INTERTANKO Members – SIRE 2.

0 transition inspections phase 3

SIRE 2.0 – Transition inspections and experience sharing.

INTERTANKO, in response to discussions arising at the 64th meeting of its Vetting Committee, has
compiled a list of both negative and positive observations, all supplied anonymously, produced during
Phase 3 of SIRE 2.0 trial inspections as shared by Members. The exercise produced enough data to
provide the statistical analysis presented below.

Overall, Members shared the results of 63 inspections that resulted in 554 negative and 34 positive
observations since the start of Phase 3 in January 2024.

Observation per Inspection

8.79

0.54
Negative Observations Positive Observations
Observation per Inspection 8.79 0.54

Figure 1: Average No. of Observations per inspection

Percentage of Negative/Positive
Observations

6%

Negative Observations
Positive Observations
94%

Figure 2: Percentage of Negative and Positive Observations

Comments: During 2023, the observations per inspection under the VIQ 7 regime for INTERTANKO
Members was 2,16 observations per inspection. During Phase 3 of the SIRE 2.0 regime, the number of
negative observations increased to 8.86 observations per inspection. The number of negative

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observations increased by one observation per inspection according to the results circulated on 5 April
2024. The data distributed on 5 April is available on INTERTANKO Weekly News No. 14-2024.

Categorization of Observations

Hardware
Process 20%
46%
Hardware

Human Human
28% Photo
Photo
6% Process

Figure 3: Categorization of Observations (Human, Process, Hardware, Photo)

Comments: The photo categorisation relates to observations associated with wrong photo input or an
observation related to a photo where the inspector was not able to verify the condition of the
equipment. Compared with the statistics of 5 April, the photo negative observations were reduced.
More negative observations are Process related, followed by the human and hardware related
observations. It seems that the inspectors are focussing more on Human-related observations than
hardware related.

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CATEGORIZATION OF OBSERVATIONS AS PER

CVIQ CHAPTER
30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Total 18.77% 13.00% 10.65% 24.37% 3.25% 2.89% 6.68% 4.87% 6.68% 7.94% 0.90%

Figure 4: Categorization of Observations as per CVIQ Chapter

Comments: Most negative observations are raised in Chapter 5, 2, 3. It should be noted that many
observations raised on Ch. 2 are related to PIQ or HVPQ erroneous entries by the Operator under 2.1.1
and 2.8.1 questions and most negative observations in Ch. 3 are related to missing assessor’s
qualifications in audit reports under 3.2.1-3.2.7 questions.

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11.91%
11.01%

9.39%

8.30%

6.68%
5.96%
5.05%

3.97% 3.79% 3.61% 3.97%

2.71%
2.35%
2.17%
1.99% 1.99%
1.81% 1.62%
1.44% 1.44% 1.62%
1.08% 1.26% 1.08% 1.26%
0.90%
0.36%
0.36% 0.36% 0.54%

2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 11 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12
Hardware Human Photo Process

Figure 5: Distribution of Observations per CVIQ Chapter per Hardware, Human, Photo and Process Categories

Comments: Safety Management is the main focus point of the inspectors. As above, Chapter 5 is
highlighted for the most negative observations in all three categories, putting aside the Process-related
observations in Ch. 2 and 3 as explained in Figure 4.

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Observation Trends

The table below shows the CVIQ questions where the most negative observations have been noted.

CVIQ Question Percentage of Comments

Total
Observations
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers familiar 3.61% Wrong certificates
with the company procedure for maintaining uploaded, minor
the vessel's statutory certification up to date, mistakes on the
were all certificates and documents carried certificates.
onboard up to date and was the vessel free of
conditions of class or significant memoranda?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer familiar 3.97% Coating Technical File
with the company procedure to maintain the records, erroneous DD
Enhanced Survey File in accordance with data entry in HVPQ.
Classification Society rules, and was the vessel
free of any visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of the
hull or cargo and ballast tank coatings?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the 3.97% Defective equipment,
company procedure for reporting defects to defect reporting
vessel structure, machinery and equipment to procedure.
shore-based management through the
company defect reporting system and was
evidence available to demonstrate that all
defects had been reported accordingly?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Particulars 4.15% Erroneous data in
Questionnaire (HVPQ) available through the HVPQ 6.
OCIMF SIRE Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure, outfitting,
management and certification of the vessel?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which 4.51% Assessor’s
confirmed that a static navigational qualifications and its
assessment by a suitably qualified and documentation.
experienced company representative had
been completed as declared through the pre-
inspection questionnaire?
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which 1.81%
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo audit
by a suitably qualified and experienced
company representative had been completed
as declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?

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4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers 2.53% Non availability of
familiar with the company paper chart paper charts. This
management procedures and were onboard should not be raised
paper charts managed, corrected and used as a negative
appropriately? observation but the
inspector should have
selected “not
Answerable” on
vessels fitted with
ECDIS as both primary
and back up.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar with the 2.89% Inspectors raise
company procedure for safety inspections of negative observations
the main deck areas, and had inspections been under this question
effective in identifying hazards to health, for general safety
safety and the environment? items.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officer’s familiar with the 3.25%
company procedure for safety inspections of
the machinery spaces, and had inspections
been effective in identifying hazards to health,
safety and the environment?
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers familiar 1.81% Procedures and record
with the company procedure for maintaining keeping of ozone
the Ozone-depleting Substances Record Book, depleting substances.
and did the entries contained in the Ozone-
depleting Substances Record Book accurately
record the operations and emissions required
to be documented by MARPOL Annex VI?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings familiar 1.81% Inadequate gangway
with the company procedures to control procedures /
access to the vessel in port and to ensure the implementation of
safety of visitors, and were these procedures gangway procedures.
effectively implemented?
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a direct 1.26% Mistakes and
responsibility for cargo, tank cleaning or inadequate
ballast operations familiar with the implementation of the
requirements of the ISGOTT Ship/Shore Safety SSSCL
Checklist (SSSCL) and, were appropriate
sections of the SSSCL in use with all applicable
provisions and agreements maintained
throughout?

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9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers familiar 2.89% No procedures for the
with the company procedures for the testing calibration of the
and correct operation of the mooring winch mooring winch test
brakes, and were records available to kit's pressure gauge.
demonstrate that brakes had been tested
periodically, after maintenance or when there
was evidence of premature brake slippage?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, and 2.17% Inadequate
ratings involved in bunkering operations, implementation of the
familiar with the company bunkering bunkering plan;
procedures, and were records available to inadequate bunker
demonstrate that bunker operations had been atmosphere checks.
planned and conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?

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The following information details the additional negative and positive observations gathered after 5
April 2024 for each inspection chapter and has been produced solely to give INTERTANKO Members a
flavour of SIRE 2.0 inspection observations and how they are noted by inspectors during Phase 3 trial
inspections.

Negative Observations

CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process The Operator didn't upload a
familiar with the company procedure for recent copy of the CSSR to the
maintaining the vessel's statutory document repository. CSSR was
certification up to date, were all presented to the inspector during
certificates and documents carried the inspection.
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process The CSSR uploaded in the
familiar with the company procedure for repository was issued in 2021.
maintaining the vessel’s statutory The Master however presented
certification up to date, were all an updated CSSR dated 21 Mar
certificates and documents carried 2024 during the inspection.
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process The operator had not uploaded a
familiar with the company procedure for recent copy of the CSSR to the
maintaining the vessel’s statutory document repository and the
certification up to date, were all available copy was dated 2
certificates and documents carried October 2023.
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Human Most of the certificates uploaded
familiar with the company procedure for were issued under the previous
maintaining the vessel’s statutory flag. The class survey status
certification up to date, were all report uploaded was dated 13
certificates and documents carried March 2023. Only CSR No. 2 had
onboard up to date and was the vessel been uploaded; vessel CSR had
free of conditions of class or significant been issued till CSR No. 5.
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process The CSSR was not uploaded to
familiar with the company procedure for OCIMF repository in advance of
maintaining the vessel's statutory the inspection.
certification up to date, were all
certificates and documents carried
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?

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2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process a. Incorrect Loadline Certificate
familiar with the company procedure for corresponding to deadweight
maintaining the vessel's statutory 44,995 MT was uploaded at the
certification up to date, were all repository instead of the active
certificates and documents carried deadweight 46,652 MT b. CSR
onboard up to date and was the vessel Document No. 3 was not
free of conditions of class or significant uploaded at the repository, only
memoranda? CSR No. 1, 2 and 4 were uploaded.
c. Expired USCG Certificate of
Compliance was uploaded to the
repository.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process Class certificates uploaded were
familiar with the company procedure for not endorsed for the latest class
maintaining the vessel's statutory annual survey done in 2024.
certification up to date, were all
certificates and documents carried
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and Senior Officers Process The annual thorough examination
familiar with the company procedure for in cargo gear book was on 26 June
keeping the vessel’s Statutory 2023. The Class Status report
Certification up to date, were all show the ILO 152 Cargo Gear
certificates and documents carried issued 12 November 2022 Type
onboard up to date and was the vessel Interim.
free of Conditions of Class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process It was noted during the document
familiar with the company procedure for review that Civil Liability
maintaining the vessel’s statutory Convention 1992 (CLC) Certificate
certification up to date, were all - Oil listed in the PIQ was the
certificates and documents carried expired certificate, the PIQ had
onboard up to date and was the vessel not been updated for the new
free of conditions of class or significant certificate valid until 20 February
memoranda? 2023.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Human The RT had not updated the CLC
familiar with the company procedure for 1992 Certificate - Oil which
maintaining the vessel’s statutory expired last 20 February 2024.
certification up to date, were all
certificates and documents carried
onboard up to date and was the vessel
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Hardware A new minimum safe manning
familiar with the company procedure for certificate had been issued on 19
maintaining the vessel’s statutory September 2023 and it included
certification up to date, were all the requirements for carrying a
certificates and documents carried cook when the total number of
onboard up to date and was the vessel the crew on board was more than

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free of conditions of class or significant 10 but it was not available on

memoranda? board. The certificate had been
downloaded during the
inspection.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Hardware The minimum safe manning
familiar with the company procedure for certificate required to have 13
maintaining the vessel’s statutory persons but there was no
certification up to date, were all requirement to have a cook on
certificates and documents carried board as per MLC A.3.2.5 when
onboard up to date and was the vessel the personnel on board was more
free of conditions of class or significant than 10 persons. The actual crew
memoranda? on board was 18 persons.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Hardware The cargo ship safety equipment
familiar with the company procedure for certificate uploaded in the
maintaining the vessel’s statutory document repository reported
certification up to date, were all that last class annual survey was
certificates and documents carried made on 11 December 2021
onboard up to date and was the vessel while actually last was made on
free of conditions of class or significant 14 Feb 2024.
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Process The observed person was not
familiar with the company procedure for familiar with the MLC
maintaining the vessel’s statutory requirement and no guidance was
certification up to date, were all provided by the company related
certificates and documents carried to the MLC requirements for a
onboard up to date and was the vessel cook if the vessel personnel was
free of conditions of class or significant more than 10 persons on board.
memoranda?
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Human A new minimum safe manning
familiar with the company procedure for certificate had been issued on 19
maintaining the vessel’s statutory September 2023, but it was not
certification up to date, were all sent to the vessel. According to
certificates and documents carried the evidence although the
onboard up to date and was the vessel company office had the possibility
free of conditions of class or significant to check the certificates in the
memoranda? PMS system no verification was
carried out by them.
2.1.1 Were the Master and senior officers Human OP was not familiar with the
familiar with the company procedure for company procedure for tracking
maintaining the vessel’s statutory the certificates. It was noticed
certification up to date, were all that an uncontrolled certificate
certificates and documents carried index form was in use at the time
onboard up to date and was the vessel of the inspection.
free of conditions of class or significant
memoranda?

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2.2.1 Had the vessel been attended by a Process Duration of last Marine
company Superintendent at Superintendent audit was marked
approximately six-monthly intervals and on PIQ as 6 days instead of 5.
were reports available to demonstrate
that a systematic vessel inspection had
been completed during each attendance
declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
2.2.1 Had the vessel been attended by a Process Available onboard copy of last
company Superintendent at vessel inspection report
approximately six-monthly intervals and completed by the Technical
were reports available to demonstrate superintendent in Nov 2023 had
that a systematic vessel inspection had not been signed by any of the
been completed during each attendance Technical superintendent, Marine
declared through the pre-inspection superintendent or the DPA as
questionnaire? required by the format. Each area
for improvement identified within
the vessel inspection report had
been followed up through an
excel work progress sheet and not
by a documented company
processes either as non-
conformities or defect reports.
2.2.1 Had the vessel been attended by a Process The interval between successive
company Superintendent at qualifying inspections by either a
approximately six-monthly intervals and Marine or Technical
were reports available to demonstrate Superintendent exceeded seven
that a systematic vessel inspection had months. The last inspection was
been completed during each attendance for internal audit was completed
declared through the pre-inspection by marine superintendent on 14
questionnaire? July 2023.
2.2.1 Had the vessel been attended by a Process The vessel inspection reports filed
company Superintendent at in the onboard system were only
approximately six-monthly intervals and a summary of the findings. The
were reports available to demonstrate full report was not filed on board.
that a systematic vessel inspection had
been completed during each attendance
declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human OP was unfamiliar with the
familiar with the company procedure to company procedures for
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in maintaining coating technical file.
accordance with Classification Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?

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2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human OP did not check ballast tanks
familiar with the company procedure to valves and hydraulic lines. As per
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in tank condition reports dated 3
accordance with Classification Society November 2023 for all ballast
rules, and was the vessel free of any tanks and cofferdams checking of
visible or documentary evidence of hydraulic lines and valves
concerns with the structural condition of condition assessment as per
the hull or cargo and ballast tank relevant check list Form tech 031
coatings? selected as `not applicable`
instead of stating conditions.
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Hardware Wrong entry in HVPQ by
familiar with the company procedure to mentioning the dry dock date as
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in the delivery date
accordance with Classification Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process Wrong entry in HVPQ by
familiar with the company procedure to mentioning the dry dock date
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in similar to the delivery date.
accordance with Classification Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human Erroneous entry in the HVPQ.
familiar with the company procedure to
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in
accordance with Classification Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Was the Master and Chief Engineer Human No record of defect reporting was
familiar with the company procedure to available for the renewal of
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in eyebolts for several steel renewal
accordance with Classification Society / repair jobs were carried out
rules, and was the vessel free of any during the last dry dock.
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?

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2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process No company procedure which
familiar with the company procedure to required that the coating
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in technical file was maintained.
accordance with Classificat ion Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Hardware Two dents covering approximate
familiar with the company procedure to area of 0.5 m X 0.5 m (L X B) and
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in 5 cm deep each, were noted
accordance with Classification Society approximately 1.0 m below the
rules, and was the vessel free of any top side coating in 5S WBT around
visible or documentary evidence of 2.0 m forward of the aft bulkhead.
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process As per records, coating repairs
familiar with the company procedure to had taken place in ballast tanks
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in during the third special survey at
accordance with Classification Society the dry dock, while there was no
rules, and was the vessel free of any coating technical file available on
visible or documentary evidence of board to comply with the
concerns with the structural condition of requirement of classification
the hull or cargo and ballast tank rules.
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human RT was not familiar with the
familiar with the company procedure to requirement of maintaining the
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in coating technical file on board.
accordance with Classification Society
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human No record of defect reporting was
familiar with the company procedure to available for the renewal of
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in eyebolts for the FWD bulwark
accordance with Classification Society handrail chain supports, while
rules, and was the vessel free of any several steel renewal/ repair jobs
visible or documentary evidence of were carried out during the last
concerns with the structural condition of dry dock.
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process Coating technical file was not
familiar with the company procedure to available on board at the time of
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in inspection.
accordance with Classification Society

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rules, and was the vessel free of any

visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human Below repairs were carried out at
familiar with the company procedure to dry dock in April 2023 and these
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in repairs were not reported in
accordance with Classification Society company failure/ defect reporting
rules, and was the vessel free of any system:
visible or documentary evidence of 1. Deformed stbd side bulwark
concerns with the structural condition of repair.
the hull or cargo and ballast tank 2. Repair in atmospheric
coatings? condenser leak.
3. Boiler drain overboard stub
pipe renewal.
4. Steel renewal in ballast tanks
(1W, 2W, 3S, 4W, 5W and 6W).
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human Coating repairs were reported to
familiar with the company procedure to have taken place within ballast
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in tanks due to repairs/ renewal of
accordance with Classification Society steel and OP was not aware of the
rules, and was the vessel free of any requirement to maintain the
visible or documentary evidence of record of repairs electronically in
concerns with the structural condition of PMS as required to be maintained
the hull or cargo and ballast tank in the coating technical file.
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process The After Peak tank last
familiar with the company procedure to inspection was on 4 November
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in 2022. The operator procedures
accordance with Classification Society require annual Ballast Tank
rules, and was the vessel free of any inspection. As per SMS the job for
visible or documentary evidence of the After peak inspection have
concerns with the structural condition of been extended until 29 June 2024
the hull or cargo and ballast tank due to tank full of fresh water
coatings? utilised for cargo tank cleaning.
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Process The SMS does not contain
familiar with the company procedure to procedure to maintain up-to-date
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in Enhanced Survey in accordance
accordance with Classification Society of Class Society.
rules, and was the vessel free of any
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Human The OP was not aware about the
familiar with the company procedure to procedure required.
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in
accordance with Classification Society

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rules, and was the vessel free of any

visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.1 Were the Master and Chief Engineer Hardware Safety equipment Form E item 2.1
familiar with the company procedure to stated that nautical charts and
maintain the Enhanced Survey File in ECDIS were provided while on
accordance with Classification Society board the vessel was not carrying
rules, and was the vessel free of any nautical charts.
visible or documentary evidence of
concerns with the structural condition of
the hull or cargo and ballast tank
coatings?
2.3.5 Had the vessel been enrolled in a Process Information given in PIQ
Classification Society Condition 2.3.5003.2 was inaccurate. The
Assessment Programme (CAP)? completion date of the CAP
survey was 26th November 2023,
not 26th September 2023.
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Hardware Forward mast led flood light was
company procedure for reporting defects not operational.
to vessel structure, machinery and
equipment to shore-based management
through the company defect reporting
system and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Process The defect list was not updated
company procedure for reporting defects for the target date of completion
to vessel structure, machinery and of the job by the company.
equipment to shore-based management
through the company defect reporting
system and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officer’s familiar with the Hardware Two dents covering approximate
company procedure for reporting defects area of 0.5 m X 0.5 m (L X B) and
to vessel structure, machinery and 5 cm deep each, were noted
equipment to shore-based management approximately 1.0 m below the
through the company defect reporting top side coating in 5S WBT around
system and was evidence available to 2.0 m forward of the aft bulkhead.
demonstrate that all defects had been No defect report was created in
reported accordingly? the defect reporting system.
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Hardware The defective UTI was not listed in
company procedure for reporting defects the vessel's defect list.
to vessel structure, machinery and
equipment to shore-based management
through the company defect reporting
system and was evidence available to

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demonstrate that all defects had been

reported accordingly?

2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Process The defect entered in the vessel
company procedure for reporting defects defect reporting system had not
to vessel structure, machinery and been acknowledged by the office
equipment to shore-based management within the ship shore software.
through the company defect reporting
system and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Process RT failed to report the indentation
company procedure for reporting defects located 5S WBT shell plating in
to vessel structure, machinery and the defect reporting system as
equipment to shore-based management required by the operator's
through the company defect reporting procedure.
system and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Process Operators defect reporting
company procedure for reporting defects procedure did not clearly provide
to vessel structure, machinery and the time frame required for a
equipment to shore-based management reported defect that needs to be
through the company defect reporting addressed and rectified in
system and was evidence available to communication with shore
demonstrate that all defects had been management.
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Human The OP did not add in the open
company procedure for reporting defects defect list / report the damaged
to vessel structure, machinery and light fixture i.w.o entrance of
equipment to shore-based management cargo pumproom which was
through the company defect reporting observed at the time of
system and was evidence available to inspection.
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Hardware The ODME was reported with a
company procedure for reporting defects failed digital display on 17 Apr
to vessel structure, machinery and 2024. The defects list was not
equipment to shore-based management updated for such defect.
through the company defect reporting
system and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Human A defect of the ODME display was
company procedure for reporting defects not included by the OP at the
to vessel structure, machinery and defects list
equipment to shore-based management
through the company defect reporting

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system and was evidence available to

demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?

2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Hardware Hydraulic aggregate pumps were
company procedure for reporting defects located in their own dedicated
to vessel structure, machinery and space within the engine room,
equipment to shore-based management however the bulkhead was
through the company defect reporting penetrated by several pipe runs
system and was evidence available to which were not sealed with a fire
demonstrate that all defects had been retardant putty or similar
reported accordingly? material. The operators had
correspondence with Class
stating that the current
arrangement was acceptable to
them, so this was not regarded by
the operators as a defect on the
vessel. The responsible person
was aware of this, and also the
operator’s procedure for
reporting defects.
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar with the Process Defect reporting procedures were
company procedure for reporting defects available and defect could be
to vessel structure, machinery and entered computerized in Danaos
equipment to shore-based management system. Was not available even a
through the company defect reporting single defect into the system since
system and was evidence available to 2021 when the system was in use.
demonstrate that all defects had been
reported accordingly?
2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel’s Hardware No item as per the class survey
structure, machinery or equipment, had status report.
the vessel operator notified class, flag
and/or the authorities in the port of
arrival, as appropriate to the
circumstances, and had short term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or
permissions to proceed the voyage been
issued where necessary?
2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel’s Hardware No defects existed that had been
structure, machinery or equipment, had notified to class and flag
the vessel operator notified class, flag administration.
and/or the authorities in the port of
arrival, as appropriate to the
circumstances, and had short term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or
permissions to proceed the voyage been
issued where necessary?

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2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel’s Human No record was available to
structure, machinery or equipment, had confirm notification to class
the vessel operator notified class, flag about the indentations identified
and/or the authorities in the port of on 5S WBT shell plating.
arrival, as appropriate to the
circumstances, and had short term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or
permissions to proceed the voyage been
issued where necessary?
2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel's Hardware There was no evidence that class
structure, machinery or equipment, had and flag had been informed in
the vessel operator notified class, flag accordance with the company
and/or the authorities in the port of procedure for the ODME defect
arrival, as appropriate to the on its digital display.
circumstances, and had short term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or
permissions to proceed the voyage been
issued where necessary?
2.4.2 Where defects existed to the vessel's Human There was not any evidence that
structure, machinery or equipment, had the OP has reported the ODME
the vessel operator notified class, flag digital display failure appeared on
and/or the authorities in the port of 17 Apr 2024 to the local port
arrival, as appropriate to the authorities.
circumstances, and had short term
certificates, waivers, exemptions and/or
permissions to proceed the voyage been
issued where necessary?
2.6.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The target operating pressure for
with the VOC Management Plan, and had the cargo tanks (70% of the P/V
the procedures for minimising VOC set pressure) as detailed in the
emissions set out in the Plan been VOC was not clearly indicated in
implemented and documented as the cargo control room and as per
required? records the pressure being
maintained in the cargo tanks
during cargo operations and
transit was below the
recommended target operating
pressure.
2.6.3 Were the Master and senior officers Process The SEEMP Part I did not contain
familiar with the contents and a package of measures to improve
requirements of the Ship Energy the ship's energy efficiency, and
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and details for their
had these been fully implemented? implementation, such as:
1. Improved voyage planning.
2. Weather routeing.
3. Just in time arrival.
4. Speed optimization.
5. Optimum trim.
6. Optimum use of rudder and

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heading. control systems

(autopilots).
7. Hull maintenance.

2.6.3 Were the Master and senior officers Process At the time of inspection, the
familiar with the contents and SEEMP Part 1 only included Speed
requirements of the Ship Energy Optimisation and Hull Resistance
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) and Optimisation and none related to
had these been fully implemented? improved voyage planning,
weather routing, just in time
arrival, optimum trim, rudder and
heading control. The SEEMP
Manual was updated by
downloading the Energy
Efficiency Procedure from the
operator's SMS Manual.
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process Last dry dock date was not
Particulars Questionnaire {HVPQ) inserted in the HVPQ.
available through the OCIMF SIRE
Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process The HVPQ mentioned the delivery
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) date as the last dry dock date.
available through the OCIMF SIRE
Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process There were minor errors in the
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) HVPQ:
available through the OCIMF SIRE 1.9.1 stated the vessel had traded
Programme database completed without unscheduled repairs for
accurately to reflect the structure, the last 12 months, however
outfitting, management and certification there had been a replacement of
of the vessel? the starboard anchor following its
loss.
1.9.2.1 was correctly completed;
1.9.2.2 the nature of the repairs
was not listed;
1.9.2.3 the date of the repairs was
not given.

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11.1.9 the vessel was not suitable

for SBM use so question should
be N/A.
11.3.4 the secondary means of
starting the emergency generator
was hydraulic not pneumatic as
detailed.

2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process The following were provided with
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) inaccurate information.
available through the OCIMF SIRE 1.9.8
Programme database completed 7.1.1
accurately to reflect the structure, 7.1.3
outfitting, management and certification 10.1.4
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process The current in use dead weight
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) was not correctly reflected. As per
available through the OCIMF SIRE the HVPQ the in use dead weight
Programme database completed was 44999, however, vessel had
accurately to reflect the structure, reduced the dead weight to
outfitting, management and certification 39999 on 27 January 2024.
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process HVPQ reference 7.1.3 ballast tank
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) coating, date of inspection for
available through the OCIMF SIRE ballast tanks was not updated.
Programme database completed BWTs latest inspection was from
accurately to reflect the structure, 02/09/2023 to 09/12/2023.
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process Refer 5.3.1.4 Foam analysis report
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) date was not updated. New foam
available through the OCIMF SIRE analysis report was 09/11/2023.
Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process Information reported in HVPQ
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) under section 1.5.9 and 10.1.4
available through the OCIMF SIRE were incorrect/ not updated.
Programme database completed
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process HVPQ was not accurately
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) updated. More specifically, was
available through the OCIMF SIRE stated in item 1.5.5 that the
Programme database completed vessel undergone IWS on
accurately to reflect the structure, 22.10.2024, however records

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outfitting, management and certification indicated that vessel completed

of the vessel? dry dock/ special survey iii on
22.10.2024.
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process Incorrect information was
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) provided at HVPQ dated 04 April
available through the OCIMF SIRE 2024 for items 1.5.10,
Programme database completed 1.5.11 1.9.8, 2.14 and 5.3.6
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process The HVPQ made reference to the
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) secondary starting system of the
available through the OCIMF SIRE emergency generator as a
Programme database completed compressed air reservoir,
accurately to reflect the structure, supported by an independent air
outfitting, management and certification compressor, when in reality it was
of the vessel? a hydraulic manual pressure
system with spring.
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process During the inspection of the
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) mooring decks, it was noted that
available through the OCIMF SIRE the vessel had been fitted with
Programme database completed split drum winches, which
accurately to reflect the structure, differed from the review of the
outfitting, management and certification HVPQ that stated the ship's
of the vessel? mooring winches were not split
drums.
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process As per PIQ, it was noted that the
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) secondary protection for the
available through the OCIMF SIRE cargo tanks was a full flow P/V
Programme database completed Valve and pressure sensors, but in
accurately to reflect the structure, accordance with HVPQ and the
outfitting, management and certification procedures and instructions
of the vessel? posted in the cargo control room,
the pressure sensors were the
only secondary protection system
to avoid over pressure or under
pressure in the cargo tanks.
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process The were several errors in the
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) HVPQ at points 3.2.1, 4.1.1, 6.1.9,
available through the OCIMF SIRE 9.8.3, 9,16.7. A class survey status
Programme database completed was not updated.
accurately to reflect the structure,
outfitting, management and certification
of the vessel?
2.8.1 Was the OCIMF Harmonised Vessel Process A review of the uploaded HVPQ
Particulars Questionnaire (HVPQ) indicated that the following
available through the OCIMF SIRE questions had incorrect answers
Programme database completed of information: 1.1.8, 2.1.5,
accurately to reflect the structure,

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outfitting, management and certification 4.2.10, 7.1.1, 7.1.3, 9.6.4, 9.16.5

of the vessel? and 10.1.7

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.

3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process Brief details of the assessor's
confirmed that a static navigational qualification and experience were
assessment by a suitably qualified and not included within the last static
experienced company representative had navigational assessment done on
been completed as declared through the 18 July 2023. The form was
inspection questionnaire? amended by operator on 15
March 204 with the new
requirements and should be used
during the next assessment.
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The qualification and seagoing
confirmed that a static navigational experience of operator's marine
assessment by a suitably qualified and superintendent were not
experienced company representative had included in the report template.
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The navigational assessment
confirmed that a static navigational audit was not conducted on 11
assessment by a suitably qualified and February 2024 as documented by
experienced company representative had the operator through the pre
been completed as declared through the inspection questionnaire.
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process There was no evidence indicating
confirmed that a static navigational that the assessor holds or had
assessment by a suitably qualified and held a senior deck officer licence
experienced company representative had and / or had sailed as a senior
been completed as declared through the deck officer.
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The static navigation audit report
confirmed that a static navigational was available only as a summary
assessment by a suitably qualified and of findings. The complete report
experienced company representative had was not available on board.
been completed as declared through the Additionally, there was no record
pre-inspection questionnaire? of the assessor's qualifications or
experience within the report.
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process Brief details of the assessor’s
confirmed that a static navigational qualifications and experience
assessment by a suitably qualified and were not included within the
experienced company representative had report, however, the assessor
been completed as declared through the qualifications were received
pre-inspection questionnaire? through email at time of closing
meeting.
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The details of the qualifications
confirmed that a static navigational and pertinent seafaring
assessment by a suitably qualified and experience of the assessor were
experienced company representative had not included within the

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been completed as declared through the Navigational Assessment Report

pre-inspection questionnaire? dated 20 May 2023.

3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The report for the static
confirmed that a static navigational navigational audit assessment
assessment by a suitably qualified and dated 09 February 2024, declared
experienced company representative had through the PIQ was not available
been completed as declared through the on board.
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The qualification and pertinent
confirmed that a static navigational sailing experience of the assessor
assessment by a suitably qualified and was not available in the static
experienced company representative had navigation audit report dated 22
been completed as declared through the Feb 2024.
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Has a static navigational assessment been Process The qualifications and pertinent
conducted by a member of the shore staff seafaring experience of the
during the preceding twelve months? assessor were not included within
the report.
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The details of qualification and
confirmed that a static navigational pertinent experience of the
assessment by a suitably qualified and assessor was not included within
experienced company representative had the last static navigational audit.
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process The company policy required that
confirmed that a static navigational a company representative had to
assessment by a suitably qualified and carry out a navigation audit and a
experienced company representative had check list was provided and used
been completed as declared through the for this purpose. In the navigation
pre-inspection questionnaire? audit form there was no place to
record the required experience
and qualification details of the
auditor.
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process Brief qualification and seafaring
confirmed that a static navigational experience of the assessor were
assessment by a suitably qualified and not included in the report.
experienced company representative had
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.1 Was a report available onboard which Process Last navigational audit was
confirmed that a static navigational carried out on 18 September
assessment by a suitably qualified and 2023 was not included the
experienced company representative had qualification of the assessor in the
been completed as declared through the form.
pre-inspection questionnaire?

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3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process The cargo audit report did not
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo mention the experience of the
audit by a suitably qualified and auditor regarding the type of
experienced company representative had vessels he has sailed on.
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process The details of pertinent seafaring
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo experience of the assessor was
audit by a suitably qualified and not included within the report.
experienced company representative had
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process The details of the qualifications
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo and pertinent seafaring
audit by a suitably qualified and experience of the assessor who
experienced company representative had carried out the last cargo audit on
been completed as declared through the board were not included within
pre-inspection questionnaire? the report.
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process The company required to carry
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo out a cargo operation audit and a
audit by a suitably qualified and dedicated checklist was provided
experienced company representative had but it did not include the
been completed as declared through the experience details of the auditor.
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process Details of the assessor
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo qualification experience was not
audit by a suitably qualified and included in the report.
experienced company representative had
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.5 Was a report available onboard which Process Last cargo audit was carried out
confirmed that a comprehensive cargo on 29 September 2023 was not
audit by a suitably qualified and included in the form the
experienced company representative had qualification of the assessor.
been completed as declared through the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.6 Was a report available onboard which Process The Age and Sea Rank tab was left
confirmed that a comprehensive blank in the Internal Engineering
engineering audit by a suitable qualified Audit report.
and experienced company representative
had been completed as declared in the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.6 Was a report available onboard which Process The policy states that the internal
confirmed that a comprehensive auditor performing the internal
engineering audit by a suitable qualified engineering audit must have a
and experienced company representative certain number of years as a chief
had been completed as declared in the engineer, but the attending
pre-inspection questionnaire? auditor is a graduate from
University.

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3.2.6 Was a report available on board which Process The technical Superintendent
confirmed that a comprehensive inspections reports did not
engineering audit by a suitable qualified include the inspector
and experienced company representative background.
had been completed as declared in the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.6 Was a report available onboard which Process The engineering audit completed
confirmed that a comprehensive on 15 April 2023 did not include
engineering audit by a suitable qualified the recommendation indicated in
and experienced company representative the TMSA 4.4.5
had been completed as declared in the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.6 Was a report available onboard which Process Engine assessment report did not
confirmed that a comprehensive include the qualification of the
engineering audit by a suitable qualified assessor.
and experienced company representative
had been completed as declared in the
pre-inspection questionnaire?
3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which Process The anchoring and mooring audit
confirmed that a comprehensive mooring report was available on board
and anchoring audit by a suitably only in summary format. The
qualified and experienced company complete report was not
representative had been completed as available. Additionally, the
declared through the pre-inspection qualifications and experience of
questionnaire? the auditor was not detailed.
3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which Process The comprehensive mooring and
confirmed that a comprehensive mooring anchoring audit report was not
and anchoring audit by a suitably substantially in alignment with
qualified and experienced company the suggested best practice
representative had been completed as guidance of TMSA KPI 6A.4.3.
declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which Process The qualification and pertinent
confirmed that a comprehensive mooring sailing experience of the assessor
and anchoring audit by a suitably was not provided in the mooring
qualified and experienced company audit report dated 23 Feb 2024.
representative had been completed as Also, anchoring live anchoring
declared through the pre-inspection audit was covered in the annual
questionnaire? mooring audit report dated 23
Feb 2024.
3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which Process The comprehensive mooring and
confirmed that a comprehensive mooring anchoring audit did not cover the
and anchoring audit by a suitably deep water anchoring operation
qualified and experienced company as declared by the operator
representative had been completed as through the pre-inspection
declared through the preinspection questionnaire. Item for deep
questionnaire? water marked as N/A within the
checklist.

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3.2.7 Was a report available onboard which Process The details of pertinent seafaring
confirmed that a comprehensive mooring experience of the assessor was
and anchoring audit by a suitably not included within the report.
qualified and experienced company
representative had been completed as
declared through the pre-inspection
questionnaire?
3.2.8 Had the vessel operator implemented a Process The Operator start to implement
Behavioural Competency Assessment the BCA since on 15 March 2024,
Programme onboard and was there so far not any record found on
evidence available that assessments board of training for the on-board
were being conducted for navigation, crew and one of the two
cargo, mooring and engineering nominated assessors didn't
operations by approved assessors? complete any course. Vessel
provided with e-learning CBT and
nominated person should
complete it.
3.2.8 Had the vessel operator implemented a Process Procedure in place for CBT
Behavioural Competency Assessment competency training, however no
Programme onboard and was there assessor identification or training
evidence available that assessments requirement for such programme
were being conducted for navigation, was provided.
cargo, mooring and engineering
operations by approved assessors?
3.2.8 Had the vessel operator implemented a Process The trained onboard assessors
Behavioural Competency Assessment only carried out performance
Programme onboard and was there reviews, not behavioural
evidence available that assessments assessments.
were being conducted for navigation,
cargo, mooring and engineering
operations by approved assessors?
3.3.1 Had the Master and all navigation officers Process Bridge team management
attended a shore-based Bridge Team certificate as per IMO model
Management training course within the course 1.22 for two navigating
previous five years? officers were found to be older
five years.
3.3.2 Had the Master received formal ship Process Master had more than 9 years of
handling training prior to promotion or rank experience on various types
when being assigned to a new type of of vessel, last few years were on
ship having significantly different similar kind of vessels.
handling characteristics to ships in which
they had recently served?
3.3.3 Had the Master, deck officers, and Process Not all of the deck officers on
cargo/gas engineer where carried, board were in possession of a
attended a shore-based simulator course valid training course for liquid
covering routine and emergency cargo cargoes. The Master, Third Officer
operations within the previous five and Junior officer had not
years? received any training. The Second
officers course was not

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completed within the last five

years.

3.3.4 Had the Chief Engineer and all engineer Process There was no operator
officers attended a shore-based engine requirement for engineer officers
room management simulator course to attend a shore based engine
covering routine and emergency resource management course or
machinery operations within the refresher training every five
previous five years? years.
The Chief and Second engineers
had received historical training,
but nothing within the last five
years. There was no record of the
third and fourth engineers having
received any training.
3.4.1 Was there an effective system in place to Human OP made a mistake on recording
record and monitor the hours of rest for of rest hours as Senior Officer had
all personnel onboard in compliance with rest period as per record while he
STCW, MLC or the regulatory was actually working in the
requirements applicable to the vessel? Ballast tanks as per records for
following occasions; Cofferdams
Starboard inspection performed
between 1415-1430 hrs on 3 Nov
2023.
Cofferdams emergency generator
entry at 1350-1405 hrs on 3 Nov
2023.
Cofferdams port entry 1330-1345
hrs on 3 Nov 2023.
Fwd void space entry at 1305-
1320 hrs on 3 Nov 2023.
WBT 4 Starboard entry at 1330-
1345 hrs on 2 Nov 2023.
WBT 4 Port entry at 1305-1320
hrs on 2 Nov 2023.
3.4.1 Was there an effective system in place to Human During bunkering operation, 1st
record and monitor the hours of rest for March 2024, it was observed that
all personnel onboard in compliance with the Senior Engineers were
STCW, MLC or the regulatory recorded as resting the same time
requirements applicable to the vessel? as the bunkering operation was
ongoing.
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Human OP at the manifold duty was not
familiarization programme that covered aware of proper action to take in
the personal safety and professional a event of oil leak from the cargo
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, manifold during loading
including visitors and contractors, and operation. Activating emergency
were records available to demonstrate stop was not included in action he
that the familiarization had been would take.
completed as required?

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3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Process Familiarization check list for the
familiarisation programme that covered OP did not include the BNWAS
the personal safety and professional equipment as per company
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, assigned forms.
including visitors and contractors, and
were records available to demonstrate
that the familiarisation had been
completed as required?
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Process It was observed that
familiarisation programme that covered familiarisation checklists for
the personal safety and professional several officers and rating were
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, not completed and signed.
including visitors and contractors, and
were records available to demonstrate
that the familiarisation had been
completed as required?
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Human The OP failed to notice the
familiarisation programme that covered incomplete familiarisation
the personal safety and professional checklists for several officers and
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, ratings.
including visitors and contractors, and
were records available to demonstrate
that the familiarisation had been
completed as required?
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Human After several tries the observed
familiarisation programme that covered person was unable to identify
the personal safety and professional what system and where it was
responsibilities of all on board personnel, located that one identified as HPP
including visitors and contractors, and in the local firefighting control
were records available to demonstrate and monitoring panel located on
that the familiarisation had been the bridge.
completed as required?
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Human Upon boarding the vessel, the
familiarisation programme that covered watchman did not give me any
the personal safety and professional familiarisation or instructions
responsibilities of all on board personnel, related to safety and security.
including visitors and contractors, and Familiarisation instruction was
were records available to demonstrate available at the boarding area.
that the familiarisation had been
completed as required?
3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Process Within the SMS there was no
familiarisation programme that covered procedure for familiarisation of
the personal safety and professional vessels visitors, despite there
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, being a familiarisation form which
including visitors and contractors, and included visitors.
were records available to demonstrate
that the familiarisation had been
completed as required?

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3.5.1 Had the company developed an effective Process Operators had procedures for
familiarisation programme that covered familiarisation for visitors sailing
the personal safety and professional with the vessel and for visitors not
responsibilities of all onboard personnel, intended to sail with the vessel.
including visitors and contractors, and Familiarisation records for visitors
were records available to demonstrate not intended to sail with the
that the familiarisation had been vessel did not find.
completed as required?

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Human OP was not able to say the correct
familiar with the company procedures for colour code (Grey) for the Safety
the set up and operation of the ECDIS depth when deeper area is
units fitted to the vessel and were records considered.
available to demonstrate that the ECDIS
had been operated in accordance with
company procedures at all stages of a
voyage?
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The echo sounder was equipped
familiar with the company procedures for with transducers both forward
the set up and operation of the ECDIS and aft. While the transducer
units fitted to the vessel and were records selected data was properly
available to demonstrate that the ECDIS transmitted to the conning
had been operated in accordance with station and repeaters, it was not
company procedures at all stages of a correctly displayed on the ECDIS
voyage? units. Instead, both reading were
transmitted to the forward
position, resulting in incorrect
information when the aft
transducer was selected.
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Process The procedure and checklist
familiar with the company procedures for associated to the testing the
the set up and operation of the ECDIS correct functioning of various
units fitted to the vessel and were records navigation equipment did not
available to demonstrate that the ECDIS include the validation of this
had been operated in accordance with point.
company procedures at all stages of a
voyage?
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Process There was no procedure
4 familiar with the company procedure for presented which defined the
testing and using the daylight signalling company expectations for the use
lamp? of the daylight signalling lamp
while there was a procedure
available for testing of the same.
4.1.2 Were the Master and navigation officers Human The OP was unfamiliar with the
familiar with the company procedures for company procedures for
managing and operating the radar/ARPA managing and operating the
units fitted to the vessel, and were Radar/ARPA unit fitted on board;
records available to demonstrate that the the company has procedures and
units had been operated and tested in checklist for Radar/ARPA. The OP
accordance with company procedures? knew the checklist, but had no
idea about the presence or
absence of the procedures.
4.1.2 Were the Master and navigation officers Process Operators’ procedure did not
familiar with the company procedures for provide specific procedure to
managing and operating the radar/ARPA confirm the operability/
units fitted to the vessel, and were

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records available to demonstrate that the performance testing of the ARPA

units had been operated and tested in system provided on both Radars.
accordance with company procedures?

4.1.2 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The Magnetrons to "X-Band" and
familiar with the company procedures for S-Band" had not been changed in
managing and operating the radar/ARPA accordance with the planned
units fitted to the vessel, and were maintenance schedule. Life
records available to demonstrate that the expectancy for "X-Band and "S-
units had been operated and tested in Band" radars was recorded in the
accordance with company procedures? radar operation manual was 4000
hours. The transceiver. Time
displayed on the “X-Band and "S-
Band" radar displays were 5166
hours and 5201 hours
respectively.
4.1.2 Were the Master and navigation officers Human OP was unfamiliar with the
familiar with the company procedures for difference between the
managing and operating the radar/ARPA performance characteristics of X-
units fitted to the vessel, and were band (9 GHz) and S-band (3 GHz)
records available to demonstrate that the radars.
units had been operated and tested in
accordance with company procedures?
4.1.4 Were the Master and navigation officers Process There were no records of the
familiar with the company procedures for performance test of the AIS
using the Automatic Identification equipment fitted.
System (AIS) fitted to the vessel and were
records available to confirm that periodic
checks and tests had been carried out in
accordance with the procedures?
4.1.4 Were the Master and navigation officers Human The OP was not familiar with the
familiar with the company procedures for procedure for conducting
using the Automatic Identification performance test on the AIS.
System (AIS) fitted to the vessel and were There were no records of the
records available to confirm that periodic performance test of the AIS
checks and tests had been carried out in equipment fitted.
accordance with the procedures?
4.1.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Human During the bridge inspection OP
familiar with the company procedure for was not able to present the
the use of the Bridge Navigational Watch operator's navigational
Alarm System (BNWAS) and were records procedures which required the
available to demonstrate that it had been BNWAS to be activated while the
operated and tested in accordance with vessel was at anchor. OP stated
the procedure? not having seen such specific
requirement while as per records
the BNWAS was kept ON during
anchorage. Later during the
inspection, OP presented
document which stated BNWAS

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to be switched on prior to all cast

off and switched off after all fast.

4.1.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware No authorised deputy was
familiar with the company procedure for appointed by the Master who was
the use of the Bridge Navigational Watch aware of the password or
Alarm System (BNWAS) and were records activation key for BNWAS.
available to demonstrate that it had been
operated and tested in accordance with
the procedure?
4.2.1 Were the Master and navigating officers Process The company procedures for the
familiar with the company passage passage plan specifically for
planning procedures and had all voyages certain areas mentioned to keep
been appraised, planned, executed and at Security Level 1 and follow
monitored in accordance with company measures as Security Level 2.
procedures, industry best practice and
both local and international rules?
4.2.1 Were the Master and navigating officers Human The OP responsible for the
familiar with the company passage passage plan has mentioned
planning procedures and had all voyages within the passage plan for each
been appraised, planned, executed and waypoint to be at Security Level 1
monitored in accordance with company and follow measures as Security
procedures, industry best practice and Level 2.
both local and international rules?
4.2.1 Were the Master and navigating officers Process Procedures did not require a
familiar with the company passage member of the engineering
planning procedures and had all voyages department to take part in the
been appraised, planned, executed and bridge meeting prior to
monitored in accordance with company commencing a voyage or, prior to
procedures, industry best practice and each significant portion of a
both local and international rules? voyage.
4.2.1 Were the Master and navigating officers Process The passage plan did not include
familiar with the company passage a clearly defined appraisal form or
planning procedures and had all voyages section. Parts of appraisal were
been appraised, planned, executed and incorporated in various sections
monitored in accordance with company of passage plan.
procedures, industry best practice and
both local and international rules?
4.2.1 Were the Master and navigating officers Process The operator's procedures
familiar with the company passage outlined the definition of the
planning procedures and had all voyages safety depth and safety contour in
been appraised, planned, executed and an inverse manner. The
monitored in accordance with company procedure began with definition
procedures, industry best practice and of safety contour and
both local and international rules? subsequently derived safety
depth input values. In this case
stated that safety depth was
similar to safety contour, whereas

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it should have started with the

formal definition of the safety
depth and then determined the
safety contour value.
Furthermore, in the definition of
the safety depth, other minor but
relevant parameters and safety
margins such as swell, heel, etc
were not taken into account.
4.2.3 Had the Master prepared Master's Process The Company standing orders did
Standing Orders, supplemented by Daily not address how the alarms and
Orders, which emphasised and reinforced layers for use with ECDIS/ECS are
the company expectations with regards required to be set and checked,
to navigational requirements including and in what circumstances they
restricted visibility, CPA/BCR and can be changed.
minimum passing distance from
navigational dangers and navigational
aids and, if so, had all navigation officers
signed to acknowledge their
understanding of the same?
4.2.5 4.2.5. Were the Master and navigation Process No paper charts were provided on
officers familiar with the company paper board. Only security and routing
chart management procedures and were (not for navigation) were
onboard paper charts managed, provided
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Human The vessel is fitted with ECDIS as
familiar with the company paper chart both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation chart
onboard paper charts managed, provision, and no paper charts at
corrected and used appropriately? all are carried.
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Process The vessel is fitted with ECDIS as
familiar with the company paper chart both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation chart
onboard paper charts managed, provision, and no paper charts at
corrected and used appropriately? all are carried.
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The vessel is fitted with ECDIS as
familiar with the company paper chart both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation chart
onboard paper charts managed, provision, and no paper charts at
corrected and used appropriately? all are carried.
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The vessel was fully paperless. No
familiar with the company paper chart paper charts were carried.
management procedures and were
onboard paper charts managed,
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Process No paper charts were carried so
familiar with the company paper chart no procedure required.
management procedures and were

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onboard paper charts managed,

corrected and used appropriately?

4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Human Paper charts not carried so no
familiar with the company paper chart human response required.
management procedures and were
onboard paper charts managed,
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The vessel was fitted with ECDIS
familiar with the company paper chart as both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation and no paper
onboard paper charts managed, charts at all are carried.
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Process The vessel was fitted with ECDIS
familiar with the company paper chart as both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation and no paper
onboard paper charts managed, charts at all are carried.
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Human The vessel was fitted with ECDIS
familiar with the company paper chart as both the primary and back up
management procedures and were means of navigation and no paper
onboard paper charts managed, charts at all are carried.
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.5 Were the Master and navigation officers Hardware The vessel was not fitted with
familiar with the company paper chart paper nautical charts.
management procedures and were
onboard paper charts managed,
corrected and used appropriately?
4.2.6 Were the Master and navigation officers Process Steering gear tests to be carried
familiar with the company procedures for out as per Company Procedures
testing the navigational equipment, main had not been completed as
propulsion, steering gear and thrusters required. Last steering gear tests
prior to use and prior to critical phases prior departure port was
of a passage or operation and, did completed on 13 February 2024
checklists or logbook entries confirm the
required tests had been completed as
required?
4.2.7 Were the Master and navigation officers Process More than 10 publications were
familiar with the company paper chart observed to be missing which
management procedures and were were required to be carried
onboard paper charts managed, onboard in either electronic or
corrected and used appropriately? hard copy as per company
procedure.
4.2.7 Were the Master and navigation officers Process The list of required publications
familiar with the company procedure for was maintained on an operator
the carriage and management of nautical supplied form, however there
publications and was evidence available was no document control
to demonstrate that publications had information on the form, so it was

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been managed in accordance with the not possible to determine if it was

procedure? the latest version.

4.3.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Process Company procedure 3.10 regards
familiar with the company procedures the bridge watch condition ''The
defining the minimum bridge team hand steering'' provided for any
composition and engine room operating defined watch composition, but
mode and were records available to this was not mentioned in the
demonstrate that recent voyages had poster Appendix 7.
been planned and executed in
accordance with company expectations?
4.3.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Process Coastal waters was mentioned in
familiar with the company procedures the vessel safety management,
defining the minimum bridge team but no definition was provided.
composition and engine room operating
mode and were records available to
demonstrate that recent voyages had
been planned and executed in
accordance with company expectations?
4.3.1 Were the Master and navigation officers Process Although the company
familiar with the company procedures procedures indicated the
defining the minimum bridge team navigation condition when the
composition and engine room operating engine room was required to be
mode and were records available to manned or could be unmanned
demonstrate that the recent voyages had there were no clear instructions
been planned and executed in related where to record the time
accordance with company expectations? the engine space was set to UMS
mode or manned mode.
According to the records available
the time the engine room was set
to UMS or manned mode.
According to the records available
the time the engine room was set
to UMS or manned mode was
recorded in the engine log book
and not in the deck log book too.
4.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Process The RT was not familiar with
the company procedures defining company procedure and
machinery space operating mode and, corresponding poster for the
where required to be attended, the required engine room manning at
machinery space team composition different conditions.
during the various stages of a voyage, and
were records avail ble to confirm the
machinery space had been operated
accordingly?

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4.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Human The OP was not aware of the
the company procedures defining existence of such procedure and
machinery space operating mode and, poster in the SMS Manual during
where required to be attended, the interview.
machinery space team composition
during the various stages of a voyage, and
were records available to confirm the
machinery space had been operated
accordingly?
4.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Human Th op when asked was not aware
the company procedures defining of the company procedure and
machinery space operating mode and, only refer to Work Schedule
where required to be attended, the Poster and Chief Engineer Night
machinery space team composition Order.
during the various stages of a voyage, and
were records available to confirm the
machinery space had been operated
accordingly?
4.4.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Survival craft portable two-way
with the location, purpose and operation VHF radios provided in the bridge
of the survival craft portable two-way were not marked with the
VHF radios and were they in good order required operating instructions.
with records available to demonstrate
that had they been inspected and tested
as required?

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The Company form for record and
with the onboard emergency response evaluation of drills did not require
plans, and were records available to formally to document the lessons
demonstrate that all mandatory and learnt during the drill.
company defined emergency drills had
been completed and documented as
required by company procedures?
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human When asked, the OP did not recall
with the onboard emergency response any lesson learned documented
plans, and were records available to in previous records.
demonstrate that all mandatory and
company defined emergency drills had
been completed and documented as
required by company procedures?
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no record of Risk
with the onboard emergency response Assessment being conducted,
plans, and were records available to prior to lowering of lifeboats onto
demonstrate that all mandatory and water during drill as required by
company defined emergency drills had the Company Procedure.
been completed and documented as
required by company procedures?
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no Company
with the onboard emergency response Procedure defining the actions to
plans, and were records available to take if a drill could not be
demonstrate that all mandatory and completed within the required
company defined emergency drills had time frame.
been completed and documented as
required by company procedures?
5.1.10 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Junior deck officer was unable to
with the shipboard emergency plan for explain required actions in case of
loss loss of propulsion.
of propulsion, and had drills taken place
to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard
emergency response plan in accordance
with company procedures?
5.1.11 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no shipboard
with the shipboard emergency plan for emergency plan or drill scenario
failure of electrical power, and had drills for the failure of electrical power.
taken place to test the effectiveness of
the shipboard emergency response plan
in accordance with company
procedures?
5.1.11 Were the Master and officers familiar Human OP was unfamiliar with the
with the shipboard emergency plan for process of estimating the
failure of electrical power, and had drills predicated drift of a disabled
taken place to test the effectiveness of

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the shipboard emergency response plan tanker taking into account the
in accordance with company wind, current and the ship's head.
procedures?
5.1.14 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The Observed person was not
familiar with the shipboard emergency familiar with his duties during
response plan for man overboard, man overboard situation.
including the launching and recovering
the rescue boat, and had drills taken
place to test the effectiveness of the
shipboard emergency response plan in
accordance with company procedures?
5.1.9 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The last annual grounding drill
with the shipboard emergency plan for carried out on 21-Mar-2023 was
grounding, and had drills taken place to not in line with the guidance
test the effectiveness of the shipboard provided in the vessel's response
emergency response plan in accordance plan for the drill. The drill as
with company procedures? recorded was carried out as table
top discussion without any
specific grounding scenario and
follow up actions.
5.1.9 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Perseverance of ECDIS data was
with the shipboard emergency plan for not included in the company
grounding, and had drills taken place to checklist for the grounding drill.
test the effectiveness of the shipboard
emergency response plan in accordance
with company procedures?
5.2.2 Were the Master, officers and crew Hardware Emergency diesel generator
familiar with the location, purpose, mushroom ventilation flap did
testing and operation of the vessel’s fire not close when tested. Air supply
dampers, the means of closing the main was noted insufficient. Air supply
inlets and outlets of all ventilation restored and ventilation flap
systems and the means of stopping the closed.
power ventilation systems from outside
the space served?
5.2.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The UV flame detector tester was
with the location, purpose and out of order, but properly
operation of the vessel’s fixed fire reported in the defect reporting
detection and fire alarm system, and system. Action taken requisition
was the equipment in good working order issued.
order, regularly inspected, tested and
maintained?
5.2.8 Were the Master, officers and galley Hardware Fatty deposits found in the visible
staff familiar with the location, purpose galley duct area.
and operation of the fixed and portable
fire extinguishing systems provided in
the galley, were the systems in good
working order and available for
immediate use, and were galley ranges,

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exhaust vents, filter cowls free of grease

or combustible material?

5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process There were no procedures stating
familiar with the location and use of the that SCBA annual or 5yearly
vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including inspection by shore service
the self-contained breathing apparatus certificate letter shall be
(SCBA), and was the equipment countersigned by OP by cross
maintained in good condition and ready checking serial number and
for immediate use in accordance with inventory of equipment. Onboard
company procedures? procedure 7.1.1.4 was only
stating IACS class approved
company to be used primarily.
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human OP did not countersign section
familiar with the location and use of the stated in the certificate to affirm
vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including verification by Senior Officer.
the self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA), and was the equipment
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Hardware The BA compressor was equipped
familiar with the location and use of the with only one final stage safety
vessel's firefighter's outfits including relief valve rated at 300 bars,
the self-contained breathing apparatus despite the onboard was doing
(SCBA), and was the equipment recharge operation of equipment
maintained in good condition and ready at a pressure rate of 200 bars.
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process There was no locally posted or
familiar with the location and use of the accessible instructions stating the
vessel's firefighter's outfits including necessity to adapt the safety
the self-contained breathing apparatus protection valve to the specific
(SCBA), and was the equipment equipment in use.
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The observed person lacked
familiar with the location and use of the familiarisation with the
vessel's firefighter's outfits including equipment that he was usually
the self-contained breathing apparatus using.
(SCBA), and was the equipment
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?

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5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process No procedures available for
familiar with the location and use of the breathing air compressor air filter
vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including replacement.
the self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA), and was the equipment
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The OP was not aware about air
familiar with the location and use of the compressor maintenance
vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including procedures.
the self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA), and was the equipment
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.3.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Hardware BA bottle in foam room for fire
familiar with the location and use of the fighters were noted leaking when
vessel’s firefighter’s outfits including tested.
the self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA), and was the equipment
maintained in good condition and ready
for immediate use in accordance with
company procedures?
5.4.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware A defect report indicated that the
with the operation of the davit- starboard side lifeboat
launched lifeboats, release mechanisms embarkation ladder was defective
and launching appliances, and were due to deterioration of the side
they in good order with records ropes by Decay. A new ladder was
available to demonstrate that they had currently on order due to be
been inspected and tested as required? supplied at this port.
5.4.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Two fuel tanks were located in the
with the operation of the dedicated designated compartment within
rescue boat and launching appliance, the rescue boat. But it was
and were they in good order with observed that about 30% of the
records available to demonstrate that compartment was filled with
they had been inspected and tested as water due to the damaged rubber
required? seal.
5.4.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The computerised PMS indicated
with the operation of the dedicated that the rescue boat was
rescue boat and launching appliance, checked/tested weekly and
and were they in good order with reported to be good. However,
records available to demonstrate that the seal in the compartment,
they had been inspected and tested as where the fuel tanks were stored,
required? was damaged and filled with
water.
5.4.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Procedure to start rescue boat
with the operation of the dedicated engine not posted next to the
rescue boat and launching appliance, engine starting position.

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and were they in good order with

records available to demonstrate that
they had been inspected and tested as
required?
5.4.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP omitted to post near by
with the operation of the dedicated the dedicated rescue boat the
rescue boat and launching appliance, operating instructions of
and were they in good order with launching davit in manual / em'cy
records available to demonstrate that mode.
they had been inspected and tested as
required?
5.4.9 Were the Master and officers familiar Process PMS work order in place for
with the company procedures for the inspection of lighting systems,
periodic testing and maintenance of the however the job description and
emergency lighting system, was there or historical records did not
evidence of periodic testing, and was identify the emergency lighting
the system in proper operating system.
condition?
5.5.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The OP was not familiar with his
familiar with the company enclosed role in signing the enclosed
space entry procedures, and was space permit as either an
evidence available to demonstrate that attendant or someone who
all enclosed space entries had been enters the space.
made in strict compliance with the
procedures?
5.5.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human In the enclosed space entry
familiar with the company enclosed permit for the inspection of 1 port
space entry procedures, and was WBT completed on 18.10.2023
evidence available to demonstrate that was noted that name and rank of
all enclosed space entries had been the person initially entered the
made in strict compliance with the space was not recorded in the
procedures? permit.
5.5.5 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Forward mast head flood light not
with the company procedures for working.
working on electrical equipment and
systems, and was there evidence that
risk control measures such as permits to
work and/or documented risk
assessments were consistently used
whenever work was undertaken on
electrical equipment and systems?
5.5.6 Were the Master and officers familiar Human LO/TO equipment was found not
with the company procedures for the to be attached / recorded as per
control of hazardous energy, and was operator policy to machinery or
evidence available, through systems during the inspection.
documented risk assessment or
permits, that hazardous energy sources
were routinely identified and isolated
before working on, or in, machinery,

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systems or spaces where hazardous

energy could be present?

5.6.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP was not familiar with
with the purpose, operation, testing, personal gas meter calibration.
maintenance and calibration of the
vessel’s portable and personal gas
measurement instruments, and was the
equipment on board sufficient, in good
working order, regularly tested and
periodically calibrated?
5.6.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Procedure manual required the
with the purpose, operation, testing, inspection of dragger pump
maintenance and calibration of the yearly and prior use. OP was not
vessel’s portable and personal gas aware regarding records keeping.
measurement instruments, and was the
equipment on board sufficient, in good
working order, regularly tested and
periodically calibrated?
5.7.1 Had all onboard incidents been Process The vessel had been involved in a
reported and investigated in accordance incident on 28 Jan 2024 parting of
with company procedures, and was an a forward breast mooring wire,
incident investigation report or a however, the incident was not
summarised lessons learned bulletin reported through the PIQ.
available for each incident at or above a
defined threshold?
5.7.1 Had all onboard incidents been Process From the electronic accident
reported and investigated in accordance document management system it
with company procedures, and was an was noted that the AE1 alternator
incident investigation report or a had been found to be in low
summarised lessons learned bulletin insulation condition on 15 Sep
available for each incident at or above a 2023 and renewed consequently.
defined threshold? However, the associated incident
investigation report was missing
and this incident was not
declared via PIQ.
5.7.1 Had all onboard incidents been Process It was noted from the electronic
reported and investigated in accordance accident document management
with company procedures, and was an system that an engine crew
incident investigation report or a member had undergone a foot
summarised lessons learned bulletin injury in the engine room on 8
available for each incident at or above a October 2023 but this incident
defined threshold? was not declared in the PIQ .The
associated incident investigation
report and this incident had been
already closed out.

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5.7.4 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process Operator’s procedure did not
familiar with the company work require recording of daily work
planning procedures and were records plan meeting as guided by ISGOTT
available to demonstrate that onboard 4.7.5.
work planning meetings had been
conducted and documented in
accordance with the procedures?
5.7.8 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human OP was unfamiliar with the term
familiar with the company SIMOPS and responsibilities
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) regarding the assigned task when
procedure and was there evidence that SIMOPS is being undertaken.
SIMOPS were considered during work
planning and the required controls
implemented for
the duration of such operations?
5.7.8 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human OP was unfamiliar with the
familiar with the company decision matrix of permitted
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) operations for accessing SIMOPS.
procedure and was there evidence that
SIMOPS were considered during work
planning and the required controls
implemented for
the duration of such operations?
5.7.8 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process During cargo and bunkering
familiar with the company operations, procedures were
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) requiring a risk assessment to be
procedure and was there evidence that completed with office approval.
SIMOPS were considered during work During present SIMOP operation
planning and the required controls risk assessment was carried out
implemented for the duration of such however office approval was
operations? missing.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Human As per records safety officers’
with the company procedure for safety inspection were being conducted
inspections of the main deck areas, and on a regular interval, however
had inspections been effective in metal scraps (pipes, angle bars,
identifying hazards to health, safety and frames and gratings) were noted
the environment? stowed on the walkway around
the swimming pool between the
railings without any securing
arrangement resulting with
ineffective safety inspection.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Entry procedure posted by Bow
with the company procedure for safety Truster Room was limited to "Do
inspections of the main deck areas, and Not Enter W/O C/O Permission".
had inspections been effective in Not included starting of blower,
identifying hazards to health, safety and informing duty officer, carrying
the environment? personal gas meter & completing
company's 'Record of Movement
Of Persons'.

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5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The area safety inspection for the
with the company procedure for safety main deck was a job in the PMS
inspections of the main deck areas, and under Area 2, however the
had inspections been effective in required inspection items did not
identifying hazards to health, safety and cover the list detailed within the
the environment? SIRE guidance.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Five portable fire extinguishers
with the company procedure for safety observed that their securing pin
inspections of the main deck areas, and seals were broken and missing.
had inspections been effective in
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP did not follow the
with the company procedure for safety company instructions for
inspections of the main deck areas, and checking the portable
had inspections been effective in extinguishers.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no procedure/ task
with the company procedure for safety available in the PMS to test the
inspections of the main deck areas, and fixed gas freeing blower provided
had inspections been effective in on the port side midship blower
identifying hazards to health, safety and room. There was no test record
the environment? available for this blower.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Individual aerials fitted on the
with the company procedure for safety monkey island were not marked/
inspections of the main deck areas, and identified as per the aerial
had inspections been effective in diagram.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Vessel was not fitted with ballast
with the company procedure for safety pump room however part of
inspections of the main deck areas, and ballast pump room Company
had inspections been effective in Form was completed.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP had completed part of
with the company procedure for safety Safety Officer Inspection Checklist
inspections of the main deck areas, and for the Ballast Pump Room
had inspections been effective in incorrectly.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no company procedure
with the company procedure for safety which required that safety
inspections of the main deck areas, and inspection of the main deck areas
had inspections been effective in were conducted at appropriate
identifying hazards to health, safety and intervals by the designated safety
the environment? officer.

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5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Hardware The manifolds platform was not
with the company procedure for safety fitted with protection rails
inspections of the main deck areas, and however edges were not marked
had inspections been effective in with contrasting colour or
identifying hazards to health, safety and warning signs to prevent falls
the environment? during connection and
disconnection operation. The
height of the manifolds from the
deck was 1 meter.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Hardware The aft deck dump valves
with the company procedure for safety operating wheel would remain
inspections of the main deck areas, and below the surface of the
had inspections been effective in accumulation of spilled cargo and
identifying hazards to health, safety and require to put hands into spilled
the environment? liquid if become near to fish plate
height.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Hardware Mast Riser support wire stays,
with the company procedure for safety fwd mast and compass desk stays
inspections of the main deck areas, and wires were covered by plastic
had inspections been effective in sheathing.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Process The deck safety inspection check
with the company procedure for safety list was lacking instructions for
inspections of the main deck areas, and checking risk from elevated
had inspections been effective in platforms.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.1 Were the Master and officer’s familiar Process The marking of snap back on deck
with the company procedure for safety was noted with zebra marking
inspections of the main deck areas, and near to mooring fittings and
had inspections been effective in deployed wires. There was no
identifying hazards to health, safety and warning notice that the entire
the environment? deck should considered risk of
snap back during mooring.
5.8.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The checklist for the safety
with the company procedure for safety officers Inspection of the main
inspections of the main deck areas, and deck was generic in format and
had inspections been effective in did not cover all of the items
identifying hazards to health, safety and detailed in the guidance notes to
the environment? this question.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The maintenance instructions for
with the company procedure for safety the insulation gloves provided for
inspections of the machinery spaces, the engine room and emergency
and had inspections been effective in switchboards were in Chinese.
identifying hazards to health, safety and There was no task on board for
the environment? testing or replacing the insulation
gloves as necessary. It was not

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possible to establish their

manufacturing date either.

5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The area safety inspection for the
with the company procedure for safety machinery spaces was a job in the
inspections of the machinery spaces, PMS under Area 3, however the
and had inspections been effective in required inspection items did not
identifying hazards to health, safety and cover the list detailed within the
the environment? SIRE guidance.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Trace of oil leakage was observed
with the company procedure for safety from connection unions of the
inspections of the machinery spaces, remote valve system and small
and had inspections been effective in amount of leaking oil was
identifying hazards to health, safety and accumulated in the solenoid valve
the environment? cabinet located in the engine
room.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Two butterfly nut locking
with the company procedure for safety arrangement out of ten numbers
inspections of the machinery spaces, provided for the emergency
and had inspections been effective in generator vent maintenance
identifying hazards to health, safety and hatch was found to be broken and
the environment? missing from place.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The bottom securing eye pad
with the company procedure for safety (right side) for the short ladder on
inspections of the machinery spaces, main engine local manoeuvring
and had inspections been effective in platform was found to be broken
identifying hazards to health, safety and from its welding joint.
the environment?
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There were no company
with the company procedure for safety procedures which required that
inspections of the machinery spaces, safety inspections of the engine /
and had inspections been effective in steering compartments were
identifying hazards to health, safety and conducted by the designated
the environment? safety officer / responsible engine
officer.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The safety barrier, which used a
with the company procedure for safety chain to prove the access to the
inspections of the machinery spaces, engine emergency escape was
and had inspections been effective in not fitted in position.
identifying hazards to health, safety and Furthermore, the chain was
the environment? painted in red as it was on other
de k access point.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Not a properly engine safety
with the company procedure for safety inspection.
inspections of the machinery spaces,
and had inspections been effective in
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?

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5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The checklist for the safety
with the company procedure for safety officers Inspection of the
inspections of the machinery spaces, machinery spaces was generic in
and had inspections been effective in format and did not cover all of the
identifying hazards to health, safety and items detailed in the guidance
the environment? notes to this question.
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware It was found during the inspection
with the company procedure for safety that the fuel oil leak alarms for
inspections of the machinery spaces, the three auxiliary generator
and had inspections been effective in engines remained by-passed by
identifying hazards to health, safety and putting the leak oil container
the environment? drain valves to the open
conditions
5.8.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The fuel oil leak alarms for the
with the company procedure for safety three auxiliary generators were
inspections of the machinery spaces, kept by passed as the OP was not
and had inspections been effective in aware of the correct closed
identifying hazards to health, safety and position of the leak oil connection
the environment? container drain valves. The drain
valves were a cock valve type and
not marked with their closed and
open positions at the time.
5.8.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The cargo pump #1 was found
with the company procedure for safety leaking cargo through the upper
inspections of the cargo pumproom, bearing
and had inspections been effective in
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware At the time of the inspection in
with the company procedure for safety pumproom was note that the
inspections of the cargo pumproom, light fixture fitted at the entrance
and had inspections been effective in was damaged / broken.
identifying hazards to health, safety and
the environment?
5.8.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no company procedure
with the company procedure for safety which required that safety
inspections of the cargo pumproom, inspections in pumproom were
and had inspections been effective in conducted at appropriate
identifying hazards to health, safety and intervals by the designated safety
the environment? officer.
5.8.3 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP, who was the designated
with the company procedure for safety safety officer was unfamiliar with
inspections of the machinery spaces, the Company Safety Officer's
and had inspections been effective in Monthly inspection checklist for
identifying hazards to health, safety and the cargo Pump room, according
the environment? to the OP he had been very busy
and dealing with stress.

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5.8.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Three reinforcements supporting
with the procedure for safety the mesh of the two ventilators
inspections of the cargo machinery located at the top of the
rooms, and had inspections been compressor room were partially
effective in identifying hazards to loose due to broken welds.
health, safety and the environment?
5.8.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Improper inspection of the area.
with the procedure for safety
inspections of the cargo machinery
rooms, and had inspections been
effective in identifying hazards to
health, safety and the environment?
5.8.5 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The area safety inspection for the
with the company procedure for safety forecastle was a job in the PMS
inspections of the forecastle, and had under Area 1 which covered the
inspections been effective in identifying forecastle, main deck and cargo
hazards to health, safety and the deck trunk, however the required
environment? inspection items did not cover the
list detailed within the SIRE
guidance.
5.8.5 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There was no company procedure
with the company procedure for safety which required the safety
inspections of the forecastle, and had inspection in forecastle were
inspections been effective in identifying conducted at appropriate
hazards to health, safety and the intervals by the designated safety
environment? officer.
5.8.5 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The checklist for the safety
with the company procedure for safety officers Inspection of the
inspections of the forecastle, and had forecastle was generic in format
inspections been effective in identifying and did not cover all of the items
hazards to health, safety and the detailed in the guidance notes to
environment? this question.
5.9.2 Where the vessel was fitted with a Process There was no risk assessment
single cargo hose handling crane, was a available which identified the
risk assessment available which minimum spare parts that must
identified the minimum spare parts that be carried for a single hose
must be carried onboard to ensure handling crane.
continued operation in the event of a
single
component failure, and were the
identified spare parts available
onboard?
5.9.2 Where the vessel was fitted with a Process The vessel was fitted with single
single cargo hose handling crane, was a hose handling crane. There was
risk no risk assessment in the vessel
assessment available which identified library for crane component
the minimum spare parts that must be failure.
carried onboard to ensure continued
operation in the event of a single

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component failure, and were the

identified spare parts available
onboard?

5.10.1 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Human The dedicated pilot lifebuoy was
ratings familiar with the company provided with self-igniting light
procedures for rigging the pilot and the heaving line was
boarding arrangements, and was the connected to the lifebuoy.
equipment provided in satisfactory When asked, the RT was not able
condition and used in accordance with to identify the incorrect
industry best practice? arrangement of heavy line to the
dedicated pilot boarding buoy
5.10.1 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Hardware Two pilot ladders stored on the
ratings familiar with the company main deck close to the pilot
procedures for rigging the pilot boarding area were damaged but
boarding arrangements, and was the they were not marked as not to
equipment provided in satisfactory be used.
condition and used in accordance with
industry best practice?
5.10.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Equipment not fitted on board.
with the company personnel transfer by No mistake in either PIQ or HVPQ.
crane procedure, and where a
personnel transfer basket (PTB) and
accessories were provided, were these
in satisfactory condition and used in
accordance with company procedures
and manufacturer’s recommendations?
5.10.7 Were the Master, officers and crew Human Designated walkways around the
familiar with the escape routes from the accommodation were found to be
machinery spaces, pump rooms, slippery due to ice deposition and
compressor rooms, accommodation RT did not clear the walkway as
spaces and, when in port, from the required by company procedure.
vessel, and were these routes clearly Walkways were cleared during
marked, unobstructed and well the inspection.
illuminated?

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Human Ozone depleting substance
familiar with the company procedure records were not verified and
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting signed by the OP upon
Substances Record Book, and did the completion of each page.
entries contained in the Ozone-
depleting Substances Record Book
accurately record the operations and
emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
6.1.5 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Company procedures did not
with the company procedures for cyber designate who on board should
security risk management, and had have an administrator profile
these procedures been fully and/or who should manage user
implemented? profiles.
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Human Permanently sealed equipments
familiar with the company procedure were being recorded within the
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting ozone depleting substances
Substances Record Book, and did the record book. The interviewed OP
entries contained in the Ozone- was not aware of this process
depleting Substances Record Book which was clearly mentioned
accurately record the operations and within the company procedures.
emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Process As per the IAPPC, the vessel did
familiar with the company procedure not have a system or equipment
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting subject to Ozone-depleting
Substances Record Book, and did the substances regulation.
entries contained in the Ozone-
depleting Substances Record Book
accurately record the operations and
emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Human As per the supplement to IAPPC,
familiar with the company procedure the vessel did not have a system
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting or equipment subject to Ozone-
Substances Record Book, and did the depleting substances regulation.
entries contained in the Ozone- (Equipment not fitted - therefore
depleting Substances Record Book no procedure or familiarity.)
accurately record the operations and
emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Process Vessel was not maintaining
familiar with the company procedure record book for the Ozone
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting depletion substances. RO
Substances Record Book, and did the reported, vessel not carrying
entries contained in the Ozone- Ozone depleting substances.
depleting Substances Record Book

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accurately record the operations and

emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?

6.1.5 Were the Master and engineer officers Process There was no company procedure
familiar with the company procedure that describe the requirements
for maintaining the Ozone-depleting for maintaining ozone depleting
Substances Record Book, and did the substances record book.
entries contained in the Ozone-
depleting Substances Record Book
accurately record the operations and
emissions required to be documented
by MARPOL Annex VI?
6.1.6 Were the documents and records Process There was no procedure for
required by MARPOL Annex VI action to take in the event that
Regulation 13 for the control of NOx and the NOX abatement system fitted
associated emissions in good order? suffered a failure that could not
be rectified within one hour.
6.3.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Vessel had an open reported
with the company procedures for the defect with regards to the shaft
safe operation of the ballast water and oil seal for both filters of
management system (BWMS), and was BWTS which were recorded to be
the equipment in satisfactory condition severely worn out and causing
and used in accordance with the sea water leak during the
company procedures and operation of BWTS.
manufacturer’s instructions?
6.3.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process The filter cleaning records for the
with the company procedures for the BWTS was not included in the
safe operation of the ballast water PMS and any other company
management system (BWMS), and was procedures.
the equipment in satisfactory condition
and used in accordance with the
company procedures and
manufacturer’s instructions?
6.3.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP was not able to
with the company procedures for the demonstrate the test and
safe operation of the ballast water maintenance of filters for the
management system (BWMS), and was BWTS within the company
the equipment in satisfactory condition procedures.
and used in accordance with the
company procedures and
manufacturer’s instructions?
6.3.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Heating arrangement provided
with the company procedures for the inside the ballast water treatment
safe operation of the ballast water room was not started at the time
management system (BWMS), and was of inspection. OP started the
the equipment in satisfactory condition heating arrangement provided
and used in accordance with the during inspection.

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company procedures and

manufacturer’s instructions?

6.5.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Process Operator provided library of risk
the company procedure for the safe use assessment did not include any
of the incinerator, and was the for the safe operation of the
incinerator in satisfactory condition and incinerator. Risk assessment was
used in accordance with the company available for maintenance of the
procedure and in compliance with incinerator.
MARPOL?
6.5.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Human Ship specific risk assessment was
the company procedure for the safe use not available for the safe
of the incinerator, and was the operation of the incinerator. Risk
incinerator in satisfactory condition and assessment was available for
used in accordance with the company maintenance of the incinerator.
procedure and in compliance with
MARPOL?
6.6.1 Were the Master and engineer officers Hardware The bilge and sludge discharge
familiar with the company procedures were marked by engraving on the
for the use of the oil filtering flange and painted surrounding
equipment, and was the oil filtering area to indicate only bilge
equipment in satisfactory condition and discharge.
used in accordance with the company
procedure, manufacturer's instructions
and MARPOL Annex I?

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
7.1.1 Was security threat and risk assessment Process No security risk assessment had
an integral part of voyage planning, and been performed/ available for a
did the passage plan contain security recent voyage.
related information for each leg of the
voyage?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The person at the gangway did
familiar with the company procedures to not ask for the photo ID of the
control access to the vessel in port and to inspector.
ensure the safety of visitors, and were
these procedures effectively
implemented?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Hardware Vessel was under CCTV
familiar with the company procedures to surveillance and CCTV
control access to the vessel in port and to monitoring could only be done
ensure the safety of visitors, and were from the bridge with the
these procedures effectively dedicated CCTV monitor. No
implemented? dedicated CCTV monitor was
provided in the cargo control
room for access monitoring
during port operation.
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The terminal was not provided
familiar with the company procedures to with a list of approved visitors
control access to the vessel in port and to by the OP therefore gangway
ensure the safety of visitors, and were watch was not aware of the
these procedures effectively anticipated visitors.
implemented?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human During the gangway briefing OP
familiar with the company procedures to was not aware of toxic gases in
control access to the vessel in port and to the cargo on board and was not
ensure the safety of visitors, and were able to appraise about the cargo
these procedures effectively hazards.
implemented?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process The inspector was not briefed
familiar with the company procedures to on the drug and alcohol policy
control access to the vessel in port and to on board at the security control
ensure the safety of visitors, and were point next to the gangway, in
these procedures effectively addition, the visitor card did not
implemented? include the D&A policy.
Information of the D&A policy
was included in the gangway
poster after the inspector
pointed out the observation.
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human The OP did not mention the
familiar with the company procedures to drug and alcohol policy on
control access to the vessel in port and to board during the briefing to the
ensure the safety of visitors, and were inspector at the security check
point next to the gangway.

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these procedures effectively

implemented?

7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Process The OP had not provided the
familiar with the company procedures to Terminal with a list of approved
control access to the vessel in port and to visitors.
ensure the safety of visitors, and were
these procedures effectively
implemented?
7.2.2 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human OP was not aware if Terminal
familiar with the company procedures to has to be informed about
control access to the vessel in port and to visitors list.
ensure the safety of visitors, and were
these procedures effectively
implemented?
7.5.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human One of the OP did not have user
with the company procedures for cyber profile. When interviewed it
security risk management, and had these was found that the OP was using
procedures been fully implemented? same profile as that of another
Junior Officer.
7.5.1 Were the Master, officers and ratings Hardware IMO symbol for the ESD button
familiar with the cargo system Emergency in front of the pump room
Shutdown (ESD) system, where fitted, entrance was not available.
and/or the cargo pump emergency stop
controls, and was there evidence that the
systems and equipment had been tested
in accordance with company procedures?

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CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
8.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human OP was not fully familiar with the
with the company procedures for the use company policy of inert gas
of the inert gas system, and had the inert percentage to be maintained
gas system been used in accordance with during crude oil operation.
ISGOTT guidance, with cargo tanks
maintained in an inert condition at all
times, except when it was necessary to be
gas-free for entry?
8.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The key of the fixed CO2 fire
with the company procedures extinguishing system fitted on the
for the use of the inert gas system, and Mast Riser was missing from its
had the inert gas system been used in key box. Rectified when pointed
accordance with ISGOTT guidance, with out by the inspector.
cargo tanks maintained in an inert
condition at all times, except when it was
necessary to be gas-free for entry?
8.1.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The OP failed to return the vent
with the company procedures riser's fixed CO2 fire extinguishing
for the use of the inert gas system, and system's key back to its key box
had the inert gas system been used in after removing it for cleaning
accordance with ISGOTT guidance, with purposes.
cargo tanks maintained in an inert
condition at all times, except when it was
necessary to be gas-free for entry?
8.2.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Human The contingency plan for
with the company procedures that uncontrolled polymerization was
addressed the carriage of inhibited not prepared for the loading of
cargoes, and had these procedures been inhibitor cargo which the vessel
followed? was due to load at the present
port.
8.3.10 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware Erroneous entry in PIQ.
with the company procedures for the Equipment not fitted.
inspection, testing and operation of the
vapour collection system, and was this
equipment in satisfactory condition?
8.3.10 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Equipment not fitted so no
with the company procedures for the procedure required.
inspection, testing and operation of the
vapour collection system, and was this
equipment in satisfactory condition?
8.3.10 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Equipment no fitted so no human
with the company procedures for the response required.
inspection, testing and operation of the
vapour collection system, and was this
equipment in satisfactory condition?

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8.3.12 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The UTI tapes fitted with
with the company procedures for the use threaded couplings were not
of portable cargo provided with bonding wire and
ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) clip. Bonding post was fitted on
measurement and sampling equipment, the UTI tapes.
and was the equipment in satisfactory
condition and used in accordance with
the company procedures?
8.3.12 Were the Master and officers familiar Human It appeared that the OP was not
with the company procedures for the use familiar with the requirement of
of portable cargo fitting bonding wire during
ullage/temperature/interface (UTI) gauging of cargo tanks.
measurement and sampling equipment,
and was the equipment in satisfactory
condition and used in accordance with
the company procedures?
8.3.12 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware One UTI device was observed to
with the company procedures for the use be not working at the port side
of portable cargo cargo gear locker.
ullage/temperature/interface (UTI)
measurement and sampling equipment,
and was the equipment in satisfactory
condition and used in accordance with
the company procedures?
8.3.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Hardware The high high (98%) alarms were
with the company procedures for the non operational for cargo tanks
maintenance, testing and setting of the 2P to 6P and PST due to a
cargo tank high-level and high-high-level suspected control panel failure in
alarms, and were these alarm systems the CCR.
fully operational and properly set? The system had intermittent
faults from 8th March 2024 and
failed completely on 3rd April
2024. An order was placed for a
new unit 8th March 2024.
8.3.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Overfill alarm system test was not
with the company procedures for the recorded in the PMS as per
maintenance, testing and setting of the Operator guidelines.
cargo tank high-level and high-high-level
alarms, and were these alarm systems
fully operational and properly set?
8.3.4 Were the Master and officers familiar Human Lack of Familiarisation of
with the company procedures for the high/Overfill alarm system test.
maintenance, testing and setting of the
cargo tank high-level and high-high-level
alarms, and were these alarm systems
fully operational and properly set?
8.3.5 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Hardware Cargo tanks were inerted. (Not
ratings familiar with the company applicable – as instructed by
procedures for dipping, ullaging and question guidance.)

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sampling flammable static accumulator

cargoes in non-inerted tanks, and were
these procedures being followed?
8.3.5 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Human Cargo tanks were inerted. (Not
ratings familiar with the company applicable – as instructed by
procedures for dipping, ullaging and question guidance.)
sampling flammable static accumulator
cargoes in non-inerted tanks, and were
these procedures being followed?
8.3.5 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Process Cargo tanks were inerted. (Not
ratings familiar with the company applicable – as instructed by
procedures for dipping, ullaging and question guidance.)
sampling flammable static accumulator
cargoes in non-inerted tanks, and were
these procedures being followed?
8.3.6 Were the Master and deck officers Process Cargo tanks were inerted. (Not
familiar with the company procedures for applicable – as instructed by
loading flammable static accumulator question guidance.)
cargoes into non-inerted tanks, and were
these procedures being followed?
8.3.6 Were the Master and deck officers Human Cargo tanks were inerted. (Not
familiar with the company procedures for applicable – as instructed by
loading flammable static accumulator question guidance.)
cargoes into non-inerted tanks, and were
these procedures being followed?
8.3.7 Were the Master and officers familiar Human OP omitted to adjust / correct the
with the purpose, operation and UTC time in IG oxygen recorder
calibration of the inert gas system fixed which was fitted in CCR. All times
oxygen analyser, and had the equipment recorded in print out were in UTC.
been operated, maintained and At the time of the inspection the
calibrated in accordance with the oxygen recorder displayed UTC
manufacturer’s instructions and +2, however the correct time
company procedures? setting was UTC+3.
8.3.8 Were the Master, officers and ratings Human OP did not check as per 'deck
familiar with the cargo system Emergency safety inspection' if IMO symbol
Shutdown (ESD) system, where fitted, for the ESD button in front of the
and/or the cargo pump emergency stop pump room entrance were
controls, and was there evidence that the available.
systems and equipment had been tested
in accordance with company procedures?
8.99.1 Were the Master and all officers directly Hardware The IG tank pressure was not
involved in cargo transfer operations maintained as guidance given by
familiar with the company procedure for the discharging orders issued by
planning cargo and ballast transfers, and OP. it was stated in the
were records available to demonstrate discharging orders and
that cargo operations had been planned discharging plan to maintain an IG
in accordance with the company pressure close to 1000 mmWG,
procedure and conducted in accordance however, as per records sighted
with the agreed plan?

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the pressure observed was 750

mmWG during all the discharge.

8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human Shore staff was not verifying
direct responsibility for cargo, tank Ship/Shore safety check list
cleaning or ballast operations familiar completion every four hours,
with the requirements of the ISGOTT during OP's CCR watch keeping
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, and OP did not raise same with
were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in the Senior Officer.
use with all applicable provisions and
agreements maintained throughout?
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human OP did not arrange necessary
direct responsibility for cargo, tank Ship/Shore check list completion
cleaning or ballast operations familiar by verification from terminal
with the requirements of the ISGOTT representative. He maintained
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, only his check as per ship item in
were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in the check list. There was no radio
use with all applicable provisions and call verification record provided
agreements maintained throughout? at the time of the inspection.
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human Ship shore checklist repeat checks
direct responsibility for cargo, tank done by OOW were marked as yes
cleaning or ballast operations familiar in advance. OP reported that the
with the requirements of the ISGOTT copy was printout sent from
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, terminal and terminal had them
were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in marked as yes from before. The
use with all applicable provisions and OP entered the time of checks at
agreements maintained throughout? the top when the checks was
done once a watch. Four items
related to inert gas were marked
as yes while the same was not
applicable to the vessel. OP
presented previous loading
operation repeat checks in which
the same were marked as n/a.
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human The SSSCL for previous port
direct responsibility for cargo, tank repeat checks was not available
cleaning or ballast operations familiar on board. OP stated that terminal
with the requirements of the ISGOTT checklist was used and it was
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, likely that copy was not retained
were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in on board.
use with all applicable provisions and
agreements maintained throughout?
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human It was noted from an interview
direct responsibility for cargo, tank that the OP was not aware of
cleaning or ballast operations familiar what type of electrical insulation
with the requirements of the ISGOTT was fitted to the ship and shore
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and, interface (SSSCL item no. 54/

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were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in cargo manifold harm arm

use with all applicable provisions and connection) although the
agreements maintained throughout? checklist showed that the said
item had been checked every two
hours during the cargo transfer.
8.99.2 Were the Master and all officers with a Human The OP was not aware about
direct responsibility for cargo, tank repetitive checks as per SSSCL.
cleaning or ballast operations familiar
with the requirements of the ISGOTT
Ship/Shore Safety Checklist (SSSCL) and,
were appropriate sections of the SSSCL in
use with all applicable provisions and
agreements maintained throughout?

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CVIQ Question Categor Observation

No. y
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Process The certificate of calibration of
familiar with the company procedures for the pressure gauge used during
the testing and correct operation of the the BHC test was not provided.
mooring winch brakes, and were records No procedure in place to mark the
available to demonstrate that brakes had pressure gauge setting value
been tested periodically, after during the BHC test, which value
maintenance or when there was evidence was not mark in the winches.
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human When asked, the OP was not
familiar with the company procedures for aware of the requirement to mark
the testing and correct operation of the the pressure gauge value in the
mooring winch brakes, and were records winch drum.
available to demonstrate that brakes had
been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human Two mooring winches on the
familiar with the company procedures for poop deck, used as stern lines
the testing and correct operation of the were not adjusted to the marked
mooring winch brakes, and were records rendering point, and there was a
available to demonstrate that brakes had gap about 1 - 2 cm between the
been tested periodically, after marked rendering point and the
maintenance or when there was evidence actual holing point. The RT did not
of premature brake slippage? properly check this after
completion of mooring operation.
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human One of the forward mooring
familiar with the company procedures for winches brake markings were not
the testing and correct operation of the evident, whereas one other had
mooring winch brakes, and were records the brake overtightened.
available to demonstrate that brakes had
been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Hardwar Vessel was carrying equipment to
familiar with the company procedures for e test mooring winch brakes. There
the testing and correct operation of the was no evidence to indicate that
mooring winch brakes, and were records pressure gauge for the brake
available to demonstrate that brakes had testing equipment was calibrated
been tested periodically, after before use.
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Process There was no procedure to
familiar with the company procedures for ensure that pressure gauge for
the testing and correct operation of the the mooring winch brake testing
mooring winch brakes, and were records equipment needs to be calibrated
available to demonstrate that brakes had before use.
been tested periodically, after

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maintenance or when there was evidence

of premature brake slippage?

9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human RO not familiar that gauge for the
familiar with the company procedures for mooring testing equipment need
the testing and correct operation of the to be calibrated before use.
mooring winch brakes, and were records
available to demonstrate that brakes had
been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Process There was no procedure for
familiar with the company procedures for calibration of hydraulic jack
the testing and correct operation of the pressure gauge prior testing the
mooring winch brakes, and were records break holding of mooring
available to demonstrate that brakes had winches.
been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Hardwar There was more than one layer of
familiar with the company procedures e line on the tension side of a drum
for the testing and correct operation of at the winch M4 located on the
the mooring winch brakes, and were poop deck.
records available to demonstrate that
brakes had been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human The OP responsible at the aft
familiar with the company procedures Mooring station did not notice
for the testing and correct operation of that a second layer of line existed
the mooring winch brakes, and were at the winch drum M4 on the
records available to demonstrate that poop deck.
brakes had been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Hardwar At forward midship winch, one
familiar with the company procedures for e display of the local tension system
the testing and correct operation of the was not operational.
mooring winch brakes, and were records
available to demonstrate that brakes had
been tested periodically, after
maintenance or when there was evidence
of premature brake slippage?

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9.1.2 Was the vessel satisfactorily moored in Human During the interview to the
accordance with both the terminal accompanied person and
mooring plan and the mooring following his description of the
configurations permitted by the vessel's operator procedures, it was noted
Mooring System Management Plan? that the minimum number of
turns to be used on the tension
drums should be five, however
only four turns were fitted on one
winch aft. In three winches, the
covers of the line chafing
equipment were not kept free
outside the tension drums but
were turned inside the tension
drums. The deck safety rounds
were not fully effective, as the
engage lever security pin of one
winch forward starboard side was
not properly fitted in secured
position.
9.1.3 Were the Master, deck officers, and Hardwar One mooring wire / tail joining
ratings involved with mooring e shackle on aft mooring station
operations, deployed wire was incorrectly
familiar with the content of the Line fitted.
Management Plan and was the plan
maintained in accordance with company
instructions with mooring line, mooring
tail and joining shackle certificates
available for each item included within
the Line Management Plan?
9.1.3 Were the Master, deck officers, and Hardwar One of the fwd mooring station
ratings involved with mooring e wires was rubbing against the
operations, plate of the pedestal roller.
familiar with the content of the Line
Management Plan and was the plan
maintained in accordance with company
instructions with mooring line, mooring
tail and joining shackle certificates
available for each item included within
the Line Management Plan?
9.1.3 Were the Master, deck officers, and Human The OP failed to identify, during
ratings involved with mooring deck inspection, the 1,5 days
operations, vessel is at berth, the incorrectly
familiar with the content of the Line fitted mandal shackle.
Management Plan and was the plan
maintained in accordance with company
instructions with mooring line, mooring
tail and joining shackle certificates
available for each item included within
the Line Management Plan?

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9.1.3 Were the Master, deck officers, and Human The OP (officer on duty) failed to
ratings involved with mooring identify, during deck inspection
operations, and SSSCL repeated checks,
familiar with the content of the Line during the 1,5 days vessel is at
Management Plan and was the plan berth, the incorrectly fitted
maintained in accordance with company mandal shackle on one of the aft
instructions with mooring line, mooring deployed mooring wires.
tail and joining shackle certificates
available for each item included within
the Line Management Plan?
9.4.1 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Human Operator procedure required one
ratings familiar with the company engine rating to be included for
procedure that defined mooring team forward and one for ah mooring
supervision and composition for the station. OP stated that during
various mooring and anchoring mooring stations 4 persons
operations likely to be undertaken, and comprised the composition of the
was evidence available that each mooring team while engine
mooring work space had been supervised ratings were not involved. Review
and manned in accordance with company of hours of rest also indicated that
expectations? the company expectations
relating to mooring team
composition had not been
complied with.
9.4.1 Were the Master, deck officers and deck Process There was no procedure within
ratings familiar with the company either the MSMP or SMS detailing
procedure that defined mooring team the minimum number of
supervision and composition for the personnel to be present for
various mooring and anchoring mooring or anchoring operations.
operations likely to be undertaken, and
was evidence available that each
mooring work space had been supervised
and manned in accordance with company
expectations?
9.6.2 Were the Master and officers familiar Process There were no company
with the company procedures for procedures provided for the
mooring at an SPM or F(P)SO and were guidance on preparations for
the fittings required accurately described mooring at SPM and instructions
in the HVPQ? for safe mooring at SPM.

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CVIQ Question Categor Observation

No. y
10.2.1 Were the officers familiar with the Process The Company Procedures did not
starting procedure for the emergency define testing of emergency
generator and were records available to generator spare starter motor.
demonstrate that the emergency
generator had been tested according to
company procedures?
10.2.1 Were the officers familiar with the Hardwar Quick closing valve was found
starting procedure for the emergency e activated before testing the
generator and were records available to Emergency Generator in manual
demonstrate that the emergency mode.
generator had been tested according to
company procedures?
10.2.1 Were the officers familiar with the Human The EDG was tested prior
starting procedure for the emergency inspector boarding the vessel and
generator and were records available to during Class survey, however the
demonstrate that the emergency OP forgot to fix the quick closing
generator had been tested according to valve in open position.
company procedures?
10.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Human The OP was not familiar with the
the purpose and setting of the insulation company procedure which
monitoring devices provided on the provided guidance for the setting
primary and secondary distribution values for the IMDs for 220v, 440v
systems, and were the distribution and any other voltages used for
switchboards free of significant earth the primary or secondary
faults? distribution systems.
10.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Hardwar At the forecastle, the 220V
the purpose and setting of the insulation e switchboard insulation
monitoring devices provided on the monitoring system indicated a
primary and secondary distribution low insulation value of 0. 1
systems, and were the distribution Mohm.
switchboards free of significant earth
faults?
10.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Human During the routine electrical
the purpose and setting of the insulation inspection rounds of the different
monitoring devices provided on the switchboard and insulation
primary and secondary distribution monitoring devices, this alert was
systems, and were the distribution not identified.
switchboards free of significant earth
faults?
10.3.2 Were the engineer officers familiar with Process No company procedure for 440
the purpose and setting of the insulation and 220 low insulation settings
monitoring devices provided on the
primary and secondary distribution
systems, and were the distribution
switchboards free of significant earth
faults?

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10.3.8 Were engineer officers and ratings Human The electric welding power
familiar with the safety precautions for source had an alternating current
the use of electric welding equipment, (AC) output exceeding 25V. OP
were these safety precautions posted, was not aware of the criteria that
and was the equipment in satisfactory was to be met for electric arc
condition? welding machine regarding the
voltage output in case of AC or DC
electric welding machines
10.4.1 Were the responsible vessel staff familiar Hardwar There was no spare X-band radar
with the company procedure for e motor on board. One spare motor
managing and using the planned was required as per company
maintenance system, and was the system procedure. Same was on order.
updated with an accurate record of
onboard maintenance and spare parts in
accordance with the procedure?
10.4.1 Were the responsible vessel staff familiar Hardwar There was no spare lifeboat
with the company procedure for e starter motor on board. One
managing and using the planned spare motor was required as per
maintenance system, and was the system company procedure. Same was
updated with an accurate record of on order.
onboard maintenance and spare parts in
accordance with the procedure?
10.4.1 Were the responsible vessel staff familiar Hardwar There was no spare IG cone on
with the company procedure for e board. One was required as per
managing and using the planned company procedure. Same was
maintenance system, and was the system on order.
updated with an accurate record of
onboard maintenance and spare parts in
accordance with the procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, Process Bunker tanks ullage space
officers, and ratings involved in atmosphere checks for
bunkering operations, familiar with the flammable and toxic vapours
company bunkering procedures, and required to be taken before the
were records available to demonstrate bunkering operation had not
that bunker operations had been been recorded in accordance with
planned and conducted in accordance the Company Procedure. The first
with the company procedure? atmosphere check was recorded
after two hours of the bunkering
operation.
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, Process The bunkering plan was not
officers, and ratings involved in signed by the persons involved in
bunkering operations, familiar with the the bunkering operation.
company bunkering procedures, and
were records available to demonstrate
that bunker operations had been
planned and conducted in accordance
with the company procedure?

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10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Human The vessel was supplied HFO and
and ratings involved in bunkering LSMGO on 08 - 09 Mar 2024, but
operations, familiar with the company the OP did not obtain the
bunkering procedures, and were records master's approval sign in the
available to demonstrate that bunker bunkering plan.
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Process There was no company procedure
and ratings involved in bunkering that required bunker transfer
operations, familiar with the company plans to be prepared with defined
bunkering procedures, and were records content in alignment with ISGOTT
available to demonstrate that bunker Chapter 24 and TMSA KPI 6.2.5.
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Process The ship shore safety checklist in
and ratings involved in bunkering use by the vessel (form T23) for
operations, familiar with the company the bunkering operation of 24th
bunkering procedures, and were records April 2024 was not in compliance
available to demonstrate that bunker with ISGOTT 6.
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Process Company procedure not
and ratings involved in bunkering followed. No records of ullages
operations, familiar with the company and ullages spaces atmosphere
bunkering procedures, and were records check.
available to demonstrate that bunker
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Human Responsible person did not
and ratings involved in bunkering record bunker tank ullages and
operations, familiar with the company ullage space atmosphere check
bunkering procedures, and were records during bunkering operations.
available to demonstrate that bunker
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?
10.5.1 Were the Master, Chief Engineer, officers, Human No records maintained for
and ratings involved in bunkering monitoring of ullages and ullage
operations, familiar with the company spaces atmospheres checks
bunkering procedures, and were records during bunkering operations.
available to demonstrate that bunker
operations had been planned and
conducted in accordance with the
company procedure?

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10.5.2 Were the Chief Engineer and engineer Human The bunker samples more than
officers familiar with the company one year old were observed kept
procedures for bunker fuel oil sampling along with the current samples.
and analysis, and were records available as per the company procedures
to demonstrate that samples had been bunker samples over one year old
taken and retained or analysed in should be removed. The
accordance with the procedure? responsible OP missed on
removing the old samples from
the sample locker.
10.5.3 Were the Chief Engineer and senior Process There was not only ONE fuel oil
engineer officers familiar with the changeover procedure of the
company and vessel specific fuel different system on board that
changeover procedures, and were integrated all information but two
records available to demonstrate that different procedures. The first,
fuel grade changeovers had been issued by the shipyard, with clear
completed in compliance with the details of valve identification and
procedures and MARPOL regulations? steps to follow. The second was
issued by the operator, where
some margins of different
parameters were narrowed to
precise values that the one issued
by shipyard. In any case, neither
of the two contained all the
information that would allow
with a single reading following all
steps but it was necessary a
combined reading of the two
procedures.
10.7.3 Were the main engine crankcase oil mist Process As per manufacturer's the sensor
detectors, engine bearing temperature unit of the oil mist detector was
monitors or equivalent devices and required to be replaced every
associated alarms in good order? three years but there was no
recorded evidence in the PMS
that required replacement of the
sensor was carried out.
10.7.3 Were the main engine crankcase oil mist Process There was no procedure available
detectors, engine bearing temperature to address the actions to be taken
monitors or equivalent devices and in the event of an alarm activated
associated alarms in good order? by the oil mist detector.

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CVIQ Question Categor Observation

No. y
11.1.1 Was photograph no.1, bow area from Photo No photograph loaded by
dead ahead, representative of the operator, inspector boarded the
condition as seen onboard at the time vessel during the night time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free before start the STS operation so
of any areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.
11.1.1 Was photograph no.1, bow area from Photo Photograph of the bow area was
dead ahead, representative of the not uploaded to the OCIMF SIRE
condition as seen onboard at the time 2.0 database by the operator,
of the inspection and, if so, was it free however, hull coating was found
of any areas for concern? intact and markings were in place.
11.1.2 Was photograph no.2, hull forward end Photo No photograph loaded by
starboard side, representative of the operator, inspector boarded the
condition as seen onboard at the time vessel during the night time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free before start the STS operation so
of any areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.
11.1.2 Was photograph no.2, hull forward end Hardwar From photograph taken a day
starboard side, representative of the e earlier by on-signing Master,
condition as seen onboard at the time starboard side of hull with
of the inspection and, if so, was it free scattered rust & together with
of any areas for concern? rust stains along parallel body,
total area affected about 5% of
visible hull & concentrated at top
side coating area. (Reported
coating breakdown was due to
recent abrasion damage suffered
during passage canal locks).
11.1.23 Was photograph no.23, the emergency Photo The uploaded photo was not of
generator or accumulator batteries, emergency generator.
representative of the condition as seen
onboard at the time of the inspection
and, if so, was it free of any areas for
concern?
11.1.26 was photograph no.26, the oil filtering Photo Uploaded photograph was for
equipment, representative of the purifier instead of for oil filtering
condition as seen onboard at the time equipment.
of the inspection and, if so, was it free
of any areas for concern?
11.1.3 Was photograph no.3, hull forward end Photo No photograph loaded by
port side representative, of the operator, inspector boarded the
condition as seen onboard at the time vessel during the night time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free before start the STS operation so
of any areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.

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11.1.3 Was photograph no.3, hull forward end Photo No photo provided by operator.
port side representative, of the
condition as seen onboard at the time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free
of any areas for concern?
11.1.3 Was photograph no.3, hull forward end Hardwar Portside of hull with scattered
port side representative, of the e rust together with rust stains
condition as seen on board at the time along parallel body, total area
of the inspection and, if so, was it free affected about 8% of visible hull &
of any areas for concern? concentrated at top side coating
area. (Reported coating
breakdown was due to recent
abrasion damage suffered during
passage canal locks).
11.1.30 Was photograph no.30, purifier room Hardwar Oil soaked lagging observed
general view, representative of the e under the heater in purifier room.
condition as seen onboard at the time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free
of any areas for concern?
11.1.31 Was photograph no.31, main engine Photo Wrong photograph uploaded.
side showing local control station,
representative of the condition as seen
onboard at the time of the inspection
and, if so, was it free of any areas for
concern?
11.1.33 Was photograph no.33, main steering Hardwar Photo not representative. There
gear, representative of the condition as e were two pipes on deck which
seen onboard at the time of the were not effectively secured.
inspection and, if so, was it free of any
areas for concern?
11.1.4 Was photograph no.4, hull aft end Photo No photograph loaded by
starboard side, representative of the operator, inspector boarded the
condition as seen onboard at the time vessel during the night time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free before start the STS operation so
of any areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.
11.1.4 Was photograph no.4, hull aft end Photo The photo was of poor quality and
starboard side, representative of the condition were not visible.
condition as seen onboard at the time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free
of any areas for concern?
11.1.42 Was photograph no.42, one main cargo Hardwar The photograph uploaded for the
pump and, if in pump room, including e one cargo pump including bilges
bilges, representative of the condition did not represent the actual
as seen onboard at the time of the condition of the vessel as it
inspection and, if so, was it free of any existed at the time of the
areas for concern? inspection.

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11.1.42 Was photograph no. 42, one main cargo Photo Framo pump photo was not
pump and, if in pump room, including attached.
bilges, representative of the condition
as seen on board at the time of the
inspection and, if so, was itfree of any
areas for concern?
11.1.42 Was photograph no.42, one main cargo Hardwar Minor leak observed from the
pump and, if in pump room, including e temperature sensor located on
bilges, representative of the condition top of COP 1 casing.
as seen onboard at the time of the
inspection and, if so, was it free of any
areas for concern?
11.1.5 Was photograph no.5, hull aft end port Photo No photograph loaded by
side, representative of the condition as operator, inspector boarded the
seen onboard at the time of the vessel during the night time
inspection and, if so, was it free of any before start the STS operation so
areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.
11.1.5 Was photograph no.5, hull aft end port Photo No photo provided by operator.
side, representative of the condition as There was a weeping white stain
seen onboard at the time of the from port aft deck scupper. The
inspection and, if so, was it free of any origin of which was not clear to
areas for concern? the ships staff.
11.1.6 Was photograph no.6, transom from Photo No photograph loaded by
right astern, representative of the operator, inspector boarded the
condition as seen onboard at the time vessel during the night time
of the inspection and, if so, was it free before start the STS operation so
of any areas for concern? not possible to take a new photo.

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CVIQ Question Categor Observation

No. y
12.3.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Operators’ winterization checklist
with the company procedures to ensure do not cover the inspection of
the operability of the engine room engine room sea chest strainer
machinery and systems in sub-zero prior entering ice area.
temperatures, and had these
procedures been complied with?
12.6.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Process Publication 'BIMCO: The Ice
with the company procedures for Navigation and Seamanship
navigating in areas affected by ice, and Handbook 1st Edition 2019' was
had they received suitable training? not available onboard as well as
the publication was not listed in
the standard publication
inventory that needs to be carried
on board. Vessel was assigned
with ice notation.
12.6.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human There were no records of senior
with the company procedures for officer training with regard to
navigating in areas affected by ice, and operating ships in ice.
had they received suitable training?
12.6.1 Were the Master and officers familiar Human There were no records of deck
with the company procedures for officers training with regard to
navigating in areas affected by ice, and operating ships in ice.
had they received suitable training?

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Positive Observations

CVIQ Question Category Observation

No.
2.4.1 Were the senior officers familiar Human The OP explained very clear the
with the company procedure for company procedures and requirements.
reporting defects to ensure
structure, machinery and
equipment to shore-based
management through the company
defect reporting system and was
evidence available to demonstrate
that all defects had been reported
accordingly?
2.6.2 Were the Master and officers Human The OP demonstrated to the inspector
familiar with the VOC Management to know detailed the cargo tank venting
Plan, and had the procedures for system of the vessel; in addition, the
minimising VOC emissions set out primary and secondary protection of the
in the Plan been implemented and cargo tanks settings to avoid over
documented as required? pressure and under pressure were
correctly indicated by the OP.
3.5.1 Had the company developed an Human OP confidently explained his boat and
effective familiarization fire station duties and responsibilities.
programme that covered the
personal safety and professional
responsibilities of all onboard
personnel, including visitors and
contractors, and were records
available to demonstrate that the
familiarization had been completed
as required?
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation Human OP demonstrated his familiarity with
officers familiar with the company ECDIS procedure flawlessly.
procedures for the set up and
operation of the ECDIS units fitted
to the vessel and were records
available to demonstrate that the
ECDIS had been operated in
accordance with company
procedures at all stages of a
voyage?
4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation Human The OP clearly and satisfactorily
officers familiar with the company explained ECDIS setup.
procedures for the set up and
operation of the ECDIS units fitted
to the vessel and were records
available to demonstrate the the
ECDIS had been operated in
accordance with company

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procedures at all stages of a

voyage?

4.1.1 Were the Master and navigation Human The OP was able to explain in very detail
officers familiar with the company the operation of the ECDIS and the
procedures for the set up and contingency measures emergency
operation of the ECDIS units fitted response action/checklist when both
to the vessel and were records ECDIS unit failure.
available to demonstrate that the
ECDIS had been operated in
accordance with company
procedures at all stages of a
voyage?
4.1.5 Were the Master and navigating Human The OP was very well familiar with the
officers familiar with the company company procedures and showed a
passage planning procedures and good knowledge of all bridge equipment
had all voyages and their uses.
been appraised, planned, executed
and monitored in accordance with
company procedures, industry best
practice and both local and
international rules?
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers Human The OP demonstrated a clear
familiar with the onboard understanding with company
emergency response plans, and procedures and records.
were records available to
demonstrate that all mandatory
and company defined emergency
drills had been completed and
documented as required by
company procedures?
5.1.1 Were the Master and officers Human The OP was able to provide a detailed
familiar with the onboard description of the emergency drill plans
emergency response plans, and on board and the actions to be taken
were records available to when the exercises drill were
demonstrate that all mandatory interrupted due to poor weather
and company defined emergency conditions or other reasons.
drills had been completed and
documented as required by
company procedures?
5.12.1 Were the Master, officers and Human OP confidently answered and
ratings familiar with the company demonstrated proper safety checks and
procedures that addressed the use communication signals when using the
of respiratory protective self-contained breathing apparatus.
equipment during cargo
operations, and did the procedures
prohibit the use of filter type
respirators for this purpose?

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5.4.1 Were the Master and officers Human The OP was found to hold a very good
familiar with the operation of the understanding of the procedures for the
davit-launched lifeboats, release operation of the davit launched
mechanisms and launching lifeboats, release mechanics; in
appliances, and were they in good addition, he mentioned all the safety
order with records available to precautions to be taken before, during
demonstrate that they had been and after the operation.
inspected and tested as required?
5.4.2 Were the Master and officers Human OP demonstrated the requested actions
familiar with the operation of the during the inspection of Freefall lifeboat
free-fall lifeboat, its release flawlessly and was even able to locate
systems and its launching lifeboat equipment’s on random
appliance, and was the equipment request.
in satisfactory condition with
records available to demonstrate
that it had been inspected and
tested in accordance with company
procedures?
5.5.1 Were the Master, officers and Human OP confidently explained the
ratings familiar with the company requirements of enclosed space entry,
enclosed space entry procedures, including the checklist.
and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all enclosed
space entries had been made in
strict compliance with the
procedures?
5.5.1 Were the Master, officers and Human OP demonstrated the entire process of
ratings familiar with the company enclosed space entry without even
enclosed space entry procedures, missing minor details which was listed in
and was evidence available to the checklist
demonstrate that all enclosed and his action was commendable.
space entries had been made in
strict compliance with the
procedures?
5.5.1 Were the Master, officers and Human The OP clearly and satisfactorily
ratings familiar with the company explained the Pump room entry
enclosed space entry procedures, procedures.
and was evidence available to
demonstrate that all enclosed
space entries had been made in
strict compliance with the
procedures?
5.9.1 Were the Master, officers and Human The OP described to the inspector in
ratings familiar with the company detail the colour coding for the lifting
lifting and rigging procedures, and and rigging equipment on board, in
was evidence available to addition, he was able to explain to the
demonstrate that each item of inspector the measures in case the
lifting and rigging equipment had equipment had any defect before the
been maintained, inspected and expected date of retirement.

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tested in accordance with the

procedure?

6.6.2 Were the Master and officers Human Observed person explained the
familiar with the company operation of ODME better than
procedures for the use of the oil expected and was well versed with the
discharge monitoring and control operation of the system.
system, and was the oil discharge
monitoring and control system in
satisfactory condition and used in
accordance with the company
procedures, manufacturer’s
instructions and MARPOL Annex I?
9.1.1 Were the Master and deck officers Human The OP clearly explained familiarisation
familiar with the company with the procedures and marks
procedures for the testing and required.
correct operation of the mooring
winch brakes, and were records
available to demonstrate that
brakes had been tested
periodically, after maintenance or
when there was evidence of
premature brake slippage?
10.2.1 Were the officers familiar with the Human The OP was able to explain detailed the
starting procedure for the procedures to start the diesel
emergency generator and were emergency generator by batteries and
records available to demonstrate hydraulic starter.
that the emergency generator had
been tested according to company
procedures?

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