Submod Value
Submod Value
Jan Vondrák
Department of Mathematics
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
[email protected]
attack the non-linear optimization problem max{F (y) : y ∈ is a convex linear combination of vectors in P . To prove the
P (M)} directly. approximation guarantee, fix a point y and suppose that
x∗ ∈ P is the true optimum, OP T = F (x∗ ). The essence of
The Submodular Welfare Problem. our analysis is that the rate of increase in F (y) is equal to
It is known that the Submodular Welfare Problem is a spe- the deficit OP T − F (y). This kind of behavior always leads
cial case of submodular maximization subject to a matroid to a factor of 1 − 1/e, as we show below.
constraint [17]. To fix notation, let us review the reduction Consider a direction v ∗ = (x∗ ∨ y) − y = (x∗ − y) ∨ 0.
here. Let the set of n players be P , the set of m items Q, This is a nonnegative vector; since v ∗ ≤ x∗ ∈ P and P is
and for each i ∈ P , let the respective utility function be down-monotone, we also have v ∗ ∈ P . By monotonicity,
wi : 2Q → R+ . We define a new ground set X = P × Q, F (y + v ∗ ) = F (x∗ ∨ y) ≥ F (x∗ ) = OP T . Note that y + v ∗ is
with a function f : 2X → R+ defined S as follows: Every set not necessarily in P but this is not an issue. Consider the ray
S ⊆ X can be written uniquely as S = i∈P ({i}×Si ). Then of direction v ∗ starting at y, and the function F (y+ξv ∗ ), ξ ≥
let 0. The directional derivative of F along this ray is dF dξ
= v∗ ·
f (S) =
X
wi (Si ). ∇F . Since F is smooth submodular and v ∗ is nonnegative,
i∈P
F (y + ξv ∗ ) is concave in ξ and dF dξ
is non-increasing. By
the mean value theorem, there is some c ∈ [0, 1] such that
Assuming that each wi is a monotone submodular function,
F (y + v ∗ ) − F (y) = dF ≤ dF = v ∗ · ∇F (y). Since
˛ ˛
˛ ˛
it is easy to verify that f is also monotone submodular. The dξ ξ=c dξ ξ=0
interpretation of this construction is that we make |P | copies v ∗ ∈ P , and v(y) ∈ P maximizes v · ∇F (y), we get
of each item, one for each player. However, in reality we can v(y)·∇F (y) ≥ v ∗ ·∇F (y) ≥ F (y+v ∗ )−F (y) ≥ OP T −F (y).
only allocate one copy of each item. Therefore, let us define (2)
a partition matroid M = (X, I) as follows: Now let us return to our continuous process and analyze
I = {S ⊆ X | ∀j; |S ∩ (P × {j})| ≤ 1}. F (y(t)). By the chain rule and using (2), we get
Then the Submodular Welfare Problem is equivalent to max dF X ∂F dyj
= = v(y(t)) · ∇F (y(t)) ≥ OP T − F (y(t)).
{f (S) : S ∈ I}. Due to Lemma 2.2, we know that instead of dt ∂yj dt
j
this discrete problem, it suffices to consider the non-linear
optimization problem max{F (y) : y ∈ P (M)}. We remark This means that F (y(t)) dominates the solution of the dif-
that in this special case, we do not need the full strength ferential equation dφ
dt
= OP T − φ(t), φ(0) = 0, which is
of Lemma 2.2; instead, y ∈ P (M) can be converted into an φ(t) = (1 − e−t )OP T . This proves F (y(t)) ≥ (1 − e−t )OP T .
integral solution by simple randomized rounding. We return
to this issue in Section 5.
4. SUBMODULAR MAXIMIZATION SUB-
3. THE CONTINUOUS GREEDY PROCESS JECT TO A MATROID CONSTRAINT
In this section, we present the analytic picture behind Let us assume now that the polytope in question is a ma-
our algorithm. This section is not formally needed for our troid polytope P (M) and the smooth submodular function
main result. Our point of view is that the analytic intu- is F (y) = E[f (ŷ)]. We consider the question how to find a
ition explains why 1 − 1/e arises naturally in problems in- fractional solution y ∈ P (M) of value F (y) ≥ (1−1/e)OP T .
volving maximization of monotone submodular functions. The continuous greedy process provides a guide on how to
We consider any down-monotone polytope P and a smooth design our algorithm. It remains to deal with two issues.
monotone submodular function F . For concreteness, the
• To obtain a finite algorithm, we need to discretize the
reader may think of the matroid polytope and the function
time scale. This introduces some technical issues re-
F (y) = E[f (ŷ)] defined in the previous section. Our aim is
garding the granularity of our discretization and the
to define a process that runs continuously, depending only
error incurred. We show how to handle this issue for
on local properties of F , and produces a point y ∈ P ap-
the particular choice of F (y) = E[f (ŷ)].
proximating the optimum OP T = max{F (y) : y ∈ P }. We
propose to move in the direction of a vector constrained by • In each step, we need to find v(y) = argmaxv∈P (M) (v ·
P which maximizes the local gain. ∇F (y)). Apart from estimating ∇F (which can be
done by random sampling), observe that this amounts
The continuous greedy process. to a linear optimization problem over P (M). This
We view the process as a particle starting at y(0) = 0 and means finding a maximum-weight independent set in
following a certain flow over a unit time interval: a matroid, a task which can be solved easily.
dy
= v(y), In analogy with Equation (2), we use a suitable bound on
dt ∂F
the optimum. Note that ∂y j
= E[f (ŷ) | ŷj = 1] − E[f (ŷ) |
where v(y) is defined as
ŷj = 0]; we replace this by E[fŷ (j)] which works as well and
v(y) = argmaxv∈P (v · ∇F (y)). will be more convenient.
Lemma 4.1. Let OP T = maxS∈I f (S). Consider any the discussion above, we obtain
y ∈ [0, 1]X and let R denote a random set corresponding
to ŷ, with elements sampled independently according to yj . F (y(t + δ)) − F (y(t)) ≥ E[f (R(t) ∪ D(t)) − f (R(t))]
Then
X
≥ Pr[D(t) = {j}] E[fR(t) (j)]
X
j
OP T ≤ F (y) + max E[fR (j)].
I∈I X
j∈I = δ(1 − δ)|I(t)|−1 E[fR(t) (j)]
j∈I(t)
Proof. Fix an optimal solution OP∈ I. By submodular-
ity, we have OP T = f (O) ≤ f (R) + j∈O fR (j) for any set
X
≥ δ(1 − nδ) E[fR(t) (j)].
R. By taking the Pexpectation over a random
P R as above, j∈I(t)
OP T ≤ E[f (R) + j∈O fR (j)] = F (y) + j∈O E[fR (j)] ≤ P
Recall that I(t) is an independent set maximizing j∈I ωj (t)
P
F (y) + maxI∈I j∈I E[fR (j)].
where ωj (t) are our estimates of E[fR(t) (j)]. By standard
The Continuous Greedy Algorithm. Chernoff bounds, the probability that the error in any es-
Given: matroid M = (X, I), monotone submodular function timate is more than OP T /n2 is exponentially small in n
f : 2X → R+ . (note that OP T ≥ maxR,j fR (j)). Hence, w.h.p. we in-
cur an error of at most OP T /n in our computation of the
1. Let δ = 1/n2 where n = |X|. Start with t = 0 and maximum-weight independent set. Then we can write
y(0) = 0.
F (y(t + δ)) − F (y(t))
2. Let R(t) contain each j independently with probability !
yj (t). For each j ∈ X, estimate
X
≥ δ(1 − nδ) max E[fR(t) (j)] − OP T /n
I∈I
j∈I
ωj (t) = E[fR(t) (j)].
≥ δ(1 − 1/n)(OP T − F (y(t)) − OP T /n)
by taking the average of n5 independent samples. ˜ T − F (y(t)))
≥ δ(OP
3. Let I(t) be a maximum-weight independent set in M, ˜ T = (1−2/n)OP T .
using Lemma 4.1, δ = 1/n2 and setting OP
according to the weights ωj (t). We can find this by
From here, OP˜ T − F (y(t + δ)) ≤ (1 − δ)(OP˜ T − F (y(t)))
the greedy algorithm. Let
and by induction, OP˜ T − F (y(kδ)) ≤ (1 − δ)k OP ˜ T . For
y(t + δ) = y(t) + δ · 1I(t) . k = 1/δ, we get
Now we are ready to estimate how much F (y) gains at F (y(t))) instead of ω ∗ (t) in the original analysis. In good
time t. It is important that the probability that any item steps, the improved analysis gives
appears in D(t) is very small, so we can focus on the contri- 1
butions from sets D(t) that turn out to be singletons. From F (y(t + δ)) − F (y(t)) ≥ δ(1 − nδ)(1 + ˜ T − F (y(t))).
)(OP
2n2
By taking δ = o( n13 ), we get that F (y(t + δ)) − F (y(t)) ≥ 2. Let Ri (t) be a random set containing each item j inde-
δ(1 + nδ)(OP˜ T − F (y(t))). Then, we can conclude that in pendently with probability yij (t). For all i, j, estimate
good steps, we have the expected marginal profit of player i from item j,
˜ T − F (y(t + δ)) ≤ (1 − δ − nδ 2 ))(OP
OP ˜ T − F (y(t))), ωij (t) = E[wi (Ri (t) + j) − wi (Ri (t))]
by taking the average of (mn)5 independent samples.
while in bad steps
˜ T − F (y(t + δ)) ≤ (1 − δ + nδ 2 ))(OP
˜ T − F (y(t))). 3. For each j, let ij (t) = argmaxi ωij (t) be the preferred
OP
player for item j (breaking possible ties arbitrarily).
Overall, we get Set yij (t + δ) = yij (t) + δ for the preferred player i =
ij (t) and yij (t + δ) = yij (t) otherwise.
1 1
F (y(1)) ≥ ˜T
(1 − (1 − δ + nδ 2 ) 2δ (1 − δ − nδ 2 ) 2δ )OP
4. Increment t := t + δ; if t < 1, go back to Step 2.
≥ (1 − (1 − δ)1/δ )OP˜ T ≥ (1 − 1/e + Ω(δ))OP ˜T.
5. Allocate each item j independently, with probability
We can also make our sampling estimates accurate enough yij (1) to player i.
˜ T = (1−o(δ))OP T . We conclude that F (y(1)) ≥
so that OP
(1 − 1/e + Ω(δ))OP T . Lemma 4.2 and the discussion above imply our main result.