AmlCft+Artikel+158+Vol+2+No+2+English Fix2 Fin
AmlCft+Artikel+158+Vol+2+No+2+English Fix2 Fin
Original paper
Abstract
Keywords:
Anti-Money Laundering, Technology has revolutionized finance, but seamless services
Digital Financial Services, increase fraud risks. As digital finance grows, anti-money laundering
Open Banking, Regtech (AML) systems struggle with high transaction volumes. The main
objective of this study is to verify whether open banking catalyzes
the efficiency of transaction monitoring in AML. Another objective
is to analyze the current agenda of regulators in Indonesia, which is
related to the Indonesia Payment Systems Blueprint 2025 and
customer data security. The Delphi technique pinpointed
contemporary AML compliance technologies, encompassing money
laundering, Regulatory Technology, and regulatory bodies. The
article delves into a comparative analysis between Regulatory
Technology and financial crime, which emphasizes several actions
to eradicate money laundering, such as strengthening the AML
Submitted: 28 October 2023 system, customer screening, and allowing cross-data sharing
between institutions. In addition, this paper explores RegTech's
Accepted: 31 May 2024 limitations and forthcoming hurdles regarding AML compliance.
Published: 1 June 2024 The finding shows that open banking catalyzes the efficiency of
transaction monitoring in AML and supports the regulator's agenda
Copyright (c) Authors
to combat money laundering with some requirements.
To cite this article: Rusli, G. R. & Fermay, A. H. 2024. Digital Financial Services Effort in Enforcing
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) through Open Banking Optimization. AML/CFT Journal: The Journal of
Anti Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism 2(2):159-174,
https://doi.org/10.59593/amlcft.2024.v2i2.158
Introduction
Connecting banking and financial technology (FinTech) through the interlink of the two
services allows small business players to carry out business transactions more efficiently. For
instance, support of access to capital and provision of a safe payment system as well as foster
economic growth.1 However, there is an issue related to tracking the customer transaction flow,
which is suspected of being involved in suspicious transactions related to money laundering.
Financial institutions (FI) do not have the authority to access the same consumer data in different
FI's to find out the track record of their financial activities. When the customer's funds have gone
out to other FIs, it will not be easy to get a big picture of the transactions carried out by these
customers. Therefore, cross-data sharing through open banking is believed to be a solution for
enforcing AML efforts in FIs.
1
(Bank Indonesia, 2019)
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Technologies in this context pertain to the tools and systems designed for streamlining and
automating financial services. Essentially, digital financial services are innovative solutions in
financial services that include electronic cash, crowdfunding platforms, and virtual currencies
(VCs), among others, which have emerged over recent years. The European Commission (2019)2
has identified sectors and products susceptible to money laundering risks. These involve cash
transactions, the financial sector, the gambling industry, non-financial businesses and their
products, fund transfers carried out by nonprofit organizations, and some new sectors with unique
products. Combating financial crime necessitates collaboration between regulators, who must
work efficiently together.
Financial Institutions (FIs) require Regulatory Technology (RegTech) solutions to enhance
AML Compliance3 while improving Transaction Monitoring capabilities4 and understanding
how best to integrate RegTech into their operations.5 Certain components from previous analyses
raise questions about data sharing's role in AML/CFT efforts against terrorism financing.
Consequently, a cooperative model between governance and regulated FIs has been developed
where these institutions share data for AML/CFT purposes, but it would not be possible without
RegTech development.6 The alliance of FIs and technology companies7 or public-private
stakeholders8 is essential for such developments.
The regulator had established a data sharing policy through 27, 2022, on Personal Data
Protection (Indonesian: Undang-undang Pelindungan Data Pribadi, or UU PDP)9. Cross-data
sharing is permissible, as written in Article 15, paragraph 1 (point d, the clause on the interests
of supervision of the financial services sector). It is stated that the rights of the personal data
subject, as referred to in Article 8, article 9, article 10 paragraph (1), article 11, and Article 13,
paragraphs (1) and (2), are excluded from supervision of the financial services sector, monetary,
payment systems, and system stability finances carried out in order state administration. UU PDP
also supports the central bank of Indonesia's agenda related to the Indonesia Payment System
Blueprint 2025 (SPI 2025).10 The Blueprint consists of five payment system visions towards 2025
for implementation by five working groups, namely Open Banking, Retail Payment System,
Large-Value (Wholesale) Payment System and Financial Market Infrastructure, Data and
Digitalization, as well as Regulatory, Licensing and Supervisory Reforms. SPI 2025 ensures a
2
European Commission, “Report From The Commission To The European Parliament And The Council,”
Angewandte Chemie International Edition, 6(11) (2019): 951–952. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52019DC0370&from=GA.
3
Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., “Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation,” SSRN
Electronic Journal, (2017), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018534.
4
Dionysios S. Demetis, “Fighting Money Laundering with Technology: A Case Study of Bank X in the UK,”
Decision Support Systems 105 (2018): 96–107, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2017.11.005.
5
Emily Lee, “Financial Inclusion: A Challenge to the New Paradigm of Financial Technology, Regulatory
Technology and Anti-Money Laundering Law,” SSRN Electronic Journal, (2018): 1–51,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3018960.
6
Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis, and Ross P. Buckley, “FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization
of Financial Regulation,” Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 37, no. 3 (2017): 373–415;
Dong Yang and Min Li, “Evolutionary Approaches and the Construction of Technology-Driven Regulations,”
Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 54, no. 14 (2018): 3256–71,
https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2018.1496422.
7
R. Butler, T. and Brooks, “On the Role of Ontology-Based RegTech for Managing Risk and Compliance
Reporting in the Age of Regulation,” Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions 11, no. 1 (2017):
19–33.
8
K. Lai, “Blockchain as AML Tool: A Work in Progress,” International Financial Law Review, London, 2018.
9
27th, 2022 on Personal Data Protection (UU PDP), https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/229798/uu-no-27-
tahun-2022 accessed on August 6, 2023.
10
Indonesia Payment System Blueprint 2025, https://www.bi.go.id/id/fungsi-utama/sistem-
pembayaran/blueprint-2025/default.aspx accessed on July 22, 2023.
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balance of innovation through the Implementation of Know Your Customer (KYC) and
AML/CFT.
This paper aims to ascertain how open banking enhances the efficiency of transaction
monitoring in AML. It also seeks to examine Indonesia's current regulatory agenda regarding
Indonesia Payment Systems Blueprint 2025 and customer data security. Compared to the
previous study conducted by Arner et al. (2017), which used regulators and policymakers as their
survey subject, this study focuses on specific stakeholders who are Compliance AML experts
with intensive experience in the finance and banking industry over five years.
This study centered on facts and contemporary advancements and findings about financial
crime cases, particularly emphasizing the scourge of money laundering. In addition, the paper
explains RegTech and its relevance to cross-data sharing related to open banking. Then, research
on the emergence of new technologies in the finance and banking sector, particularly FinTech
and RegTech, has facilitated a deeper comprehension of how innovation enables financial
institutions to develop cutting-edge solutions. Properly managing data has become increasingly
critical as it is a valuable resource for these advancements. Finally, the study proposes
recommendations on technologies that will play a major role in AML transaction monitoring by
optimizing open banking.
The Delphi method was utilized to identify recent technologies for AML compliance,
including money laundering, Regulatory Technology, and regulators. The paper discusses the
comparison between Regulatory Technology and financial crime and the constraints and future
challenges of RegTech for AML compliance. This research is exploratory, and the approach used
in this exploratory study was the Delphi method, which was developed by the RAND Corporation
(RAND, 2019).11 This iterative methodology relies on the insights of specialists who respond to
a series of recurring surveys to prognosticate and anticipate forthcoming trends within a
designated industry or topic. The Delphi method pursued four distinct objectives during this
research:
1. Recruit a minimum of six experts in AML compliance and RegTech who are engaged in or
employed by financial institutions to address matters related to anti-money laundering.
2. Determine the prevailing elements that AML compliance experts consistently emphasize
when utilizing RegTech and other cutting-edge technologies.
3. Shift the focus towards future implications of RegTech implementation on the evolution of
money laundering in the medium to long term and
4. To strive for a comprehensive accord (alternatively called "consensus") among AML
compliance and RegTech experts regarding a collection of actions that regulatory bodies
could deem essential objectives in the battle opposed to financial crime.
At least six experts had to be recruited to make this research relevant. At the end of the hiring
process, six AML compliance or RegTech professionals confirmed they could participate in this
study and be part of the panel of experts. According to the research conducted,12 a minimum of
five panels were necessary to ensure realistic results. Therefore, the recruitment of six specialists
was deemed sufficient despite initially contacting over 10 experts. The aim was to maintain a
relatively small panel size to guarantee high response and retention rates, as Delphi surveys
require strong participant commitment. Google Forms were the tools for data collection. Two
phases comprised one survey, each enough to get consensus among the surveyed experts.
Otherwise, a third phase with an additional survey would have been necessary. The first phase
(called "Phase 1") included open and wide questions on the relevance of RegTech for AML
compliance. The second phase (called "Phase 2") included more technical questions and was
elaborated using the results from the first survey.
11
Delphi method, www.rand.org/topics/delphi-method.html.
12
Esman Kurum, “RegTech Solutions and AML Compliance: What Future for Financial Crime?,” Journal of
Financial Crime 30, no. 3 (2023): 776–94, https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-04-2020-0051.
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The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis reports that digital banking fraud increased during
the COVID-19 pandemic.13 Additionally, a report by Business Insider Intelligence found that
account takeover fraud (when hackers gain unauthorized access to an account) has increased by
over 280% since 2015.14 The escalation of digital banking fraud can be attributed to five primary
factors, namely:
1. Technological advancements like digital payment systems like QRIS have made online
transactions more accessible and convenient. However, it represents new threats, such as fake
QRIS codes. The QRIS code generated by malefactors could potentially direct victims to
fraudulent web pages that mimic authentic login portals for digital banking or social media
platforms.
2. Weak cyber security or lack of strong authentication protocols leads to several digital banking
systems continuing to depend on feeble authentication protocols, such as passwords or PINs,
which are susceptible to brute-force attacks and social engineering strategies. Consequently,
financial institutions must allocate resources toward implementing more robust
authentication techniques like biometric authentication and multi-factor authentication
(MFA) to enhance the security of their online banking systems.
3. Lack of regulatory compliance, like inadequate customer identification and verification
procedures, is the gate for fraudsters to open accounts using fake identities or stolen
information. Weaknesses in security protocols, such as inadequate authentication measures,
may also lead to unauthorized access to customer accounts. Additionally, a lack of regulatory
oversight or failure to comply with regulations may result in vulnerabilities exploited by
fraudsters.
4. The increasing sophistication of fraudsters using machine learning and artificial intelligence.
One technique used is Natural Language Processing (NLP). With NLP techniques, fraudsters
utilize chatbots to communicate with bank customers and smuggle money. The other
technique is Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which fraudsters use to generate
synthetic data-like bank accounts like real ones, not to stimulate suspicion from regulatory
bodies.
5. Insider threats such as employee negligence, employee misconduct, and third-party risk
contribute to the insider threats that FIs face if they are not regularly audited and implement
strict internal controls.
There is a strong correlation between fraud and money laundering. Fraud often involves
the illegal acquisition of funds, which are then laundered through various means to conceal their
13
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2022/sep/fed-guidelines-master-account-access-payment-
services accessed on July 22, 2023.
14
https://www.businessinsider.com/capitol-one-data-breach-has-heavy-implications-2019-7 accessed on July
22, 2023.
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illicit origins. In this sense, fraud and money laundering are two sides of the same coin, with one
often leading to or facilitating the other. The Indonesian Government's steadfast dedication to
combatting money laundering has been evidenced by the outcomes of its recent decision of the
Constitutional Court Number 15/PUU-XIX/2021 on the results of the judicial review of Article
74 of Law Number 8 of 2010 on Prevention and Eradication of Money Laundering (Money
Laundering Law) which has established legal certainty and ensured uniformity in the
interpretation and enforcement of anti-money laundering regulations.
Talking about the exploitation of technologies in digital financial services can be seen in several
cases, such as Danske Bank's Extonian branch,15 where billions of euros were laundered through
non-resident accounts. Another example is the case of Latvia's ABLV Bank16, which was accused
by US authorities of facilitating large-scale criminal activity and became subject to sanctions.
Other instances include investigations into potential money laundering activities at German
online bank N26 and UK-based Revolut.17
In 2021, N26 had been fined for weak anti-money laundering controls and received
another warning from the German financial regulator, BaFin. It happened due to deficiencies in
its AML systems. Meanwhile, Revolut, known as a "borderless financial super app," offers many
services a consumer would associate with a bank. Revolut case related to sanctions, they claimed
that their system could detect and automatically halt transactions to individuals who matched
against the sanctions list. However, the system only flagged the transaction for further
investigation but still allowed the transaction to go through. As a result, Revolut's systems failed
to pick up the mass fraud, allowing thieves to steal USD 20 million from the company's cash.
From the money laundering and fraud cases explained above, system deficiency can be
loopholes that hamper the FIs, and it contributes to their financial and reputation risk. Especially
if the system implementation does not comply with the standards provided by the regulators. The
compliance process that RegTech can automate includes customer due diligence, transaction
monitoring, and reporting. This can assist financial institutions to comply with regulations more
efficiently and effectively, reducing the risk of errors and punitive actions. According to the
Institute of International Finance (IIF), RegTech can encompass auditing, reporting, compliance
tools (like KYC and AML/CFT implementation), and risk management. This can be achieved by
connecting advanced algorithms and business models, artificial intelligence, machine learning,
and real-time supervision. Given the nature of the present digital financial era, which heavily
relies on data and is characterized by high velocity, large variety, and a significant volume of
data (referred to as the 3V), these aspects are highly likely to operate and evolve.18
The main contributions focus on RegTech, essentially merging regulation and technology.
RegTech solutions drive digitalization and digital innovation, affecting vast swaths of
organizations, entities, and authorities, providing the means to improve areas such as digital
reporting, potentially upturning preexisting structures, and reshaping regulatory processes and
15
European Parliament, “Money Laundering - Recent Cases from a EU Banking Supervisory Perspective,”
no. February (2018): 1–24, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/142725/EGOV Briefing on EU Banking
supervisory perspective.pdf.
16
European Parliament.
17
Dermot The, “BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online The Politics of FinTech: Technology ,
Regulation and Disruption” 99 (2021): 859–72, https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/43244/10/43244a.pdf.
18
Henrik Braun, “Evaluation of Big Data Maturity Models: A Benchmarking Study to Support Big Data
Maturity Assessment in Organizations,” 2015, 129,
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwj
1t4LKpN2EAxU8KbkGHQ3SCOcQFnoECA4QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fptop.only.wip.la%3A443%2Fhttps%2Fcore.ac.uk%2Fdownload%2Fp
df%2F196555414.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3ng3KVN2-0l5wiXhkHFZ91&opi=89978449.
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systems.19, 20 The data-driven will introduce new or shift current paradigms, moving, for
example, from a Know Your Customer (KYC) to a Know Your Data (KYD) approach.21 The
data ecosystem emerges as a key aspect22 where data are shared "among regulators, industry
associations, and investors, which is the foundation for integrated technology-driven
regulation."23 Data can be structured (such as trade orders and canceled orders, market data, and
customer portfolio) or unstructured (such as emails, voice recordings, social media profiles, or
other communications), qualitative or quantitative, and granular or aggregated.24
Cross-data sharing with good infrastructure and secure access is essential to optimize the
implementation of RegTech among FIs, regulators, industry associations, and investors.
Currently, cross-data sharing between FIs has already happened for payment systems, and the
implementation of QRIS is one example of open banking. It is consistent with the BSPI, which
shows the central bank's role in supporting interoperability, competition, and innovation, as well
as the operation of public infrastructure. The open banking initiative through open application
programming interface (API) standardization and integrated payment interface (IPI) aims to
encourage digital transformation in banking and promote interlinks between FinTech and banks.
The idea of cross-data sharing in transaction monitoring to enforce AML can mirror how
the central bank of Indonesia standardizes the API and IPI so that data exchange between FIs and
regulators can be safely secured. The advantage that FIs and regulators can obtain from
implementing open banking for transaction monitoring in AML is that the fraudulent activities
can be adequately managed with inter-access between FIs, regulators, and any institution linked
to the activities. It will make the investigator work more effectively and efficiently in
investigating cases related to money laundering.
19
Douglas W. Arner et al., “Sustainability, FinTech and Financial Inclusion,” European Business Organization
Law Review 21, no. 1 (2020): 7–35, https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-020-00183-y.
20
Petros Kavassalis et al., “The Journal of Risk Finance an Innovative RegTech Approach to Financial Risk
Monitoring and Supervisory Reporting Article Information,” The Journal of Risk Finance 19, no. 1 (2018): 1–
18, https://doi.org/10.1108/JRF-07-2017-0111.
21
Arner, Barberis, and Buckley, “FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation.”
22
Seán O’Riain, Edward Curry, and Andreas Harth, “XBRL and Open Data for Global Financial Ecosystems:
A Linked Data Approach,” International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 13, no. 2 (2012): 141–
62, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.accinf.2012.02.002.
23
Yang and Li, “Evolutionary Approaches and the Construction of Technology-Driven Regulations.”
24
EIOPA, “Digital Transformation Strategy,” Yang and Li, “Evolutionary Approaches and the Construction
of Technology-Driven Regulations.” 2021.
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Open API Payment Standard (SNAP) is a set of protocols and instructions that facilitate
interconnection between applications in processing payment transactions stipulated by the
Central Bank of Indonesia. SNAP QRIS itself is the embodiment of the (SPI) 2025 in addition to
the existing platforms, namely Open API, BI-FAST, QRIS, IPT, BI-RTGS, Data Hub, Payment
ID, Sandbox 2.0, and electronically as enablers for the three sectors, namely economic sector,
financial sector, and Bank Indonesia itself.
SNAP, on the other hand, as Open API positions itself as a middle system as a bridge for
data communication between the front end and the back end that acts as an enabler or data hub
to carry out transactions between central bank network systems in various ASEAN+ countries to
carry out transaction settlements.
Using antiquated systems, such as obsolete (AML) solutions may result in financial
institutions suffering losses that could have otherwise been averted through AI-powered analysis
and big data. Consequently, banks and other financial establishments must embrace
contemporary methods that enable them to stay ahead of their processes while ensuring
regulatory compliance that guarantees cost-effectiveness and efficiency. The escalation of
financial misconduct and the imperative for strengthened cybersecurity protocols have
underscored the necessity for RegTech. RegTech solutions in the financial crime sector utilize
advanced big data analysis techniques to scrutinize massive amounts of data and establish
connections between seemingly unrelated data points, thereby gaining a comprehensive
regulatory perspective. This data is accessible via open banking, which establishes a direct
connection to the bank for seamless real-time transaction tracking and client risk evaluation.
According to the Delphi survey that was conducted and sent to the experts in AML and
Regtech, several RegTech solutions are most likely used. All six participants successfully
submitted their answers for the Phase 1 survey, resulting in a response rate of 100 percent. This
is acceptable, given that the research required at least five AML or RegTech specialists. The
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survey consisted of five open-ended questions, which elicited free-text responses. Therefore,
Figure 3 summarizes the results obtained through manual text analysis for each question in Phase
1.
In Phase 2, the response rate was 100%, as all six participants submitted their answers on
time. The survey comprised Likert scale questions ranging from 1 (not at all important) to 5 (very
important), along with two closed inquiries for the experts' panel to rank their response from
Round 1. The survey for this phase was divided into four parts, namely:
1. Advancements in technology for AML compliance;
2. Money laundering, RegTech, and regulators;
3. RegTech versus Financial Crime.; and
4. Constraints and forthcoming obstacles of RegTech for AML compliance.
The purpose of P2Q1 was to ascertain the respondent's perspective on the future focus areas
of RegTech solutions concerning AML compliance (Table 1). Question P2Q2 aimed to assess
the potential impact of advanced technological implementations by financial institutions in their
anti-money laundering (AML) efforts on the complexity level of illicit money laundering
techniques adopted by perpetrators, as depicted in Table 2. The objective of P2Q3 was to
ascertain whether RegTech solutions have the potential to surpass regulators' suggestions in the
realm of AML programs and policy development within financial institutions (as indicated by
Table 3). P2Q4 aimed to determine what the panel thinks the next topics to be addressed by
RegTech solutions regarding AML compliance will be (Table 4). P2Q4 aimed to ascertain the
panel's hierarchy of priorities regarding future challenges in RegTech implementation for AML
compliance, as presented in Table 5.
Consensus was reached for each of the questions in Phase 2, except for the first question
(P2Q1) about robotic process automation, which was considered less likely to significantly
impact the AML compliance program due to the percentage being less than 50%. The strongest
consensuses among participants for each topic discussed at the end of Phase 2 are explained as
follows:
a. Machine Learning and digital identity verification are rated as the most impactful technologies
in the AML compliance program (100%), followed by artificial intelligence and cloud
computing (83.3%). These changes are changing how digital financial services identify
customers using digital identity verification and automating daily manual assignments using
machine learning.
c. RegTech solutions have been confirmed to have a more significant influence than regulators
on how AML policies are designed within FIs (83.3%). However, regulators possess the
authority to regulate and steer the AML policy. Failure to do so may result in RegTech taking
over this role, which, if utilized improperly, can adversely affect unbiased decision-making.
d. Sanction screening (100%) is listed as the most likely to become the next focus point in
financial crime that RegTech solutions could help to counter. In addition, transaction
monitoring and KYC and EDD processes also have the potential that RegTech solutions
tackle in the future respectively (83.3%, 66.7%). Sanction screening has garnered significant
attention in this sector, given the nature of digital financial services in offering foreign
exchange services. This is to ensure that their reputation remains untarnished, and they do
not engage with any counterparts who are sanctioned or blacklisted.
e. The implementation of RegTech solutions has the specific challenge confirmed by the
respondents as non-affordable and accessible for all financial institutions (83.3%), and
changes in regulations and standardization issues (66.7%) become the second limitation of it
and at last, followed by the human resources (50%). The varying size of digital financial
services has resulted in differing capacities to offer comprehensive RegTech solutions, owing
to differences in their inherent capital and budgetary eligibility. Nonetheless, this should not
pose a significant obstacle if regulators provide specific guidance and policies to ensure
compliance among digital financial services.
Table 6. Group Mean Response for Questions P2Q1, P2Q4, and P2Q5
Questions Response Options Group Mean Mean absolute
Response (1-5) deviation (MAD)
P2Q1 Machine Learning 4.5 0.5
(P2Q1.1)
Artificial Intelligence 4.2 0.8
(P2Q1.2)
Robotic Process 3.8 0.9
Automation (RPA)
(P2Q1.3)
Digital Identity 4.8 0.3
Verification
(P2Q1.4)
Cloud Computing 4.3 0.7
(P2Q1.5)
P2Q4 Transaction 4.7 0.6
Monitoring
(P2Q4.1)
KYC and EDD process 4.7 0.4
(P2Q4.2)
Sanctions screening 5 0
(P2Q4.3)
P2Q5 Not affordable and 4.2 0.6
accessible for all
Financial Institutions
(P2Q5.1)
Changes in regulations 3.7 0.8
and Standardization
issue
(P2Q5.2)
Human Resources 3.7 1
(P2Q5.3)
In the Phase 1 survey, text analysis and text mining affirmed that advanced technologies
such as machine learning, artificial intelligence (AI), robotic process automation (RPA), cloud
computing, and digital identity verification are poised to significantly impact AML compliance
within financial institutions. As per the experts surveyed, these have been presented as response
options for Phase 2 to prioritize and rank their thoughts. In this section, the data analysis is more
focused on Phase 2 because the analysis of replies to Phase 1 is the source of the design survey
for Phase 2.
The Delphi method relies on the potential for surveyed experts to reach a consensus on
specific topics through anonymous responses to successive surveys. To ensure accurate analysis
of collected data and raw results, it was necessary to establish a consensus definition for this
study. Consensus was deemed achieved for categorical values (i.e., yes-no questions) when over
50% of participants provided the same response. For scales and ratios (such as Likert scales
ranging from 1 to 5), consensus was considered reached when the group mean response fell
within the intervals of [1;2] or [4;5].
Phase 2 data analysis focused on categorical values for yes-no and closed-ended questions
(P2Q2, P2Q3) (Tables 3, 4) and the calculation of group mean responses for scales and ratios
(P2Q1, P2Q4, P2Q5). Categorization was available to question 2 (P2Q2) to proceed with data
analysis. Regarding questions 2 and 3 of Phase 2 (P2Q2, P2Q3), consensus was reached in both
cases, with 100% and 83.3% agreement, respectively. This means that the growing use of
RegTech solutions by financial institutions for AML compliance will lead to more
technologically sophisticated money laundering methods, and RegTech solutions will have a
greater influence than regulators' recommendations on how AML policies are designed within
financial institutions.
Furthermore, Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) is a quantitative measure gauges the degree
of variation in each data set relative to its mean. The computation involves averaging the absolute
differences between each value and the mean. A smaller MAD suggests that the data points are
tightly clustered around their central tendency, whereas an elevated MAD indicates greater
spread or dispersion. A lower MAD implies proximity to the mean and reduced variability, which
may suggest dependability, consistency, or uniformity; conversely, a higher MAD signifies a
significant deviation from the mean and amplified variability that could indicate noise,
instability, or heterogeneity.
According to the group means responses in Table 6 for questions P2Q1, P2Q4, and P2Q5,
Financial institutions are advised to consider investing in RegTech solutions as a means of
strengthening their anti-money laundering compliance programs using digital identity
verification for sanction screening, machine learning, and artificial intelligence for transaction
monitoring, KYC and EDD process. Furthermore, FIs must prioritize investing in RegTech
solutions to bolster their capacity to adapt to emerging technologies and expedite the maturation
of their AML compliance program. Indeed, the sooner FIs enhance their AML compliance
technology, the better it catalyzes the implementation of open banking in terms of technology
infrastructure readiness.
Conclusion
Implementing outdated systems, such as archaic (AML) solutions, can lead to financial
institutions incurring losses that could have been prevented using AI-powered analysis and big
data. Henceforth, banks and other financial establishments must adopt modern approaches to stay
ahead of their operations while ensuring regulatory compliance, cost-effectiveness, and
efficiency. The data analysis showed that using advanced technologies such as machine learning
and digital identity verification as part of RegTech solutions catalyzes the efficiency of
transaction monitoring and KYC and EDD processes in AML. It also supports the strategy and
plan of regulators to combat money laundering and how AML policies are designed within
financial institutions. Furthermore, the respondents suggested enhancing transaction monitoring,
sanction screening, KYC, and EDD processes would be the next issue RegTech solutions could
cover.
It has been shown that time will become an ever more crucial resource for FIs to integrate
RegTech solutions to stay on top of regulatory changes related to open banking and get ahead of
any upcoming developments. As FIs combat the same fraudsters and money launderers, working
cooperatively supported by cross-data sharing enabled by open banking will improve the FI's
environment in terms of providing safety and soundness for banks and the integrity of the
international financial system. Regulators must remain aware that criminals are employing
increasingly sophisticated methods for money laundering. As such, regulators should monitor
RegTech and embrace technology more fully to enhance their oversight capabilities. This
necessitates recruiting additional technical specialists who can assist with the seamless
integration of RegTech into regulatory frameworks.
Acknowledgment
On behalf of the Allobank, the author would like to thank everyone for making this study
possible and for their continued support of the Allobank in its research endeavors. Further, we
would like to thank the following individuals: Rika Astari (RegTech.ID), Pandu Adiat
(Allobank), Muhammad Iqbal Saksono (ALAMI, former Head of AML CFT - SeaBank),
Christian PYK (Bank Sinarmas, former AML CFT Lead - SeaBank), Kemal M (SeaBank), and
Robby Julian (SeaBank) for their contributions and willingness to participate as a respondent to
make this study possible.
In particular, we are grateful to Indra Utoyo (President Director of Allobank, Dimas Hananto
Nugroho (Head of Compliance & AML/CTF Allobank), and Dewi Evarini (AML/CTF Dept
Head Allobank) for their valuable effort and support throughout the study.
References
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Arner, Douglas W., Ross P. Buckley, Dirk A. Zetzsche, and Robin Veidt. "Sustainability,
FinTech and Financial Inclusion." European Business Organization Law Review 21, no. 1