the administration’s health care scheme, the Brannan
Plan died aborning. The only things that prevented a major farm reces-
sion in the late 1940s were huge demands for food and fiber created by
the Marshall Plan and the Korean War. The administration’s plans for a
Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) with the power to penalize
job discrimination in both the public and the private sectors foundered
on the opposition of former Dixiecrats who referred to the proposed new
employment commission as a “Democratic version of Reconstruction.”
Relying on Senate Rule XXII, which required a two thirds vote to shut
off debate, the Upper House filibustered FEPC bills to death in 1949 and
1950.
The second Truman administration achieved some isolated victories.
The National Housing Act of 1949, passed in July with the help of Senator
Taft, provided funds for slum clearance and for the construction of 810,000
units of low-cost housing. Although it rejected the administration’s health
care program, Congress approved the Hill–Burton Act, which made federal
matching grants available to the states for the construction of nonprofit
clinics and hospitals. In August 1950, Congress expanded the Social Se-
curity Act, raising benefits and bringing more than 10 million additional
people under its umbrella.
Virtually nothing of significance was accomplished on the home front
from 1950 to 1952. The conservative coalition continued to hold the bal-
ance of power in Congress, and the persistence of prosperity eliminated the
economic impetus for social justice. The very poor – blacks, Hispanics, and
whites – tended to be disfranchised through law, custom, or apathy. In ad-
dition, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 diverted the nation’s
attention and resources away from domestic reform. Finally, the Truman
administration was buffeted by charges of corruption and cronyism
throughout the second half of its second term in office. Fueled by Repub-
lican partisanship and the disgust of members of Truman’s own party, the
anticorruption campaign blossomed as congressional committee after con-
gressional committee investigated wrongdoing in high places. Although
Truman was never personally implicated in “the mess in Washington,”
many of his closest associates were. Congressional investigators uncov-
ered a nest of “five percenters” – individuals who sold actual or pretended
influence to would-be government contractors. A committee headed by
Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright revealed that officials of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation regularly granted or obtained loans for fi-
nancially shaky business concerns and then quit and went to work for those
same firms at lucrative salaries. Truman, as usual, stuck by his friends. One
Gallup poll conducted in the midst of the scandals gave the president a pal-
try 23% approval rating.
30 Quest for Identity: America Since 1945
Summary
The years immediately following World War II were ones of recovery, con-
solidation, prosperity, and limited social progress. Victory over the Axis
powers drew the United States together, instilled an unparalleled sense of
confidence, and fostered a desire to enjoy the fruits of victory. But a return
to normality meant different things to different people. The successful and
upwardly mobile wanted to return to the old ways. Because prosperity bred
by the war continued throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, and hun-
dreds of thousands of former working-class Americans were able to move
into the middle class, this meant that a majority of Americans were conser-
vative, committed to the status quo. For others – some women, minorities,
unorganized industrial workers, and sharecroppers – the good life meant
change. African Americans and Hispanics acted individually and collec-
tively to enter the mainstream economically and politically. Although they
made some gains, they were largely frustrated by the white power struc-
ture. These rising, disappointed expectations created pent-up energy that
would burst forth during the 1950s and 1960s. The same was true of those
women who sought careers outside the home or for those who simply de-
sired a choice, a choice as to whether to be a mother and housewife, to
have a career, or to have both; to have sex on their own terms; or to bear
unwanted children.
The GI generation that emerged from World War II was upwardly mo-
bile but generally conservative. Some 2 million Americans were educated
under the GI bill, leading to the greater democratization of higher edu-
cation and of American society in general. Young men and women who
entered the professional work force were interested in security, not risk
taking – an attitude that dovetailed not coincidentally with unprecedented
growth and consolidation in the corporate world. Young people married
earlier and at a higher rate. They also had more children. The resulting
baby boom laid the basis for the consumerism and youth culture of the
1950s and 1960s. Increasingly affluent, educated whites moved to subur-
bia leaving much of urban America inhabited by the chronically poor and
disadvantaged.
Politically, the post–World War II years were ones of consolidation
and modest advance. Republicans and Democrats were committed to the
preservation of the basic New Deal structure and, as a result, the federal
government continued to play a large role in the economic and social life of
the United States. Harry Truman pressed for extension of Social Security
and other New Deal programs as well as the establishment of new initia-
tives in agriculture, housing, education, medical insurance, and civil rights.
However, he was generally contained by the conservative coalition, a com-
bination of Republicans and southern Democrats that dominated Congress
during these years. Although periodically reviled during his nearly eight
years of office, Truman remained president and was able to lead the nation
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
Bullet in brain: Crises; cortical blindness; vertigo;
hallucinations.
Chart 6
(LHERMITTE)
A soldier wounded May 18, 1916, was given antitetanic serum May
26th. The wounds healed, but on June 16, that is, 29 days after the
trauma, contractures began, at first localized. There had been
numerous wounds of legs and scrotum by shell fragments and the
contractures were limited to the right leg and scrotum. There was no
trismus or any lumbar symptom.
During the next few days the contractures became general, the
temperature rose, a shell fragment was found by X-ray at the root of
the thigh and was surgically extracted. B. tetani was found upon
inoculation of media with material from the shell fragment.
Persulphide of soda and antitetanic serum 90 cc. in three days were
given intravenously. The temperature fell and the general health was
greatly improved. July 6, hallucinations and terrors, worse at night,
set in. The man believed himself surrounded by flames, that daggers
were being plunged into his old wounds, that his hair was being
pulled. These symptoms lasted a fortnight only, whereupon the
patient recovered.
This case and six others accompanied by cerebral disturbances all
recovered, and all the patients retained a perfect memory of their
delirium and of their hallucinations.
The chronological distribution of these cases was odd. One case
was found early in the war; then no other cases of cerebral disorder
presented themselves until the group observed at the end of 1916.
Besides flames and daggers, zoöpsia was several times observed.
One of the cases showed these symptoms without having been
given antitetanic serum.
Re tetanus in the war, see in the Collection Horizon a book by
Courtois-Suffit and Giroux on Les formes anormales du tétanos.
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