Current Electoral Processes in Southeast Asia.

Regional Learnings

1
RÉSEAUX MONASTIQUES AU LAOS ET DYNAMIQUES TRANSNATIONALES

IRASEC’s Occasional Papers

The IRASEC’s Occasional Papers series is open to contributors from various horizons:
researchers, journalists, entrepreneurs, NGO experts, lawyers, etc. Their analyses and
testimony bring first-hand data about highly relevant issues. Each of these contributions
is a “snapshot”, and provides a unique percpective on a current situation. Together, they
shed light on contemporary developments in Southeast Asia.
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alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of IRASEC or its members.

Published in 2023 by:

Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (IRASEC)
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 Current Electoral Processes in
Southeast Asia.
Regional Learnings

Edited by Gabriel Facal

Cleo Anne A. Calimbahin, Khoo Ying Hooi, Rui Graça Feijó,

Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee, Chum Chandarin, Deasy Simandjuntak

Occasional Paper n°43

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RÉSEAUX MONASTIQUES AU LAOS ET DYNAMIQUES TRANSNATIONALES

IRASEC
The Research Institute on Contemporary Southeast Asia (USR 3142 – UMIFRE 22
CNRS-MAEDI) has since 2001 focused its activities on the political, economic, social
and environmental evolutions of the eleven countries of the region (Brunei, Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-
Leste and Vietnam). Based in Bangkok, IRASEC promotes transdisciplinary and regional
approaches.

IRASEC
179 Thanon Witthayu, Lumphini, Pathum Wan,
Bangkok 10330, Thailand
Tel (+66) 026 70 42 91 - Fax (+66) 026 70 42 90
www.irasec.com

4
 Contents

Authors................................................................................................... 7
Foreword ................................................................................................ 9

The 2022 Philippines Elections: Unity, Continuity,

and Impunity (Cleo Anne A. Calimbahin) .................................................... 11
When Dynasties Unite ............................................................................................................12
Electoral Fairness and Credible Authority..........................................................................13
The Conduct of the 2022 Elections ......................................................................................14
Filipino Voters and the 2022 Elections ...............................................................................16
Increasing Electoral Integrity: Challenges to Election Officials....................................17

Malaysia’s Electoral Processes: Tracing the Path from the Bersih Movement
to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (Khoo Ying Hooi) ..................................... 19
The Dynamics of Changing Political Coalitions ...............................................................21
The Nexus Between Mass Mobilisation and Democratisation.......................................23

Elections in Timor-Leste, 2022-2023 (Rui Graça Feijó) ................................. 29

The Political and Electoral System of Timor-Leste..........................................................30
The Presidential Election of 19 March and 19 April, 2022 ............................................33
The Parliamentary Election of May 21, 2023 ....................................................................36
Where to from Here? ...............................................................................................................38

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RÉSEAUX MONASTIQUES AU LAOS ET DYNAMIQUES TRANSNATIONALES
Thailand’s 2023 General Election: Process, Key Issues,
and Future Trajectories (Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee) .................................. 45
The Process at a Glance ......................................................................................................... 46
Key Electoral Issues and Party Positions ........................................................................... 46
Electoral Results: A Tornado of Changes .......................................................................... 48
The Long Road to a Government Formation ..................................................................... 52
The Future Trajectories .......................................................................................................... 53

Hun Sen’s Election in 2023 (Chandarin Chum) ............................................ 57

Cambodia’s Political Landscape .......................................................................................... 58
Election Without Opposition................................................................................................. 59
Restrictions on Civil Society and Media ............................................................................ 60
Restrictions on Civil Society ............................................................................................. 60
Restrictions on Media ........................................................................................................ 62
Electoral Manipulation ........................................................................................................... 63
Hun Manet Assumes Control ................................................................................................ 64
A Shaky Democratic Future .................................................................................................. 66

Indonesia’s Upcoming 2024 Presidential Election: Political Binarism

and its Impact on Democracy (Deasy Simandjuntak) ................................... 69
Indonesia’s Electoral Politics: Political Parties
and their Non-Ideological Coalitions .................................................................................. 70
Indonesia’s 2019 Election and the Religious Binary Politics ........................................ 72
2024 Presidential Election: Party Politics and Potential Candidates ............................ 76
Perspectives for the Country’s State of Democracy ......................................................... 80

Abstracts .............................................................................................. 85

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 Authors

Cleo Anne A. Calimbahin is an Associate Professor and Chair in the Department of

Political Science at the De La Salle University-Manila. Her research focuses on election
administration, corruption studies, and comparative democratization. She has related
research interests in Southeast Asia politics, state capacity and autonomy. She co-edited
the book Patronage Democracy: Clans, Clients and Competition in Local Elections with
Julio Teehankee (ADMU Press, 2022). She completed her PhD at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison as a Fulbright Fellow. She received her MSc in International Politics
of Asia and Africa from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University
of London. Dr. Calimbahin was a Research Associate with RAND, a Visiting Scholar at
Stanford’s Asia Pacific Research Center (APARC), the Global South Scholar in
Residence in the Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies (IHEID)
in Geneva; and a Visiting Research Fellow for the Institute for Developing Economies
(IDE-Jetro) in Japan. Dr. Calimbahin provides technical assistance and research to
international organizations and foundations. She is a Board member of the Social
Weather Stations (2022-2025).

Khoo Ying Hooi, PhD is an Associate Professor and Head of Department at the
Department of International and Strategic Studies, Universiti Malaya. Her research
focuses on the intersectionality of power, human rights, democracy and civil society in
Southeast Asia. She is the author of The Bersih Movement and Democratization in
Malaysia and Seeds of Dissent. She has also co-edited several volumes, including
“Marginalisation and Human Rights in Southeast Asia” and “Rethinking Human Rights
and Peace in the Post-Independence Timor-Leste through Local Perspectives.” Ying
Hooi is the Editor-in-Chief of the Malaysian Journal of International Relations and is
also on the editorial board of the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, Journal of
Southeast Asian Human Rights and Indonesian Law Review. She has actively worked on

7
human rights and democracy in Southeast Asia by combining academic and practical
approaches.

Rui Graça Feijó, Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra and Institute for
Contemporary History, NOVA University of Lisboa. He holds a DPhil in Modern
History from University of Oxford (1984) and Habilitation in Democracy in the
21st century from University of Coimbra (2017). He was UN-sponsored advisor to the
presidency of Timor-Leste (2005-6), and has worked extensively on this country’s
history and politics. He published Dynamics of Democracy in Timor-Leste (AUP 2016)
and Presidents in Semi-presidential Regimes: Moderating Power in Portugal and Timor-
Leste (Palgrave 2020).

Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee, PhD is a Professor at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty

of Political Science. Her research interests embrace comparative political parties and
electoral systems, political behaviour, institutional design, Thai politics and civic
education. Her research entitled “Voting Behaviours and Pattern of Political Participation
of the Thai Electorate in the Conflict Situation” won an award from the National
Research Council of Thailand for the Excellent Research. She writes in academic
journals on a regular basis and participates in public debates about Thai politics. Her
recent publication in English includes “Youth Study Thailand 2021-2022,” “Thailand” in
Strengthening legal frameworks for political parties,” and “Two Tales of Identity Politics
in Thailand.”

Chum Chandarin is a freelance consultant. He holds a Ph.D. in Public Administration

Science from Budapest and has a strong background in public policy and good
governance. His research interest is in democratization and public policy.

Deasy Simandjuntak is Assistant Professor at National Chengchi University (NCCU),

Taipei, Visiting Researcher at National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Jakarta
and Associate Fellow at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore.

8
 Foreword

Gabriel Facal

While Southeast Asia is completing a strong geopolitical sequence and the

region remains a strategic area in the relations of influence in the Indo-Pacific,
several countries are also focused on electoral agendas and the domestic
political dynamics they impel. The Philippines saw a presidential election
(May 2022) for which an assessment has yet to be made, while the general
elections in Malaysia (November 2022) and the presidential one in Timor-Leste
(April 2022), followed by the legislative elections in May 2023, open up new
dynamics that have yet to be consolidated.
The elections showed important contrasts between countries. The results
of the polls in 2023 did not lead to political renewal. In Thailand (legislative
elections, 14 May) the electoral process was marked by uncertainty, while in
Cambodia (legislative elections, 23 July) it wasn’t much surprise. In Indonesia
(general elections in February 2024), the campaign is still open, and the results
could lead to very different directions.
This book, Current Electoral Processes in Southeast Asia - Regional
Learnings, provides an opportunity for experts from six countries to decipher
the issues and consequences of these elections (including the future ones).
Moreover, based on a regional perspective, it tries to draw comparisons,
parallels and contrasts, and to identify broad regional trends in the functioning
of electoral systems and the political institutions on which they are based.

9
URBANITÉ IMPÉRIALISTE DE SINGAPOUR

Current Electoral Processes in Southeast Asia - Regional Learnings

follows on from a seminar organised by IRASEC and Heinrich Böll Stiftung-
Southeast Asia Regional Office on May 22nd, 2023, hosted by the Faculty of
Political Science of Chulalongkorn University and with the support of the King
Prajadhipok’s Institute, who provided a simultaneous translation in Thai
language during the seminar.

10
 The 2022 Philippines Elections:
Unity, Continuity, and Impunity

Cleo Anne A. Calimbahin

Elections in the Philippines are free but not necessarily fair or competitive. The
high cost of campaign finance in the Philippines limits running for public office
to very few. Estimates of campaign expenditure to run for President in the
Philippines range from 5 to 50 billion  (90 million to 900 million US$). Candi-
dates submit a Statement of Contributions and Expenses (SOCE) to the election
commission. Many candidates are suspected to under-declare their expenditures
to keep to the maximum required by law or not to divulge their campaign
strategy and costs. Based on their SOCE in 2019, on average, senatorial
candidates spent 190 million  (3.6 million US$) on political advertisements.
In 2022, one senatorial candidate spent 245 million  (4.4 million US$)1. These
staggering amounts of money starkly contrast with a Filipino family’s average
annual income of 313,000  (5,400 US$)2. The rising cost of election campaigns
favours incumbents with access to the patronage that flows from national
political elites down to significant local political players. There is an increasing
number of dynastic families in Congress and across different positions in local
government. Filipino economists label these dynasties as “obese,” “fat,” and
“thin” dynasties (Mendoza, Juminola, and Yap 2019: 8-9). Election, originally

1
Dwight de Leon, “Candidates who spent the most based on their SOCEs”, Rappler, July 14, 2022.
2
Philippine Statistics Authority, “2018 Family Income and Expenditure Survey”, June 4, 2020,
https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/FIES%202018%20Final%20Report.pdf, retrieved on June 27, 2023.
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

meant to provide a change in leadership, appears to be a platform of clan

continuity in the Philippines. Political families dominate the Philippine political
landscape for decades.
Observers of Philippine politics have seen the fall of democracy with
Marcos Sr. declaring martial law in 1972, the restoration of democracy in 1986
with Corazon Aquino, and the decline of democracy with the violent populist of
Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines and now the return of the Marcos name with
the overwhelming victory of Marcos Jr. One way to make sense of where we are
and why we are where we are is through the lens of election administration and
how a democratic institution such as an independent election commission falls
short in protecting the democratic space and make it a level playing field for all.
Elections are essential to a democracy. Analyses of elections are typically
directed toward understanding electoral outcomes rather than the electoral
process. The electoral process shapes the dynamics and outcomes of elections.
The electoral process matters because the administration of elections cues how
free and fair the election is and will be.

When Dynasties Unite

In the 2022 Philippine elections, the results that showed the large margin of
Ferdinand Marcos Jr. surprised many. Perhaps most especially observers from
outside the Philippines who still remember the ouster of the Marcoses from
Malacanang palace. It seemed unimaginable to have, yet again, a Marcos as
President. Since the last time much of the world heard of the Marcos family
name, it was associated with dictatorship, human rights abuses, images of
excesses and a lifestyle so remote to the poverty-stricken country it was running
as President3.
Much has been written and said about historical revisionism alongside
social media campaigns that utilized disinformation and organized troll farms.
Much has also been said about the disillusionment towards the failed promises

3
Pangalangan, R.C., 2021. Human Rights Cases from the Marcos Dictatorship. In Philippine Materials in
International Law (pp. 262-308). Brill Nijhoff.

12
 THE 2022 PHILIPPINES ELECTIONS

that should have come with liberal democracy in 1986. As previously

mentioned, elections in the Philippines are often more about continuity than a
change of guard. A recently published article shows evidence that voters saw
Marcos Jr. as the continuity of the very popular strongman Rodrigo Duterte and
the continuity to Marcos Sr., his father’s legacy, also strongman rule (Dulay,
Hicken, Menon, Holmes 2022: 482-484). The study also shows that Filipinos
voted along ethnic lines. The North, bailiwick of the Marcoses, and the South,
bailiwick of the Dutertes, voted for the Bongbong Marcos-Sara Duterte UNITY
Team as President and vice president, respectively.
However, this UNITY is a coalition of convenience. Dynastic families
holding on together until they get through the election. Once the election is over,
it will be politics as usual. The UNITY team already shows that it is frayed and
rife with factions. In May 2023, one year after the elections, Sara Duterte
resigned as chairperson of the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-
CMD) political party, citing “political toxicity and political power play”4. There
were insinuations that Sara Duterte sided with former President, now
congresswoman Gloria Arroyo who was relegated from senior deputy speaker to
deputy speaker. There were allegations of a coup against Speaker of the House
Martin Romualdez in the lower house5. Romualdez is the President’s first cousin
and the National President of Lakas-CMD. In the coming months, we can
expect more challenges to the united team of Marcos and Duterte. The mid-term
elections in 2025 will test loyalties and reveal alliances. It will show signs of
what to expect for the 2028 national elections. It will be the same players. But
with different principals and party affiliations.

Electoral Fairness and Credible Authority

Some civil society members perceive electoral fraud in the 2022 elections, but
these claims have not been substantiated and remain as allegations. However,
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the country’s official Election

4
Daphne Galvez, “Sara Duterte Resigns from Lakas-CMD”, The Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 19, 2023.
5
Ellson Quismorio, “Arroyo responds to alleged coup plot vs Romualdez, says she’s dropping ‘ambition’ to be
Speaker again”, Manila Bulletin, May 18, 2023.

13
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES
Management Body (EMB), could have better managed the entire electoral
process. On election day, voters in multiple voting precincts waited in line for
three to four hours to cast their ballots. The concern is not just management on
the polling day itself. The COMELEC could have secured the integrity of the
entire electoral process.
The COMELEC is one of the oldest election commissions in the region.
However, the prevalence of vote-buying and patronage disbursement between
candidates, supporters, and voters persists, as do allegations of fraud and
clientelistic appointments to the Commission on Elections that remain
unresolved through multiple election cycles (Calimbahin, 2011).
Despite its label as a constitutional body, the COMELEC is both a bureau-
1
cracy and constitutional commission that is, over time, plagued by a three-
pronged pathology composed of two types of clientelism and organisational
inefficiency. The first deficiency of COMELEC is its vulnerability to external
clientelism, in which the patron-candidate, a political-economic elite, looks to
acquire favourable election outcomes (Ibid: 110). The second deficiency is 2
internally motivated clientelism, where the patron is within the bureaucracy.
They act as “entrepreneurial bureaucrats” using their knowledge and network of
bureaucrats in exchange for career or financial enrichment (Ibid: 113). Lastly,
organisational inefficiency refers to the incapacities of the poll body to enforce 3
the rules thoroughly and effectively. Understanding this three-pronged
pathology of the COMELEC allows one to see “the bifurcated expectations of
the voting public—high normative expectation as a constitutional commission
and low-performance expectation as a bureaucracy responsible for election
management” (Ibid: 105).

The Conduct of the 2022 Elections

COMELEC’s performance in the 2022 Philippine general election is less about
fraud and more about organisational efficiency and capacity issues. Two months
before the elections, three out of seven commissioners were appointed. For any
organisation, leadership changes right before a critical period is challenging.
Likewise, personnel changes in the COMELEC field offices occurred one week
14
 THE 2022 PHILIPPINES ELECTIONS

before election day. The changes included newly appointed roles and new area
assignments. Affected officials, such as some Provincial Board of Canvassers,
Provincial Election Supervisors, and Election Officers, have vital roles in the
lead-up and on election day. The disruption this caused in the Election
Management Body’s preparation led to one commissioner publicly disagreeing
with this last-minute re-organisation and another commissioner publicly saying
it was illegal6. The re-shuffling of field personnel does not help alleviate staff
and resource issues that affect the monitoring and implementation of electoral
administration rules before, during, and after election day.
EXTERNAL CLIENTELISM
The 2022 general election saw multiple substitutions and withdrawals
leading to election day. Substitutions have become a strategy at national-level
positions. The COMELEC appears like a bystander, unable to control what is
clearly undermining the electoral system. Campaign finance issues continue to
hound the COMELEC. Effectively monitoring campaign expenditures is one
way to disqualify over spenders and examine campaign contributors. The
Omnibus Election Code requires candidates to submit their “full, true, and
itemized” election-related statement of contributions and expenditures to the
COMELEC. However, the Campaign Finance Office does not have regular
employees and should include accountants who are certified fraud examiners
INTERNAL C.
(Ilagan and Simon, 2021). Another issue that persists is election violence. The
deputized agency of the COMELEC for security, peace, and order is the
Philippine National Police. An alarming pattern that needs more attention is the
increasing violence and killings of COMELEC personnel, including election
officers, after the conduct of elections. Issues of capacity and more effective
administration in an election commission can be remedied with better resource
allocation, training, and public management reform. The issue of autonomy is
difficult to remedy if there is elite capture and the independence of the election
commission is undermined by appointments that the public perceives as
partisan. EXTERNAL

In the 2022 elections, the COMELEC comprised five commissioners, out

of the seven, from Mindanao. Former president Duterte’s support comes from

6
Dhel Nazario, “Reshuffling gov’t personnel before elections without Comelec consent illegal – Garcia”, The
Manila Bulletin, May 6, 2022

15
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

that region. Two of the seven commissioners were from the same Law School as
former president Duterte. Moreover, one commissioner is an election lawyer
representing two 2022 presidential candidates, Marcos Jr., and Isko Moreno.
Because the COMELEC has adjudication duties, the public perceived some
partisanship when the commission ruled on the candidacy of Bongbong Marcos.
Petitioners filed a disqualification case on the candidacy of Marcos Jr due to a
guilty verdict for non-payment and filing of income tax. At the same time, he
was still a Governor of Ilocos Norte. The case took longer to resolve
and involved a public disagreement between and among commissioners.
Insinuations of clientelistic relationships between a commissioner and a pro-
administration Senator were lobbed by an election commissioner set to retire
one month before the May 2022 elections7. The very public spat among
COMELEC commissioners, including accusations of partisan ruling in favour
of a candidate, erodes voter confidence in an election management body.
Perception of autonomy in an election commission is equally essential as
conducting fraud-free elections.

Filipino Voters and the 2022 Elections

During election season, a pejorative goes around in social media, characterising
voters as ill-informed and not understanding how democracy works for selling
their votes to corrupt politicians. The prevalence of vote-buying, after all,
offends middle-class sensibilities. Labels for voters who cannot afford to refuse
payoffs in exchange for their vote further alienate and breed distaste for liberal
democratic ideals. Push-back includes accusations of elitism, further polarising
Philippine society. A society that now barely sees any cross-class civil society
action.
The popularity of Rodrigo Duterte, despite his very violent drug war and
the majority win of Marcos Jr., a name associated with his father’s authoritarian
rule, has led to the question, are Filipino voters becoming illiberal? (Kasuya and

7
CNN Philippines Staff, “Guanzon: Delay of DQ case ‘a grand design’ in Marcos’ favor”, CNN Philippines,
February 2, 2022.

16
 THE 2022 PHILIPPINES ELECTIONS

Calimbahin, 2023) Research findings show that at the baseline, Filipinos

continue to support democracy but are contingent supporters of authoritarian
rulers. The long-term impact of this contingent support for an illiberal rule is the
weakening of democratic institutions, especially accountability institutions. The
lack of demand for accountability and the enforcement of oversight functions
can lead to impunity.
Social Weather Station survey findings show Filipinos are satisfied with
democracy. From 1991 to the fourth quarter of 2022, Filipinos responded that
they were satisfied with how democracy works. In 2022, 89% responded as
satisfied with democracy8. Similarly, from 1998 to 2022, respondents gave
COMELEC an “excellent” net satisfaction rating. There is an observation that
COMELEC exceeds the public’s low expectations (Calimbahin, 2011). Or is it
possible that voters are willing to make do with a defective democracy?

Increasing Electoral Integrity:

Challenges to Election Officials
The COMELEC is mandated to lead the electoral process with integrity and
credibility. However, for this to be a reality, the pace of reforms within the
commission needs to pick up. The reforms should combine administrative
reforms that do not require constitutional change, an appointment framework
that will require constitutional change, and reforms through legislative action.
One possible area of reform is the decoupling of the administration and
adjudication duties of the commission. This can address issues of compromised
capacity. Experts on election administration can work alongside election law
experts who will address electoral cases. Decoupling will mean faster adjudi-
cation decisions and a more focused election management body that can build
expertise on all matters related to elections, not just crisis managers.
Second, appointments matter. Given the nature of elections, electoral inte-
grity requires non-partisanship among those who lead an election management

8
See SWS website for the “2023 SWS Survey Review”.

17
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

body. In an increasingly polarised environment, the mere perception of fraud

can encourage and justify actions leading to political instability.
The new leadership in the Commission on Elections is reaching out to
electoral reform advocates and is more visible in explaining election matters to
the public. These are all promising signs. The youth council elections in October
2023 and the upcoming mid-term elections are worth observing if election
officials are serious about promoting electoral integrity and addressing election
administration concerns.

Bibliography
CALIMBAHIN, Cleo, 2011, “Exceeding (Low) Expectations: Autonomy, Bureaucratic
Integrity, and Capacity in the 2010 Elections”, Philippine Political Science
Journal, vol. 32 (55), pp. 103-126.
DULAY, Dean C., HICKEN, Allen, MENON, Anil, and HOLMES, Ronald, 2022, “How
do Filipinos remember their history? A descriptive account of Filipino historical
memory”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 44 (3), pp. 482-514.
KASUYA, Y., & CALIMBAHIN, Cleo, 2022, “Democratic backsliding in the
Philippines: Are voters becoming illiberal?”, Asian Journal of Comparative
Politics, vol. 0 (0).
ILAGAN, Karol, and FLOREEN, Simon, 2021, “Covering Campaign Finance: The
Philippine Experience in Media Reporting of Elections in Asia: Issues, Challenges,
and Lessons”, Asian Network for Free Elections.
MENDOZA, Ronald U., JAMINOLA, Leonardo and YAP, Jurel, 2019, “From Fat to
Obese: Political Dynasties after the 2019 Midterm Elections”, Ateneo school of
government working paper series, September, 19-013,
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3449201.
PANGALANGAN, R.C., 2021. Human Rights Cases from the Marcos Dictatorship. In
Philippine Materials in International Law (pp. 262-308). Brill Nijhoff.

18
 Malaysia’s Electoral Processes: Tracing
the Path from the Bersih Movement
to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim

Khoo Ying Hooi

There exists a prevailing consensus regarding the phenomenon of democratic

backsliding, which has been observed not only globally but also within
Southeast Asian nations. In this context, indicators of democratic erosion, such
as the curtailment of civil liberties, the subversion of the rule of law, electoral
manipulation, and the consolidation of power, have become increasingly
apparent. Notably, two recent cases within the region exemplify these trends:
the ongoing political upheaval caused by the military junta in Myanmar and the
prolonged dictatorial rule of Hun Sen in Cambodia. These instances serve as
noteworthy illustrations of the challenges faced by Southeast Asian countries in
maintaining and advancing democratic principles and institutions (Khoo, 2022).
Malaysia has undergone a tumultuous yet dynamic trajectory of political
development throughout recent decades. Over six decades under the rule of the
Barisan Nasional (BN)1 coalition, Malaysia witnessed a notable expansion of

1
The coalition of Barisan Nasional or National Front was an extension of the Alliance by incorporating other
political parties into the ruling coalition. The Alliance formed before Independence originally consisted of three
ethnic parties, namely the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The expansion project was led by then Prime Minister Tun
Abdul Razak in the aftermath of the racial riots of 1969. The enlarged coalition had effectively reduced the
political influences of MCA and MIC and enhanced the domineering role of UMNO over the government.
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

executive powers at the expense of judicial independence and the legislature,

accompanied by a gradual constriction of the civic space. The leadership of
former Prime Minister Najib Razak, who is presently incarcerated on corruption
charges, witnessed the BN government’s failure to secure a majority in the
14th General Elections (GE14) held in 2018. The GE14 is widely recognised as a
watershed moment in Malaysia’s democratic history and electoral politics,
marking the conclusion of BN’s prolonged governance. The election’s outcome
was hailed as transformative, signifying the demise of a long-standing single-
party regime and the emergence of a new government led by Pakatan Harapan
(PH), which championed a reform agenda for the nation (Hutchinson and Lee,
2019).
With the advent of a “new” regime, civil society actors expressed a sense
of optimism, expecting genuine efforts by the incoming government to initiate
comprehensive reforms of existing institutions and socioeconomic policies.
Additionally, there was an anticipation for a replacement of old political figures
with fresh faces who had committed to constructing a “New Malaysia” (Loh and
Netto, 2018). However, this hopeful atmosphere surrounding reforms quickly
dissipated in February 2020, as the country witnessed the downfall of the PH
government. Since 2018, Malaysians have witnessed an unprecedented turnover
of four prime ministers: Mahathir Mohamad, Muhyiddin Yasin, Ismail Sabri,
and the current prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. This rapid succession of
leadership changes has left the public disillusioned with regard to the prospect
of meaningful reform (Loh and Netto, 2018).
The election of Malaysia’s longstanding opposition leader, Anwar Ibrahim,
as the country’s 10th prime minister has sparked waves of reform and is also
perceived as a significant victory for democracy. The 15th General Election
(GE15), which occurred on November 19, 2022, resulted in an unprecedented
scenario of a hung Parliament. In order to form a government, Anwar had to
forge unconventional political alliances, notably teaming up with the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), a party that has dominated Malaysian
politics since the country’s independence. Anwar’s ascension to the role of
prime minister carries profound emotional significance, particularly for his
steadfast supporters who patiently awaited his return to the government for over
two decades following his ousting in 1998. During this period, Anwar
20
 MALAYSIA’S ELECTORAL PROCESSES

predominantly operated as an opposition figure, except for a brief tenure in

government from 2018 to 2020 before reclaiming his position in 2022 and
assuming the role of prime minister.
Anwar Ibrahim was officially sworn in as prime minister on November 24,
2022, following a series of twists and turns that culminated in the establishment
of a unity government comprising the previous ruling coalition BN, Gabungan
Parti Sarawak (GPS), Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS), Parti Warisan, and the
PH coalition. Contrary to the reform-oriented reputation associated with
Anwar’s coalition, UMNO—a historically dominant, primarily Malay party—
has been implicated in various scandals, most notably the extensive 1 Malaysia
Development Berhad (1MDB) corruption scandal that led to the imprisonment
of former UMNO leader and prime minister Najib Razak.

The Dynamics of Changing Political Coalitions

Political analysts and commentators closely monitoring the trajectory of
Malaysian politics are divided into their interpretations concerning several
pertinent issues, including political fragmentation and voting behaviour. Within
this discourse, certain voices contend that political parties in Malaysia persist in
aligning themselves along ethnic or religious lines, thereby representing the
distinct interests and concerns of particular communities. Consequently, this
exacerbates the phenomenon of political fragmentation within the nation.
Conversely, an alternative view posits that notwithstanding the political trans-
formation witnessed in 2018, during which Malaysia experienced a change in
administration, there has been limited institutional and structural change within
the political system. Nonetheless, there exist optimists who maintain faith in the
broader process of democratisation in Malaysia and choose to extend a measure
of leniency towards the administration led by Anwar Ibrahim.
The political landscape in Malaysia has been marked by frequent
realignments of political alliances and coalitions. Parties and politicians often
form new alliances or switch allegiances based on considerations of political
expediency, resulting in a fluid and fragmented political environment. Notably,
for over six decades following Malaysia’s independence in 1957, the country
21
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

experienced a consistent continuity of government until 2018. However, from

2018 to 2022, Malaysia underwent a series of leadership changes, with four
different prime ministers—Mahathir Mohamad, Muhyiddin Yassin, Ismail
Sabri, and Anwar Ibrahim—assuming office during this period. One of the
primary factors contributing to these shifts can be attributed to the collapse of
coalition governments triggered by the formation of new coalitions and the
occurrence of political defections, commonly referred to as “political frogs,”
whereby politicians switch their party affiliations. In February 2020, the nation
witnessed a significant event known as the “Sheraton Move,” which resulted in
the downfall of the ruling PH coalition government and the subsequent
resignation of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad after holding office for
22 months.
Within the realm of Malaysian politics, the majority of political observers
tend to focus their analysis on the dynamics of coalition politics and the
prominent role played by political elites, primarily hailing from established
parties such as the UMNO, Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu), and
People’s Justice Party (PKR). Interestingly, it is noteworthy that most of these
seasoned politicians trace their origins back to the same root, namely UMNO,
which traditionally espouses right-wing conservative Malay politics.
The current composition of the unity government encompasses coalitions
and parties that previously found themselves on opposing ends of the political
spectrum, as witnessed in the intense rivalry between PH and BN during the
GE15. Scepticism has arisen among some political observers regarding the
viability and longevity of the unity government. In many respects, Anwar finds
himself in a precarious position as the prime minister, given that his deputy
prime minister, Zahid Hamidi, faces over 40 charges related to corruption. This
situation poses a challenge to the anti-corruption agenda, which was one of the
key reform priorities under the previous PH administration.

22
 MALAYSIA’S ELECTORAL PROCESSES

The Nexus Between Mass Mobilisation

and Democratisation
Beyond the realm of coalition politics, the electoral process in Malaysia encom-
passes a prominent characteristic: the significant role of mass mobilisation,
which has played a pivotal role in the country’s journey towards democra-
tisation. The significance of mass mobilisation in Malaysia’s electoral process
underscores the power of citizen engagement and the crucial role of political
participation in shaping democratic systems. However, it is imperative to
acknowledge that the significance of mass mobilisation is not devoid of
challenges and complexities.
The field of political science has long engaged in a debate concerning the
implications of mass mobilisation during the process of democratisation, with
much focus placed on its impact on elite support for democracy. In the
Malaysian context, since the emergence of the Coalition for Clean and Fair
Elections (Bersih), the landscape of electoral politics has been characterised by
perpetual dynamism. Notably, the connection between protests and electoral
outcomes in Malaysia’s general elections has been evidenced. Since its
inaugural street protest in 2007, the mass mobilisation spearheaded by Bersih
has served as a significant catalyst for political change. In contributing to the
existing scholarly discourse on the attitudinal consequences of mobilisation, this
article posits that the mass mobilisation led by Bersih has played a crucial role
in shaping popular perceptions of democracy in Malaysia since its inception
in 2005.
These mass mobilisations have played a pivotal role in mobilising support
for political change and have contributed to the emergence of a more
competitive political landscape. The impact of the Bersih movement in fostering
a sense of rights consciousness can be observed through its series of five mass
protests conducted in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2015, and 2016, which coincided with
Malaysia’s general elections held in 2008, 2013, 2018, and 2022. Throughout
these years, mass mobilisation continued to exert a significant influence during
the electoral process.

23
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Political parties and civil society actors organised large-scale rallies,

roadshows, and campaign events to mobilise voters, raise awareness about
pertinent issues, and garner support for their respective causes. These mobili-
sation endeavours effectively energised the electorate, fostered increased
political engagement, and encouraged citizens to exercise their democratic
rights through voting. An examination of the Bersih movement’s outcomes,
whether in the short or long term, must take into account the transformation of
the cultural domain it has influenced. This includes changes in public values and
ideas and the formation of new cultural practices and collective identity (Earl,
2004). Such cultural transformations are integral to understanding the broader
impact of mass mobilisation on the democratic fabric of Malaysian society.
Several significant features of Malaysia’s electoral politics merit discus-
sion in this context. The question of identity politics remains a subject of debate,
particularly with regard to the voting patterns of Malays and the implications of
the Undi18 policy, which enabled six million new voters to register for the
GE15. Before the GE15, various political observers and politicians believed that
these new voters, particularly the youth, might lean towards progressive reforms
championed by Anwar’s PH coalition, which encompasses parties representing
diverse racial backgrounds. However, the election results of GE15 reveal that
voters have shown considerable support for right-wing Malay-dominated
political parties, such as the PN coalition led by Bersatu and the Malaysian
Islamic Party (PAS). This outcome serves as a concerning signal, particularly
for pro-democracy groups aspiring for Malaysia to transcend the dominance of
identity politics that has pervaded the political landscape.
The formation of a unity government by Anwar’s PH and the dominant
political party, UMNO, within the BN coalition has evoked a mixed response
from the electorate. Both parties have entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing to uphold political stability in the country. This development also
highlights the importance of considering the divergent reactions of civil society
actors. While some view Anwar’s compromises as necessary to avert alternative
scenarios, others adopt a more critical stance, urging him to follow through on
the reform agenda he has championed for decades. For instance, Suara Rakyat
Malaysia (SUARAM), a prominent local human rights non-governmental
organisation (NGO), has expressed concerns regarding the government’s
24
 MALAYSIA’S ELECTORAL PROCESSES

commitment to amending draconian and outdated laws, noting the slow progress
in implementing policies that safeguard human rights (Hariz, 2023).
Although a unity government can contribute to stability by mitigating poli-
tical polarisation and fostering cooperation among different factions, proving
particularly valuable during crises. However, the process of power-sharing and
political compromises on certain policy positions come at a cost, namely, public
perception and trust.

T
In a previous study on the Bersih movement (Khoo, 2020), I argue that the
emergence and persistence of Bersih, as well as the political participation of
Malaysians, are primarily driven by a combination of accumulated grievances
against the dominant BN coalition and political opportunities. Civil society
actors have been able to mobilise around these issues, exerting pressure on the
authorities for reform. This argument adopts a bottom-up approach to
understanding the drivers of Bersih while acknowledging that civic activism is
also influenced by institutional structures and other contextual factors.
The Malaysian case highlights the involvement of political elites and civil
society actors in the democratic process, and their actions shape the extent and
forms of individual political participation. As the debate surrounding the
survival of a unity government under Anwar Ibrahim alongside its long-time
rival, UMNO, continues, the role of mass mobilisation and contentious politics
in facilitating democratisation becomes increasingly significant. Democrati-
sation occurs organically as more individuals engage in the political realm
(Dahl, 1971). While mass mobilisation plays a crucial role in driving democra-
tisation in Malaysia, it is also subject to change as democratisation alters the
mobilisation context (Cho, 2000).
It is noteworthy to recognise that the relationship between mass mobili-
sation and electoral politics is complex and multifaceted. Mass mobilisation can
significantly impact electoral outcomes, but electoral politics also shape the
opportunities and constraints of mobilised groups. The interaction between these
dynamics is influenced by factors such as the political system, the nature of the

25
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

issues at stake, the strategies employed by mobilised groups, and the response of
political elites.
The challenge for Malaysia’s electoral politics lies in navigating a path of
continued political change to avoid democratic backsliding, as witnessed in
some Southeast Asian countries. Understanding the interplay between mass
mobilisation and electoral politics in Malaysia necessitates considering the
specific political context, the issues at stake, the strategies of mobilised groups,
and the response of political elites. This complex relationship is influenced by
factors such as the political system, government policies, public sentiment, and
the organisational capacity of mobilised groups.
With the six state elections concluded on 12 August, all eyes are on how
Anwar’s PH-BN coalition will sustain itself. The result shows the status quo of
six states, with three currently held by Anwar’s PH-BN coalition (Penang,
Selangor and Negeri Sembilan) and three held by the PN opposition coalition
(Kelantan, Terengganu and Kedah). The election results provide insights into
the political inclinations of voters, particularly in the peninsula. At the same
time, these elections also expose Anwar’s greatest challenge, especially in
winning the Malay-Muslim votes. Consequently, Anwar faces the formidable
task of reconciling the demands of diverse coalitions and governing parties with
the aspirations of the electorate.

Bibliography
CHO, Hee-Yeon, 2000, “Democratic transition and social movement change in South
Korea,” The Journal of Sungkonghoe University, vol. 14.
DAHL, Robert, 1971, Polyarchy: participation and opposition, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
EARL, J, 2004, “The cultural consequences of social movements”, The Blackwell
companion to social movements, pp. 508-530.
HARIZ MOHD, 2023, “Where are rights reforms, Suaram asks ‘former victim’ Anwar”,
Malaysiakini, April 27, https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/663333.
HUTCHINSON, Francis E., and AUN, Lee Hwok, 2019, The defeat of Barisan
Nasional: Missed signs or late surge?, Singapore: ISEAS-Ishak Yusof Institute.

26
 MALAYSIA’S ELECTORAL PROCESSES
LOH, Francis, and NETTO, Anil, 2018, Regime change in Malaysia: GE14 and the end
of UMNO-BN’s 60-year rule, Petaling Jaya: SIRD.
YING HOOI, Khoo, 2022, “Navigating Malaysia-China relations amid the democracy vs
autocracy debate under Anwar Ibrahim”, The Prospect Foundation, 7 December,
https://www.pf.org.tw/en/pfen/33-9817.html.
YING HOOI, Khoo, 2020, The Bersih movement and democratisation in Malaysia:
Repression, dissent and opportunities, Pennsylvania: Lexington Books.

27
 Elections in Timor-Leste, 2022-2023

Rui Graça Feijó

Elections are powerful tools to legitimize political power. If they are regular,
frequent, free and fair, then they constitute a solid rock upon which to root a
democratic polity and perform a decisive role in settling political disputes in a
peaceful manner. As from the restoration of its independence, the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste has established a solid tradition of democratic
elections based on constitutional prescriptions, a reliable electoral adminis-
tration, and a massive adherence of the citizenry to this form of ascertaining
popular preferences and translate the oscillations of their main options.
However, the nature of individual elections depends on the way they are
framed by an overarching government system. Legislative or presidential polls
have different meanings in presidential, parliamentary or semi-presidential
regimes. Single constituency polls differ from those which take place in
countries where the territory is divided in a number of smaller units.
Proportional Representation is associated with different outcomes from those
prevailing in First-past-the-post voting systems. Limiting candidates to partisan
members or allowing for the entry into the fray of individuals without partisan
affiliation also generates specific dynamics.
For all these reasons, the present essay begins with a survey of the political
and electoral system of Timor-Leste, underlying the differences between
presidential and parliamentary polls in the context of a semi-presidential regime,
and offering a general survey of their respective rules. Then, two sections
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

discuss the stakes and the outcomes of the presidential elections of 2022 and the
legislative polls of 2023. The final section discusses the avenues opened by this
electoral cycle, and offers some insight into the likely developments in the
coming years.

The Political and Electoral System of Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste is the only semi-presidential Republic in Southeast Asia. Robert
Elgie’s definition—“Semi-presidentialism is where there is a directly elected
president and a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to
the legislature” (Elgie 2011: 19-20)—aptly describes the country’s government
system. As per the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
(CDRTL), both the President of the Republic (section 76) and the National
Parliament (section 93) are elected “by universal, free, direct, equal, secret and
personal suffrage” for 5-year mandates thus creating a diarchy of powers with
independent (and eventually competing) legitimacies that Sartori considers the
distinguishing feature of this government system: “The one characteristic that
any semi-presidential system must have […] is a dual authority structure, a dual-
headed configuration.” (1997: 122). No doubt that Timor-Leste fits this broad
model. In CDRTL’s terms, the government is responsible both before the
president and the assembly (section 107), but in fact holds exclusive executive
power. Presidential functions are directed at supervising the “regular
functioning of democratic institutions” and may be regarded as a “moderating
power” in the wake of Benjamin Constant1.
Presidential and parliamentary elections, though, are rather different.
Although both the president and the assembly are vested with similar, direct
legitimacy, the role of presidents and governments are separate, and the terms
under which polls are fought are considerably diverse. To start with, presidential
elections are open to any “East Timorese original citizen” over 35 in possession
of his full capacities, proposed by a minimum of 5 000 voters (CDRTL

1
An expanded analysis of the distribution of powers among president and prime minister in Timor-Leste is
provided in Feijó 2020.

30
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

section 75), thus allowing for “independent candidates” to stand, paying respect
to the fact that the recent history of the country, including its fight for national
independence, was not, strictly speaking, organized by formal political parties
but had the concourse of civil society in many forms.
In the wake of the first elections that returned the charismatic Resistance
leader Xanana Gusmão to the job on a landslide (82.7% of the popular vote), in
the so-called “friendly election” in which he defeated another national hero—
Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the president of the ephemeral independent nation
in 1975 who volunteered to fight “for the sake of a democratic poll” (Smith
2004)—a political convention has been established that regards the lack of
partisan ties as an attribute of presidents who are supposed to behave above the
party fray. In that election, Xanana refused to be associated with any particular
party, accepting the endorsement of many organizations and personalities, and
stressed he would not act as partisan agent. As John M. Carey (2000) has
argued, decisions that are the object of fierce bargaining at the time of creation
of a new regime—as well as the terms under which “founding elections” are
fought—have long lasting and pervasive implications and tend to frame
subsequent forms of political behaviour. These need not be enshrined in any
legal document, but may be powerful tools in the political culture arsenal, and
configure political conventions deemed highly legitimate.
Presidential elections are fought on a single nation-wide constituency
(including voting rights for the East Timorese diaspora), and require an absolute
majority of votes to proclaim a winner; should the first round (usually open to a
vast array of candidates who successfully overcome the legal and bureaucratic
hurdles) fail to return 50% +1 vote to one candidate, a runoff is organised
30 days later between the two best positioned ones. Before the current electoral
cycle, this has happened in 2007 and 2012.
In sharp contrast, legislative elections for a single 65-seat chamber
(Parlamento Nacional) are the reserved ground for legally registered political
parties. The legislation regulating the formation and also—quite important—the
survival of political parties is strictly upheld, meaning that any group wishing to
compete in national elections must not only observe founding rules, but must
also remain significantly active. The whole country—just like in the case of

31
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

presidential polls—makes up a constituency (therefore downplaying regional

representation). Parties submit closed slates of candidates (65 permanent and
several alternate ones), in which one in every three candidates must be of a
different gender (up from one in four; law amended in 2011). Seats are allocated
through the D’Hondt method (proportional representation with an inbuilt bias in
favour of larger parties) to all those who score more than the 4% threshold (up
from 3%; law amended 2011).
A brief word on the electoral administration2. From the very first national
polls, there are two agencies: the National Electoral Commission (Comissão
Nacional de Eleições, CNE), notionally an independent body tasked with
general supervision, disposing of a grandiose headquarters in Dili, and
permanently staffed; and a government department—Technical Secretariat for
Electoral Affairs (Secretariado Técnico para os Assuntos Eleitorais, STAE)—
that runs the electoral organization on the ground. This dual structure, even
though prone to some form of government dependence and/or interference, has
discharged its functions rather successfully in most elections (if one judges by
the reports of international observation missions).
In the first electoral cycles after independence, presidential elections were
held at such a time that it allowed for the inauguration of the new president on
Independence Day (20 May), and were soon followed by legislative ones (about
three months later). This situation is often referred to as “honeymoon” or
“coattails” elections, linking the fate of presidents with that of the parliamentary
majority. Even though they may be perceived as rather independent, the
likelihood that the political mood in the country expresses itself in converging
fashion on both polls is high, giving presidents a theoretical advantage to
influence the configuration of parliaments. Recently, though, a disturbance was
introduced in the model: after the 2017 cycle was complete, and faced with
unexpected difficulties to form a stable government in the extant parliamentary
context, president Lu Olo dissolved a recently elected assembly, called early
elections for June 2018, and introduced a wider gap between the two polls if
terms run their normal time. “Coattails” effect has been blurred if not altogether

2
For an extended revision of electoral administration, albeit referring to the last decade, see Feijó (2016a).

32
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

abolished. This situation can be reversed if and when a president dissolves the
sitting parliament after his election and restores the original formula. In the
meantime, both the president and the parliament’s terms ran their normal
periods, and thus elections were held in 2022 for the presidency and in 2023 for
the legislative chamber.

The Presidential Election of 19 March

and 19 April, 2022
In 2022, Timor-Leste held its fifth presidential election. The first three
presidents (Xanana Gusmão, 2002-2005; José Ramos-Horta, 2007-2012; Taur
Matan Ruak, 2012-2017) were all “independent” (i.e. non-partisan) figures who
created and sustained a political convention regarding the ways in which the
head of stare discharges his functions. In 2017, Francisco Guterres “Lu Olo,”
the chairman of FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Indepen-
dente, Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste) (but not the party’s
actual leader, a role performed by its secretary-general, Mari Alkatiri) ran for
the third time, and insisted on being his party’s flag bearer. This time he
managed to put together a pre-electoral, informal coalition and was supported
by other parties—critically, by the parties sustaining the sitting “government of
national inclusion,”3 including Xanana’s CNRT (Congresso Nacional para a
Reconstrução de Timor-Leste, National Congress for the Reconstruction of
Timor-Leste) and the old leader individual endorsement. Lu Olo was returned
on the first ballot with a comfortable 57% of the popular vote (three months
later, his party would score just under 30%).
Lu Olo discharged a controversial mandate, deviating from the previous
convention inasmuch as he was a leading figure of a major party (FRETILIN)
and interfered directly with the parliamentary process of choosing and
sustaining government (Feijó 2023a; 2023b). He tested the constitutional limits
of presidential powers on several occasions—refusing to dismiss the (minority)

3
On the meaning of the “government of national inclusion” (the VI Constitutional Government headed by Rui
Maria de Araújo), see Feijó (2016b).

33
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

VII Constitutional Government (led by Alkatiri) after it failed parliamentary

investiture and keeping it as a caretaker cabinet for more than six months;
refusing to offer the parliamentary majority coalition the chance to form a
government; after dissolving the parliament for the first time in the country’s
history and calling fresh legislative elections (which were won by a coalition
opposed to FRETILIN), the president was forced to accept a solution excluding
his own party, but rejected a dozen ministers from the major coalition partner
(Xanana’s CNRT) forcing Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak (TMR) to govern
with a cabinet devoid of critical ministers and severely distorting the
representation of its parliamentary basis. After a tug-of-war with Xanana, the
VIII Constitutional Government was profoundly reshuffled: the president
pressed TMR to ditch his pre-electoral alliance, offering him FRETILIN support
(and entry into government) in lieu of CNRT. The revamped cabinet lasted until
the end of the parliaments term.
Lu Olo’s political behaviour was challenged at the Constitutional Court.
However, the court’s interpretation of the issue resulted in enhancing presi-
dential powers. In fact, the court ruled that presidential decisions and actions
can only be legally challenged in case an impeachment procedure—requiring a
qualified, two-thirds majority in parliament (CRDTL section 79.3.)—is
initiated. Otherwise, presidential actions are not susceptible to legal challenge
(see Leach 2021).
In brief: for most of Lu Olo’s term in office there was an unprecedented
and clear identification between the president and the government, which the
president had actively manoeuvred to impose, acting openly as a party agent.
Disputes over the legality aside, the legitimacy of his mandate, and the
transparency of his chosen methods have been questioned. They entailed a high
degree of instability, and political animosity in Dili ran high. For some
observers, the perils of “democratic backsliding” were emerging4.
Lu Olo ran for a second consecutive mandate (his fourth campaign). As
usual in two-round elections, when electors tend to express an ideological or
sentimental vote in the first instance and face a tougher, pragmatic choice in the

4
I dealt with these issues at length in Feijó (2023b).

34
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

second ballot, and therefore pre-electoral coalitions or agreements are not hard
pressing, Lu Olo faced the competition from 15 other candidates, several of
them from the government support base that saw no need for a unified march
and preferred to test their popularity in view of subsequent bargains. Eleven of
those ran as “independent”—including a leading figure also associated with
FRETILIN (Lieutenant-General Lere Anan Timur who polled 7.8%). Four were
women (amongst whom the prime-minister’s wife, who did very poorly:
0.65%). José Ramos-Horta, who had failed his re-election bid in 2012, stood as
“independent” with Xanana’s CNRT support. Observers noted that the show had
two major actors, the majority of candidates being relegated to subsidiary roles.
The crux of the matter was then: how does the electorate judge the course of
action initiated by Lu Olo in 2017, which he purported to maintain, and Ramos-
Horta frontally challenged?
The first round was staged on 19 March, and as it was widely expected,
returned Lu Olo (22.13%, well below his own score in the 2007 and 2012 first
rounds) and Ramos-Horta (46.56%) for the runoff on 19 April. In the second
round, Lu Olo attracted votes from his allies who failed to qualify, and polled
37.90%; Ramos-Horta cruised to a landslide (62.10%) based on the vote of
electors dissatisfied with his opponent’s term in office. Ramos-Horta platform
promised the return to the abandoned convention of “president of all the
Timorese,” distancing himself from partisan agency. In tune with this stance, he
resisted his main supporters’ pressure for the immediate dissolution of
parliament and early elections (that would be justifiable in view of the poor
results obtained by the government apologists) and kept the prime minister in
office. Ultimately, president Ramos-Horta called parliamentary elections to be
held roughly five years after the last ones on May 21, 2023. At the moment of
announcing his decision, he made a powerful speech reflecting critically on
what he regarded as excessive political polarization and urging his citizens to
meditate seriously on the sectarian course that was taking hold of the country
(Ramos-Horta 2023).

35
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Parliamentary Election of May 21, 2023

Parliamentary elections took place on May 21, 2023. Unlike the previous poll
(2018) in which many parties formed pre-electoral coalitions both to beat the
4% threshold, in the case of smaller parties, or to anticipate post-electoral
government formation bargaining given the experience of the pervious poll’s
aftermath (only FRETILIN and PD [Partido Democrático, Democratic Party]
went solo), in 2023 there was no single coalition, the Court of Appeals having
rejected all three proposals being submitted. A total of 17 parties were finally
accepted by the court, most without any previous experience. In the run up to
the polls, the three major parties supporting the VIII Constitutional
Government5, rooted in young sectors of the population with significant ties to
“martial arts groups” (MAGs), announced they would endeavour to pursue the
political line of the outgoing cabinet and share government responsibilities.
Xanana’s CNRT campaigned aggressively for an absolute majority and admitted
it might look for external support in case its score was not sufficient, but ruled
out any agreement with the outgoing cabinet’s political bases.
Timor-Leste has a small political elite dominated by the presence of
katuas, or elders—a rather common feature in many countries. However, a
distinctive feature of this group of extremely influential individuals is that they
were prominent political actors back in 1974-1975—almost half a century
ago—when Portugal initiated the failed decolonisation of the territory which
ended up at the time of the Indonesian invasion (December 7, 1975), then
followed by 24 dramatic years of neo-colonial and rather brutal rule. These
fifty-odd years saw those figures play different roles, converge as often as
diverge, support and fight each other, generate a ballast of personal animosity. It
is not surprising that, as they remain powerful actors, political platforms are
somehow overshadowed by their personal competition and individual ambitions.
Generally, observers find it difficult to ascertain the main ideological orientation
or pragmatic issues in dispute, and prefer to stress conjunctural proposals and

5
These parties comprise FRETILIN, PLP (Partido da Libertação do Povo, People’s Liberation Party), led by Taur
Matan Ruak, and KHUNTO (Kmanek Haburas União Nacional Timor Oan, Enrich the National Unity of the Sons
of Timor).

36
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

personality clashes. The major stakes of this election were the survival of the
incumbent government and its patronage network, seriously weakened in last
presidential poll.
This election mobilized a vast number of East Timorese. Even though the
electoral register is poorly updated and tends to include more individuals than
actual citizens with voting capacity (due the slow elimination of deceased
electors and difficulties in tracking migrants who are sometimes doubly regis-
tered), a feature that artificially enhances abstention, official figures suggest a
participation rate around 80%. In any case, the actual number of citizens casting
a vote was the highest ever—a clear indication that the polls were regarded as
highly relevant to the population ways of life.
Xanana’s CNRT was the clear winner. Falling just short of an absolute
majority (41.5% of the popular vote and 31 seats, close to its goal of 33), CNRT
won in 10 of the country’s 13 districts, including the heavily populated capital
district (Dili), where it polled 52%—a clear indication of its traction among the
most dynamic sectors of Timor-Leste. A party with parliamentary representation
(PD), rooted in the youth and student’s movements of the Indonesian times,
strong among the Gerasaun Foun (New Generation), standing outside the
government base even though it had been supportive of the mid-term reshuffle,
and later endorsed Ramos-Horta in the 2022 runoff, marginally increased its
performance to finish in third place (6 seats/9.3% from 5 seats /8.1%).
Conversely, FRETILIN plummeted to its lowest ever score: 25.75%
(previously 34%) and only 19 seats (from 23). It managed to retain the first spot
in its traditional eastern districts’ stronghold, but in the Special Administrative
Region of Oecusse that has been governed by its cadres for a long while, it lost
to CNRT. In the capital district, its share of the vote (22.5%) was less than half
that of CNRT. Prime minister’s PLP’s seats were cut in half (4 from 8), and just
scored 5.8% of the popular vote, coming last of those that surpassed the
threshold. The third party in his government support base, KHUNTO, managed
to stick to the same number of seats it had previously (5 from 7.5% of the vote).
From the 17 competing parties, only these five secured seats in parliament.
A newcomer, PVT (Partido os Verdes de Timor, Green Party of Timor)—
another organization closely linked with the youth and MAGs—, registered in

37
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

2022, came close to overtaking the 4% threshold (it scored 3.6%), as did another
party in the former government support base, PUDD (Partido Unido para o
Desenvolvimento e a Democracia, United Party for Development and
Democracy), with 3.2%. All others scored less than 1%. Taken as group, these
12 parties received just below 10%, meaning the elected parliament actually
represents more than 90% of electors. In view of these results, President Ramos-
Horta has made it clear he will appoint a CNRT designated prime minister as
soon as the new parliament convenes for the first time. The outgoing
government has tried to push the inauguration of the new assembly to
September, arguing the extant parliamentarians ought to be given the right to
“terminate the legislative session”—a delaying tactics that did not meet the
approval of the judicial authorities that stressed the parliament had been
dissolved for the purpose of the May elections, and the new elected members
ought to be sworn in according to the law. This attempt delayed by several
weeks the normal course of events.
Most likely, the new prime minister would be Xanana Gusmão himself (for
what would be his third term as head of government). Two theoretical options
were open: to form a minority cabinet, or to entertain a cooperation agreement
with PD. Both parties have issued public statements indicating they were ready
to share government responsibilities, and a formal coalition government would
be formed with majority support in the National Parliament

Where to from Here?

One might expect constitutional rules to prevail in the coming years as
democracy in Timor-Leste moves towards consolidation, and regular, free and
free elections take place at their opportune moment. That would mean having
new presidential elections in 2027 and parliamentary ones in 2028.
The CRDTL enshrines a political principle: that of the necessary renewal
of political personnel as it states in section 64: “No one shall hold any political
office for life, or for indefinite periods of time.” The pragmatic consequences of
the principle, though, are not clear. Contrary to some speculation based on
CRDTL’s unclear formulation regarding the renewal of presidential mandates
38
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

(CRDTL section 75.3 reads: “The President of the Republic’s term in office
may be renewed only once),” by virtue of which some have sustained that
Ramos-Horta would not be eligible to stand again, the constitutional expert
Pedro Bacelar de Vasconcelos—himself well acquainted with the Timorese
fundamental law—sustains that a president exercising his second term in office
after someone else’s mandate (that is, in a non-consecutive manner) is eligible
for a third one (Vasconcelos 2011: 265). Assuming that the Constitutional Court
of Timor-Leste upholds this position, then there is no case to suggest any of the
current day politicians will be barred from running again. However, it is most
unlikely that Gerasaun Tuan (generation of 1974-1975) will seek new
mandates.
If for no other reason, the “laws of life” will apply to a key group of
individuals now in their mid- to late seventies. Generational turnover is inevi-
table, regardless of the timing for its manifestation. In terms of official rhetoric,
this principle is embraced across the political spectrum; however, actual
performance often denies stated goals. Back in 2015, Xanana took a critical step
in that direction when he handed over his premiership to an illustrious member
of the following generation—Rui Maria de Araújo. The broad approval elicited
by the new premier, and the structural solution he embodied, rose hopes it
would not be reversed. But hopes proved to be short-lived, as FRETILIN went
back on its word and reinstated a premier from the older generation in 2017. As
it turned out, Rui de Araujo went on to emerge as an alternative voice within his
party to the old guard, trying to challenge it in their congress (but was prevented
from standing for a vote on leadership), and has recently called for a reconsi-
deration of his party’s options in face of the “shameful defeat” of last elections,
positioning himself as a candidate for a different style of leadership. The fact
that the most prominent face of the “renovation” proposed by the current
FRETILIN leadership for the last elections was Lieutenant-General Lere Anan
Timur (born 1952) suggests there is a long way before accepting a decisive
turnover
Xanana will remain at the forefront of politics for some time. However, he
is supposed to feel the weight of his age and to keep truthful to his previous
desire to pave the way for the next generation. When he does so, a major issue
will surface. The rooting of democracy in Timor-Leste has been made through
39
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

an original process that combines the development of liberal-democratic

practices (namely, free and fair regular elections) with respect for other forms of
political legitimation, mainly with charismatic authority (in the precise
Weberian sense). As Weber explained over a century ago (1922), charisma may
have a critical impact on politics, and it is an attribute of precise individuals who
normally are unable to pass it on to others—a feature that renders charismatic
authority difficult to articulate with legal-rational legitimacy. However, Xanana
has behaved since independence in a manner that reveals his option to develop
democratic institutions. Failure to realise the virtues (or even the mere
existence) of this association, and the double nature of current political system’s
popular legitimacy—as was arguably the case with Lu Olo’s term in office,
blatantly ostracizing the old leader—resulted in a crisis that the recent polls put
in evidence. As a brilliant student I had in Dili once put to me: “we may do
things without Maun Boot (Big or Older Brother); but we can hardly achieve
anything against Xanana.” His wisdom ought to be heard.
Moving beyond the critical aspect of the fate of personalities, two aspects
of national politics deserve special mention. For one, in the quarter century
mediating between the self-determination referendum of August 30, 1999 and
the most recent elections, the number of registered electors rose from 451,968 to
890,145— almost doubled. The vast majority of new voters are youngsters,
some of whom born after independence. A significant number of East Timorese
youths are prone to participate in “martial arts groups” activities, which go well
beyond the alleged sporting side of things, as James Scambary (2019) has
shown. As recently as early 2023, President Ramos-Horta referred in highly
critical terms to their activities and their responsibilities in confronting and
undermining established, democratic authority, going as far as to suggest he
would not be willing to appoint ministers associated with MAGs. Why did he
feel compelled to go this far? Because MAGs have close links to at least two
registered political parties—KHUNTO, which has been in parliament since
2017, and was part of the VIII Constitutional Government; and PVT, registered
in 2022—which have polled almost 10% of the popular vote. For most
observers, the radical rejection of established authorities embodied by MAGs is
a consequence of the youth’s incapacity to find adequate ways to engage in a
prosperous way of life and their frustration at the precarious economic and

40
 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023

social status they enjoy. Policies are urgently required that address the roots of
youth discomfort, lest it degenerate in radical populist movements challenging
the rule of law.
The second critical issue is economic diversification in a country highly
dependent on oil revenues. Statistically speaking, the petroleum sector accounts
for approximately 70% of the Timor-Leste GDP, more than 90% of the total
exports, as well as more than 80% of the state’s annual revenue (Neves 2022).
Oil revenues have been channeled to the Petroleum Fund (PF), from which an
Estimated Sustained Income (ESI) may be withdrawn every year, guaranteeing
its long-term sustainability. In fact, ESI has systematically been overstepped,
and more funds diverted to the annual state budget given the lack of alternative
economic and financial sources. Both a prudent management of the PF that
dispels fears of a “doomsday” (the drying out of PF deposits within a few years
unless new fossil fuel fields come in exploration, as has been exposed by NGOs
like Lao Hamutuk), and sound investments in diversifying the economy—
another example of rhetoric convergence and similar action abstention - are
urgently called for.
In this context, one may expect Xanana’s new administration to pursue a
more “nationalist” approach—in line with what he did in past occasions. For
instance, the decision on whether the processing of new oil and gas output from
the Greater Sunrise in Darwin or else in a new venue in Timor-Leste’s south
coast, where a major ambitious infrastructure and industrial plan—the Tasi
Mane Project (Male Sea Project)—has been devised and progresses with
hiccups, cannot wait much longer. Xanana has been a champion of the project,
defending it with an aggressive “national independence” rhetoric. However, it
does raise some questions as to its economic profitability, and poses diplomatic
considerations in the country’s relations with its neighbour Australia (with
whom the output is to be shared according to an established proportion which
that is contingent on the final solution), extending further to the Asia-Pacific
security context in view of a possible partnership with the People’s Republic of
China. A more energetic stance on this project is expected soon.

41
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Bibliography
CAREY, John M., 2000, “Presidential Electoral Systems”, in Richard Rose (ed.)
International Encyclopaedia of Elections. Basingstoke & Oxford, Macmillan, pp.
220-224.
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2002, Constitution of the Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste, Dili, Assembleia Constituinte.
ELGIE, Robert, 2011, Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-types and Democratic Performance,
Oxford, Oxford University Press.
FEIJÓ, Rui G., 2016a, Dynamics of Democracy in Timor-Leste. The Birth of a
Democratic Nation (1999-2012), Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.
—— 2016b, “A Long and Winding Road: a Brief History of the Idea of a ‘Government
of National Unity’ in Timor-Leste and its Current Implications”, Australian
National University SSGM Discussion Paper 2016/3.
—— 2020, Presidents in Semi-Presidential Regimes: Moderating Power in Portugal and
Timor-Leste, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
—— 2023a, “Timor-Leste in 2021 and 2022”, The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 35
number 2, pp. xxx-yyy.
—— 2023b, “Timor-Leste: Constitutional Provisions, Political Conventions and
Legitimacy Under Strain”, in Elsa Lafaye de Micheaux, Astrid Norén-Nilsson and
Gabriel Facal (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of Political Norm Dynamics in
Southeast Asia, London: Palgrave (forthcoming).
LEACH, Michael, 2021, “Timor-Leste”, in The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 33 number 2,
pp. 579-584.
NEVES, Guteriano, 2022, “Timor-Leste’s Petroleum Revenues: The Challenges of
Managing ‘Easy Money’”. Heinrich Boll Stiftung – Southeast Asia. DOI:
https://th.boell.org/en/2022/03/21/timor-leste-petroleum-fund.
RAMOS-HORTA, José, 2023, “Some Thoughts on the 2023 Parliamentary Elections”
(23 February 2023). DOI: www.presidenciarepublica.tl (accessed on May 26,
2023).
SARTORI, Giovanni,1997, Comparative Constitutional Engineering, London, Palgrave.
SCAMBARY, James, 2019, Conflict, Identity and State Formation in East Timor, 2000-
2017, Leiden & Boston, Brill.

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 ELECTIONS IN TIMOR-LESTE, 2022-2023
SMITH, Anthony L., 2004, “Elections in the World’s Newest Nation”. Journal of
Democracy volume 15 number 2, pp. 145-159.
VASCONCELOS, Pedro Bacelar de (ed.), 2011, Constituição Anotada da Republica
Democrática de Timor-Leste, Braga: Centro de Estudos de Direitos Humanos,
Universidade do Minho.
WEBER, Max, 1922, “The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization” in his
Economy and Society, edited / translated by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich,
2013, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, University of California Press,
chapter III, paragraph 10.

43
 Thailand’s 2023 General Election:
Process, Key Issues,
and Future Trajectories

Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee

On May 14, 2023, Thailand held an election within the framework of a hybrid
regime and “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler,
2013; Diamond, 2002). The 2016 constitution was crafted with the intention of
establishing appointed senators as a counter-majoritarian mechanism. In order to
form a government, a minimum of 376 legislative votes out of 750 in the two
chambers is required. Among these, 250 senators appointed by the military junta
also play a part in the selection of the prime minister along with members of the
House of Representatives (MPs). Approximately 52 million Thai voters directly
elected 500 MPs for a four-year term using the parallel voting system. The first-
past-the post method was employed to elect 400 members to represent each
constituency. The remaining 100 members were chosen through proportional
representation from closed nationwide party lists ranked by political parties. In
total, 4,781 candidates ran for constituency MPs, and 1,898 candidates were
listed on party ballots from 70 different political parties. Prior to election day,
63 candidates were nominated for the prime minister (Bangkok Post 2023). To
be eligible for nominating a prime minister, a party needed to secure at least 5%
of the House members or 25 seats. Each party had the option to propose up to
three candidates.
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Process at a Glance

The electoral process raised some concerns, including the use of state resources,
electoral manipulations, gerrymandering, and an uneven playing field favouring
ruling parties. These issues were generally less severe than in the 2019 election
(Sawasdee 2020). For example, the ballot design assigned different numbers for
the party-list ballot and the ballot for constituency candidates, creating confus-
sion among voters. The constituency ballot did not include candidates’ names or
party affiliations, aiming to reduce the advantage of parties with popular
banners and encouraging candidates to focus on personal votes.1 Additionally,
the Election Commission of Thailand implemented a 10% limit on the variation
among constituencies to avoid malapportionment, resulting in the redrawing of
constituency boundaries that might benefit certain candidates over others.
The electoral campaign period lasted 44 days and was marked by a strong
wave of enthusiasm. Political parties employed a range of strategies, such as
rallies, door-to-door canvassing, patronage, distributing materials, and digital
media to engage voters. Broadcasting debates and the widespread use of social
media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and Twitter played a pivotal role in
evaluating prime minister and House candidates, shaping public discourse, and
capturing voters’ attention. Thailand’s 2023 general election set a record for
voter turnout in the country’s history, with 75.71% of eligible voters
participating.2

Key Electoral Issues and Party Positions

Classifying Thai political parties as strictly left-wing or right-wing can be
challenging, as their primary aim often revolves around securing cabinet
positions rather than embodying strong ideological differences. Furthermore,

1
Allen Hicken, “What’s in a Number? The Implications of Thailand’s Ballot Design,” Thai Data Points, Available
from: https://www.thaidatapoints.com/post/what-s-in-a-number-the-implications-of-thailand-s-ballot-design
[accessed May 12, 2023].
2
Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, The 2023 Election Results, an official report by the Election
Commission of Thailand, Official Report available from: https://ectreport66.ect.go.th/overview.

46
 THAILAND’S 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Thailand’s historical political centre has leaned right, largely due to the absence
of a prominent left-wing party. However, when comparing Thai political parties
(though not necessarily to parties in other countries), certain distinctions become
evident based on campaign policies and positions:
Move Forward Party (MFP): Emerged as the successor to the dissolved
Future Forward Party, due to a Constitutional Court order, has a distinct
emphasis on tackling Thailand’s structural challenges through three core areas:
demilitarization, de-monopolization, and decentralization. They believe these
changes can bring about significant transformation, as expressed in their slogan,
“Choose MFP, and Thailand won’t be the same.” The MFP exhibits elements of
left-wing populism3, combining left-wing politics with populist rhetoric. The
party takes a progressive stance on issues like anti-establishment sentiments,
military reform, the abolition of conglomerate monopolies, and the amendment
of Section 112 (Lèse-majesté legislation that bans criticism of the monarchy),
which is seen as a sensitive subject. Its character might alternatively be
described as techno-populism (Bickerton and Accetti 2021) as the party actively
engages with voters through social media, involving academic leaders and
experts.
Pheu Thai Party (PT): As the third incarnation of former Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra’s parties, the PT has consistently secured the most seats
in five successive general election since 2001. The party’s key policy proposals
include providing a 10 000 THB (approximately 285 US $) digital wallet for
every individual aged 16 and over and raising the minimum wage to 600 THB
(17 US $) by 2027. The PT has a more centrist stance, emphasising previous
economic achievement rather than striving for structural and institutional
reforms.
Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP): Characterized as a big-tent party
comprising veteran politicians from various factions, including many former
members of the PT, and teams of technocrats. The PPRP’s main campaign
promise centres on increasing entitlements for state welfare cardholders. The

3
Two examples of the left-wing populism are Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain (see
Piquer and Jäger 2020).

47
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

party positions itself as a party of reconciliation without strong adherence to any

specific ideology. It has nominated General Prawit Wongsuwan, the eldest
among the “Three ‘Por’ Brothers” (a group of three former army chiefs) as its
premier candidate, in place of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha.
Democrat Party (DP): Being the oldest functioning political party in
Thailand, the DP holds a conservative and pro-market stance. However, the
party’s popularity has faded, and it has experienced a significant exodus of
members. This is owing to the belief that its anti-Thaksin stance proved
ineffective, and its previous image as a defender of democracy has been tainted
by its cosy relationship with the military.
Bhumjaithai Party (BJT): Known for attracting more than 40 defectors
from other parties, is also recognized for its advocacy to legalize marijuana. The
BJT takes a conservative populist stance with the motto “said and done.”
United Thai Nation Party (UTN): Established approximately one year
prior to the election to endorse General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the UTN primarily
appeals to those who see him as the guardian of national identity and traditional
institutions. The party leans much farther right than most traditional parties in
Thailand. It places a strong emphasis on conventional morality and upholding
national and cultural values.
Leading up to the 2023 election, most parties struggle to effectively
communicate with voters and have not made significant efforts in party
building. Instead, they rely on old-school practices to garner votes, including
providing patronage, co-opting incumbent candidates, and leveraging local
political networks. These techniques often require substantial financial resources
and become less effective over time.

Electoral Results: A Tornado of Changes

In the overall picture, a total of 18 political parties were elected to the House of
Representatives, among them were seven single seated parties, as demonstrated
in Table 1. The MFP won more than 14 million votes (38.4%) nationwide,
winning party list votes across 43 provinces, including Bangkok, vicinity, and

48
 THAILAND’S 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS
Table 1: Electoral Results, 14 May 2023

Political Constituency Party list Total

Parties Seats Votes % Seats Votes % Seats %

Move Forward 112 9,665,433 25.989 39 14,438,851 38.480 151 30.20

Pheu Thai 112 9,340,082 25.114 29 10,962,522 29.216 141 28.20

Bhumjaithai 68 5,133,441 13.803 3 1,138,202 3.033 71 14.20

Palang 39 4,186,441 11.257 1 537,625 1.433 40 8.00

Pracharath
United Thai 23 3,607,575 9.700 13 4,766,408 12.703 36 7.20

Democrat 22 2,278,857 6.128 3 925,349 2.466 25 5.00

Chartthaipattana 9 585,205 1.574 1 192,497 0.513 10 2.00

Prachachat 7 334,051 0.898 2 602,645 1.606 9 1.80

Thai Sang Thai 5 872,893 2.347 1 340,178 0.907 6 1.20

Pue Thai 2 94,345 0.254 0 67,692 0.180 2 0.40

Rumphlang
Chartpattanakla 1 297,946 0.801 1 212,676 0.567 2 0.40

Thai Liberal 0 277,007 0.745 1 351,376 0.936 1 0.20

New 0 13,583 0.037 1 273,428 0.729 1 0.20

Democracy
New 0 1,365 0.004 1 249,731 0.666 1 0.20

The Party of 0 1,202 0.003 1 201,411 0.537 1 0.20

Thai Counties
Fair 0 9,653 0.026 1 184,817 0.493 1 0.20

Plung Sungkom 0 20,353 0.055 1 177,379 0.473 1 0.20

Mai
Thai Teachers 0 4,464 0.012 1 175,182 0.467 1 0.20
for People
Valid Votes 400 37,190,071 100 37,522,746 500

Spoiled Ballots 1,457,899 1,509,836

Voter Turnout 39,514,973 39,514,964

Eligible Voters 52,195,920 52,195,920

Source: Author’s calculation based on the data provided by the Election Commission of Thailand
Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, 2023, The 2023 Election Results, an official report
by the Election Commission of Thailand, https://ectreport66.ect.go.th/overview.

49
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

the eastern region. Additionally, it obtained the second highest party list votes in
the remaining 33 provinces. The electoral results reflected a thirst for change,
especially in urbanized areas across country, where conventional clientelistic
and dynastic politics (Nishizaki 2023; Meechan 2023) were being challenged by
high mobility and evolving media consumption habits.
The MFP, known for its anti-establishment stance and alignment with the
2020-2021 Youth Movements, received robust support from the younger demo-
graphic (Lertchoosakul 2023; Jatusripitak 2023). Notably, six of the MFP’s
elected Members of Parliament were activists during these movements. Young
voters, including more than three million first-time electors, high school and
university students and the middle to upper-income segments of the electorate
favoured the MFP over other parties. According to my research on the Youth’s
perspective during 2020-2021, over 75% of young people prioritize democratic
values over conservative and traditional principles (Sawasdee 2022).
The MFP’s popularity extended beyond the younger generation, resonating
across different age groups and spanning both urban and rural areas. Despite
spending less than other parties, the MFP’s constituency candidates won
112 seats, negating the popular narrative that money is the primary determinant
of electoral success. The MFP’s extensive use of social media platforms,
especially TikTok, have weakened provincial bosses, family politics, and
conventional vote canvassing based on patronage.
The PT has experienced a decline in its electoral dominance, slipping to
the second place in the House of Representatives with nearly 11 million votes
(29.2%) nationwide. While the party was successful in winning the party list
votes in 26 provinces and securing seats in its stronghold region of Northeast
Thailand, it failed to win any seats in the South and managed just one seat in
Bangkok. Several factors contributed to the PT’s unexpected loss: 1) The
confusion surrounding its prime ministerial candidates. The party fielded three
candidates, including Thaksin Shinawatra’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra
and real estate billionaire Srettha Thavisin. However, the party never stated
clearly which candidate would be its top choice for prime minister, and none of
them participated in the pivotal prime ministerial debates; 2) the party’s
ambivalence about forming a coalition with the military-aligned parties; 3) the

50
 THAILAND’S 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS

disconnection with young voters, who were seeking a more transformative

political agenda rather than mere economic policies. These challenges point to
the need for the party to reevaluate its goals, messaging, and internal dynamics
in order to regain its political standing in the future.
The BJT is the third-largest party, obtaining seats mostly in its heartland of
the northeast. Although it also won seats in the South, Central, and North
regions, it did not collect the most popular votes in any province under the party
list system, receiving just over 1 million votes (3.0%). This underscored the
BJT’s primary strategy of gaining votes through political brokers and from
political network support. The party lacked the potential to establish itself as a
national party.
The DP has experienced a significant decay in popularity, with its propor-
tional representation votes plummeting from 12 million (40.4%) in 2007 to
925 245 (2.4%). It won 25 seats in the lower house, and even its stronghold in
the southern region faced challenges from the MFP.
The PPRP, once the core coalition party that obtained 116 seats in 2019,
has now captured 40 seats and only 537 625 votes (1.4%) from the party list
system. The United Thai Nation Party (UTN), a newly created party supporting
Prime Minister General Prayuth, received 4.7 million votes (12.7%) from the
party list ballot, resulting in a total of 36 seats in the lower house. Together, the
two military-backed parties won 76 seats, with their combined vote share
dropping from 23.7% in 2019 to 14% in 2023. The internal conflicts among
conservative elites that led to the breakup of the PPRP and the UTN highlighted
the flaws and limitations of the competitive authoritarian model in maintaining
power through the electoral arena. The coalition government was held
responsible for economic difficulties and a poor response to the Covid-19
pandemic.
It is worth noting that the disparity in constituency votes between the
MFP (9.6 million), the PT (9.3 million), the BJT (5.1 million), and the PPRP
(4.1 million) was less pronounced compared to the difference in party list votes.
This implies that political brokerage and clientelistic patterns continue to
influence voters at the constituency level in many parts of Thailand, while anti-
military sentiments, a desire for change, and programmatic issues play a more

51
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

prominent role in shaping voters’ decisions at the national level. This underlines
Thailand’s changing political landscape and the complexity of election
campaigns in a country where urbanisation and mobilisation spread into rural
areas and the youth versus conservative cleavage is more visible, especially
among the MFP supporters.

The Long Road to a Government Formation

Thailand’s political landscape post-election was both challenging and intricate.
The MFP’s leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, formed an eight-party coalition MOU,
commanding 312 seats in the 500-seat lower house. However, to become prime
minister, Pita needed support from the appointed senators. Many of these
senators, who had previously voted for the military-backed government in the
2019 election, refused to vote for Pita due to their opposition to the MFP’s
progressive stance.
After more than three months of political deadlock, the second-placed PT
successfully formed a government, led by Srettha Thavisin, with the support of
11 parties, some of which were backed by its longtime rival, the military. This
unusual alliance was a result of a transitional provision in the constitution,
which made it highly improbable for election winners not favoured by the
traditional establishment to assume power. However, the Senate’s authority in
selecting the prime minister, as stated in the transitional clause, will cease in
May 2024.
The coalition created by the PT and parties affiliated with the previous
junta-backed government, along with the return of former Prime Minister
Thaksin after 17 years in exile with a royal pardon, represented an audacious
attempt to bridge a two-decade political conflicts between the PT and its
adversaries in the military and established political circles. The PT made crucial
commitments, such as not altering the lèse-majesté law and pledging to defend
the monarchy.
However, the alliance with junta-linked parties has infuriated many Thais
who believe their votes are being neglected. Consequently, the PT may face

52
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animosity from the MFP’s supporters who feel deceived by what they perceive
as a collusion with the elite’s machinery, as well as some of its own voters who
may see the PT’s union with pro-junta parties as a deviation from the party’s
stance as a defender of electoral democracy. This could culminate in the PT
losing ground in the electoral arena to the surging MFP. Ironically, for a party
like the PT, which has built its reputation on campaign promises and its past
accomplishments in improving the economy, the inability to form a government
after being out of office for more than nine years could be more damaging than
partnering with its old enemy.

The Future Trajectories

The election outcomes in Thailand reflect a growing weariness among the
public with prolonged military-dominated governance and a strong desire for a
fresh direction. The perception that a pro-military ruling coalition has held
power for an extended period and has demonstrated inefficiency in governance
has played a significant role in their electoral setback. The MFP, with its
progressive agenda, has resonated with voters disenchanted with the leadership
of military figures like General Prayuth Chan-o-cha. However, the MFP’s
commitment to reform powerful institutions, including the monarchy and the
military, have alarmed royalist conservatives.
The electoral landscape, traditionally influenced by provincial network
politicians, local power brokers, and patronage-based vote canvassing, is being
contested by the emergence of the MFP and the growing impact of social media
platforms like TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter. The use of digital media has
introduced a new sense of intimacy and is increasingly superseding traditional
clientelism in influencing voting behaviour. This results in shifting voter
expectations and inspirations.
The future trajectory of Thailand’s political landscape is likely to evolve
towards a multi-party system divided into three major political camps: the left-
wing techno-populist MPF, the centrist populist PT, and various clientelistic
parties. While both the MFP and PT are generally seen as pro-democracy
parties, their key distinction lies in their priorities. The MFP places a strong
53
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

emphasis on significant institutional reforms, while the PT focuses on delivering

economic performance.

Bibliography
“70 Parties Fielding 4,781 Constituency Candidates”, Bangkok Post, 8 April 2023,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2545739/70-parties-fielding-4-781-
constituency-candidates
BICKERTON, Christopher J., and ACCETTI, Carlo Invernizzi, 2021, “Introduction”, in
Technopopulism: The New Logic of Democratic Politics, London: Oxford
Academic, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807766.003.0001.
DIAMOND, Larry, 2002, Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid
Regimes, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13 (2), pp. 21-35.
HICKEN, Allen, 2023, “What’s in a Number? The Implications of Thailand’s Ballot
Design”, Thai Data Points, 12 May, https://www.thaidatapoints.com/post/what-s-
in-a-number-the-implications-of-thailand-s-ballot-design.
JATUSRIPITAK, Napon, 2023, “The Move Forward Party: Surge in Momentum, But
Obstacles Ahead”, 18 May, https://fulcrum.sg/the-move-forward-party-surge-in-
momentum-but-obstacles-ahead/
LERTCHOOSAKUL, Kanokrat, 2023, “The May 2023 Elections and the Triumph of
Thai Youth Social Movements”, Critical Asian Studies, https://shorturl.at/jpACD.
LEVITSKY, Steven and WAY, Lucan A. 2010, Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid
regimes after the Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MEECHAN, Suthikarn, 2023, Power and Local Networks in Northeast Thailand after
the 2006 Military Coup, Doctoral dissertation. Political Science and International
Relations departments, Canterbury: University of Canterbury.
NISHIZAKI, Yoshinori, 2023, Dynastic Democracy: Political Families in Thailand,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, 2023, The 2023 Election Results, an
official report by the Election Commission of Thailand,
https://ectreport66.ect.go.th/overview.

54
 THAILAND’S 2023 GENERAL ELECTIONS
PIQUER, Jose and JÄGER, Anton M. M., 2020, “After the Cartel Party: ‘Extra-Party’
and ‘Intra-Party’ Techno-Populism”, Politics and Governance, vol. 8 (4),
pp. 33-544.
SAWASDEE, Siripan Nogsuan, 2020, “Electoral Integrity and the Repercussions of the
Institutional Manipulations: The 2019 General Election in Thailand”, Asian
Journal of Comparative Politics, vol. 5 (1), pp. 52-68.
SAWASDEE, Siripan Nogsuan, 2022, 2020-2021 Youth Study Thailand, Bangkok:
Fredrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
SCHEDLER, Andreas, 2013, The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting
Electoral Authoritarianism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

55
 Hun Sen’s Election in 2023

Chandarin Chum

Cambodia had its legislative election in July 2023. Elections in Cambodia,

however, have been a subject of controversy and criticism. The election has
been merely seen as a tool to convince local people that the kingdom is a
democratic country, and members of the elite ruling class widely share this
narrative. Public discourse is shaped to present the illusion of choice and citizen
participation in decision-making. Behind the façade of democratic elections, the
reality often reveals a different story. The electoral landscape is seen as heavily
dominated by Hun Sen, one of the world’s longest-serving leaders (1985-1993;
1998-2023). As a Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) leader, Hun Sen has used
political strategies to manipulate the electoral process and weaken political
opposition in Cambodia for decades. He has cracked down on political
opposition, civil society organisations, and independent media, limiting freedom
of expression and assembly. However, there are signs that opposition to Hun
Sen’s rule is growing, and the government’s crackdown on opposition and civil
society is unlikely to lead to long-term stability or prosperity for the country,
even though Hun Sen successfully managed to replace himself with his son,
Hun Manet. This article will discuss how Hun Sen uses political strategies to
eliminate his competitors from the election contest and maintain his political
power to steer Cambodia into a closed authoritarian country.
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Cambodia’s Political Landscape

Cambodia has a long history of political turmoil, with numerous power
struggles and regime changes over the years. After gaining independence from
France in 1953, the country has experienced periods of monarchy, military rule,
civil war, and, worst of all, the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime that claimed
millions of Cambodian lives in the 1970s. The election in 1993, however,
marked a significant turning point as the formation of a multiparty system
reemerged. Unfortunately, a violent coup in 1997 resulted in the consolidation
of power by the Cambodian People’s Party, currently led by Hun Sen.
The Prime Minister, Hun Sen, has held power for 38 years in total, making
him one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. His Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) has dominated the political scene for decades and controls almost every
level of government. Under his leadership, Hun Sen has been accused of leading
the country toward authoritarianism, corruption, and human rights abuses.
Cambodia has never been labelled as a “Free” or “Partly Free” country by
Freedom House for the last decades. The country was consistently marked as a
“Not Free” regime. Political rights and Civil liberties scores remain low, at 5/40
and 19/60, respectively. The latest report from V-dem Institute (2021: 11)
suggests that Cambodia is in the autocratising moment. Cambodia, in all areas
captured by V-dem, indicates severe democratic deficits. Deliberative and
Electoral Indices experienced a significant setback if we compare the score in
2011 with 2021.
The Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) emerged as a serious
challenger to the CPP in the 2013 and 2017 elections, securing 44% of the vote
in both instances. However, the CNRP was dissolved in 2017 by a controversial
court ruling that accused the party of plotting the illegal overthrow of the
government. CNRP leader Sam Rainsy was forced to exile in France, and the
other leader, Kem Sokha, was sentenced to 27 years under house arrest on
treason charges.

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 HUN SEN’S ELECTION IN 2023

Election Without Opposition

In the July 2023 election, 18 political parties have competed with the CPP.
There have been approximately 9.8 million voters, with 53% of them being
female. The number of new voters is estimated to be around 600,000. Unfortu-
nately, the most credible opposition, Candlelight Party (CLP), was excluded
from the contest. In the wake of the CNRP’s dissolution, CLP formed as an
unofficial successor, inheriting many of its members and policies. Despite
facing intimidation and harassment, the CLP managed to secure 22% of the vote
in the 2022 local election, positioning itself as the sole credible challenger to
the CPP. The National Election Committee (NEC) disqualified the CLP from
participating in the upcoming national election, citing a paperwork issue as the
reason for the decision. According to the NEC, the party failed to provide the
necessary documents for registration, specifically, a certified or notarized copy
of the party’s original registration letter from the Ministry of Interior, which was
lost during a police raid in 2017. One would wonder why such a letter was not
required in the local election in 2022. NEC declined to explain such a different
decision.
Following the disqualification, the Candlelight Party filed an appeal with
the Constitutional Council, asking for the decision to be overturned. However,
the Council upheld the NEC’s decision, deeming the party’s complaint unlawful
and making the decision final and unappealable. Hun Sen has warned that
any demonstration against such a decision would lead to death or detention
(Samean, 2023). A legal amendment was made to ensure that CLP cannot call
for their supporters not to vote in the election, or they will lose their rights to
stand as a candidate to run future elections for up to six years.
Several implications can be made following the disqualification of CLP.
First, with the CLP barred from participating in the elections, the CPP has faced
no real challenge, as the only remaining contenders are either aligned with the
CPP or small, obscure parties that lack a national presence. This situation raises
concerns about the fairness and legitimacy of the electoral process, as well as
the prospects for a multiparty democracy in Cambodia. Second, the disquali-
fication has also prevented millions of Cambodian voters from choosing their
preferred candidates. As a spokesperson for the Candlelight Party stated, “The
59
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

absence of the Candlelight Party from the election means the voices of the
people are dismissed. Such a move would never occur in a real democratic
country” (Chheang, 2023). Finally, the disqualification paved the way for Prime
Minister Hun Sen to consolidate power further and establish a political dynasty
with his eldest son, army chief Hun Manet, and other relatives.

Restrictions On Civil Society and Media

In recent years, Cambodia has faced increasing restrictions on civil society
organisations (CSOs) and media outlets, raising concerns about the country’s
shrinking space for freedom of expression, assembly, and independent voices.
Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party have implemented
various measures that curtail the activities of civil society groups and impose
control over the media landscape.

Restrictions on Civil Society

Several regulations have imposed barriers on CSOs, targeting those working on
issues such as human rights, democracy, and social justice. For example, the
Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organisations (LANGO) was
enacted in 2015 with burdensome registration requirements, extensive reporting
obligations, and broad discretionary powers to authorities to suspend or dissolve
organisations deemed non-compliant. Harassment and intimidation were also
noticed toward CSOs critical of the government. Reports of arbitrary arrests,
criminal charges, and even violence against activists have led to self-censorship
and fear within the civil society sector. The suspension of the Coalition of
Cambodian Farmers Community (CCFC) marks the latest crackdown on CSOs
since its leaders were arrested, and some were at large under the accusation of
plotting a “peasant revolution.”
Tax-related laws were also imposed to restrict international funding for
CSOs. Organisations must seek government approval for funding sources and
face scrutiny over their financial activities. Both service delivery and advocacy

60
 HUN SEN’S ELECTION IN 2023

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Cambodia face a similar threat. A

recent study with 106 NGOs in Cambodia indicates that Cambodian authorities
target both kinds of NGOs because they are worried about political activity
(Springman et al., 2022). The study discovers that the authority pressures the
NGOs until they can confirm their avoidance of political activities. The findings
also suggest that standard forms of government repression effectively minimize
NGOs’ political advocacy but also result in reductions in non-state service
delivery.
Simultaneously, the Cambodian government has intensified its efforts to
coopt civil society and establish compliant civil society organisations (CSOs).
This includes the creation of the Civil Society Alliance Forum (CSAF) through
sub-decree 128 ANKr.BK, which was issued on June 22, 2016. CSAF, often
referred to as a government-organized non-governmental organisation
(GONGO), is known to receive funding from the Chinese government or
Chinese GONGOs (Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organisations).
CSAF’s main office is located within the government cabinet and receives
funding from it.
The labour union is also divided, with some unions maintaining their
independence while others are perceived as affiliated with or controlled by the
CPP or employers. This division raises concerns about the extent of genuine
representation and the ability to advocate for the rights and interests of workers.
Furthermore, CPP has relied on its youth wing, the Union of Youth Federations
of Cambodia (UYFC), registered as an NGO. According to LANGO, an NGO
will not be able to do activities as UYFC is doing. In contrast, the UYFC plays a
role in recruiting new followers for the party and imposing restrictions on
freedom of speech in educational institutions, including schools and universities.
Under this arrangement, UYFC members, known as “class monitors”, monitor
their fellow students and teachers/lecturers, potentially creating an atmosphere
of surveillance and self-censorship. In some cases, the UYFC has undermined or
coopted the activities of local and international NGOs working on youth
empowerment. They have participated in NGO dialogues, training, and
capacity-building initiatives, preventing other, more independent youth from
accessing these programs. This strategy allows the CPP to influence youth

61
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

activities and limit the space for alternative voices and independent youth
movements.
These actions by the Cambodian government and the CPP have raised
concerns about civil society organisations’ genuine independence and
autonomy, labour unions, and youth organisations. The ruling party’s co-option
and control of these entities undermine the principles of a vibrant and diverse
civil society and impede the development of a genuinely democratic and
participatory society in Cambodia.

Restrictions on Media
The media landscape in Cambodia has also faced significant challenges, with
growing restrictions on press freedom and the independent operation of media
outlets. In addition to the law on media, adopted in 1995 following several
amendments, the sub-decree in February 2021 on the National Internet Gateway
has further tightened control of the internet and expanded online surveillance of
internet users. This has led to a heightened sense of fear and self-censorship
among journalists and media outlets. Several media platforms, such as Radio
Free Asia, the Cambodia Daily, and Voice of America, were closed down in
2017 under the accusation of not paying taxes. The latest closure of Voice of
Democracy (VOD) earlier this year has deepened the concerns about the
prospects of democratisation and the erosion of fundamental democratic values.
VOD has been at the forefront of investigating and reporting crime and
violations mostly related to corruption and human rights issues. The Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported
lately that Cambodia’s media was in a “perilous state” (UN Human Rights
Office, 2022).
The restrictions imposed on civil society and media have significantly
impacted Cambodia’s overall freedom of expression and assembly. Several
arrests and convictions of individuals for their online activities have been
recorded, including those who criticize the government’s ways of work or
express support for opposition parties. This has created a chilling effect on
public discourse and dissenting voices in the country. Furthermore, peaceful

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 HUN SEN’S ELECTION IN 2023

protests and assemblies have been effectively outlawed, with the government
using the Covid-19 law as a tool to shut down the rights of civil society organi-
sations working to promote human rights in Cambodia. This further narrows the
space for the country’s fundamental freedoms and civil society engagement.

Electoral Manipulation
Elections in Cambodia have been marred by allegations of electoral manipu-
lation, including gerrymandering, voter intimidation, and vote buying. There
have always been reports of irregularities, such as the removal of voters from
electoral rolls and the presence of ruling party officials at polling stations, in
addition to the legal amendments limiting civil society’s freedom to participate
in the election campaign that has been highlighted above (COMFREL, 2022).
Independent experts and human rights organisations have raised serious
allegations of electoral manipulation and irregularities in the 2022 commune
elections, which serve as a precursor to the national elections. Reports suggest
that ballot forms were tampered with, votes were not correctly counted and
reported, and there were widespread instances of intimidation and harassment of
opposition party observers.
Human Rights Watch (2013) also noticed a systematic problem
undermining Cambodia’s free and fair elections. These include, first, the
unequal access to media. It is noted that the CPP maintains a near-monopoly on
broadcast media, giving it a significant advantage over other parties and limiting
access to information for voters. This has led to biased reporting, with state-
owned and private stations favouring the ruling party while criticising or
ignoring opposition voices. The second marks that Cambodia’s national and
local electoral apparatus is heavily influenced by the CPP, leading to claims of
bias and corruption. The National Election Committee (NEC), responsible for
overseeing the electoral process, has been accused of being politically biased
and lacking credibility. The NEC’s recent decision to exclude CLP and support
Hun Sen’s latest initiative to amend the election law, which bars those who do
not vote from contesting in the future election, has further fuelled concerns
about its impartiality. The third issue plaguing Cambodia’s electoral process is

63
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

the need for an independent and impartial dispute resolution mechanism. The
NEC has consistently rejected opposition complaints and sided with the CPP,
often without any indication of a serious investigation into allegations of
election irregularities. International observers and experts have called for an
independent election tribunal or court to address this issue, but the Cambodian
government has yet to act on these recommendations. Finally, officers of
Cambodia’s security forces and officials of the state civil service have been
openly campaigning for the CPP and Hun Sen. This partisanship has created an
intimidating atmosphere for voters, with opposition leaders and activists
expressing fears that the military and police could be ordered to suppress them if
they pose a threat to the ruling party.
Before the national election of 2023, countries such as the United States,
European Unions, France, and Japan expressed their reluctance to send electoral
observers or provide assistance; the legitimacy of the election process, therefore,
has been called into question. The absence of such observers raises concerns
about the credibility of the election result. As Sam Kunteamy, executive director
of the Neutral and Impartial Committee for Free and Fair Elections (NICFEC),
stated, “They might not have confidence that the election will be free and fair”
(RFA Khmer, 2023). Despite these, Hun Sen won the 2023 election in
Cambodia, securing 120 of 125 parliamentarian seats. He quickly appointed his
son as his successor and urged his old comrades to step down. A new cabinet
was established with the former ministers’ sons, daughters, and relatives. For
example, the Ministry of Interior was given to Sar Keng’s son, Sar Sokha, and
the Defence to Tea Banh’s son, Tea Seiha. However, Hun Sen is still believed to
be powerful behind his son as he is the President of the Senate and the Supreme
Privy Council to the King.

Hun Manet Assumes Control

Hun Sen’s son has been groomed and positioned as a successor in the Hun’s
reins of power. In December 2021, the CPP central committee endorsed Hun
Manet, Hun Sen’s eldest son, as a likely prime minister candidate in the future.
The perceived dynastic succession has drawn criticism from domestic and

64
 HUN SEN’S ELECTION IN 2023

international observers, who argue that it undermines democracy, political

pluralism, and fair competition within Cambodia’s political landscape. Sam
Rainsy (2023) used to argue that Manet is immature and lacks charisma like his
father. He further predicted that it was also impossible for the CPP’s future
generations to work together as their father’s comrade did. David Hutt (2023), a
columnist, also cited several sources that may hinder the succession plan. This
may originate from the internal friction among CPP senior members.
Despite its outward appearance, the CPP is characterized by internal
divisions and diversity that are not readily apparent. These differences within
the party may become more pronounced under the leadership of Hun Manet,
particularly between those who advocate for modernisation and those who view
the CPP as a means for personal gain and the consolidation of power through
patronage networks. Another challenge for the future leader lies in the genera-
tional shift that his ascension implies, as Hun Sen has emphasized that along
with his retirement, other long-serving party members must also step aside. This
transition is likely to generate resentment among certain members of the older
generation who may feel that Manet’s seemingly unearned promotion has
thwarted their aspirations for higher positions of authority. Al Jazeera (2023)
quoted a political analyst suggesting that “there is much unease and
unhappiness—expressed privately—among party members that Hun Manet was
elevated to the top job despite having no proven track record in Cambodian
politics”. Nevertheless, it is believed that as long as Hun Sen is there, friction
will not likely be a significant challenge for Manet.
External factors are not also very conducive to the power that has been
transferred. The increasing influence of China in Cambodia has raised questions
about the extent of support from the Chinese government for Hun Sen’s
succession plan. As noted by Hutt (2023), some sources suggest that Beijing
may harbour reservations about fully trusting Hun Manet and could potentially
favour an alternative successor. However, China is the first country, including
North Korea’s Prime Minister Kim Tok-hun, to congratulate Manet on
becoming the Cambodian prime minister.
The United States, in contrast, welcomed the 2023 election with punitive
measures, citing that the election was “neither free, nor fair” (Miller, 2023).

65
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

According to the State Department spokesperson Mathew Miller, the Biden

administration will impose visa restrictions on individuals undermining
democracy. However, the names of the persons were not revealed. Western
countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Canada expressed
similar disappointment over the election, but specific measures to ensure
democratic development have not been highlighted yet.

A Shaky Democratic Future

The question of hope for Cambodian democracy in the future is complex and
multifaceted. Planting a democratic seed in Cambodia takes time; maintaining
hope is even more critical. The situation is evolving, and several factors can
foster the chance to sustain and deepen the democratic space. There is a need for
concerted efforts from the international community that signed and witnessed
the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA) in 1991 and Cambodian citizens to uphold
democratic principles and human rights. The democratic ideals spelled in the
PPA and the Cambodian Constitution shall be reviewed and questioned.
International pressure is still relevant and necessary. Cambodia will only
survive long with the US or EU’s market despite the effort to diversify and build
resilience for its economy by expanding its trade relationship with countries
such as China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN member states. The scrutiny
and criticism from the international community, including human rights
organisations and foreign governments, can help maintain pressure on the
Cambodian government to respect democratic norms and practices. International
assistance and cooperation in capacity-building for democratic institutions,
promoting good governance, and protecting human rights can contribute to the
long-term development of a robust democratic system in Cambodia.
The other key factor that will shape the future of Cambodian democracy is
the engagement and mobilisation of the Cambodian people. Civil society
organisations, human rights activists, and grassroots movements continue to
play a vital role in advocating for democratic principles, defending human
rights, and demanding political reforms. These groups are instrumental in
raising awareness, promoting civic participation, and holding the government
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 HUN SEN’S ELECTION IN 2023

accountable. Additionally, the younger generation’s involvement is crucial for

the future of Cambodian democracy. Young Cambodians, with their energy,
ideas, and aspirations, can drive change and push for a more inclusive and
participatory political system. Empowering youth through education, access to
information, and opportunities for political engagement can help shape a new
generation of leaders committed to democratic values.

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2023, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/election-international-observers-
03312023140751.html, retrieved on June 15, 2023.
“Cambodia parliament elects Hun Sen’s son, Hun Manet, as new PM”, Politics News, Al
Jazeera, August 22, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/22/cambodian-
parliamentarians-elect-hun-sens-son-hun-manet-as-new-pm, Retrieved on
September 4, 2023.
COMFREL, 2022, “Finding and Summary Report on Commune/Sangkat Councils
Election, 5th Mandate 2022”, https://comfrel.org/english/finding-and-summary-
report-on-the-commune-sangkat-councils-election-2022/, retrieved on June 15,
2023.
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July 26, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/26/cambodia-systematic-problems-
undermine-elections, retrieved on June 15, 2023.
HUTT, David, 2023, “Hun Sen’s dynasty plan under hot military fire”, March 7, Asia
Times, https://asiatimes.com/2023/03/hun-sens-dynasty-plan-under-hot-military-
fire/, retrieved on June 15, 2023.
MILLER, Matthew, 2023, National elections in Cambodia - United States Department of
State, United States Department of State, July 23, https://www.state.gov/national-
elections-in-cambodia/, retrieved on September 3, 2023.
RAINSY, Sam, 2023, “Hun Sen’s Cambodian succession plan slides into chaos”, The
Diplomat, March 20, https://thediplomat.com/2023/03/hun-sens-cambodian-
succession-plan-slides-into-chaos/, retrieved June 15, 2023.

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SOPHENG, Cheang, 2023, “Cambodia’s top opposition party barred from July elections,
leaving Hun Sen’s party unchallenged”, AP News, May 26,
https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-opposition-party-election-hun-sen-
63659ff8f2de992d84d2be748afbab8b, retrieved on June 15, 2023.
SPRINGMAN, J. et al., 2022, “The effect of government repression on civil society:
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V-Dem Institute, 2022, “Democracy Report 2022: Autocratization changing nature?”,
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68
 Indonesia’s Upcoming 2024 Presidential
Election: Political Binarism
and its Impact on Democracy

Deasy Simandjuntak

The years 2022-2024 are political years for Southeast Asia, in which many
countries have held and will be holding general elections. Given that almost all
Southeast Asian countries are hybrid regimes—or stuck between full democracy
and authoritarianism—it is not surprising that these elections have shown mixed
results. Malaysia’s election in November 2022, for example, demonstrated a
reflected the smooth functioning of democratic institutions when the reform-
minded opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim was finally appointed prime minister
after winning in the election which ended three years of tumultuous political
crisis. In Thailand, a new anti-junta opposition party has resoundingly won the
May 2023 election. Yet after several weeks, the democratic victory did not
translate into political renewal, due to political manoeuvring by the military and
pro-royalist camp, but the electoral success gives progressives hope of change in
the years to come (cf. article of Sawasdee in this volume). A year before,
however, most voters in the Philippines, despite it being the region’s oldest
democracy, had again opted for a “strongmen” leadership by electing the son
and namesake of their former dictator, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. as the new
president. Marcos Jr. succeeded Rodrigo Duterte, also democratically elected in
2016, yet whose punitive populism and hard-handed approach in the “War on
Drugs” has earned his administration a disrepute in the national and
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

international human rights circles. The above cases show how elections can
either produce democratic triumphs or become a façade of persistent
authoritarianism. Despite these mixed results nonetheless, there is something to
be said for the fact that elections are still seen as a yardstick for democracy
across the region, including in the socialist Vietnam and Laos.
Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy and generally considered as
Southeast Asia’s democratic beacon, will have its general election on
14 February 2024 followed by local elections on 27 November 2024. With
206 million eligible voters, this will be the world’s largest one-day election that
year. It will also be a simultaneous election wherein voters will vote for the
president, representatives in the national and local parliaments, and senators. Of
all these elections, voters will likely focus on the presidential one. Learning
from the 2019 election, the latter will potentially create a serious rift in the
society as voters fervently support and rally behind the candidates of their
choice.
Still more than three months away, excitement has been building up as the
manoeuvres of political parties and speculations on who will be the presidential
and vice-presidential candidates embellish the daily media reports. This
commentary discusses the prospect of various aspects of the Indonesian 2024
presidential election, including the candidacy, political polarisation and what we
can expect of Indonesia’s politics going forward.

Indonesia’s Electoral Politics: Political Parties

and their Non-Ideological Coalitions
It is noteworthy that Indonesia’s political party spectrum is not ideological: most
of the parties are “nationalist” (which in Indonesia is understood as “non-
religious”) even when some are officially Islamic parties, with the exception of
the more Islamist-inspired Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Albeit having the
largest Muslim population in the world—87% of its 274 million citizens are
Muslims—, Indonesia it is not an Islamic country, meaning that Islam is not the
religion of the state. In fact, Indonesia sanctions six religions (Islam,

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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism) and

officially gives them equal protection.
The general “absence” of ideology in party politics means that the latter is
largely shaped by the common aspiration to secure governance in order to
benefit from the spoils of office. Consequently, the country only has two
political “camps”: the government’s and the opposition’s, the latter being a
minuscule and fragmented group consisting of only the above Islamist-inspired
PKS and the nationalist Democrat Party. The rest of them, twelve nationalist
and Islamic parties, formed the government coalition, which is led by the
Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDIP), the country’s largest
nationalist party.
Yet, such formation can change in the next months as parties will hop on
and off of the coalitions following which presidential candidates, they will
endorse in 2024. The Elections Law stipulates that a party or party coalition
may nominate its presidential ticket (consisting of a pair of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates) if in the previous election it has acquired 20% of
the national votes or 15% of the parliamentary seats. The only party fulfilling
this requirement is PDIP, thus the only party that can nominate its own
presidential candidate without having to form a coalition with others. Herein lies
the gist of Indonesia’s party politics: the absence of clear party ideology means
that most parties are prepared to form very broad and heterogeneous coalitions
consisting of both nationalist and Islamic parties to endorse a popular
presidential ticket.
Although seemingly superficial, the polarisation caused by such non-
ideological political cleavage can be seriously aggravated by identity politics.
The 2019 election showed that the two opposing camps has used religion and/or
religiosity as a tool to mobilize votes. As a result, the campaign period which
lasted for several months were filled with religious mobilisation and largely
devoid of any discourse on important governance issues such as the anti-
corruption efforts, accountability, and rule-of-law. This reflects the general
reluctance of the political elites to address the country’s important democratic
challenges, opting instead to treat election as a mere tool for power succession,
without taking this opportunity to examine and improve governance.

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The 2019 electoral politics and its superficial polarisation that was based
on religious issues/identity-politics will likely underpin the politics approaching
the 2024 election. The current manoeuvres by political parties have already
reflected the same prioritisation of securing power in the election and neglect of
the more substantive issues of democratic challenges. The next section discusses
the 2019 election and its polarisation and how this polarisation will shape
Indonesia’s electoral politics in 2024.

Indonesia’s 2019 Election

and the Religious Binary Politics
With 193 million voters, 809,500 polling stations and around 6 million recruited
election workers, Indonesia’s 2019 election was the world’s largest and
arguably most complicated election. Despite it being a simultaneous election in
which voters voted for their president, local and national representatives, and
senators, voters mostly focused on the presidential election. This election was
dubbed “the most polarized election” in Indonesia’s post-reform politics,
creating a serious and long-standing rift in the society (Simandjuntak 2022).
Binary oppositions, or polarisation, refers to the divergence of political
attitudes into two ideological extremes (DiMaggio, Evans and Bryson, 1996;
Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). In binary politics, ‘third’ alternatives are less
accommodated. US politics, for example, often only allows two parties to
participate substantially in governance, leading to binary stances of “Liberal vs
Conservative” or “Left vs Right” or disputative issues such as “pro-Life vs pro-
Choice.” There are typically two levels of polarisation: elite and mass. Elite
polarisation refers to the polarisation of the political elites, whereas mass
polarisation signifies the societal polarisation of the electorate or the public
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2016). The 2019 presidential election has
indeed formed a semblance of political polarisation, at that time between the
more Islamic camp and the more religiously “pluralist” camp. The incumbent
President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo represented the “pluralist” camp as he was
supported by a coalition led by the non-religious party PDIP. The opposition
candidate Ret. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, is the populist leader of the nationalist
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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra). As Prabowo was also supported by

the Islamist-inspired PKS, he was subsequently touted as the representative of
the Islamists although he himself was not religious.
The competition between the so-called Islamism vs religious pluralism
camp had begun in 2016, when some conservative groups organized massive
protests against the Chinese-Christian Jakarta’s former governor Basuki Tjahaja
Purnama (Ahok). The latter had quoted a verse from the Islamic Holy Book
during his re-election campaign and this has angered the conservatives and their
supporters. Consequently, in 2017, in the most acrimoniously sectarian guberna-
torial election, these groups, supported by Prabowo, launched a massive anti-
Ahok movement which not only successfully prevented his re-election, but also
jailed him for blasphemy1. The gubernatorial candidate whom the conservatives
have supported and eventually won the election was Anies Baswedan, a former
minister of Education and Culture in Jokowi’s 2014 cabinet, yet who was
discharged in 2016 allegedly for deviating from the President’s vision2. Anies,
whose paternal grandfather was a prominent Arab-Indonesian activist, has
suitable credentials to receive support from the conservative Islamic groups.
These group, dubbed the “212” movement, later became a semi-consolidated
anti-government movement.
Despite the acrimoniously sectarian mobilisation in 2017 and 2019,
compared to the established political polarisation in the US between the
Republicans and the Democrats, where significantly contentious social issues
are profoundly connected to the ideological divergence between the two,
Indonesia’s 2019 political binarism was transitory and superficial. There was no
discussion on what the government would look like if one or the other camp
won the election. The Islamist camp, for example, did not have a clear idea of
how they would govern the country, except for a vague agreement with
Prabowo that he would prioritize the interests of the Muslims if he won the
election. The incumbent also did not seem to offer anything new other than the

1
Deasy Simandjuntak, “Faced with a troubling blasphemy verdict, Ahok at least left Jakarta a legacy of reform,”
Channel News Asia commentary, 11 May 2017, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/commentary-ahok-
left-jakarta-legacy-of-reform-8836708, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
2
Ayomi Amindoni, “Jokowi’s new cabinet announced,” The Jakarta Post, 27 July 2016,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/07/27/jokowis-new-cabinet-announced.html, retrieved on July 3, 2023.

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

continuation of the ongoing government programs. The 2019 election was thus
only about the political cleavage, or the boundary between the two competing
camps.
Both camps’ strategies also relied heavily on populism, with Prabowo
criticising the government elites’ alleged incompetence in managing state
budget while portraying himself as representative of the suffering “people”, and
Jokowi promising potential voters of the implementation of various health and
education projects—some of which he eventually fulfilled. Prabowo’s populism,
however, also included criticisms on government’s decision to allow many
Chinese investments in Indonesia which included a massive influx of Chinese
workers. Focusing on China’s economic dominant is not an unusual electoral
strategy in Southeast Asia, with opposition leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad
of Malaysia winning elections in the past after criticising their incumbent
governments’ pro-China policies3. Yet in Indonesia, this strategy bore a
considerable risk. While this criticism resonates with Indonesian voters who
were increasingly apprehensive of Chinese workers, this was a precarious
strategy as voters could associate Chinese businesses with the long-time
predominance of Chinese-Indonesian businesses in the country and this could
have inflamed anti-Chinese Indonesian sentiments.
Still, religious mobilisation was the main campaign strategy in 2019 as this
strategy was not only utilized by the Islamist camp. The incumbent camp, which
was considered to support religious pluralism, also benefitted from a religious
“card.” In a last-minute move, the incumbent President Jokowi decided to
appoint Ma’ruf Amin, a prominent conservative cleric of the Nahdlatul Ulama,
Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, as his vice president candidate. This
appointment was aimed at first, at “shielding” the president from being accused
by the opposition camp of having downplayed the Islamic interests in his
political platform, and second, splitting the Muslim votes. Religious voting was

3
Deasy Simandjuntak, “Jokowi’s triumph in the 2019 presidential election and the future of binary politics,”
Heinrich Böll Stiftung Southeast Asia, 6 June 2019, https://th.boell.org/en/2019/06/06/jokowis-triumph-2019-
presidential-election-and-future-binary-politics#_ftn14.

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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

then unavoidable. An exit poll4 conducted on the day of the election revealed
that 97% of the voters with minority religious voted for Jokowi. However,
Jokowi’s strategy of getting a prominent Islamic cleric as running mate
successfully split the Muslim votes: 51% of Muslim voters voted for Prabowo.
Such division also closely mirrored the overall election result which was won by
the incumbent, who gained 55.5% against the opposition, who gained 44.5%
with a difference of 11% or almost 17 million votes5.
When the 2019 election was won by Jokowi, the “pluralist” camp was
elated, as it was considered as a victory for the more “democratic” Indonesian
polity. Yet democracy is not about which “label” won the election, but whether
the governance afterwards fulfil the prerequisites of substantive democracy
which includes rule of law and fulfilment of civil liberties. As is evident in the
president’s second tenure, the government is not without its own democratic
challenges. Even though the Islamist camp lost the 2019 election, religious
mobilisation, particularly the question of to which degree the government
should prioritize the Islamic interest, has created such a bitter polarisation in the
society that the president decided to appease Prabowo’s supporters by
appointing him as his cabinet’s minister of Defence. In a similar gesture a year
later, the President also appointed Prabowo’s former running-mate Sandiaga
Uno as minister of Tourism and Creative Economy. As both Prabowo and
Sandiaga are leaders at the opposition Gerindra party, with this move the
government has coopted the Gerindra into the ruling coalition, thus further
shrinking the already diminutive opposition and subsequently posing a problem
in the checks-and-balances mechanism that is important for a democratic
governance.
A similar electoral polarisation, albeit transitory and superficial, will likely
embellish Indonesia’s electoral politics approaching the 2024 election. The next
section discusses the current political party manoeuvring pertaining to the
potential presidential candidates.

4
Callistasia Wijaya, “Siapa saja yang memilih Jokowi dan Prabowo berdasarkan exit poll dan quick count?” [Who
voted for Jokowi and Prabowo according to exit polls and quick counts?], BBC News Indonesia, 24 April 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-48019930, retrieved on July 3, 2023.
5
Wim Tohari Danielaldi, “Scrambling for Jokowi’s Blessing,” Kompas, 20 June 2023,
https://www.kompas.id/baca/english/2023/06/18/en-berebut-restu-jokowi, retrieved on July 3, 2023.

75
CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

2024 Presidential Election:

Party Politics and Potential Candidates
The official presidential nomination was finalized at the end of October 2023
and there are three pairs of candidates: Ganjar Pranowo, the current Central Java
province governor with his running-mate Mahfud MD, former Chief Justice of
the Constitutional Court and current Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal
and Security Affairs; Prabowo Subianto, the current Defence Minister with his
running-mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Jokowi’s son and current
Mayor of Solo city; and Anies Baswedan, the current Jakarta governor with his
running mate Muhaimin Iskandar, Chairman of the National Awakening party
(PKB).
From the three candidates, Ganjar and Anies are the ones with somewhat
clearer political platforms. Ganjar is a long-time PDIP cadre and has recently
been endorsed by the main government party, making him, for millions of
President Jokowi’s supporters, the obvious successor of the incumbent
government. Ganjar also has a similar background with the president: he is
Central Javanese, has the experience of governing an important administrative
region, and more importantly for Jokowi’s minority religions support based,
Ganjar, like Jokowi, exhibits a moderate Islamic outlook which promises the
upholding of religious harmony.
Although Ganjar seems to embody Jokowi’s political stance, the fact that
Jokowi’s son Gibran is running as Prabowo vice-presidential candidate has
indicated that the President might have always favoured Prabowo, rather than
Ganjar, to continue his legacy. Many observers, however, lamented Gibran’s
controversial nomination, dubbing this an effort to cement Jokowi’s political
dynasty. Gibran’s candidacy was preceded by a controversial ruling by the
Constitutional Court removing a minimum age requirement of 40 for presi-
dential or vice-presidential candidates, on the condition they have been elected
to regional posts, clearing the way for the 36-year-old mayor of Solo city to run
for vice president in 2024. Added to this controversy was the fact that Jokowi’s
brother-in-law, thus Gibran’s uncle, is the Constitutional Court Chief Justice
who presided over the ruling. It remains to be seen how this suspected “ethical
violation” will be handled by the Constitutional Court.
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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

At the other end of the so-called political spectrum, Anies, whose victory
in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election was gained by riding the wave of
Islamic mobilisation, is largely seen as representing the Islamic conservative
aspiration and the opposition camp. Interestingly, the first party which declared
their support for him was not the Islamist-inspired PKS, but rather a former
government party the National Democrat party (Nasdem) in 2022. Its contro-
versial declaration of support for Anies then removed Nasdem from the
government coalition. Recently, the PKS and the National Awakening Party
(PKB) together with Nasdem officially declared support for the Jakarta
governor. The PKB joined the coalition as their leader Muhaimin Iskandar
became Anies’ runing-mate. These declarations have cemented Anies’ position
as the candidate of the opposition camp and the more Islamic polity.
So far, the two opposite camps of the political spectrum have already
gotten their men. What about Prabowo? Herewith lies the quintessence of the
country’s non-ideological politics. From the three candidates, Prabowo is the
one with the most flexible political persona. Table 1 shows the quadrant of
potential voters’ perception of the candidates’ characteristics. While Ganjar and
Anies have limited support bases, Prabowo is also the only one that can appeal
to both the supporters of the government and those of the opposition. In 2019,
Prabowo had fronted the conservative religious camp which launched the most
bitter sectarian electoral politics in Indonesia’s post-reform history, yet he also
self-proclaimed of being not religious6. After losing the election he even gladly
accepted President Jokowi’s offer to become the minister of Defence, and thus
has very good relations with the president. Prabowo was a general during
Suharto’s authoritarian regime and also the latter’s son-in-law. He was allegedly
involved in orchestrating the riots which took place right before Suharto stepped
down in 1998, which earned him a disrespect in the national human rights
circles. Yet in 2019, as a populist he portrayed himself as part of the people and
could gain the trust of many conservative Muslim voters.

6
Marlinda Oktavia Erwanti, “Prabowo: Ilmu Islam saya kurang, tapi…” [Prabowo: I lack Islamic credentials,
but…], Detik, 27 July 2018, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4137520/prabowo-ilmu-islam-saya-kurang-tapi,
retrieved on July 5, 2023.

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Table I. How the candidates cater to different types of supporters

Pluralism Conservative Islam

Jokowi’s supporters Ganjar Pranowo Prabowo Subianto
Prabowo Subianto
Opposition Prabowo Subianto Anies Baswedan
Prabowo Subianto

Indonesians are getting ready for the three-horse race in the 2024 election
with Ganjar, Prabowo and Anies as presidential contenders. Political parties’
manoeuvres also seem to indicate such tendency. Ganjar has now officially
supported by a coalition consisting of PDIP, an Islamic party United
Development Party (PPP) and two smaller parties with no representatives in the
parliament, the People’s Conscience Party (Hanura) and the Indonesian United
Party (Perido). With PDIP being the only party that can put forward its presi-
dential ticket without actually having to form a coalition with others, PDIP has
the final say of who will be Ganjar’s VP candidate, and it has chosen Former
Constitutional Court Justice Mahfud MD.
PDIP was essentially interested in making Prabowo the VP candidate for
Ganjar, that is why President Jokowi, who was supported by PDIP, sought to
create what he termed as a “grand coalition,” which would pull together the
parties that support Ganjar and those that support Prabowo in one big coalition.
If Prabowo had ditched his presidential ambition and was willing to run as
Ganjar’s VP candidate, PDIP would reap the benefit of having both a presi-
dential candidate who carries Jokowi’s qualities and a VP candidate who can
cater to the opposition’s (and the Islamic) interests. Persuading Prabowo to
accept being only a VP, however, was not an easy task, as the latter is more
senior than Ganjar and has harboured presidential ambition since 2009 when he
ran as Megawati’s VP candidate. Yet the fact that he had run with Megawati
before means that politically his party Gerindra has no qualms with cooperating
with Megawati’s party PDIP, much unlike Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s
Democrat party which is consistent in being in the opposition.

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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Nonetheless, Prabowo seemed to be reluctant to run if not as a presidential

candidate7. In June, there were reports that Gerindra, the country’s second
strongest party Golkar, the moderate Islamic party National Awakening Party
(PKB) and a modernist Islamic party the National Mandate Party (PAN) had
created a coalition to nominate Prabowo. However, as always with Indonesia’s
politics, coalitions can still change following political calculations. To recapi-
tulate, Ganjar will be supported by PDIP, PPP, Hanura and Perindo, Prabowo by
Gerindra, Golkar, Demokrat, and PSI, while Anies by Nasdem, PKB and PKS.
Another reason why PDIP was interested in pairing Ganjar with Prabowo,
in addition to the benefits of attracting two opposite support bases, was also
because a two-round election, which would likely happen if there are three pairs
running, would actually be dangerous for the government camp. Indonesia
follows a majoritarian two-round system in its presidential elections, meaning,
the winner is the one who can garner 50% plus 1 vote. If no one can get 50%
plus 1 vote in the election, then an election run-off (or second round) is
conducted. The fact that the three candidates are similarly popular leads to the
possibility that if the three of them become competitors, then no one would be
able to get 50% plus 1 vote in the election. Thus, a second round will have to be
conducted between the two candidates who have gained the most votes.
Observers speculate that these two candidates would most likely be Ganjar and
Prabowo. This would be precarious as Ganjar could lose if he goes head-to-head
with Prabowo in the second round, the voters who had voted for Anies in the
first round would likely vote for Prabowo in the second round. Again, this is
because Prabowo could easily attract the opposition votes as he had fronted the
opposition camp in 2019.

7
Agus Raharjo, “Prabowo tolak jadi cawapres Ganjar, Sekjen PDIP: tidak ada kawin paksa” [Prabowo refuses to
be Ganjar’s VP candidate, PDIP’s General Secretary: there is no forced marriage here], Republika, 24 April 2023,
https://news.republika.co.id/berita/rtm8ki436/prabowo-tolak-jadi-cawapres-ganjar-sekjen-pdip-tidak-ada-kawin-
paksa, retrieved on July 5, 2023.

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Perspectives for the Country’s State of Democracy

Polarisation will continue to embellish Indonesia’s politics. Regarding pola-
risation, Haggard and Kaufman have argued that it can lead to democratic
regression as deep polarisation hinders the government from functioning
efficiently (Haggard and Kaufman 2021), resulting in popular disaffection and
distrust of institutions. Second, parties in a deeply polarized setting are either
captured by extremist elements or displaced by populist movements; and third,
the “us” versus “them” competition is a common trait of populism, and this is
ultimately illiberal. Yet, Haggard and Kaufman’s polarisation regards the
situation where political elites and publics become divided over public policy
and ideology. As argued in this paper, however, Indonesia’s electoral politics is
not ideological, moreover, it is unclear whether the opposition would issue
different public policies if they had won the 2019 election. Yet, the fact that
Indonesia’s political binarism is transitory and superficial is perhaps what
prevents the country’s (hybrid) democracy from further deconsolidating, as
polarisation will intensify mostly only during politically sensitive periods such
as the elections. Beyond these periods, it is politics as usual and political elites
can change coalitions to suit their power interests.
As mentioned earlier, Indonesia’s government faces democratic challenges
such as transactional politics, the issuance of controversial laws which curb the
freedom of speech, labour rights and anti-corruption efforts, rampant dynastic
politics, and the shrinkage of oppositional politics. However, an Indikator
survey has indicated that more than 77% of Indonesians still believe that
democracy is “the best system for Indonesia, even though it is not perfect.”8 In
addition, ISEAS 2022 Indonesia National Survey Project indicates that the
public satisfaction with the president has risen from 68% in 2017 to 71.8% in

8
Indikator, Trust terhadap institusi politik, isu-isu mutakhir, dan dinamika electoral jelang pemilu serentak 2024
[Trust of political institutions, current issues, and electoral dynamics approaching the 2024 simultaneous
elections], National Survey, 11-12 February 2022, https://indikator.co.id/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/RILIS-03-
04-22_Survei-Nasional_2022_3_APRIL_2022.pdf

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 INDONESIA’S UPCOMING 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

20229. Similarly, a Kompas survey shows that 70.1% respondent have claimed
that they were “satisfied” with the government’s performance10.
Yet the controversial ruling which paves the way for Jokowi’s son to run
for vice president despite his young age could be the straw that breaks the
camel’s back concerning people’s support for democracy. The public so far sees
Gibran’s nomination as nepotistic and this could undermine Prabowo’s chances,
if his camp does not come up with ways to revamp Gibran’s political image
soon.
The fact that Indonesians still wholeheartedly support democracy despite
the deteriorating democratic fundamentals, for Jefferson Ng, shows the
discrepancy of the perception of democracy by Indonesians as compared to the
understanding of democracy by international rating agencies11. He mentions that
for Indonesians, “democracy success is measured not by the robustness of its
checks and balances but by its ability to deliver on concrete policy outcomes”.
Indonesians are satisfied with the current government’s track record in
infrastructure development and its social welfare initiatives, and they connect
these with a democratic triumph.
Although this “instrumental” logic of democracy seems to brush aside the
deterioration of democratic fundamentals such as accountability, civil liberties,
and checks and balances, for Indonesians the system still guarantees effective
redistributive policies. The fact that political polarisation is transitory also
means that the competing parties can easily “move on” from the divisive
electoral competition for the government to focus on implementing policies. In
the long run, however, Indonesia has to encourage the opposition to perform its
function of checks and balances, promotes accountability and safeguard
democratic freedoms in order to foster a more substantive democracy.

9
Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Hui Yew-Foong, and Siwage Dharma Negara, “The Indonesia National Survey Project
2022: Engaging with Developments in the Political, Economic and Social Spheres”, ISEAS Trends in Southeast
Asia (ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2022), https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/TRS3_23.pdf
10
Bestian Nainggolan, “Survei litbang “Kompas”: kepuasan meningkat, faktor “Jokowi” menguat?” [Kompas
survey: satisfaction increases, the “Jokowi” factor strengthens?], Kompas, 22 May 2023,
https://www.kompas.id/baca/riset/2023/05/22/survei-litbang-kompas-kepuasan-meningkat-faktor-jokowi-
menguat?open_from=Tagar_Page
11
Jefferson Ng, “The rise of performance politics in Indonesia?”, New Mandala, 21 March 2023,
https://www.newmandala.org/the-rise-of-performance-politics-in-indonesia/

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CURRENT ELECTORAL PROCESSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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21 March, https://newmandala.org/the-rise-of-performance-politics-in-indonesia/
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kawin paksa” [Prabowo refuses to be Ganjar’s VP candidate, PDIP’s General
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 Abstracts

The 2022 Philippine Elections:

Unity, Continuity, and Impunity
Cleo Anne Calimbahin

Despite the overwhelming support for the winning candidate and the
unprecedented speed of transmission of votes, there remains allegations of fraud
in the 2022 elections. Calls for a shift for a hybrid system, the Commission
Elections held an Election Summit with various stakeholders present to discuss
electoral reform issues. This presentation focuses on the examination of election
administration during the 2022 Philippine general election. Specifically on the
constitutional commission mandated to deliver free and fair elections, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In this paper, the following will be
examined, the election management performance of the COMELEC in the 2022
election, the issues of capacity and autonomy encountered, and the lack of
authoritative voice on matters of election management shaped the conduct of
election. By pushing the analysis on autonomy and capacity, COMELEC’s lack
of authoritative voice and decisive actions as a constitutionally independent
body led to its inability to mitigate the challenges concerning election
administration in the Philippines. However, it is worth noting that the public
satisfaction of COMELEC is high. As the referee and gatekeeper of the electoral
arena, it is crucial for COMELEC to resolve issues surrounding its autonomy
and capacity in order to administer elections with integrity and address
perceptions and allegations of fraud.
URBANITÉ IMPÉRIALISTE DE SINGAPOUR

Malaysia’s Electoral Processes: Tracing the Path from

the Bersih Movement to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim
Khoo Ying Hooi

This article examines the intricacies of electoral politics in Malaysia,

specifically focusing on the period spanning from the inception of the electoral
reform movement, commonly referred to as the Coalition for Clean and Fair
Elections (Bersih), in 2005 to the present administration led by Prime Minister
Anwar Ibrahim. Malaysia’s electoral politics landscape has been characterised
by constant dynamism and engagement throughout this duration. With Anwar’s
long struggle in Malaysian politics, the anticipation surrounding his assumption
of the role of prime minister was significant. Anwar has garnered international
acclaim as a prominent figure in the pro-democracy movement and has enjoyed
a comparable reputation domestically. Nevertheless, the formation of his unity
government in November 2022, which included the former ruling coalition
Barisan Nasional (BN) that he had long strived to topple throughout his political
career, has sparked substantial debate. Against this backdrop, this article delves
into the trajectory of Malaysia’s electoral processes, shedding light on the
interplay between popular mobilisation and political compromise that ultimately
shape the country’s ongoing process of democratisation.

Elections in Timor-Leste, 2022-2023

Rui Graça Feijó

This brief essay introduces the government system of Timor-Leste enshrined in

its Constitution and refers the main political conventions operating in its broad
framework. Then, it refers the main features of the electoral system,
distinguishing presidential and legislative elections, and offering a summary of
the electoral administration.

86
 ABSTRACTS

Next, it considers the 2022 presidential elections, placing those polls in the
context of the evolution of the previous presidential terms in office and the
sharp distinction of the incumbent’s mandate. A brief analysis of the results
suggest that electors rejected the incumbent’s platform and chose a return to
conventional forms of presidential rule.
The third section described the framework for the 2023 parliamentary
polls, underlining that these were not “coattails” elections as had been the case
in 2007, 2012 and 2017, but still were fought along a default line similar to the
2022 presidential ones. The emerging results were in line with that of the
previous year, and the way the country had been ruled for the last few years
clearly rejected the incumbent’s platform and chose a return to conventional
forms of presidential rule.
The final section purports to reflect on some major challenges head:
generational turnover and the anticipated eclipse of charismatic authority, new
policies to address youth unrest, and economic diversification to combat
excessive dependence on oil revenues.

Thailand’s 2023 General Elections:

Processes, Key Issues, and Future Trajectories
Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee

The Move Forward Party surpassed predictions in the election, with

demographic factors, especially the support of the younger generation and
advancements in communication technology, playing a significant role in their
success. This election marked a departure from the past, witnessing the
emergence of various political ideologies and a diverse range of policy
platforms. The election results suggested a growing dissatisfaction with the
military-backed government and a desire for change among the Thai population.
The traditional influence of provincial politics and dynastic patronage was being
challenged by the rapid expansion of urbanization and the role of social media.
These factors have triggered a transformation in how politics is conducted and
87
URBANITÉ IMPÉRIALISTE DE SINGAPOUR

how voters engaged with political parties. Nevertheless, the military-appointed

Senate allowed pro-military parties to join in the new coalition government. The
coalition government formed between these two opposing factions represented a
significant shift and realignment in Thailand’s new era of political conflict.

Hun Sen’s Election in 2023

Chandarin Chum

This article explores the political landscape in Cambodia, focusing on the last
legislative election in July 2023. It examines the dominance of Prime Minister
Hun Sen and his Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and their strategies to
maintain power and eliminate opposition. The article highlights the history of
political turmoil in Cambodia, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP)
dissolution, and the exclusion of the credible opposition Candlelight Party
(CLP) from the election. It discusses the implications of the absence of a
genuine challenger to the CPP and the disenfranchisement of Cambodian voters.
Additionally, the article explores the restrictions imposed on civil society
organizations and the media, including laws and regulations that curtail their
activities and control their operations. It also sheds light on the allegations of
electoral manipulation, such as gerrymandering and voter intimidation, which
undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Finally, the article briefly
updates about Hun Sen's son's successor, Hun Manet, and highlights a few
challenges he will face when assuming his position. Overall, the article
accentuates the challenges to democracy and human rights in Cambodia and
raises concerns about the prospects for a multiparty democracy.

88
 ABSTRACTS

Indonesia’s Upcoming 2024 Presidential Election:

Political Binarism and its Impact on Democracy
Deasy Simandjuntak

Indonesia, the world’s third largest democracy and generally considered as

Southeast Asia’s democratic beacon, will have its general election on
14 February 2024, where 206 million eligible voters will vote for the president,
representatives in the national and local parliaments, and senators. Incumbent
President Joko Widodo is ineligible to run for a third term due to the term limits
established by the Indonesian constitution. For the moment, the coalitions
remain open. Local elections will also be held on 27 November 2024 across
548 regions: 37 provinces, 415 regencies and 98 cities. This commentary
discusses the prospect of various aspects of the Indonesian 2024 presidential
election, including the candidacy, political polarisation and what we can expect
of Indonesia’s politics going forward.

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