BP Sri May 2011 MTG B Looney
BP Sri May 2011 MTG B Looney
Bernard Looney
Executive Vice President - Developments
Cautionary Statement
This presentation and the associated slides and discussion contain certain
forward-looking statements concerning the businesses, operations and
strategy of BP. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risks
and uncertainties because they relate to events and depend on
circumstances that will or may occur in the future. Actual results may
differ from those expressed in such statements depending on a variety of
factors, including changes in regulatory standards and operational
requirements; the availability of personnel and other resources; the
successful engagement with BP's external stakeholders, including
industry-wide bodies and contractors; the requirements of BP's existing
contractual and legal obligations; the timing and successful
implementation of Bly Report governance, including BP's centralised wells
organisation and the Safety & Operational Risk Organisation; the timing
and successful implementation of the Bly Report recommendations; and
other factors discussed elsewhere in this presentation, the associated
slides or under “Risk factors” in our Annual Report and Form 20-F 2010 as
filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
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Our approach to managing potential risk in Wells
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Global Wells Organization, with S&OR assurance
Group CEO
Bob Dudley
EVP Production EVP Developments EVP Exploration EVP Strat. & Integration EVP Safety &
Bob Fryar Bernard Looney Mike Daly Andy Hopwood Operational Risk
Mark Bly
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Framework to further reduce risk in Wells
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Enhanced BP standards are being Spill
developed or updated in each of response
these areas. 5
4 Crisis
Relief wells management
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Prevention
However these activities take time to deliver with quality down to the front line, across our global
operations. As such, in parallel we are also:
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Immediate actions, interim guidance & standards
• Blow-out preventers
Riser
• Cementing
• Verification
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3 5 • BP’s investigation into the Deepwater Horizon accident drew upon the
expertise of more than 50 technical and other specialists from
within BP and the industry
Riser
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• The Bly Report concluded that there were multiple causes involving
8 multiple parties
BOP
Sea Floor
• Eight key findings
1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons
Casing 2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons
3. Negative pressure test accepted - well integrity not established
4. Influx not recognised until hydrocarbons were in the riser
5. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well
6. Diversion to the mud gas separator – gas vented onto rig
7. Fire and gas system did not prevent ignition
8. BOP emergency mode did not seal the well
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Bly Report
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Bly Report program governance
Group operations Quarterly updates to the group operations risk committee, which includes Bob
risk committee Dudley and Mark Bly
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Programme organization
External
Work Stream Lead
Industry/ Work Stream Lead Work Stream Lead Organisation Regional Contractors &
Project Coordinator Finance Contracts BOP/Well Control
Regulatory Performance Industry Training Capability Coordinator 2 Service Providers
Coordinator
Work Stream Lead Work Stream Lead Work Stream Lead Competency PSCM / Contract
Project Manager Sr. S&OR Advisor
Well Control Casing Design Conformance Assessment Advisors
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Key steps taken to assure successful delivery
Knowledge
• Employ past learnings, i.e. Texas City
management
Performance
• Actual versus planned performance
reporting
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26 recommendations
The process for implementing the Bly Recommendations is firmly in place. The timelines are estimates based on existing facts, circumstances and planning
status. While these estimates reflect the team’s best judgment, they can change depending on circumstantial factors such as complexity, resource
availability and evolving regulatory requirements.
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26 recommendations
The process for implementing the Bly Recommendations is firmly in place. The timelines are estimates based on existing facts, circumstances and planning
status. While these estimates reflect the team’s best judgment, they can change depending on circumstantial factors such as complexity, resource
availability and evolving regulatory requirements.
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Verification and audit
Self-verification
• Site visits by Executive Vice President to provide additional assurance
• Stage gate verification processes
• Enhanced rig start up checklist, including safety critical equipment, emergency drills
and personal competency
S&OR audit
• S&OR Audit remit will include Wells activities
• Rig audit will move into S&OR bringing independent assurance
• S&OR will verify the closure of all 26 Bly report recommendations
Group audit
• Group Audit will audit the S&OR assurance process
• They will conduct 3 audits in 2011
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Keeping you informed
• Available at bp.com/safety
• First update will be in July 2011 – until all actions are closed
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