PEOPLE’S WAR: THREAT TO

NEPAL’S NATIONAL SECURITY

By

Sukumar Basu
American Military University
ID: 1007543

A Term Paper submitted to Dr. Lawrence E. Cline

for the course LC537 CA Summer 2003 – Forecasting Terrorism.

Katmandu, Nepal
10 February 2004
 CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS ………………………………………………………………………………iii

ABSTRACT ………………………………………………………………………………… iv

Chapters

INTRODUCTION ………………………………………………………………….. 1

BRIEF HISTORY ………………..…………………………………………………. 3

MAOIST LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ……………. 17

PROPENSITY OF THE MAOIST TO USE VIOLENCE AND TYPES

OF TACTICS EMPLOYED …………………………………………………………34

MAOIST IDEOLOGY …………………………………………………………….…44

POSSIBLE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN

THE CREATION AND ACTIVITIES OF MAOISTS ..………………………….…52

ALLIANCES OF THE MAOIST WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND

MOVEMENTS ……………………………………………………………….………58

POLITICAL/SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MAOIST ………………….…68

PREDICTIONS AS TO THE FUTURE CAPABILITIES, POSSIBLE TYPE OF

OPERATIONS AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE MAOIST ……………………....80

CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………95

BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………………………….…97

ii
 LIST OF MAPS

Map No. Description Page

1. Maoist Central Command and Regional Bureaus……………………. 25

iii
 ABSTRACT

This paper shows how the Maoist insurgency or “People’s War,” based on the philosophy

of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Prachanda Path, which started eight years ago as an innocuous

law and order problem, has now turned into a critical threat to Nepal’s National Security; in

other words the three elements--ends, ways, and means--of Nepalese National Security Strategy

faces a grave danger. The Maoists with political and military fronts, in achieving their objectives

of establishing a People’s Democratic Republic of Nepal, have undermined Nepalese

government by establishing parallel village, district, and autonomous region people’s

governments, and have plunged the country into a civil war. In yet another front, Maoists are

drafting a new “Constitution of People’s Republic of Nepal 2004” to challenge the existing

“Constitution of Nepal 1990.” This means that the essence of the present Constitution,

parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, is being challenged. In the

progress of usage of terror that range from simple beating to sabotage, Maoists are now using

“Special Task Force” to assassinate their enemies--which in fact is a copy of the al Quaeda

cellular network model. In other words, the lethality of the Maoist attack has increased, maybe

due to its alliance with national, regional, and international communist network. In totality, the

in-depth study of the historical background and the current situation shows that the present

medium threat scenario is “Volatile, communist networked, and democratic Nepal, which

contributes to world revolution for the achievement of worldwide communism,” which is

gradually moving towards a future high threat scenario of “Volatile, independent, and republic

Nepal, which contributes to world revolution for the achievement of worldwide communism.”

iv
 PEOPLE’S WAR: THREAT TO NEPAL’S NATIONAL SECURITY

The Party wants to institutionalise a republican form of state through the Constituent Assembly
and believes that in a free and fair election the mandate of the Nepalese people would be in favour
of a republic.1

- Prachanda, Chairman, Nepal Communist Party (Maoist)

INTRODUCTION

Nepal is an official Hindu kingdom, bounded on the north by Tibet, and on the east, west,

and south by India. With the present population of 24 million, the total area is 140,800 square

kilometers with the east to west expansion being 885 kilometers, while north to south varies from

145 to 241 kilometers, an approximation of the American state of North Carolina.2 There are

three geographical regions--Himalayan (mountains), Hill, and the Terai (flatlands once covered

by forest)--divided administratively into 5 regions, 14 zones, and 75 districts, where regional

commissioners heads each region, while chief district officers head the districts to look after the

day-to-day administrative matters, maintain law-and-order, and coordinate works of the field

agencies of different ministries.34

For the past eight years, Nepal has been facing a critical threat to her national security

from the vicious tentacles of the Maoist insurgency called “People’s War,” whether it is through

their tactics of negotiation, continous offense, or any other means against His Majesty’s

1
Prachanda, Chairman of NCP (Maoist), A Brief Introduction to the Policies of the NCP (Maoist), 12 January 2004,
Maoist Information Bulletin-8 [article on-line]; available from
http://www.cpnmaoist.org/cpnm/documents/english/information_bulletin8.htm; Internet; accessed 20 January 2004.
2
According to the Department of Statistics, National Census Data of Nepal 2001.
3
The Himalayan region consists of 19% of the total land, and altitude is between 4877 to 8848 meters; the Hill
region consists of 64% of total land, and altitude is between 610 to 1524 meters); and the Terai consists of 17% of
the total land, altitude is between 70 to 305 meters.
4
Library of Congress Country Studies, Nepal: Government and Politics, September 1991 [on-line article]; available
from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+np0011); Internet; accessed 11 November
2003.

1
Government (HMG). The national and international links and supports from various extreme

leftist elements to the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) or NCP (Maoist)--headed by Mr. Pushpa

Kamal Dahal (Prachanda)--in the venture to abolish multiparty democracy and constitutional

monarchy by establishing new People’s Democratic Republic has resulted in grave loss of both

life and property, and an tremendous kickback to the socio-politico-economic condition.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the threat to Nepal’s National Security from

“People’s War,” for a detailed overview of the “People’s War” would be outlined in the context

of Nepal to clarify the brief history; Maoist leadership and organizational structure; propensity of

the Maoists to use violence and types of tactics employed; ideology; possible social, political,

and economic factors in the creation and activities of the Maoists; alliances of the Maoist with

other organizations or movements; political and security significance of the Maoist; and

prediction to the future capabilities, possible types of operations, and survivability of the Maoists

so that the readers would be able to visualize the clear picture. Then after, the terms “insurgency”

and “national security” would be defined to keep it inside the parameters of this paper, wherein

the three basic elements--ends, ways and means--of national security strategy as outlined by

Senator Gregorio B. Honasan and Michael Eric L. Castillo in “Fundamentals of National

Security Strategy” would be critically examined and evaluated within the Nepalese context to see

if Nepal’s National Security is threatened by the “People’s War.”5 The information cut-off date

for this paper has been taken as that of 10 February 2004.

5
Senator Gregorio B. Honasan and Michael Eric L. Castillo, Fundamentals of National Security Strategy, [online
paper]; available from
http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/ppapers/Fundamentals%20of%20National%20Security%20Strategy.htm; Internet; accessed
15 October 2003.

2
 BRIEF HISTORY

After the genesis of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) in September 1949 by Pushpa

Lal, different groups and sub-groups of communist parties with different ideologies were formed

under different leaderships. In 1971, the Jhapa movement (named after the eastern district of

Nepal) inspired by the Naxalites of Nakshalbari in West Bengal, India carried out a short-lived

rebellion, wherein rebels went on a rampage, killing and mutilating the bodies of local

landlords.6 The violence was perpetrated by the Coordination Committee, which later evolved

into the core of the NCP.7

During 23 November 1990, the NCP (Unity Center) was formed due to the merger of

NCP (Mashal), NCP (Fourth Congress), and Sarbaharabadi Sramik Sangathan (Proletarian

Worker’s Organization), of which Prachanda became the General Secretary. The NCP (Unity

Center) contested the general election of 1991 in the name of Samyukta Jana Morcha (United

People’s Front or UPF) headed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai. In 1993, the NCP (Unity Center)

broke into two factions--NCP (Maoist) and NCP (Fourth Congress). The NCP (Maoist) took

momentum when the political wing of Nepal’s radical left parties, the UPF split in August 1994

into two parties--UPF (Vaidya) and UPF (Bhattarai).8 Eventually, before mid-term election on

1994 the UPF (Bhattarai), a political wing of NCP (Maoist), led by Dr. Bhattarai denounced

parliamentary politics and boycotted the elections.9

6
Laxman Bahroo, Understanding Nepal’s Civil War, Volume 4(4), January-February 2002, Bharat Rakshak
Monitor [online article]; available from http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-4/bahroo.html;
Internet; accessed 12 December 2003.
7
Ibid.
8
During May 1991 election, the UPF had been the third strongest force in the House of Representatives with nine
members in the Parliament. See, Maoist insurgency (including emergency reports), Nepal Research website;
available from http://www.nepalresearch.org/politics/maoists.htm+Maoists&h1=en&ie=UTF-8; Internet; accessed
from 10 November 2002 until present.
9
Anju Susan Alex, Maoists of Nepal, [online article]; available from http://www.ipcs.org/nmt/milgroups/maoist-
nep.html; Internet; accessed 20 November 2002.

3
 On March 1995, the NCP (Maoist) led by Prachanda fore-sweard elections and decided to

take up arms against the government. UPF (Bhattarai) joined hands with NCP (Maoist) in the

beginning of 1995 to wage “People’s War,” objective being to bring a total revolution, even

though violent, and to establish a republican state. After the downfall of the Nepalese

government led by Late Man Mohan Adhikari of NCP (United Marxist Leninist or UML) in

September 1995, and following the harsh government actions against the Maoist forces in

western Nepal, the NCP (Maoist) found the time ripe for revolution.10 During the October of

1995 the “Sija Movement” in Rukum and Rolpa districts of Nepal was planned to recruit UPF

(Bhattarai) youths for rebellion, which was later countered by November 1995 “Romeo

Operations” by police to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, which ultimately didn’t go

according to the plan and resulted in widespread police abuses and public anger.

On 4 February 1996 the UPF (Bhattarai) submitted a list of 40-point demands--demands

related to nationalism, people’s democracy, and public livelihood--to the then government

headed by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba giving him until 17 February 1996 to act upon.11

At this juncture, it is appropriate to state the 40-point demands to get a sense of their perception

and intentions at the conception of Maoist insurgency:12

A. Demands related to nationalism-

1. All discriminatory treaties, including the 1950 Nepal-India Treaty, should be

abrogated.
2. The so-called Integrated Mahakali Treaty concluded on 29 January 1996
should be repealed immediately, as it is designed to conceal the disastrous
Tanakpur Treaty and allows Indian imperialist monopoly over Nepal’s water
resources.

10
Maoist insurgency (including emergency reports).
11
Maoist demands, [posted online]; available from
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/ntimes/feb16-2001/nation.htm#Maoist%20demands; Internet; accessed 20 December
2002.
12
Maoist demands, as translated into English from Nepalese.

4
 3. The open border between Nepal and India should be regulated, controlled and
systematized. All vehicles with Indian license plates should be banned from
Nepal.
4. The Gurkha/Gorkha Recruitment Centers should be closed. Nepali citizens
should be provided dignified employment in the country.
5. Nepali workers should be given priority in different sectors. A “work permit”
system should be strictly implemented if foreign workers are required in the
country.
6. The domination of foreign capital in Nepali industries, business and finance
should be stopped.
7. An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that
economic development helps the nation become self-reliant.
8. The invasion of imperialist and colonial culture should be banned. Vulgar
Hindi films, videos and magazines should be immediately outlawed.
9. The invasion of colonial and imperial elements in the name of NGOs and
INGOs should be stopped.

B. Demands related to people’s democracy-

10. A new Constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the

establishment of a people’s democratic system.
11. All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished.
12. The army, the police and the bureaucracy should be completely under
people’s control.
13. All repressive acts, including the Security Act, should be repealed.
14. Everyone arrested extra-judicially for political reasons or revenge in Rukum,
Rolpa, Jajarkot, Gorkha, Kavre, Sindhupalchowk, Sindhuli, Dhanusa,
Ramechhap, and so on, should be immediately released. All false cases
should be immediately withdrawn.
15. The operation of armed police, repression and State-sponsored terror should
be immediately stopped.
16. The whereabouts of citizens who disappeared in police custody at different
times, namely Dilip Chaudhary, Bhuwan Thapa Magar, Prabhakar Subedi
and others, should be investigated and those responsible brought to justice.
The families of victims should be duly compensated.
17. All those killed during the People’s Movement should be declared martyrs.
The families of the martyrs and those injured and deformed should be duly
compensated, and the murderers brought to justice.
18. Nepal should be declared a secular nation.
19. Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped.
Daughters should be allowed access to paternal property.
20. All racial exploitation and suppression should be stopped. Where ethnic
communities are in the majority, they should be allowed to form their own
autonomous governments.
21. Discrimination against downtrodden and backward people should be stopped.
The system of untouchables should be eliminated.

5
 22. All languages and dialects should be given equal opportunities to prosper.
The right to education in the mother tongue up to higher levels should be
guaranteed.
23. The right to expression and freedom of press and publication should be
guaranteed. The government mass media should be completely autonomous.
24. Academic and professional freedom of scholars, writers, artists and cultural
workers should be guaranteed.
25. Regional discrimination between the hills and the terai should be eliminated.
Backward areas should be given regional autonomy. Rural and urban areas
should be treated at par.
26. Local bodies should be empowered and appropriately equipped.

C. Demands related to public livelihood-

27. Land should belong to “tenants”. Land under the control of the feudal system
should be confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless.
28. The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated
and nationalized. Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote
industrialization.
29. Employment should be guaranteed for all. Until such time as employment can
be arranged, an unemployment allowance should be provided.
30. A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be
fixed and strictly implemented.
31. The homeless should be rehabilitated. No one should be relocated until
alternative infrastructure is guaranteed.
32. Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small
farmers from the Agricultural Development Bank should be written off.
Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small farmers.
33. Fertilizer and seed should be easily available and at a cheap rate. Farmers
should be provided with appropriate prices and markets for their products.
34. People in flood- and drought-affected areas should be provided with
appropriate relief materials.
35. Free and scientific health services and education should be available to all.
The commercialization of education should be stopped.
36. Inflation should be checked. Wages should be increased proportionate to
inflation. Essential goods should be cheaply and easily available to everyone.
37. Drinking water, roads and electricity should be provided to all villagers.
38. Domestic and cottage industries should be protected and promoted.
39. Corruption, smuggling, black marketing, bribery, and the practices of
middlemen and so on should be eliminated.
40. Orphans, the disabled, the elderly and children should be duly honored and
protected.

6
 Five days before the deadline and because the demands were disregarded, the NCP

(Maoist) declared “People’s War” from 13 February 1996 under the leadership of Prachanda, and

launched the first attack at various places of the four districts--Rolpa, Gorkha, Sindhuli, and

Kavre--by using methods like arson, vandalism, looting, assault, and attacks on police posts.13

These attacks were well justified by Prachanda, and he also forwarded his view for the initiation

of the “People’s War,” which can be better understood by the paragraph quoted below:

We decided that we should initiate People's War from different parts of

the country…centralize in mainly three areas--East, Middle, West-and the
capital. Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for
propaganda and such things…one other area where we should concentrate
work is in India, because more than seven million Nepalese live in
India. Therefore India should be the other point where we should make
efforts to resist the ruling classes.14

From the year 1996 to 1999, the Maoists were under the radar of the regional press and

international media and reports of violence received attention only in Nepal.15 During this

period, Nepal watchers dismissed the group as a terrorist organization without goals or

purpose.16 However in February 1999, on the third anniversary of the movement, the attacks

increased in tempo, and occurred simultaneously in various regions of the country.17 Later that

year, the Maoists called on the oppressed classes and other ethnicities and religions to join the

struggle, wherein the Maoists started widening their base areas by including broader economic,

political and ethnic issues and transforming their movement into a leftist-nationalistic

13
Nepal Police Record.
14
B. Raman, The Maoists of Nepal: Three perspectives, Paper No. 277, 13 July 2001, South Asia Analysis Group
[online article]; available from http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper277.html; Internet; accessed 20 November 2003.
15
Laxman Bahroo.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.

7
revolution.18 In this way, the Maoists started claiming that Rolpa and other neighboring districts

of the Mid-western Nepal was becoming their stronghold.

Due to the escalation of Maoist terrorist activities, the local press reported in mid-

November 1999 that the Prime Minister was considering to submit a formal proposal to His

Majesty to mobilize the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) to suppress the Maoist insurgency; however,

the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) indicated that the RNA is willing to suppress the Maoists "if

there is an all-party consensus in the matter"--this was a very difficult goal to attain.19

In the year 2000, further development was observed in the “People’s War” as the

movement tightened its grip on the western-central regions of the country and spread to the

eastern districts.20 According to press reports, the Maoists began to establish parallel

governmental authority in the districts of western Nepal that were under their control, in spite of

the presence of government authorities. In at least one district, the Maoists began collecting taxes

and administering justice through their own "people's courts".

On 25 February 2000, Maoists stated that to initiate dialogue, the government has to meet

their conditions--all Maoist leaders and workers who are in jail should be immediately released,

“state terrorism" should be stopped immediately, names of those who disappeared from police

custody and killed should be made public, investigation of killing and arson in Rukum district

should be initiated and strict action should be taken against those found guilty, and compensation

should be paid to the victims of police action. Regarding the above matter, Prachanda rejected

18
Ibid.
19
The Maoist Problem, [online article]; available from
http://www.nepal-school-projects.org/maoist%20problem.htm; Internet; accessed 15 December 2003.
20
Laxman Bahroo.

8
the informal talks proposed by the then formed “High-level Consensus Seeking Commission”

headed by Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba.21

In December 2000, the NCP (Maoist) held elections in local villages of Rolpa and

Rukum districts and introduced their national anthem, which posed a direct challenge to the then

HMG of Nepal.22 Also, during this period, Prachanda stated that they would move forward for

the establishment of a People’s Republic in Nepal. Due to the escalation of Maoist offences, on

26 December 2000, the government formed a “Special Tribunal” under the State Offences and

Punishment Act 2043 to prosecute crimes against the state, particularly those committed by the

Maoists involved in the “People’s War.”

During the year 2001, the Maoists started to show their strength by establishing “people’s

court” in the districts of the Mid-western region, wherein an escalation of offences was again

observed.23 On the other hand, the Maoist movement started expanding in the eastern region of

Nepal; and, through the second convention held in Rolpa district during February of this year,

Prachanda declared himself the Chairman of the NCP (Maoist) party, and also adopted the

"Prachanda Path" as the party’s ideological stance with the same stature as that of international

communist ideologies of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism, wherein the statement concluded that

no specific model of the proletariat revolution could presently be developed in the context of the

changes taking place in the world today.24

As the insurgency continued to engulf the nation, the assassination of the Royal Family

on 1 June 2001 threw Nepal into a deeper political crisis; this massacre was taken as a plot by the

21
This commission was formed on 27 July 2000.
22
Laxman Bahroo.
23
Laxman Bahroo.
24
The Maoist Problem.

9
Maoists, wherein they claimed that the “massacre was a plot by Research and Analysis Wing

(RAW) of India, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of USA and the current monarch His

Majesty Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev to subjugate the nation.”25 The sentiment of the

general public created through this assassination was “tapped” by the Maoists to further their

goals, wherein an increase in Maoist violence was immediately noted. To curb this situation, the

government adopted new strategies and gave more authority to the security forces to curb the

situation—King Gyanendra gave Royal assent to Armed Police Force Ordinance on 22 August

2003, thus legalizing the para-military organization.26

In the evening of 22 July 2001 Prachanda and the then Prime Minister Sher Bahadur

Deuba declared a “temporary cease-fire,” wherein Prachanda laid out a three-point demand for

the setting up of an interim government, a new constitution and to work towards the institutional

development of a republic.27 The three-member Maoist talk-team formed for the peace-talk

included Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Mr. Agni Sapkota, and Mr. Top Bahadur Rayamajhi,

wherein Mr. Mahara was the team leader. Likewise, the government talk-team included Mr.

Chiranjibi Wagle, Mr. Mahesh Acharya, Mr. Chakra Prasad Bastola, Mr. Nara Hari Acharya, and

Mr. Bijaya Gachadhar, wherein Mr. Wagle was the team leader. To facilitate the peace-talks both

parties agreed upon to have Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar and Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana as the

facilitators.

The first round of talk took place on 30 August 2001 at Godavari Village Resort in

Lalitpur district; the second round of talk on 13 September 2001 at Bardiya Resort,

Thakurdwara, Bardiya district; and the third round of talk on 14 September 2001 at Godavari

25
Laxman Bahroo.
26
Ibid.
27
The Maoist Problem.

10
Resort, Lalitpur district. As negotiations continued, both sides released prisoners but reports of

Maoist active training camps, new abductions, and restocking of ammunition pointed to the

impermanence of the talks.2829 The Maoists insisted on the formation of a "constituent

assembly," while the government side argued that if such an assembly were formed it would take

away all the rights guaranteed by the present constitution. In this way, on 21 November 2001,

Prachanda suspended talks and stated that the struggle for the liberation of Nepal will continue,

because "the desire and efforts of the people and Maoist party to seek positive political outlet

through peace talks have been made unsuccessful by imperialist and reactionary conspiracies.”30

Two days later, the Maoist offensive actions started once again with a simultaneous attack in

nine districts, engaging the RNA for the first time. Again to put pressure on the government, on

24 November 2001, the Maoists declared a parallel "People's Revolutionary Government"

headed by Dr. Bhattarai—in the past, Maoists had already formed parallel village and district

level people’s governments in more than 40 districts.31 The most shocking aspect during this

year is the geographic growth of the insurgency--Nepal's government admitted that 68 districts

out 75 total districts have been affected by the Maoist violence and about 32 are considered to be

the strongholds.32

Due to the deteriorating security condition, on 26 November 2001, the government

declared the “State of Emergency” for the first time for 90 days, and branded the Maoists as

28
Laxman Bahroo.
29
The government released 33 Maoists detained under the “Public Security Act,” in order to create favorable
environment for talks aimed at ending the almost six-year long insurrection. See, The Maoist Problem.
30
The Maoist Problem.
31
Ibid.
32
Laxman Bahroo.

11
“terrorists”; the King also approved mobilization of the army.33 This brought the RNA in direct

confrontation with the Maoists who had already gained guerrilla experience.

In the year 2002, the “State of Emergency” was again continued by another declaration

for the second time on 25 February 2002, and for the third time on 27 May 2002, each for the

period of 90 days respectively. But prior to declaring the “State of Emergency” for the third time,

on 22 May 2003 His Majesty King Gyanendra dissolved the House of Representatives and called

for fresh election on 13 November 2002 on the recommendation of the then Prime Minister

Deuba. As the security situation still continued to deteriorate, the Deuba government didn’t seem

too confident to carry on with the forthcoming 13 November 2002 election. Therefore, on 3

October 2002 Prime Minister Deuba made another submission to King Gyanendra for

postponing the election from 13 November 2002 to 19 November 2003. The King did not agree

with this recommendation, and thus relieved the Prime Minister and other ministers from their

office on 4 October 2002, terming them as incompetent and thus took over the executive power

until the formation of a new government.34 The new government was later formed under Prime

Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand on 11 October 2002, who tried in vain to bring all the

political parties to a general consensus for the formation of an all-party government.

The year 2003 saw the assassination of the Inspector General of Armed Police Force

(IGP) Mr. Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife Mrs. Nudup Shrestha, and the bodyguard Mr. Surya

Regmi, who were shot dead on 26 January 2003 by a group of four individuals--said to be

Maoists. This took everyone by surprise in the midst of rumors of the oncoming declaration of

ceasefire and dialogue. To the extreme surprise, on the night of 29 January 2003, the Maoists

33
Laxman Bahroo.
34
Nepal faces new political crisis, 5 October 2002, CNN World news [online news]; available from
http://asia.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/05/nepal.govt.crisis/; Internet; accessed 20 October 2003.

12
declared ceasefire stating to willingly participate in the peace talks process.35 In response to this,

about two hours later on the same night, the government gave a press statement--revoking the

previous decision of declaring the Maoists as terrorists; withdrawal of red corner notice issued

against the Maoists; withdrawal of price tag on the heads of Maoists leaders; and, the cease-

fire.36 In other words, the government and the Maoists decided to agree to a cease-fire as the

government took initiative to resolve the Maoist problem through dialogue, and therefore

appointed the then Minister for Works and Physical Planning Mr. Narayan Singh Pun as the

coordinator of the talks from the government side.37 To move with the peace-process, the Maoist

formed their five member talk-team on 1 February 2003, which consisted of Dr. Baburam

Bhattarai as the Convener, and Mr. Ram Bahadur Thapa, Mr. Krishan Bahadur Mahara, Mr.

Matrika Yadav and Mr. Dev Gurung as the members. In the same way, the government formed

their six-member talk-team on 16 April 2003, which consisted of Mr. Badri Prasad Mandal as the

Convener, and Dr. Upendra Devkota, Mr. Ramesh Nath Pandey, Mr. Narayan Singh Pun, Mr.

Kamal Chaulagain and Mrs. Anuradha Koirala as the members. To facilitate the peace-talks, the

government side nominated Mr. Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya and Mr. Karna Dhwoj Adhikary,

whereas the Maoists nominated Mr. Daman Nath Dhungana and Mr. Padma Ratna Tuladhar as

the facilitators—both sides agreed on all the four individuals. Similarly, the government formed

a “Talks Monitoring Team – Think Tank Task Force” under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister

Chand, wherein Mr. Dharmapal Bar Singh Thapa (former COAS), Mr. Dhruba Bahahdur

Pradhan former IGP Nepal Police), Mr. Bal Krishna Neupane (background in legal affairs), Mr.

35
Maoist press release dated 29 January 2003.
36
“Cease fire declared by government and Maoists,” extracted from various Nepalese newspapers dated 30 January
2003.
37
Maoist, govt. announce cease fire (9:00PM), 29 January 2003 [on-line news]; available from
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/january/arc588.htm; Internet; accessed 29 January 2003.

13
Karna Dhwoj Adhikary (former bureaucrat), and Dr. Mohan Lohani (background in international

affairs) were the members.

Likewise, on 18 March 2003, “Code of Conduct Monitoring and Enforcement

Committee,” which included Mr. Narayan Singh pun and Mr. Kamal Thapa, was formed to

monitor the “code of conduct” accepted by both the warring parties during the peace-talks. Prior

to the formation of the talk-teams, Mr. Narayan Singh Pun from the government side and Mr.

Krishna Bahadur Mahara from the Maoist side were engaged in the informal talks to prepare for

the formal talks and to agree upon the 22-point “code of conduct”—this was agreed on 13 March

2003.38

After three rounds of formal talks—first on 27 April 2003 at Shanker Hotel, Lainchour,

Katmandu district and the second on 9 May 2003 at the same hotel. After the second-round of

talk, on 30 May 2003, Prime Minister Chand resigned form his post, and later the King

appointed Mr. Surya Bahahdur Thapa as the new Prime Minister on 4 June 2003.

During Prime Minister Thapa’s tenure, the third round of government-Maoist talk took

place from 17 to 19 August 2003 (the first session on 17 August as Sneha Hotel, Nepalgunj,

Banke district; the second session again on 17 August at Purandhara VDC, Hapure of Dang

district; the third session on 18 August at Purandhara VDC, Hapure of Dang district; and the

fourth session on 19 August at Purandhara VDC, Hapure, Dang district)--the Maoists still upheld

their fundamental demands, that for a constituent assembly.39 This was rejected by the royal

government, which instead presented an agenda for major constitutional reforms with only vague

details. As a result, the Maoists on 27 August 2003 broke off the peace dialogue and returned to

their politics of violence and destruction—two high-ranking RNA officers were shot, wherein

38
The Maoist Problem.
39
The 40-point demands of the Maoists scaled down to 24-point demands during the peace-talks.

14
one died and other was injured. This led to the government once again declaring the NCP

(Maoist) as “terrorists” on 28 August 2003, and requesting the Interpol for re-issuance of red-

corner notices.40

With the break of cease-fire the Maoist violence escalated during the month of

September, October and November of 2003, wherein indiscriminate firings and bombings were

carried out—though major offensive actions were not noted. The government on the other hand

came forward with the “Unified Command,” under which all the four branches of Nepal’s

security organizations—Royal Nepal Army (RNA), Nepal Police (NP), Armed Police Force

(APF), and National Investigation Department (NID)—jointly operates against the Maoist

insurgents. The decision of the “unified command” is being flayed by the opposition and is being

termed as “militarization”. Prime Minister Thapa says that this strategy has been implemented by

a civilian prime minister, within the purview of existing constitution and laws; even the RNA

had to clarify its stand by saying that the “unified command” does not mean militarization this is

only a tool to make the optimum use of available resources, for instance, by forging coordination

and unified command, the resources of the RNA, the APF, and the NP can be better utilized to

deal with the security situation--besides, the “unified command” takes effect only in operation in

the field, all other organs of the state function normally.41

The start of the year 2004 has shown that the Maoists are pretty much focused towards

forming various levels of government, especially Autonomous Region People’s Government and

moving towards forming the Central People’s Government. On the other hand, it is observed that

a vast gap is being created between the political parties and the monarch, due to the Kings direct

intervention in the political process. Due to this, the five political parties and their sister

40
The Maoist Problem.
41
RNA version given to the press on or around December 2003.

15
organizations—especially the student wings—are in the street chanting anti-monarchial slogans

and questioning the relevance of monarchy in Nepal, not to mention the establishment of a

republican state. Analysts say that the student slogans at present point towards what the Maoists

are catering for—not from the jungle but from the streets.

While the political parties and the monarchy are giving their own views about the present

situation in Nepal, the Maoists on the other hand have said that to give legitimacy to the

“People’s Power,” they are in the process of declaring a draft of the Interim Constitution,

People’s law, and the other necessary instructions.42 They further say that this will lead to two

Constitutions, two Governments, and two Armies in the country—one of the Old Power, while

the other of the People’s Power; therefore, they have decided to send informal letters to every

country that has ties with UN to acknowledge the new power against the old power.43

One can now sum up the present situation in Nepal, by saying that due to the tripatriate

power vacuum and the differences in the way the Maoist are being looked by the International

Community, the situation of Nepal is deteriorating day by day, and the impact of this

deteriorating situation is being exploited by the Nepalese Maoists with the help of CCOMPOSA

to gain momentum in their “People’s War” to move towards the establishment of new People’s

Democratic Republic. With this, one can now move towards describing the Maoist leadership

and the organizational structure. Most of the information, which has helped develop the charts,

maps, etc has been collected through various Maoist documents and publications, and by talking

with security personnel.

42
“Maoists in the process of declaring interim constitution,” Rajdhani (Katmandu) daily Nepalese newspaper, 1
November 2003, Vol III, No. 144.
43
Ibid.

16
 MAOIST LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Maoist movement in Nepal is headed by Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), who

is the Chairman of the NCP (Maoist).44 Prachanda, a former primary-school teacher was

described as a firebrand intellectual, and holds a degree in B.Sc. (Bachelor of Science)

Agriculture from Rampur College, Chitwan district of Nepal.45 Likewise, the third in command

within the Maoist, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, studied urban planning at Jawaharlal Nehru

University and architecture in Chandigarh, India; later, HMG of Nepal employed him for rural

development. Another strong member is Mr. Ram Bahadur Thapa, who studied Atomic

engineering and acquired his leftist ideology in the former Soviet Union; it is speculated that he

was trained in guerrilla warfare by Libyan radicals while in the Soviet Union.46

The NCP (Maoist) organizational structure is based on the Maoist philosophy, which

consists of hard-core leadership, active cadres, active and passive support groups, and various

sympathizing elements in the society, who help complete the vicious circle of introducing the

elements of communism and socialism in the country. To elaborate, one can say that Nepalese

Maoists have two kinds of organizational structure--the political front, and the military front—

both headed by Prachanda. The political front focuses to organize, create awareness and spread

the Maoist ideology among the society, whereas, the military front focuses to safeguard the

activities of the political front.

The political front consists of one Standing Committee, one Polit-bureau, one Central

Committee, four Central Commands, 10 Regional Bureaus or Sector Bureaus, unspecified

44
Shaul Shay, ICT Research Fellow, Maoist Terrorism in the Foothills of the Himalayas, 1 December 2001 [online
article]; available from
http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:kRkqG0RxNvIJ:www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm%3Farticleid%3D417+%2
2Maoist+structure%22&hl=en&ie=UTF-8; Internet; accessed 10 January 2004.
45
Laxman Bahroo.
46
Ibid.

17
number of Sub-regional Bureaus or Sub-sector Bureaus, and unspecified number of District,

Area and Cell Committees. The Standing Committee, which is a high-level and a final decision

taking body, is made up of five top-level NCP (Maoist) leaders; the decisions taken in the

Standing Committee has to be later approved by the Polit-bureau and the Central Committee.

The names of the five Standing Committee Members (SCMs) are given below according to their

ranking in the NCP (Maoist) organization:

1. Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, @ Prachanda, @Biswas

2. Mr. Mohan Vaidya, @ Agam, @ Kiran
3. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, @ Lal Dhoj, @ Jitbir, @ Mukti Manab
4. Mr. Posta Bahadur Bogati, @ Randhoj, @ Divakar
5. Mr. Ram Bahadur Thapa, @ Badal, @ Lakhan, @ Bhimsen, @ Prem

The Polit-bureau consists of 13 full Polit-bureau members (Full PBMs) and five alternate

Polit-bureau members (Alternate PBMs). It is also to be noted that the five SCMs are

automatically the members of Polit-bureau because of their organizational standing. In totality,

we can say the Polit-bureau has 23 members—5 SCMs, 13 Full PBMs, and 5 Alternate PBMs.

The Polit-bureau makes decisions that need to be made immediately, but later the decision(s)

have to be approved by the Central Committee. The names of the 13 Full PBMs are as follows:

1. Mr. Chandra Prakash Gajurel, @ Gaurab, @ Bijaya, @ Parbesh Kumar

2. Mr. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, @ Amar Singh, @ Chattan
3. Mr. Dev Gurung, @ Dorje, @ Kancha Bahadur
4. Mr. Dinanath Sharma, @ Ashok
5. Mr. Top Bahadur Rayamajhi, @ Amar, @ Anil
6. Mr. Barsha Man Pun, @ Ananta
7. Mr. Agni Prasad Sapkota, @ Sushil, @ Parbat, @ Kanchan
8. Mr. Mani Thapa, @ Anukul, @ Anup
9. Mr. Hit Man Shakya, @ Suman, @ Tutu, @ Sagar
10. Mr. Haribol Gajurel, @ Prajawol, @ Sital Kumar
11. Mr. Netra Bahadur Chand, @ Biplav, @ Ratna Bahadur Shahi, @ Iman Singh
12. Mr. Matrika Yadav, @ Ram Singh, @ Pradeep
13. Mr. Prabhakar Pradhanang, @ Ishwar Pradhanang, @ Rabindra Shrestha

18
 Likewise, the names of the five Alternate PBMs are as follows:

1. Mr. Nanda Kishor Pun, @ Pashang

2. Mr. Shakti Bahadur Basnet, @ Suresh Singh, @ Chandra Bir
3. Mr. Chandra Prakash Khanal, @ Baldev
4. Mr. Janardhan Sharma, @ Prabhakar
5. Mr. Babu Lal Pun (possible name), @ Sonam

In the same way, the Central Committee is made of 25 full Central Committee members

(Full CCMs) and 41 alternate Central Committee members (Alternate CCMs). It is also to be

noted that the 5 SCMs and the 18 PBMs are automatically the members of Central Committee

because of their organizational standing. In totality, we can say the Central Committee has 89

members—5 SCMs, 13 Full PBMs and 5 Alternate PBMs, and 25 Full CCMs and 41 Alternate

CCMs. The Central Committee is the main body where all decisions has to be approved prior to

implementation, or if the decisions have already been made and implemented by other bodies

due to the necessity of immediate action, then this decision(s) has to be later brought infront of

the Central Committee for approval. The names of the 25 Full CCMs are as follows:47

1. Mr. Narayan Prasad Sharma, @ Kamal Prasad, @ Nagendra

2. Ms. Pampha Bhusal, @ Himali, @ Sarita, @ Puja
3. Mr. Hari Bhakta Kandel, @ Bimal, @ Pratik
4. Mr. Santosh Buda Magar, @ Bhrun
5. Mr. Khadka Bahadur B.K., @ Prakanda
6. Mr. Lek Raj Bhatta, @ Rakesh
7. Mr. Ram Charan Chowudhary, @ Sagar
8. Mr. Jay Puri Gharti, @ Namuna
9. Mr. Devendra Paudel, @ Sunil
10. Mr. Shree Ram Dhakal, @ Prashanta
11. Ms. Rekha Sharma, @ Srijana
12. Mr. Santu Darai, @ Parwana
13. Ms. Hishila Yami, @ Himani, @ Rahul
14. Mr. Ram Prasad Sharma, @ Saral, @ Subodh
15. Mr. Lokendra Bista
16. Mr. Dharmendra Bastolla, @ Kanchan Kumar
17. Mr. Hit Raj Pandey, @ Uttam
18. Mr. Bishnu Prasad Chaulagain, @ Dinesh Sharma
47
The dotted lines indicate names not known yet.

19
 19. Mr. Gopal Khumbu
20. Mr. Tulsi Ghimire
21. Mr………………
22. Mr………………
23. Mr………………
24. Mr………………
25. Mr………………

Likewise, the names of the 41 Alternate CCMs are as follows:48

1. Mr. Purna Bahadur Gharti Magar, @ Abhash

2. Mr. Krishna Dhwoj Khadka, @ Sudeep
3. Mr. Mumaram Khanal, @ Jeevan
4. Mr. Bam Dev Chhetri, @ Biplav Sharma
5. Mr. ………………, @ Ananta
6. Mr. Kumar Sharma Poudel
7. Mr. ……………….. , @ Anwar
8. Mr. Hemanta Prakash Oli, @ HP Himali, @ Sudarshan, @ Prem Silwal
9. Mr………………….., @ Santosh
10. Mr. Salikram Sharma, @ Apar
11. Mr. Kumar Dahal, @ Bijay
12. Mr. Hit Bahadur Tamang, @ Dilip
13. Mr. Pushpa Bikram Malla, @ Singha
14. Mr. Kulman Buda Magar
15. Mr. Jaya Krishna Goit
16. Mr. Surendra Karki, @ Ram Karki, @ Partha Chhetri
17. Mr. Ganga Shrestha
18. Ms. Yesoda Subedi
19. Mr. Bhakta Bahadur Shah
20. Mr. Dil Kumar Prajapati, @ Pradip, @ DK, @ Sujan, @ Bhisma
21. Mr. Anil Sharma, @ Birahi, @ Kesav, @ Prabah
22. Mr. Dhruba Prasad Parajuli, @
23. Mr. Ganga Karki, @
24. Mr. Krishna Prasad Sapkota, @
25. Mr. Prabhu Shah, @
26. Mr. Gauri Shanker Khadka, @
27. Mr. Padma Rai, @
28. Mr. Mohan Chandra Gautam, @
29. Mr. Amrita Thapa Magar, @
30. Mr………………………, @ Himal
31. Mr……………………..
32. Mr………………………
33. Mr……………………..
34. Mr………………………
48
Ibid.

20
 35. Mr……………………..
36. Mr……………………..
37. Mr………………………..
38. Mr……………………….
39. Mr………………………..
40. Mr………………………..
41. Mr………………………..

Other than the CCMs, there are few Central Advisors like Mr. Ishwari Dahal @ Asare @

Shyam Prasad, Mr. Suresh Ale Magar @ Sher Singh @ Chepang, Mr. Shiva Raj Gautam, Mr.

Chitra Bahadur Shrestha, Mr. Khushi Ram Pakhrin, etc to advise the NCP (Maoist) in various

aspects.

Geographically, the command structure is divided into four command levels: Internal

Commands (three commands inside the country), and External Command (one command outside

the country).49 The internal commands are: Eastern Central Command (which includes the

present 23 districts), the Special Central Command (which includes the present 11 districts and

the eastern part of Chitwan district), Western Central Command (which includes the present 40

districts and except the eastern part of the Chitwan district), and the External Command (which

includes Nepalese living mainly in India). The Political Commissar of the Eastern Central

Command is Mr. Mohan Vaidya, the Political Commissar of the Special Central Command is

Mr. Ram Bahadur Thapa, the Political Commissar of the Western Central Command is Mr. Posta

Bahadur Bogati, and the Political Commissar of the External Central Command is Mr. Top

Bahahdur Rayamajhi. The Central Command structure has around 21 open organizations (as

mentioned under the section of “alliances of the Maoists” totally focused towards gathering

people from different class and profession. It is also seen that there is a “United Revolutionary

People’s Council (URPC),” headed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, which is a transitional and

49
Anju Susan Alex.

21
temporary united body of the people which carries out the administrative, legislative, and war

time functions in the liberated areas and directs the “united people’s committees”. In totality,

one can say that all the five-members of the Standing Committee of the NCP (Maoist) hold the

major positions in the strategic command and control (C2) mechanism of the party—Prachanda

heading both the political and military fronts.

While talking of the commands, the Eastern Central Command of the political front is

further divided into three Regional or Sector Bureaus—the Mechi-Koshi Regional Bureau (the

present Jhapa, Ilam, Panchthar, Taplejung, Morang, Sunsari, Dhankuta, Terathum, Bhojpur and

Sankhuwasabha districts), headed by Mr. Barsh Man Pun; the Sagarmatha Regional Bureau (the

present Saptari, Siraha, Udaipur, Khotang, Okhaldhunga, and Solukhumbu districts), headed by

Mr. Hit Man Shakya; and the Janakpur Regional Bureau (the present Rauthat, Sarlahi, Mahottari,

Dhanusha, Sindhuli, Ramechhap, and Dolakha districts), headed by Mr. Agni Sapkota. These

regional bureaus are further divided into unspecified number of Sub-regional Bureaus or Sub-

sector Bureaus, and District, Area and Cell Committees.

Similalry, the Special Central Command of the political front is further divided into two

Regional or Sector Bureaus—the “Ka” Regional Bureau (the present districts surrounding

Kathmandu valley, like Bara, Parsa, Makwanpur, Dhading, Nuwakot, Rasuwa, Sindhupalchowk,

and Kavrepalanchowk districts, and the eastern part of Chitwan district), headed by Mr. Babu

Lal Pun @ Sonam; and the “Kha” Regional Bureau (the present three districts Kathmandu,

Lalitpur and Bhaktapur of Kathmandu valley), headed by Mr. Kumar Dahal @ Bijay. These

regional bureaus are further divided into unspecified number of Sub-regional Bureaus or Sub-

sector Bureaus, and District, Area and Cell Committees. Some members working in the Special

Central Commands are: Mr. Devendra Parajuli @ Roshan (Regional Bureau Member or RBM),

22
Mr. Salikram Jamkattel @ Jyoti (RBM), Mr. Krishna K.C. @ Bidur @ Samsher Khatri (RBM),

Ms. Kalpana Dahal @ Muna (Distrcit Committee Member or DCM Lalitpur), Mr. Shambha

Poudel @ Gyanendra @ Kesav (DCM Lalitpur), Mr. Pawan Man Shrestha @ Prabha Kiran @

Anuman Shrestha (RBM, Kathmandu Incharge), Mr. Ganga Lama (DCM Kathmandu), Mr.

Nichhal Nakarmi @ Lambu @ Pidit @ Sangharsha (RBM), Mr. Himal Sharma @ Bijay (DCM

Kathamndu), Mr. Dipendra Panta (DCM Lalitpur), Mr. Gyanendra Tripathi @ Sanjay Sharma @

Abhinash (DCM Kathmandu), Mr. Sailendra Ghimire (DCM Kathmandu), Mr. Baikuntha

Pokharel (DCM Lalitpur), Mr. Sadhuram Devkota @ Ashok (DCM), Mr. Fadindra Devkota @

Akash (DCM), Mr. Atindra Neupane (DCM), Mr. Buddhi Lama (DCM Kathmandu), Mr. Badri

Prasad Bajgain @ Damaru @ Sanjay @ Dipak Sharma (DCM Kathmandu), Mr. Dhan Bahadur

Maharjan @ Sujan (DCM), Ms. Lasata Shrestha @ Rubi (DCM Lalitpur), Mr. Bhawanath

Dhamala (DCM Kathmandu), Mr. Hira Bahadur Rokka @ Suraj (DCM), Mr. Surya Man Dong

@ Laldhoj (RBM), Mr. Dil Kumar Prajapati @ Sujan @ DK, @ Pradip @ Bhisma (Valley

Special Company Commander), Mr. Bhim Giri @ hari Chhetri, Mr. Umesh Lama @ Harke, Mr.

Dil Krishna Shrestha @ Deep, Mr. Raj Kumar Shrestha @ Raj @ Ramesh, Mr. Krishna Bahadur

Sunar, Mrs. … (Lambu’s wife), Mr. Hem Kumar Ghimire, Mr. Ratna Dhakal @ Saroj @ Shiva

Prasad, Mr. Madhav Adhikari, Mr. Suchendra Shrestha, Mr. Arjun Pokharel, Mr. Prakash Lama,

Mr. Rajendra Ghimire @ Chhewang @ Harish @ Biswas, Mr. Hira Bahadur Saru, Mr. Pushpa

Raj Basnet, Ms. Tika Bastola @ Sabina, Mr. Nawaraj Regmi @ Nawaraj, Mr. Dipendra Panth,

Mr. Binod Thakuri (Squad), Mr. Lila Pandey (Squad), Mr. Desh Bhakta Chapagain (Squad), Mr.

Bhabanath Dhamala (Squad), Mr. Binod Dhakal @ Bishal (Squad), Mr. Shanker Bhandari

(Squad), Mr. Ramesh Shahi (Squad), Mr. Ramesh Timilsina (Squad), Mr. Madhu K.C. @

Indrajit (Squad), Ms. Bimala Karki (Squad), Mr. Akash Mainali (Squad), Mr. Dhirendra Basnet

23
(Squad), Ms. Bina Magar @ Soni (Squad), Mr. Jekendra Shrestha (Squad), Mr. Raju Shrestha

(Squad), Mr. Ghanshyam Shrestha @ Ramesh (Squad), Mr. Ram Saran Silwal (Squad), Mr. Raju

K.C. (Squad), Mr. Narayan Dhoj Mahat (Squad), Manoj Kumar Rawat (Squad), Mr. Surendra

Shrestha (Squad), Mr. Prafulla Shrestha (Squad), Mr. Bikram Maharjan (Squad), etc.

Likewise, the Western Central Command of the political front is further divided into four

Regional or Sector Bureaus—the Seti-Mahankali Regional Bureau (the present Darchula,

Baitadi, Dadeldhura, Kanchanpur, Kailali, Doti, Accham, Bajura and Bajhang districts), headed

by Mr. Dina Nath Sharma; the Bheri-Karnali Regional Bureau (the present Banke, Bardiya,

Surkhet, Jajarkot, Dailekh, Kalikot, Jumla, Humla, Mugu, and Dolpa districts), headed by Mr.

Shakti Bahadur Basnet; the Special Regional Bureau (the present Dang, Salyan, Rolpa, Rukum,

Pyuthan, Kapilbastu, Rupandehi, Palpa, Argakhanchi, Gulmi, Baglung, and Myagdi districts),

headed by Mr. Netra Bahadur Chand; and the Gandak Regional Bureau (the present Parbat,

Syanjha, Nawalparasi, Tanahu, Kaski, Lamjung, Mustang, Manang, Chitwan [except eastern

part], and Gorkha districts), headed by Mr. Dev Bahadur Gurung. These regional bureaus are

further divided into unspecified number of Sub-regional Bureaus or Sub-sector Bureaus, and

District, Area and Cell Committees.

The last command is the External Central Command of the Maoist political front, which

is divided into various sectors in the international arena, especially in India. The map shown

below, indicates the four Maoist Central Commands and the Regional Bureaus according to the

geographical division:

24
 Map 1: Maoist Central Command and Regional Bureaus.

On the other hand, the military front or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) consists of a

Central Military Commission headed by Prachanda himself, under whom lies the four Central

Military Commands—Western Military Command, headed by Mr. Nanda Kishor Pun as the

Divisional Commander; Special Military Command, headed by Mr. Babu Lal Pun @ Sonam as

the Divisional Commander; and Eastern Military Commander, headed by Mr. Barsha Ram Pun

as the Divisional Commander; whereas, under the political External Command there is no

External Military Command—and 10 Regional or Sector Military Commands, wherein there are

unspecified number of Sub-regional or Sub-sector Military Commands, District Military

Commands, Area Committee Security Teams, and Cell Committee Volunters Teams.

During 13 August 2000, the PLA under the Military Commands were sub-divided into

four groups--security forces for the villages, public intimacy group to look after rights and

justices of people, squads for administration and intelligence, and platoons to combat security

forces. Though the level of the PLA cannot be determined to the point of fact at this instance, the

Maoists claim that their PLA has four divisions, ten brigades, and unspecified number of

battalions, companies, sections, and volunteer groups or militias. On the other hand, police

sources state that though the concept of division has been implemented within the PLA, the

25
strength is near to kneel, whereas the brigades are in the range of 600 to 1200, battalions in the

range of 200, companies in the range of 50 to 60, sections in the range of 10 to 12 personnel. On

the oher hand, the military analysts estimate that the current NCP (Maoist) strength is at 3,000-

4,000 “hardcore militants” or regular troops, and 10,000-15,000 men organized as various local

militias; in addition, there are thousands of activists and other cadres who work openly in the

countryside, or through front organizations in the towns.50 In the operational mode, when

launching offensive actions against the security forces of HMG of Nepal, the Maoists normally

use the tactical structure based on the number of attackers. Generally, a tactical command

element includes an intelligence collection section, a logistic support section, and a tactical unit

to launch offensive action(s).

The Maoist mode of warfare is based on the military technique of Mao-tse Tung of

inflicting defeat on a powerful army as the cardinal principle in carrying out their raids by

Guerillas who are trained on the strategies of the Chinese military strategist “Sanju”.51

Manpower, of course, derives from the clandestine infrastructure, which has become quite

developed in some areas, drawing sustenance from a combination of exploitation of grievances

and adroit use of terror.52

As the People’s War group (PWG) in India have refined their strategy of physically

eliminating adversaries and are, reportedly, set to form Permanent Action Teams (PAT), a task

hitherto being performed by Special Action Teams (SAT)--the PAT idea is a copy of the al

Qaeda cellular network model.53 In the same way the Maoists in Nepal have started to operate in

50
Compiled from Maoist documents and police sources.
51
Anju Susan Alex.
52
Information has been collected through Maoist publications, daily and weekly Nepalese newspapers, police
reports, and interaction with security personnel, on different dates from 13 February 1996 until May 2002.
53
PV Ramana, ‘Copy cat’ PWG and the al Qaeda cell model, [online article]; available from
http://www.ipcs.org/ipcs/kashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=632&subCatID=1019&mod=d; Internet;
accessed 30 August 2003.

26
urban centres where targets live; they gather intelligence, abducts the rich for ransom, and

murders adversaries--politicians and security force personnel.54 The Nepalese security sources

state that the highest number of personnel in such SAT has been found to be 10 dedicated

Maoists. From December 2001 until January 2004, thirty-six individuals have been either killed

or injured—by indiscriminate shooting--by such Maoist SAT within the Kathmandu valley

(urban area).55

On the judicial side, the justice systems established by the Maoists, as of 13 August 2000,

reflects their strategic move to rule the country. The six types of courts they have created are:56

•
•
Village Level People’s Court

•
Area People’s Court

•
District People’s Court

•
Bureau People’s Court

•
Regional People’s Court
Central People’s Court

According to the legal division regional bureau secretary of the Maoists Mr. Narendra

KC, the Maoists have established their “people’s court” with one justice and Maoist People’s

government lawyer, and other staff members in each 11 districts of Nepal--Rukum, Rolpa,

Salyan, Pyuthan, Dang, Arghakhanchi, Myagdi, Baglung, Gulmi and Kapilvastu—as of 4

January 2004. Furthermore, the Maoists are preparing to give legal training to the people’s

representatives, Maoists workers and the People’s Liberation army.57

Moreover, on 22 November 2001 a thirty-seven members United Revolutionary People’s

Council (URPC) was formed, which has a coordinator, an assistant-coordinator, a secretary, and

54
Ibid.
55
According to Polie Record, 31 January 2004.
56
Except regional and central courts, other courts do exist in the Maoist controlled areas.
57
“People’s Court in eleven districts,” Kantipur (Kathmandu) Nepalese daily newspaper, 5 January 2004, Vol. XI,
No. 353 and other newspapers.

27
34 other members, wherein the coordinator is Dr. Baburam Bhattarai—Maoist polit-bureau

member. This council was formed by the conference of the representatives of the PLA, different

National and Regional Fronts, different mass organizations, and districts’ United People’s

Committees; moreover, it is a transitional and temporary united body of the people which carries

out the administrative, legislative, and war time functions in the liberated areas and directs the

united people’s committees--it is the alternative of monarchial structure and works for

establishing peoples republic of Nepal.58 The names of the members of the UPRC are as follows:

1. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Co-ordinator

2. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Assistance Co-ordinator
3. Deb Gurung, Secretary
4. Haribhakta Kandel, Member
5. Top Bahadur Rayamajhi, Member
6. Rabindra Shrestha, Member
7. Hisila Yami, Member
8. Agni Sapkota, Member
9. Mani Thapa, Member
10. Barshaman Pun, Member
11. Chandra Prasad Khanal, Member
12. Shakti Bahadur Busnet, Member
13. Rekha Sharma, Member
14. Jayapuri Gharti, Member
15. Sriram Dhakal, Member
16. Khadka Bahadur Biswakarma, Member
17. Lekh Bahadur Bhatta, Member
18. Ramcharan Chaudhary, Member
19. Purna Bahadur Ghartimagar, Member
20. Nandakishor Pun, Member
21. Hitraj Pandey, Member
22. Santa Darai, Member
23. Shivaraj Gautam, Member
24. Suresh Alemagar, Member
25. Pampha Bhusal, Member
26. Tilak Pariyar, Member
27. Jhakku Prasad Subedi, Member
28. Khop Bahadur Kandel, Member
29. Hit Bahadur Tamang, Member
30. Dil Kumari Prajapati, Member

58
People’s Council formed, Human Right and People’s War in Nepal [posted online]; available from
http://www.insof.org/news/251101_peoples_council.htm; Internet; accessed 30 December 2002.

28
 31. Kumar Dahal, Member
32. Mukti Pradhan, Member
33. Chaturman Rajbanshi, Member
34. Jayakrishana Goit, Member
35. Gopal Khambu, Member
36. Bhaktaraj Kandangva, Member
37. Resham Chaulagai, Member

The Maoists have different activities in different places in the country. Activity wise, one

can divide them as follows: captured areas, heavily influenced areas and less influenced areas. In

the captured areas, they have formed “United People's Governments” at the village and the

district levels, where they claim that they are providing all government services. Maoists claim

that the first “United People’s Government” was announced on 20 December in Rukum district,

through a mass-gathering of around 20,000 at Banfikot village of the said district. The chairman

of this district government is Mr. Purna Bahahdur Gharti, who was elected unanimously with

vice-chairman Maheswarjang Gahatraj and military representative Kal Bahadur Nath. It is said

that there are 12 other members elected out of 14 candidates.59

After completing the process of forming elected “United People’s Government” at the

villages and district levels on the basis of revolutionary united front policies, currently

“autonomous regional level people’s governments” are being installed in different parts of the

country.60 As per the Party’s known policy of granting autonomous rule along with rights of self-

determination to the oppressed nationalities and regions, a campaign is now almost completed to

form such Maoist governments in the so called liberated areas. According to Prachanda, the

establishment of the “Autonomous Region People’s Government” is the entry into the stage of

59
Janak Pathak, The announcement of the united people's Government, Human Rights and People’s War in Nepal
[online article]; available from http://www.nepalresearch.com; Internet; accessed 28 December 2003.
60
Autonomous People’s Governments Formed, 20 January 2004, Maoist Information Bulletin-8 [online article];
available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/cpnm/documents/english/information_bulletin8.htm; Internet; accessed 25
January 2004.

29
“Strategic Offence” from “Strategic Stalemate,” for which the Maoists plan to form nine such

“autonomous region people’s governments”--as indicated below—and, after that the URPC

formed under the leadership of Dr. Bhattarai would be declared as the “Central People’s

Government”—a political strategy to get hold of the central state power:6162

1. Magarat Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas from Kali

Gandaki river up to Bheri river.

2. Bheri-Karnali Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas of

Bheri Karnali zones.

3. Set-Mahankali Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas of Seti

and Mahankali zones.

4. Tharuwan Autonomous Region People’s Government - Inner and outer terai

from Rapti river up to Mahankali river.

5. Tamuwan Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas of Gandaki

region (from Kali Gandaki river up to Budi Gandaki river).

6. Tamangsaling Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas of

Bagmati, Narayani, and Janakpur zones, except areas within Kathmandu
Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts).

7. Newar Autonomous Region People’s Government - All the plain areas of

Kathmandu Valley (Kathmandu, Lalitpur, and Bhaktapur districts).

8. Kirat Autonomous Region People’s Government - Hilly areas of Mechi,

Koshi, and Sagarmatha zones.

9. Madhesi Autonomous Region People’s Government - All the Madhesi areas,

where Abadhi, Bhojpuri, and Maithili dialects are spoken.

On 9 January 2004, a twenty-seven member “Magarat Autonomous Region People’s

Government” was declared under the leadership of Mr. Santosh Budha Magar, in the Thawang

61
J. Pandey, “Gun’s Rule in Maoists’ Yenan,” Nepal (Katmandu) bi-weekly magazine, 30 Jan-12 Feb 2004, Year 4,
Issue 12.
62
“Autonomous Region People’s Government,” Janadesh (Kathmandu) online news, 27 January 2004, Year 13,
Issue 9; available from http://www.cpnm.org/index/janadesh/main_news.htm#df3; Internet; accessed 29 January
2004.

30
village in Rolpa district. Revolutionary felicitation messages from Prachanda, Chairman of the

NCP (Maoist) and Supreme Commander of PLA, and from Dr. Bhattarai, Convener of URPC,

were read to the masses on the occasion. Comrade Diwakar, In-charge, Western Command, and

Comrade Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Joint-Convener of URPC, among others, addressed the

gathering.63 Maoists further said that the declaration of the first autonomous government

[Magarat] is a step towards preparation for the establishement of a Federal Republican State in

Nepal. In this relation, to show the republican power, the Maoists on 15 January 2004, declared a

130-member People’s Representatives Assembly-- which includes [Maoists] 13 from Salyan, 7

from Baglung, 15 from Rukum, 17 from Rolpa, 6 from Gulmi, 6 from Pyuthan, 5 from Myagdi,

and 6 from Arghakhanchi district, 1 form Gandaki zone, 16 from People’s Liberation Army, 10

from Special districts, and 28 from the URPC-- whose Speaker has been designated as Mr. Sarun

Bantha Magar of Rukum district.64

In the same way, on 15 January 2004, a 29-member “Tamangsaling Autonomous Region

People’s Government” was established in the eastern Nepal at a place called Hariharpur Gadi of

Sindhuli district. In this government, Mr. Hit Bahadur Tamang has been elected as the Chairman,

Ms. Kumari Moktan as Vice-Chairman, and Mr. Surat Bahadur Syangtang as the Chef Secretary;

moreover, Mr. Dawa Lama has beem designated as the Speaker and Mr. Shanker Lama the

Deputy Speaker in the People’s Assembly of this regional government.65

Similarly, on 19 January 2004, a 25-member “Bheri-Karnali Autonomous Region

People’s Government” was formed at Junga Thapa Chaur of Jajarkot district under the leadership

63
Autonomous Region declared in Rolpa, 9 January 2004, RA online [online article]; available from
http://www.mypage.bluewin.ch/raonline/pages/story/np/mao16B04a.html#jan0401; Internet; accessed 15 January
2004.
64
Rameshwor Bohara, “They were confident,” Himal Magazine (Kathmandu), 30 Jan-12 Feb, 2004, Year 13, Issue
20.
65
Tamangsaling Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news];
available from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.

31
of Mr. Kkadka Bahadur B.K., wherein Mr. Kali Bahadur Malla is the Vice Chairman. The other

members of this government are—Mr. Jarishi Gautam, Mr. Ram Bahadur Bohara, Mr. Gyanu

Basnet, Mr. Bishnu B.K., Mr. Tek Bahadur Rawal, Mr. Nain Prasad Pahadi, Mr. Thir Bahadur

Karki, Mr. Prem Bahadur Roka, Mr. Amar B.K., Mr. Kamal Thapa, Mr. Nawaraj Singh, Mr.

Chhiring Lama, Ms. Sita Nepali, Ms. Saraswati Pandey, Mr. Nawaraj Dhami, Mr. Sonam

Gyaljen Lama, Mr. Naresh Bhandari, Mr. Ganesh Salami.66 This region is also called as “Nepal’s

Yenan” by the Maoists.67

In the same way, on 21 January 2004, “Newar Autonomous Region People’s

Government” was declared.68 Likewise, on 25 January 2004, a 31-member “Madhes

Autonomous Region People’s Government” was formed under the leadership of Mr. Matrika

Yadav at Sarlahi district. In this government, Vice-Chariman is Mr. Binod Upadhyaya, and the

Chief Secretary is Mr. Mahendra Paswan. The other members of this government are—Mr.

Srawan Yadav, Mr. Shiva Chandra Kusawa, Mr. Binaya Mahato, Mr. Ram Chandra Yadav, Mr.

Bharat Shah, Mr. Surya Nath Yadav, Mr. Roshan Jankpuri, Mr. Udhav Pokharel, Ms. Ram

Kumari Yadav, Mr. Surendra Jaiswal, Mr. Satya Narayan Bhagat, Mr. Ram Ashraya Raya, Mr.

Parma Nanda Burma, Mr. Ram Kumar Mishra, Mr. Maqsood Ali, Mr. Kabita Yadav, Mr. Chinak

Kurmi, Mr. Ram Kumar Chowudhary, Mr. Ram Kumar Chowudhary, Mr. Krishna Bahadur

K.C., Mr. Tika Bahadur Darlami, Mr. Mahendra Sada, Mr. Ramlotan Tiwari, Mr. Shiva Kumar

Mandal, Mr. Shiva Ram Yadav, Ms. Shila Subedi, and Ms. Saraswati Chowudhary; Maoists

have decided to add two members in a later stage. Moreover, Mr. Prabhu Saha has been

66
Bheri-Karnali Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news];
available from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.
67
In China, Mao had made Yenan as capital of the revolutionary stage; in Nepal Prachanda might be wanting to
make Rapti-Bheri-Karnali as similar base reagion. See, J. Pandey.
68
Newar Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Police Sources, 31 January 2004.

32
designated as the Speaker and Mr. Dev Narayan Yadav as the Deputy Speaker in the People’s

Representative Assembly of this regional government.69

In the same way, on 28 January 2004, the “Tharuwan Autonomous Region People’s

Government” was formed under the leadership of Mr. R.C. Chowudhary, wherein the Vice

Chairman is Mr. Kuber Woli.70 Likewise, 29 January 2004, the “Seti-Mahankali Autonomous

Region People’s Government” was declared at Ramroshan of Accham district under the

leadership of Mr. Lekh Raj Bhatta, wherein the Chief Secretary is Mr. Bharat Bom. The other

members of this government are—Mr. Bibidh from military, Mr. Harsha Bahadur Shahi from

cultural, Ms. Hari Kala B.K. from women, Mr. Nabin B.K. from militia, Mr. Bharat Baduwal,

Mr. Shanker Khadka, Mr. Ekendra Bhatta, Mr. Sarad Awasthi, Mr. Danda Birkram B.K., Ms.

Renu Chand, Mr. Dhirendra Upadhyaya, Mr. Tek Bahadur Bista, Mr. Lazman Joshi, Mr.Nanda

Sarki, Mr. Dewaki Malla, Ms. Manju Bom, Mr. Khem Bom, Mr. Durga Pun Magar, Mr. Karna

Bahadur B.K., Mr. Ram Bahadur K.C., and Ms. Gita Dhungana.71

Similalry, on 30 January 2004, the “Tamuwan Autonomous Region People’s

Government” was formed under the leadership of Mr. Dev Gurung at a place called Puran Chaur

of Kaski district.72

The last such regional government—Kirat Autonomous Region People’s Government--

was declared on 2 February 2004 at Khotang district. This 23-memebr government has been

formed under the leadership of Mr. Gopla Khambu. In this government, the Vice-Chairman is

69
Madhes Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news]; available
from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.
70
Tharuwan Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news]; available
from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.
71
Seti-Mahankali Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news];
available from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.
72
Tamuwan Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, Krishna Sen News Agency [online news]; available
from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 31 January 2004.

33
Mr. Tanka Angbuhang, Chief Secretary is Mr. Sri Prasad Jabegu, and other members are—Mr.

Basu Shakya, Mr. Rajesh Sharma, Mr. Mubihang Khambu, Mr. Saku Hang Khambu, Mr. Gopal

Giri, Mr. Khadga Yogi, Mr. Kiran Limbu, Mr. Bhodan Kandawa, Mr. Lokendra Khambu, Ms.

Yasoda Kandawa, Mr. Pusing Kirati, Mr. Renlibak Limbu, Mr. Shikhar Kirati, Mr. Bishnu

Prasad Dahal, Mr. Kabi Lal Risal, Mr. Lal Bahahdur Tamang, Ms. Mana Kumari Rai, Mr.

Pasang Sherpa, and Mr. Shubha Raj Sunwar. Moreover, Mr. Bhakta Raj Kandangwa has been

designated as the Speaker and Deputy Speaker as Mr. Bikash Kirati of the People’s

Representative Assembly of this regional government.73

To conclude this section, it can be said that the Maoists have expanded their

organizational structure from small cells operating at the rural areas to an integrated national

network consisting of the political front and the military fronts supported by open groups and

organizations. They say that they have already formed village and district level “people’s

governments,” and as of recent has completed forming the nine “autonomous region people’s

governments”. Moreover, they are preparing to form the “Central People’s Government,”

according to their step towards “Strategic Offence”. After understanding the Maoist

organizational structure and its leadership, one can move forward to look at the propensity of the

Maoist to use violence and the types of tactics employed.

PROPENSITY OF THE MAOIST TO USE VIOLENCE AND TYPES OF TACTICS

EMPLOYED

The security sources point out that the Maoist modus operandi--assassination, explosion,

indiscriminate bombing, arson, fatal attack, robbery, sabotage, destruction of infrastructure,

73
Kirat Autonomous Region People’s Government formed, 3 February 2004 Krishna Sen News Agency [online
news of Janadesh]; available from http://www.cpnm.org/index/krishnasen/index.htm; Internet; accessed 5 Feb 2004.

34
threat, intimidation, kidnapping, hostage taking, attack on offices and personnel of security force,

extortion, donation collection, vandalism, closure, and declaring various levels of Maoists local

governing bodies--has helped tear the country apart.74 Maoists, who started with small cells has

carried out large-scale attacks against security forces, even being able to get hold of the M-16

rifle(s)--provided by the US to RNA—during confrontation. Military analysts estimate that the

insurgents had only hunting guns, mostly muzzle-loaders collected from local people and a few

home-made rifles and pistols, which they had obtained from illegal gun factories in the

neighboring Indian state of Bihar.75 Their tactic of raiding police armories has allowed them to

expand their arsenal to include .303 rifles, 12-bore shotguns and pistols, while attacks on army

camps have yielded hauls of sten-guns and Indian-made self-loading rifles; these small arms

have been supplemented by bombs made from explosives smuggled into the country, mostly by

sympathetic Nepalese laborers working on road construction projects in India.76

Massive casualties have been observed in the past eight years--whole army barracks have

been run over with nothing else but death and spot-assassinations. The attacks, which were

basically focused on the police stations and personnel during the start of “People’s War” has

changed the trend towards attacks targeted on government installations, airstrips, other security

components, local bureaucrats, politicians, banks, and “hostile” villages towards the Maoists.

Often, the victim is murdered using knives and other weapons; vehicles belonging to security

personnel are either fired upon or ambushed; and the installations and government buildings are

bombed.77 In other words, physical actions have been taken against the general public, security

74
Due to security reasons, the names of the sources have not been quoted.
75
The captured M-16 rifle was proudly shown by Comrade Shyam, vice commander of the first battalion of the first
brigade of the Maoist Western Command to the journalists. See, “M-16s in Maoist hands,” Nepali Times
(Katmandu), 2-8 Jan 2004, # 177.
76
Extracted from various discussions held with Nepalese security personnel.
77
Shaul Shay.

35
forces, political party workers, and Nepalese working at foreign missions and international

organizations, while destructive activities have been launched on country’s infrastructure and

vital installations. Incidents, whether it be bombing of a police station or burning a diplomatic

plated vehicle or an inhumane killing of a reporter—on 7 September 2003 in Devisthan of

Sindhupalchowk district, reporter of National News Agency Nepal, Mr. Gyanendra Khadka, was

brutally killed by the Maoists by tying the hands behind the back and then slitting the throat--

always creates the extreme form of terror amongst the general populace.

Few notable incidents that critically strikes the human-mind can be taken as the major

attacks--as shown in the map below which shows “very high casualty attacks, i.e. above 100

dead or injured”--and of few other incidents such as the RNA confiscating two vehicles from

Katmandu district on January 2004 that were planned to use as a “vehicle bomb” against the

Chief of the Royal Nepal Army; Maoists abducting a Lieutenant Colonel of British Army Mr.

Adrian Briffith from Lekhani VDC of Baglung district on 20 October 2003, who had gone to this

area with three other Nepalese British Army personnel for recruitment purposes; the

assassination of the Chief of Armed Police Force, Mr. Krishna Mohan Shrestha, his wife and the

body guard at Bagdole of Lalitpur district on 26 January 2003 while they were on morning-walk;

and, the assassination of two US Embassy Katmandu security guards Mr. Ramesh Manandhar at

Ravibhawan of Katmandu district on 15 December 2001, and Mr. Dipak Pokharel at New

Baneshwor of Katmandu district on 9 November 2002 by the Maoists. There are hundreds of

other incidents that do fall under the “Maoist terror-campaign,” which would be too long to show

in this paper.

In the Maoist extortion side, it can be said that this activity is very strong throughout the

nation. An example of such activity can be taken of the Maoist rebels extorting money from

36
tourists in various districts of Nepal--army officials at the Suligad-based barrack said that the

rebel fighters were collecting Nepalese rupees 1,000 from every tourist visiting Upper Dolpo at

Dho of Dolpa district; and also tourist guide of Great Himalayan Adventure Pvt. Ltd. Dambar

Gurung said that he had to pay Nepalese rupees 12,000 to the rebels for 12 French tourists after

they threatened to prevent the group from visiting the Upper Dolpo area.78 This indeed has

created an impact on the tourism industry in Nepal, the country’s primary source of foreign

income. On the other hand multi-national companies like Coca Cola, Dabur Nepal, Colgate

Palmolive, etc have also been demanded money or else to face consequences--there have been

instances wherein these companies have been targeted by indiscriminate bombing and threat to

management.

In the abduction side during the same period, it is seen that the Maoists have abducted

302 NP personnel (out of which 272 were later released, 23 were killed, and 7 still missing), 13

APF personnel (out of which 5 were released, 3 were killed, and 5 still missing), 4 RNA

personnel (out of which 4 still missing), 1 NID personnel (killed after abduction), and 1828

civilians (out of which 1071 released, 160 killed, and 597 still missing).79 On the other hand,

police sources claim that 18,678 Maoists have been arrested, out of which 12,447 were later

released after investigation, 5847 have been prosecuted, and 384 are still under investigation; the

records further show that that 4030 Maoists, 1108 NP personnel, 175 APF personnel, 370 RNA

personnel, 10 NID personnel, and 1143 civilians have been killed; whereas, unspecified number

of Maoists, 1536 NP personnel, 238 APF personnel, 479 RNA personnel, 5 NID personnel, and

78
Maoists extorting money from tourists, [online news]; available from
http://www.nepalhomepage.com/ecommunity/interact/showTopic.php?id=1106821&forum_id=3; Internet; accessed
20 November 2003.
79
According to the Anti-terrorist Division, Nepal Police record January 2004.

37
2218 Civilians have been injured from the commencement of insurgency on 13 February 1996

until January 2004.80

Likewise, during the same period, there have been following number of different types of

incidents: 2085 lootings, 991 assaults, 1582 explosions, 232 vandalisms, 2408 arsons, 411

attacks at police stations, 1232 instances of confrontation with the police, 1893 rifles (.303

enfields) looted, 175 magnum (.22) looted, 225 shotguns looted, 575 twelve bore guns looted, 52

guns (.22 bore) looted, 400 revolvers and/or pistols looted, 917 musket guns looted, 19 air-guns

looted, 1191 hand bombs looted, 95 police communications sets looted, 29 foreign conducted

NGOs/INGOs attacked and vandalized, 351 government/semi-government conducted companies

attacked and vandalized, 119 telecommunication centers attacked and vandalized, 521 vacant

police posts attacked and burnt.81 On the other hand, the Maoists have looted Nepalese Rupees

1,580,871,000.00 worth of cash and kind during the same period.82 This indeed is a grave

concern to Nepal’s national security, not to mention the fear that is being generated amongst the

general populace, and the chaos in the political mainstream thus leading towards fragmentation

of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy.

While talking about the types of tactics employed, one has to look at the Maoist strategic

move implemented to fulfill their objective. Based on the Spirit of Revolutionary

Internationalism, the Maoists think that the new People’s Democracy will be reached by the

three strategic phases—strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offense. The strategic

defense phase consisted of various stages like preparation (from February 1995 until 12 February

1996), commencement (from 13 February 1996 until March 1996), continuity (from March 1996

80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
US dollar 1=Nepalese rupees 73.85; On the other hand the looted amount is quoted according to the Anti-terrorist
Division, Nepal Police record January 2004.

38
until September 1997), and the construction of the base areas (from September 1997 until 12

February 2000). Likewise, the strategic stalemate phase consisted of various stages like public

struggle at the cities (from 11 February 2000 until end of 2002), eradication of illusions created

by the reactionaries (end of 2002 until present), and joint government of revolutionary

communist powers (trying to form this government, and has already started forming

“Autonomous Regional People’s Governments”). Similarly, the strategic offense phase (which

according to Prachanda has already started as of January 2004) would be to follow international

conventions of war.83

The Maoists are seen appealing the general populace to unite and move forward with the

historic work for the establishment of New Nepal without being involved in the greediness,

threat, warning and verbosity of feudal elements.84 In support of this statement one can take the

recorded and telecasted interview of one of the top most Maoist leader--Krishna Bahadur

Mahara, presently appointed as the spokesman of the NCP (Maoist)--by Cable News Network

(CNN) on 14 November 2002, wherein the interview was focused towards bringing forward their

political demand of an interim government and constituent assembly, and with their slogan of

people’s democracy and new democracy.85

In regard to the foreign intervention for a peaceful solution—maybe another tactic to gain

time—in the Nepalese politics, Prachanda states the necessity of the UN to intervene and raise its

voice against US hegemonism growing in the present world and in the favor of peace and the

right of nations to self-determination.86 Likewise, Prachanda says that the decision has been

83
The dates in the bracket signify the period that the Maoists have been applying their strategy.
84
Maoist Press Release dated 5 October 2002.
85
Krishna Bahadur Mahara, “Maoist leader predicts ‘war to end’,” interview by Satinder Bindra, Cable News
Network (CNN) recorded telecast, 14 November 2002 Posted: 7:53 AM EST (1253 GMT); available from
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/11/14/nepal.mahara/index.html; Internet; accessed 15 November
2003.
86
Interview with Prachanda, 3 November 2003 [online information]; available from

39
made not to attack the NGOs and INGOs, except the ones directly run by the US, which he

claims as a preparation and a move towards strategic offense.87 Prachanda also makes it clear

that it has been the party policy not to take any physical action against any US citizens, tourist or

personnel except the US soldiers who come with so-called Royal Army to fight in the direct

encounter.88

In another aspect, to make the party’s information dissemination more strong in every

aspect, the Maoists have now designated Krishna Bahadur Mahara—polit-bureau member—as

the Spokesman of the Party.89

In an supplementary resolution for the current situation and to launch a strategic offense,

Maoists now consider the US imperialists as beeing isolated politically and caught in quagmire

of greater crisis militarily, and state that its strategy to tighten its hegemony in South Asia is also

facing newer problems.90 Therefore, the Maoists state that by focusing towards strengthening and

expanding the relations with the communists revolutionaries and anti-imperialist masses over the

world, like CCOMPOSA, the objectivity to concentrate ideological, political and military attacks

on the US imperialism and the royal military dictatorship would be achieved.91

Looking at the position of the present state of the old power, the Maoists sees the

necessity to carry forward firmly the Party policy of concentrating attacks on military fascism by

making political exposure of parliamentary capitulationism presenting itself as a middle-roader

http://www.cpnm.org/interviews/english/newinterview.htm; Internet; accessed 10 November 2003.

87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
89
Ibid.
90
Let's Concentrate Total Force to Raise Preparations for the (Strategic) Offensive to a New Height Through
Correct Handling of Contradictions, Supplementary resolution to current situation and our historic task presented by
Prachanda, 25 October 2003 [online information]; available from http://www.cpnm.org/documents/english/bulletin-
6.htm; Internet; accessed 1 November 2003.
91
Ibid.

40
and by uniting with the broad masses and classes.92 They think that the existing forms of actions

should be continued and stress should be placed on organizing centralized big actions, so that it

may exercise a qualitative role in the preparations for the counter-offensive and insurrection.93

As of 3 November 2003, the Maoists’ plan to gain over the negative consequences of

military actions, wherein they see the necessity to clarify the concept and practice in the context

of immediate military actions: on destruction and construction, they plan to “construct” in the

rural areas which are in their hold, while “destruct” in the urban areas which are in the hold of

the enemy; on annihilation of class enemies and spies, they plan for a certain minimum legal

method that needs to be adhered instead of using a particular team or member for annihilation

purposes in the rural areas; on action against enemy soldiers and police forces, they plan to

indoctrinate and persuade them to abandon the service instead of annihilation in the rural areas;

on dealing with opposition political leaders and cadres, they state that the physical action against

somebody should not be because of his/her membership of a particular party but due to his/her

involvement in the crime against the people and the “People’s War”—strive to follow the

democratic legal process in context of such person deserving punishment or physical action; on

collection of donation, they plan for party regional bureaus to control the activities of collection

of donations, wherein concrete criteria for collecting donations from the people on a class basis

are to be fixed; on various national and international non-government organizations, the Maoists

plan to deal positively with NGOs in the rural areas, which are not straightway linked politically

with the old state and are desirous of working in tandem with Maoist policies and plans, and

except for those INGOs directly financed by the US imperialism, Maoists state that they should

not carry out any physical action or exercise coercion against the INGOs related with neutral

92
Ibid.
93
Ibid.

41
countries or those not hostile against the “People’s War” like the European Union and others.94

Regarding the future military plan, the Maoists state that they plan on decentralized actions

instead of centralized ones, wherein the decentralized actions are to be resolutely carried forward

without any pressure and preparations are to be made for centralized and definite big actions.95

At present the Maoists have established a frequency modulation (FM) radio station in 98

megahertz at Sindhuli district, 95.1 megahertz around Katmandu district, and 24hrs FM program

called “Prachanda” through which they are expanding their propaganda campaign throughout the

nation. Likewise, they have established an online “Krishna Sen News Agency,” “People’s radio,”

weekly newspapers, “Maoist Information Bulletin,” and has a website at http://www.cpnm.org.

Through these mediums, the Maoists try to show that their present military might includes two

divisions, seven brigades, 19 battalions of PLA, and more that one hundred thousand militia in

the country—which can be questionable!9697 In the Maoist local governance side:

…an example can be taken of the establishment of labor camps, where the
culprits are made to work in the fields throughout the day and are allowed
to roam around, but in the evening they have to come back to the said to
be “Maoist prisons”. One such example is of the Maoist prison in
Kholagaon of Rukum district, where there are 12 inmates including three
women, who have been imprisoned by the Maoists because of their
involvement in offences like sexual, child marriage, and homicide. The
Maoists have introduced different legal measures to enforce it on their
enemies and rivalries they think are involved in activities against the
society.98

By implementing various tactics, the Maoists are now claiming that their armed struggle

against the Nepal Police is already completed because it [police] is in no position to counter them

94
Ibid.
95
Ibid.
96
Maoists smuggled arms worth Rs 90m during ceasefire, 23 October 2003 [online news]; available from
www.nepalnews.com; Internet; accessed 25 October 2003.
97
Maoist website; available from http://www.cpnm.org; Internet; accessed for the last one year.
98
SB Khanal, This is Maoist prison, 18 November 2003 [online article in Nepal magazine]; available from
http://www.kantipuronline.com/Nepal/Nepalmag.htm; Internet; accessed 20 November 2003.

42
[Maoist} effectively.99 Similarly, the armed struggle against the Royal Nepal Army which,

according to them, they would prefer that the army comes into the rural/interior areas to attack

them so that they could confront and defeat it; so that the last armed struggle against the Indian

army can continue.100 The Maoists apprehend or even foresee that when they ultimately proclaim

the establishment of a People's Republic of Nepal either in the areas presently under their control

or in the whole of Nepal, if and when they capture Katmandu, India might not be a silent

spectator of their success and that its [India] Army might intervene to crush the

Maoists.101 Maoist further proclaim that they are confident of being able to take on the Indian

Army, with the back-up support of the Maoists of India in general and of Bihar in particular.102

To conclude this section, it can be said that the Maoists are at present in the stage of

“strategic offense” to fulfill their prime objective. From small cells to large strong tactical

groups, from captured home-made guns to US made M-16 rifles, from creating terror in parts of

the society to through out nation, and from chatting with small groups of people to the usage of

propaganda campaign and the usage of internet has been a gigantic leap in the area of tactics in

the last eight years. Through the mixture of political and military strength and through

intimidation and terror, the Maoists have been gradually increasing the propensity of their terror

tactics. It is also noted that there have been notable changes in the Maoist tactics--supporting

bases, size, weaponry, and money. With this said, one can now move forward to discuss about

the Maoist ideology.

99
B. Raman.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
102
Ibid.

43
 MAOIST IDEOLOGY

The idea of starting the “People's War” in Nepal may have been hatched following a

meeting that took place on 1 July 1995 between the Indian Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)

(People's War) and the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist).103 At the meeting the two parties

issued the following joint statement:

The Parliamentary system of the reactionaries is facing a crisis

everywhere, but the revisionists still are shamelessly trying to take the
people along that path. It has, therefore, become essential to eliminate the
counter-revolutionary confusion of the parliamentary system and lead the
people toward ‘People's War’. The Marxist-Leninist-Maoist
revolutionaries of all countries thus bear the historic responsibility of
unitedly providing leadership to the imminent world revolution so as to
direct it along the path shown by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao by
thwarting revisionist conspiracies.104

Going through the fundamental essence of the Maoist philosophy that is being forcefully

influenced in Nepal, one can say that the core objective of the NCP (Maoist) is nothing else but

to establish new People’s Democratic Republic of Nepal. It is well known that the guiding

principle of the NCP (Maoist), the political representative of the Nepalese proletariat, is

Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, and its ultimate goal is socialism and communism. While firmly

adhering to its principles and goals the Party has been developing its policies in a flexible

manner on the basis of concrete analysis of concrete conditions, and has been particularly

stressing on creative application and development of the principles with ceaseless struggles

against dogmatism and empiricism in the realm of ideology.105 A statement of Prachanda can be

stated at this juncture to show the truth behind the above statement:

The 'People's War' according to the Maoist leader Prachanda, in pure

Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terms is one which is directed against feudalism

103
The Maoist Problem.
104
Ibid.
105
Prachanda.

44
 and for establishing a People's Republic. They believed their principle
provided the scientific tools to emancipate the suppressed working class.
The 'People's War' is directed against the 200 year old coalition between
feudalism and imperialism which would ultimately lead to the
establishment of the Peoples Republic.' 106

On 25 February 2001, on the occasion of the fifth year of “People’s War,” from a

convention held in the Rolpa district of Nepal, the Maoists adopted the "Prachanda Path" as the

party’s ideological stance with the same stature as that of international communist ideologies of

Marxism, Leninism and Maoism.107108 In other words, “Prachanda Path” is a particular set of

ideas of its own in the course of providing leadership to the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist

democratic revolution of the Nepalese people, wherein it has provided a new dimension of

ingenuity and creativity to the communist movement with the proposed new idea of

“Development of Democracy in the 21st Century”.109 In totality one can say that the NCP

(Maoist) have been using the ideology of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Prachanda Path to

move forward with their goal. The context of this philosophy can be noted from the extracts of

the convention notes:

At the conclusion of the convention Prachanda declared that there were no

real communist parties in Nepal…the situation in the country had become
chaotic and in order to resolve the present stalemate, the insurgents were
ready to initiate dialogues with the representatives of the King, the
government, the Nepali Congress and the NCP (UML). They also
suggested the formation of an ‘interim government’ and their willingness
to participate in it should such a government be formed. The statement
stresses the need to coordinate the important changes that took place on
the international scene in recent years with the long-term strategies of the
people's war and people's armed revolution. The statement concludes that

106
Anju Susan Alex.
107
The literary meaning of “Prachanda path” is “Prachanda way.”
108
According to Prachanda, “Prachanda Path” is the set of ideas developed from the second conference. This name
is kept, because it represents the centralized expression of the collective leadership and Comrade Prachanda’s
“correct and continuous leadership”. See, Prachanda.
109
Prachanda.

45
 no specific model of the proletariat revolution could presently be
developed in the context of the changes taking place in the world today.110

Prachanda’s own words offer evidence of his radical and violent intentions, signaling his

long-held conviction that the constitutional monarchy must be overthrown--for instance, during

an interview on May 28, 2001, Prachanda admitted that “the [people’s war] would not be

discarded until the final construction of Communism.”111 He confirmed, “Our talk of negotiation

[with the government] is a revolutionary tactic advanced in a conscious and balanced manner

after drawing lessons from the same negative experience in Peru.”112 These statements alone

forewarn of a miserable future for the people of Nepal and for the “peace process” naively hoped

to end the Maoist insurgency; but when complemented with additional facts, it becomes obvious

that the government’s current course of action vis-à-vis the rebels may lead to a strategic

catastrophe.113

Similarly, the Maoists’ second-in-command, Dr. Bhattarai’s statement during July 2003

points out that there is absolutely no possibility of the NCP (Maoist) turning into a parliamentary

party; and, also indicates towards the hasty ganging-up between the US and India primarily

designed to encircle China.114 Bhattarai further continues that in this changing global and

regional geo-strategic calculus Nepal occupies an important place due to its geographical and

historical setting; hence, the imperialists and expansionists would not tolerate any regime,

political force or leader in Nepal that refuse to dance to their tunes.115 In other words, it shows

110
The Maoist Problem.
111
Steven C. Baker, Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 25 July 2003, Frontpage Magazine.com [online article]; available
from http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=9090; accessed 20 November 2003.
112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
114
Ultimately the people’s will triumph, 13-20 July 2003, Nepali Times weekly Nepalese newspaper [online news];
available from http://www.peacemonger.com/edition6/interview.htm; Internet; accessed 30 August 2003.
115
Ibid.

46
that the Maoists are well aware of the international intervention and are preparing themselves for

the giant leap.

To give continuity to fulfill the objective, the Maoists have provided the basic outline of

the New Democratic economic development strategy--to usher in vibrant, self-reliant,

independent, balanced and planned economic development in the country primarily through a

radical land reform program based on the policy of land to the tiller and national

industrialization; and, basic thrust to completely dismantle the retrograde semi-feudal and semi-

colonial production relations in agriculture, industry and trade, and to develop a new type of

national capitalist relations oriented towards socialism, wherein they would maintain trade and

financial relations with all the countries in the world based on equality, mutual benefits and

national needs.116

Similalry, the Maoist political strategy has been formulated on the basis of study of

history of the Nepalese society and its economic, political and cultural specificities, wherein the

Maoists have concluded that feudal production relations and imperialist exploitation and

interventions are the main obstacles to the progress of Nepal.117 In this regard, the Maoists are

firm in its conviction that the development process of the productive forces would take a forward

course and the progress of the Nepalese society would be ensured only when

it is freed from the feudal production relations.118 Hence, the basic political strategy of the Party

is to free the Nepalese society from feudalism and imperialism through the bourgeois democratic

revolution, wherein the military strategy of “People’s War” is objectively based on the goal of

achieving this political strategy.119

116
Ibid.
117
Prachanda.
118
Ibid.
119
Ibid.

47
 Regarding the constitutional monarchy, Maoists state that the past 53 years of political

developments in Nepal have proved time and again that the feudal monarchy is the principal

impediment to the democratic rights of the people.120 They continue by saying that the eight

years of “People’s War,” the infamous Narayanhiti palace massacre and the regressive step of 4

October 2002, have inflated the hatred and wrath of the Nepalese people against the King and the

monarchy to its peak, because the fake monarchy erected after the palace massacre has

consistently opposed the proposal for a Constituent Assembly and the reality of the republican

consciousness of the general masses.121 They further state that the monarchy is making a vain

attempt to perpetuate the rule of genocide and terror on Nepal and the Nepalese people by

appeasing and kowtowing mainly American imperialism—and even the old regime has labelled

the great & historic democratic movement of the Nepalese people as “terrorism”.122

The Maoists state that they have been pursuing a very flexible “political tactics or

immediate policy” due to the present international situation and the prevailing balance of power

in the country.123 This minimum policy is focused towards a round table conference, an interim

government and election to a Constituent Assembly, and state that only a new constitution made

by a Constituent Assembly can in reality institutionalise the sovereign rights of the Nepalese

people, and can institutionalise a republican form of state—Maoist believes that in a free and fair

election the mandate of the Nepalese people would be in favour of a republic.124 They further

state that to obtain this tactical line, the party had entered into negotiations with the old regime

twice; however, both the times it was proved that the old regime was not in favour of a political

solution but was in the path of conspiracy and regression—rejecting the supreme democratic

120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.

48
method of Constituent Assembly to make a new constitution.125 Therefore, the Maoists now

conclude that in the given context of the existence of two ideologies, two armies and two states

in the country, the Party is agreeable to demobilization of both the armies and carrying out of

elections to the Constituent Assembly under the supervision of United Nations and international

human rights organizations.126

On another front, to move towards a republican state, the Maoists have now been

preparing the draft of the “Constitution of People’s Republic of Nepal 2060 [2003/2004]”127128 A

recently published article by Prachanda in the Maoist website have clearly indicated some

fundamental attributes of the content of new constitution which has been outlined below:129

(a) Political-

Full sovereignty to the people; secular state; elected house of representatives

as the highest representative body of the people; reorganization of a unified
national army; provision of national and regional autonomy along with rights
of self-determination; provision of constitutional changes or refinement
according to the wishes of the people; guarantee of multi-party competition,
periodic elections, adult franchise, rule of law and fundamental rights
including freedom of speech and press; provision of special rights for women
and dalits (i.e. oppressed caste).

(b) Economic-

Revolutionary land reforms for judicious redistribution of land on the

principle of ‘land to the tiller’; self-reliant and national industrial policy;
promotion and development of national capital; formulation of an integrated
national policy for proper utilization of natural resources.

(c) Social-

Development of a mechanism for strict punishment to the corrupt, smugglers

and profiteers; development of employment-oriented national and scientific
124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
2060 is the Nepalese year, and 2004 is the English year.
128
This draft constitution still has not been published in any Maoist documents; but the Nepalese security sources
have said that such document does exist.
129
Prachanda.

49
 education system; universal health service; provision of state care for the
destitute, the elderly and the children; end to all forms of exploitation,
discrimination and dishonour to women and dalits; guarantee of minimum
wages and worker’s participation in industrial management; guarantee of
intellectual & academic freedom and professional rights; promotion of
democratic and scientific culture in place of feudal and imperialist reactionary
culture; plan of integrated national infrastructure development; guarantee of
full employment to all; fulfilment of demands of class and mass organizations.

(d) Foreign Policy

Independent foreign policy of maintaining friendly relations with all on the

basis of Panchasheel (i.e. five principles of peaceful coexistence) and non-
alignment; abrogation of all unequal treaties from the past and conclusion of
new treaties and agreements on a new basis; promotion of good neighbourly
relations with neighbouring India and China with mutual cooperation in the
fields of utilization of natural resources, trade and transit, etc. for mutual
benefit, keeping in view the particularity of economic, political, cultural,
historical and geographical relations with them.

As per the Party’s known policy of granting autonomous rule along with rights of self-

determination to the oppressed nationalities and regions, a campaign is now underway to form

“autonomous region people’s governments” in the liberated areas. After completing the process

of forming elected people’s committees at village and district levels on the basis of revolutionary

united front policies, currently regional level people’s governments are being installed in

different parts of the country. This is supplemented by the seventy-five point “Common

Minimum Policy and Programme of United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC)‚ Nepal”

that has been formulated in order to guide the struggle to complete the New Democratic or

People’s Democratic Revolution and to guide the state after the revolution; attempts are being

made by the Maoists to implement them in areas where local state powers have been founded in

course of the development of people’s revolution.130

130
Common Minimum Policy and Programme of United Revolutionary People’s Council‚ Nepal, January 2003, The
Worker No. 8 [online information]; available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/worker/issue8/urpc.htm; Internet;
accessed 15 November 2003.

50
 Meanwhile, the Maoists have recently issued the “Autonomous Rule and Local Body

Directive-2060 [2004 AD]”and “Public Administration Directive-2060 [2004 AD]” to bring

harmony to the administration of local people’s power in the base areas throughout the

country.131 In these Directives, separate chapters have been included for the administration of

Autonomous Regions and Local Bodies, General Administration, Public Security, Revolutionary

Land Reform, Forest Management, Industry, Commerce and Finance, People’s Cooperatives,

Physical Infrastructure Development, Public Health, Public Education, People’s Culture and

Social Welfare. Similarly a Public Legal Code has been formulated to administer the New

Democratic people’s power.132

Similarly, the Maoists have now taken up the policy of using the political parties towards

republic, which is well reflected in the statement of Seti-Mahakali military Bureau-in-Charge

Pravakar.133 This strategy was also mentioned by Maoist supremeo Prachanda with the foreign

reporters.134 Moreover, the Maoist ideologue Dr. Bhattarai, in an interview to a Nepalese daily

newspaper has urged political parties to build a national consensus "working together with

Nepali Congress" to resolve the current deadlock, and said that he was "pleased with the present

political development" because the triangular conflict in Nepalese politics was developing to a

bipolar conflict of pro-monarchy forces and anti-monarchy democratic forces.135 Bhattarai has

further said that the "climax of this polarization will solve the present crisis," and has claimed

131
Autonomous People’s Governments Formed, 20 Jan 2004, Maoist Information Bulletin-8 [online news]; available
from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/cpnm/documents/english/information_bulletin8.htm; accessed 22 January 2004.
132
Ibid.
133
“Maoist policy to use the political parties,” Kantipur (Katmandu) Nepalese daily newspaper, 14 December 2003,
Vol. XI, No. 298.
134
“Comrade Prachanda proposes for talk,” Arthaduth newspaper, 15 Dec 2003, Vol. XXI, No. 30.
135
Unity of democratic forces: Bhattarai, [online news]; available from http://www.nepalnews.com; Internet;
accessed 20 December 2003.

51
that international power centers were also in favor of an alliance between the parliamentary

forces and Maoists for a progressive political exit and peace in Nepal.136

In totality one can say that the Maoist objective is to establish a People’s Democratic

Republic of Nepal based on socialism and communism, wherein the philosophies of Marxism-

Leninism-Maoism-Prachanda Path would be integrated. Therefore, to obtain the republican form

of state, Maoists have forwarded their minimum demand—round table conference, interim

government, and election to constituent assembly to the HMG of Nepal. Recently, they have

come with the view that since at present there is a status quo in the country--two ideology, two

states, and two army—they would agree to demobilize both the army and carry out election to

Constituent Assembly under supervision of United Nations and international human rights

organizations. Now one can describe the possible social, political and economic factors in the

creation and activities of Maoists.

POSSIBLE SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE CREATION

AND ACTIVITIES OF MAOISTS

The political and security analysts say that the possible social, political and economic

factors in the creation and activities of the “People’s War” in Nepal is because of the following

existing and ongoing problems in the country:137

• Geographical condition-

Due to the geographical location and condition of the terrain, the governments’
security and development programs has not reached all the places in the country.
In other words, most of the Maoist affected areas are far from central
management, wherein the local people are poor, simple, and uneducated.

136
Ibid.
137
The views are collected in general from various articles and journals, and Mercy Crops, Western Nepal Conflict
Assessment, March 2003.

52
• Caste and ethnicity-

Over half of Nepal’s 23 million citizens are either members of the untouchable
occupational caste known as Dalits or of nearly sixty ethnic groups comprising
roughly 35% of the national population, who reside mainly, but not exclusively,
in the Hills. Dalits represent about 20% of Nepal’s population; Magars represent
more than 7% of Nepal’s population; and, the Tharu people with over 6.75% of
the national population.

Within these groups, the Dalits are only limited to such occupations as tailors,
blacksmiths, shoemakers, and jewelry makers, whose per capita income is US$ 40
in comparison national per capita income of US$210. Likewise, most of the
Tharus are trapped in a system of bonded labor, while others are among the
poorest landless class in the Terai. These caste and ethnic attributes were
exploited by the Maoists to launch their “People’s War,” by promising autonomy
and liberalization.

• Economic condition-

Economically, Nepal is among the poorest and least developed countries in the
world, with nearly half of its population living below the poverty line. Economic
assistance from other countries, especially India, has been vital to Nepal; since the
1980s, however, bilateral aid and multilateral assistance programs from countries
other than India have been an increasingly important part of development
planning--Nepal has received aid from both the US and communist countries.
Nepal's industrial base was established in the 1930s, but little process has been
made in improving economic performance. In the early 1990s, tourism was one of
the largest sources of foreign exchange; visitors from the US were the most
numerous.

• Exclusion from civil service or unemployment-

There are grievances, which affect minorities as a group. For example, according
to one university expert, an 1854 survey revealed that 98% of civil service posts
were held by Brahmins, Chhetris and Newars--the country’s three dominant
castes. A similar survey published in the Nepal Press Digest in 1991 reported that
93% of these jobs were held by the same groups. In 137 years, the lower status
half of the Nepali population gained only a 5% share of these sought-after
positions.

• Fraction in Nepal Communist Party-

The NCP (Maoist) took momentum when the political wing of Nepal’s radical left
parties, the UPF split in August 1994 into two parties--UPF (Vaidya) and UPF
(Bhattarai).

53
 • Election abuses or unfair election-

In 1989, the nation-wide “People’s Movement” signaled a popular demand for

multi-party democracy, resulting in Late King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev
acceding to this demand and promulgated a new Constitution in February 1990.
Elections for the Parliament were held in May 1991; elections for ward, Village
Development Committees and District Development Committees were held in
May 1992. From the beginning these elections observed violence and fraud
against the minority parties, one of which was UPF (Bhattarai). Therefore, later
before the mid-term election on 1994 the UPF (Bhattarai), a political wing of
NCP (Maoist), led by Dr. Bhattarai denounced parliamentary politics and
boycotted the elections and joined hands with NCP (Maoist) to wage “People’s
War”.

• Post election abuses-

While the UPF (Bhattarai) party did well in the 1991/1992 elections in Rolpa and
Rukum districts of Nepal, it polled poorly at the national level, winning only 9
(4%) of the Parliament’s 205 seats. The Nepali Congress Party was elected to
national office with 110 (54%) of the seats, while the UML won 69 seats (34%).
From 1993 to about 1995 there was an escalation of violence in Rolpa and Rukum
districts. During these violence, UPF leaders were severely beaten by other
political cadres and/or the police. Since, Nepali Congress won the election, the
newly formed government instructed the police to arrest UPF activists, which
resulted in massive arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions.

In other words, due to harsh government actions against the Maoist forces in the
western Nepal during 1995, especially by the police operations named “Romeo
Operation” which didn’t go according to the government plan to win the “hearts
and minds of people,” the Maoists were able to motivate local people to support
“People’s War.”

• Non-fulfilment of Maoist forty-point demand during the starting stage-

During 4 February 1996 the UPF (Bhattarai) submitted a list of 40-point

demands--related to nationalism, people’s democracy, and public livelihood—
were not fulfilled by the then government.138

• SiJa Campaign-

During 1994, the Maoists began a long-term consciousness-raising and political

mobilization campaign in areas of Rolpa district. The campaign was named
“SIJA” after Sisne mountain, which at about 6,000 meters is the highest peak in
the area, and the Jaljala shrine. This campaign was organized by one of the most
senior Magars in the Maoist movement, military commander Ram Bahadur
138
As mentioned in the Maoist Brief Histroy section.

54
 Thapa, known as “Badal,” wherein people from the districts gathered for
developing this area as the insurgency base—from this came the name “SIJA”
campaign.

• Disillusion with multi-party democracy-

It has been observed that fifteen governments have been constituted since the
enforcement of the democratic Constitution. The governments formed were
majority, minority, coalition and two formed under the Article 127 of the
Constitution—said to be an active form of monarchial rule. Under the same
constitution, 22 sessions of the parliament were convened while the parliament
has remained dissolved at the moment. During this period, constitutional
questions were raised on the rights of the Prime Minister to dissolve the
parliament, the water resources agreement with neighboring countries and
citizenship to which the Supreme Court gave its verdict to resolve the
Constitutional complexity. Of late, questions are being raised that the present
Constitution is not being able to address the issues of dalits, women, janjatis and
other backward people. This resulted in widespread disillusion towards multiparty
democracy because of the corruption, ineptitude and failure to deliver material
benefits.

• Untrustworthy and doubtful matters-

There arose a question of doubtfulness amongst the local population because the
government was not fulfilling the promises they had made during the election
campaigns.

• Oath taken by people in the rural society not to get dissected from the local
communal religion-

The factor that the local populace wanted to survive within their own ethnic
community has created a enormous impact in homogeneity of the society in the
rural areas.

• Domination in the society and community by elites-

People from minority groups and also the general local population was being
exploited by the so-called elites within those societies. The real domination was
done by castes like Shah, Thakuri, Rana, etc. in almost all aspect of the societal
attributes.

• National and international links-

The national and international links has basically helped the NCP (Maoist) to
flourish for the last eight year, wherein they have received training, financial and
moral support, supply of arms and ammunition, safe haven, meeting and planning

55
 point, indoctrination, formation of inter and intra-alliance, and even strengthening
of the communist propaganda campaign. Especially support is being given to the
Nepalese Maoists by the Maoists of the South Asian region formed under an
umbrella entity named CCOMPOSA—a regional strategic concept of the RIM.

Maoists have been able to create a strategic vacuum in the South Asia with the
help of the CCOMPOSA by exploiting the Nepalese political system, using the
open access of the Indo-Nepal border, manipulating the corrupt system of the
region.

• The Existence of triangular conflict in the country-

It can be said that there is an existence of a triangular conflict in the country,

whose actors are: the Monarchial Power, the Parliamentary Power, and the Maoist
Power. Constitutional monarch is the source of the Monarchial Power, wherein
the present King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev personifies this power; the six
major political parties—Nepali Congress (NC), Nepal Communist party (United
Marxist Leninist) or NCP (UML), Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), Nepal
Sadhbhawana Party (NSP), Nepal Worker and Peasant Party (NWPP), and
People’s Front Nepal (PFN)--that were in the House of Representatives, prior to
its dissolution, falls under the Parliamentary Power; whereas, the Nepal
Communist Party (Maoist) or NCP (Maoist) falls under the Maoist Power.

• Difference in the perception of the three powers-

The perception of the three powers has been found to differ significantly between
the two given timeframes: from the start of Maoist insurgency until 3 October
2002, and 4 October 2002 until the present. It is seen that the role of the
Monarchial power went from passive to active; the Parliamentary power from
conducting military actions while in government, to unstable and feeble “joint
agitation” (after PM Deuba was shacked by His Majesty); and, the Maoist power
from the direct demand of republican state to the formation of new constitution
through constituent assembly and moving towards a progressive political solution
for establishing a new People’s Democratic Republic. It is seen that with the
changes in the government there has been changes in the perceptions of all the
three powers. This has been especially true after 4 October 2002, where His
Majesty shacked PM Deuba and formed a new government after taking over the
executive power.

• All the three powers are using the Maoist demands as the “bargaining chips”-

On the worst part, it is seen that the “three powers” are using the Maoist demands
as “bargaining chips” to ensure their politics flourish and get strengthened in the
eyes of the general populace. Some within the Parliamentary power is voicing to
reinstate the dissolved House of Representatives, whereas, others are voicing for
an “all-party government” stating that if their demands are not fulfilled they will

56
 continue with stronger “joint agitation”. On the other hand, the Monarchial power
is indirectly requesting--through various means--to all the political parties to join
the present government to solve the Maoist problem through dialogue or else in
silent words they seem to say “we will deal with it alone;” whereas, the Maoist
power with the support of CCOMPOSA is using the strategy of negotiation and
offense as their present weapon. In totality one can say that a bargain is going on
about whom to give what, how much, and to whom--the philosophy being holding
on to the “power politics”.

• Conflict between Monarch and the political parties-

It is seen that the political parties, once voicing for the monarch has now started
voicing against Him. In a similar way, the Monarchial power once very near and
dear to the Parliamentary power has now been avoiding them, and seems to be
guided by international power politics.

• Role of Royal Nepal Army-

The monarch is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army,

which basically is considered a force not favorable to other forces in Nepal.

• Foreign power politics-

Nepal being a land-locked country located between two big countries—India and
China—plays a critical geo-strategic role in the South Asian region. In this
circumstance overt and covert moves by foreign power centers in the internal
affairs of Nepal has been continuing for long.

• Non-fulfillment of the Maoist present demands-

The Maoist present demand of round table conference, interim government, and
election to constituent assembly is still being negotiated for a solution—
negotiation of peace-talk has already failed couple of times.

• Conflicting view about Maoist insurgency amongst international community-

The worst part is that the international community itself has not been able to come
to a consensus about their “strategy towards the Maoists.” In one hand, it is seen
that the US government is whole-heartedly moving against the Maoists, whereas
the European Community is giving a double standard view. Similarly, India is
playing a strategic game by ignoring that the Nepalese Maoists are using the
Indian soil for action against Nepal.
The above-mentioned details are the possible social, political, and economic factors in the

creation and activities of the Maoists in Nepal. In other words, the existence of suppression,

57
injustice, nepotism, inequality, unemployment, abuses, international power politics, internal

rivalries and grudges, political imbalance, and deteriorating economic condition within a society,

which is multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, has given birth to this conflict. After going through the

factors that created the Maoist problem, one can now point-out the alliances of the Maoist with

other organizations or movements.

ALLIANCES OF THE MAOIST WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS OR MOVEMENTS

The national and international links has basically helped the NCP (Maoist) to flourish for

the last eight year, wherein they have received training, financial and moral support, supply of

arms and ammunition, safe haven, meeting and planning point, indoctrination, formation of inter

and intra-alliance, and even strengthening of the communist propaganda campaign. The support

from within the country varies from labors to the intellectuals, which can be outlined as:139

•
•
All Nepal National Independent Students Union (Revolutionary), ANNISU (Rev)

•
All Nepal National Communist Youth League (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Ethnic Community Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal National Intellectual Organization (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Trade Union Federation (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Women’s Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Teachers Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal People’s Cultural Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Carpet Laborers Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Transport Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Hotel & Restaurant Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Builders Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Meter Tempo Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Press Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Peasants Association (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Thanka Artists Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
All Nepal Shops Labor Union (Revolutionary)
All Nepal Newspaper Sellers Union (Revolutionary)
139
Compiled from Maoist documents and police sources.

58
 •
•
Himalayan Trading Labor Union (Revolutionary)

•
Pong Communist League

•
Madhise Liberation Front

•
Newa Khala

•
Tamang National Liberation Front

•
Tharuwan National Liberation Front

•
Tamuwan Liberation Front

•
Magarat Liberation Front

•
Dalit Liberation front

•
Karnali Liberation Front

•
Seti-Mahankali Liberation Front

•
Kirat liberation Front

•
Khumbuwan Liberation Front

•
Darai Liberation Front

•
Rakbanshi Liberation Front
Human Right Concerning Committee

In addition, during the beginning of 2002, the NCP (Maoist) formed Tamuwan National

Liberation Front, Magrat National Liberation Front, Madhise National Liberation Front, and

have also given recognition in the Maoist party, wherein the members of above-mentioned

Liberation Fronts--which have been fighting for the liberation of ethnic community--are force to

shed blood in the name of Maoists People’s War.140

The above-mentioned internal groups have been in the forefront to help the Maoist with

the necessary manpower for overt as well as covert implementation of Maoist policy in Nepal. In

other words, the internal networking of the Maoists through these entities have strengthened their

local intelligence collection, subversive, and for local movement strategies.

On the other hand, the external supports range from the Maoist Communist Center

(MCC) and People’s War Group (PWG) in India, up to the communist parties in the western

world, wherein the international players can be best identified as:141

140
“Kirat National Liberation Front Threatened Maoist Commander,” Saptahik Nepali Awaz (Katmandu) weekly
newspaper, 26 February 2002.
141
Ibid.

59
 •
•
All India Nepal Union

•
All India Nepal Students Union

•
Transportation Labor Union, India

•
Nepal Youth Association, Chennai Committee, India

•
United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

•
Northern Bihar Liberation Front (NBLF)

•
Bharatiya Communist Party (Maoist)

•
Maoist Communist Center (MCC), India

•
Peoples’ War Group (PWG), Andra Pradesh, India

•
East Bangal ‘Sarbahara’ Party, Bangladesh

•
Kerala Communist Party

•
Revolutionary Communist Party, USA

•
Philippines Communist Party

•
Turkey Communist Party

•
Rastriya Swayan Sewak Party (RSS), India

•
Revolutionary International Movement (RIM)
Co-ordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia
(CCOMPOSA)

In regard to the strong linkage between the Nepalese Maoists and the Indian Maoists the

joint declaration of 8 July 2002, as quoted below, can be taken as the thrust towards

strengthening their future policies and operations in South Asia:

The Indian rulers in their historic worldwide campaign against so-called

terrorism, seeks to crush the revolutionary forces of not only India but also
throughout South Asia. Acting as a regional guideline of the imperialism
specifically the US imperialism, the Indian expansionists together with
their puppets in Nepal are planning further intervention in the sovereign
states of Nepal to crush the growing Maoist forces there.142

Not only with the Indian Maoists, the Nepalese Maoists have extremely good linkages

with the other Maoists entities, which is refelceted in the article written by Anju Susan Alex:

The Maoist communist revolutionaries from Peru, Philippines and India

(Andhra Pradesh and Bihar) are linked with the Revolutionary
Internationalists Movement (RIM), which is preparing the ground for the
ultimate coming together of the Communist Revolutionaries throughout
the world. The NCP (Maoist) is a participating member of this movement.
The RIM is the embryonic center of the world genuine communist forces
142
Police source.

60
 and it’s struggling for the formation of a Communist International, a new
type based on Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. It is believed that they have
more than fraternal links with the Maoist Communist Center (MCC),
which operates in the Indian States of Bihar and the People’s War Group
(PWG) in Andhra Pradesh. It is also believed that the Maoist insurgents
have linkages with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ilam (LTTE) operating
in Sri Lanka.143

The above statement of Anju can be well verified by the way Prachanda describes the

influence of international proletariat on their movement, wherein RIM played a critical role:

In the whole process of this final preparation...there was consistent

international involvement…RIM Committee (Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement)…the experience in Turkey, the experience in
Iran, and the experience in the Philippines…experience in Bangladesh and
from some experience in Sri Lanka…we were also having direct and
continuous debate with the Indian communists, mainly the People's War
(PW) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC) groups…It helped us to
understand the whole process of People's War. Therefore, what I want to
say here is that one of the specific things about our People's War, the
initiation of our People's War, is that there was international involvement
right from the beginning…Help, debate and discussion was there.144

A 19 June 2002 report indicates that the Nepalese Maoist insurgents and PWG have

formed the Indo-Nepal Border Regional Committee (INBRC) “to coordinate their activities” in

Bihar [India].145 Nepalese Maoist representatives are known to have participated in the PWG's

congresses and also the Maoist leaders have been provided safe sanctuaries in MCC and PWG

hideouts.

Moreover, as the NCP (Maoist) has always believed that the third and final stage of its

fight to achieve power in Nepal would have to be against the Indian army, since India, in its

perception, would not tolerate the Maoist Government in Katmandu and would try to have it

overthrown through military intervention. Hence, to gain this objective, the Maoists have seen

143
Anju Susan Alex.
144
B. Raman.

61
the necessity to network with the Maoist organizations of India in order to keep the Indian

security forces preoccupied in dealing with their activities--possibly this is the reason the

Nepalese Maoists became the active member of the CCOMPOSA.

CCOMPOSA is the South Asia-based Maoist networking conceptualized by RIM, which

was established on 1 June 2001. This entity includes ten left-extremist outfits active in India,

Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh--the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the Communist Party

of India (Marxist-Leninist) (People's War), the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) of India, the

Revolutionary Communist Center of India (MLM), the Revolutionary Communist Center of

India (Maoist), the Communist Party of India (ML)(Naxalbari), the Purba Bangla Sarbahara

Party (CC) (Bangladesh), the Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party (Maoist Punarghathan Kendra), the

Bangladesh Samyabadi Party (ML), and the Communist Party of Ceylon (Maoist).146

The formation of CCOMPOSA has also facilitated the exchange of expertise, weapons

training and flow of weapons--while explosives stolen from quarries and ordnance factories flow

from the PW's hands to the Nepalese Maoists, guns are said to move in the reverse direction.147

The real significance of the creation of the CCOMPOSA, say analysts, lies in the consequent

emergence of a "compact revolutionary zone (CRZ)," wherein cooperation between Maoist

outfits active in Nepal through Bihar, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh up to Andhra of India has

provided the left-extremists contiguous areas in which to operate, move, hide and train.148

Even Dr. Bhattarai’s determination for the need to expand and use the CCOMPOSA for

the overall betterment to fight the US imperialists and the Indian expansionists points towards a

145
Ibid.
146
Members as of its Second Annual Conference on September 15, 2002, [online information about CCOMPOSA];
available from http://www.massline.info/India/Indian_Groups.htm#CCOMPOSA; internet; accessed 30 August
2003
147
Sudha Ramachandra, Red alert in Andhra Pradesh, [online article from Asia Times]; available from
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EJ08Df05.html; Internet; accessed 30 August 2003.
148
Ibid.

62
strong linkage between NCP (Maoist) and other Maoist parties of this South Asian region for

creating a volcanic revolutionary center:

A Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South

Asia (CCOMPOSA) have been launched on 1 June 2001 to unify and
coordinate the revolutionary process in the region. As South Asia is
developing into one of the post potent volcanic centers of revolution in the
21st century, this initiative of CCOMPOSA has been very timely and
significant. We are all strengthening and expanding CCOMPOSA, which
is destined to play an historic role in the South Asian region.149

Sources in the troubled Northeast Indian State of Assam indicated in November 2003 that

there was increasing evidence that the proscribed ULFA was forging links with the Nepalese

Maoists and may soon set up bases in the Himalayan Kingdom.150 ULFA and the Maoists are

reported to have recently agreed to have the former operate three new bases in Nepal; earlier

reports suggest that the ULFA may already have been operating some camps in Nepal and have

agreed to share training resources.151

Likewise, the arrested Maoists in India have disclosed to the Indian police that several

newly recruited cadres were being given arms training in special training camps in the forests of

Bagha in the West Champaran district [of India], which have, of late, emerged as a safe haven

for the Nepalese insurgents.152 Recently, a high level Maoist militant, who surrendered six

months ago, publicly admitted on 22 January 2003 that “the Maoists were being trained by two

Indian (terrorist) outfits, PWG and MCC, at least for three times (first was to 17/18 Maoists five

years back, second was to 70/80 Maoists two/three years back, and third was to around 150

149
Ultimately the people’s will triumph.
150
P.G. Raja Mohan, Maoist Incursions across open borders, 15 December 2003, Vol 2, No. 22, The
Counterterrorism Page [online article]; available from http://www.terrorism.net/article.php?sid=164; Internet;
accessed 25 December 2003.
151
Ibid.
152
Sanjay K Jha, research associate, Nepal and the Maoist maize, 22 Oct 2002, Institute for Conflict Management
India, Global Vision News Network [online article]; available from
http://www.gvnews.net/html/DailyNews/alert2595.html; Internet; accessed 20 December 2003.

63
Maoists two years ago) in Rolpa and other districts in western Nepal.”153 This information surely

justifies the assumptions that were made during October 2000 that Nepalese Maoists were being

trained by Maoist and other outfits in South Asia.

The Bihar police also suspect that one of the top ideologues of the Nepalese Maoists,

Baburam Bhattarai, is hiding in Bihar.154 Reports also suggested that the executive head and

Chairman of the Maoists, Prachanda, had entered India and held a meeting with the Naxalites at

Patna in May 2002.155 Apart from Bihar, the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) is also

fast emerging as a shelter for the Maoists, particularly in the border districts of Baharaich and

Maharajganj; the Maoists are also attempting to establish a network in north Bengal and

Sikkim.156 Available evidence suggests that the Maoists have been able to penetrate deep into

certain border areas, particularly Darjeeling and Siliguri in north Bengal of India, and have been

instigating local Nepalese settlers to assert their "right to self-determination" in Nepali

dominated areas.157 The more disturbing trend relates to reports about Maoist linkages with the

Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), which primarily operates in parts of West Bengal and

Assam of India, and is believed to provide sanctuary to Maoist cadres fleeing Nepal.158

When talking about alliances, one has to critically analyze the medial alliances near Indo-

Nepal border, which helps the Maoists take care of their injured or sick. An Associated Press

report of 13 December 2003, stated that at least 128 injured Maoists from Nepal had been treated

at hospitals in Uttar Pradesh of India--an Uttar Pradesh Home Department official, Anil Kumar

Singh, confirmed, further, "The actual number must be very high, and many rebels, who operate

153
According to Mr. Jaya Bahadur Gharti, 25yrs, Maoist Battalion Commander. See, PWG, MCC trained Maoists
admits ex-militant; available from http://www.nepalnews.com.np; Internet; accessed 22 January 2004.
154
Sanjay K Jha.
155
Ibid.
156
Ibid.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.

64
through their local contacts, get treatment at undisclosed locations."159 This does point out that a

major network of medical practitioners does exist for the support mechanism of the Maoists--

either through self-acknowledgement, being a sympathizer, or through intimidation.

On another facet of alliance, one can take the “alliance of the Nepalese Maoists with the

Nepalese living or working in India”. The view expressed during 7 December 2003 by Dr.

Bhattarai who said that there are more than 10 million poor Nepalese who earn their livelihood in

India and that the Maoists are trying to organize them and under their protection plans to hold

talks with different quarters—thinks that this is a “big revolutionary responsibility.160 This

headline news caught the attention of the already speculating security forces that Maoists were

organizing Nepalese in India, which in-fact can be taken as a strongest mass-alliance.161 It is

plausible that much of this “organizing” would be routed through the “Akhil Bharatiya Nepali

Ekata Samaj (ABNES),” which is a proscribed group in India under the Prevention of Terrorism

Act (POTA), 2002.162 ABNES was originally founded to work for the “unity and welfare” of

Nepalese residing in India, which gradually evolved into a front organization for the Nepalese

Maoists and is increasingly identified with the demand for a “Greater Nepal,” which includes

Indian territories.163 Sources indicate that ABNES secretary Bamdev Chhetri had visited Jammu

in India in September 2001 to establish contact with Kashmiri militant groups in order to set up a

supply line for arms for the NCP (Maoist); Chhetri was eventually arrested by Indian authorities

in September 2002 and subsequently deported to Nepal.164

159
P.G. Raja Mohan.
160
“Maoists plan to ‘organize’ Indian Nepalese,” The Himalayan Times (Katmandu) daily newspaper, Vol. III, No.
15.
161
Ibid.
162
Maoist Alliances in India and Nepal, 17 December 2003, Ranthburg, online [online news]; available from
http://www.rantburg.com/default.asp?D=12/17/2003&C=India-Pakistan#22868; Internet; accessed 1 January 2004.
163
Ibid.
164
Ibid.

65
 The “organizing of Nepalese in India,” shows a critical Maoist manoeveur, because only

last month on 20 November 2003, the Maoist met with the NCP (UML) --one of the five main

political parties of Nepal— leaders (Madhav Nepal and few others) in Lucknow of India.165 In an

interview, Maoist spokesman and politburo member Mr. Mahara claimed to the press at

Jungathapa Chaur of Jajarkot district that both Maoists and NCP (UML) have reached a secret

agreement to launch anti-monarchy movement in the country.166 This in addition to the 17

August 2001 meeting between Prachanda and other Nepalese leftist leaders in Siliguri of India

shows the existing possibilities of the communist parties getting together for a “joint

revolutionary government” in Nepal, by acknowledging and accepting the Maoist demand of a

People’s Democratic Republic of Nepal.

Another example of alliance can be taken as that of propaganda campaign via worldwide

web and other publications. One such alliance can be taken as the support extended by the

American Revolutionary Communist Party to the NCP (Maoist), in the form of launching

websites, selling books and newspapers in the western world, and sending individuals to the

remote areas of Nepal in the name of “fact finding” missions. These activities help support the

propaganda and disinformation campaign about the Maoist movement in Nepal.

The Revolutionary Communist Party, USA (RCP) is a staunch supporter of Maoist

people’s wars in Peru, Nepal and the Philippines.167 A letter send by RCP to NCP (Maoist) to

commemorate the “One Year Anniversary of the People’s War in Nepal” (February 13, 1997),

read: “It is a great testimony to the strength of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and is an important

165
Maoists plan to ‘organize’ Indian Nepalese.
166
Maoists hint at shift in stand on Monarchy, available from http://www.nepalnews.com.np; Internet; accessed 22
January 2004.
167
Steven C. Baker.

66
victory and source of inspiration not only for the NCP (Maoist) but for the RIM, of which we are

proud to be a participant together with you and other comrades all over the world….”168 This

letter further read that the RCP fully supports the NCP (Maoist), and the revolutionary warfare in

Nepal is every day more a shining beacon for the oppressed masses in the United States and the

world over, pointing to the path of “People's War,” which alone can bring about the defeat of

imperialism and reaction and open the door to the bright new future of socialism and

Communism.169 Likewise, RCP Chairman Bob Avakian has urged support for “the Maoists in

Nepal, waging a war of liberation, People’s War;” moreover, he condemns the United States

Government for its decision to describe the NCP (Maoist) as a terrorist group, and instead he

contends that the insurrection is a “military struggle.”170

To summarize the alliances of the Maoists in Nepal, it can be said that the national and

international linkages does exist due to which the support system is being fed to the ongoing

insurgency in Nepal, making it difficult for the Nepalese security forces to curb the situation.

Especially, support is being funneled to the Nepalese Maoists by the Maoists of the South Asian

region formed under an umbrella named CCOMPOSA—a regional strategic concept of the RIM.

With this said, one can now move forward to describe the political/security significance of the

Maoist.

POLITICAL/SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MAOIST

To have a better understanding of the political and security significance of the Maoists,

one has to absorb the significances stated by the Maoists themselves, the present stage of HMG

168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid.

67
of Nepal, and the way the international community is perceiving and reacting to the ongoing

problem. Only through this, counter insurgency analysts will be able to understand and

recommend effective counter-measures.

The Maoists state that during the last eight years they have been able to expand their

network and have enrooted themselves in the microcosm of the society. In other words, they

want to show their immense national and international significance in this country as being the

basic necessity of the time. According to the Maoists, the correct Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

ideological, political, organizational and military perspective has been the most significant

distinguishing feature and guiding factor for the successful launching of “People's War” in

Nepal. The elaboration of the first significance, as quoted below, shows that the fight for

establishing communism is still going on, and that the strategic and tactical balance between the

political, military and the frontal organizations of NCP (Maoist) has shown the needed

orientation for the perception of the “People’s War”:

At a time when the imperialists and their lackeys were rejoicing over the
demise of phony 'communism' in the erstwhile Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe and the revisionists and neo-revisionists had been apologetically
taking recourse to the cocoon of parliamentarism or outright
liquidationism of various hues, this people's war has shown that the fight
for communism is far from over and that the road to real communism is
illuminated only by Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Firm adherence to the
succinct Maoist formulations of ‘Everything is an illusion except political
power’ and ‘Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun’ has given the
people's war a definite and correct political orientation. Similarly, a
correct grasp of the importance of concurrent development of the three
magic weapons of a new type of a proletarian Party, a People's Army and
a revolutionary United Front under the leadership of the proletariat has
provided a proper organizational orientation for the people's war. And
above all, the historically synthesized military science of the proletarian
revolution and in particular the theory of the protracted people's war
developed by Com. [Comrade] Mao has been the military guide of this
historic war.171

171
Long Live The People's War! [online article]; available from
http://www.maoism.org/misc/nepal/worker3/editorial.htm; Internet; accessed 20 January 2004.

68
 Secondly, the Maoists see that the great success of the eight years of “People's War” in

Nepal has been ensured by the correct assessment of the prevailing objective and subjective

conditions and formulation and implementation of politico-military policies, plans and programs

accordingly. In their own words:

…But the crisis of the old Nepalese state ridden by class, national and
regional contradictions have been so acute and deteriorating over the years
that all attempts at cosmetic reforms have miserably failed and a
revolutionary transformation of the state and society has been urgently
overdue. On the subjective plane, the exploited and oppressed masses of
the people and various oppressed nationalities have accumulated a long
experience of struggle against this rotten system and acquired a
revolutionary consciousness to go all out to smash this state. More
importantly, the party of the proletariat, i.e. the NCP (Maoist), has been
steeled through long years of inner-struggle and class struggle and finally
acquired the capability and maturity to lead this inevitably violent and
protracted revolution; based on the assessment of these concrete objective
and subjective realities the plans and programs for the systematic initiation
and development of the people's war were drawn and implemented in a
phased manner.172

The third significance, according to the Maoists, is the unprecedented sense of

revolutionary devotion, courage and sacrifice practiced by the Nepalese proletariat and the

oppressed masses which has been instrumental for the forward march of the people's war so far.

Maoists point out that the tribal youths that are being used as “mercenaries” in the foreign armies

are now being re-channeled for the betterment of the “People’s War”; in other words:

…instances of daredevil bravery exhibited by the guerrilla fighters and the

high levels of devotion and sacrifice maintained by the Party members and
supporters have contributed immensely to spread the fire of people's war
far and wide in the country. This re-channeling of the vast reservoir of
energy of the poor peasant and tribal youths for the revolutionary
purposes, so far misappropriated and squandered by the British
imperialists and Indian expansionists through cheap mercenary services in
172
Ibid.

69
 their predatory armies while flattering them as 'brave Gurkhas', should
play a major role in the future development and successful conclusion of
the people's war under the leadership of the Party of the proletariat.173

Fourthly, the immense goodwill, sympathy and support given by the international

proletariat through their Parties and organizations in the true proletarian internationalist spirit and

tradition have contributed a lot towards the successful development of the “People's War” in

Nepal. The CCOMPOSA has been formed in order to unify and coordinate the activities of the

Maoist parties and organizations in South Asia to confront this developing situation by spreading

protracted “people’s war” in the region, in the context of hastening and advancing the World

Proletarian Socialist Revolution; this too is a historic step of far-reaching significance. These

affiliations and supports are termed by the Maoists as yet another significance, because a

revolution in certain country is taken as the base area for the world proletariat revolution:

In this context we deem it our duty to gratefully acknowledge the

important contributions of the Committee of the Revolutionary
Internationalist Movement (RIM), of which our Party is the proud
participating member, and various Parties and organizations within and
outside the ambit of the RIM. Also, the revolutionary people's war raging
in Peru, Philippines, India (Andhra Pradesh, Dandakaranya and Bihar),
Turkey and other parts of the world provide a direct inspiration to the
revolutionaries in Nepal. It is this sense of belonging to and learning from
the experiences of the world proletarian movement that has been one of
the most significant contributing factors for the development so far, and
would be the ultimate guarantee of the success or otherwise, of the
people's war. Because in the present era of imperialism and the so-called
'globalization' and 'cyberspace', the revolution in a particular country can
be, and should be, viewed only as a base area for the world proletarian
revolution.174

The above significances, as stated by the Maoists, is much reiterated in the interview of

Maoist polit-bureau leader, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, taken on 7 December 2002 by Chitra Tiwari-

173
Ibid.
174
Ibid.

70
-a Washington based analyst of international affairs--which was published on 14 December 2002

on The Washington Times. This interview needs to be quoted here because the context of climax

being reached is quoted, which has a significant thrust on the possibilities of various scenarios

that can develop in Nepal—in-fact a communist state:175

• The situation is now peaking towards a climax after the fratricidal and regicidal
“king,” Gyanendra, and his notorious son, Paras, have staged a retrogressive coup
d’etat against the supine parliamentary democracy on 4 October 2002 and
restored autocratic monarchy in the country. This has substantiated our long-held
position that the limited democratic rights won after the 1990 people’s movement
were not enough for a full-fledged democracy, and the real state authority and
sovereignty were still vested in the monarchy due to its traditional strange-hold

•
over the royal army, bureaucracy and the economy.
In the current triangular balance of forces—namely [among] the monarchists,
parliamentary democrats and revolutionary democrats—if the latter two
democratic forces are able to mount a joint struggle against the feudal autocratic
forces, there are strong chances that democracy will be consummated in the

•
country in the near future.
Our own preference would be to settle the problem internally without any external
interference. But if the complexities of the situation, particularly Nepal's specific
geo-strategic positioning between two super states, India and China, so dictate,
then we would not mind facilitation or mediation of some genuinely neutral

•
international organizations.
Our party, our party Chairman Prachanda and our various publications have time
and again stressed that our immediate political agenda is to consummate a
democratic republic in the country. Please note that we are not pressing for a
"communist republic" but a bourgeois democratic republic. For that we have
advanced the immediate slogans of a round-table conference of all the political
forces, an interim government and elections to a constituent assembly, which have

•
been increasingly endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the population.
As the constituent assembly is the highest manifestation of bourgeois democracy
in history, we fail to understand why anybody claiming to be a democrat should

•
shy away from this.
The Second National Conference of our Party held last year has already resolved
to discard some of the negative and harmful experiences of the international
communist movement—particularly those of the Stalin era—and further develop
and enrich the positive experiences, especially on the question of mass
democracy. Skeptics can go to our numerous base areas and see for themselves
how we are practicing democracy among millions of different classes,
nationalities, regions, castes and gender.

175
Chitra Tiwari, Maoists seek a democratic Nepal, 7 December 2002, The Washington Post [Interview, published
on 14 December 2002]; available from http://www.washingtontimes.com; Internet; accessed 17 December 2003.

71
 • Since ours is a genuine People's War, the people themselves are the real source of
our finances. We also collect taxes from businessmen and industrialists, and
occasionally seize from banks. As regards the sources of weapons, it is an open
secret that our enemy is the greatest source so far. As Mao said, even the foreign

•
powers may supply us via our enemy.
As per the action against two Nepalese citizens working in the US Embassy in
Katmandu for espionage charges, the party has reviewed the cases and resolved
that henceforth, if any such charges were leveled against any such employee, the
concerned embassy would be advised before taking any actions. However, we
would caution the enlightened American people to beware of the xenophobic

•
propaganda of the US government to hide its nefarious agenda.
We have publicly stated our position about the future state and government
systems in the 75-point Common Minimum Policy and Program of the United
Revolutionary People's Council (URPC). There we have clearly stressed our

•
commitment to a multiparty system in the future state setup.
We have time and again made it clear that we will have diplomatic and friendly
relations with all the countries of the world on the basis of five principles
(Panchsheel) of peaceful coexistence—namely mutual respect for each others
sovereignty and national integrity, non-interference in each others internal affairs,
equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Given the specific geo-
strategic position of the country sandwiched between the two huge and hostile
states of India and China, we will strive to maintain friendly and equidistant
relations with the two immediate neighbors. It is just ridiculous to presume that a
state of Nepal's size and strength can inflict by design any harm to giant India, a
nuclear power. Rather Nepal has long been a victim of unequal relations with
India since the Sugauli Treaty of 1815-16, which will have to be sorted out in a

•
friendly manner.
By ideological persuasion, we are avowed proletarian internationalists. Hence we
have no xenophobic apprehensions to have mutually beneficial economic and
other relations with any country or international organizations. In that sense, we
would welcome foreign aid and loans, which are beneficial to the Nepalese people
and their economic development. Of course, the basic thrust of our economic
development policy would be self-reliance and abolition of dependency, which
has plagued the country's economy for long. For this we intend to restructure our
economic relations with foreign countries and multilateral institutions in a
friendly and cooperative manner.

Looking at the above interview, there is no way one can believe that the Maoists are for

the multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, because in yet another article written by

72
Dr. Bhattarai himself, he has again reiterated the necessity of a new constitution made by an

elected constituent assembly and to establish a republican state.176

Now, to look at the political and security significances from a different angle, one can

take the present stage of government of Nepal. The Nepalese government primarily viewed the

insurgency as an exclusively law and order problem and used police units, which was not

equipped to handle a rapidly spreading insurgency, and frequently blamed foreign powers,

usually India and sometimes US for aiding the Maoists; however, they were unable to provide

any proof or convincing argument to back up the claims.177 As the insurgency progressed, the

government was forced to accept the political and economic dimensions of the problem, but

could not come to a general consensus on “how to deal with the problem” pre-assuming that it

might lead to potential abuse and impingement of citizen's rights.178 Gradually, the government

realized the limitation of using the police in fighting the insurgency, but still was not able to

involve the RNA due to the refusal of the King.179

Therefore, one can say that the government is not being able to understand the strategic

significance of the current developments. It is clear that the Maoist leadership is far more aware

of this significance than is the national leadership at Katmandu--both at the Palace and among

the democratic parties.180 Prachanda's recently declared statement, "From a tactical point of view,

at present the people's army is going ahead with primary and decentralized resistance so as to

feel the pulse of the enemy, tire them out and to prepare ground for centralized offensive," can be

176
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, Rejoinder on some current issues, 4 Sept 2002 [online article]; available from
http://www.insof.org/050902_bb_arti.htm; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002.
177
Laxman Bahroo.
178
Ibid.
179
Ibid.
180
Ajai Sahni, How not to Fight an Insurgency, 8 December 2003, Vol 2, No. 21, South Asian Intelligence Review
[online article]; available from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_21.htm; Internet; accessed 22
December 2003.

73
taken as a mild-stone in the part of the Maoists.181 On the other hand, though holding and losing

territory matters little to the insurgents, it is central to the government that it must govern them, it

must provide the public goods and services, including most significantly, security of life and

property, that its citizens expect in exchange for their allegiance.182

In this, the government is failing the people of Nepal despite the joint mobilization of the

security forces and the morale support of the international community.183 In fact, instead of

jointly trying to solve the problem in the country, the existence of a triangular conflict--between

the monarchy, political parties, and the Maoists--is helping the Maoists “tap the situation”

according to their favor.

In the environmental context, it is seen that Nepal’s natural resources and wildlife is

under grave danger. The Regional Environmental Hub of US Embassy in Nepal points out that

the impact on Nepal's environment, natural resources and conservation efforts also has been

severe due to the ongoing Maoist insurgency; Maoist attacks on forest and park personnel, as

well as on army posts in protected areas, illegal logging, and poaching of endangered wildlife are

all on the rise; on the other hand, deforestation is accelerating, and globally significant

biodiversity resources are facing extinction.184

In the US front, the Bush administration has used the political instability and the rise of

Maoist forces in Nepal as levers to get much more involved in the internal affairs of Nepal,

which is seen as being of great strategic significance because of Nepal's geographical position

181
Ibid.
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
The Impact of Nepal's Armed Conflict on Conservation Efforts, American Embassy Kathmandu, Regional
Enviornmental Hub; available from http://www.south-asia.com/USA/hub_impact.htm; Internet; accessed 10 January
2004.

74
with relation to India and China.185 Analysts nearer to the “communist blocs” and India state that

this Administration putting the NCP (Maoist) under "Other Terrorist Groups” on 30 April 2003,

even though the Maoists were formally implementing a ceasefire and negotiations with the

government were on, can be taken as a strategic move of US to enforce its presence in this

region.186 To support this view, the analysts point out that the US government signing a five-year

Anti-terrorist agreement with the Nepalese government "for cooperation in fighting terrorism and

preventing possible terror attacks," increasing the military aid--both in terms of financial aid and

hardware along with the training of Nepalese armed forces—and, within Nepal, strengthening

the hand of the monarchy, which has traditionally relied upon and been associated with the

dominantly royalist military, can be taken as few examples of the US strategic move.187

Similarly, to strengthen the grip further, the US again designating the NCP (Maoist)

under Executive Order 13224 as of 31 October 2003, which blocks the Maoists’ assets in the US

or held by US persons wherever located and bars most transactions or dealings with the

organization, and also lists several aliases for the organization including the URPC and the PLA

of the Maoist, all of which are covered by the sanctions.188189 This indeed shows that the US is

very much worried about the present situation in Nepal.

Noteworthy are also some views of analysts of the Western world. They say that it does

not require a leap of faith to imagine an anti-American regime such as Prachanda’s working with

its internationalist brethren in the US and abroad to attack US interests worldwide; it is also

185
Jayati Ghosh, Continuing Conflict in Nepal, 19 July–1 Aug 2003, Vol 20, Issue 15, Frontline [online article];
available from http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2015/stories/20030801003311500.htm; Internet; accessed 10
November 2003.
186
Ibid.
187
Ibid.
188
Ibid.
189
US blocks CPN-Maoists’ assets, 1 November 2003 [online news from Gorkhapatra]; available from
http://www.gorkhapatra.org.np/pageloader.php?file=2003/11/02/topstories/main1; Internet; accessed 3 November
2003.

75
conceivable that the totalitarian nature of a Prachanda regime will eventually find common cause

with virulently anti-US elements in the Islamic world.190 Similarly, these analysts state that the

real contest is between India and China--if Nepal become a communist state led by Prachanda,

this would place Nepal in the pro-China camp and offer a proxy through which like-minded

governments and individuals may influence events in the region and affect the balance of power

internationally.191 On the other hand, the Maoist insurgency though confined to Nepal, presents

India with multiple concerns. The anti-Indian rhetoric of the NCP (Maoist) and its programs seek

to weaken the India-Nepal bond to the detriment of both countries.192

The crux of Indian foreign policy concern is the spread of anti-Indian ideology; the

success of the Maoist movement in Nepal may encourage a similar movement in Bhutan, a rural

monarchy and Indian protectorate.193 An ascendant insurgency will increase the morale of the

fraternal organizations, provide arms, funds and encourage copycat attacks.194 This points

towards a much more greater concern for the Indian government, not because of the Maoists

operating in Nepal, but because of the NCP (Maoist) increasing their potential linkage in the

South Asia, of which most of the linkages are with different communist parties in India.

On human rights aspects, the seven international human rights organizations--Amnesty

International, the Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT), Human Rights Watch

(HRW), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the International Federation of Human

Rights (FIDH), the International Service for Human Rights (ISHR), and the World Organization

against Torture (OMCT)--have strongly endorsed the call by the Nepal’s National Human Rights

Commission (NHRC) and eight Governmental donor agencies and Embassies in Katmandu for

190
Steven C. Baker.
191
Ibid.
192
Laxman Bahroo.
193
Ibid.

76
international monitoring of the human rights situation in Nepal and have urged the international

community to fully support this appeal, and have also called on the HMG of Nepal to extend

invitations to visit the country to the human rights experts of the United Nations Human Rights

Commission. In the same joint statement, the Canadian Embassy, the United Kingdom

Department for International Development (DFID), the French Embassy, the German Society for

Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Royal Danish Embassy, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, the

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation and the Netherlands Development Organization

have expressed concern about “the rapidly deteriorating human rights situation” and declared

that there is an “urgent need” for the Government and the Maoist rebels to sign the proposed

Human Rights Accord--the NHCR has presented a proposal for a Human Rights Accord to the

Government and the Maoist rebels which would provide for five NHRC regional monitoring

units in the country to operate in cooperation with the UNHCR.

As the human rights organizations are voicing their words of concern, there are others

that have also put their views about Nepal in the international community. The British

Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the foreign Commonwealth Office stated on 12

October 2002 that the international community has pledged full support to the Nepali people to

end Maoist insurgency and to bring about development in the country-terrorism can never be

allowed to win--international community is determined to support democracy opposing

terrorism. Similarly, in a statement issued on 12 October 2002 by the President of the European

Union, the insurgents were urged to immediately end their violent actions and enter into a

political dialogue with the Government of Nepal; at the same time the European Union reiterates

the urgent need to address the underlying causes of the ongoing conflict, including the issue of

194
Ibid.

77
poverty, corruption, and human rights. A report in India Today of 21 October 2002 writes about

the grave Indian concern: “India's worst nightmare would be a tri-cornered fight between

monarchy, political parties and the Maoist rebels, who are threatening to overrun the country; it

is in touch with Gyanendra as political unrest in Nepal could have security ramifications for

Delhi.” Likewise, the editorial in The Times of India newspaper of 18 November 2002, states that

the state of near civil war in Nepal with monarchy unable to check the unrelenting Maoist

offensive is an “Save our Soul (SOS)” that those interested in peace in the Himalayan Kingdom

can not ignore; friends of Nepal would agree that the situation appears irretrievably grim as

things stand today. The newspaper further continues that any headway towards ending the

insurgency in Nepal appears unlikely without Washington's tacit help; however, New Delhi,

which has been giving all assistance to Katmandu for combating "Maoists terrorism" will do well

not to get embroiled any further in this conflict, because that would be courting another fiasco

like the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) mission to Sri Lanka.

As of November 2003, the view given by the British Ambassador to Nepal, Keith

Bloomfield, on the conduct of the counter-insurgency operations and the role of the international

community in getting the palace and the parties to patch up, stresses that the cost of trying to

force the Maoists back to the negotiating table through military means is too high. With the

British Ambassadors’ latest views, it seems that the US is standing all alone in its effort to help

Nepal come out of the crisis. Since Ambassador Bloomfields’ view is totally in the opposite

direction of the US strategy towards the Maoists in Nepal, it needs to be quoted here to show the

impact it can have on the US interest:

There has been certain amount of misunderstanding of our position,

particularly in relation to development activities and human rights. We
have had a policy for some years of not supplying lethal weaponry and we
are continuing with that policy. We are very attached to the observation of

78
 human rights, partly because we believe that is the way to win the battle
against the Maoists for the hearts and minds of the Nepali people…What
we are saying is when they do happen [violation of human rights] then
there must be steps to make sure that they don’t happen again. The people
concerned, if they are found guilty, should be punished…I think the
fundamental objective here is a democratic and stable country that is
prosperous, development-friendly, human-rights respecting…What I was
hearing in this country back in February almost unanimously was that the
Maoists were forced to negotiations because they believed that they would
not win militarily, and by August this had all changed. I continue to
believe that there is no victory for either side through military means
alone…The cost of trying to achieve a military victory or even forcing the
Maoists back to the negotiating table and rejecting overtures meanwhile is
too high for this country to pay in terms of human lives and the
economy…All my diplomatic colleagues are very keen to see a peace
process restored as soon as possible. I think there are slight nuances about
whether and how far the Maoists need to be weakened before one goes
back into the peace process but, as far as we are concerned, humanitarian
arguments for an early as possible ceasefire are overwhelming…The
Royal Nepali Army has improved its defensive capabilities during the
ceasefire in the same way as the Maoists have strengthened their political
position in certain parts of the country. As I said, I don’t think a military
solution is possible. It follows, I think, that we do not accept that the
Maoists can be forced to the negotiating table through military
means…We believe there is a role for the international community in this
process…We believe that a united body politic is essential to provide and
find a long-lasting solution to the conflict…For that reason we have been
urging the king and the parties for many months now to find a way to
overcome their differences…I think there is a will on both sides [king and
the parties] to form a multiparty government. The differences are about
how and on what conditions this can be achieved. We have had some
success on the basic principle but very little success, as is apparent, in
terms how this should be achieved…We can say as friends to you in
Nepal, we believe that the political constitutional forces need to be
reconciled. What we cannot, and should not do, is who should be the
prime minister or how the difficulties should be overcome…It’s an
ongoing process [regarding aid to royal Nepal Army]. As I said, the UK
does not supply lethal weaponry. We do have a program of ongoing
assistance, mostly in the field of training, which will continue because we
believe the state has the right to protect itself against a violent threat of the
type posed by the Maoists.195

195
The cost of trying to force the Maoists back to the negotiating table through military means is too high, 21-27
November 2003, Nepali Times (Katmandu) news magazine [online interview of the British Ambassador]; available
from http://www.nepalnews.com/ntimes/issue171/interview.htm; Internet; accessed 22 November 2003.

79
 To summarize the political and security significances of the Maoist, one can now state

that not only there is a great impact on the politico-socio-economic aspects within Nepal, but

also there is a critical threat to the regional balance. Nepal moving towards or becoming a

“communist hub” of the world revolution is never going to be accepted by the western world,

wherein overt or covert interventions in the internal affairs is very likely, especially by India

because of its direct national interest. At this juncture a question then arise, “What would the

worlds only super-power do—will it keep quiet or intervene?” With the creeping thought that—

“South Asia might now become a second Middle East” because “Nepal is moving towards

becoming a failed state due to the ongoing Maoist insurgency”--entangled in the mind, one can

now move forward to predict the future capabilities, possible types of operations, and

survivability of the Maoists based on the past and the present scenarios. This then would point

towards why the “People’s War” conducted by the Maoists can be taken as a critical threat to the

National Security of Nepal.

PREDICTIONS AS TO THE FUTURE CAPABILITIES, POSSIBLE TYPES OF

OPERATIONS, AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE MAOISTS

This section is focused towards predicting the future capabilities, possible types of

operations, survivability of the Maoists, and would try to clarify why “People’s War” can be

considered as a threat to Nepal’s National Security. But before predicting, one has to understand

the terms “insurgency” and “national security,” and also grasp the strength of the present

Constitution, so that the judgment remains within the parameters of this paper.

80
 “Insurgency” is a violence in support, strategically, of a political goal, operationally, of a

political infrastructure, tactically, of local political domination.196 On the other hand, “national

security” signifies protection of the nation’s people and territories against physical assault and, in

that narrow sense is roughly equivalent to the traditionally used term defense; however, an

extensive meaning of “national security” also implies protection, through a variety of means, of

vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values

and vitality of the state.197

As the power of a nation is conditioned by (a) what that nation is in relation to people and

national consciousness, (b) what it has in land and material resources, one can consider these as

the elements of national power, wherein the power of national state is measured by the degree to

which it is able to achieve that which it desires.198 The sum of the desires or objectives of a

nation is known as the national interest, which means that the government pursues to attain these

ends are termed national policy (domestic or foreign), wherein the soundness of a national policy

may be measured by the success with which it uses the nations resources and energies to provide

prosperity, amicable foreign relations and the safeguards of defense.199 The national security

strategy is the bridge that connects the national instrument of power (military & diplomacy) and

the country’s defined national security objectives, and it seeks to direct and relate the national

security instruments to policy goals.200 This paper would evaluate the threat to Nepal’s National

196
Tom Marks, Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspective
(Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994), 2.
197
Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, American National Security, 5th Edition
(Baltimore, Maryland: The JohnHopkins University, 1999), 3.
198
Human resources include not only manpower but also those characteristics required to make manpower effective:
“know-how,” national cohesion, energy, resourcefulness and character, type and influence of government. Under
material resources are classified all those material things needed for maintaining a peacetime economic and for
waging war. See, S.T. Das, National Security in perspective (Shakti Nagar: Delhi, Gian Publishing House, 1987), 3.
199
Ibid., 4.
200
Collin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, 17.

81
Security from “People’s War” based on the three basic elements--ends, ways and means--of

national security as defined by Senator Honasan and Mr. Castillo.201 Prior to evaluating the

threat, the three elements need to be defined and conceptualized--according to Honasan and

Castillo:202

A. The Ends-

The national security defines the country’s strategic objectives/visions, which are
derived from the hopes and aspirations of the people it seeks to serve. The goal of
a national security strategy is to ensure the protection of the nation’s fundamental
and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of the people, maintain the
sovereignty of the country, with its values, institutions and territory intact. The
primary objective of a strategy is to protect and enhance the peoples’ physical and
the government’s political survival. Political survival means that the government
can effectively exercise sovereignty, delegated to it by the people, over its defined
territory. This espouses the idea that existential threats are the primary threats to
security. The secondary objective of a strategy is the protection and enhancement
of the pillars of national security: social cohesion, political stability, and
economic prosperity. The primary and secondary objectives are not merely
desirable but are vital to the overall security of the state.

B. The Ways-

A national security strategy must seek to create conditions in its environment

where the nation’s interests are rarely threatened, an environment where the
nation, through its government and people, can influence the policies and actions
of countries and individuals that can affect the well-being of the nation.

Shaping the country’s security environment is a big challenge. It requires the

utilization of all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the action
of other states and non-state actors. It also requires a demonstrated will and
capabilities of the nation to continue the role it has assumed to itself. Most
important is that the people and the national leadership demonstrates the
willingness to bear the costs of shaping the country’s security environment. Thus,
the national leadership must be able to foster the broad public understanding and
support necessary for the implementation of country’s national security strategy
and plans. It must also sustain its current security activities or engagements.

In an event where shaping the security environment proves difficult, the nation
must be prepared to respond to the different challenges using the national security
instruments in its possession. National security strategy must, therefore, provide

201
Senator Gregorio B. Honasan; Michael Eric L. Castillo.
202
Ibid.

82
 an array of possible responses consonant to the anticipated risks that may occur in
its security environment.

It is also imperative that the country cooperates with like-minded nations in

pursuing its security objectives to lessen the cost of attaining common security
objectives. No nation can defeat all threats to its security. Therefore, the strategy
must include cooperation as one of its central thrusts. Security relationships with
other nations should be adapted to combat threats to common interests.

Building effective coalition with countries of similar interests is not enough. A

country should continue strengthening its own capabilities so that it can
effectively combat threats when responding to challenges in alliance with other
nations becomes difficult, if not impossible. It must harness its armed forces for
effective utilization and must organize all it resources in such a way that they are
readily available when needed. Resources of all sorts must be organized for easy
and quick mobilization.

C. The Means

Every country faces the problem of scarcity; resources are limited. Thus, a
country should be selective in the use of its capabilities. It must also be selective
in its international involvement. The choices and decisions that a country makes
must always be tied with the objective of advancing its defined national security
interests.

The country’s diplomatic instrument of power is the countries first line of

defense. Its diplomatic corps must be composed of professional and well-trained
individuals. Members of the diplomatic corps must possess a broad understanding
of the dynamics of domestic and international politics.

The country’s armed forces remain to be a strong source of the country’s security.
A country can rely only from organized armed forces for its defense. Like the
diplomatic corps, it must also be composed of professional individuals. The
armed forces must be equipped with tools/technology demanded by the times.

As the three elements of “national security” have been identified and described, one can

now look at the present Constitution of Nepal 1990--derived from the hopes and aspirations of

the Nepalese people--which is the product of the popular People’s Movement that restored

multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy after thirty years of tyrannical Panchayati

Rule--wherein the monarch used to play an active role.

83
 In the Preamble of the present Constitution, it is stated that the source of sovereign

authority of the independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people; moreover, it

guarantees basic human rights to every citizen of Nepal, and also consolidates adult franchise,

parliamentary system of government, constitutional monarchy and system of multi-party

democracy by promoting amongst the people of Nepal the spirit of fraternity and bond of unity

on the basis of liberty and equality, and also establishes an independent and competent system of

justice with a view of transforming the concept of the “rule of law” into a living reality.203

Likewise, in Part 4, Article 24, 25 and 26 of the present Constitution, the Directive

Principles and Policies of the State of Nepal is outlined, wherein Article 24 states about the

Application of Directive Principles and Policies, which are:204

(1) The principles and policies contained in this Part shall not be enforceable in any
court.
(2) The principles and policies contained in this part shall be fundamental to the
activities and governance of the State and shall be implemented in stages through
laws within the limits of the resources and the means available in the country.

Similarly, the Article 25 states the five Directive Principles of the State:205

(1) It shall be the chief objective of the State to promote conditions of welfare on the
basis of the principles of an open society, by establishing a just system in all
aspects of national life, including social, economic and political life, while at the
same time protecting the lives, property and liberty of the people.
(2) The fundamental economic objective of the State shall be to transform the
national economy into an independent and self-reliant system by preventing the
available means and resources of the country from being concentrated within a

203
Constitution of Nepal 1990, Part 4, [online information]; available from
http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/constitution.html; Internet; accessed 10 October 2003.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
205
Ibid.

84
 limited section of society, by making arrangements for the equitable distribution
of economic gains on the basis of social justice, by making such provisions as will
prevent economic exploitation of any class or individual, and by giving
preferential treatment and encouragement to national enterprises, both private and
public .
(3) The social objective of the State shall be to establish and develop, on the
foundation of justice and morality, a healthy social life, by eliminating all types of
economic and social inequalities and by establishing harmony amongst the
various castes, tribes, religions, languages, races and communities.
(4) It shall be the chief responsibility of the State to maintain conditions suitable to
the enjoyment of the fruits of democracy through wider participation of the people
in the governance of the country and by way of decentralization, and to promote
general welfare by making provisions for the protection and promotion of human
rights, by maintaining tranquility and order in the society.
(5) The State, in its international relations, shall be guided by the objective of
enhancing the dignity of the nation in the international arena by maintaining the
sovereignty, integrity and independence of the country.

In the same way, the State Policies, which are very crucial for Nepalese national security

is outlined in the Article 26 of the present Constitution, which are:206

(1) The State shall pursue a policy of raising the standard of living of the general
public through the development of infrastructures such as education, health,
housing and employment of the people of all regions by equitably distributing
investment of economic resources for balanced development in the various
geographical regions of the country.
(2) The State shall, while maintaining the cultural diversity of the country, pursue a
policy of strengthening the national unity by promoting healthy and cordial social
relations amongst the various religions, castes, tribes, communities and linguistic
groups, and by helping in the promotion of their languages, literatures, scripts,
arts and cultures.
(3) The State shall pursue a policy of mobilizing the natural resources and heritage of
the country in a manner, which might be useful and beneficial to the interest of
the nation.
(4) The State shall give priority to the protection of the environment and also to the
prevention of its further damage due to physical development activities by

206
Ibid.

85
 increasing the awareness of the general public about environmental cleanliness,
and the State shall also make arrangements for the protection of the rare wildlife,
the forests and the vegetation.
(5) The State shall create conditions for the economic progress of the majority of the
people, who are dependent on agriculture, by introducing measures that will help
in raising productivity in the agricultural sector and develop the agricultural sector
on the principles of industrial growth by launching land reform programs.
(6) The State shall pursue a policy of increasing the participation of the labor force,
the chief socio-economic force of the country, in the management of enterprises
by gradually securing employment opportunities to it, ensuring the right to work,
and thus protecting its rights and interests.
(7) The State shall pursue a policy of making the female population participate, to a
greater extent, in the task of national development by making special provisions
for their education, health and employment.
(8) The State shall make necessary arrangements to safeguard the rights and interests
of children and shall ensure that they are not exploited, and shall make gradual
arrangements for free education.
(9) The State shall pursue such policies in matters of education, health and social
security of orphans, helpless women, the aged, the disabled and incapacitated
persons, as well as ensure their protection and welfare.
(10) The State shall pursue a policy that will help promote the interests of the
economically and socially backward groups and communities by making special
provisions with regard to their education, health, and employment.
(11) The State shall, with a view to bringing about prosperity in the country, pursue a
policy of giving priority to the development of science and technology and shall
also give due consideration to the development of local technology.
(12) The State shall, for the purposes of national development, pursue a policy of
taking measures necessary for the attraction of foreign capital and technology,
while at the same time promoting indigenous investment.
(13) The State shall pursue a policy of creating conditions for the acceleration of the
speed of rural development, keeping in view the welfare of the majority of the
rural population.
(14) The State shall, in order to secure justice for all, pursue a policy of providing free
legal aid to indigent persons for their legal representation in keeping with the
principle of the Rule of Law.
(15) The foreign policy of Nepal shall be guided by the principles of the United
Nations Charter, nonalignment, Panchsheel, international law and the value of
world peace.

86
 (16) The State shall pursue a policy of making continuous efforts to institutionalize
peace for Nepal through international recognition, by promoting cooperative and
good relations in the economic, social and other spheres on the basis of equality
with neighboring and all other countries of the world.

The Directive Principles and Policies of the State of Nepal as stated in the present

Constitution, not only ensures the protection of the nation’s fundamental and enduring needs, but

also envisions Nepal’s golden future with peace, progress and prosperity. Therefore, in the

theoretical aspect, it can be well said that the primary and the secondary objectives of Nepal’s

national security strategy is well protected and consolidated in the present Constitution. In other

words, the three elements of Nepalese national security are well structured, focused, strong, and

secured in the present constitutional context.

One can now start assessing the threat to Nepal’s National Security from the ongoing

“People’s War” by examining the three elements of national security. The first element of

national security strategy, “the ends,” can now be compared within the context of Nepal, wherein

a question can be asked: How is the first element of Nepal’s national security strategy--the end--

threatened by the “People’s War?” The answer depends on the ultimate core objective of the

NCP (Maoists), which is to establish new People’s Democratic Republic of Nepal—in fact a

communist state, which will maintain people’s communism and authoritarian over the rivals.

Though the Maoists state that in the new Constitution—Constitution of People’s Republic

of Nepal 2060--the sovereignty would still be inherent in the people, it is seen that the Maoists

want to replace the present political system of multiparty democracy and constitutional

monarchy with a progressive republican system, which they like to call a new People’s

Democracy. Maoists see the Parliamentary system of the reactionaries as facing crisis

everywhere, but the revisionists still trying shamelessly to take the people along that path;

87
therefore, they say that it has become essential to eliminate the counter-revolutionary confusion

of the parliamentary system and lead the general population toward “People’s War.”207

Likewise, the Directive Principles and Policies of the State of Nepal as mentioned in the

present Constitution is under grave threat because the base of the Maoist directives of the

People’s Republic would be Marxism-Leninism-Maoism-Prachanda Path. In this type of “closed

society,” people would loose their liberties; the economic policy would be much centralized and

state controlled, wherein the private and public sector would have a hard time to survive because

of the national industrial policy; the social factor would see upheavals as different castes and

ethnic groups would have their own government, therefore creating a fractured society with

communal upheavals and grudges; the tranquility and order in the society might face

disturbances as democratic groups and political parties would be under constant suppression; in

the international arena, a communist Nepal would be questionable at this part of the world

because the of the likelihood of the country becoming a base for the world revolutionary

movement directed against what the Maoists call—US imperialism and Indian expansionism; the

balanced development in various regions in Nepal would suffer due to the fractured society;

there would be a lack of national integrity and unity; the national resources instead of being

mobilized for the interest of the nation as a whole would be mobilized only for certain areas or

regions because of the independent autonomous regions; questions would arise in the labor

market, as employment opportunities would face negative aspects; and, the attraction of foreign

capital and technology would be directly hampered due to a communist and socialist policy.

In totality, one can say that the “People’s War” is directed against the spirit of the present

Constitution, wherein the first element of national security--the ends—is under constant threat

because both the primary and secondary objectives of this element is being exploited.

207
Ibid.

88
 The second element of national security strategy, “the ways,” can now be compared

within the context of Nepal. In other words, it is necessary to see if Nepal’s national security

seeks to create and build conditions in its environment where the nation’s interests are rarely

threatened, shapes the nations security environment, constructs effective response capabilities,

and builds effective international co-operation and coalition. It is only through strengthening “the

ways,” Nepal’s national security can be strengthened.

Again a question can be asked: How is the second element of Nepal’s national security

strategy--the ways--be threatened by the “People’s War?” It is seen that Nepal’s national security

is being threatened both internally and externally. As it is being extremely difficult for the nation

to influence the policies and actions for the welfare of the nation, through the government with

the involvement of the people, one can say that the internal threat does exist. Moreover, the use

of “fear as a weapon” by the Maoist is encroaching the freewill of the people for a democratic

consensus; in democracy, the key to a successful national security strategy lies in the consensus.

In Nepal, political instability--frequent changing of governments--has hampered the

ability to forge consensus to implement key socio-economic-political reforms. These grave

factors combined with the diversity of culture, terrain, and ethnicity has made it easier for the

insurgents to motivate elements of the populace towards supporting insurgency. As political and

security analysts say that as long as the gap exists between rich and poor, educated and

uneducated, and elites and suppressed, the problem in the society would continue, thus giving

birth to potential threats.208

Under these conditions, the full form of democracy is unlikely to survive. The gaining of

power by the Maoists will foster the rise of conflict with the democratic political parties as well

208
The views are collected in general from various articles and journals.

89
as the monarch. On the other hand, the inter-alignment of the monarch with the Maoists, might

lead to another armed conflict in Nepal, this time with the political parties--to gain back what

they have lost, democracy. Not only this, the democratic forces would strive to maintain their

identity or expand their influence among one another, and all would seek to get the maximum

support from within and outside Nepal--to tackle the new problem. In this respect the

neighboring countries like India and China may use this “need” as a bargaining chip, which in

the long run would accelerate the conflict and may lead towards anarchism and civil war.

Similarly, shaping the countries security environment is very crucial for supporting

Nepal’s national security strategy. For the last eight years there has been nothing but “unknown

fear” of being killed or maimed by the Maoists in the hearts and minds of the security personnel,

whether it be during confrontation, or while being engaged in daily activities. The morale of the

security personnel has gone down, due to inappropriate decision of the political forces and the

people in power. Security forces are being used as a puppet for the benefit of the political

mainstream, because they--the politicians--have no idea on how to shape the security

environment. In other words, the policy and decision-makers are trying to safeguard themselves--

both personally and politically--from the Maoists and are misusing the nations critical pillar, the

security forces. To worsen it more, the government is using the security force to go after what

they can see, the armed Maoists, while the Maoists are strengthening their political infrastructure

in the microcosm of the society.

Moreover, the Maoists are bringing out programs of closures and strikes through their

sister and frontal organizations, while the guerilla outfit is conducting reconnaissance and action

plans. Massive casualties have been observed in the past seven years--whole army barracks have

been run over with nothing else but death and spot-assassinations. Physical actions have been

90
taken against the general public, democratic party cadres, Nepalese working at foreign missions

and international organizations, while destructive activities have been launched on country’s

infrastructure and vital installations. The political forces, instead of trying to strengthen and

comfort the morale of the security personnel are becoming “puppets” in the hand of both the

extreme leftists and rightists—three days after the assassination of the IGP of APF, the

government accepts the declaration of cease-fire by the Maoists. This not only puts the

creditability of the ever-changing government in the eyes of the security force, but also shows

the lack of shaping the countries security environment. This can be considered as an end to the

containment of security activities or engagements, because the nation lacked the proper response

mechanism to the anticipated risk. The theory then is “no one is safe from the Maoists,” if such

high level authority can be assassinated, why not a general public who doesn’t agree on the

Maoist philosophy!

When Nepal’s governing bodies consider about co-operation and coalition to fight the

threats to national security, there is always a phobia of--what will others say, especially India!

To some extent this is acceptable because of the open border with India, and Indo-Nepal treaties,

and being sandwiched between the two giant neighbors--India and China. But this doesn’t mean

that our national security strategy must whole-heartedly depend upon either of the two. The

philosophy must be in the greater national interest, wherein the cooperation and coalition must

be the tools to attain the prime objective of strengthening the national security.

The above-mentioned criticalities show that there is a potential threat to “the ways”of

Nepal’s national security strategy by the ongoing “People’s War,” wherein the Maoists are trying

to inflict “fear” and “chaos” in the security environment of Nepal, in which the government and

political parties are being lured into. It is therefore, a direct attack on the spirit of the present

91
Constitution because the Maoists are exploiting the national interest, power, leadership, and the

response mechanism.

The last element of national security strategy, “the means,” can now be compared within

the context of Nepal. In other words, Nepal must be selective in the use of its capabilities and

international involvement, must have a well-trained diplomatic corps, and the armed forces must

be both professionally trained and well equipped to strengthen “the means” of Nepal’s national

security strategy.

Once again a question can be asked: How is the third element of Nepal’s national security

strategy--the means--be threatened by the “People’s War?” It is observed that the Maoists are

exploiting this element by propaganda and disinformation campaign. In an interview to CNN by

Mahara, he said that Maoists are a political force fighting on behalf of the majority rural poor to

rid the country of an outdated feudal system that favors only a small urban elite, and do not

support terrorism. He concluded by saying, “WE CONDEMN ALL TYPES OF

TERRORISM.”209

In one hand Maoists are condemning terrorism, whereas on the other hand they are using

“terror tactics” to coerce their “enemy”.

On a different facet, the lack of broader understanding of the dynamics of domestic and

international politics by Nepal’s diplomatic corps is being a hazard for “convincing purposes” to

the world community. In other words, Nepalese diplomats are not being able to convince the

realities of the ongoing “People’s War,” and the impact it might have in the regional balance of

power; whereas, in the Maoist side they have been able to consolidate regional Maoist network

and gain international revolutionary support from like-minded nations, groups, and individuals.

209
Krishna Bahadur Mahara.

92
 Similarly, Nepal’s security forces are not being able to remain a strong source of

country’s security, because of the internal dynamics, resource constraints, and the “problem of

ego”. The RNA is seen to undermine the NP and APF, though they have started to operate jointly

under a “Unified Command”. The Maoists are exploiting the nature of this conflict in various

ways, to progress in their objective.

The implications for the world community might be very dangerous, especially the

capitalist countries, as Nepal start becoming the “hub of communist movement” and the armed

conflict escalates. Ultimately, the problem in Nepal might become the problem of the world

community, especially India. Therefore, to curb this problem, which might be the headache of

India, the Indian government might mobilize their military within Nepal. Eventually, this might

lead Nepal loose its independency and a global tension might arise. One can ask a question about

what would the role of US be if these are the future circumstances in Nepal!

The above-mentioned aspects show that there is a potential threat to “the means” of

Nepal’s national security strategy by the ongoing “People’s War,” wherein the Maoists are trying

to exploit the internal dynamics and differences to the best of their interest. It is therefore, a

direct attack on the spirit of the present Constitution, because Nepal doesn’t have a strong

diplomatic corps, and nor does it have a well equipped and effectively coordinating armed

forces; these weaknesses are being exploited by the Maoists in their favor.

After assessing the threat to Nepal’s National Security, one can now state the future

capabilities, possible types of operations, and survivability of the Maoists. The future Maoist

capabilities can be identified as:

•
•
Announcement of establishing parallel local governments.

•
Pressure groups formed.

•
Announcement of Central People’s Government.
Announcement of the “Constitution of People’s Republic of Nepal”

93
 • Announcement of the establishment of People’s Representatives Assembly in

•
the autonomous regions.

•
Allignment with regional terrorist organizations.

•
Lead the regional Maoist network.
Become the hub for global revolution.

Likewise, the future possible types of Maoist operations can be identified as:

•
•
Increase in major attacks.

•
Decentralization of offensive action against government forces.

•
Use of negotiation, as a tactic to buy time and resources.
Create confusion among security forces by using the ploy of “divide and

•
rule”.

•
Increase in extortion activities.

•
Anti-Indian and Anti-US activities.

•
Aligning with political parties to go against the Monarchy.

•
Hostage taking.
Infiltrate the increasing civil unrest programs conducted by the political

•
party’s, in the urban areas for violent disturbance.

•
Increase in assassination attempts.
Maoist power takes the opportunity of the “rift” created between the
Monarchial and Parliamentary power to respond to negotiate a cease-fire, and,

•
eventually, a peace-settlement.
Maoist press releases demanding the Monarchial power for dialogue or

•
continue fighting, wherein their demands are again reiterated
Informal talks with the Monarchial power

And, the future survivability of Maoists can be identified as:

•
•
Expand the external base to China
Create pressure to India government via local, regional, and international
communist blocs for survival purposes.

To summarize this section on prediction, one can say that all the three elements—the

ends, the ways, and the means--of Nepal’s National Security is under grave threat by the

“People’s War” because the government is not being able to protect the nation’s people and

territories against physical assaults by the Maoists, safeguard vital economic and political

94
interests; bring back the Constitution of Nepal 1990 in the main track; and control the increasing

capabilities, operations, and survivability of the Maoists.

CONCLUSION

The events, perceptions, and intentions of the Maoist Power from the start of insurgency

until the information cut-off date 10 February 2004--can be seen as the initiation of Maoist

insurgency due to non-fulfillment of their demands by the then government resulting in the

escalation of “People’s War” backed by Maoist’s national and international links, especially

CCOMPOSA, in which they have been operating both under legal and illegal fronts. With lots of

sympathizers and well-wishers both in-country and abroad, Maoists have been able to launch

massive attacks on the security forces, and are functioning with their own system of governance

at their controlled areas to move towards forming a new People’s Democratic Republic in Nepal-

-by using the philosophy of “Prachanda Path” integrated to the already existing philosophy of

Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism. The last eight years have been floating with Maoist press

releases and various other activities, where changes in approach has been observed, and can be

taken as a potential aspect for the prediction of Nepal’s future. Evaluating the Maoist activities

and their demands with the three elements—the ends, the ways, and the means--of national

security strategy, as identified by Senator Honasan and Mr. Castillo, one can state that there is a

critical threat to Nepal’s National Security by the “People’s War,” wherein the “worst-case

future scenario” can be predicted as the formation of interim government, a new constitution

through constituent assembly, and moving towards progressive political system to form a new

People’s Democratic Republic (based in communist philosophy) in Nepal. This in turn would

then adversely affect the parliamentary multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy, and

95
will eventually lead towards extreme armed conflict resulting in anarchy and civil war—not to

mention the higher probabilities of external interventions to subjugate the conflict for regional

security.

96
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________. Koirala doublts Maoist moves. 7 December 2002. On-line news from The Kathmandu
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People’s Council formed. Posted online at Human Rights and People’s War in Nepal.
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PV Ramana. ‘Copy cat’ PWG and the al Qaeda cell model. Posted online.
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PWG, MCC trained Maoists admits ex-militant. Posted online. http://www.nepalnews.com.np.

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Rameshwor Bohara. “They were confident.” Himal Magazine (Kathmandu). 30 Jan-12 Feb,
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The cost of trying to force the Maoists back to the negotiating table through military means is
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UML urges Maoists to hold dialogue. 8 December 2000. Online news.

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