Nazi Rise To Power Compared To Maga Musk Trump Alliance
Nazi Rise To Power Compared To Maga Musk Trump Alliance
1919–1923: Post-WWI Turmoil and Nazi Emergence – In the wake of World War I,
Germany was in chaos. Economic hardship and resentment of the Treaty of Versailles
created fertile ground for extremist politics. Adolf Hitler joined the small German Workers’
Party in 1919 and soon rebranded it as the National Socialist German Workers’ (Nazi)
Party. Hitler organized a paramilitary wing, the SA (Sturmabteilung), which carried out
street violence against opponents and disrupted other parties’ meetings
theholocaustexplained.org
theholocaustexplained.org
. In 1923, Hitler attempted a coup (the Beer Hall Putsch) in Munich. The putsch failed, but
Hitler’s subsequent trial gave him national attention. He was sentenced to five years in
prison but served only about nine months – a lenient punishment that proved to be a
missed chance to remove a dangerous agitator
foreignpolicy.com
. During his brief imprisonment, Hitler wrote Mein Kampf, outlining his extremist ideology
and propaganda techniques.
1924–1929: Rebuilding and Propaganda – After release, Hitler rebuilt the Nazi Party as a
legitimate political force. He decided to seek power democratically rather than by force.
The Nazis leveraged the relative stability of these years to organize and spread their
message. Propaganda became a key tool: Joseph Goebbels joined the movement and
later headed the Nazi propaganda machine. The party promoted a völkisch (nationalist)
message, scapegoating Jews and Marxists for Germany’s problems, and promising to
revive German greatness. The SA ranks swelled with disaffected veterans and unemployed
youths, though Hitler kept their violence somewhat in check to improve the party’s image
theholocaustexplained.org
. In 1928, the Nazis were still fringe (only 2.6% of the Reichstag vote), but they were laying
the groundwork with manipulative propaganda and local organization. Hitler also created
a new elite bodyguard unit, the SS (Schutzstaffel), in 1925 – small at first, but fiercely loyal
theholocaustexplained.org
.
1929–1932: Exploiting Economic Crisis – The Great Depression struck in 1929, causing
mass unemployment and misery in Germany. This crisis was the Nazis’ opportunity. As
despair in Weimar democracy grew, the Nazis dramatically increased their support by
manipulating public anger. They blamed Germany’s woes on the “November criminals”
(the politicians who signed the WWI armistice), Marxists, and, above all, Jews – using them
as scapegoats for economic collapse. Nazi propaganda tapped into fear and nationalism,
railing against the Versailles Treaty and promising jobs, stability, and national rebirth
isj.org.uk
isj.org.uk
. The Nazis also spread the myth of the “stab-in-the-back,” insinuating Germany had lost
WWI due to internal enemies, not military defeat. These messages resonated with a
populace in crisis. In the 1930 election, the Nazi Party’s vote share leapt to 18%, making it
the second-largest party in the Reichstag
isj.org.uk
. Hitler’s charisma at rallies, relentless propaganda posters, radio addresses, and the
intimidating presence of the SA all helped sway public opinion. By July 1932, the Nazis
gained 37% of the vote, becoming the largest party in Parliament
isj.org.uk
– though still short of a majority. Importantly, conservative elites and business leaders
began to support Hitler, seeing him as a bulwark against communism and a path to a
strong, authoritarian government
isj.org.uk
.
1933: Legal Power Grab and Dismantling Democracy – In January 1933, despite the
Nazis never winning an outright majority, political maneuvers brought Hitler to power.
Aging President Paul von Hindenburg, under pressure from former Chancellor Franz von
Papen and other conservatives, appointed Hitler as Chancellor on Jan. 30, 1933. Papen
and his allies believed they could control Hitler from within the cabinet, viewing him as a
figurehead they could tame
en.wikipedia.org
. This was a fatal miscalculation. Once in office, Hitler moved swiftly to dismantle
democratic institutions
nationalww2museum.org
. In February 1933, the Reichstag (Parliament) building burned down under mysterious
circumstances. Hitler and the Nazis seized on the Reichstag Fire to stoke fear of a
Communist uprising, claiming it was the start of a leftist revolution
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. The very next day, Hitler pushed President Hindenburg to sign the Reichstag Fire Decree,
an emergency order suspending civil liberties – freedom of speech, assembly, privacy, and
the press – under the guise of national security
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Armed with these powers, the Nazis rounded up communist deputies and other
opponents, effectively silencing their largest rival party
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.
On March 23, 1933, Hitler introduced the Enabling Act in the Reichstag – a law to give his
cabinet the power to enact laws without parliamentary approval, even if those laws
violated the constitution
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. SA and SS troopers stood guard in the chamber’s halls, intimidating deputies. With
many opposition deputies already jailed or in hiding, and after Hitler made promises to the
Catholic Center Party, the Reichstag passed the Enabling Act with the required two-thirds
majority. Only the Social Democrats (SPD) dared vote “no,” with leader Otto Wels bravely
declaring, “You can take our lives and our freedom, but you cannot take our honor.” Still,
the Act passed 444 to 94, effectively ending parliamentary democracy in Germany
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. From that point, Hitler wielded dictatorial powers legally. He wasted no time “smashing”
any remaining checks and balances
nationalww2museum.org
:
• One-Party Rule: In July 1933, the Nazi Party declared itself the only legal political
party in Germany. A new law forbade the formation of any new parties
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. All other parties – from the Communists to the Catholic Center – were either already
destroyed, banned, or dissolved themselves under pressure. Germany became a single-
party state under Hitler’s control
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
.
• Control of State Governments: Using the Enabling Act, Hitler’s regime also
dissolved the democratically elected state legislatures and replaced state
governors with Nazi Reich Governors who answered to Berlin
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. This centralized power and eliminated Germany’s federal checks. Local officials and
mayors were replaced with Nazis (a process called Gleichschaltung, or “coordination”)
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.
• Purging Civil Service: In April 1933, the Law for the Restoration of the
Professional Civil Service removed Jews and known anti-Nazis from civil service
jobs – including teachers, judges, and bureaucrats
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. This meant the courts and administration were staffed only with loyalists or those too
fearful to resist. Even German judges, who might have been expected to defend the
constitution, did not challenge Hitler’s extra-legal measures, instead viewing
themselves as servants of the new regime
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
.
By the end of 1933, Hitler had eliminated all political opposition and secured total
control of the government
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. The German democracy had been hollowed out from within in a matter of months.
1934–1935: Consolidating Total Power – In 1934, Hitler solidified his hold. In June, fearing
rivals within his own movement and needing the army’s support, Hitler carried out the
Night of the Long Knives (June 30 – July 2, 1934). The SS, now led by Heinrich Himmler,
arrested and executed dozens of SA leaders, including Ernst Röhm, who Hitler perceived
as a potential threat due to the SA’s radical calls for a “second revolution.” This purge also
conveniently eliminated other political enemies (like former Chancellor Schleicher and
some of Papen’s associates) and silenced internal dissent. Vice-Chancellor Papen – the
man who once boasted he had “hired” Hitler – narrowly escaped death but was pushed
out of power, completely marginalized
en.wikipedia.org
. The German Army, which viewed the SA as a rabble, approved of Hitler’s actions; in
return, the army leadership swore personal oaths of allegiance to Hitler.
In August 1934, President Hindenburg died. Hitler merged the presidency with the
chancellorship, declaring himself “Führer and Reich Chancellor,” combining head of
state and head of government. The German military and civil servants swore loyalty not to
the constitution but to Hitler personally. With this, all institutional checks were gone –
Hitler now ruled absolutely as dictator of the Third Reich
nationalww2museum.org
nationalww2museum.org
.
At this stage, the Nazis intensified their grip on society. All independent institutions were
dismantled or absorbed into the Nazi state. For example, all labor unions were
abolished on May 2, 1933 (right after the workers had been forced to celebrate a Nazi
“Labor Day” on May 1). They were replaced by the German Labor Front (Deutsche
Arbeitsfront, DAF), a Nazi-controlled organization that all workers and employers had to
join
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Traditional unions, which once advocated for workers’ rights, were thus eliminated –
workers could no longer strike or bargain, only comply with Nazi directives. Professional
associations, youth clubs, and cultural organizations were similarly “coordinated”
(Gleichschaltung) under Nazi leadership
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. In September 1933, Goebbels’ Propaganda Ministry set up the Reich Chamber of
Culture to control all media and art – literature, journalism, music, theater, film, radio, and
even fine arts
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Only those approved by the Nazis could work in these fields. Jazz music was banned,
modern art derided as “degenerate,” and book burnings were organized to destroy works
deemed “un-German”
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Even youth organizations were taken over: all scouting or religious youth groups were
merged into the Hitler Youth, which became the only legal youth organization by 1934 (and
later mandatory in 1939)
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. From classrooms to summer camps, children were indoctrinated with Nazi ideology.
In 1935, the regime took its racist agenda further by passing the Nuremberg Laws, which
stripped Jews of citizenship and rights, formalizing anti-Semitic persecution. Hitler also
defied the Versailles Treaty openly by rebuilding the military – reintroducing conscription
and expanding the armed forces in 1935. The German populace, bombarded with
propaganda, largely either cheered these moves as restoring national pride or were too
afraid to protest.
spiegel.de
. But neither France nor Britain acted, missing a chance to check Nazi expansion early.
Hitler grew bolder. The regime hosted the 1936 Berlin Olympics to showcase a “new
Germany” – temporarily downplaying overt anti-Semitism for foreign consumption, while
behind the scenes persecution continued. Propaganda efforts like the lavish film “Triumph
of the Will” (1935) glorified Hitler and the Nazi Party, reinforcing Hitler’s cult of personality
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
.
In 1938, Hitler’s expansionism escalated with the Anschluss (annexation of Austria) and
the crisis over the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. European powers chose
appeasement, allowing Hitler to seize the Sudetenland (Munich Agreement, 1938) in
hopes of satisfying his ambitions peacefully. Internally, 1938 also saw the brutal
Kristallnacht pogrom (November 1938), where Nazi paramilitaries attacked Jewish
synagogues, homes, and businesses, a foreboding escalation of anti-Jewish violence. By
now the Nazis had perfected control of the media and messaging: Germans heard only
the Nazi narrative on state-controlled radio and in censored newspapers
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Dissent was deadly – the Gestapo (secret police) and SS had established a network of
concentration camps (like Dachau, opened 1933) to imprison political opponents, Jews,
and other perceived enemies. Fear and propaganda kept the populace in check.
1939–1945: War and Genocidal Tyranny – In September 1939, Nazi Germany invaded
Poland, igniting World War II. By this point Hitler had transformed Germany into a
militarized “war state” dedicated to conquest
nationalww2museum.org
. Democratic institutions were long gone; the regime ruled through fear, propaganda, and
indoctrination. Media was completely controlled – listening even to foreign radio was
banned on pain of severe punishment
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. As war continued, the Nazis intensified their genocidal policies, culminating in the
Holocaust – the systematic murder of six million Jews and millions of others. Internally,
some ordinary Germans grew disillusioned as the war turned against Germany, but
opposition was dangerous. Hitler’s police state responded to any dissent with terror; by
1943–44, as defeat loomed, Nazi leaders relied on terror even more to maintain control
theguardian.com
. Hitler’s rule only ended with Germany’s total defeat in 1945. By then, he had led the
nation into catastrophe, but only after 15 years of step-by-step manipulation and
dismantling of German democracy that allowed him to accumulate such unchecked
power.
• Militant Extremism in the Early 1920s: From the start, the Nazi Party showed a
penchant for violence and anti-democratic action. The existence of Nazi
paramilitary units (SA) engaging in street brawls, intimidation of political
opponents, and racist attacks in the early 1920s was a glaring warning sign. A
democratic society might have responded by strictly enforcing laws against political
violence and hate crimes. However, Weimar authorities often underestimated the
threat or lacked the will to crack down – the judiciary and police were sometimes
sympathetic to right-wing groups and harder on left-wing unrest. Missed
opportunity: In 1923, Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch attempt was an unmistakable red
flag – an open rebellion against the government. The coup failed and the Bavarian
authorities actually defeated it (police killed several Nazi insurrectionists in
Munich)
foreignpolicy.com
, but then came the missed chance: Hitler’s lenient sentence. Instead of jailing him for
years or forever barring him from politics, the courts gave him a light punishment. This
afforded Hitler time to regroup and refine his strategy. What could have been done: A
harsher judicial response – longer imprisonment or a sustained ban of the Nazi Party –
might have removed Hitler from the scene or at least stalled the Nazi movement while it
was still weak.
• Ideology of Hatred and Mein Kampf: Throughout the 1920s, Hitler and Nazi
speakers were explicit about their extreme nationalism, anti-Semitism, and
contempt for democracy. Hitler’s book Mein Kampf (1925) spelled out his anti-
Jewish ideology and desire to overturn the Versailles Treaty. These were not
hidden agendas – they were published for all to see. Warning sign: When a
politician openly advocates eliminating minorities’ rights or dismantling
democratic norms, it’s a sign of authoritarian intent. In the 1920s, many Germans
and foreign observers dismissed Hitler’s rhetoric as bluster or too extreme to ever
be implemented. Missed opportunity: Other political leaders could have formed a
united front to ostracize and marginalize Hitler’s movement early on, educating
the public about the dangers of his ideas. Instead, conservative elites in Germany
thought they could co-opt or contain the Nazis. This underestimation was
exemplified by Papen’s belief that bringing Hitler into government would moderate
him
en.wikipedia.org
. What could have been done: German conservatives and nationalists could have refused
any alliance with Hitler, isolating the Nazis politically. A broad pro-democratic coalition
(from socialists to centrists to moderate conservatives) might have kept the presidency
and chancellorship out of Hitler’s hands. In hindsight, one early warning was how far-right
factions tried to undermine democracy even before Hitler – e.g. the Kapp Putsch in
1920 and constant elite calls to roll back parliamentary rule. If pro-democracy forces had
more vigorously defended the republic (as workers did during Kapp Putsch with a general
strike
isj.org.uk
), the later Nazi threat might have been checked.
• Political Polarization and Divided Opposition (Early 1930s): As the Nazis gained
votes in 1930-1932, Germany’s democratic camp grew deeply divided. The
Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democrats (SPD) were bitter rivals, even
though both opposed Nazism. The KPD, following Stalinist directives, treated the
SPD as “social fascists,” preventing any united front. This was a critical warning
sign: when moderate and left-wing parties are splintered, an extremist minority can
dominate. In the early ‘30s, there were indeed calls for the SPD and KPD to unite
against Hitler, but cooperation never materialized
wsws.org
. Each misjudged the Nazis – some communists believed Hitler’s reign would be short and
spark a workers’ revolution, while many Social Democrats hoped to legally contain the
Nazis. Missed opportunity: The 13 million Germans who voted SPD or KPD in 1932
actually outnumbered Nazi voters, but because those parties wouldn’t work together,
their strength in Parliament was fractured
wsws.org
. If they had formed an alliance or even a tactical cooperation, they might have denied the
Nazis a Reichstag majority or thwarted some of Hitler’s maneuvers. Likewise, if centrists
and conservatives had allied with the SPD instead of the Nazis, a majority coalition
excluding Hitler was possible. What could have been done: A broad anti-Nazi coalition in
1932 – spanning from communists to centrist liberals – could have kept Hitler out of power.
Even short of that, President Hindenburg had options: he could have renewed a more
moderate chancellorship (like Schleicher’s) or upheld parliamentary norms a bit longer
rather than turning to Hitler. Ultimately, the decision on January 30, 1933, to appoint Hitler
as Chancellor was the last moment a different choice at the top might have changed
history. The warning signs – Nazi violence, Hitler’s refusal to accept any subordinate role,
his “hateful rhetoric” and his followers’ penchant for violence
tpr.org
tpr.org
– were all evident. Yet Papen and Hindenburg chose to bring Hitler into power legally,
believing they could manage him. This was a profound miscalculation and a missed
chance to keep the Weimar Republic alive.
• Erosion of Democratic Norms (1933): Once Hitler was Chancellor, there were still
a few early warning signs that dramatically signaled the coming dictatorship. The
Reichstag Fire on February 27, 1933, and the subsequent suspension of civil
liberties were blatant alerts. The Nazis immediately used the fire as a pretext to
arrest hundreds of opponents and censor the press. At this point, it was clear the
Nazis were abandoning the rule of law. Missed opportunity: Hindenburg, as
President, still had the constitutional power to dismiss Hitler or refuse his requests.
If he had recognized this as a power grab (rather than going along with Hitler’s
decree), he could have halted the Nazi coup-by-stealth. Likewise, other
conservative cabinet members, or the German Army, could have objected that
Hitler was exceeding constitutional bounds. Instead, they acquiesced. When Hitler
pushed the Enabling Act in March 1933, that was the final legal nail in democracy’s
coffin. The early warning signs here were the SA and SS guards intimidating
legislators and the arrest of dozens of opposition deputies
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
– hardly the normal legislative process. Only the Social Democrats protested. The Center
Party and others yielded to Hitler’s demands, some out of fear, others believing Hitler’s
vague promises to respect their interests. What could have been done: If the Center
Party and conservative Nationalists had joined the SPD in voting “No,” the Enabling Act
would have failed to reach the two-thirds majority. That might have forced Hitler to govern
more cautiously or seek compromise. It was a slim chance (given Nazi intimidation), but it
existed. The lack of unity and courage among most non-Nazi politicians in that vote was a
tragic missed opportunity – one later Center Party deputy said they “bowed to pressure
when standing firm might have changed fate.”
• Muzzling the Press and Civil Society: Through 1933, the Nazis moved quickly to
censor media and outlaw independent groups. Early on, they shut down
opposition newspapers and began purging universities and arts of dissenters. Book
burnings in May 1933 were a theatrical warning of the regime’s intent to eradicate
opposing ideas
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. These events signaled that Hitler’s government would brook no criticism. Yet, many
Germans reacted with either applause or silence. Missed opportunity: German
intellectuals, church leaders, and journalists who saw the danger could have spoken out
more forcefully together at this stage – perhaps an organized refusal by major newspapers
to print Nazi propaganda or a coalition of religious and academic figures condemning the
book burnings might have swayed public opinion. Unfortunately, while a few brave
individuals (like some pastors in the Confessing Church or editors who resisted until shut
down) did protest, there was no concerted, broad resistance. Key institutions like the
Protestant and Catholic churches mostly tried to accommodate the Nazis rather than defy
them in 1933. This acquiescence squandered an opportunity to rally public moral
opposition before fear fully set in.
• International Appeasement and Inaction: Early warning signs were not only
domestic. Hitler’s actions quickly set off alarms abroad. When Germany withdrew
from the League of Nations and announced rearmament (1933–1935), and
especially when the Rhineland was remilitarized in 1936, these were clear
violations of the post-WWI order and indicators of Hitler’s aggressive aims. The
Rhineland move was a major warning sign to Europe – even some of Hitler’s
generals were nervous, recognizing it as a bluffing gamble. Missed opportunity
(international): France and Britain, however, did nothing. As noted, German forces
in 1936 were still too weak to fight; Hitler would have had to retreat if challenged
militarily
spiegel.de
. A firm French move into the Rhineland could have toppled Hitler’s prestige at home –
possibly even leading to a coup by the cautious German Army leadership. Similarly, when
Hitler bullied Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938, there were warnings (from figures like
Winston Churchill) that yielding to him would only embolden further aggression. Yet the
policy of appeasement prevailed. Each diplomatic concession – the remilitarization, the
Anschluss, the Munich Agreement – was a missed chance to contain Nazi expansion
before it led to world war. What could have been done: Stronger collective security –
Britain, France, or the League of Nations standing up to early Nazi treaty breaches – could
have checked Hitler’s ambitions or at least forced him to proceed more cautiously. By the
time Poland was invaded in 1939, those early chances were long gone, and a devastating
war was the only way to stop the Nazi regime.
In summary, the world did not lack early warnings about Hitler and the Nazis. The pattern
of escalating rhetoric, political violence, subversion of law, persecution of minorities,
and military aggression was visible at each step. Intervening earlier – whether by German
leaders uniting against Hitler or foreign powers enforcing peace terms – could have altered
the course of history. The tragedy is that at many key junctures, people in positions of
power hesitated, underestimated the threat, or hoped to appease it instead of
confronting it.
Case Study 1: The Beer Hall Putsch Trial (1923) – What happened: Hitler’s first grab for
power was a violent coup attempt. It failed spectacularly, and Hitler was arrested for
treason. This presented an opportunity to eliminate the Nazi threat early. Resistance effort:
The Bavarian authorities did suppress the coup – local police and troops remained loyal to
the Weimar government and defeated Hitler’s armed followers during the Beer Hall
Putsch
foreignpolicy.com
. However, the subsequent handling of Hitler by the legal system was a critical failure. Why
it failed: At Hitler’s trial, the judges allowed him to turn proceedings into a propaganda
forum. He gained national attention by broadcasting his nationalist message from the
dock. Instead of a harsh penalty for treason, Hitler received the minimum sentence and
even special treatment in prison (where he was permitted to have visitors and write Mein
Kampf). This leniency stemmed from the judiciary’s conservative bias – many judges in
Weimar sympathized more with right-wing nationalists than with the republic. They
saw Hitler as a patriotic if misguided figure, not the criminal threat he was. Missed
opportunity: If the court had treated Hitler as the dangerous insurrectionist he truly was –
for example, sentencing him to a much longer prison term (the law allowed up to life for
treason) or keeping the Nazi Party banned after the Putsch – his momentum could have
been broken. A lengthy imprisonment might have kept Hitler out of the public eye during
the crucial years of 1924–1929 when the Nazi Party reorganized. In essence, the
institutions “resisted” the Putsch but then failed to follow through. They punished Hitler
lightly, effectively giving him a second chance. A more determined defense of democracy
(akin to how the Weimar government crushed left-wing revolts with force and harsh
sentences) might have stopped Hitler then and there. The lesson: Enabling or excusing
anti-democratic agitators out of bias or complacency can backfire disastrously.
Case Study 2: Division and Inaction of the Democratic Forces (1932–1933) – What
happened: As the Nazi threat grew, Germany’s democratic parties and institutions
mounted only fragmented, insufficient resistance. One example was the response of the
Social Democratic Party (SPD) and trade unions when Hitler was appointed Chancellor in
January 1933. Resistance effort: The SPD had a paramilitary wing (Reichsbanner) and the
unions had millions of members – together they once mustered a general strike to defeat
the Kapp Putsch in 1920
isj.org.uk
. Many expected they might do the same against Hitler. In early 1933, there were indeed
calls for a general strike to protest Hitler’s government. However, the strike never
materialized. The SPD leadership decided to play by legal rules and oppose Hitler in the
Reichstag, and union leaders sought to avoid confrontation, hoping to survive under the
new regime. Why it failed: There were several reasons for this inaction. First, by 1933 the
Nazi grip was already tightening – the Reichstag Fire Decree in February gave the Nazis
pretext to arrest many communist leaders and some socialists, decapitating much of the
opposition. Second, memories of the bloody street fights of early 1930s and fear of civil
war made moderate leaders hesitate to unleash mass protests. The Nazis had made clear
they would respond to resistance with brutal force by the SA and SS. Third, some union
leaders naively thought they could reach an accommodation with Hitler. In fact, on May 1,
1933 (International Workers’ Day), the Nazi government staged a national labor celebration
to win workers’ trust – and union officials participated. It was a trap: the very next day,
May 2, the Nazis outlawed all unions, occupying union offices and arresting their leaders
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. The working-class resistance was caught off guard and subdued without a fight. Missed
opportunity: A coordinated general strike or mass protest in early 1933 – immediately
after Hitler took office or after the Reichstag Fire decree – might have slowed the Nazi
takeover. Even if it failed to topple Hitler, it could have signaled to the world and fellow
Germans that many opposed the Nazi course (potentially emboldening more resistance).
Sadly, by the time the SPD deputies voted against the Enabling Act in late March 1933, it
was a largely symbolic resistance – the last protest in a legislature soon to be made
irrelevant. Only Otto Wels and the SPD spoke out against Hitler’s dictatorial law (all
other parties caved)
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Wels’ famous speech, defending freedom and democratic ideals in the Reichstag, earned
him exile (he fled Germany that same year). This was a noble stand but ineffective alone. If
the SPD and others had taken bolder action earlier – or if conservative politicians had
refused alliance with Hitler – the Enabling Act might never have come to a vote. But
internal divisions (SPD vs KPD, moderates vs radicals) and a failure to grasp that Hitler
could not be restrained by normal politics meant these resistance efforts never coalesced
into a force strong enough to stop the Nazis.
Case Study 3: The Enabling Act Vote and the Catholic Center Party (March 1933) – What
happened: The Enabling Act was the legal linchpin of Hitler’s dictatorship. Passing it
required a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag. With the communists banned and many
Social Democrats jailed or hiding, Hitler still needed support from the Catholic Center
Party and others. Resistance effort: The Social Democratic Party (SPD) stood alone in
open opposition to the Enabling Act. All 94 SPD deputies who could attend voted against it
– a courageous but futile gesture
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. The larger Center Party, which held the balance, had the opportunity to resist. Some
Center Party members were uneasy with giving Hitler unchecked power. Why it failed:
Ultimately, the Center Party (and its Bavarian ally, the BVP) voted in favor of the Enabling
Act. They were swayed by a mix of intimidation and false assurances. Stormtroopers
surrounded the opera house where the vote took place, creating an atmosphere of
menace. Hitler personally promised Center Party leaders that he would respect the
interests of the Catholic Church and uphold moral values if given full powers. Under
pressure and perhaps deceived by these promises, Center leader Ludwig Kaas led his
party to vote “Yes.” German conservative-nationalist deputies (DNVP) also voted yes, as
they were already inclined toward authoritarian solutions. The German National People’s
Party actually welcomed the act, thinking it would help a strong right-wing government.
Meanwhile, the absence of the communist deputies (all 81 were prevented from taking
their seats, many under “protective detention” in camps) and 26 detained SPD deputies
meant opposition votes were far short
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. Thus, the Act passed. Missed opportunity: This was arguably the last constitutional
chance to stop Hitler. If the Center Party and others had joined the SPD in voting No, the
two-thirds majority would not have been reached. Hitler would have been forced to either
negotiate or resort to even more blatantly illegal means (which might have fractured his
coalition). The Center Party’s decision was influenced by a hope to preserve its institutions
(like Catholic schools) under Nazi rule – a bargain that did not pay off for long. Within a
year, the Nazis reneged on many promises and dissolved the Center Party as well. In
hindsight, had figures like Kaas or former Chancellor Heinrich Brüning been more resolute
and refused Hitler’s deal, they might have rallied enough deputies to block Hitler’s formal
dictatorship. Their failure was one of nerve and political miscalculation – they did not grasp
that once Hitler had the power, he would never give it back. The lesson: trying to appease
or bargain with authoritarians (by giving them what they want politically) is a doomed
strategy – it only delays confrontation and usually on the enemy’s terms.
Case Study 4: The Army and Conservative Elites – What happened: Traditional
conservative elites – the Junker officers, right-wing politicians, and business leaders –
initially thought they could use Hitler for their own ends, then discard him. Some did
attempt to rein him in at points, but these efforts were half-hearted or too late. Resistance
effort: One example is General Ludwig Beck, the Army Chief of Staff, who opposed Hitler’s
plan to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938. Beck even circulated memos urging colleagues to
consider stopping Hitler, and he resigned in protest. There were whispers of a potential
military coup if Hitler pushed Germany into war over the Sudetenland in 1938. Another
example: former Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher had tried in late 1932 to form a
government that would split the Nazis and govern without Hitler, but he failed and was
later murdered in 1934 during the Nazi purge. Why it failed: The German Army as an
institution never collectively stood up to Hitler when it mattered. In 1934, when Hitler
eliminated the SA leadership (which the army viewed as rivals), the army embraced Hitler
as its savior and swore loyalty to him. By tying their fate to Hitler’s, the generals lost their
chance to act as a check. In 1938, the planned coup by some officers fizzled because
Britain and France appeased Hitler at Munich – without a trigger (like an imminent war
they thought unwinnable), the will to overthrow Hitler evaporated. Many elites were also
complicit: industrialists supported rearmament and prospered under Hitler, and judges
and bureaucrats (as noted) mostly cooperated rather than resisted
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
. By the time some elites recognized the monster they’d empowered, Hitler’s police state
made action exceedingly dangerous. (The final major attempt, the July 20, 1944
assassination plot by military officers, failed when Hitler survived the bombing – a last,
desperate bid that came far too late in the game.) Missed opportunity: The key missed
opportunity for conservative elites was before Hitler was fully consolidated – roughly
1933–1934. In those early years, President Hindenburg could have dismissed Hitler
(especially if he’d listened to advisers like Gen. Schleicher instead of Papen). The army
could have refused the loyalty oath or intervened if Hitler’s measures blatantly violated the
constitution (the Reichswehr had an ethos of serving the country, but no tradition of
defending democracy – a crucial failing). In essence, those who thought Hitler could be a
“tame” dictator realized too late that they had no control over him at all
en.wikipedia.org
. Their belief that they could “play with the fire of right-wing extremism” without getting
burned was fatal
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. When they finally tried to pull back (Beck in 1938, Stauffenberg in 1944), Hitler’s power
was too great and their own positions too compromised to succeed.
spiegel.de
. There was also an expectation that the League of Nations should respond to blatant treaty
violations. Why it failed: France’s political leadership was divided and war-weary; Britain
was unwilling to support a forceful move (many in Britain felt the Versailles restrictions on
Germany had been too harsh to begin with). Thus, no order to resist was given. The Nazis
faced zero opposition and Hitler scored a huge psychological victory. Each further act of
aggression met a similar pattern of Allied reluctance: condemnation but no action. The
Anschluss (1938) prompted protests but nothing concrete. At Munich, Britain and France
actually pressured Czechoslovakia to concede territory. The lack of resolve taught Hitler
that the West would not intervene, emboldening him to take ever bigger risks. Missed
opportunity: The Rhineland crisis was the best chance to stop Hitler without a world war.
As later analysis showed, the German forces were so outnumbered and under-equipped in
1936 that a single French division could have sent them packing
spiegel.de
. That, in turn, might have caused a severe blow to Hitler’s prestige domestically – perhaps
even a challenge to his rule from the Army or others. Similarly, had Britain and France
drawn a firm line at Czechoslovakia (instead of the Munich appeasement), Germany’s own
generals might have moved against Hitler rather than risk a war they believed Germany
would lose. Those internal German resistance plans were real – for example, documents
and testimonies after the war showed some officers plotted to arrest Hitler during the
Sudeten crisis if a war looked inevitable. But when the Western powers gave in, Hitler’s
bloodless victory undercut the justification for a coup. In short, the hesitance of
democratic nations to confront a burgeoning tyrant was a series of missed chances to
prevent greater conflict. It’s a stark reminder that nipping aggression in the bud is far less
costly than fighting a full-blown war later.
Each of these cases – domestic and international – highlights a common theme: the cost
of hesitation and disunity in the face of authoritarianism. Efforts to resist Hitler failed
largely because they were too isolated, too late, or undermined by misjudgment. The Beer
Hall Putsch was suppressed, but the follow-through lacked conviction. Democratic
politicians opposed Hitler, but not in unison or with the needed urgency. Institutions that
might have checked him (courts, civil service, churches, the army) mostly chose self-
preservation or expediency, which in the long run sealed their own fates under Nazi
domination. And globally, the reluctance to enforce peace terms or form anti-Nazi
alliances in the 1930s allowed Hitler to grow too strong.
In hindsight, what could have been done differently comes down to acting early and
decisively. Democracy’s defenders needed to close ranks despite differences, and those
in power needed the courage to uphold principles over short-term interests. Unfortunately,
in each case study we see the consequences when that doesn’t happen: the Nazis
exploited every hesitation as a weakness and pushed further until it was too late to stop
them without massive force.
foreignpolicy.com
. In both cases, a charismatic leader’s false claims mobilized followers to reject an
election’s legitimacy. Author Timothy Ryback notes that “both [Hitler and Trump] tried to
overturn a presidential election” and both used hateful, incendiary rhetoric as rallying
cries
tpr.org
. The fact that an American leader would attempt such a thing is a chilling modern echo of
tactics used by authoritarians like Hitler.
tpr.org
. In both cases, fear of “outsiders” is stoked to rally a political base. Modern far-right
movements, like some white nationalist groups in the U.S., explicitly draw inspiration from
Nazi ideas or symbols, showing how persistent this toxic thread is. While the scale and
context differ, the tactic of uniting followers by demonizing an “Other” is common to
Nazi Germany and some current extremist politics.
• Delegitimizing the Free Press and Spreading Disinformation: One of the Nazis’
first moves was to seize control of the media – shutting down opposing newspapers
and flooding the public with their propaganda. In today’s United States, a free press
still exists, but there have been aggressive attempts to discredit independent
media. Notably, President Trump repeatedly called the mainstream press “the
enemy of the people” – a phrase with a dark pedigree
hks.harvard.edu
. This language is “dangerous territory,” as journalist Marvin Kalb notes: “Twentieth-century
dictators — notably, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao — had all denounced their critics, especially
the press, as ‘enemies of the people.’”
hks.harvard.edu
. The goal, as Kalb explains, is to delegitimize the press and create confusion about truth
versus lies
hks.harvard.edu
. Indeed, Trump also popularized the term “fake news” to dismiss any reporting he found
unfavorable, much as Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels would label inconvenient facts
as lies spread by Jewish or Marxist media. The resonance is unmistakable: Hitler’s regime
coined “Lügenpresse” (lying press) to attack journalists, and in recent years we have
seen American crowds echoing this slur at rallies. While the U.S. government has not taken
over newspapers or radio as the Nazis did in 1933, the effect of constant attacks on the
media’s credibility is similar – it erodes an important check on power and leaves a
segment of the population trusting only the leader’s narrative. Additionally, the rise of
partisan media ecosystems and conspiracy-theory-driven online platforms has allowed
disinformation to spread at an unprecedented scale (e.g. QAnon, election fraud myths).
This parallels the Nazis’ use of the “Big Lie” technique – repeating a colossal falsehood
until many believe it. Historians often cite that Hitler accused Jews of using the “Big Lie,”
even as the Nazis themselves employed it. Today, false claims like the election being
stolen, or other grand conspiracies, serve to mislead and inflame the public in ways that
Nazis would recognize. The battle over truth is a modern frontline just as it was in the
1930s. Commentators have warned that “the battle for truth matters” because
democracy’s survival depends on a shared acceptance of reality
foreignpolicy.com
.
• Weakening Institutional Checks and the Rule of Law: Hitler was a master at
bending or breaking institutions to his will – from courts to the civil service to the
electoral system. In the U.S., institutions are stronger, but there have been worrying
attempts to undermine the independence of key institutions. For instance, there
were reports of pressure on the Justice Department to act in the president’s
personal or political interest (investigating political rivals, or trying to overturn state
election results). There were also unprecedented interventions in the military chain
of command and intelligence agencies, often with an eye toward personal loyalty.
One modern example: during Trump’s term, he demanded loyalty from FBI and DOJ
officials and lambasted those who defied him, calling them part of a “deep state.”
He also attempted to use emergency powers and executive orders in ways that
courts often struck down, but not without causing damage. Legal experts noted that
some of these moves were “undermining the rule of law” and could be precursors
to authoritarian governance
theguardian.com
. Even after leaving office, Trump and some allies have pledged to purge career officials
and “weaponize” the government against opponents if they regain power
theguardian.com
. This rhetoric is reminiscent of how Nazis politicized the civil service – Hitler’s regime
required every official to be loyal to the party line (the Nazi “Restoration of Civil Service”
law purged non-loyalists
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
). While the U.S. hasn’t gone that far, talk of an administration staffing only true loyalists
and punishing dissenters is a modern parallel that many find alarming.
• Political Violence and Paramilitary Tendencies: The Nazi rise featured street
violence by the SA. In recent years, the U.S. has seen a growth in extremist militias
and political violence, from Charlottesville in 2017 to the militia plots and the Jan. 6
attack. Armed groups like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers (some of whom were
present on Jan. 6) view themselves as foot soldiers for a political cause,
analogous in a loose way to the SA brownshirts (though far smaller in scale). The
fact that an American mob stormed the Capitol, some wearing shirts praising
Auschwitz or carrying Confederate and neo-Nazi symbols, underscores the
conscious channeling of fascist imagery. Even beyond organized groups, there’s
been a coarsening of political discourse to the point where threats of violence
(against election officials, school board members, etc.) are becoming frequent.
We’re reminded of the late Weimar era, when fistfights and gunfights broke out in
legislative halls and on the streets due to political polarization
tpr.org
. Recently, scholars and journalists have openly asked if America is facing a “pre-civil war”
atmosphere or a Weimar-like scenario of rampant polarization. The presence of heavily
armed protestors at political events and the increase in hate crimes indicate a willingness
by some to use intimidation or violence for political ends – a clear parallel to the
environment that helped the Nazis bully their way to dominance. The difference, of course,
is that U.S. law enforcement (federal and state) is not infiltrated or controlled by an
extremist party, whereas many local police in Weimar were indulgent to Nazi thuggery.
Still, the danger is that tolerance of growing political violence can normalize it, as
happened in Germany. Each violent episode that goes lightly punished or is downplayed
for partisan reasons could encourage the next.
foreignpolicy.com
. But the mere fact that influential figures suggest sweeping aside legal norms “for the good
of the nation” (always self-servingly defined) shows an authoritarian temptation at work.
It’s a small leap from that to actual enabling acts if enough people in power acquiesce.
news.wttw.com
forward.com
. That drew backlash, as any Nazi comparison in politics does, but it underscores a
concern that isn’t limited to fringe alarmists. Even the Anne Frank Center in 2017 issued a
warning of “alarming parallels” between Trump’s behavior and Hitler’s early years
the-independent.com
. These include attacks on the press, scapegoating minorities, nationalism, and attempts
to obstruct the democratic process. To be clear, most historians would also point out
differences – the U.S. today is not Weimar Germany; for one, our democratic culture and
institutions are far more established
foreignpolicy.com
. However, as one analysis noted, some differences should serve as warnings rather than
comfort
foreignpolicy.com
foreignpolicy.com
. In particular, the lesson that democracies can degrade from within is very relevant.
American democracy’s guardrails have held in recent years (for example, courts and
election officials upheld the 2020 results despite pressure
foreignpolicy.com
), but the stresses on those guardrails are mounting.
In summary, modern America has seen the rise of what political scholars call
“authoritarian populism” – a style of politics that combines charismatic, strongman
leadership with populist rhetoric and disdain for liberal democratic norms
news.berkeley.edu
news.berkeley.edu
. Leaders who employ this style, in the U.S. and elsewhere, often do the following:
**promote disinformation, scapegoat marginalized groups, encourage popular anger
against institutions, and attempt to concentrate power in their own hands
news.berkeley.edu
. These practices directly echo the Nazi political playbook (minus, so far, the full
elimination of elections or opposition). What we see today – whether it’s a crowd chanting
to jail political opponents, or a leader urging supporters to “fight like hell” or casting the
press as evil – has unmistakable historical echoes. As Ryback put it, the parallels between
1930s Germany and now are “disturbing”
tpr.org
.
There is also a global context: the U.S. is not alone. Across the world, a number of
democracies have slid into illiberal, authoritarian rule through elected strongmen – in
countries like Hungary, Turkey, or Brazil (under Bolsonaro). In each case, we see a pattern
similar to aspects of the Nazi rise: democratic processes being used by autocrats who
then chip away at institutional checks (like press freedom and judicial independence) to
entrench themselves. The U.S. is part of this global struggle between democracy and
authoritarianism, which makes the parallels with the past particularly salient as
warnings.
1. Take Early Warning Signs Seriously: Extremist rhetoric, the targeting of minority groups
as scapegoats, calls for violence, and efforts to delegitimize elections or the press are all
red flags. In the 1920s, many dismissed Hitler as a fringe agitator until it was too late.
Today, we must recognize that when politicians demonize opponents or minorities, or
when they claim only they can be trusted over the electoral process, those are alarms.
Rather than shrugging off hateful or anti-democratic speech as “just talk” or political
theater, citizens and leaders should call it out and reject it. As the experience of Weimar
shows, what begins as rhetoric can end as policy if such figures gain power. The moment
an official suggests suspending constitutional processes or channels public anger toward
vilifying an “enemy within,” there should be broad, cross-partisan condemnation. Silence
or rationalization in the face of those warnings is what allowed Nazi ideas to fester and
spread.
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
, lawmakers ceded their authority with the Enabling Act, and police often turned a blind eye
to SA violence. A lesson for today is that those who serve in institutions must put
country and constitution above party or personal loyalty. In the U.S., we saw how
crucial this was when, for example, election officials in 2020 resisted immense pressure to
falsify results, and judges (including those appointed by Trump) upheld the law rather than
bending to political expedience
foreignpolicy.com
. That kind of courage and integrity is needed at all levels – from local election boards to the
Supreme Court. At the same time, citizens should support and trust institutions that
behave impartially and ethically, instead of buying into demagogic attacks on them. If a
leader tries to bully the press or the courts, the public should recognize the threat and
stand with those institutions. As one historian noted, one lesson from Weimar is that it’s
“fatal for conservatives to think they can play with the fire of right-wing extremism without
getting burned.”
foreignpolicy.com
In practice, this means politicians must refrain from undermining institutions or tolerating
extremist allies for short-term gain – doing so only empowers forces that will eventually
destroy those same institutions and turn on their enablers. In essence, everyone has a role
in propping up the guardrails of democracy: the integrity of institutions is only as strong as
the commitment of individuals to uphold norms and laws.
3. Foster Unity Against Authoritarian Threats: A glaring lesson from the Nazi takeover is
the peril of a divided democratic front. The failure of the SPD, Center, and KPD to unite
against Hitler, and of moderate conservatives to ally with those groups, fragmented any
effective resistance. Today, democrats (small-d) of all stripes need to remember that
when the very rules of the game are at stake, differences in policy or ideology become
secondary. Liberals, moderates, conservatives – if they are committed to constitutional
government – should find common cause in opposing authoritarian-minded candidates or
measures. This might mean building unusual coalitions, much like some pro-democracy
alliances we’ve seen recently (for example, diverse coalitions that came together in Europe
to keep far-right parties out of power, or Republicans and Democrats jointly defending an
election’s legitimacy). The notion of a “Popular Front” against fascism from the 1930s
resonates here: it’s better to have a temporary alliance of broad groups to save democracy
than to maintain purity of disagreement and lose democracy altogether. In practice, this
could mean bipartisan efforts to protect voting rights, to ensure the peaceful transfer of
power, and to repudiate political violence. It also means community groups, religious
organizations, and businesses joining voices to reject demagoguery and hate – signaling
that society at large won’t stand for a slide into dictatorship. Unity doesn’t require
unanimity on everything, just a shared commitment to the democratic framework.
4. Stand Up to Big Lies and Propaganda: The Nazis showed how a relentless drumbeat of
propaganda and falsehood can brainwash a population. Modern technology can amplify
lies even faster. Truth is the antidote. One lesson is the importance of independent media
and education in inoculating the public against disinformation. That means supporting
quality journalism, promoting media literacy, and quickly debunking false narratives before
they spread. Individuals can help by not sharing unverified rumors and by choosing
information sources wisely. Governments and social media platforms face the challenge
of balancing free speech with curbing coordinated disinformation campaigns. It’s a hard
balance, but doing nothing is not an option – unchecked propaganda can warp a society’s
perception of reality (as Germans under Goebbels learned). In the U.S., the concept that
“facts and truth matter” has to be reasserted vigorously
foreignpolicy.com
. Public figures and citizens alike should challenge outrageous claims (e.g. openly
correcting conspiracy theories at town halls or in conversations with friends). The more
people willing to say “this is not true, and here’s evidence,” the less space there is for a Big
Lie to take hold. Nazi Germany teaches us that lies can fuel atrocities – Hitler convinced
millions that Jews were subhuman and plotting against Germany, which paved the way for
genocide. While today’s lies may differ, any propaganda that dehumanizes a group or
rejects the fundamental equality of people is extremely dangerous and must be confronted
head-on.
5. Use Laws and Checks as They Were Intended: Democracies often have mechanisms –
impeachment, judicial review, emergency brake laws – to stop would-be dictators. But
those mechanisms only work if invoked. Weimar’s constitution had emergency provisions
that were misused by authoritarians, and other protections (like the ability to outlaw
harmful parties) that were never effectively used against the Nazis. Today, constitutions
and laws should be wielded to protect democracy. For instance, if a leader clearly abuses
power or violates the law, legislators of their own party should hold them accountable via
impeachment or removal – putting country over party. Election laws should be fortified to
prevent subversion (for example, clarifying that officials cannot arbitrarily reject voters’
will). If extremists are infiltrating security forces, those forces must be scrutinized and
cleaned of elements that might one day follow unlawful orders. Essentially, the legal
framework of democracy must not be a suicide pact – it should defend itself.
Policymakers might consider reforms to shore up weak points (some have proposed
reforms like better regulating emergency powers, modernizing anti-militia laws, or
tightening the process of transition to avoid Jan 6-type scenarios). While overreaction can
itself harm liberty, under-reaction allows the erosion of liberty. Each society must
calibrate this carefully, learning from how the Nazis gamed Weimar’s lax enforcement.
6. Civic Education and Engagement are Critical: In the long term, an informed and
engaged citizenry is the best defense against demagogues. Many Germans in the 1930s
either fell prey to Hitler’s appeals or stayed apathetic as long as their own lives weren’t
immediately affected. By the time they realized the stakes, it was too dangerous to resist.
One modern lesson is to cultivate a public that understands democratic values – things
like tolerance, the importance of minority rights, and how government is supposed to
function. Schools should teach not just dry civics, but the vivid history of how fragile
democracy can be (including the story of Weimar and Nazi Germany as a case study).
When people recognize early on what propaganda and authoritarianism look like, they are
more likely to reject those. Moreover, encouraging people to participate in democracy –
vote, volunteer in campaigns, attend city council meetings, join civic organizations – builds
a culture of ownership where it’s harder for an authoritarian movement to claim “I alone
can fix it.” In a healthy democracy, citizens don’t wait for a hero; they work collectively,
which leaves less space for dictators. The resilience of American institutions in recent
years (as noted, courts and states resisted pressure
foreignpolicy.com
foreignpolicy.com
) is partly because many individuals in those institutions had a basic commitment to
democratic norms. That came from their education and ethos. We need to keep that alive
in future generations.
7. Never Normalize the Unthinkable: Perhaps the starkest lesson of Nazi Germany is how
the unthinkable can become reality if normalized step by step. Each incremental violation
– each lie, each broken law, each act of violence – that goes unchallenged sets a new,
lower standard. Germans in 1933 could hardly imagine the mass murder of millions just a
decade later, yet through many small steps of inurement, it became possible. For today,
this means drawing clear lines early. For example, suggestion of political violence must
be denounced immediately, not explained away. Racist or authoritarian language from
leaders should be met with firm opposition, not eye-rolling complacency. As citizens, we
should be wary of becoming desensitized. If one year a candidate saying they might not
accept election results is shocking, that must remain unacceptable the next year and the
next – not become an expected part of politics. Norms matter: once broken, it’s hard to
restore them. Therefore, society should collectively uphold standards of decency and
democracy, and refuse to accept “that’s just how it is now” when those standards slip.
In conclusion, the story of Nazi Germany’s rise is a grim testament to how quickly a
democracy can crumble when manipulation, fear, and hate go unchecked. Yet, it also
arms us with knowledge: we can identify the patterns and we do have agency to respond
differently. The United States today, and other democracies, still have robust
institutions and a citizenry that largely cherishes freedom – advantages the Weimar
Republic lacked in its final days
foreignpolicy.com
. But those advantages must not lead to complacency. The lesson “it can happen here” is
not to say history will repeat, but to remind us it could if we ignore the warning signs. The
“fire” of extremism and authoritarianism, once lit, can consume a nation – so it’s far better
to prevent the spark or snuff it early than to battle a blaze already raging.
Ultimately, the actions of individuals and institutions will determine whether democracy
endures. As citizens, we should stay informed, speak out against injustices, support
ethical leaders, and vote with these lessons in mind. As communities, we should build
bridges and trust so that demagogues find no fertile ground in which to sow division. And
as a nation, we must recommit to the ideals of the Constitution – that no leader is above
the law, that all people are created equal, and that government is of, by, and for the
people. History has shown us the alternative; it is our job to ensure that the darkest
chapters of the 20th century are never repeated. By heeding the early warnings, standing
united, and holding fast to truth and law, we can safeguard democracy for future
generations. The rise of Nazi Germany ended in unparalleled tragedy – but our awareness
of that past gives us the wisdom to say, “Never again,” and to act so that those horrors
remain history, not a future prophecy.
foreignpolicy.com
hks.harvard.edu