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Studies in Science Education

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Philosophy of Science, Science

and Science Education
a
Derek Hodson
a
Division of Curriculum, Department of Education ,
University of Manchester
Published online: 26 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Derek Hodson (1985) Philosophy of Science, Science

and Science Education, Studies in Science Education, 12:1, 25-57, DOI:
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 25
Studies in Science Education, 12 (1985) 25-57

Philosophy of Science, Science

and Science Education
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DEREK HODSON
Division of Curriculum, Department of Education, University of Manchester

INTRODUCTION
The late 1950s marked the end of a long period of stability in the school science
curriculum. The publication of the SMA policy statement Science and Education
(1957) and the Rockefeller Report (1958) to a large extent initiated the rapid
curriculum development of the 1960s and 1970s (the Nuffield and Schools Council
courses in the UK, PSSC Physics, Harvard Project Physics, BSCS, CBA, CHEM
Study, etc., in the USA and ASEP in Australia). Central to many of these
developments was a belief that considerations of the structure of science, scientific
knowledge and scientific method should be major factors in curriculum design.
Indications of the philosophical perspective underpinning science curriculum pro-
vision can be found in the rhetoric surrounding the proposals and in the choice of
content and learning methods. Curriculum aims and objectives, content, materials,
methods and assessment procedures all carry assumptions about the nature of science
and scientific method. A number of detailed reviews of the philosophical stance
of various published courses and school textbooks are available elsewhere (Jones,
O.M. 1974; Selley 1979; Jones, V.G. 1981; Wright 1982); this article considers only
one or two general aspects concerning the aims of science education, the image of
science presented through the curriculum and the learning experiences provided.
As far as learning experiences are concerned, attention has been directed principally
to three issues which relate directly to considerations in the philosophy of science.
(i) The role of scientific theory.
(ii) The nature of scientific method.
(iii) The purpose of practical work.

THE AIMS OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

The rapid changes in the science curriculum occurring during the 1960s have been
well documented elsewhere (Lewis 1965; Hurd 1969; Uzzell 1978; Waring 1979;
Jones, V.G. 1981). Most of these writers point to a significant shift of emphasis
 26 Derek Hodson

during this period towards science as a human activity, with increasing curriculum
emphasis on providing an awareness of what scientists do. Such a re-orientation
from content to method implies an understanding of what 'being a scientist' and
'thinking scientifically' actually entail, confidence that children can be initiated into
this understanding and belief that such an approach is likely to provide a superior
science education to previous approaches. Much of this confidence was misplaced.
It would be a gross over-simplification to assume that the emphasis on 'being
a scientist' was the only curriculum initiative during this period. Indeed, Roberts
(1982) identifies seven different 'curriculum emphases': 'Everyday Coping', 'Struc-
ture of Science', 'Science, Technology and Decisions', 'Scientific Skill Development',
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'Correct Explanations', 'Self as Explainer' and 'Solid Foundation'. Clearly, none

of these is an exclusively correct view, and shifts of emphasis are apparent with
time. Fashions come and go! At present there would seem to be an increasing move
towards education about science (its relevance to society and to the environment)
and away from education in science. Indeed, Gresswell (1974) advocates the aban-
donment of what he calls the 'obsolete' idea of the pursuit of science for the sake
of knowledge and its replacement by a concern with social, political and technological
issues. The tragedy from the learner's point of view is that reform movements tend
to lose sight of the other emphases in their pursuit of their particular orientation.
Social, moral and economic issues are important, of course, and should be included
in contemporary science courses at secondary level. But this should not mean that
all other emphases are out-of-date and should be abandoned. As Thelen (1983)
argues, we need to include value issues as well as, not instead of, concern with the
products and processes of science. A science education programme is incomplete
if it neglects any of the following: a concern for scientific knowledge (certain facts,
principles and theories are worth knowing), a concern for the processes and methods
of science (reasoning and investigating), direct experience of scientific activity,
appreciation of the complex relationshps between science and society and the foster-
ing of positive attitudes towards science.

THE IMAGE OF SCIENCE

What children understand about the nature of science and the activities of scien-
tists, and their attitudes towards science (i.e. the new public image of science) are
compounded of their curricular experiences and the existing public image of science,
as portrayed by informal learning channels (Lucas 1983). There is considerable
evidence that attitudes to science are formed very early and that the most impor-
tant factors in determining them are teaching style (Evans and Baker 1977) and the
teacher's own image of science (Jungwirth 1971). If Schibeci's (1981) claim is correct
that many teachers only put explicit value on cognitive objectives and leave attitudes
and concern with the appreciation of the nature of science to chance, then it is the
implicit philosophy of the curriculum (what one might call the 'hidden science
curriculum') which carries the important message about what science is and is
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 27

ultimately responsible for forming children's attitudes and beliefs. Smolicz and
Nunan (1975) identify four of these implicit assumptions: the anthropocentric view
(man as conqueror and controller of nature through science), the principle of quan-
tification and demystification (science as a rational process for obtaining quantitative
information about the world), the positivistic faith (faith in the continued advance
of technology through application of scientific method) and the analytic ideal (the
assumption that the whole is best understood by a study of its component parts).
Because school science has traditionally drawn no clear distinction between science
and technology, technological advance is seen to derive directly from a correct ap-
plication of scientific method to everyday problems, resulting in the propagation
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of what Eastman (1969) terms scientism — the assumption that scientific method
is universally powerful and applicable. By emphasising only the tactics of a
formalised scientific method and the knowledge products of the scientific endeavour,
science education projects a distorted image of scientists as objective, open-minded,
unbiased and possessing a critical and infallible method (Gauld 1973; Connelly et
al. 1977; Malvern 1977; Brophy 1978; Cawthron and Rowell 1978). Science and
the knowledge it produces are seen to have certain characteristics.
1. Science gives access to factual truths about the world through detached
observation.
2. Scientific knowledge is derived directly from the observation of phenomena.
3. Science rationally tests its propositions by means of objective and reliable
experimental procedures.
4. Science is a neutral activity untainted by socio-historical and economic factors,
producing value-free knowledge.
Nadeau and Désautels (1984) argue that because of these assumptions, school
science propagates five myths: 'naive realism', 'blissful empiricism', 'credulous
experimentation', 'excessive rationalism' and 'blind idealism'. These myths are
internalised by teachers during their own science education and, in turn, re-presented
to children through the curriculum. A number of reports (HMI 1979; ASE 1979;
Finniston 1980) have suggested that this image of science as impersonal and lack-
ing in social responsibility is a major factor turning children, especially girls, away
from science and Entwistle and Duckworth (1977) have argued that recruitment
would be improved if science was seen to be more person-oriented. Indeed, whenever
the humanitarian aspects of science are emphasised, attitudes (and recruitment to
optional courses) are seen to improve (Brush 1979).
Neglect of social and humanitarian considerations, and the consequent adverse
image of science, is detrimental to the production of future scientists, but con-
siderably more detrimental to the production of a scientifically literate citizenry.
To a large extent it is teachers' inadequate understanding in philosophy of science,
particularly the continued advocacy of inductivism (long since abandoned by
philosophers of science), that leads them to project an unfavourable image of science
and the activities of scientists through the hidden science curriculum. Such a view
 28 Derek Hodson

of scientific method undervalues creativity and treats discovery as testing and proof.
It assumes that there is only one way of proceeding, makes no allowance for
individuality and is intolerant of 'deviant' opinion. Rubba et al. (1981) have shown
that 30% of children entering a science project competition (and hence considered
more capable and more knowledgeable about science than the average) regard science
as revealing 'incontrovertible truths, necessary absolute truths'. All of the children
failed to appreciate the tentative nature of scientific knowledge. Gauld and Hukins
(1980) define the scientific attitude as 'an attitude to ideas and information and
to particular ways of evaluating them' and so distinguish it from attitude to science
and scientists and from ability to use scientific procedures. There is no doubt that
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inculcation of 'the scientific attitude' has a high priority in the rhetoric surroun-
ding science curriculum developments. It is generally believed that children will best
appreciate the activities of scientists by adopting a stance of objectivity, open-
mindedness and willingness to suspend judgement, and that such qualities, desirable
in themselves, are transferable to other areas of concern. However, there would
appear to be considerable discrepancy between this idealised picture of scientific
attitudes and the characteristics of real scientists (Mahoney 1979). If this is the case,
it is high time that we abandoned this stereotype. As Gauld (1982) remarks, 'teaching
that scientists possess these characteristics is bad enough, but it is abhorrent that
science educators should actually attempt to mould children in the same false image'.
A radical reappraisal of what constitutes the scientific attitude is needed in the light
of contemporary thinking in philosophy and sociology of science if the present
distorted and damaging image of science presented through the secondary school
science curriculum is to be modified.

WHY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?

Science education in school has to cater for two broad groups of pupils: those
who will study science at an advanced level and those who will not. Thus, the science
curriculum must be a sound and adequate preparation for later study and must ensure
scientific literacy for those others (the majority) who will opt for alternative pur-
suits. In meeting these two needs it must teach science and teach about science. An
important question, then, in the design of science curricula is whether one can learn
what it is to be scientific without being scientific and whether one can be scientific
without knowing what it is to be scientific. Green (1964) argues that knowing about
being a scientist, although not sufficient, is a necessary condition for being a scien-
tist. On the other hand, Scheffler (1973) argues that to be a skilled scientist it is
not necessary to engage in or even to understand arguments in the philosophy of
science, but that such is essential for science teachers. This rather odd conclusion
that practitioners need to be less knowledgeable about their discipline (in a
philosophical sense) than those who teach, implies a distinction between education
in science (which requires an understanding of the procedures of science) and training
in science (which doesn't). In general terms, this distinction is dealt with at some
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 29

length by a number of writers (Nagel 1969; Hirst 1974; Langford 1975; Margetson
1981) and will not be further discussed here beyond the assumption that the cur-
riculum should seek a satisfactory science education for all.
Some seventy years ago, Dewey (1916) argued that familiarity with scientific
method was more important than content, particularly for those who would not
become scientists and during the 1960s and 1970s there was increasing awareness
that pupils need to be taught the philosophy and methodology of science if they
are to appreciate the difference between science and other disciplines (Kuslan and
Stone 1968; Tisher, Power and Endean 1972). Though most writers advocate that
this understanding should be conveyed indirectly, as part of the day-to-day learn-
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ing of science (Baddeley 1980, Matthews 1975), there have been calls for the direct
teaching of the philosophy of science (Lewis 1965; Forge 1979). In either event,
science teachers need some understanding in the philosophy of science and its
relevance to science education, and there have been numerous pleas for increased
attention to be paid to the philosophy of science in teacher training, in in-service
courses and in curriculum planning (Rutherford 1964; Bridgham 1969; Koertge 1969;
Finch 1971; Martin 1972; Aley 1973; Connelly 1974; Dark and Squires 1975; Ennis
1979; Harms and Yager 1981; Manuel 1981; Summers 1982a). It should be noted
in passing, that not all educators share this view. For example, Wilson and Cowell
(1982) argue that 'anyone who believed that what (say) Popper or Kuhn were con-
cerned with was central to education in science would, surely, either not know the
kind of issues these philosophers were trying to tackle or not have a firm grasp on
the idea of education'.
Some years ago Robinson (1969) observed that science curricula are not founded
on sound ideas in the philosophy of science and little has occurred since then to
improve the situation. Despite the ever-growing number of books and articles deal-
ing with such issues, science teachers remain surprisingly uninformed about issues
in the philosophy of science, their awareness running some twenty to thirty years
behind contemporary developments (Elkana 1970). As the ASE (1979) report 'most
science teachers, who are themselves products of a science education that places
a high premium on scientific knowledge and pays lip service to the history and
philosophy of science, share with many practising scientists a scant understanding
of the nature of scientific knowledge itself. It is interesting that scientists are also
regarded as deficient in understanding, a view expressed earlier by Medawar (1969)
and Kimball (1967).
A survey by Durkee (1975) found that both scientists and philosophers consider
the chief aim of science to be 'a search for pattern and coherence in nature', but
whereas scientists tend to favour inductivism and an instrumentalist view of scien-
tific theory, philosophers tend to reject both positions. Evidence of the widespread
acceptance of inductivism (by scientists and non-scientists, teachers and students)
is provided by several recent studies (Ogunniyi and Pelia 1980; Rowell and Cawthron
1982). Bileh and Malik (1977) review a number of studies which suggest that teachers'
 30 Derek Hodson
understanding of the nature of science is no better than that of their students, though
Carey and Strauss (1968, 1970) show that it can be enhanced by appropriate in-service
training. Robinson (1969) expressed the fear that the efforts of curriculum developers
would be rendered ineffective in bringing about desired changes in children if
teachers' understanding of the nature of science were not also transformed. Perhaps
this is the explanation behind Aikenhead's (1973) finding that the national curriculum
projects in the USA have not led to more learning about science and scientists than
traditional courses. It is, therefore, all the more disappointing that the ASE policy
statement Education Through Science (1981) does not specifically recommend such
in-service training as an urgent priority.
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The nature and extent of dissatisfaction felt about teachers' understanding of

science and about current science curricula, and the specific recommendations made
by a particular writer depend on the writer's own philosophical perspective. The
range of perspectives is considerable: whilst some writers argue for a move from
inductivism to Popperian hypothetico-deductive approaches, others advocate a shift
away from Popperian methodology towards Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian views. Table
1 lists the major philosophical issues addressed in a number of recent works.

Problems of Falsifica- Problems of Kuhnian Post-Kuhnian

observation tionism falsifica- views views
& induction tionism

Hamilton (1974)
Jones, O.M. (1974)
Tawney (1974)
Westwood (1977)
Donnelly (1979)
Forge (1979)
Richardson and Boyle (1979)
Freundlich (1980)
Heath (1980)
Whitaker (1980)
Jones, V.G. (1981)
Laura (1981)
Dibbs (1982)
Margetson (1982)
Nock and Nelson (1982)
Swartz (1982)
Wright (1982)
Abimbola (1983)
Akeroyd (1983)
Finley (1983)
Wagner (1983)
Robinson M.C. (1984)

Table 1 Major issues in selected recent studies

 Philosophy of science. science and science education 31
According to Losee (1980), philosophy of science is concerned with four basic
questions.
1. What characteristics distinguish scientific inquiry from other types of
investigation?
2. What procedures should scientists follow in investigating nature?
3. What conditions must be satisfied for a scientific explanation to be correct?
4. What is the cognitive status of scientific laws and principles?
It is not appropriate here to enter into a detailed discussion of each of these ques-
tions and comment is restricted to a consideration of issues which are central to
curriculum design. There is a measure of agreement amongst the authors listed in
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Table 1 on a number of points relevant to the school science curriculum.

i) Observations depend on our often inadequate sense perceptions and,
therefore, are unreliable and fallible
ii) Observations are theory dependent and theory often (though not always)
precedes observation.
iii) Indirect observation depends on an additional theory of instrumentation.
iv) Observations and theories have logically different status.
v) Concepts and theories are produced by creative acts of abstraction and
invention.
vi) Theories are often justified post hoc by experimental evidence, but for a
theory to be accepted as science there must be (conceivable) evidence for
or against.
vii) Scientific concepts have their meaning in the role they play within a
theoretical structure, rather than in formal lexical definitions.
viii) Scientific knowledge and scientific theories may have only temporary status.
Concepts and theories change and develop; some disappear.
ix) Induction is inadequate as a description of scientific method.
More problematic than these are certain issues related to the nature of scientific
knowledge (especially theoretical knowledge), the precise nature of scientific method,
and the part played in scientific practice by the community of scientists.

THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ROLE OF THEORY

In presenting theoretical knowledge in science it is important that the nature and
purpose of theory is made apparent. Its purpose is to explain phenomena and merely
to learn theory without examining its empirical basis is little better than the rote
memorisation of facts. Theories are not derived from direct observations (by
induction), but their value to scientists lies in their ability to explain observations.
A view appropriate to school science is that scientific theories are complex struc-
tures (not simple statements open to a yes/no test) which stand or fall on their ability
to describe, explain and predict observable phenomena. The degree of theoretical
sophistication appropriate to particular stages should, therefore, be determined by
ability to explain the phenomena the children will encounter, and as children pro-
 32 Derek Hodson

gress through the school the form of the theory should develop (Selley 1981, 1981a).
Acceptance of this position leads directly to the realism/instrumentalism controversy.
Ormell (1980) declares that the main purpose of teaching science is 'to bring
children to a state of mind in which they understand . . . phenomena which scien-
tists have explained'. This is fine as far as it goes, but it does not establish whether
the 'explanation' we present to children should be regarded as a description of the
actual state of affairs or merely as a convenient device to enable us to obtain some
predictive understanding of nature. As far as school science is concerned there would
appear to be two extreme positions; naive realism and instrumentalism.
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In naive realism scientific theory is believed to provide a true description of the

world, though because our senses are deficient and our methods are occasionally
suspect, we may be wrong and subsequently have to modify, or totally re-cast our
view in the light of new data, or a new way of looking at existing data. All entities
in scientific propositions are held to have a real existence. For the instrumentalist,
the observable, real world is described by means of an imaginary scientific theoretical
model. Theories are not attempts to describe the real world but are convenient
fictions whose value is judged by their usefulness in explanation and prediction.
Such a position draws a sharp distinction between observable entities and theoretical
ones.
This aspect of the philosophy of science has particular relevance to school science
which teaches about physical phenomena through the use of theoretical models and
explanations. Osborne and Gilbert (1980) acknowledge that our understanding of
the physical world can never be certain and that the best we can do is 'to guess
(intelligently) some likely cause and to build imaginative pictures of the processes
which give rise to the observed behaviour'. In saying that such 'pictures' are called
theories or models, they fail to draw the clear distinction between the realist position
(theory) and instrumentalist position (model) that Achinstein (1965) and Forge (1979)
regard as essential. Whilst the choice of 'theory' or 'model' is to some extent a
semantic issue, it does highlight the difficulty of deciding which theoretical entities
are regarded as real and which are regarded as convenient fictions.
There are, in addition, two other positions regarding scientific theory which could
be taken: idealism, according to which the whole of the perceptual physical world
is regarded as an illusion and the only reality is the scientific theoretical world
(Eddington, 1928); and a sophisticated realist position that is variously termed critical
realism (Caws 1965; Barbour 1966), pluralistic realism (Chalmers 1978) and
temperate rationalism (Newton-Smith 1981). This latter doctrine avoids the bifur-
cation into the real world and the theoretical world by recognising that science con-
tains knowledge compounded of man's creative speculation and patterns of events
which have an ontological existence. Our knowledge is to some extent derived from
the external world (it is not all conjecture), but many of our theoretical concepts
have no directly observable features.
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 33
In discussing the most appropriate view of scientific theory for school science,
Hodson (1982a, b) and Selley (1979) both advocate realism, but their views of 'reality'
are significantly different. Selley's view is that reality is best represented as a con-
tinuum from direct sense experience to pure conjecture. The reality of an entity
depends on the immediacy of our experience of it, which may be a mixture of direct
observation and theoretical inference. In that event the entity is 'moderately real'.
The difficulties created by this position have been discussed by Hodson, who argues
that they can be solved by adopting Dewey's view that a sharp distinction can be
drawn between the statements 'theoretical entities are real' and 'theoretical entities
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exist'. 'Real' is being employed in the sense used by Popper (1972), i.e. having an
independent, objective existence.
Difference in status between theories and models is not one of degree. Both are
interpretations of sense data (not direct perceptions), but theories are believed to
be 'true' (in the Popperian sense of 'corresponding to the facts'), models are not.
Science often approaches a realist theory by way of instrumentalist models and may
retain a structure in an instrumentalist capacity (i.e. as a convenient model) after
its realist value has been eroded. Use of the terms 'model' and 'theory' within the
science curriculum should, therefore, be an indication of the 'degree of certainty'
with which we hold a particular view (Tawney 1974).
Additionally, there are differences in the degree of complexity of theories and
models. Taking three of Nagel's (1969) four categories of theory as being relevant
to scientific theories, it is possible to identify (in order of increasing complexity)
'strategic variable' theories (which merely list the factors and cannot be refuted or
confirmed), 'limited generalisations' (inductively derived and fairly modest theories
which assert some relation of dependence between variables and whose validity
depends on congruence with observed 'facts') and 'integrated systems' (which are
comprehensive conceptual structures with deductive power of explanation and predic-
tion). It should be made clear to pupils what kind of model or theory is being
employed at any particular time.
In the document Science and Education, identified above as the major impetus
to science curriculum reform in the UK, confusion regarding the proper role of theory
is apparent in the assertion on the one hand, that 'theories are to be used, not
accepted' and, on the other hand, that science is a 'quest for truth' and theories
are 'validated' by experiment. With the introduction of the Nuffield, PSSC, BSCS
and CHEM Study courses a shift of emphasis towards an instrumentalist view of
scientific theory is apparent (Elkana 1970). There is a disturbing emphasis on the
distinction between observed experimental 'facts' and theories, which seems to imply
that theory-free observations are posssible, and there is a marked tendency in all
the schemes to confuse an inductive summary of experimental results (Nagel's (1969)
'limited generalisation' or 'strategic variables theory') with a fully developed scien-
tific theory. Too many curricula introduce theories as 'pieces of knowledge' and
 34 Derek Hodson

then fail to employ them. One is tempted to enquire whether, in the absence of
phenomena to be explained, there is any need for theory at all. In order to avoid
an excessively instrumentalist view without falling into the trap of naive realism,
a major theory in school science should pass through several stages.
1. Tentative introduction as a model (instrumental phase).
2. A search for evidence through observation and experiment.
3. Further elaboration of the model into a theory.
4. Acceptance of the theory into the body of scientific knowledge (realist phase).
5. Use of the sophisticated theory to explain phenomena.
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6. Testing of the theory's predictions and application of the theory in new

situations.

SCIENTIFIC METHOD
The most significant feature of curriculum development in science during the past
twenty years has been the move away from the teaching of science as a body of
knowledge towards the experience of science as a method of generating and validating
such knowledge. Science teachers have been encouraged to provide courses which
exemplify scientific method and which put the pupil in the position of 'being a scien-
tist'. This entirely laudable intention does, however, carry with it the assumption
that scientific method can be fairly easily characterised and taught. A considera-
tion of the extensive literature in the philosophy of science reveals that such an
assumption cannot be sustained. There is no general agreement on what constitutes
scientific method, something which, in retrospect, should not surprise us in view
of the complexity of the scientific enterprise, the myriad of possible starting points
and the differences in knowledge and personality between individual scientists (White
1983). But the fact that we cannot describe a single, simple method does not mean
that science has no methods and we would do children a gross disservice if we implied
that the world of the scientist is totally anarchic, a disservice, just as great as the
suggestion that science is propelled by a single, all-powerful method. The fact that
science has no access to absolute truth does not mean that scientific knowledge cannot
move progressively towards the truth. The fact that science has no one entirely
rational method does not mean that science is a mere jumble of irrational goings-
on. The fact that we choose to adopt certain procedures and theories has nothing
whatever to do with the objective validity of those procedures or theories.
Schwab (1962) considers there to be two basic methods (syntactical structures)
for science: the syntax of stable enquiry (roughly equivalent to Kuhn's 'normal
science') and the syntax of fluid enquiry (which approximates to the period of
'extraordinary science' immediately preceding and accompanying a Kuhnian scien-
tific revolution). Whilst the latter methodology has no recognised structure and
would not, therefore, provide a model for curriculum building, the former
methodology can be characterised as seven steps, each of which can presumably
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 35

be taught (Wallis 1980; Herron 1971). There are those who consider that Schwab's
structures do not constitute real descriptions of science and scientific practice and
are mere pedagogic devices to assist the learning of science (Phillips 1974; Fenster-
macher 1980). Structures introduced solely to assist learning are legitimate if they
do assist such learning and we are aware of their instrumental nature (i.e. we
recognise them as models rather than theories).
In seeking a view of scientific method suitable for the school curriculum, Hodson
(1982 c) suggests a modification of Popper's (1972) Three worlds' view of
knowledge, replacing the world of human thought (world 2) by scientific method
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(Figure 1). Scientific method is seen as a dynamic process which changes and develops
as the scientific knowledge it utilises changes and develops. There is a range of
processes available to scientists and a particular individual adopts the selection from
these processes that he/she considers most appropriate to the domain and to the
substantive structure employed. Brewster (1984) provides a helpful review of the
extensive literature dealing with the processes of science.
The views of scientific method contained in the Nuffield schemes are simplistic
and frequently inconsistent. Whilst the Nuffield chemistry scheme exhibits some
Popperian overtones (i.e. the tentative nature of theoretical speculation), it is, in
cdmmon with most of the Nuffield courses, predominantly induedvist in outlook.
Experiments invariably precede theories and theory construction is regarded as a
search for patterns and generalisations of experimental data (which are regarded
as secure 'facts'). Serious inconsistencies are apparent in Nuffield Physics, which
explicitly rejects Baconian inductivism yet asserts that an experiment is an 'open-
eyed and open-minded putting of questions of Nature' (Rogers 1966). Similar
criticisms have been levelled at CHEM Study, CBA and PSSC ( Diederich 1969;
Elkana 1970).
The almost universal adoption of inductivism by the Nuffield schemes seems to
have arisen from a praiseworthy attempt to avoid the trap of traditional school
experiments serving merely to confirm theoretical knowledge given earlier. Unfor-
tunately, in attempting to avoid this trap the authors of these schemes fell into
another: the assumption that theoretical structures can emerge from experimental
data by a process of inductive generalisation.

Figure 1 Popper's 'three worlds' view of knowledge modified to include

scientific method
 36 Derek Hodson
THE COMMUNITY OF SCIENTISTS
It is not appropriate here to enter into a discussion of the sociological issues sur-
rounding the practice of science by the community of scientists, save to note that
some understanding that science is a complex social activity is an important, though
invariably neglected aspect of the curriculum. Reviews of the rapidly growing
literature in the sociology of science are provided by Brannigan (1981), Barnes and
Edge (1982), Shapin (1982) and Collins (1982). Basically, there are two extreme posi-
tions; (i) scientific thought is independent of social forces (the traditional view),
and (ii) scientific thought is determined by social forces (the new sociology of science).
In an attempted compromise, Laudan (1977) asserts that sociological explanations
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are invoked when beliefs cannot be justified rationally or when 'the unexpected
happens'. Perhaps a more productive compromise is Lugg's (1983) attempt to sub-
sume social considerations within the rational procedures of science (the reverse
of Bloor's (1976) attempt to subsume 'rationality' under social considerations).
Whilst such issues are still a matter of debate, what is beyond doubt is that the
disciplines have a social reality: they comprise groups of people working, com-
municating, sharing ideas and procedures, and controlling admission to the com-
munity and the publication of new knowledge. Perhaps the key to understanding
this social reality is through a consideration of the nature of scientific knowledge
itself. Basically, there are three distinct views of scientific knowledge: the subjec-
tivist view (which regards scientific knowledge as a set of beliefs held by individual
scientists), the objectivist view (which asserts the separateness of knower and known,
and claims that knowledge has an autonomous existence independent of the opinions
and feelings of individuals) and the consensus view (which holds that the beliefs
of individual scientists are subservient to those of the scientific community and that
meanings are socially constructed). Ravetz's (1971) cathedral-building analogy can
be employed to present a compromise view of scientific knowledge suitable for school
science (Hodson 1981). Scientific practice may be regarded as a process with three
distinct phases: creation, validation and incorporation into the body of knowledge.
Scientific knowledge is the product of a complex social activity which precedes and
follows the individual act of discovery or creation. An individual's confidence in
new experimental results or in a new theoretical system is insufficient to establish
it as part of scientific knowledge. It must stand up to criticism or testing by fellow
practitioners. The criteria of truth and acceptability are determined by the com-
munity and scientific knowledge is recorded for the community in a style approved
by the community. There are distinct phases in the practice of science and it is
important that school science curricula recognise them and draw clear distinctions
between hypothesis generation (by creative speculation), hypothesis testing (by critical
experimentation) and the social processes of acceptance and recording of scientific
knowledge. If these distinctions are clearly drawn and made apparent to the children,
many of the problems of mismatch between school science, real science and the
philosophy of science (with the attendant adverse effects described earlier) would
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 37
be minimised. Thus, it might be convenient for pupils to consider scientific prac-
tice as comprising three major elements.
1. An individual creative phase, starting from knowledge currently accepted by
the community.
2. An experimental phase, using procedures accepted and validated by the
community.
3. A recording and reporting phase, adopting language and forms approved by
the community.

1. The Creative Phase

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Creativity lies at the heart of scientific practice, yet many philosophers are reluc-
tant to attempt to analyse it. Perhaps it defies analysis and, being a cognitive pro-
cess, is more appropriately the concern of psychologists than philosophers. In the
space available here it is not possible to attempt a discussion of the issues involved,
save to note (i) that there is a growing literature concerned with creativity in science
and (ii) that it is an unfortunate consequence of teachers' concern to teach correct
knowledge and to eliminate misconceptions in children's understanding of science
that they may (unconsciously) tend to discourage speculative thought in children
(Donnelly 1979) and thus foster the mistaken view that science is intolerant of
individual opinion. A complete understanding of scientific practice requires that
children be provided with opportunities to think creatively. Medawar (1969) iden-
tifies four kinds of scientific creativity: deductive intuition, inductive intuition,
instant apprehension of analogy and experimental flair. Children should be pro-
vided with opportunities to develop and practise each of these skills. Tawney (1974)
and Driver (1975) argue that technology is a better vehicle than science for foster-
ing creativity because technological problems never have a single correct solution.
Others have suggested case studies, project work and computer-assisted learning.

2. The Experimental Phase

Medawar (1969) identifies four types of experiment in science.
1. Inductive (or Baconian) experiments, necessitating a belief in induction and
observation as prerequisites for making generalisations.
2. Deductive (or Kantian) experiments to examine the consequences of vary-
ing the axioms or presuppositions of a scheme of deductive reasoning.
3. Critical (or Galilean) experiments: actions carried out to test a hypothesis
by examining the logical consequences of it.
4. Demonstrative (or Aristotelian) experiments designed to illustrate a
preconceived belief and convince people of its validity.
He asserts that most original research begins with Baconian experiments. As
notions begin to form it becomes necessary to distinguish between them by critical
experiments (which he sees as the principal demarcation between science and non-
science). A Kuhnian analysis of science might recognise inductive experiments as
 38 Derek Hodson

appropriate to pre-paradigmatic activity, deductive and demonstrative experiments

as typical of normal science and critical experiments as part of the activity immed-
iately preceding a scientific revolution.
It is centrally important to good curriculum design that experimental work in
class has a clearly defined function. Children should be clear in their minds whether
they are simply collecting data (with a view to making inductive generalisations),
testing a hypothesis or illustrating relationships within a conceptual structure. The
relationship between experiment and theory is more complex than many teachers,
and indeed many philosophers, assume. Some experimental work is generated
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entirely by theoretical speculation; some theories owe their origins to pre-theoretical

experimentation; sometimes experimental findings have to wait 'in limbo' whilst
theoreticians attempt to account for them; occasionally quite complex theories have
no immediate experimental support. And, on occasions, theory and experiment
develop together: experiments testing the empirical adequacy of the theory and
guiding theory construction by 'filling in the gaps' and pointing out potentially fruit-
ful avenues of investigation. The complexity of these relationships is rarely made
apparent in school science, which tends to assume a simple inductive or critical role
for experiment and to confuse the teaching of an awareness of the role of experiments
with other pedagogic goals.

3. The Recording and Reporting Phase

As several writers have observed (Medawar 1967; Ziman 1980) there is a marked
difference between the way science is carried out and the way science is written up
in research papers and in textbooks. Science curricula fail to make children suffi-
ciently aware of this difference and of the reasons for it. Perhaps the neglect of
this issue lies at the root of the mismatch between school science and real science
and is a major factor in turning children away from science. An individual scientist
thinks and works in a free and creative 'private language', but is constrained by
the community to present his/her work for appraisal and publication in the formal
'public language' of science (Holton 1962; Elkana 1970). Science textbooks, derived
from academic papers, ignore the existence of 'private science' and present science
in its 'public' form only (Smolicz 1970; Ziman 1980; Elkana 1975). They also present
science solely from the perspective and within the assumptions of the prevailing
paradigm, thereby disguising the revolutionary nature of major scientific advances
(Kuhn 1970: Siegel 1978, 1979).
Children could be brought to an understanding that research papers are written
to persuade readers to accept conclusions, rather than to describe what actually
happened on a day-to-day basis, by reading academic papers (suitably edited to
reduce conceptual and linguistic complexity) in conjunction with personal accounts,
such as Watson's The Double Helix (1970). Reinforcement of the distinction could
be made through children's own writing: sometimes accounts of laboratory
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 39

experiences expressed in 'private language' and sometimes descriptions of procedures

and results expressed in community 'public language'.

THE ROLE OF PRACTICAL WORK

Whilst there is a long tradition of practical work in the science curriculum, many
teachers who advocate its extensive use are unsure of its precise role. A practical
session which lacks clarity of purpose, or attempts to achieve several diverse goals
simultaneously may prove pedagogically useless. Attempts to ascertain teachers'
purposes for such work (extensively reviewed by Guthrie (1980)) have identified
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a wide range of goals, though it is sufficient for present purposes to group them
into four major categories.
1. To stimulate interest and enjoyment.
2. To teach laboratory skills.
3. To teach the processes of science.
4. To assist the learning of scientific knowledge.
A number of studies have identified a significant shift of priority away from a
concern with scientific knowledge (rated as the most important in Kerr's (1963) classic
study) towards the processes of science and the fostering of attitudes and interest
(Woolnough 1976; Gould 1978; Beatty and Woolnough 1982a, b). It is significant
that practical work is seen rather differently by teachers and pupils (Boud 1973;
Gunning and Johnstone 1976; Boud et al. 1980; Lynch and Ndyetabura 1983), with
children expecting to carry out practical work principally to find out what scien-
tists do (Hofstein et al. 1980; Kyle 1980). Therefore, the kind of practical work
presented will markedly affect their views of science.
Michels (1962) and Ramsey (1975) argue very strongly that the procedures of
science should be adopted as the methods of learning science. Implicit in these sug-
gestions are a commitment to extensive laboratory work and to the adoption of
discovery or inquiry methods of learning. This latter assumption is worthy of closer
scrutiny. 'Learning science by discovery' and 'teaching science as inquiry' are too
often bandwagon slogans rather than carefully thought out pedagogic procedures.
At best they are ambiguous. There are at least four possible meanings.
1. Teaching science as a method of acquiring knowledge, with a curriculum
emphasis on epistemological issues such as the status of observations and scien-
tific knowledge, the nature of scientific theories and methods of scientific
inquiry.
2. Teaching science as a set of inquiry skills, with a curriculum emphasis on
the acquisition and use of the specific skills of observation, measurement,
data interpretation, etc.
3. Teaching science as a general and generalisable method of inquiry, with a
curriculum emphasis on the general strategic skills of problem-solving, logical
reasoning and decision-making.
 40 Derek Hodson

4. Teaching science through inquiry, with a curriculum emphasis on acquiring

scientific knowledge by using the methods and processes of science.
In general terms, approaches 1-3 emphasise the acquisition of knowledge about
inquiry and discovery whilst approach 4 emphasises the acquisition of knowledge
through inquiry and discovery. It would seem that it is this latter position that is
advocated by the Nuffield courses and their American counterparts (Kornhauser
1979). It is interesting to speculate on why discovery methods have been so widely
and vigorously promoted. It seems not to be because they are successful in bring-
ing about learning: in reviewing research evidence supporting the use of discovery
methods Nuthall (1973) concludes that the evidence is 'inconclusive'. Such methods,
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he says, appear to suit some learners, but not others. The major impetus was the
fusion of inductivist ideas about scientific method with progressive child-centred
views of education. In promoting the value of direct experience and an inquiry-
oriented curriculum, in stressing the motivational value of finding out for oneself
and in their use of terms such as observation, experiment and investigation,
psychologists produced a model of learning which seemed to fit perfectly the tradi-
tional inductivist-empiricist views of scientific methodology (Cawthron and Rowell
1978; Harris and Taylor 1983). However, inquiry in this psychological sense is very
different from its meaning in an epistemological context. Whilst some writers con-
tinue to maintain that discovery methods do provide insight into scientific method
(Jones, C.E. 1970; Burden, Turner and Whittaker 1975; Prestt 1976; Rogers 1982;
van Praagh 1983), there is a growing awareness that in relying heavily on inductive
inferences such methods present a distorted and inadequate view of scientific
methodology (Ivany 1969; Tampion 1977; Brandon 1981; Wellington 1981; Summers
1982b).
It would, of course, be unacceptable for children to 'discover' an alternative
science to the prevailing paradigm. Thus, it is an interesting paradox that the need
to guide them towards the (re)discovery of accepted knowledge instils in children
a concern with what 'ought to happen' and projects an authoritarian, doctrinaire
image of science that discovery methods were expressly introduced to counter
(Herron 1970; Schwartz 1974; Driver 1975; Gunning and Johnstone 1976; Stevens
1978). Partly through lack of sufficient time, and partly because genuine open-
endedness can lead to class management problems, discovery learning frequently
degenerates into a stage-managed pseudo-discovery of the inevitable, and the benefits
of making children active and engaging them in thinking are offset by the need to
so guide the discovery process that the 'thrill of discovery' is spoiled. Children are
frustrated because they frequently make observations and discoveries which the
teacher, because of prior theoretical knowledge, dismisses as irrelevant or wrong.
Faced with such experiences, they quickly lose confidence and incentive to pursue
such activities.
The suggestion that initial, unprejudiced observations lead infallibly to concep-
tual explanations is both philosophically and psychologically absurd. For children
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 41
to 'discover' anything at all they need a prior conceptual framework., Discovery
methods can legitimately investigate the relationships between concepts, but they
cannot lead to the formation of new concepts. The acquisition of new knowledge
depends on the child's existing knowledge and on the structure and organisation
of the new knowledge. Identifying learning methods solely with the procedures of
science leads to a neglect of the importance of the child's existing conceptual
frameworks. Children cannot discover all scientific knowledge for themselves, nor
can they be given scientific knowledge as though they were empty vessels waiting
to be filled up (what Popper calls the 'bucket theory' of mind). New knowledge
has to be firmly anchored to existing knowledge. Thus it is important for teachers
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to recognise the differences between real science and children's intuitive views of
the world: science utilises non-observable entities, complex abstract relationships
and precise technical language; children prefer simple, direct explanations. There
is now a rapidly growing body of literature attempting to describe the characteristics
of this 'children's science' and suggesting ways in which it can be built on so that
it is brought closer to scientist's science, or to 'curriculum science' since this in-
evitably differs from real science (Driver and Erickson 1983; Gilbert and Watts 1983).
Whilst much progress has been made in this area, there does seem to be an assump-
tion that a teacher's epistemological views determine his/her choice of learning
methods. Thus, Pope and Gilbert (1983) assert that a realist view of science leads
a teacher to adopt a 'cultural transmission' view of learning whilst a constructivist
(Kuhnian) view of science leads to a constructivist view of learning. This assump-
tion of an invariable relation between beliefs about the nature of science and beliefs
about how science is learned is, in my view, mistaken and is potentially damaging.
It is the same assumption underpinning the choice of the inductivist discovery lear-
ning methods in the 1960s.
How to teach science is not a scientific question and neither science nor philosophy
of science can give us infallible guidance on how to proceed. Scientific theory does
not contain within it a means of teaching and learning science, nor does scientific
method represent a significant means of acquiring scientific knowledge (except for
those involved in scientific research). The patterns and structures of science do not
constitute 'well tried learning mechanisms', as Ramsey (1975) alleges. Adoption of
learning methods based on a model of science is not a logical requirement of a com-
mitment to acquaint pupils with an understanding of the methods and procedures
of science. To make such an assumption is to confuse aims with methods. Not all
learning experiences should attempt to mimic scientific method. It is absurd to sug-
gest that the quite separate aims of understanding the procedures of science and
learning scientific knowledge require the learner to be put in a situation where he
has to learn the content through the method. In asserting that the epistemological
and the psychological can, indeed must be separated, if satisfactory learning
experiences are to be provided, I am not denying that there is a relationship between
epistemology and psychology (Posner et al. 1982).
 42 Derek Hodson

If discovery methods as utilised in the Nuffield and related courses are discredited
from an epistemological and psychological point of view, is there any sense in which
'discovery' can be retained? There is a sense in which children 'discover' when they
simply collect information in a rather open-ended way. But they certainly do not
'discover' the theoretical framework with which to classify and explain their findings.
This explanatory framework is provided by the teacher. If it is to have more than
this trivial meaning, discovery must be accompanied by an increase in understanding,
that is by an independently formed conclusion that a proposition is 'true' (in a Pop-
perian sense of corresponding with the facts). It is unrealistic to expect children
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to have hypothesised that proposition. But such may not be necessary. As Strike
(1975) observes, 'there are numerous cases of absolute discovery where a person
is credited with a discovery not because he conceived of a particular hypothesis,
but because he was the first to generate the evidence that a particular hypothesis
was true'. The distinction between the context of creation and the context of justifica-
tion is a useful one for the school science curriculum. If discovery learning is inter-
preted as hypothesis testing then it is philosophically more sound. Another useful
distinction for the curriculum designer is that between learning about the formula-
tion and testing of hypotheses, for which philosophical and historical studies are
appropriate, and learning how to formulate and test hypotheses, for which direct
experience is necessary (Martin 1972b). A number of curriculum development pro-
jects have changed the emphasis of school practical work away from the traditional
one of verifying theories towards hypothesis testing, a shift of emphasis which has
been warmly supported by Rachelson (1977), Brandon (1981) and Hamner (1980).
Unfortunately, the view of scientific method propagated by such courses is too
simplistic in implying that theories are simple propositions which should stand or
fall on the evidence of single experiments. For example, the Nuffield Working with
Science project embodies a hypothetico-deductive methodology based on hypothesis
testing (Wild and Gilbert 1977), but at a somewhat naive level, which assumes that
theory-independent evidence is available, that a theory can be isolated for testing
and that unambiguous testing is possible. This approach seems to carry the assump-
tion that theories are no more than simple guesses, of the kind that children
themselves produce after a few moments of laboratory experience, and are easily
tested for validity by means of direct observations. Theories are subordinated to
experimentally gathered 'facts' and there is a real danger that children get an inflated
sense of the value of their 'experimental' results. The role of experiment is a crucial
one in science, but theories are only abandoned when there is compelling evidence
and/or an alternative theory. Good hypotheses are not abandoned because of a
few negative results. Thus, the implied relationship between science lessons and the
activities of scientists is grossly misleading. It would be more helpful to children
to draw distinctions between school experiments (designed for pedagogic purposes)
and real scientific research than to allow implicit parallels to be drawn.
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 43

The pupil's first priority is to learn currently accepted theories and to apply them
to appropriate phenomena and in appropriate situations. Theory testing is an
important skill to learn, but in class the test is of a minor or specific consequence
or application of a theory. It is not a test of the theory itself. Much of the laboratory
work in school should concentrate on theory illustration and investigation, rather
in the manner of Kuhn's normal science (Selley 1981). Theory rejection (revolu-
tionary science) is a rather rarer event and might best be approached by other
methods. No published course appears to take the more sophisticated view that it
is the consequences of a theory rather than the theory itself which is under test and
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that, because the testing procedure is also theory-dependent, considerable subjec-

tive judgement is involved in appraising the significance of apparently falsifying
evidence. In other words, experimental testing is not an infallible method, but a
decision-making process validated by the community.
Rational evaluation of practical work can only be made with reference to the
purposes of such work. Regarding the four major purposes listed earlier, doubt
has been cast on the first by Gonzalez and Gilbert (1980), who claim that its motiva-
tional value is more in the minds of teachers than children. The second has only
limited value: one is tempted to ask whether there is any intrinsic value at all in
laboratory skills or whether they are simply a means of acquiring and exploring
knowledge. This leaves categories 3 and 4, and the conflict between epistemological
validity and the need for active learning methods. This conflict arises from a major
confusion in science curriculum design which assumes that the use of practical work
is directly related to the experimental phase in the practice of science. Acquain-
tance with the function of the experimental phase is, of course, only one of the
reasons for providing children with the experience of practical laboratory work.
The conflict might best be resolved by looking closely at three aspects of experimental
work:
(i) the purpose of the experiment;
(ii) the experimental procedure;
(iii) the experimental results.
Each has a different pedagogic function. Consideration of purpose has value in
teaching an understanding of scientific methods; doing the experiment may have
some motivational value and is the way in which manipulative skills are acquired;
study of the results has value for the learning of scientific knowledge. There would
be value in considering each of these aspects separately (as pre-experiment goals,
during-experiment goals and post-experiment goals) and in selecting the approach
(individual practical work, teacher demonstration, computer simulation, etc.) that
is most appropriate to the aspect having pedagogic priority.
Yager et al. (1969) have claimed that, except in the area of laboratory skills, there
is no real advantage in individual practical work over teacher demonstration-based
courses, though Shulman and Tamir (1973) argue that the courses which they
 44 Derek Hodson
monitored (CHEM Study and BSCS) allow little opportunity for genuine open-ended
enquiry anyway and that if school science is to resemble real science it should exhibit
both the reflexive and the non-reflexive components (Herron's (1971) terms for
Kuhn's normal and revolutionary science). It could be argued, however, that because
reflexive (revolutionary) events are rather rare they should not be over-represented
in the curriculum, which should emphasise the various aspects of non-reflexive
(normal) science.
In an attempt to design a faithful representation of real science, Pella (1961) has
produced a hierarchical model for experimental work in school science. Depending
on the relative amounts of pupil-control versus teacher-control at each stage, five
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types of practical work are possible, ranging from skill practice through to individual
research. Whilst increasing the amount of pupil control may lead to school prac-
tical work more closely resembling real science, there are the constraints of time
and cost working in the opposite direction — though perhaps we are now at a critical
stage in the development of the science curriculum where we can provide increas-
ing amounts of pupil control through computer simulations of experimental
investigations without excessive cost or loss of teaching time. Although most modern
courses advocate extensive practical work, it could be argued that those who have
already reached the Piagetian stage of formal, abstract reasoning do not need the
concrete experience of actual laboratory experimentation. Thought experiments and
simulations might be just as effective. Indeed, Kreitler and Kreitler (1974) suggest
that real experiments may actually divert pupils' attention away from the impor-
tant theoretical features of a problem, and that freedom from the concrete may
be the first step towards freedom of thinking. Much practical work in school is
aimless, trivial and badly planned. It is used unthinkingly, without proper regard
for its pedagogic and epistemological roles. Precise instructions are given, but the
rationale underpinning the experimental procedure is often unclear, so that children
acquire certain manipulative skills, but little else (MacDuffie 1973; Johnstone and
Wham 1980, 1982; Moreira 1980). As a way forward, and as a way of enabling
teaching/learning methods to be more closely and rationally matched to educational
purposes, a clear distinction should be drawn between practical work and laboratory
work and, more particularly, between practical work and the experimental phase
of the scientific process. The role of experiment may, on occasions, be better taught
by historical case study or CAL simulation than by laboratory work. Practical work
is valuable for providing direct experience (active learning), but this does not mean
that it has to be solely laboratory work. Any direct, as opposed to passive method
would meet this need.
If experimental work is to be used to support the acquisition of new knowledge,
then it is important that the following conditions be met.
(i) The experiment focuses on central theoretical concepts and conceptual
relationships.
(ii) The experiment 'works' successfully.
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 45
(iii) The experiment is teacher-directed. Open-ended, pupil-directed experiments
may not lead to the desired learning.
(iv) The experiment is within the practical capabilities of the children.
(v) Only one, or a limited number of conclusions is possible from the
experimental data.
(vi) The teacher provides the conceptual structure for interpreting the
experiment.
It may be that in view of these considerations demonstrations and computer
simulations are, on occasions, more appropriate than individual practical work.
Clearly, computer simulation would do nothing to improve pupils' laboratory skills,
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though if the earlier assertion that such skills have only extrinsic value (in providing
the means by which other worthwhile goals are attained) is accepted, then this
objection to their widespread use is removed. It is time that individual laboratory
work was dethroned from its position of curriculum priority. A more rational
approach to good science curriculum design requires that we are clear about the
purpose of practical work (active learning methods) and that we exploit the par-
ticular strengths of individual laboratory work, teacher demonstration, project work,
CAL, audio-tutorial methods, video presentation, etc. (Henry 1975; Moore and
Thomas 1983). Genuine revolutionary science is, perhaps, best studied by means
of historical case studies, which concentrate on the theoretical circumstances of
discovery and use original writings (suitably edited for readability and for concep-
tual and procedural complexity). It is important in this approach that the nature
of the problem as it appeared at the time is appreciated. Children need to see the
'blind alleys' that were followed and to appreciate the part played by personal
ambition if they are to appreciate that science is a human activity of deep cultural
significance and not the humdrum, soulless affair described by many school science
textbooks. Since the pioneering work of Conant (1947, 1948) and Klopfer (1964),
several writers have recommended historical case studies, most recently Lind (1979),
Wellington (1981), Bradley (1984) and Collins and Shapin (1984). An urgent priority
is the development of suitable resource material interpreting scientific change from
a socio-economic-historical perspective.

CONCLUSIONS
The effects of modern courses on attitudes and interest are not very encouraging
(Meyer 1970; Kempa and Dube 1974; Gardner 1976, Simmons and Esler 1972) and,
in general, it seems that courses emphasising scientific method fare no better in later
recruitment to optional courses than courses emphasising scientific knowledge
(Walters and Boldt 1970). Reforms intended to make science in school more
interesting and more like real science did succeed in making scientific method (as
perceived by the authors) more prominent and in increasing the amount of pupil
practical work, but they also made science more difficult through a logical rather
than a psychological ordering of subject matter (Shayer and Adey 1981).
 46 Derek Hodson
Reference has already been made to children's inadequate and distorted views
of science and scientists. Young children appear to have some intuitive understanding
of the nature of science (Steller 1977; Smith 1978) and whilst this is generally not
well developed (Mackay 1971) it does seem to improve when attempts are made
to teach the philosophy of science or to provide training in inquiry methods (Weber
and Renner 1972; Barnfield et al. 1977; Bowyer and Linn 1978; Peterson 1978;
Haukoos and Penick 1983). Some modern courses appear to lead to improved critical
thinking and problem-solving (Seymour and Sutnam 1973;. Dillashaw and Okey
1980; Shaw 1983; Padilla et al. 1984), but there is little evidence that children can
transfer these skills to non-science areas (Sciadeh 1973; Kamm 1971; Tabbron and
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Kerr 1971; Dreyfus and Jungwirth 1980). Indeed, if there is any transfer it would
seem to be in the opposite direction, with children applying their everyday thinking
skills to laboratory problems (Maskill and Wallis 1982). Even large scale research
fails to yield clear and consistent conclusions about children's knowledge of scien-
tific methods and their abilities to employ the processes of science (Bybee et al.
1980; Welch, Klopfer et al. 1981) and some would argue that the results tell us no
more than 'some teachers are effective in communicating some understanding of
the nature of science' (Jungwirth 1972). This is largely because of uncertainty about
what these methods and processes are and how to measure them, and partly because
of the problems of relating outcomes to curriculum experiences. A major problem
of research in this area is that one cannot assume that use of a particular course
implies agreement with its philosophical stance or the adoption of appropriate
classroom behaviour (Raths 1973; Wilson 1977; Klopfer and Champagne 1981).
Actual classroom practice tends to be much more teacher-directed than the cur-
riculum plan would imply (Tamir 1977; Kyle 1977). Studies by Herron (1971) and
by Tamir and Lunetta (1981) have shown that many teachers using modern science
courses fail to provide opportunities consistent with the declared goals of these
schemes to develop scientific understanding and skills of investigation.
Eggleston, Galton and Jones (1976) identify three basic styles of science teaching,
which to some extent reflect implicit views about science: emphasis on teacher-
directed problem-solving ('actor managers'), emphasis on fact-finding and fact-
acquiring ('informers'), emphasis on pupil-centred enquiry ('enquirers'). It seems
that whilst 'enquirers' tend to foster better attitudes to science on the part of their
pupils, no one style leads to greater all round cognitive gains. The research pro-
vides no prescription for the ideal science teacher — the most appropriate style
depends on the particular cognitive gains desired. Whether teaching style is influenced
by the curriculum materials is uncertain (Power 1977); what is less in dispute is that
teaching style should change in relation to the cognitive gains, attitudes and skills
being pursued. Teachers should learn to 'wear different pedagogic hats', according
to the task in hand.
Regarding the issues under discussion in this article, it has been claimed that a
freer and less directed approach increases the ability of pupils to formulate
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 47
hypotheses, design experiments and analyse results (Raghubir 1979). Using a ques-
tionnaire procedure, Dibbs (1982) claims to have identified four types of science
teacher: the hypothetico-deductive teacher (H), the inductivist teacher (I), the
verificationist teacher (V) and the teacher with no discernible beliefs about the nature
of science (O). He further claims that when parallel groups of children were
experimentally provided with I, V and H style teaching (by Dibbs himself) there
were significant effects on the children's understanding of science. He also found
some evidence that V-style teaching resulted in higher scores on attainment tests,
but in lower recruitment to optional courses.
Though strongly related to academic ability, the ability to use theoretical ideas
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for the explanation of phenomena seems susceptible to the influences of teaching

style and teacher expectation (Selley 1979). Building on the pioneering work of
Schwab and Klopfer, Hacker has developed the Science Lesson Analysis System
(Hacker 1982), which identifies twelve categories of intellectual activity in science,
ranging from simple recall and making of observations to hypothesis generation
and experimental design. Observation of science lessons across twelve years of
primary and secondary schooling lead him to postulate a six-tier hierarchical model
of cognitive development in science (Hacker 1983, 1984). The lower levels of the
hierarchy focus on acquisition of the syntactical structure of science, proceeding
through the application of these skills to concrete tasks and the acquisition and con-
solidation of scientific knowledge, to use of the knowledge in problem-solving and
hypothesis generation. There is an element of circularity in the research. if the basic
premise of the argument (that children develop the intellectual skills they are given
experience of) is accepted, then the way they develop might conceivably be other-
wise and the model which Hacker presents may tell us more about science teachers
than it does about children. Nonetheless, there are some important and interesting
findings (for example, children as young as five or six were observed to make simple
hypotheses and devise suitable tests), which support the growing body of opinion
that Piagetian theory, by placing insufficient emphasis on the context of the problem
and the provision of suitable experiences, seriously underestimates the potential
abilities of children. Not everyone shares this view, of course. Bady (1979), for
example, suggests that it may be unrealistic to expect more than 50% of children
to appreciate the subtleties of falsificationism.

TOWARDS AN EPISTEMOLOGICALLY MORE VALID SCIENCE CURRICULUM

In some ways the rapid development of the science curriculum during the 1960s
and 1970s failed to meet its targets. There were considerable gains, but there were
areas of disappointment, too. Research evidence suggests that, in general, the new
courses have not led to increased interest in science, increased cognitive gains or
increased understanding of the nature of science. To some extent this was due to
a degree of confusion in three of the assumptions made by the developers.
1. The science curriculum should be determined by the nature of science.
 48 Derek Hodson
2. Scientific method can be described and taught.
3. Scientific knowledge is best learned through learning experiences based on
the procedures of science.
Few would argue against considerations of the nature of science having a signifi-
cant influence on the science curriculum. Perhaps the error was in making this the
major, and in some cases the only influence. The period of rapid change in the science
curriculum was coincident with equally rapid changes in the philosophy of science.
The publication of the first English translation of Karl Popper's The Logic of Scien-
tific Discovery in 1959 signalled the onset of a period of rapid development, marked
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by the works of Kuhn, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Putnam and others. In general, science
curriculum development has been uninformed by these developments and the views
of science contained within the curriculum proposals have been confused, often con-
tradictory and based on 'dubious or discarded philosophies of science' (Martin 1979).
There is an urgent need for reconsideration of the epistemological basis of the science
curriculum in the light of contemporary views in the philosophy and sociology of
science.
There is a sloppiness of thought in the assumption that a variety of desired out-
comes are served by a single type of learning experience. A major conclusion of
this article is that it may be necessary to distinguish more carefully than previously
between the various goals of science education and to provide separate learning
experiences for each of the following:
1. Acquisition of factual and theoretical knowledge.
2. Critical scrutiny of evidence and arguments for and against particular
theories.
3. Practice in using theories for explaining phenomena.
4. Using theory for prediction.
5. The acquisition of laboratory skills and techniques.
6. Testing predictions and other consequences of particular theories.
7. Designing experiments to test hypotheses or to illustrate theory.
8. Hypothesis generation.
9. Testing hypotheses by logical criticism (i. internal consistency; ii. com-
patibility with other existing theory).
10. Testing hypotheses by experiment.
11. An appreciation of socio-historical-economic issues concerning science and
its applications.
In planning the curriculum, a major question which must be answered at the outset
is whether integrated science or separate sciences are to be provided. The range of
meanings of integrated science has been extensively reviewed by Brown (1977) and
Wellington (1982). Arguments concerning integration raise questions about the
criteria for the demarcation of the disciplines and could be compounded of four
elements: the area of concern (domain), the conceptual structure (substantive struc-
 Philosophy of science, science and science education 49
ture), the methodology (syntactical structure) and the criteria of truth. Arguments
based on substantive structure have little difficulty in integrating the physical sciences
(Robinson 1968, 1969a) but occasionally locate biology with the human sciences
on the basis of certain shared concepts (Hirst 1974). A major problem is that con-
cepts change their meaning in relation to the roles they play in different theories.
As Theobald (1976) remarks: 'the chemist's atom and electron ought not to be iden-
tified . . . with the physicist's atom and electron'. Not many published courses
attempt conceptual integration; notable exceptions are Nuffield Combined Science
and SCISP. Much the most common argument for integrated science is on the basis
of a perceived common methodology (Richmond 1974). Courses which attempt
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methodological integration (such as SCISP, Science — A Process Approach and

Scottish Integrated Science) assume that there is a generalised scientific method that
can be characterised and taught — an assumption which has little support from
contemporary philosophers of science.
A related issue is the question of relative curricular emphasis on content and
method (or product and process). It has been argued that in primary school science
scientific method should have curriculum priority and that content is relatively unim-
portant (Harlen 1978; HMI 1978; Whittaker 1980). Indeed, Science 5-13 might be
described as virtually 'content-free'. Such an approach may be adequate at an
elementary level and may not present any great problems for the teacher, but as
the level of sophistication rises, and more complex concepts and conceptual struc-
tures are involved, content-specific procedures become increasingly important. The
validity of a content-free approach rests on the assumptions that there is a scien-
tific method and that it is independent of content. It also seems to carry with it
an implicit acceptance of the inductivist-empiricist approach that processes precede
concepts and that process skills learned in one context are transferable to others.
However, if Figure 1 is a valid representation of the dynamic relationships between
the physical world, scientific practice (scientific method) and the 'world' of scien-
tific theory, then it follows that as the part of the real world under study changes
and the substantive structure changes, so also will the method change. Because they
have different areas of concern and different goals, the different sciences utilise
different theories and require different sorts of evidence, and so employ different
procedures of enquiry. Rather than science concepts deriving from science processes,
concepts inform and determine processes. Gardner (1972, 1975) argues that the
substantive structure of science contains five different classes of knowledge
statements (definition statements, direct observation statements, instrumental obser-
vation statements, law statements and theory statements). At each phase of theory
development, a particular scientific process is relevant: abduction (the inventing
of new concepts), introduction (the process of reasoning to generate conceptual rela-
tionships), transduction (connecting concepts with operational definitions) and pro-
duction (generating new and empirically testable predictions from theory, usually
by deductive reasoning).
 50 Derek Hodson

What can be said by way of conclusion? Firstly, there are no content-independent

(and, therefore, transferable) problem-solving activities in science. Secondly, there
do seem to be different ways of approaching problems and different styles of enquiry
in chemistry, physics and biology. Children should be made aware of these dif-
ferences. But they are not fundamental differences. Rather, they are sophisticated
and subtle differences arising from the different areas of concern (domains) and
the different theoretical structures of the different developed sciences. Thus, at
primary level, where the phenomena under investigation and the conceptual struc-
tures are relatively simple, an integrated approach with major emphasis on
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methodology might be appropriate, with a gradual move towards separate sciences

as specialised and sophisticated ways of looking at phenomena and events. Later
on, interdisciplinary science might be introduced so that the separate sophisticated
ways of knowing and proceeding can be used to approach complex issues not fall-
ing into the domain of any one science.

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Roger Osborne, co-author of a paper in this volume, was

tragically killed in a motor car accident in June 1985. His
contributions to science education were outstanding and
the community of science education researchers has been
notably diminished by his death.