No.

284, JANUARY - FEBRUARY 2021

Motto:”Opinions are free, but not mandatory“ I.L.Caragiale

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CONTENT Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

EDITORIAL 29 Achim HURRELMANN : THE WESTERN BALKANS

“The EU’s own history shows
3 A Promising Start that economic and political 49 Zlatko HADŽIDEDIĆ:
cooperation across borders can “All major wars in the 19th,
promote peace and prosperity” 20th, and 21st centuries have
been generated by nationalism.
On the global geopolitical
level, nationalism was also the
main tool for the
transformation of the entire
Constantin IACOBIȚĂ world, for the dissolution of
large mercantilist empires and
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION
31 Decisive Moments in their transformation into a
Romania’s History number of nation-states”
4 NATO and Emerging
Security Chalenges

Ion I. JINGA THE MIDDLE EAST

Michael RÜHLE 33 Romania and the System of 53 Interview with

Christopher DAVIDSON on
9 A New Wave of Investment Treaties of Versailles the Current and Future State of
Protectionism: Characteristics, the Middle East Politics
Determinants and Country Alexandru GHIŞA
Experiences
THE BLACK SEA
Iulia Monica OEHLER-ȘINCAI

EUROPEAN UNION 45 Angela GRĂMADĂ: “At

this point, Maia Sandu cannot
completely change the
25 European Defence substance of the bilateral
Cooperation in Times of Crisis dialogue with Russia, however, ________
she can steer it in the right
direction” 56 About the Authors

Jiří ŠEDIVÝ
26 Monika HOHLMEIER: 47 Crimea Platform: Ukraine’s
"The EU budget is a symbol of Initiative to Raise the Costs of
solidarity and common Russia’s Occupation
interests and it benefits every
single Member State"

Vladimir SOCOR
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Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021 www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro

Motto: “Opinions are free, but not mandatory” - I.L.Caragiale

EDITORIAL
A Promising Start
Constantin IACOBIȚĂ

President Joe Biden’s first foreign engagements seem promising, even if they are
limited to the online environment because of the restrictions imposed by a pandemic
whose causes, manifestations, effects, and duration are yet to be entirely known.
During his online appearances at the G7 Summit and the Munich Security Conference that took place
late last week, the new American president emphatically stated that the USA was returning as a global
leader, and as a trusted partner for its allies.
Joe Biden’s messages probably included everything the allies of the USA have been waiting for four
years – he reconfirmed the transatlantic link and the USA’s commitment to NATO, the values of
democracy, as well as the economic, security and environment cooperation. In short, America’s return to
multilateralism.
The new American president also announced a change in Washington’s approach and attitude with
regard to Russia (which he called a destabilizing factor on an international level), in contrast with his
predecessor, Donald Trump; however, he also indicated a certain continuity as far as China was
concerned.
Beyond their reassuring nature, though, the messages of the new US President should be viewed from a
realistic point of view.
Thus, on one hand, the intention to reposition America as a global leader and to recommit it as a
multilateral player was announced, last week as well, through two relevant actions:
•The Munich Security Conference was also used as an opportunity by the Biden Administration to
announce the US rejoining the Paris Agreement.
•Three days before, an official with the Health Department announced that the USA was to transition
from observer, to member of the COVAX Council, an initiative co-chaired by the World Health
Organization whose objective was the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccines globally (the USA has
allotted 4 billion USD worth of funds for this global effort).
On the other hand, it remains to be seen to what extent America will succeed in being what its
president committed to.
And the most edifying tests in this respect could be two of the issues the Biden Administration has
already voiced about. The first is climate change, where a position and especially a collective
commitment to countering them internationally are very difficult to imagine without the cooperation of
America’s adversaries – China (most of all, since this country is the number one producer of carbon
monoxide in the world) and Russia.
The second is represented by the Iranian nuclear programme. Secretary of state Antony Blinken
suggested, the day before the two international events mentioned above, that the USA would return to
the negotiating table on the Iranian nuclear programme; however, according to the official transcripts of
the phone call President Joe Biden had (the very same day) with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
the terms of the US’ re-engagement in the process would also depend on Israel.

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INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Michael RÜHLE integral part of any military campaign. Similarly,

while the effect of politically motivated terrorist
In 1948, some of the brightest minds in the US, attacks against critical energy infrastructure may be
Canada, and Western Europe got together to create a largely symbolic, state-sponsored attacks can also
novel transatlantic defence pact. Their goal was to have the goal to undermine a country’s ability to
draft a treaty so simple and clear that even “a build up a coherent conventional military defence.
milkman in Omaha” would understand it. The Disinformation can be used as a tool to de-stabilize a
diplomats succeeded. The Washington Treaty, state, yet it can also be part of a “hybrid warfare”
signed on 4 April 1949, required only 14 articles to approach, intended to prepare for (and then mask) a
outline a transatlantic defence community that was direct military aggression against a neighbouring
entirely different from the short-lived alliances of state. Climate change, in turn, can increase the
convenience that had been the curse of European number and scale of natural disasters, with the
history. The Treaty, which soon turned into a fully- military often being the “first responder”, but it can
fledged organization called NATO, described a also aggravate conflicts between states or generate
community of destiny between two continents – a new migration pressures. While it appears unlikely
community that would last much longer than its that the future will see “resource wars”, as
founding fathers ever dared to dream. propounded by some sensationalist authors, it is
However, over seven decades of successful clear that oil, gas and other natural resources (e.g.,
transatlantic defence cooperation say little about “rare earths”) will affect international security
NATO’s future. After all, the Washington Treaty policy: an oil discovery in a region claimed by two
was written at a time when security was largely states; a dam project in a water-scarce region that
understood as state-centric, focused on the defence further limits the scarce supply of water to a
of borders and territory against an aggression by neighbouring country – such scenarios are not only
another state. Today, these traditional notions of imaginable but likely. Finally, the number of
security are increasingly giving way to a complex “virtual” nuclear weapons states is not only growing
mix of military and non-military threats that can due to more countries mastering the full nuclear fuel
affect societies also from within. These range from cycle, it is also growing due to the
targeted manmade threats, such as cyberattacks or commercialisation of proliferation, for example
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to through the emergence of a “black market” for
broader phenomena, such as climate change or sensitive technologies.
resource scarcity. For NATO, which is based on
traditional notions of defence against an “armed
attack”, who’s founding Treaty even defines the
specific territory that is eligible for collective
protection, this rise of “de-territorialized”, non-
kinetic threats create a whole series of challenges.
How well NATO addresses them will determine its
future as an effective security provider for almost
one billion citizens.
The Interaction of Traditional and Non-
Traditional Security Challenges
The return of great power competition, notably
Russia’s revisionism and China’s more assertive
foreign policy, is a stark reminder that the increase
of non-traditional threats does not spell the
obsolescence of traditional security challenges, such www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm
as inter-state wars. On the contrary, traditional and
non-traditional threats increasingly interact.
Cyberattacks, for example, have long been a tool for The Need to Adapt
industrial espionage, yet they also have become an This emerging security landscape challenges

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NATO on several levels. On the institutional level, ranging from then security implications of Artificial
the new threats challenge the centrality of NATO, as Intelligence to the strategic consequences of
many of them are non-military in nature and thus do Bitcoins.
not lend themselves to purely military responses. On
the political level, the fact that these threats offer Countering Hybrid Challenges
little or no early warning, are often anonymous as Russia’s use of hybrid tools in its assault on
well as ambiguous, and, above all, non-existential, Ukraine in 2014 forced NATO to not only re-
creates dilemmas of attribution as well as of emphasise its core task of collective defence, but
solidarity and collective responses. Consequently, also to examine responses to hybrid threats. This is
NATO needs to not only grasp the specific character all the more urgent as hybrid campaigns could
of such non-traditional challenges, but also define its undermine NATO’s collective defence preparations
role in each of them. At the same time, NATO needs in a crisis, notably along NATO’s Eastern flank.
to develop trustful ties with the broader community Consequently, NATO is systematically enlarging its
of stakeholders. counter hybrid toolbox, which now encompasses,
NATO had been addressing a range of emerging inter alia, enhanced intelligence sharing, a stronger
threats for quite some time, yet it had done so in a focus on national resilience, the creation of specific
compartmentalised way, without clear-cut political tools (such as Counter Hybrid Support Teams), more
guidance or thorough conceptual underpinning. The responsive public diplomacy efforts, specifically
2010 Strategic Concept, which gave considerable tailored exercises, and closer relations with the
prominence to emerging challenges, signalled a European Union. In addition, more analysis is
change, however, as it provided NATO with a wide- devoted to the hybrid approaches of specific actors,
ranging mandate to address these challenges in a such as Russia and China, and to deterring hybrid
more systematic way. Moreover, the creation of the threats, notably to the unique role of the military in a
Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s predominantly non-kinetic context. Even the
International Staff, which happened in conjunction difficult problem of attributing certain hybrid attacks
with the release of the Strategic Concept, created a to specific state or non-state actors, which is
bureaucratic foothold for non-traditional challenges essentially a national prerogative, is being discussed
within the Organization, thus facilitating more – as well as exercised – in a NATO context. If the
coherent policy development and implementation in threat of attribution is supposed to act as a deterrent,
these areas. one must seek to attribute collectively.

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news

Improving Situational Awareness

By bringing together over 60 intelligence services,
NATO provides a unique forum for discussing
current and future threats, including non-traditional
ones. Intelligence-sharing in NATO includes all
developments that are relevant to allied security, www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/11/23/cooperating-to
ranging from regional conflicts to new developments -counter-hybrid-threats
in attacks on critical energy infrastructure. To
further enhance situational awareness, NATO stood Enhancing Training, Education and Exercises
up an Intelligence Security Division in its The growing importance of non-traditional
International Staff, including a unit that analyses challenges is making them a permanent fixture in
hybrid threats, while at the same time expanding its NATO’s education and training programmes, as
in-house analytical capabilities to deal with strategic well as in its exercises. Diplomats and military
analysis and foresight. In contrast to intelligence- leaders alike must be given the opportunity to
sharing, strategic analysis allows for a more forward develop a better understanding of cyber, energy,
looking, and sometimes more provocative, open- climate change and similar challenges as drivers of
source approach towards emerging challenges, future security developments. To this end, dedicated
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courses have been set up at NATO’s training between both organizations is greater than ever.
facilities as well as the NATO Centres of Many of the new challenges are both internal and
Excellence, and existing courses are being external in nature. For example, terrorism can be
augmented with appropriate elements. The challenge home grown or imported, protecting cyber and
of coping with non-traditional threats is also being energy infrastructures against hybrid threats are
increasingly reflected in NATO’s exercises. Even a essentially national responsibilities, and a pandemic
“traditional” military conflict today will include requires the early coordination of responses. This
numerous cyber elements, the targeting of energy poses entirely new challenges for all actors involved.
and other critical infrastructure, and massive A stronger NATO–EU relationship would be a
amounts of disinformation. Hence, it is only through major step toward overcoming such challenges.
exercises that one can gain a thorough understanding
of how these non-traditional threats affect a military
campaign.
Enhancing Allied Resilience
If one must assume that certain types of attacks,
such as cyber or terrorist, will happen and cannot be
deterred, the focus needs to shift towards resilience.
Again, cyber provides a case in point. Since
cyberattacks are happening all the time, the
emphasis must be placed on upgrading cyber
defences, so that one’s networks will continue to
operate even in a degraded environment. Similarly,
the effects of attacks on energy infrastructure can be
minimised if that infrastructure can be repaired
quickly. Such resilience measures are largely a
national responsibility. However, NATO can assist www.atlanticcouncil.org
nations in conducting self-assessments that help
identify gaps that need addressing. This new focus
on resilience is also important for NATO’s Developing Links with the Private Sector
traditional collective defence: an opponent seeking Another part of an adapted NATO is a sustained
to undermine NATO’s collective defence relationship with the private sector. Just as the
preparations will do so first and foremost by non- urgency to enhance NATO’s cyber defence
traditional, non-kinetic means, such as cyberattacks capabilities is leading to closer ties with the software
or energy supply disruptions. companies, the need to develop a more coherent
approach to energy security will require NATO to
Reaching Out to Other International reach out to energy companies. With most energy
Organisations and cyber networks in private hands, it will be
The nature of non-traditional security challenges crucial to build public-private partnerships. The goal
makes NATO’s success increasingly dependent on should be to establish “communities of trust” in
how well it cooperates with others. Consequently, which different stakeholders can share confidential
NATO needs to be much better connected to the information, for example on cyberattacks. Creating
broader international community. This is true for its such new relationships will be challenging, since
relations with other security stakeholders such as the national business interests and collective security
European Union and the United Nations, but also interests may sometimes prove to be irreconcilable.
with respect to non-governmental organizations Still, the nature of many emerging security
(NGOs). Hence, enhancing NATO’s challenges makes the established
“connectivity”’ (former NATO Secretary General compartmentalisation of responsibilities between the
Rasmussen) is a precondition for its future as viable public and private sectors appear increasingly
security provider. The NATO-EU relationship, anachronistic.
which is perhaps the most important of all, has seen
considerable progress, yet still remains nervous and Understanding Emerging Disruptive
incomplete. While certain national sensitivities of Technologies
NATO Allies and EU members must be respected, NATO is also making a greater effort to get a firm
the urgency for closer coordination and cooperation grasp on new technologies and their implications.
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Artificial intelligence, “big data” analysis, or block to adapt them to the unique circumstances imposed
chain technologies may offer huge security benefits, by non-traditional security challenges, such as
yet they can also empower adversaries, enabling cyberattacks or hybrid warfare.
them to orchestrate smarter and stealthier attacks.
Moreover, like autonomous vehicles, these Fostering a new Culture of Debate
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies also raise Finally, Allies must use NATO as a forum for a
legal and moral issues that need to be thoroughly sustained political dialogue about broader security
examined. Today, with many new technologies developments. While NATO is engaged on several
being driven by the private sector rather than the continents, its collective “mind-set” is still largely
military, and with many more actors gaining access Eurocentric and reactive. As a result, many NATO
to them, NATO’s erstwhile technological dominance members approach discussions on potential future
can no longer be taken for granted. Consequently, security issues only hesitantly, worrying that
the Allies need to turn NATO into a facilitator for NATO’s image as an operations-driven alliance will
robust innovation. At the same time, Allies need to create the impression that any such debate was only
discuss how to design new arms control mechanisms the precursor to military engagement. While such
that capture the speed of technological change, as misperceptions can never be ruled out entirely,
well as how to set new norms of behaviour in new Allies should nevertheless resist making themselves
domains, such as space, and in new “virtual” hostage to the risk of a few false press reports about
domains, such as cyberspace. In short, NATO needs NATO’s allegedly sinister military intentions.
to prepare for an entirely new era of how conflicts Indeed, the true risk for NATO lies in the opposite
will be fought. direction: by refusing to look ahead and debate
political and military options in meeting emerging
challenges, the Allies would condemn themselves to
an entirely reactive approach, thus foregoing
opportunities for a pro-active policy.
Such a culture of debate is all the more important
as many new security challenges do not affect all
Allies in quite the same way. A terrorist assault or a
cyberattack against just one Ally will not necessarily
generate the collective sense of moral outrage and
political solidarity that one could witness after the
terrorist attacks of “9/11”, for example.
Consequently, political solidarity and collective
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news responses may be far more difficult to generate.
Admitting this is not fatalism. It is simply a
Improving Collective Decision-Taking reminder that the new threats can be divisive rather
Another obvious challenge pertains to the speed of than unifying if Allies do not make a determined
the necessary response and, consequently, the effort to address them collectively. On a positive
question of political control. Cyberattacks offer the note, there are some indications that this cultural
most glaring example: they simply do not leave one change in NATO has finally begun, as Allies have
with enough time to engage in lengthy deliberations, become more willing to discuss potentially
let alone with the opportunity to seek parliamentary controversial issues in a brainstorming mode. This
approval of a response. While this challenge is welcome development must now be sustained by
already significant on the national level, it is even beefing up NATO’s analytical capabilities, including
more severe in a multinational context. To overcome improved intelligence sharing and longer-range
it, nations have to agree on rules of engagement, or forecasting. Over time, these developments should
pre-delegate authority to certain entities. This quasi- lead to a shift in NATO’s “culture” toward
automaticity runs counter to the natural instinct of becoming a more forward-looking organization.
governments to retain political control over each and
every aspect of their collective response; yet the Achievements and Challenges
slow, deliberative nature of consensus-building may Given the many structural differences between
turn out to be ill-suited for the challenges at hand. traditional and non-traditional security challenges, it
The consensus needs to be built before the actual should not come as a surprise that NATO’s forays
event occurs. Consequently, NATO is constantly into addressing the latter category have been
reviewing its decision-taking procedures, and seeks difficult. However, since the 2010 Strategic Concept
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set the stage, much has been achieved. This is prevented through deterrence, and that, some
particularly true for cyber defence, which has seen damage will inevitably occur, will be difficult to
the fastest progress, including the development of an explain to populations that have become used to near
agreed NATO policy, the definition of cyber as a -perfect security. Thus, such a policy will be charged
distinct operational domain, and its mention in the as being fatalistic or scaremongering, while others
context of the Article 5 collective self-defence will interpret it as an alibi by governments to better
clause. While nations are still reluctant to share control their citizens, or simply as an excuse for
information beyond the very small trusted increasing defence budgets. And yet the
communities in which their intelligence services and governments of modern industrial societies have no
private-public partnerships operate, the need for choice but to admit to their citizens that in an era
NATO to meet the cyber challenge has been fully marked by hybrid conflict, climate change,
acknowledged. As pointed out earlier, the attribution proliferation, terrorism, and resource scarcity neither
challenge remains difficult to meet in a collective the individual state nor an alliance can still offer
framework, yet Allies have demonstrated the near-perfect protection. Hence, the notion of defence
political will to “name and shame” a country that will increasingly have to be understood as “total
they consider the perpetrator of cyberattacks or the defence”, as practised for instance by Nordic
use of chemical/biological weapons. European countries, which includes many non-
Non-traditional challenges have also been a military elements such as civil defence (including
convenient venue for some partner countries to counter-disinformation), civil emergency planning,
move closer to NATO. Moreover, several of or medical stockpiling.
NATO’s about two dozen Centres of Excellence
have proven to be invaluable analytical resources, as
have the two Strategic Commands in Mons and
Norfolk. NATO’s support for scientific research also
focuses on non-traditional challenges, including
climate and water security, and NATO has built ties
to the scientific community to discuss these and
other issues. Allies have also increased their work
on – and understanding of – hybrid threats, notably
in cooperation with the European Union. In short,
NATO has become a serious interlocutor on non-
traditional challenges.
All this is not to say that NATO has entirely www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics
mastered the difficult terrain of non-traditional
security challenges. There are still areas where the
Conclusion
gap between expectations and reality remains wide.
For example, while the 2010 Strategic Concept NATO was born at a time when the “Omaha
refers to climate change as a potential threat milkman” delivered his bottles in a small van from
multiplier, Allies are only now starting to develop a door to door. Soon, however, the refrigerator will
visible collective approach to dealing with this order the milk autonomously via the Internet, and
phenomenon. The same holds true for resource the product may be delivered by a drone. Such a
scarcity and similar issues: while NATO should not world has little in common with the world of 1949.
“militarise” what are essentially economic matters, Neither can its security challenges be met with the
the lack of interest in such topics could lead to all means of the past. If all Allies understand and
kinds of unwelcome surprises. By the same token, embrace this fundamental fact, they will be able to
despite a variety of forecasting efforts by NATO as transform their Alliance into a true 21st century
well as by individual Allies, NATO as a collective security provider. NATO’s founding fathers surely
has not yet fully embraced this methodology. would approve of this.

A New Concept of Security NB: Michael RÜHLE heads the Hybrid

Dealing with non-traditional challenges requires a Challenges and Energy Security Section in
paradigm shift away from deterrence and toward NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division.
resilience – an enormous challenge both for He writes in a personal capacity.
individual states as well as for alliances. A security
policy that accepts that certain threats cannot be
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Iulia Monica OEHLER-ȘINCAI of the world economy, trade and international

investment, point to a worrying inclination towards
Introduction interventionism, protectionism and the transition
The present synthesis[1] highlights a number of from a multilateral regulatory model to regional and
new features of the international relations system bilateral frameworks (UNCTAD, 2020a; WTO,
and reveals restrictive measures taken by both 2020; IMF, 2020).
developed and developing/emerging countries in The literature reflects that, during a serious crisis,
the field of foreign direct investment (FDI), before many governments resort to protectionist measures
the COVID-19 pandemic and also under its in order to defend national interests. In such
influence. circumstances, the probability of a “copycat”
Since 2018, there has been remarked a strong protectionist behaviour rises (Evenett, 2019). But
trend towards stricter FDI control regimes, the US-initiated trade war against China, even in
especially in terms of investment in strategic the absence of an international crisis, has had
industries and critical infrastructure, in response to similar domino effects of protectionist measures,
Chinese investments, closely linked to national over which the COVID-19 crisis has overlapped.
security motivations. The COVID-19 crisis has The various facets of the US-China trade war
once again emphasized the inclination towards point out that trade disputes and tensions between
economic nationalism and even the goal of the two world leaders do not take the form of a
achieving strategic economic autonomy, not only simple trade war, but are associated with an
in developed countries but also in developing ones ideological one and one for global domination, not
(of particular interest in this regard are case studies limited to trade but including also economy at
on China and India). large, technology, investments, security and
The propensity for economic nationalism and political values. Barriers to FDI flows are not only
strategic autonomy in many parts of the world falls related to regulations, measures and restrictive
into the category of “harmful protectionism”, in rules, which protect certain sectors of the national/
contrast to the restrictive measures imposed in regional economy, but also to geopolitical
order to enforce necessary environmental, social motivations. At the same time, in the field of
and governance standards associated with “good industrial policies, there is a major change
protectionism”. Most developing/emerging worldwide, from the “laissez-faire” approach, to the
countries continue to liberalize their FDI regime in increase of interventionism and the role of the state.
certain sectors that do not affect national security, The digital economy is also threatened by
as FDI represents their main source of capital. But protectionism, with countries participating in the
starting from a higher level of restrictions, international debate on the taxation of digital
developing countries continue to be more services being far from a consensus, with the US
protectionist than the developed ones. The withdrawing from the negotiations under the
uncertainty regarding the economic recovery after auspices of the Organization for Economic
the COVID-19 crisis is also reflected in the field of Cooperation and Development (OECD) in June
the FDI regimes, the protectionist tendencies 2020. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic
becoming more and more prominent, although their is accompanied by new protectionist tendencies,
negative effect is obvious. which are not limited to trade in medicines, medical
devices and sanitary materials. All these factors
Determinants of the Current Protectionist will be addressed in the following sections.
Trends
Experts from the United Nations Conference on Close Links between National Industrial
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the World Policies, Structural transformations in the
Trade Organization (WTO) and the International World Economy and Protectionist Trends
Monetary Fund (IMF), in their reports on the state Protectionist tendencies overlap with the deep

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structural changes in the world economy. These the international ranking taking into account the
transformations reflect the fourth industrial global innovation index (Table 1).
revolution, based on both new technologies and the Notes to Table 1: Since 2011, Switzerland ranks
digitalization of economies and the fact that in total 1. South Korea entered the top 10 for the first time
production costs, the importance of labour costs is in 2020. In 2020, China maintained its 14th position,
declining. The competitive advantages of the in 2019 entering the top 15 for the first time. It is
manufacturing industry concentrated in low-cost the only middle-income economy in top 30. Over
labour areas have begun to diminish with the the past seven years, China, the Philippines, India
increasing presence of industrial robots, which has and Vietnam are the top 50 economies with the
already led to a change in the configuration of most significant advances in innovation. Although
global production networks (GPNs). Brazil ranks only 62nd in the world ranking of econ-
To this is added the increase in labour costs in omies according to the global innovation index for
emerging economies and the geopolitical risks on 2020 (up 4 positions from 2019), however it has a
the rise, which creates solid preconditions for research and development intensity comparable to
moving production activities to countries of origin. European countries (such as Spain and Portugal),
But developing/emerging countries, such as China, has multinational companies in the field of research
India, Brazil and Mexico, also have significant and development and hosts major clusters in the
stocks of industrial robots, new technologies and field of science and technology.
digitalized economies. Multinational companies Given that international trade and investment
present in these countries may decide to stay, in revolve around global value chains, through the
order to continue to benefit from the workforce circuit of inputs generated and received for export
skills and to avoid the additional costs generated by production, it is expected that any new wave of
the relocation of productive capacities. Although protectionism will generate significant costs,
the trend of relocation of production (repatriation of amplified by a number of factors: (1)
production facilities to countries of origin or hyperspecialization in tasks and production of parts
elsewhere) will intensify in the coming years, amid and components, which involves multiplying costs
automation of international production and global along the GVCs; (2) protectionist measures directed
value chains (GVCs), it will not impact all against a country affect all GVC participants,
industries and countries uniformly, and technology- including their initiators, having not only effects on
driven relocation will remain limited (UNCTAD, countries directly targeted by the imposed barriers
2020a). Innovation is both a central element of (for instance, China’s exports to the US have
companies’ strategies and national economic significant added value from countries such as
growth and development strategies (Cornell Japan, South Korea, the United States of America
University-INSEAD-WIPO, 2020). This is also and Germany, while the US exports to China
reflected in the positioning of world economies in incorporate high added value from countries such

Table 1: Rankings of the top ten economies by income group according to the global innovation index[2] for 2020 (in
parenthesis, the position occupied in the world ranking of the 131 economies analysed)

Source: Cornell University-INSEAD-WIPO (2020)

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as Canada, China, Japan, Mexico); (3) the semiconductors, in India clusters specializing in IT
uncertainty generated is reflected on the behaviour services). Such initiatives not only generate
of the companies, reluctant in initiating new protectionist tendencies, but also measures to
investments; (4) the remodelling of supply chains, stimulate technology transfer and to modernize
through their reorganization (relocation, shortening, national productive capacities through trade and
etc.), has direct effects on partner companies, investment facilitation programs. The COVID-19
including the impossibility of some of them to pandemic has led to new measures in key areas,
provide parts, components and services or to meet highlighting the strategic importance of the
delivery deadlines; (5) the increase of transaction pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries,
costs is accompanied by the decrease of trade for example (UNCTAD, 2020a).
flows, and the trade carried out through GVCs has a Rising interventionism and protectionism in
much higher effect on the economic growth and the advanced countries means blocking access to
labour market than that outside the GVCs; (6) the technologies for developing/emerging countries,
increase of production costs generates a price spike, which stimulates South-South partnerships, but also
the final consumers being directly affected (IBRD- national efforts of research, development and
WB, 2020). innovation, such underscored by China. A trend
In terms of industrial policies, there is a major that could accelerate in the coming years is the
change, from the “laissez-faire” approach, to intensification of regional, bilateral and even ad hoc
increasing interventionism and the role of the state, economic integration efforts, to the detriment of
not only in developing but also developed international economic cooperation (UNCTAD,
countries. In the last decade, at least 110 countries 2020a).
have presented industrial development intentions or
explicit policies, not only for reasons related to Concomitant Changes at Multiple Levels
economic development and job creation, but also Reconfiguration of international production.
for poverty reduction, participation in the industrial International production, under the impact of new
revolution and the GVCs, and achieving sustainable technologies, economic policies and stricter
development goals. To these objectives are added environmental, social and governance standards
those of national security, but also the competition (the acronym ESG in English), may have several
for gaining the dominant position in advanced trajectories: (1) Relocation from host countries to
technologies and strategic GVCs, with a strong countries of origin, leading to shorter and less
protectionist touch (UNCTAD, 2020a). Recently, fragmented value-added chains, as well as a higher
concerns about the situation of companies in geographical concentration of added value. The
strategic sectors that, weakened by the health crisis, most affected are technology-intensive industries,
could face the risk of being taken over by export-oriented economies and those participating
companies from other countries such as China in global value chains. Relocation means the
(including state-owned or state-controlled withdrawal of investment from the host country, for
enterprises) have worsened (Solís, 2020). some economies this implies the need for
Economic nationalism is therefore on the rise. reindustrialization or counteracting the effects of
Developing countries fear premature premature deindustrialization. (2) Diversification
deindustrialization, while developed ones envisage leads to a greater distribution of economic
rebuilding the industrial base (through subsidies, activities, increases opportunities for new entrants
fiscal incentives, public investment to increase (economies and companies) in the direction of
domestic productive capacity), but especially participation in global value chains. Digitalizing
strategic positioning in the field of advanced supply chains requires both high-quality hardware
technologies. Special economic zones, focused on and software infrastructure. (3) Regionalization
attracting FDI, continue to increase in number and contributes to the reduction of the length of supply
diversify, currently being over 5,400 such zones in chains, but not the decrease of their fragmentation,
about 150 economies, compared to 4,000 in 2015. meaning a transition from global efficiency-seeking
Many such special economic zones target the investment to regional market-seeking investment.
concentration of know-how and technology in It requires cooperation with neighbours in industrial
capital and innovation intensive industries (in development, trade and investment. (4) Replication
China and South Korea, exempli gratia, are clusters means the transition from investment in large-scale
specializing in electronic components, batteries, industrial activities to more geographically
distributed manufacturing and shorter value-added
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chains, with the production of goods being as close become even more uncertain under the impact of
as possible to where they are used and according to the COVID-19 pandemic. This has been
the customers’ exigency. This requires a digital accompanied by new restrictions, with some
network of decentralized production sites, in countries tightening investment regulations and
several locations, connected by digital technology. introducing temporary measures to prevent foreign
On-demand production means flexibility and rapid takeovers during the crisis (Seric, Hauge, 2020a;
adaptation to customer demands, in contrast to UNCTAD, 2020a).
mass production of goods (UNCTAD, 2020a). The more prominent the challenges and risks from
Changing development strategies. The recent the outside, the stronger the temptation to resort to
general trend in international production indicates measures to protect companies and sectors of the
shorter GVCs, a higher concentration of added national economy. It is clear that protectionist
value and a decrease in international investment in measures in one area affect other sectors (for
productive physical assets. All of these are instance, those related to trade also affect FDI
accompanied by major challenges for developing flows), as these measures discourage the activities
countries. For decades, their development and of global production networks, in which the free
industrialization strategies have depended on movement of goods and services between
attracting FDI, increasing participation and companies from different countries is vital (Görg,
capturing as much value as possible in the GVCs, Labonte, 2011). Given that the evolution of the
technological advancement and digitalizing the world economy is uncertain at the moment, under
economy. The deep transformations in terms of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, on this also
international production are long term and require a depend the decisions of the economic actors to
change in development strategies (UNCTAD, continue investing or, on the contrary, to disinvest
2020a). or wait for a more favourable period to launch new
On this basis, it is necessary to rebalance towards investment projects.
growth based on domestic and regional demand and
to promote investments in infrastructure and “America First” and the Pursuit of National
domestic services, taking into account the Interest
Sustainable Development Goals. Investors are no At the 2018 World Economic Forum in Davos,
longer looking for opportunities associated with Donald Trump stressed in his speech that the US
manufacturing projects, but aim instead value- would take into account the national interest, urging
added projects in infrastructure, renewable energy, other countries to do the same. But which may be
water and sanitation, food and agriculture and the result if the national interest of a major player
health care, taking into account priorities induced on the international stage violates the rights of other
by: the new industrial revolution, digitalization of states? In the US relations with the EU, to the
the economy, sustainable development, but also the frictions generated by factors such as subsidies in
intensification of economic nationalism (UNCTAD, the aeronautics and agriculture industry, others
2020a). The COVID-19 crisis is manifesting itself have recently been added, such as the digital
in a period of profound changes and services taxation, among the big companies
transformations in the world economy, affected by such measures being GAFA (Google,
contributing to their amplification and Amazon, Facebook and Apple). Moreover, during
acceleration. the COVID-19 pandemic, the US and the EU took
positions diametrically opposed to the new risks
Figure 1: Priority sectors for investment nowadays
induced by the new coronavirus, the US being
accused even of acts of “piracy” in its actions to
obtain sanitary materials and equipment, needed by
Source: Based on the literature review the American population, to the detriment of
Against the background of simultaneous demand European partners, which raised a number of
and supply shocks and their adverse effects, it has questions about how much confidence remained in
been revealed once again how interconnected are bilateral relations.
international trade and investment flows, various The comparison of the two current trade wars,
countries rethinking their economic policy the one between the USA and China, on the one
strategies to reduce vulnerability to global hand, and the one between the USA and the EU,
economic shocks (Seric, Hauge, 2020a; 2020b; on the other hand (which will probably be
Coveri et al., 2020). Moreover, the outlook has tempered and even abandoned by the new US
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administration), indicates two relevant aspects of United States and China, given their significant
international relations. share in international trade flows. In 2018, the two
(1) Despite differences of opinion, developed countries imposed each other, successively,
countries are working together to strengthen increased customs duties, covering more than half
international rules governing key areas such as of their bilateral trade (about 70% of US exports to
subsidies and forced technology transfers. China and almost half of the US imports from
Currently, the only emerging country that has the China). The US imports of intermediate goods from
capacity to catch up with developed countries is China are expected to fall by more than 40% in the
China. long run, a much sharper decline than that of
(2) Unlike the US-China trade war, that between imports of consumer goods (9%) and capital goods
the US and the EU is more like a war of (26%). The US has also imposed additional tariffs
declarations and threats, each party being cautious on other countries (on various products, such as
when it comes to implementing de facto solar panels, washing machines, steel and
protectionist measures. At the same time, the US’ aluminum), causing retaliation from affected
measures do not appear to have affected EU exports trading partners (IBRD-WB, 2020).
of goods. The US’ trade deficit with the EU in
The Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic
terms of trade in goods continued to grow between
2017 and 2019, despite the intensification of International experts consider that while
economic nationalism during Donald Trump’s term temporary national protectionism can serve a
and unprecedented trade restrictions, reflected by country’s urgent interests and stimulate domestic
the intense recourse by the US President to Section production, there is a danger of slipping into
301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (referring to uncontrolled nationalism, with long-term
“unjustifiable acts, policies or practices, defined as repercussions on international trade and investment
incompatible with US international law and and, implicitly, on relations between nations
burdening or restricting US trade”) and Section 232 (World Economic Forum, 2020). We are therefore
of the Trade Act of 1962 (concerning national far from a “capitalism of stakeholders” [3] that
security). Statistical data show how interdependent takes into account the interests of states, companies
the two economies are, an undeniable evidence in and society alike, given a set of environmental,
this regard being the share of over 30% of EU-US social and governance objectives.
FDI stocks in the EU total inward and outward FDI The intensification of protectionist tendencies in
stocks (Eurostat, 2020). Bilateral relations are “the international trade and investment has become all
largest and most complex” in the world (USTR, the more evident during the COVID-19 pandemic,
2020), but the elimination of uncertainty is a sine and consequently the term deglobalization is
qua non condition for further strengthening them. increasingly used. However, while the process of
The trade and investment policies of the key “physical” deglobalization has been accelerated
actors in the field of international relations were by the current crisis, on the contrary, the online,
marked by an obvious amplification of the digital globalization has been markedly
protectionist tendencies, even before the stimulated.
manifestation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Many The COVID-19 epidemic turned into a pandemic
restrictive measures have directly targeted China, (confirmed by the World Health Organization on
which is and continues to be considered by March 11, 2020), considered by IMF experts “a
international organizations as a developing country, rare disaster” (Gopinath, 2020). The world has
and under this status is exempted from certain changed radically in just a few months. As
obligations, which gives it a competitive advantage countries have implemented the necessary
over competitors, both among developed and quarantine and social distancing measures to
developing countries. prevent the spread of the pandemic, the world has
The recent period has been dominated by the US- reached a “Great Isolation” and the world economy
China confrontation, the growing constraint on has entered a recession (IMF, 2020). The economic
international cooperation in science and technology situation has changed and continues to change
and new forms of investment barriers for reasons of profoundly around the world, necessitating the
national security. direct involvement of the state and central banks in
the economy. The IMF has confirmed that the
From 2018 onwards, one can remark a new wave current crisis is the worst since the Great
of protectionism, fuelled by tensions between the Depression of 1929-1933, far exceeding the
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international financial crisis of 2008-2009. focus of G20 Member States on safeguarding key
An important aspect to consider is the behaviour national security interests from 2018 onwards.
of consumers and companies during the COVID- These include access to sensitive personal data and
19 pandemic: consumers choose to save rather than the acquisition of advanced dual-use technologies,
spend, and a significant share of investors chooses civilian and military. Between October 2018 and
to postpone planned investments, which keeps May 2019, France, Germany, Italy, the USA, the
inflation low. At the same time, broad fiscal EU adopted new policies or tightened existing
measures to stimulate the economy, estimated at legislation (except for the EU, the other economies
over USD 11 trillion at the G20 level, accompanied already had FDI monitoring policies) (OECD-WTO
by rising fiscal deficits (17% of GDP in OECD -UNCTAD, 2019a). Reviewing the cases of
countries) and an average public debt of 140% of restrictive measures adopted between 2018 and
GDP in developed countries, associated with a new 2020, [4] it is worth noting: (1) the adoption of
role of central banks (that of supporting massive protectionist policies – in the first instance by
packages to stimulate national economies) induce developed countries, then by developing/emerging
risks, but not of the nature of a sovereign debt crisis countries and (2) the intensification of
(EIU, 2020). protectionist measures during the COVID-19
pandemic, both at the level of developed and
Strategic Autonomy, a Solution? developing/emerging countries, either in the
Economic autonomy is not a new concept. This direction of FDI monitoring to avoid the takeover
term was frequently used in the social field, but had of strategic assets by foreign companies, or in that
a sporadic presence in the theory of international of obtaining strategic economic autonomy (OECD
economic relations. In the first case, it is considered -WTO-UNCTAD, 2019b; 2019c; UNCTAD,
to be a “product of capitalism”, because “the 2020b).
market and not the state generates opportunities to The path to strategic autonomy is seen by China
earn a living”, in terms of the economic as a normal response and a form of defence against
independence of the population, as a guarantor of decoupling from the United States, although this is
the capacity to exercise democratic rights to its disadvantage. In turn, India announced the
(McMann, 2012). In the second case, economic Self-reliant India Mission (Atma-Nirbhar Bharat
autonomy is defined as “the ability of companies Abhiyan), in the context of the COVID-19
and states to make independent decisions about pandemic and excessive dependence on certain
their economic future” (Sarooshi, 2004). The need categories of imports.
for economic autonomy has been perceived as more Once the devastating effects of COVID-19
and more stringent together with the countries’ became apparent, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
increasing economic dependence on China and resorted to a program of firm measures to revive the
energy dependence on Russia, but the peak has Indian economy. It relies on the support of the
been reached during the COVID-19 pandemic, by local manufacturing industry and local supply
the temporary interruption of the supply along the chains, in the wider context of India’s excessive
global production chains. dependence on certain categories of imports[5] and
In recent decades, global value chains have the objective of ensuring the country’s strategic
increased in both length and complexity as autonomy. His speech on May 12, 2020 was a
companies have expanded around the world. Since strong nationalist one, based on the slogan “Vocal
2000, the value of intermediate goods traded for Local”. The Prime Minister announced Self-
globally has tripled, reaching over USD 10,000 reliant India Mission[6] (Atma-Nirbhar Bharat
billion annually. But multinational companies have Abhiyan), accompanied by a package of economic
not only benefited from efficiency, reduced stimulus measures worth 20,000 billion rupees
production costs and proximity to major markets. (about 265 billion dollars), representing 10% of
They also have faced risks, the most serious being India’s GDP.
the disruption of supply chains. Companies can The five pillars of the Mission are: rapid
expect such outages, with an average duration of economic transition, not gradual changes; world-
one month or more, to occur every 3.7 years, with class infrastructure, representing modern India; a
the worst such events having a major financial system based on modern technology; dynamic
impact on them (McKinsey Global Institute, 2020). demographics and demand that contribute to the use
Recent reports from international organizations of the power of demand and supply to its full
indicate a clear trend towards the increase of the potential. The reform measures to achieve India’s
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economic independence include: reform of even in the absence of the COVID-19 pandemic;
agricultural supply chains, a rational tax system, (4) new synchronized challenges: the reduction of
simple and clear laws, capable human resources private consumption, productive investments, trade
(labour market reform) and a strong financial and investment flows, in parallel with the increase
system. For the military industry, the aim is, of the unemployment rate, the fiscal deficit and the
among others, to reduce imports and stimulate public debt, with the entry into recession and the
foreign companies to produce in India, but also to need to adopt anti-crisis measures.
encourage public procurement from domestic
sources. Major Determinants of the FDI Protectionist
However the country’s economic independence is Trends
difficult to achieve, as production costs are much The motivations for restricting FDI are various,
higher in India than in neighbouring countries from protecting advanced technologies, maintaining
(China, for example). On the other hand, supporting jobs and encouraging local production (through
the local manufacturing industry and local supply local content requirements), to maintaining control
chains is a long, complex and difficult process, over national companies and stimulating
given not only domestic but also regional and technology transfer at the national level, with
international challenges. developing countries generally more protectionist
As for China, its reaction to the protectionist than developed ones (De Bolle, Zettelmeyer,
measures adopted by key partners has been to lean 2019).
towards strategic autonomy. A statement The international financial crisis of 2007-2008
summarizing the main directions of action that will generated a wave of protectionist and
be included in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for 2021 interventionist tendencies, a gradual decrease in
-2025 shows that innovation is the key to modern the FDI rate of return and a shift from
development, “making technological self-reliance a multilateral to regional and bilateral negotiating
strategic support for national development”. frameworks (UNCTAD, 2020a). But other studies
Chinese leadership sees dependence on foreign show that until 2016-2017, there is no trend of
technologies, such as semiconductors, as a major abrupt intensification of protectionism, which
weakness, especially following the expansion of the appeared only in 2018 (Evenett, 2019). The
US export control policies (Price et al., 2020). This UNCTAD Report on FDI Policies in 2009 shows
is all the more so since the USA, during the Trump that measures to promote FDI coexist with those of
administration, expressed its intention to discrimination against foreign investors, including
“decoupling” of the Chinese economy. The aim is through hidden actions (referring to public
to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers for procurement with a high local content, especially in
strategic products such as food, energy and the case of public infrastructure projects, preventing
semiconductors. The path to strategic autonomy is banks from granting loans to foreign economic
seen by China as a form of defence against agents, invoking exceptions for reasons related to
decoupling by the US and its allies, although national security, etc.). The Report also mentions
Chinese experts believe it would be to China’s fears about the takeover of “national champions” by
advantage not to resort to this path (McDonald, foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2009). It should be
2020). emphasized that this dichotomy, liberalization-
But the economic independence of a country is promotion of investments versus the intensification
difficult to achieve, given: (1) the deep of FDI regulation in order to achieve economic
interdependencies between the world’s economies, policy objectives is noticeable in all countries of the
at least regionally; (2) the prospect of giving up the world, in some more pronounced, in others less
advantages of internationalization, taking into intensely. The UNCTAD Report with analyses for
account the reasons that have led over time to 2016 shows that 80% of the measures adopted
increased international trade and investment flows globally are in favour of FDI liberalization and only
(comparative and competitive advantages in terms 20% restrict FDI (UNCTAD, 2017).
of labour, purchasing power and demand, Especially since 2017-2018, after a wave of
technological advancement, level of infrastructure Chinese investment led Chinese players to take
development, connectivity, knowledge economy, control of foreign high-tech companies and other
legislative framework, progress of reforms, political strategic assets, there has been a growing concern
stability, etc.); (3) national constraints, existing among countries (especially developed, led by the
USA) on the effects of these takeovers in terms of
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national competitiveness and the protection of The EU Regulation 452/2019 of the European
national interests.[7] Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019
Developed countries are the ones that “set the establishing a framework for the screening of FDI
tone” for the new wave of protectionism in the field into the Union (applied from 11 October 2020) lays
of FDI, being worth mentioning the measures to down the general framework for the examination of
monitor foreign investment in EU member states, FDI from the perspective of security or public
but also in the US and Japan. Although they are order. FDI will be analysed from the perspective of
considered by countries that adopt them as ways to their impact on: “(a) critical infrastructure, whether
eliminate “harmful” FDI, it is difficult to draw a physical or virtual, including infrastructure in the
precise line between simple protection of the fields of energy, transport, water, health,
economy and forms of protectionism aimed at communications, media, data processing or storage,
blocking the access of investors from other aerospace, defence, electoral or financial
countries to strategic assets, to slow down their infrastructure, and sensitive facilities, as well as
technological advancement. land and real estate crucial for the use of such
In the Communication from the European infrastructure; (b) critical technologies and dual-use
Commission, Welcoming Foreign Direct items as defined in Article 2 (1) of Regulation (EC)
Investment while Protecting Essential Interests No 428/2009, including artificial intelligence,
(European Commission, 2017), it is highlighted that robotics, semiconductors, cybersecurity, aerospace,
“Foreign direct investment is an important source defence, energy storage, quantum and nuclear
of growth, jobs and innovation. It has brought technologies, as well as nanotechnologies and
significant benefits to the EU as to the rest of the biotechnologies; (c) supply of critical inputs,
world. This is why the EU wants to maintain an including energy or raw materials, as well as food
open investment environment. At the same time, security; (d) access to sensitive information,
the reflection paper on Harnessing Globalization including personal data, or the ability to control
recognised increasing concerns about strategic such information; or (e) the freedom and pluralism
acquisitions of European companies with key of the media”. The first criterion taken into account
technologies by foreign investors, especially state- in determining whether an investment may affect
owned enterprises.” Internationally, the EU‘s security and public order is related to the control of
investment regime is among the most open ones, the investor “directly or indirectly by the
but as new investment trends emerge (including in government, including state bodies or armed forces,
terms of the role played by some emerging of a third country, including through ownership
economies as suppliers of FDI, such as China, but structure or significant funding”. The control
also by private companies that have access to exerted by the EU authorities over FDI in each
financing or other state support measures, which Member State will be exercised by the annual
allow them to be more competitive than others, the reporting on the FDI carried out on their territory
risk is that “in individual cases foreign investors by 31st of March.
may seek to acquire control or influence in Romania, as an EU member state, has prepared a
European undertakings whose activities have draft Emergency Ordinance (OUG), which
repercussions on critical technologies, modifies the current mechanism for examining FDI,
infrastructure, inputs, or sensitive information”). so as to apply the provisions of EU Regulation
This Communication must be linked to the “EU- 452/2019. In this sense, it is envisaged to set up a
China - A Strategic Outlook” of March 2019, which Commission for the Examination of Foreign Direct
highlights that “China’s economic power and Investment (CEISD), attached to the Romanian
political influence have grown with unprecedented Government, composed of representatives of: the
scale and speed, reflecting its ambitions to become Prime Minister’s Office, the Presidential
a leading global power. China can no longer be Administration, the Ministry of Economy, Energy
regarded as a developing country. It is a key global and Business Environment, the Ministry of Public
actor and leading technological power. Its Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
increasing presence in the world, including in Ministry of National Defence, the Ministry of
Europe, should be accompanied by greater Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the
responsibilities for upholding the rules-based Romanian Intelligence Service, the Foreign
international order, as well as greater reciprocity, Intelligence Service and the Competition Council.
non-discrimination and openness of its system”. The normative act also provides for requesting the
approval of the Cyber Security Operational Council
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(COSC), in the situation where FDI targets or Chart 1: The number of measures adopted in the field of
involves IT technologies that may affect or harm FDI, Three main categories, 2004-2019
the security or public order of Romania. If it is
considered that there are major security risks, the
opinion of the Supreme Council of National
Defence will be sought. Foreign investors from
outside the EU (individuals or companies) must
notify the intention regarding FDI (in areas such as
energy, transport, agriculture, and communications,
military) to the Romanian authorities. CEISD will
issue an opinion based on the information received,
the decisions being taken unanimously, after which
the Government will issue a decision authorizing or
rejecting the investment. The entities directly
involved can challenge the government’s decision
in court. Failure to notify such an investment or the
Source: UNCTAD (2020a)
transmission of false/incomplete information is
punishable by fines of 1-5% of the investor’s demand, the possibility of supply disruption and
turnover.[8] uncertain revenues. Exacerbation of export
Although China is not explicitly mentioned in restrictions has become a reality since March 2020,
the Regulation 452/2019, it is clear that Chinese not only for medicines and protective equipment,
investment in infrastructure, energy, technology but also for food (Espitia, Rocha, Ruta, 2020).
and other sensitive areas at the EU level will be New investment restrictions and regulations in
hampered. This is even in the light of the adoption recent years reflect the concerns of some countries
in the near future of the EU-China Comprehensive around the world about national security and the
Agreement on Investment (although the agreement scenario of excessive takeover of high-tech firms,
in principle was reached on 30 December 2020, its strategic assets, land or natural resources by foreign
text needs to be finalized, signed by the Member investors. Several countries have tightened control
States and ratified by the European Parliament). over FDI or are considering new investment review
Since 2018, there is a strong and growing trend procedures. National security arguments are now
towards adopting stricter FDI control regimes, widely used to protect national interests, core
especially in terms of foreign investment in technologies and know-how, which are considered
strategic industries and critical infrastructure. Many essential for national competitiveness (UNCTAD,
countries, most of them developed (but also 2020a). But this term is not clearly defined
emerging, such as India), have resorted to (Ufimtseva, 2020), so that under its “shield”,
protectionist measures, with the main objective of discriminatory restrictions can be imposed, to the
protecting their national security, many of them detriment of free competition. In the coming years,
representing reactions to Chinese investment, and intellectual property in certain industries, such as
more recently to the COVID-19 pandemic financial services, telecommunications, electronics,
(UNCTAD, 2020a). Although, statistically, the year biotechnology and even agriculture, is expected to
2018 appears to be the “peak” of FDI restriction be increasingly protected, which may lead to new
measures in the recent period (Chart 1), an analysis investment restrictions (UNCTAD, 2020a).
of the attitude of world countries towards FDI, Although measures to promote FDI outnumber
especially in sectors considered to be sensitive, those of restraint or additional regulation, their
shows that the protectionist trend continues and it evolution indicates a firm inclination towards
even intensifies. protectionism (Chart 1).
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated fears These data must also be correlated with the
about the plight of companies in strategic sectors evolution of FDI flows worldwide. According to
that, weakened by the health crisis, could face the the OECD and UNCTAD, the value of total FDI
risk of being taken over by countries such as China flows worldwide has fallen by 40% for the whole of
(Solís, 2020). The current crisis and uncertainty 2020, falling to below USD 1 trillion for the first
about the duration and intensity of the shock (IMF, time since 2005 (compared to USD 1,540 billion in
2020) also affect FDI, given the evolution of 2019 and the highest level in 2015, of about USD

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2.042 billion) (Chart 2). For 2021, a new decrease Chart 3: Inward and outward FDI flows, US, China,
of 5-10% is forecasted, and for 2022, a gradual Japan, EU-27 and United Kingdom between 2008 and
recovery. In 2022, a return to the pre-COVID-19 2019 (USD million, current prices)
pandemic is possible, but only in the optimistic
Outward FDI Inward FDI
scenario (OECD-WTO-UNCTAD, 2020).
Chart 2: Inward FDI flows, 1970-2019
(USD million, current prices)

Source: UNCTAD (2020c)

two decades of the third millennium, was
stimulated by four main categories of factors: (1)
economic policies (trade liberalization initiatives
and measures associated with export growth,
investment, but also boosting demand); (2)
opportunities outlined in the field of economic
Source: UNCTAD (2020c) transactions (decrease of production costs and
also of other costs associated with international
In the first half of 2020, total FDI flows business); (3) technological advancement (factor
worldwide decreased by 49% compared to the same with a major role in decreasing costs of transport,
period in 2019, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and communication, management, coordination of
the restrictions that were imposed. Developed supply chain activities); and (4) the progress made
economies were the worst affected (-75%), with the in terms of the human development index (from a
decline in developing economies being moderate (- dual perspective, the quality of the workforce and
16% overall, -12% in Asia, -28% in Africa and - new trends in terms of demand, given the increase
25% in Latin America and the Caribbean), even in digital literacy of the population, the acceleration
lower than initially forecasted (UNCTAD, 2020d). of financial inclusion, the change in consumption
UNCTAD data show that between 1970 and 2019, habits, increasing interest in new technologies, the
the longest period of uninterrupted growth in FDI driving force of young people of generations X, Y
flows received worldwide was 1992-2000, followed and Z).
by a new beneficial period between 2004 and 2007, In 2019, Asian developing countries continued to
succeeded by ups and downs and an obvious be leaders in the number of new investment policy
downward trend between 2016 and 2018. It is measures, being even more active than in 2018 (50
worth noting that in 2016, China marked the measures, compared to 42 in 2018). These were
highest value of its global FDI flows generated, followed by African countries (17 measures, but
with nearly USD 200 billion, ranking second decreasing compared to the 27 measures adopted in
globally, after the USA, but in the following period 2018). However, the nature of the measures
the value of these flows decreased from year to adopted is different in developing regions
year, one of the main determinants being the compared to those developed. Of the measures
restrictions imposed by the advanced economies. In adopted in 2019 in developing economies, 52 were
contrast, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 did not to liberalize, promote and facilitate investments and
discourage China’s FDI flows, with an increasing only 11 were to restrict them. In contrast, in
trend until 2016. developed countries, more than half of the
Chart 3 shows the evolution of the FDI flows measures adopted in 2019 were restrictive. The
received and generated by the USA, China, Japan, different approach to FDI is explained by the fact
the EU-27 and the United Kingdom in the period that they remain the main source of capital for
2008-2019. developing countries (UNCTAD, 2020a; 2019).
But another explanation lies in the regime with a
We consider that the growth of international higher degree of openness to investment in
production, interrelated with that of FDI in the first developed countries, compared to those in
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developing/emerging countries, the continuation Chart 4 shows the FDI regulatory restrictiveness
of openness in an already more permissive index in ten developing/emerging G20 countries
economy being more difficult to achieve compared (China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Indonesia,
to a more protected economy (Mixture and Roulet, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Argentina and South Africa),
2019). with two main groups: the protectionist one (above
But beyond the reactions of developed countries the OECD average - Indonesia, Russia, China,
(the USA, Australia, Japan, but also at EU level) India, Saudi Arabia, Mexico) and the open one
and several emerging economies (India) to the (South Africa, Turkey and Argentina), Brazil
intensification of China’s acquisition of state-of-the having a level similar to the OECD average.
-art critical technologies, beyond the general trends Chart 4: FDI regulatory restrictiveness index in 2019 –
towards deglobalization manifested under the OECD average as compared to ten developing/emerging
Trump administration and the new fears that countries, members of the G20
accompany the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a
need for businesses to adhere to strict
environmental, social, and governance standards.
The ESG approach, which must also be interpreted
from the perspective of the 17 Sustainable
Development Goals, is accompanied by new
investments in infrastructure and services, as well
as in the green and blue economy (in sectors such
as renewable energy, water and sanitation, health),
new ways financing (project financing, not
traditional FDI) and attracting new categories of
investors, not just from the category of
multinational enterprises. A distinction must
Source: OECD (2020).
therefore be made between “good Note: Mexico and Turkey are members of both the OECD
protectionism” (in terms of compliance with the and G20
necessary environmental, social and governance
standards) and “harmful protectionism”, but this At the level of the three main sectors of activity
complex issue may form the basis of another (primary, secondary and tertiary), in Indonesia,
research paper. China, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Brazil, the
primary sector is the most heavily protected, while
The Amplitude of FDI Protectionism in Russia, India, Turkey, South Africa and
According to the Regulatory Restrictiveness Argentina, the tertiary sector is the most severely
Index restricted, with notable differences between the
The FDI regulatory restrictiveness index, primary and tertiary sectors being particularly
calculated by the OECD experts, measures FDI noticeable in the case of: India, Russia, Mexico,
restrictions for 22 economic sectors in 69 countries Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa. The secondary
(including OECD and G20 countries). Four sector is less protected compared to the other two,
categories of restrictions are taken into account: (1) and among the countries analyzed, Indonesia,
foreign equity limitations; (2) screening or approval Russia, Mexico, China and Saudi Arabia have the
mechanisms that are discriminatory; (3) restrictions secondary sector more protected than the other
on the employment of foreigners as key personnel; countries included in the analysis.
(4) other operational restrictions, such as those on Mistura and Roulet (2019) show that countries
capital repatriation or land ownership. Restrictions such as China, India, Indonesia, Russia and Turkey
are rated on a scale from 0 (open economies) to 1 have made substantial progress towards reducing
(closed economies). Although the FDI regulatory FDI restrictions over the period 1997-2017.
framework plays a significant role in investor Progress by countries with a higher level of
decision-making, a number of other determinants protection is possible at a faster pace. In contrast,
are also taken into account: ease of doing business, countries with a low level of restrictions mark a
quality of governance, quality of infrastructure, slower pace of liberalization reforms, as there are
macroeconomic environment, quality of education fewer barriers to remove and, moreover, restrictions
and human resources, efficiency and market size, that were easier to remove were among the first to
stage of technological development, etc. be removed, but restrictions supported by some
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major actors persist. Chart 5 shows the positive may be designated as a “non-trustworthy entity”,
developments in the liberalization of the FDI which involves, inter alia, the restriction or
regime in nine of the ten countries analysed, with prohibition of engaging in import or export
the exception of Argentina (which already has the activities from/to China and investments in China.
lowest level of restrictions among the ten). The main actions taken by a “foreign entity” (an
enterprise, another organization or a person from a
Chart 5: FDI regulatory restrictiveness index in 1997, foreign country) are primarily concerned with:
2003, 2013-2019 – OECD average as compared to ten jeopardizing China’s national sovereignty, security
developing/emerging countries, members of the G20 or development interests; suspension of normal
transactions with a Chinese company, organization
or individual; the application of discriminatory
measures against a Chinese company, organization
or individual, which violates the normal principles
of market transactions and seriously harms the
rights and legitimate interests of Chinese economic
operators (Global Trade Alert, 2020).
China has made progress on investment
liberalization through the Foreign Investment Law,
which entered into force on 1st of January 2020,
providing a much shorter “negative list” of
protected sectors. However, Articles 6 and 35
include provisions related to national security and
Source: OECD (2020) national interest, which may lead to unexpected
restrictions on investor access to certain sectors
According to OECD data, in 2019, the countries (UNCTAD, 2020b). At the same time, through the
with the highest rate of FDI regulatory corporate social credit system (SCS) only trusted
restrictiveness index were: Indonesia, Russia, companies have access to the Chinese market. The
China, Saudi Arabia, India and Mexico, despite behaviour of companies becomes the key element
reforms adopted to liberalize their FDI regime. taken into account in the process of further
OECD data do not go beyond 2019, but it should liberalization. The screening process is a complex
be noted that the new wave of protectionist system, with corporate ratings, sanctions and
measures adopted at the level of advanced reward mechanisms that have a direct impact on
economies has also “inspired” developing/emerging market access and the activities of companies active
economies. The protectionist measures in China: (1) higher scores can mean lower tax
implemented by the latter can be classified into rates, better access to credit, easier market access
several major categories: related to national and more public procurement opportunities for
security (South Africa, Russian Federation, but also companies; (2) lower scores, on the other hand,
China); restricting FDI received from neighbouring lead to limited access and even blacklisting; and (3)
countries (India); support for local producers market access for unreliable and blacklisted entities
(Indonesia); control of relations with “unreliable will be limited and even banned (European
entities” (China). Although not as detailed as those Chamber-Sinolytics, 2019).
adopted at the EU level, for instance (through the India. On 17 April 2020, the Government of India
FDI screening framework, regulated by the revised its foreign direct investment policy to
European Commission, which can decide when an discourage takeovers/acquisitions of Indian
investment is considered a threat to the overall companies “for opportunistic purposes” amid the
interests of the EU), their effects are equally strong current COVID-19 pandemic and decided to
on relations with trade and investment partners. introduce the so-called “governmental route” to all
China. On 19 September 2020, China published investments originating in countries that have
the provisions on the “Unreliable Entity List”, common borders with India. This means that all
which entered into force on the same date. foreign investment originating from Afghanistan,
However, the Chinese government did not provide Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Nepal and Pakistan
a list of names or a timetable for its requires the prior approval of the government.
implementation. A foreign entity or natural person Indonesia. On 19 May 2020, the Ministry of

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Trade issued a new regulation, MOT 50/2020, challenges, aggravated by the intensifying
taking effect on 19 November 2020, requiring e- withdrawal of the world’s nations from
commerce actors to support government programs international cooperation, and the general
by prioritizing locally produced goods and services, slowdown in the growth of global production and
increasing the competitiveness of local goods and international trade.
services and, in particular, for national e-commerce Compared to the US-China trade war, the COVID
service operators, providing space for the -19 pandemic is an even deeper shock to
promotion of locally produced goods and services. international relations. This leads to a
Russia. On 11 August 2020, an amendment to the reconfiguration of production and supply chains
Federal Law on Foreign Investment Procedures in around the world, as states and multinational
Business Entities of Strategic Importance for companies alike seek to reduce their dependence on
national defence and state security entered into certain foreign suppliers (especially for single
force. Its purpose is to subject even the temporary sources of supply) and increase their own capacity
foreign acquisitions of voting stakes in strategic and resources in the strategic industries.
companies to FDI screening procedures. Analyzing the restrictive measures from 2018-
South Africa. The competition regime was 2020, one can remark: (1) the adoption of
significantly changed on February 14, 2019, with protectionist policies in the first instance mainly by
the introduction of the FDI screening mechanism. developed countries, after which developing/
The new law requires the establishment of a special emerging countries have followed their example;
committee responsible for assessing mergers and (2) the intensification of protectionist measures
involving a foreign company, from the perspective during the COVID-19 pandemic, both at the level
of the effect that the merger may have on national of developed and developing/emerging countries,
security interests. The opinion of the committee either in the direction of FDI monitoring in order to
shall then be forwarded to the Minister for Trade avoid the takeover of their strategic assets, or in
and Industry, who shall, within 30 days, publish a that of obtaining a strategic economic autonomy.
notification of the decision to authorize, grant Therefore, the new wave of protectionist measures
authorization or prohibit the implementation of a adopted at the level of advanced economies has led
merger. As of 12 July 2019, the amendments to the developing/emerging economies to adopt a series of
South African Competition Law give the President similar retaliatory measures. These can be classified
the power to establish a list of national security into several major categories: related to national
interests and to set up a committee to monitor FDI security (South Africa, Russia, China); restricting
to protect the country’s key security interests. FDI received from neighbouring countries (India);
Such measures highlight the inclination towards support for local producers (Indonesia); control of
economic nationalism and protectionism, to the relations with “unreliable entities” (China).
detriment of liberalization and cooperation on a The COVID-19 crisis underscored the inclination
multilateral basis. Protectionist trends affect both towards economic nationalism and even the
trade and all four major types of FDI: horizontal ambitious goal of obtaining strategic economic
(market-seeking), vertical (efficiency-seeking, autonomy, not only in the case of developed
involving active trade in intermediate inputs countries, but also in developing ones. For instance,
between different subsidiaries of the multinational the path to strategic autonomy is seen by China as a
enterprises), resource-focused investments, and normal response and a form of defence against
strategic asset-oriented investments. decoupling from the US and its allies, although this
is to its disadvantage. For its part, India announced
Conclusions the Self-reliant India Mission (Atma-Nirbhar
Two completely new and unexpected factors Bharat Abhiyan), in the context of the COVID-19
have severely affected the system of international pandemic and excessive dependence on certain
relations recently: (1) the “Trump factor”, categories of imports.
associated with a tough confrontation between the Transatlantic relations will remain a key element
US and China, the decisions, actions and options of of the world order, despite obstacles that are
the two powers being the determinants with the difficult to overcome. The economic policies
widest consequences internationally, including promoted by President Trump, starting from the
from the perspective of trade and investment, and “America first” strategy, have stimulated
(2) the COVID-19 pandemic, which highlighted protectionism, unilateralism and economic
and exacerbated many of the older economic
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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

nationalism and have severely affected the EU’s Institute for International Economics, August.
confidence in its most important strategic partner. Coveri, A., Cozza, C., Nascia, L. et al. (2020).
The mission of the new president, Joe Biden, to Supply chain contagion and the role of industrial
return to multilateralism, will be able to lead to policy. Journal of Industrial and Business
regaining the trust of the partners in the USA, but it Economics, 47, 467-482.
will be a lengthy process. The European Union, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2020). A
with a geopolitical Commission and its major goal new era of slow growth, low inflation and high debt
of enhancing the EU’s role internationally, is ready Q4 global forecast 2020.
to take initiatives without US approval. The
Espitia, A., Rocha, N., Ruta, M. (2020). COVID-
adoption of the EU-China Comprehensive
19 and Food Protectionism – The Impact of the
Agreement on Investment at the end of 2020 (even
Pandemic and Export Restrictions on World Food
if its text is not final and will have to be signed by
Markets, Policy Research Working Paper 9253,
the Member States and ratified by the European
World Bank Group.
Parliament), is an example in this regard. China,
which has already proven its ability to react quickly Eurostat (2020). FDI statistics database, available
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global player. Russia continues to be severely payments/data/database.
affected by the sharp drop in oil prices and the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China,
repeated extension of sanctions by hitherto Sinolytics (European Chamber-Sinolytics) (2019).
“strategic” partners, such as the United States and The Digital Hand – How China’s Corporate Social
the EU. These factors will also be reflected in the Credit System Conditions Market Actors, Report.
evolution of FDI in the coming years. Evenett, S. (2019). Protectionism, state
The system of international relations is at a discrimination, and international business since the
crossroads, and the choice of the path of onset of the Global Financial Crisis, Journal of
deglobalization, economic nationalism and strategic International Business Policy, March 1.
economic autonomy would have far-reaching Global Trade Alert (2020). Global Dynamics,
negative consequences for both developed and database available at: https://
developing/emerging countries. A possible return www.globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics.
of the US to a more balanced attitude, in support of Gopinath, G. (2020). The Great Lockdown: Worst
multilateralism, would be a necessary impetus for a Economic Downturn since the Great Depression,
reorientation towards cooperation and the rejection IMF Blog, April 14.
of an international economic order of rivalries and Görg, H., Labonte, P. (2011). Trade protection
confrontations. during the crisis: Does it deter foreign direct
investment? Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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Trade and Investment Measures (Mid-May to Mid- [1] Synthesis of the author’s contribution to the
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Office of the United States Trade Representative economies under the impact of new international
(USTR) (2020). 2020 Trade Policy Agenda and trade and investment policies”, Oehler-Şincai, I.M.
2019 Annual Report of the President of the United (2020) (coordinator), Institute for World Economy,
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Price, A.H. et al. (2020). China Releases Broad [2] The main pillars of the global innovation index
Outline of 14th Five Year Plan Objectives, Wiley are: institutions, human capital and research,
Law, October 30. infrastructure, market and business sophistication,
Sarooshi, D. (2004). Sovereignty, Economic knowledge and technology outcomes and creative
Autonomy, the United States, and the International industry outputs.
Trading System: Representations of a Relationship [3] The founder and executive chairman of the
(September). European Journal of International World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, defines
Law, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 651-676. three types of capitalism: (1) “shareholder
Seric, A., Hauge, J. (2020a). COVID-19 and the capitalism”, supported by most Western companies,
global contraction in FDI, May, UNIDO. whose main objective is to maximize profits; (2)
“state capitalism”, which entrusts the government
Seric, A., Hauge, J. (2020b). Foreign direct with the task of establishing the direction of the
investments could contract by 40% this year, hitting national economy and which is not only present in
developing countries hardest, June, World China but in many other world economies; and (3)
Economic Forum. “stakeholder capitalism”, recommended by the
Schwab, K. (2019). Why we need the 'Davos founder of the World Economic Forum since 50
Manifesto' for a better kind of capitalism, years ago. (Schwab, 2019).
December 1. [4] Related to: critical infrastructure (energy,
Solís, M. (2020). The Post COVID-19 world: transport, water, health, communications, media,
Economic Nationalism Triumphant?, The data processing or storage, aerospace and defence,
Brookings Institute, July 10. electoral or financial infrastructure and sensitive
Ufimtseva, A. (2020). The Rise of Foreign Direct facilities); dual-use critical technologies (artificial
Investment Regulation in Investment‐recipient intelligence, robotics, semiconductors,
Countries, Global Policy, Volume 11, issue 2, cybersecurity, aerospace and defence technology,
April, pp. 222-232. energy storage technology, quantum and nuclear
UNCTAD (2020a). World Investment Report technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology,
2020 – International Production beyond the and health, medical, and pharmaceutical
Pandemic, Geneva. technology); providing critical resources, including
UNCTAD (2020b). Investment Policy Monitor, energy or raw materials, food security, medical and
available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ protective equipment; access to or control of
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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

sensitive information, including personal data; https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/

media freedom and pluralism, etc. defence/view-modis-mission-self-reliance-can-go-a
[5] For instance, in the electronics industry, India -long-way-in-making-india-a-major-hub-for-
imports most of its core components, including defence-manufacturing/articleshow/75813584.cms.
printed circuit boards. About 88 percent of mobile https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?
phone components are imported from countries PRID=1624661.
such as China, according to the Confederation of [7] Led by the US, Western countries have
Indian Industry. The solar energy industry is stepped up monitoring of Chinese investors, leading
heavily dependent on the import of photovoltaic to the cancellation or blocking of 21 Chinese
cells and modules, the electric vehicle industry on acquisitions, totaling about $ 25 billion in 2018, up
the import of chemicals for batteries, and the paint 28% from 2017. Please consult: https://
and dye industry on imported raw materials. At the www.fxstreet.com/analysis/china-five-facts-about-
same time, over 60% of the medical equipment is outward-direct-investment-and-their-implication-
imported. Even the pharmaceutical industry, for-future-trend-201903210827.
although well developed, imports certain active [8] Please consult: https://financialintelligence.ro/
pharmaceutical ingredients for antibiotics and proiect-de-oug-se-modifica-actualul-mecanism-
vitamins. national-de-examinare-al-investitiilor-straine-
[6] Please consult: https://indianexpress.com/ directe/, https://www.profit.ro/stiri/politic/statul-va-
article/explained/narendra-modi-coronavirus- putea-obliga-investitorii-straini-non-ue-considerati-
economic-package-india-self-reliance-6406939/. periculosi-pentru-securitatea-nationala-sa-si-vanda-
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/self- afacerile-din-romania-focus-special-pe-mass-media
reliant-india-which-are-the-sectors-dependent-on- -19483864, https://www.g4media.ro/exclusiv-
imports-which-are-not-6408407/. https:// marile-investitii-economice-din-afara-ue-trebuie-sa
www.oneindia.com/india/the-five-pillars-for-a-self- -treaca-de-un-nou-filtru-administrativ-format-din-
reliant-india-3087682.html. https:// guvern-presedintie-servicii-secrete-proiect-de-
www.narendramodi.in/what-are-the-five-pillars-of- transpunere-a-legislatiei-europene-provo.html.
a-self-reliant-india-read-to-find-out-more-549630.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION

involving several EU countries – is more cost-

Jiří Šedivý efficient and impactful than national solo efforts
This pandemic is not behind us yet and the full done in isolation. Money saved through EU
scale of its repercussions still unpredictable. Yet, cooperation can compensate for expected cuts in
there are lessons to be learned already now as defence spending, at least in the long run. Beyond
Europe must adjust to a new post-COVID reality. the financial benefits, cooperation also pays off
Defence is no exception. The budgetary shockwave thanks to increased operational effectiveness and
caused by the pandemic may heavily weigh on interoperability, for the benefit of EU, NATO or
some Member States’ ability to sustain existing other multinational operations. Joining forces will
national defence programmes, let alone launch new allow those Member States under budgetary strains
ones. Which in turn threatens to further curtail to do more, for their own defence and that of
Europe’s security and defence clout. Europe.
There could be a plus side to the crisis as well, The other good news is that we don’t have to start
though: some of its effects might help speed up the from scratch. All instruments and processes needed
process towards genuine EU defence cooperation. to enable and manage EU defence cooperation are
Looked at from this angle, this emergency offers a already in place and ready to be used: updated
unique and unexpected opportunity for making European Capability Development Priorities, the
collaborative capability development the new norm Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD),
in Europe. Rather than weakening national defence the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
forces one by one, the new reality imposed by and the European Defence Fund. And not only the
Covid-19 could advance the Europe of Defence as a instruments are there, but also plenty of very
whole. concrete opportunities for cooperation. The first
CARD, carried out last year under the auspices of
The follow-up costs of the pandemic are likely to the European Defence Agency, has identified no
squeeze national public spending across the board less than 55 European collaborative opportunities
and for years to come, including on defence. throughout the whole capability spectrum,
What’s more, the budgetary downturn hits at a time considered to be the most promising, most needed
when Europe needs to invest more and better in its or most pressing ones, also in terms of operational
security and defence. The many good reasons that value. Based on this catalogue of identified
led the EU and its Member States to raise the opportunities, Member States are recommended to
Union’s level of ambition on defence in 2016 and concentrate their efforts on the following six
to work towards European strategic autonomy as a specific ‘focus areas’ where the prospects for
long-term goal, are still valid. To drop or even cooperation are also looking particularly good
lower this ambition is not an option, even under (encouraging number of interested Member States,
today’s exceptional circumstances, as this would national programmes already underway or in the
seriously undermine Europe’s security role in the pipeline), namely: Main Battle Tanks (MBT),
world. Soldier Systems, Patrol Class Surface Ships,
How to square this circle? Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems, Defence
Defence cooperation is the answer. Europe needs applications in Space and Military Mobility.
more joint defence planning and capability If Member States don’t use the EU defence
development. The call for pooling and sharing of instruments and the identified cooperation
resources and capabilities is not new, but it has opportunities now, when will they then?
become more pressing today. When defence The same applies to the European Defence
budgets come under pressure, the smartest way for Agency, the EU hub for collaborative research and
Member States to safeguard or even increase their capability development which currently hosts more
military resilience is to plan, develop, procure, than 110 research and capability programmes as
maintain and operate their defence equipment well as some 200 other activities. Here too,
together. Multinational capability development – be Member States have still some leeway available if
it under PESCO, EDA or any other format they want to use the Agency’s expertise and

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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

potential to the full extent. shown the importance of maintaining strategic local
The COVID-19 pandemic has also brought to production capacities able to provide critical
light, indirectly of course, the enormous disruptive material of high quality and in sufficient quantities
potential of biological substances. Although when crises hit – from relatively basic commodities
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear such as masks or other protection utilities to live-
(CBRN) threats have been on our radars for some saving COVID-19 vaccines. This has served as a
time – the European Capability Development reminder to all of us, also in the defence sector, that
Priorities reviewed in 2018 under EDA guidance European strategic autonomy cannot only refer to
explicitly refer to the need to strengthen European high-tech, high-end military capabilities but also
capabilities in the CBRN domain – this crisis has industrial expertise and production capacities.
nevertheless highlighted the urgent need to do more Maintaining critical industrial production capacities
in order to be better prepared and equipped to deal in Europe is thus a crucial prerequisite for building
with these kind of threats in the future. This is a Europe of defence and moving towards strategic
another important lesson to be learned from this autonomy. Here too, cooperation is the way
dramatic experience. Given the magnitude of the forward as Europe’s key strategic activities can
challenge, it can only be mastered together, i.e. only be sustained together.
through cooperation. NOTE: Jiří Šedivý is the Chief Executive of the
Finally, and this is a third lesson, COVID-19 has European Defence Agency (EDA).

MEP Monika HOHLMEIER, Chair of the Geostrategic Pulse: We are currently trying to
Committee on Budgetary Control and a member of identify and understand the new challenges posed
the Committee on Budget, analysed the by Brexit. What are, as of now, the main prospects
perspectives and challenges related to the and challenges regarding the post Brexit global
management of the EU investment budget for the strategic prediction of the EU?
future Europe, in the context of the crisis caused by Monika Hohlmeier: Well, we lost one of the
the COVID-19 pandemic, in the interview offered economically strongest and politically outspoken
to Geostrategic Pulse Magazine. members of the EU. The UK has also been the most
prominent defender of open markets, a point of
view that many member states do not share and
which will be reflected in the EU’s trade policy. I
assume we might also see changes in the financial
sector, which is not yet covered by an agreement,
while in the meantime there is a transition of most
euro-denominated assets out of the UK, increasing
the activities in Paris and Frankfurt. The impact of
Brexit is so profound that we will only see the
consequences in the next weeks and months, maybe
even years. Nonetheless, the UK depends on the
EU and likewise, we need the UK. Finding an
agreement was the only alternative we had and we
must build upon this to ensure that we remain
competitive, focused, and ready for the challenges
of the 21st century.
Articulating the EU budget continues to
represent a particular stake. What are the most
sensitive issues regarding the financing of
investments in the EU? Where does the EU need

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to adjust its budget and actions? EU is currently facing?

The EU budget for 2021 is 163.5 billion euro, for If we go back by one or two years, when Corona
the next seven years the EU budget totals almost was unknown to all of us, the idea of having a 750
1.1 trillion Euro of which almost 94% are used for billion Euro recovery fund to help the EU and in
investments. I am not aware of any other budget particular, the most affected member states to
that can claim the same. The EU budget is a symbol overcome the challenges inflicted by this pandemic
of solidarity and common interests and it benefits would be something theoretical just for political
every single member state. I believe it is important scholars and Think Tanks in Brussels. We made a
to underline how many countries, businesses and leap of such massive scale in European integration
individuals benefit from it. EU funding finances and solidarity that it will take us some time to
cohesion policies, supports farmers and students, understand what actually happened. While some of
enables excellent research and innovation, provides the decisions surrounding the proposal can be
funding for border control and police forces, funds contested, in particular the exclusion of the
EU sky and space activities, and supports small and European Parliament (EP) from the decision-
medium-sized enterprises from Helsinki to Porto. making process, I think Germany and France made
The major deficit of EU investment might actually the right proposal for Europe and have shown that
be that the EU often does not properly display, we need a Union that sticks together and faces a
announce or visibly label what it finances. challenge such as COVID-19 united. The economic
Therefore, others can claim they are responsible or and social consequences are so far-reaching that no
even worse, no one knows that something was member state will be able to recover by itself. The
made possible by EU funding. However, I do see RRF (Recovery and Resilience Facility), which
some other issues that we need to address at EU encompasses 672.5 billion Euro out of the 750
level. There are still too many cases of fraud, billion Euro package, will not just finance a list of
corruption and misallocations. While some wishes of the heads of state and governments.
oligarchs and other already very wealthy families There are clear provisions that the money must be
accumulate vast amounts of money and push for a used inter alia for the green and digital transition,
concentration of land via conglomerates as sustainable and inclusive growth, and policies for
witnessed for example in the Czech Republic with the next generation. This is the direct result of the
Presidents Babiš’ Agrofert empire, small farmers EP’s continuous efforts to secure clear allocation
and business often do not get their fair share. This criteria for the recovery fund. My Romanian
means we must review and improve agriculture- colleague Siegfried Mureşan, who was part of
land distribution and talk about how we can better Parliament’s negotiation team, played an important
support small farmers. This is something I believe, role in achieving this. Unfortunately, the member
also concerns Romania. states included some loopholes in the final
We must also improve our ability to track and agreement to give them room to manoeuvre. The
trace EU money flows down to the financial European Parliament must be very careful now to
beneficiaries to gain an accurate overview of the ensure that the money goes where it creates the
true distribution and concentration of EU funds biggest benefit for our societies. While the
with a possibility to quickly react and stop such European Parliament fought for a direct
transactions. I am currently fighting for a participation in co-deciding the funding allocation
mandatory digital IT reporting, monitoring and for each member state to guarantee that RRF-funds
audit system, which is interoperable with the do not finance recurring national expenses, we can
different systems in use in member states and only check the national reform plans and track
would provide us with such an overview. milestones. But do not doubt for a minute, we will
Unfortunately, some member states are fiercely be loud if we detect any inconsistencies or
opposing this in the Council and have so far misappropriations.
blocked or watered down all constructive proposals To what extent have the current European
for modernising and digitalising the European mechanisms enabled cooperation, coordination
reporting and audit, because they benefit from a and a quick response? Have the actions taken by
lack of transparency. the EU contributed to reducing the consequences
To what extent does the Multiannual Financial of the economic and social crises in the Member
Framework and the recovery instrument Next States?
Generation EU set the ground for overcoming the Absolutely. The best example to illustrate this is
economic, social and political challenges that the the European Support Instrument (ESI), which was
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introduced within a few weeks by the European decade. This of course assumes that they will fulfil
Commission right after everything shut down in the Copenhagen Criteria and all other
early 2020. The instrument helps Member States to requirements, which means additional efforts on
address the coronavirus pandemic. It became clear their part, in particular in the area of rule of law,
that the needs could best be addressed in a strategic, fight against corruption, institutional stability, and
coordinated manner at European level rather than economic coherence.
every capital undertaking its own efforts. Basically, How is the debate regarding the scenarios for
ESI allows the EU budget to step in to provide Europe by 2025 articulated, in your opinion? To
emergency support. The money financed the what extent do the Member States have the energy
development of the Corona-vaccines, create and desire to redefine the future of the European
strategic medical stockpiles all over Europe, bring construction?
back thousands of stranded tourists to the Member I believe that the European Union has always been
States, and transfer patients as well as medical most successful whenever single states bundled
personnel and mobile medical teams among their resources because they saw that individually
countries. they only had limited impact. Trade policy,
If we look at the bigger macroeconomic picture, consumer rights, agriculture, these are just three
the launch of SURE (The European instrument for areas in which EU member states managed to find
temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment consensus and it has generated great benefits for
Risks in an Emergency) has introduced the everyone. I am convinced we will see more trade
possibility to provide financial assistance up to 100 agreements, new rules to deepen the single market
billion Euro in the form of loans from the EU to and the enhancement of excellence in research and
affected members. The money is supposed to development just to name a few areas where real
address sudden increases in public expenditure for EU-added value is created. We might very likely
the preservation of employment, for example by also see the European Border and Coast Guard
financing short-time work schemes. As of today, 18 Agency taking more control over the management
Member States have requested 90.3 billion Euro in of external borders and increased cooperation in
financial support via SURE, which is a clear sign of security and judicial matters because citizens
member state cooperation and solidarity to me. expect the EU to close the gap between promise
On a global level, what measures has the EU and delivery. Improved healthcare access and
adopted, and intends to adopt, to help vulnerable related research activities will also be high on the
regions and communities? European agenda as the Corona pandemic revealed
Development, neighbourhood and international shortcomings. Moreover, we need fast and binding
cooperation remains a core pillar of the EU budget. decision-making in foreign and security matters at
The long-term budget (MFF 2021-2027) of the EU EU level. Otherwise, European decisions end up
foresees 98.4 billion Euro for cooperation with being insignificant.
third countries. A lot of the development funding in However, I think that fundamental tasks
2020 was re-directed as part of the EU’s efforts to concerning social policies, taxes, industry policies,
combat the consequences of Covid-19 in countries and education will remain rightfully member state
outside of the EU. The focus of EU action is going responsibilities. We must be careful to avoid
to shift a bit, as European actions will address more stretching the debate of European integration too
and more the Western Balkans, the EU's wider much. The EU is not supposed to replace member
Neighbourhood and Sub-Saharan Africa. While we states, but serve as a very effective coordination
want to help stabilise our neighbourhood countries and harmonisation tool.
in the South and East to decrease refugee flows and
offer people a perspective in their home country, NOTE: Monika Hohlmeier was elected as a Member of the
European Parliament in 2009. She is the current chair of the
we also have an interest that the countries become Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) and serves
reliable and stable political allies. I have very much additionally as a member of the Committee on Budget
supported the initiative of a Marshall Plan with (BUDG) as well as a substitute member of the Committee on
Africa, because having two neighbouring Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). She was Co
continents differing to such an extent will simply -rapporteur for the Special Committee on Terrorism until
2018. Before joining the European Parliament, Monika
not work. The pandemic response and mid-to-long Hohlmeier served as State Secretary in the Bavarian Ministry
term development activities need to go hand in for Education and Culture between 1993 and 1998 followed
hand. The Western Balkans on the other hand might by her announcement as Bavarian Minister for Education and
have a perspective of joining the EU in the next Culture between 1998 and 2005.
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Professor Dr. Achim HURRELMANN (Professor and I think it took Brexit for many European
of Political Science; Co-Director – with Joan politicians to realize that they must make a much
DeBardeleben – of the Centre for European more sustained effort to respond to them. The
Studies, a Carleton University Research Centre second lesson is more positive; it derives from the
focused on European affairs; cross-appointed to the Brexit negotiations with the UK. Here, what we
Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian have seen is that, with the right strategy and
Studies) has offered his views on Brexit, its leadership, the EU can remain united even on issues
ramifications and implications from a European and where the member states’ interests are not
transatlantic perspective, in the interview given to necessarily aligned. In this sense, the Brexit
Geostrategic Pulse Magazine. negotiations were a success for the EU, and chief
negotiator Michel Barnier deserves a lot of credit
for this.
How will the EU define itself in the post-Brexit
horizon? Will we have more or less Europe? Or,
on the contrary, a multiple-speed Europe?
In the long term, I think there is no alternative to a
multi-speed Europe. The EU is simply too large,
and too diverse, to get all member states to agree on
all contentious issues. The issue of refugee policy is
the most visible illustration at the moment. We
have of course already seen a lot of flexible
integration in past decades, including the Euro,
Schengen and recently the Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence
policy – all of these have been adopted only by a
subset of member states. But up to now, such
flexible integration initiatives have always come
about on an ad-hoc basis. I think the EU needs a
more fundamental, conceptual debate about when
to use flexible mechanisms, and how they can be
used in a way that does not undermine the benefits
Professor Achim Hurrelmann (© Photo Carleton University of European integration.
Research Centre, Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian
Studies) Against the background of Brexit, the crisis
created by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the
Geostrategic Pulse: Professor Achim prospect of elections that will take place this year
Hurrelmann, the United Kingdom of Great in several EU member states, can we expect a
Britain and Northern Ireland leaving the EU more integrated, united and supportive Union, or
brings back under discussion the future of the conversely, more division? What are the main
European Union. What is the lesson the EU is prospects and challenges related to the EU identity
learning from Brexit? projection in a post-Brexit context?
Achim Hurrelmann: There are at least two key The European integration process has never
lessons from Brexit. The first is that Euroscepticism developed in big shifts, but always incrementally.
has to be taken seriously as a political force. The That will remain to be the case. The EU has been
UK always stood out among the member states fairly successful in 2020 on a number of fronts, not
because Euroscepticism was deeply rooted in the only in the Brexit negotiations but also in bringing
mainstream parties, not just the fringes. But about an agreement on the next long-term budget
Eurosceptic positions exist in other member states and the COVID recovery fund, for instance. But
as well, we only need to look to Italy for instance,
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COVID has also shown that, in a crisis situation, You are right that the EU, at present, is a
the member states’ first instinct is to act superpower mainly in economic terms. And even
unilaterally, rather than consulting the European here, the picture is mixed. As a regulatory power,
partners. So the picture is mixed, and I think it will for instance in establishing new rules for data
remain mixed. European identities are getting protection with a global reach, it is unmatched in
stronger, but only slowly and only in parts of the the world. But if you look at the global players in
population. I don’t expect the EU to develop in the digital industries, these tend to be American or
direction of a United States of Europe. It will need Chinese, not European. In terms of security, the EU
to chart its own course and find a governance is even weaker, as we just discussed. Personally, I
model that continues to build strongly on the don’t think the EU’s ambition for the future should
member states. be to play the superpower game. It should build on
What are the prospects for the EU enlargement its existing strengths in the economic realm,
in the Balkans? What about Scotland joining the continue to make trade and investment agreements,
EU? enhance its regional policies particularly vis-à-vis
EU enlargement in the Balkans is proceeding, but Africa, and promote multilateral cooperation.
progress is slow. It is not really a priority for the What is the best course for the EU to navigate in
EU, which is something that I personally regret. order to ensure its citizens' security and
The recent Bulgarian veto against the opening of prosperity, amid competition from Russia, China
accession talks with North Macedonia illustrates and even the US?
how individual member states are playing politics In my view, the right approach is to keep channels
with the issue, rather than working in the EU of communication open with all of these powers,
context to develop a coherent and forward-looking even if means holding your nose and dealing with
strategy. Scotland for now remains an internal issue regimes which one dislikes. As I said, the EU is not
of the UK. Should there be another independence in a position to enter into a superpower
referendum and Scotland votes to leave the UK, I competition. This is not the purpose for which it
am sure the EU would welcome it with open arms. was set up, and it is not institutionally equipped for
What can you tell us about the way Brexit will such an approach. But one thing that the EU’s own
influence the EU’s Common Security and history shows is that economic and political
Defence Policy (CSDP)? cooperation across borders can promote peace and
The effects will be less dramatic than some people prosperity. I think the most credible approach for
predicted. While it was a member state, the UK the EU to take is to project this insight into the
played a double role in the CSDP, on the one hand global sphere.
it was one of the EU’s most capable military What about the way Washington will see and
powers that had helped launch the policy, but on approach the overall transatlantic relationship
the other hand it strongly resisted initiatives that during Joe Biden’s mandate, in the light of Brexit
would have moved the CSDP into a more and of Europeans promoting the concept of
supranational direction. Initially after Brexit, some strategic autonomy?
observers thought that, without the UK, there would Biden is a friend of the EU. Transatlantic relations
be a major push to develop the CSDP. But that will improve under his administration. That does
hasn’t really happened, despite PESCO. And with not mean that all disagreements will disappear. The
Donald Trump’s election loss, the argument that issue of burden-sharing within NATO will remain
Europe must become more independent from the an area of contention. But there will be more
US has become somewhat less pressing, even cooperation on climate change issues, and a much
though it remains correct in the long term. smaller risk that disagreements on trade will
The European Union can become a global actor escalate into a full-scale “trade war”. Regarding
if it continues to maintain, even under the current strategic autonomy, I think this will remain a
circumstances, a high degree of involvement in buzzword in Europe, but with Trump gone,
the economic development, at regional and global advocates of this approach will find it much harder
levels. However, in order to become more to convince governments to put their money where
influential, it needs to improve in certain fields. their mouth is, and to make actual investments in
What are the areas where the EU is still weak but strategic capabilities.
that can improve vis-à-vis the other global actors?

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Dr. Ion I. Jinga Wallachia", but were to maintain separate rulers,

I believe that the knowledge of the past facilitates governments and legislative assemblies.
the understanding of the present and helps But this solution did not match the determination
anticipate the future. As a teenager, one of the of the Romanian unionists. After the Elective
books that fascinated me was “Decisive Moments Assembly of Moldova unanimously chose, on 5th
in History” (1927), by Stefan Zweig, a widely January 1859, Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza, the
translated and most popular writer in the world in candidate of the National Party, as Ruling Prince,
the first half of the 20th century. on January 24th the Elective Assembly of Wallachia
Indeed, there are decisive moments in the voted, again unanimously, for the same person, thus
evolution of nations, which mark their destiny and creating de facto the United Romanian
remain a landmark for generations to come. 24 Principalities. The Great Powers yielded to a fait
January 1859 is one such crucial moment in accompli and accepted unification.
Romania’s history. If Romanians have always been
very proud of the Union of the Principalities of
Wallachia and Moldova achieved on 24 January
1859, it is undoubtedly due to the sense of
"ownership" that they assumed in its making, and to
the great spirit of solidarity that made the union
possible 162 years ago.
After the defeat of the 1848 revolutions in Europe,
the Romanian revolutionaries in exile became
"diplomats of the Union" and defended the national
aspirations of their people, in the complex
geopolitical calculations and diplomatic
compromises of the Great Powers.
Then, in July 1853 Russian troops invaded the
Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova
(the Danube Principalities), both of which were at
that time under the Ottoman Empire's suzerainty, Source: https://ro.wikipedia.org/
but not part of it. In October 1853 the Ottomans
responded by declaring war on Russia, and in
November the Russian fleet destroyed a Turkish
naval force in the Battle of Sinop (Turkey). This
was the beginning of the Crimean War. In March
1854 France, along with Britain, declared war on
Russia due to its refusal to withdraw from the
Romanian principalities. The war ended in
February 1856 with the defeat of Russia.
Romanians made use of this moment to begin an
active campaign for the union of the Danube
Principalities. The movement enjoyed the support
of France, not least because many Romanian Source: https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/
revolutionaries had taken refuge there after 1848
and lobbied Emperor Napoleon III to press for Then, in January 1862, the first single
unification. Austria and Turkey opposed the Government and Parliament of Romania became
unification effort, while Britain was neutral. In operational in Bucharest. In his inaugural speech to
March 1856, the Paris Congress found a Parliament, Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza solemnly
compromise among the Great Powers: the two declared: "A new day is starting today for Romania,
principalities were to be allowed to take the name as it is finally entering the path that will lead to the
of "The United Principalities of Moldova and
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fulfillment of its destiny". Europe. Then, on 9 May 1877, in the wake of a

The union of the two Romanian principalities new Russian-Turkish war, the parliament in
would not have been possible without France’s Bucharest declared the independence of Romania,
support, Emperor Napoleon III being one of and the country joined the war against Turkey.
Romania’s greatest allies. Therefore, it was not After several Romanian victories won south of
surprising that the French political system inspired the Danube, the European powers recognized
Romanian lawmakers in their efforts to consolidate Romania's independence within the 1878 Treaty of
the newly formed state, and Romanians continue to Berlin. At the end of the First World War, Romania
pay homage to the last French emperor for his became a key player in Central and Eastern Europe.
support in 1859. During my term as ambassador to The Great Union of 1918, when, based on the
the Court of St James’s, I was invited to attend principle of peoples’ right to self-determination,
ceremonies organized at St Michael’s Abbey in proclaimed by the US President Woodrow Wilson,
Farnborough, Hampshire, where Napoleon III rests the inhabitants of the other historical Romanian
in an impressive mausoleum (I have the privilege to provinces - Bessarabia, Bukovina, Banat, Crișana,
count among my French friends, members of the Maramureș and Transylvania - also decided,
Bonaparte family). through their freely expressed will, to unite with
The unification of Walachia and Moldova marked Romania, was the coronation of this journey.
an essential step towards the accomplishment of Thus, “The Small Union” of 24 January 1859
one the most important political goals of represents more than just a stage in the process of
Romanians: the union of all historical provinces fulfilling the Romanians’ dream of national unity: it
where they were the majority. Sometimes laid the foundations of the Romanian modern state
mentioned by historians as “The Small Union”, this and stands, therefore, as one of those decisive
political act was the result of a long process of moments which mark a nation’s destiny.
national consciousness consolidation, whose first
spark was kindled by the union of Wallachia, NOTE: The opinions expressed in this article do
Transylvania and Moldova in 1600, under the reign not bind the official position of the author.
of Prince Michael the Brave, and culminated with
“The Great Union” of 1st December 1918.
The Union of 1859 has also been the beginning of
an extraordinary process of modernization and
reforms undertaken by Alexandru Ioan Cuza, from
the remake of the justice and fiscal systems, to an
agrarian reform which gave land to 400,000 peasant
families. A law on the adoption of the metric
system of measurements and weights, and a Civil
Code modeled after the French one were passed. A
new administrative organization was introduced,
establishing communes and counties. County
tribunals, appeal courts and the Court of Cassation
were also created during Prince Cuza’s rule.
In 1864, the electoral law expanded the base of
voters, and ensured a wider participation from
among the peasantry and the middle-class. The
University of Iași was established in 1860, and the
University of Bucharest in 1864. A “public
instruction” law was passed, stipulating that
primary school education is compulsory and free,
and introducing a unique curriculum, for both urban
and rural schools.
Alexandru Ioan Cuza was forced to abdicate in
1866 and the path of development continued under
King Carol I. In the first year of his reign, Romania
adopted one of the most modern constitutions in

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Dr. Alexandru GHIŞA the kingdom in 1881, had a positive echo among
the Romanians outside its borders, who now felt
The year 1918, from spring until winter, was for they had a “mother land” they could turn to in case
the Romanians a year of major political activities. of need.
At that time the Romanians lived in three different The sentiment of identity affiliation of the
countries – the Kingdom of Romania, the Austro- Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire went
Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, the beyond Transylvanian borders – in its broader
classical example of a divided nation. The young sense, with Banat, Crișana, and Maramureș there –
Romanian state, that had witnessed the union ever since the occurrence of the bilateral
between Moldavia and Wallachia, when – in Iași compromise between Austria and Hungary, as
(5th of January 1859) and Bucharest (24th of January dominant nations. The phrase uttered by Ioan
1859) – Alexandru Ioan Cuza was elected the ruler Slavici in the first Romanian newspaper, Tribuna
of the two, proved it had intellectuals capable of (the Tribune), issued in 1884, in Sibiu, that “the sun
taking political actions in the interest of their rises for Romanians in Bucharest”, indicated the
country. Placed on the banks of the Danube River, fact that this sentiment of affiliation went beyond
Romania came to be as a state also due to the fact regional borders, and the Romanians saw
that the Europeans developed an interest in the themselves as a whole. This feeling of national
Danube and the Black Sea, and it could guarantee belonging to the entire Romanian land defined, in
free passage at the River’s mouth – as stipulated by 1918, the Romanians in Transylvania, Bukovina,
the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, following the Crimean Bessarabia, as well as those in the Kingdom of
War (1853-1856). Even if it remained under Romania. The Romanians proved in 1918 that they
Ottoman suzerainty, according to the provisions of had a national consciousness and that they were a
the Treaty, Romania was out of Russia’s exclusive political nation, fully capable of building their own
guarantee and entered under that of the seven unified national state.
signatory countries – England, France, Austria, Once World War I started, in the summer of 1914,
Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and the Empire of the Romania set as main political objective, the
Sultans. accomplishment of the national ideal - the union of
In his seven year rule, Alexandru Ioan I managed all territories inhabited by Romanians. The
to really unite the two Romanian Principalities and obligations of the Treaty with the Triple Alliance
lay the foundations of modern Romania. The newly (the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany and Italy)
formed Romanian state would become an attraction in 1883 were no longer justified when the war
point for all the Romanians residing in the Austro- started, as the Austro-Hungarian Empire had not
Hungarian Empire – Transylvania, Banat, Crișana, been attacked but instead decided to declare war on
Maramureș, and Bukovina, but also those from the Serbia without informing its ally in Bucharest.
Russian Empire, in Bessarabia. The Romanians Romania and Italy reached an understanding – they
outside Romania would now have a country to both had claims over Austro-Hungarian territories
cling to. inhabited by their co-ethnics – so they declared
The events in 1866 – Alexandru Ioan’s removal their neutrality (an agreement signed between the
from power, and his replacement with a foreign Italian and Romanian Prime Ministers, Antonio
prince, from the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen Salandra rd
and Ion I.C. Brătianu, in Bucharest, on the
dynasty, Charles I, were seen by the Romanian 23 of September 1914). The conundrum of the
intellectuals outside Romania as a step forward government in Bucharest was setting their priorities
towards the Romania they were aspiring to. straight – freeing the territories occupied by the
Romania’s change of status by gaining its Austrian-Hungarian Empire (Transylvania and
independence and separating from the Ottoman Bukovina), or those under Russian rule
Empire, on the battlefields in Bulgaria, following (Bessarabia). The first territorial proposals for
the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War between 1877 Romania came from Russia, which asked Romania
and 1878, its international recognition as an to join the war, in exchange for the recognition of
independent, sovereign country, at the Berlin the right to unite with the territories in the Austro-
Congress in 1878, followed by the proclamation of Hungarian Empire, inhabited by Romanians,

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Semigradia (the name the Russians used for Bucharest being occupied by the German and
Transylvania), and South Bukovina. The diplomatic Austro-Hungarian troops, followed by the
exchange on the 1st of October 1914, between the withdrawal of the Romanian royals, military and
Russian foreign minister, Sergei Dmitrievich state administration to Iași, one could not have even
Sazonov, and the Romanian ambassador in Saint conceived the union with Bessarabia, Bukovina,
Petersburg, Constantin Diamandy, served as a and Transylvania by use of military force. Under
Romanian-Russian Agreement. With it, the Prime these circumstances, the intellectual elites and the
Minister, Ion I.C. Brătianu obtained, in exchange political structures representing the Romanians in
for a “welcoming” neutrality, an accord for the Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia took
union, at the opportune moment, between Romania independent actions in order to achieve that
and the territories in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, national ideal.
inhabited by Romanians. The Agreement was kept The Bolshevik slippage in Saint Petersburg (1917-
secret, even if King Charles I, who died shortly 1918) and the start of the revolution within the
after (10th of October 1914), had agreed to it. The ranks of the czarist army, allowed Bessarabia to
heir to the throne, King Ferdinand I, proved to be separate from the Russian Empire. On the 2nd of
more flexible in his relations with the Entente and December 1917, Bessarabia declared its autonomy,
in supporting the endeavours to unite with the and on the 24th of January 1918 proclaimed its
territories from the neighbouring empires, inhabited independence, and named itself the “Moldavian
by Romanians. Democratic Republic”. Taken the fact that in
The evolution of the military situation during the Bessarabia, in the beginning of the war, there were
first two years of the war, that generally favoured deployed around one million Czarist Russian
the Central Powers, made the Entente pressure troops, under the influence of the chaotic Bolshevik
Romania to cooperate. Firstly, France lobbied in revolution, the atmosphere there became anti-
Saint Petersburg and London so that they agreed to Russian and anti-Bolshevik. When the new
the terms of the Romanian government. Ion I.C authorities in Chișinău asked, between the 10th and
Brătianu’s diplomatic campaign ended on the 17th 23rd of January 1918, the Romanian army entered
of August 1916, when the political Convention Bessarabia with a declared purpose of restoring and
between Romania and the Entente (France, maintaining order. Thus, on the 27th of March/9th of
England, Italy and Russia) was signed in Bucharest, April, the Moldovan Parliament assembled in
with regard to Romania’s territorial integrity and its Chișinău and decided the union of the “Moldavian
border, following the war. The Convention Democratic Republic” – lying from the Rivers Prut,
recognized (Art. 3) Romania’s right to annex the Dniester, and the Black Sea, to the old borders of
territories of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy – the Habsburg Empire, and to the Kingdom of
Bukovina, Transylvania, and Banat. The decision of Romania. Hence, Bessarabia was the first province
the Brătianu Government was approved by the that freed itself from foreign occupation and united
Crown Council, convened by King Ferdinand I. To with Romania.
achieve its national objective, Romania joined the The defeat of the Austrian-Hungarian armies in
war alongside the Entente, on the 16th of August Italy, and the Armistice in Padua (3rd of November
1916, when it handed to the Cabinet in Vienna the 1918) led to the implosion of the Empire through
only declaration of war. This document represents devolution (the transfer of power from the centre to
the expression of the Romanian national claims, the national constituent communities). The national
mustered with all the determination and dignity that councils of the Germans-Austrians, Hungarians,
international protocol entailed. Polish, Italians, Czechs and Slovakians, Serbians,
Therefore, in August 1916, the priority of the Croatians and Slovenians, of the Romanians in
government in Bucharest was to free the Bukovina and Transylvania, once they took over
Romanians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As for the power, stopped accepting the reformation of the
Bessarabia, it could only have been recovered Empire through federalization and proceeded to
hypothetically by Romania joining the war establishing independent countries or uniting the
alongside the Central Powers and against Russia. territories inhabited by them with co-ethnic
The national and international context did not countries. Consequently, on the 14th/27th of October
favour such an option for Romania, at that time. 1918, the Romanians in Bukovina organized in
Under the circumstances in which Romania’s Cernăuți, a Constituent Assembly, which would
military action in Transylvania failed and led to decide the formation of a National Council
consisting of 50 members and of an Executive
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Committee, led by Iancu Flondor. After several entirety proved it was not ready to give up the
confrontations with Ukrainian paramilitary forces medieval idea of a historic Hungary. As such, on
that threatened the security of the Romanian the 21st of March 1919, the government led by
National Council, the Romanian army intervened Mihály Károly resigned and ensured the peaceful
(the 8th Division led by the General Iacob Zadic), transfer of power to the far left, and thus was
and restored order in Cernăuți. Under these established the first Hungarian communist
circumstances between the 15th and the 28th of government, led by Bèla Kun. It proclaimed, in
November 1918, the General Congress of Bukovina Budapest, the Republic of Councils in Hungary (or
met in the Metropolitan Palace, and unanimously the Hungarian Soviet Republic), established along
voted the union of Bukovina – stretching from the lines of Vladimir Ilich Lenin’s Bolshevik
Ceremuș and Colacin to the River Dniester – with regime in Russia. As far as his foreign policy was
the Kingdom of Romania. concerned, Bèla Kun intended to keep old
The union of the Romanian nation as a country Hungary’s borders and issued threats against
was finalized through the decision adopted in Alba Czechoslovakia and Romania.
Iulia, on the 1st of December 1918. The National East of Romania, the Bolshevik Red Army
Assembly in Alba Iulia took place on a free land, intended to get back Bessarabia and institute the
unoccupied by the armies of the Entente, nor by the communist regime all over the Romanian territory.
withdrawing German troops. The Romanian troops On the 31st of December 1917/13th of January 1918,
were deployed at the time of the proclamation, at the Romanian Minister Plenipotentiary in Saint
the Transylvanian border on the Reghin-Târgu Petersburg, Constantin Diamandy was arrested by
Mureș line, and they did not head towards Alba the newly installed Russian regime, however, he
Iulia, but towards Brașov. The Central National was released two days later, when the entire
Romanian Council, the governing body diplomatic corps in the city intervened; he was
representing the Romanians in Transylvania, Banat, forced to leave Soviet Russia. Moreover, on the 13th
Crișana and Maramureș convened on the 18th of of January 1918, the Council of People’s
November/1st of December 1918, in Alba Iulia the Commissars (led by V.I. Lenin) decided to break all
Great National Assembly. It consisted of 1228 ties with the Romanian diplomats and expel from
elected representatives, coming from all rural and Russia all the representatives of the Romanian
urban communities, envoys of the Romanian government.
churches – Orthodox and Greek-Catholic – and Consequently, the decisions of Bessarabia,
representatives of other professional organisations. Bukovina and Transylvania to unite with the
They represented all Romanians from the Kingdom of Romania were being directly
Hungarian region of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. threatened by two countries with communist
Besides, the Assembly had almost 100.000 people regimes – Soviet Russia in the East and the
present, coming from all over Transylvania, Banat, Hungarian Soviet Republic, in the West, which
and the other western regions – Crișana and made use of armed forces and state terrorism to do
Maramureș. The Great National Assembly in Alba that. This turn of events forced Romania to take
Iulia proclaimed the union of Transylvania, Banat, military actions under combat conditions, all
Crișana and Maramureș with the Kingdom of through 1919, to defend its own territory and
Romania. Pending the complete union with the implement the decisions taken in Chișinău,
Kingdom of Romania, the High National Council Cernăuți and Alba Iulia the year before. At the
of Transylvania was established, which had a same time, the decisions adopted in Chișinău,
legislative role and answered to the Parliament in Cernăuți and Alba Iulia had to receive international
Bucharest, and the Directory Council of recognition during the Paris Peace Conference that
Transylvania, which had an executive role, and took place during 1919 and 1920.
answered to the Romanian Government. The armistices with the losing parties, Austro-
Still under the shock of the events in Alba Iulia Hungary (in Padua on the 3rd of November 1918)
which the Hungarians did not attend, the Hungarian and Germany (in Compiegne, on the 11th of
National Council (the Government of the self- November 1918) allowed the Allies to start getting
proclaimed Republic of Hungary, unrecognised by ready and opening the Peace Conference. With this
the international community) discussed for the first armistice, Germany saw the obsoleteness of the
time, on the 18th of December 1918, the issue of Treaty of Buftea/Bucharest (24th of April/7th of May
establishing and defending a purely ethnic 1918) that Romania was forced to conclude with
Hungary; however, the Hungarian society in its
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the Central Powers, after the Russian “malfunction” 17 of the Armistice, which kept the entire
in Brest-Litovsk (22nd of November/5th of Hungarian administration within the borders of old
December 1917) that ended Russia’s participation Hungary could not have been agreed upon, because
in the war. Concurrently, a French military analysis on its grounds, Mihály Károly sent troops to
referring to the Armistice in Padua included a conquer Slovakia (Czechoslovakia), a recognised
reference to Romania, highlighting the fact that the country, allied to the Entente. Moreover, the border
text of the armistice did not cover the issues line set by this Armistice did not take into account
regarding Transylvania and Bukovina, and the Romania’s claims, so its validity was contested by
withdrawal from Wallachia was implied. According the Romanian Government in Bucharest and by the
to the analysis, Romania, even if at that time it was Romanian National Council in Arad that eventually
no longer an ally, it could have become once more managed to gradually move it to the West.
and then the text of truce with Austro-Hungary France takes a final decision regarding Romania’s
would have had to include facts regarding the participation to the Peace Conference only by the
evacuation of the Romanian territories claimed by end of December 1918. The decision stipulated that
this country. The fact that Romania was mentioned the allied governments should see Romania as an
was related to the endeavours of the French ally as it re-joined the war, and, as far as the Treaty
Military Command to reopen a Romanian front. of Bucharest, from the 4/17th of August 1916 was
Romania re-joining the war alongside the allies was concerned, it was considered null and void,
enough to alert Budapest due to the imminence of a amended through the Treaty signed on the 24th of
military action in Transylvania. Consequently, the April/7th of May 1918 in Buftea/Bucharest. The
Hungarian National Council, acting as the French government suggested the Allies drew up
executive, led by Mihály Károly, tried to reach an another declaration, taking into account the Treaty
agreement with the Commander in Chief of the in 1916, in order to look into Romania’s claims and
Allied Army of the Orient, general Franchet considering the union of Bessarabia with Romania
d’Esperey, to obtain from the Allies some sort of and the general and particular interests of the
guarantee with regard to Hungary’s borders. The Allies. In the beginning of January 1919, England
negotiations ended when they signed, in Belgrade announced that it agreed with the French
(13th of November 1918) a document somewhat government regarding Romania taking part in the
similar to the one in Padua, called “The Military Peace Conference as an ally, however, it proposed
Convention between the Allies and Hungary”. At they should postpone the communique regarding
that point Hungary found itself at an advantage, for the dismissal of the Treaty of Bucharest, from the
at least four reasons: it took part for the first time in 4th/17th of August 1916. These attitudes raise the
an international convention and it had its status objections of the Romanian government with the
recognised; it obtained a clear delimitation of its Allies, regarding their decision not to recognise the
Eastern and Southern borders, through the line Treaty of alliance signed on the 4th/17th of August
stretching from: the upper valley of the River 1916. Under these circumstances, was carried out
Someș, Bistrița, Mureș-Sat, the valley of the River the activity of Romanian delegation at the Peace
Mureș, all the way to the Tisa River, Subotița, Baja, Conference for almost two years (1919-1920),
Pecs, up to where Drava meets the Slovenian- which was aimed at obtaining the international
Croatian border; it eliminated the word recognition of the decisions regarding the union
“provisional” from Art. 6 of the Armistice in Padua with the Kingdom of Romania, taken in Chișinău,
and replaced it with “the civil administration will Cernăuți and Alba Iulia. The Romanian delegation
remain in the hands of the current government”; it left for Paris on the 10th of January and arrived on
managed to stop, through Art. 17 “the interference the 13th of January 1919, led by Ion I.C. Brătianu,
in matters pertaining to domestic issues”. The the head of the government. He was accompanied
Armistice of Belgrade would be declared null by by Constantin Brătianu, the Secretary General of
the French only two weeks after, without having the delegation, Colonel Toma Dumitrescu and I.
been denounced. On the 1st of December 1918, the Plessia. During those two years, the members of the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the delegation changed, due to the changes in the
representatives of the Allies in Paris that the treaty government, and due to the fact that they acquired
signed with the Hungarian government could not be new members from the historical provinces that
interpreted as a recognition of the country, and that united with Romania in 1918. Here are the
the Armistice in Belgrade should have been seen as members who represented Romania at the Paris
a “local understanding with a local authority”; Art. Peace Conference: plenipotentiary delegates - Ion
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I.C. Brătianu (first delegate), Nicolae Mișu (second Minister took part only in discussing and taking
delegate), General Constantin Coandă, Nicolae decisions regarding matters related to his country)
Titulescu, Dr. Ioan Cantacuzino, Dr. Alexandru and the Council of Five, comprising of the
Vaida-Voevod, Victor Antonescu, Constantin ministers of foreign affairs of the five great powers.
Diamandy, Ioan Pelivan, George Danielopol, etc. The Conference Bureau was comprised of the
The delegation also included consultants and president – George Clemenceau; vice-presidents:
experts: P. Zahariade and S. Rosenthal, advisors, Robert Lansing, David Lloyd George, Vittorio
Eftimie Antonescu, Constantin Antoniade and Orlando, and Marquis Saionji. The Secretary
Mircea Djuvara – legal experts, Col. Toma General was Paul Eugène Dutasta (France), who
Dumitrescu – military affairs, G. Caracostea, C.D. had three assistants, coming from countries known
Creangă, Ermil Pangrati, George Crișan, Neagoe as great powers. 17 commissions and committees
Flondor, D. Gheorghiu, D. Marinescu, Ioan were established for various issues. The Society of
Mocsoni, Gheorghe Moroianu, Ludovic Mrazec, Nations, war and sanctions, war reparations,
Eugen Neculcea, Mihail Șerban, George Popescu, financial issues, economic issues, territorial issues,
Nicolae Ștefănescu, Ion Tănăsescu – economic and with four sub-commissions regarding
financial affairs, Caius Brediceanu, Ioan Coltor, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Romanian, South-Slavic
Arhip Roșca, Vasile Vitenco, Alexandru Lapedatu, (Yugoslavian), Belgian and Danish issues, inter-
Traian Vuia – ethnographical and geographical allies military and naval matters, etc. The Supreme
affairs, Aurel Vasiliu și I. Plessia – attachés to the Council clearly stated where it stood regarding
president of the delegation. Romania, allowing it to take part in the conference
The key task of Paris Peace Forum was to enable with only two delegates, while Serbia, which had
the international recognition of the newly formed/ never surrendered, was allowed three delegates.
rebuilt states, following the disappearance of the Moreover, the Great Powers gave Romania only
German, Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian seven places in the 17 commissions assigned to
Empires. The proceedings were opened on the 18th investigate the various matters at hand and to draw
of January 1919 and over 10,000 delegates were up reports related thereto, for the decision-makers
present – politicians, diplomats, militaries, of the Peace Conference. However, in order to
consultants and experts from 32 countries. Ever elude a Romanian interference, the Romanian
since the beginning, the Peace Conference chose a experts were excluded from two commissions –
double standard policy, based on seniority. The those responsible for borders and minorities.
countries were divided into two categories – great Astonished by the hostility he was confronted
powers that had unlimited interests and small with from the western allies, Ion I.C Brătianu
powers that had limited interests. The first category ardently pleaded Romania’s cause. Therefore, on
included the United States of America, France, the 31st of January 1919, when he faced the
Great Britain, Italy and Japan (it did not play an Supreme Council, I.I.C. Brătianu refused to make
active role and was called the silent partner). any compromise regarding Romania’s territorial
Romania was part of the smaller countries, and so claims. He demanded the whole of Banat,
were Poland, Czechoslovakia, or the Kingdom of according to the terms of the Treaty from 1916,
Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia (the future Yugoslavia). evoking history and ethnic statistics to justify his
Compared to the latter, recognised and accepted as claim, and opposed the division of the region.
allies, Romania had more difficulties to overcome. Those present were not impressed, even if Brătianu
The operating body of the conference was the argued the fact that the death of 335,000 Romanian
Council of Ten, comprised of heads of state, prime troops was reason enough for Romania to stake its
ministers and foreign ministers from France, claim. The next day, on the 1st of February 1919 he
England, the USA, Italy and Japan – George continued his exposé, arguing that Romania should
Clemenceau and Stephen Pichon, David Lloyd have the entire territory it was promised in 1916, as
George and Arthur James Balfour, Thomas a just reward for the support it offered the Entente,
Woodrow Wilson and Robert Lansing, Vittorio and rejected the Supreme Council’s proposals to
Orlando and Baron Sidney Sonnino, Marquis organise referendums in the disputed territories –
Kimmachi Saionji and Baron Makino. In March Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania, where the
1919, the Council of Ten become the Council of unions with Romania had been achieved by popular
Four (the Supreme Council) comprising of the vote the year before – 1918. In his exposé, Brătianu
heads of state or prime ministers from France, even made an offer – should Romania’s claims be
England, the USA and Italy (the Japanese Prime met, and should the allies allow it to further
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advance to the west, towards Hungary, the cable Constanța –Istanbul, which passed over to
Romanian army would eradicate Bolshevism, “a Romania; 2) Art. 259, Paragraph 6, Germany was
serious and contagious disease” that quickly spread obliged to sign away the Treaty of Buftea-
from Russia to Hungary and Central Europe. The Bucharest from the 24th of April/7th of May 1918,
answer of the Supreme Council was far from what and Art. 292, it relinquished all treaties,
Brătianu expected – it voted for the establishment conventions and agreements signed with Romania
of a Romanian Territorial Commission, whose task “before the 1st of August 1914 or henceforth, until
was to analyse the legitimacy of Romania’s claims. the enforcement of that treaty”. Likewise, with Art.
During the Peace Conference, territorial issues 232, Germany was obliged to pay for “all the
mixed with others – the decision taken by the “Big damages it inflicted on the civil population in all
Four” was to have a European peace that would allied countries”; 3) With regard to the Danube, the
defend their own interests, the rights of the Treaty kept to maintaining the European
minorities in the successor states in general, and in Commission of the Danube, located in Galați,
Romania in particular, and the threat of Bolshevik which managed the navigating segment from Brăila
expansion in Central Europe. Consequently, the to Sulina, and to establishing an International
priority of the Peace Conference, imposed by Danube Commission, for the Brăila-Ulm segment;
France the host nation was to have peace with a dedicated conference later decide the Danube’s
Germany. The issue was settled on the 28th of June political and legal status. With reference to this
1919 with the Treaty of Versailles. With it, the latter matter, on the 26th of June 1919, Ion I.C.
interests of the Big Four – the USA, France, Brătianu submitted a memo to the Supreme
England and Italy – were satisfied. Romania, Council, concerning Romania’s situation generated
Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbia- by the management of the Danube by the Great
Croatia-Slovenia were among the signatories, and Powers. It requested that the navigation system at
recognised as allied states and confirmed as the mouths of the Danube be the same as before the
subjects of international law. According to the war, and that Romania be returned its ships,
Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost all its colonies. captured by the enemies and taken into their
It gave back to France – Alsace and Lorraine, to territorial waters, and were in the temporary
Belgium – Eupen, Malmédy and Moresnet, to possession of the allied armies. It also requested
Poland, recognised as independent – Poznania and that the French, British and US military missions on
some of Upper Silesia, and to Denmark – North the Danube, be limited to supplying the allied
Schleswig. According to the military chapter in the armies. The memo demanded that representatives
Treaty, Germany abolished conscription, the of Czechoslovakia, the Kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-
number of troops were downsized to 100,000 Slovenia, and Romania be included in the
people, the Rhyne valley was demilitarised and International Danube Commission. On the 23rd of
forced to pay for war damages, whose amount was August 1919, the Supreme Council told the
settled later on. Through Art. 116 Germany was Romanian delegation that it agreed to the inclusion
obliged to recognise “the independence of all of the representatives, however, it rejected all the
territories separated from the former Russian other claims in the memo.
Empire”, and through Art. 117, they had to Germany’s ally from the Central Powers, the
recognise the validity of the treaties signed with Austro-Hungarian Empire had broken apart during
“the countries that were part or would be the last months of 1918. Partners for dialogue were
established on the entire or on some of the territory being looked for and they could only be those
belonging to the former Russian Empire”. responsible for starting the World War, the
Moreover, they signed the Covenant of the League dominant countries from the dual-state, the
of Nations that represented the first in a series of Austrians and the Hungarians. The two nations
peace treaties signed with all former enemies, as formed countries of their own – Austria and
well as the statute of the International Labor Hungary. They were losing countries and they were
Organization that represented the 13th part of the the object of separate peace treaties. The Versailles
Treaty with Germany, and of the other peace Peace Treaty clearly stipulates, in art. 80 that
treaties. “Germany acknowledges and will firmly respect
There are three matters that concern Romania in the independence of Austria”, however, it does not
the Treaty of Versailles with Germany: 1) the war mention Hungary. On the 29th of May 1919 the
damages – Art. 224, annex 7 stipulates the delegations of Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia,
cessation of all rights, titles and privileges over the Czechoslovakia and Greece were informed with
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regard to the main clauses of the draft of the Peace dividing line between Hungary and Romania on the
Treaty with Austria and with regard to a special 20th of March 1919. The Hungarian government
treaty referring to minorities. In the last draft, Art. 5 was notified by Lt. Col. Fernand Vix, from the
stipulated the right of the Great Powers to adopt the Allied Mission in Budapest. The “Vix Note” led to
measures they saw fit in order “to protect” the a political crisis in Hungary, the “interim
interests of the minorities in Romania. Moreover, president”, Mihály Károly, resigned and a newly
the text of the Treaty with Austria referred to formed communist/left socialist government came
Romania’s obligation to take over some of the to power, led by Béla Kun, who proclaimed the
debts of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Soviet Republic of Hungary on the 21st of March
Under those circumstances, Ion I.C. Brătianu acted 1919. The victory of Bolshevism in Budapest had a
in the name of the medium and small allied strong influence on Bavaria and Austria, which
countries and asked and got from the President of determined the Paris Peace Conference to see the
the Conference a 48 hour-break to study the text of Soviet Republic of Hungary as a threat and decide,
the Treaty. He tried to make all small and medium starting with the 28th of March 1919 to impose an
countries interested in the Treaty with Austria join economic blockade. The new Hungarian regime-
in and raise objections against the fact that they maintained relationships with Austria and Soviet
have not been consulted when the clauses were Russia only. The latter immediately acknowledged
drawn. Since he was not able to, the Romanian the soviet regime in Budapest and agreed to the
delegation stood alone when they started a long and proposal of its communist leader to form an
fierce dispute with the Great Powers, in order to alliance between the Hungarian proletariat and the
have some of the amendments improved and some soviet government.
modified, as they were a threat to the independence As far as the relationship with the neighbours
and sovereignty of the country. went, Béla Kun kept the Yugoslavians at a distance,
To the Romanian delegation the most important threatening only Czechoslovakia and Romania.
territorial problem at the Peace Conference was Even if his discourse was Bolshevik, he acted
related to Transylvania. There, the difficulties lied solely in Hungary’s interest. He was in favour of
with the border along the River Mureș in Central the Military Convention in Belgrade, and asked the
Transylvania established by the “Military Allies to make the Romanian Army withdraw east
Convention between the Allies and Hungary”, in from the Mureș line. Under these circumstances,
Belgrade, on the 13th of November 1918. The the Directory Council in Sibiu, led by Iuliu Maniu
Romanians ignored the Convention and their troops sent a memo to the Romanian Government where
kept on advancing, despite the restrictions of the he asked for the protection of the Romanian
Supreme Council. On the 24th of February 1919, population in Transylvania, because in the areas
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a member of the occupied by the Hungarian army, Romanians were
Romanian delegation forwarded a note to the abused and tortured. In Bucharest, King Ferdinand
Supreme War Council in Versailles that contested approved the decision taken by the Council of
the validity of the provisions of the Armistice of Ministers, on the 11th of April 1919, and ordered
Belgrade, since the Hungarians could no longer the army to occupy the territories in Transylvania
speak for the Romanian territories from the former established by the Supreme War Council in
empire. He demanded Romania be treated the same Versailles, included in the “Vix Note”. To the
as Czechoslovakia, which had been authorized to Romanian King, who was the commander of the
disregard the provisions of the above-mentioned army, entering Transylvania was an absolute
Armistice, and allow the Romanian troops to necessity, both as far as his foreign policy was
advance to the limit of the Romanian territories. concerned, as well as his domestic one. A
Consequently, on the 26th of February 1919, the Hungarian attack in the Apuseni Mountains, made
Supreme War Council set a new dividing line, the Romanian Army fight back – the night between
along the railway that stretched from Satu Mare, via the 15th and 16th of April – and advance all the way
Oradea, all the way to Arad. The three cities to the Tisza River. It stopped there in the beginning
remained outside Romanian territories, under of May 1919.
French occupation. In order to prevent further In Paris the Allies asked the head of the Romanian
hostilities, the Council created a neutral zone delegation, Ion I.C. Brătianu, to have the Romanian
between the Romanian army and the Hungarian Army withdraw from the line of the Tisza River, on
one, west of the dividing line. The interested parties the line set by the Supreme War Council, but he
were made aware of the decision regarding the new refused. The stalemate between the Allies and
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Brătianu regarding the borders reached a standstill institutions.

because of Romania’s policy concerning the During all that time the Romanian army worked
minorities. Convinced that he could not achieve on recovering war machines and equipment, and
anything else in Paris, at least at that time, on the the railways that the German and Austro-Hungarian
2nd of July 1919 Ion I.C. Brătianu left the Peace armies took from Romania during the occupation
Conference. Back home, on the 9th of July 1919, and stored in the area surrounding the Hungarian
Brătianu delivers an ample report regarding the capital. The relationship between Romania and the
activity of the Romanian delegation in Paris, during Allies became more complicated when the
a meeting with the Council of Ministers, also government led by István Friederich came to power
attended by King Ferdinand and by Iuliu Maniu, the in Budapest, and when the Archduke Joseph of
president of the Directory Council of Transylvania. Habsburg assumed the leadership of the country.
The Council approved the activity of the Romanian The British expert Frank Rattigan addressed a note
delegation and decided not to sign the Peace Treaty to his foreign minister Arthur James Balfour, where
with Austria. This resistance policy led, from July he defended Romania’s policy against the criticism
to December, to a genuine “war of notes” between of the Peace Conference, claiming the following:
the Romanian government and the Supreme War the Supreme Council forbade Romania to occupy
Council. Romania’s resistance policy was seconded Budapest once the city had been taken; the Allies
by its military actions in Hungary. Even though the had asked for Romania’s cooperation in the march
Supreme War Council in Paris decided, on the 11th for Budapest; the Romanians had acted in self-
of July 1919 that the military troops of the Entente defence; the accusations of brutality had been
should occupy Hungary, they did not take any spread by the Hungarian newspapers; the
action. According to the Allies, an anti-Bolshevik Hungarian troops had not been wearing a uniform,
crusade was impossible to achieve. A French so they could not have been distinguished from the
project that required a coordinated French- civilians; the Habsburgs had not come to power
Romanian-Yugoslavian counter offensive failed, aided by Brătianu. In the fall of 1919, the Allies
due to lack of personnel. To France, at least, had entrusted the settlement of the issues between
Romania seemed to be the only force capable of the Romanians and the Hungarians to the British
taking immediate action in Central Europe. The diplomat George Clerk, minister plenipotentiary of
suggestion of a quick intervention in the region Great Britain to Prague. Clerk’s mission was to
came from Marshal Foch, approved by the French institute a liberal parliamentary democracy in
Prime Minister, Clemenceau. Budapest and make the Romanian army withdraw
Under these circumstances, Romania was forced from Hungary.
to solve the Hungarian issue by itself. After the In the meanwhile, the Great Powers through
Hungarian troops attack the Romanian ones pressure and concessions seek to make the
situated east of the Tisza River (20th-30th of July), Romanian government sign the Peace Treaty with
the Romanian troops launched a counterattack (24th Austria as well as Minority Treaty. On the 8th of
of July), crossed the Tisza River (27th of July) and September 1919 the Supreme Council warned the
entered Budapest on the 3rd of August 1919. The Romanian government that if they did not sign the
Romanian intervention in Budapest and the two documents, Romania would not be allowed to
removal of Béla Kun were not received well by the sign the Treaty with Bulgaria either. The Peace
authorities in Paris, and the Supreme War Council Treaty with Austria was signed in Saint Germaine-
asked Romania to evacuate Hungary immediately. en-Laye, on the 10th of September 1919; none of
As a consequence, only a day after Hungary the Romanian delegates attended the ceremony.
surrendered, the Supreme War Council established This Treaty recognised Austria’s independence and
a commission, made of four generals: French, that of all its neighbours, including those which
British, American and Italian, also known as the were established on the former territories of the
“Commission of the Generals”, and their mission Austro-Hungarian Empire. Austria gave Italy South
was to represent the Allies in Budapest and Tirol, Trieste and Zadar, the Istria peninsula and
negotiate with the Hungarians and the Romanians. Carniola. The Treaty obliged it to have only 30,000
Between August and November 1919, the troops and pay for war damages. A special article
Romanian troops stationed in Budapest helped forbade the annexation of Austria to Germany. Art.
reorganise the administration and supply the 59 obliged Austria to recognise the union of
Hungarian population with food and fuel, revived Bukovina with Romania and Art. 87 recognised the
the industry and restarted the activity of state borders of the countries that were formed or were to
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be established on the territories that were once part minister of foreign relations decided to accept the
of the former Russian Empire. Art. 60 of the Treaty terms of the Supreme Council so as not to endanger
imposes Romania clauses regarding the minority the victories already achieved in Paris and restore
regime, transit and trade (established by a special all good relations with the West. Consequently, on
treaty), and Art. 61 makes Romania take over some the 10th of December 1919, the government led by
of the debts of the former monarchy. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod signed, through its
Ion I.C. Brătianu’s intransigence not only did it delegates in the Peace Conference – General
not acquire the desired results, but it even Constantin Coandă and Ion Pelivan, the Peace
endangered Romania’s interests at the Peace Treaty with Austria in Saint Germain-en-Laye, the
Conference. Two days after the Treaty in Saint- Minority Treaty and the Peace Treaty with
Germain was signed with Austria, a government Bulgaria, in Neuilly-sur-Seine. This last Treaty
crisis occurred in Bucharest, which resulted with (signed on the 24th of November 1919) establishes
the resignation of Brătianu and his cabinet. The that the border between Romania and Bulgaria was
crisis ended on the 27th of September 1919 when a as “it had been on the 1st of August 1914”.
new government was formed with militaries and To the Romanian delegation in the Peace
experts, led by General Arthur Văitoianu, and under Conference there were three more important
the influence of I.I.C. Brătianu. The new prime territorial issues left on the agenda – Banat,
minister neglected the foreign relations and Bessarabia and Transylvania, whose solutions
declared that he was not at liberty to sign the Peace would be put off until 1920. The issue regarding
Treaty with Austria, the Romanian delegation Banat was resolved rather favourably. After Ion
emphasizing once more the reasons it could not I.C.Brătianu insisted that the region should be a
sign. Even if it decided to evacuate Budapest in part of Romania in its entirety, taking into account
four stages, on the 14th of November 1919, the economic, geographical and social unity (600,000
attitude of General Arthur Văitoianu, determined Romanians, compared to 400,000 Germans and
the Supreme Council in Paris, on the 15th of 300,000 Serbians), the Supreme Council drew a
November, to issue another ultimatum, which rather ethnic border between Romania and the
requested the Romanian government to meet the newly established Yugoslavia – the Romanians
following conditions, “unreservedly and received two thirds of the region and the Serbians
unconditionally”: completely evacuate Hungarian one third. The Serbian army that had occupied most
soil, withdrawing within the borders established by of Banat, including the city of Timișoara, left a
the Conference, accept the establishment of the region in the hands of the French army, who later
Inter-allied Commission, which stopped, controlled turned it to the Romanian army, in July 1920, thus
and assessed the Hungarian requisitions since the avoiding an armed conflict between the Romanians
beginning of the Romanian occupation, ever since and the Serbians.
its inception; sign the Peace Treaty with Austria The issue of regaining Bessarabia proved to be
and the Minority Treaty under the conditions more difficult. It had been discussed in front of the
referred to by the Supreme Council. The Romanian Romanian Territorial Commission ever since the
government was summoned to answer within eight 22nd of February 1919, however, the arguments of
days, otherwise the Romanian delegation was the Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu that the
forced to leave the Peace Conference, and the population in Bessarabia was 70% Romanian and
Member States of the Supreme Council would that the union with Romania had been free,
cease all diplomatic relations with Romania. The accomplished by a legal assembly, the Moldovan
note was sent to the Romanian government in Parliament, did not convince the allies. The US
Bucharest, on the evening of the 24th of November, State Secretary, Robert Lansing asked the
and they had to answer by the 2nd of December Romanian Prime Minister to organize a referendum
1919. Under these extreme circumstances, the in Bessarabia. Brătianu answered that he had no
government led by Văitoianu refused to give in and doubts regarding its result, and that he did not
resigned on the 28th of November 1919. After approve the withdrawal of the Romanian army from
several consultations, King Ferdinand assigned the region because it would have exposed the
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, the vice-president of the population to “Bolshevik anarchy”. The issue of
Romanian National Party in Transylvania, to form a Bessarabia was set aside, with other pending issues
new government. The New government led by regarding the Allies and Romania and was put off
Vaida-Voevod was sworn in on the 1st of December for most of the year 1920. In the beginning of that
1919. The new Prime Minister, who was also the year, the Romanian Prime Minister, Alexandru
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Vaida-Voevod went to Paris and London and On the 20th of February the Romanian delegation
settled with the Allies in matters regarding the forwarded a memo to the Peace Conference, a
withdrawal from Hungary. Nevertheless, the comeback to the Hungarian action regarding the
Council of Ambassadors that had been established borders, and on the 24th of February, a similar
during the Peace Conference, after the heads of document was forwarded by the Romanian,
state and governments left Paris, declared that they Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Czechoslovakian
would not sign the Treaty regarding Bessarabia, delegations. This last joint action of the three
unless Romania signed a final Peace treaty with delegations resulted in speeding the proceedings of
Hungary. the Conference. The Supreme Council met in
This last matter was left unsolved in Central London on the 3rd of March 1920 and debated
Europe – bringing Hungary to the Paris Peace mostly on the Treaty with Hungary, and on the 8th
Conference. The matter was assigned to the Clerk of March, the Council of Foreign Ministers and
Mission. Following several contacts he had in Ambassadors dealt with this issue again and
Budapest and Bucharest, Sir George Clerk decided to stop revising the territorial, military,
convinces the Romanian political and military financial, and transit clauses in the Treaty with
authorities to withdraw the Romanian army from Hungary. Moreover, the two reunions decided to
Hungary. All that remained was a new government dismiss all Hungarian claims, with one exception –
in Budapest, capable of upholding law and order, a referendum was allowed in Burgenland, a
recognised following free elections and a universal territory that was to be given to Austria, where the
vote, a government that would sign a peace treaty city of Sopron voted to remain in Hungary. These
with the Allies. Likewise, the Commission of the last decisions caused a change in the government in
Generals made the Arch-duke Joseph of Habsburg Budapest – the cabinet led by Károly Huszár was
resign from his position as the head of state, replaced on the 15th of March 1920 by another, led
however, István Friederich, who became the by Sándor Simonyi-Semadan, who took
President-Minister of Hungary was not accepted by responsibility for signing the Peace Treaty. The
the Supreme Council. The same day the Hungarian Supreme Council answered the objections of the
capital was cleared of all Romanian troops, on the Hungarians to the territorial issues with the
14th of November 1919, under the close watch of “Millerand Letter”, that is its decision to change
the armies of the Entente, Admiral Miklós Horthy none of the clauses stipulated in the draft of the
entered Budapest, leading an army of 2000 men. treaty. Instead of answering that letter, the head of
The following days, the delegate of the Allies, Sir the Hungarian delegation, Albert Apponyi,
George Clerk, consulted with the Hungarian announced, on the 16th of May, his and his
political parties and managed to establish, on the colleagues’ resignation. As a consequence, on the
24th of November 1919 a union government, led by 4th of June 1920, the Supreme Council announced
Károly Huszár, who agreed to the conditions of the the signing of the Treaty and asked Hungary to
Supreme War Council and signed the Peace Treaty. assign representatives with full powers to sign it.
A Hungarian delegation, led by Count Albert The event took place at the proposed date in the
Apponyi arrived in Paris on the 7th of January 1920, Grand Trianon, at the Palace of Versailles.
and the provisions of the Peace Treaty were handed The Trianon Peace Treaty was signed on the 4th of
to him on the 15th of January. The Supreme Allied June 1920 by 17 allied countries and Hungary. The
Council had their first debate on the issue on the preamble was dedicated to the dissolution of the
16th of January. The Hungarian delegation defended Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the text of the
in Paris the integrity of historical Hungary and tried Treaty used the phrase “the territories that once
to exonerate it from the burden of the war. When belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian
the session ended, Georges Clemenceau made the monarchy”, which confirmed the disappearance of
head of the delegation aware of the fact that the empire, not that of a Hungarian country.
decisions could not be taken “based on the Besides, Art.73 recognised Hungary as an
declarations of only one of the parties”, and gave independent and sovereign country. Consequently,
Romania two weeks to come up with an answer. the Treaty of Trianon was Hungary’s act of birth, as
The Hungarian delegation submitted to the a modern country, a subject of international law.
Secretariat of the Peace Conference a series of Moreover, by Art. 73, Hungary was obliged to
“preliminary notes“, regarding their position vis-a- renounce that status, in order to prevent any future
vis the Treaty, however they did not manage to “personal union” with another country. The
change the original text. Armistice of Belgrade from the 13th of November
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1918, never approved, but cited constantly, was document should be signed by 60 deputies,
annulled by this Treaty. At the same time, Art. 193 randomly chosen so as none of the members of the
denounces the Treaty of Buftea/Bucharest, from the Hungarian National Assembly could be accused, or
7th of May 1918 imposed on Romania by the held responsible for the ratification. The actual vote
Central Powers, according to which Hungary, as was held on the 15th of November 1920, in a
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had territorial gloomy atmosphere. The instruments of the
benefits as well as of a different nature. It also ratification were sent to the French Ministry of
stipulated that once the treaty came into effect, all Foreign Affairs (where the treaties were stored) –
state of war ended and the Allies could establish by the Romanian government on the 4th of
official relations with Hungary. Art. 27 established September 1920, and by the Hungarian
the borders between Hungary and Austria, the government, on the 23rd of March 1921. The Peace
Kingdom of Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia, Treaty with Hungary came into force on the 26th of
Czechoslovakia and Romania. The provisions of July 1921, after it had been previously ratified by
this article legalised the separation from Austro- the other signatories. Practically, legally speaking,
Hungary and the territories inhabited by Romanians according to the provisions of this Treaty, World
(Transylvania, Banat, Crișana and Maramureș), by War I ended on the 26th of July 1921.
Slovakians (Slovakia), by Ruthenians (Ruthenia, Still, Romania had to solve the issue of
incorporated in Czechoslovakia) and by the Bessarabia. Only on the 3rd of March 1920 did the
Southern Slavs (Croatia-Slavonia). Supreme Council addressed a note to the Romanian
According to Art. 46, a commission comprising of government, signed by David Lloyd George, where
seven members (five designated by the Allies and he informed them of the decision adopted by the
one by Romania and Hungary) went on site to draw Peace Conference to recognise the union of
the borders. Important Hungarian communities, Bessarabia with Romania. Based on this address, on
minorities, remained in these territories and were the 28th of October 1920 a treaty was signed in
integrated in their new countries. The Treaty Paris, where the Allies – Great Britain, France, Italy
stipulated that the persons indigenous to a territory, and Japan recognised Romania’s sovereignty over
who are of different nationality and language than the territory of Bessarabia, situated between the
the majority of the population had the right to opt Rivers Prut and Dniester. The Treaty was ratified
for the citizenship they desired, within a period of by Great Britain on the 14th of April 1922, by
six months. In order to find a solution to potential Romania on the 19th of May 1922, by France on the
misunderstandings mixed arbitration tribunals were 24th of April 1924 and by Italy on the 23rd of May
established. Articles 54 to 60 obliged Hungary to 1927, however, it was not ratified by Japan.
ensure the protection of the minorities that Practically, only by the fall of 1920 were all of
remained in its territory, and the provisions were Romania’s territorial gains recognised
identical to those imposed on the other countries internationally. Today, 100 years since the legal
from the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, recognition of the Great Union, there still is the
including Austria. On behalf of Hungary, the Treaty issue of the name we use – do we call it Greater
was signed by Gaston de Bénard (Benard Agoston), Romania or Romania Made Whole? The territorial
the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare and by losses of 1940 – Bessarabia, Bukovina, the Hertza
Alfred Drasche-Lázár de Thorda, envoy region, Northern Transylvania and Southern
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. On Dobrudja were only partially recovered in 1944,
behalf of Romania, the Treaty was signed by and attested by the Peace Treaty with Romania,
Nicolae Titulescu, a former minister, and Dr. Ion Paris 1947 (for North Transylvania). The
Cantacuzino, Minister of State. The Treaty of consequences of the Ribentropp-Molotov Pact from
Trianon was ratified by the Romanian Parliament the 23rd of August 1939 are still present in
following heated, but well-balanced debates, which Romania’s case. Greater Romania was the highlight
started on the 11th of August 1920 and ended on the of Romanian statehood. In 1918, Transylvania,
17th of August (in the Senate) and on the 26th of Banat, Maramureș, and Bukovina brought the
August (in the Chamber of Deputies). riches of the land and of the deep – gold, coal, salt,
The Hungarian Parliament ratified the Treaty only secular woods and plenty of industry, Bessarabia its
after the Great Powers that signed it sent Budapest rich soil and oak woods, and the Old Kingdom of
an ultimatum. As a consequence, they decided not Romania had the Danube, the Mouth of the Danube
to discuss the Treaty of Trianon but accepted as a and the economic respiratory gate of the Black Sea
result of maximum pressure. They agreed that the – the Port of Constanța, the Great Danube plain, the
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whole of Bărăgan and the Meadows of Siret. The

biggest gain were the people – Romania’s
population grew from 7.5 million inhabitants (the
size of the Old Kingdom) to 14,669,841 inhabitants
in 1919, only to reach, in 1930, 18 million people.
The size of the country grew as well, from 137,000
km², to 295,049 km². And because those one
hundred years that have passed – since Greater
Romania was recognised by the system of Treaties
of Versailles and up until today, in 2021 – are
already history, we can also use the concept of
“historical” Romania.
NOTE: This study was first published in
Romanian in Magazin Istoric journal, issues 4
(637), 5(638) and 6(639)/2020.

Bibliography:
Ioan Aurel Pop, Ioan Bolovan (coord.), Istoria
României. Compendiu, Romanian Academy, the
Centre of Transylvanian Studies, Cluj-Napoca,
2007.
Florin Constantiniu, O istorie sinceră a poporului
român, Univers Enciclopedic Publishing,
Bucharest, 1999.
Keith Hitchins, România, 1866-1947, Humanitas
Publishing, Bucharest, 1996.
Alexandru Ghișa, România și Ungaria la început
de secol XX. Stabilirea relațiilor diplomatice (1918
-1921), Cluj Univeristy Press Publishing, Cluj-
Napoca, 2002.
Ioan Aurel Pop, Ioan Bolovan, Istoria
Transilvaniei, Școala Ardeleană Publishing, Cluj-
Napoca, 2016.
Victor Jinga, Probleme fundamentale ale
Transilvaniei, Brașov County History Museum,
1995.
A.D. Xenopol, Românii și Ungurii, Editura
Albatros, Bucharest, 1999.
Nicolae Enciu, 1918 pe ruinele imperiului
spulberat de istorie. Basarabia în pragul
modernității, ARC Publishing, Chișinău, 2018.
Ion Calafeteanu (coord.), Istoria politicii externe
românești în date, Enciclopedica Publishing,
Bucharest, 2003.
Ioan Scurtu, Tratatul de la Trianon – o analiză de
text și câteva considerații, in „Perspective”, the
magazine of the Titulescu European Foundation no.
1/2020.

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Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021 www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro

THE BLACK SEA

PhD. Angela GRĂMADĂ (President of the domestic position, prove herself powerful and
Association “Experts for Security and Global capable, demonstrate that she deserves the support
Affairs”, Romania) has offered us her insight on the of citizens, and, at the same time she will have to
current challenges facing the Republic of Moldova, deal with the pending issues inherited from Igor
in the interview given the Geostrategic Pulse Dodon. This implies discussions with both the East
Magazine. - where there are national interests prejudiced by
particular interests of some political players, and
with the West, intending to regain the trust and the
time lost in advancing projects of strategic interest
to the Republic of Moldova. We should get rid of
the dilemma "between East and West”. We need to
move on and implement what we have pledged to
deliver through various documents and
international treaties.
Abandoning a foreign policy dependent on the
Russian Federation inevitably implies rethinking
the relationship with the regime in Kremlin. To
what extent does Vladimir Putin acknowledge the
political change in Chișinău? Will the Russian
Federation reduce, or intensify its influence in the
Republic of Moldova?
During the past four years, the relation with the
Russian Federation has rather been one of
“vassalage” and not necessarily of the citizens of
Republic of Moldova. It was the subordination to
Kremlin of a very small group of political players
Geostrategic Pulse: After her victory in the in the Republic of Moldova, while the Moldovan
presidential elections, Maia Sandu stated that she citizens were served a strategic partnership that was
“will make every effort so that the Republic of ineffective and that was advantageous only to a
Moldova should have good relations with the East, few.
as well as with the West". Is this main foreign
policy objective of the Republic of Moldova a Vladimir Putin has accepted the change of the
feasible one? Or, on the contrary, the Republic of leader in Chișinău with calm. However, we must
Moldova should choose between East and West? understand that Moscow’s attitude towards the
Republic of Moldova will not change. Russia is
Angela Grămadă: The phrase “good relations
very present in Moldovan politics and economy,
with both the East and the West” has become a
and can still influence many processes. It is enough
political satire, during Igor Dodon’s presidency.
to look at the interests of some politicians or
Every president of the Republic of Moldova should
businessmen, who support various economic
be preoccupied with implementing the foreign
agendas, to see that the political change in Chișinău
policy agenda of the country, as stipulated by the
– the country’s president so far – could only mean
Constitution, as well as with multiplying the
intensifying the fight to secure gains and
opportunities that the citizens outside the country
opportunities. Of course, we are interested in seeing
could benefit from. Maia Sandu will have a very
how the relationship between the ex-president Igor
difficult mandate. She will have to strengthen her
Dodon and his Moscow partners will change, but
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also, who will Moscow try and discuss in Chișinău, that has its interests. Of course, there were many
besides the socialists, what will happen in the times when we could question the ability of the
negotiation format of the conflict in Transnistria, authorities in Chișinău to seize the potential of the
how will the energetic and economic dialogue bilateral or multilateral dialogue.
evolve, and what legislation serving the interests of At present, I believe that the image Maia Sandu
Moscow’s foreign policy will the deputies in promotes – that of an honest politician, who is not
Chișinău promote? At this point, Maia Sandu involved in schemes and corruption scandals –
cannot completely change the substance of the supports the credibility of the partnerships with the
bilateral dialogue with Russia, however, she can EU and the USA. Hence, we can foresee that we
steer it in the right direction. Moscow must find out will witness a transfer of credibility from the person
that the Republic of Moldova has defined national to the country. However, we should not forget that
interests and objectives. the Chișinău’s political scene will soon face an
What are the challenges in front of Republic of increasing political crisis and/or early parliamentary
Moldova’s endeavour to develop pragmatic and elections, which could dishearten those wishing to
productive dialogue and relations with its Western build partnerships with us.
and European partners, as well as in the region? What are the perspectives regarding the opening
It was Igor Dodon who was isolated abroad. The of a NATO office in Chișinău? Do you see a
Republic of Moldova has kept on benefitting from possible change of attitude from Maia Sandu as
financial support, or technical assistance from its opposed to Igor Dodon’s reluctance?
European partners. There had indeed been missed So far, establishing a NATO Office in Chișinău
opportunities when the financial assistance was was not mentioned in Maia Sandu’s public
stopped and conditioned by accomplishments in the appearances. And I am strictly referring to the
anti-corruption reforms or the overcoming of period following her investiture. We need to
domestic political crises, but that was only because understand that her current public speech covers
Moldova’s partners needed stability and continuity. many domestic priorities, and focuses on
Changing governments and political leaders are organizing early parliamentary elections. Anyway,
ordinary processes in democratic countries. without strong support from the Government or the
However, a minimum degree of predictability is Parliament, any initiative coming from the
needed when it comes to undertaking commitments, president of the country will not be possible to be
just as openness to a sustained and credible put into practice, and her activity could be blocked.
domestic dialogue is needed when it comes to the President Klaus Iohannis’ visit to the Republic
country’s development direction. There are of Moldova brought back into the spotlight the
multiple challenges, and they are related to issue of strategic relations with the neighbours. In
diplomatic guidelines that have been disregarded short, what are the courses of action and the areas
(i.e. the scandal involving some of the Moldovan where the two countries could enhance their
embassies abroad), to rebuilding the image of the cooperation?
Republic of Moldova as a country that supports the I believe that any political dialogue could bear
territorial integrity of its neighbour, to promoting a fruits if it is based on sustained and effective
firm intention to find a solution to the conflict in economic cooperation. The roadmap signed in the
Transnistria, to the domestic political fighting fall of 2019 includes a list of priorities and bilateral
affecting institutional resilience, as well as to the projects that Romania and the Republic of Moldova
ability to promote the economic interests abroad. have committed to. This roadmap is very generous
The agenda of the Republic of Moldova is very concerning the objectives assumed on the political
substantial when it comes to challenges. front, on economic and energy infrastructure, as
Nevertheless, we have bigger problems when it well as on social and cultural cooperation. Not in
comes to solutions and the ability to promote these the least, I believe that Romania enjoys support
solutions for the benefit of our citizens. within the EU to assume more responsibility
To what extent does the Republic of Moldova towards the Republic of Moldova. We have
have the necessary external credibility to develop priorities and objectives set, there is a new
strong partnerships with the USA and the EU? government in Bucharest, and there is support in
Both the European Union and the United States of the Romanian Parliament for a sustained dialogue
America have promoted and supported the with Chișinău. Only one challenge remains: finding
Republic of Moldova becoming a coherent player our “true grit”.

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Vladimir SOCOR non-negotiable. On this basis, Moscow has also

ruled out any discussion about Crimea from the
agenda of the “Normandy” forum (Ukraine, Russia,
France, Germany). In that format, Berlin and Paris
have maintained all along that adding Crimea
would “clutter” the Normandy agenda and impede
“progress” toward conflict-resolution in Donbas
(see EDM, February 8).
Kyiv has, therefore, moved in recent months to
initiate an international Crimea Platform that
should continuously address these unremedied
problems. Ukraine aims to sharpen the focus of
international attention to Russia’s occupation of the
peninsula and broaden the scope of
countermeasures to the occupation. Kyiv seeks
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the international support in order to:
Ukrainian government are preparing to host a
summit of heads of state and government, aiming to •sustain the existing Crimea-related sanctions
mobilize a more effective international response to and raise their costs to Russia, with further
Russia’s seizure of Crimea from Ukraine. The sanctions for continuing unlawful actions;
summit is planned to inaugurate the “Crimea •maintain intact Ukraine’s titles of sovereignty
Platform,” a multi-level framework for devising to the peninsula and the corresponding
actions that would raise the costs of Russia’s Ukrainian exclusive maritime economic zone;
occupation and contradict Moscow’s thesis about •uphold freedom of international navigation in
the irreversibility of its hold on the peninsula. The the Black Sea and Azov Sea;
summit event is set for August 23, back-to-back
with (but distinct from) the 30th anniversary of •draw attention to Russia’s militarization of
Ukraine’s national independence on August 24, in Crimea; and
Kyiv, in the presence of world leaders. •support the maintenance of threatened cultural
The United States government became the first to and religious identities of local Ukrainians and
endorse the Crimea Platform initiative and Crimean Tatars.
proselytize for it, without awaiting the outcome of In his recent interview with the US-based news
the Joseph Biden administration’s Ukraine policy outlet Axios, Ukrainian President Volodymyr
review. Addressing the United Nations Security Zelenskyy stated, “I asked my partners and Russia:
Council’s February 11 session, dedicated to Name the platform where Crimea is on the agenda.
Ukraine (see below), the US mission’s political Are you saying that we should give up on Crimea?
coordinator, Rodney Hunter, stated, “We welcome As president, I cannot afford this and do not want to
Ukraine’s Crimea Platform initiative and hope that and will never accept this” (President.gov.ua,
like-minded partners will consider joining February 1).
it” (Ukrinform, February 11). Zelenskyy had aired a preliminary version of his
The UN Security Council’s session, called at idea when addressing last September’s UN General
Russia’s request, marked the sixth anniversary of Assembly session. On that occasion, he suggested
the signing of the Minsk Two “agreement,” an creating an international diplomatic platform aimed
agenda that, by definition, excluded debating any at protecting the rights of Crimean inhabitants and,
Crimea-related issues. ultimately, the de-occupation of the peninsula
Seven years after Russia’s seizure of Crimea from (Ukrinform, September 23, 2020).
Ukraine, no international forum is mandated to Kyiv envisions the Crimea Platform as a
discuss this act of state-on-state aggression, nor the consultative and coordinating framework among
current political and military situation on the those countries and international institutions that
peninsula. Russia deems these issues closed and are willing to respond more effectively to Russia’s
occupation, with the ultimate goal of de-
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occupation. The current proposal is for the platform Russia initially took the position that “it would not
to hold meetings periodically at several levels: rule out participating” in Platform meetings in the
heads of state and government, ministers of foreign future. According to the foreign ministry’s
affairs, the inter-parliamentary level, as well as spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, Russia could
involving expert communities. All this suggests participate provided that the agenda includes the
institutionalizing the Crimea Platform for a resumption of water and electricity supplies from
continuous, long-haul effort by governments and mainland Ukraine to Crimea and the unblocking of
international organizations willing to participate. transportation routes to the peninsula (Segodnya,
The Ukrainian government has approached a December 8, 2020; RFE/RL, February 7, 2021).
number of countries and international organizations Ukraine, however, takes the position that water,
with requests to join the proposed Platform and electricity and transportation issues could only be
attend this year’s summit in Kyiv. Such requests discussed after Russia’s de-occupation of Crimea.
usually take the form of public announcements
from Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs NOTE: The article was first published in Eurasia
following official meetings and visits. First Deputy Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 25.
Foreign Minister Emine Dzhaparova is in charge of
coordinating this outreach. The addressees have
generally responded with a wait-and-see attitude
thus far.
President Zelenskyy asked German Chancellor
Angela Merkel to endorse the Crimea Platform,
according to the Ukrainian readout of their latest
telephone conversation. The readout of the
Chancellor’s Office, however, did not mention this
matter at all (President.gov.ua, Bundeskanzlerin.de,
January 15).
The French ambassador in Kyiv, Etienne de
Poncins, said (when queried) that Ukrainian
diplomats have discussed this issue with him
several times, but he and Paris need more clarity
about the actual purposes of the proposed Platform
(Interfax-Ukraine, February 1).
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe’s (OSCE) current chair, Ann Linde of
Sweden, has also demurred by asking for “more
information about this platform” when questioned
(Ukraiynska Pravda, January 20). She did not
mention the near-certainty of Russia using its right
of veto against OSCE’s participation in the Crimea
Platform.
According to official press releases, Turkey has
hinted at its willingness to join the Platform
following President Recep Tayyp Erdoğan’s and
Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s meetings
with their Ukrainian counterparts, Zelenskyy and
Dmytro Kuleba, respectively (Daily Sabah, October
16, 2020). Although Turkey has not adopted
economic sanctions against Russia, the Turkish
president and government have repeatedly declared
that they do not recognize the annexation of
Crimea, ruled out recognizing it in the future, and
pledged to assist in maintaining the Crimean Tatar
identity.

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THE WESTERN BALKANS

Professor Dr. Zlatko HADŽIDEDIĆ - the founder introduce free market capitalism around the world
and director of the Center for Nationalism Studies and, together with it, the nation-state as the form of
in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina - shared from his state within which this model of capitalism was
insight on nationalism as an ideology and its granted monopolistic status. So, a single global
implementation in the Balkans, in the interview market practically existed since the decline of
below. mercantilism and rise of liberalism. Or, in other
words, since the death of traditional empires and
Nationalism was at the heart of the birth of the nation-state. Therefore, the nation-state,
Enlightenment notion of liberal democracy. Now, together with nationalism, was a historical product
it is often viewed with a negative connotation and of liberal ideology, accompanied with the principles
linked to concepts such as chauvinism, of free market and democracy, implemented
xenophobia, authoritarianism and even fascism. through a series of so-called bourgeois revolutions.
Why? What is your definition of nationalism for As such, it served primarily specific interests of
the current times? capitalist elites, to make capitalist society
sustainable and long-lasting by creating a social
Zlatko Hadžidedić: Interestingly, my professors glue between the rich and the poor, engaging the
at the London School of Economics and Political masses through the imagined community of the
Science (LSE) were very strict in the denial of any nation. Bridging that gap without actually changing
link between nationalism and liberalism, when I the structure of society became the paramount task
submitted my PhD thesis on this very topic, some for the system in trying to preserve its mechanism
twenty years ago. Some of them even claimed that I for incessant exploitation of labour and limitless
must have been “crazy”, since I saw a connection accumulation of capital. The system had to
between these two. For, allegedly, liberalism was introduce a social glue tailored to conceal, but also
“absolutely individualistic”, whereas nationalism to cement, the actual polarisation of society. This
was “absolutely collectivistic”. However, in glue was designed as a concept of absolute social
historical reality, nationalism is a discourse that unity, based on the assumption that the entire
was generated within the broader context of population, both the exploiting and the exploited,
capitalism, that is, as part of capitalism’s dominant was born with equal rights, common interests, and
ideology, liberalism. Liberalism’s doctrine of self- common identity. This concept of absolute social
determination of peoples served as a global unity was assumed to form an entirely new entity,
umbrella under which particular nationalisms were the nation. The nation has successfully played the
developed in their respective targeted locations. By designated role of social glue within the capitalist
spreading the doctrine of self-determination of system until a couple of years ago. However, the
peoples, liberalism undermined and eventually neoliberal policy, from the 1980s onwards, widened
dismantled both traditional feudal empires and their the gap between the rich and the poor to such an
early capitalist mercantilist successors, so as to extent that classical nationalism, connected to
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democratic principles, could not conceal it sustainable on the intra-state level, serving as a glue
anymore, so that the system itself has again become
between the rich and the poor, while maintaining
unsustainable. What was needed was nationalism in their hierarchical positions, on the inter-state level
a new, more robust, authoritarian form, and its nationalism serves as a geopolitical instrument in
current resurgence is thus a direct social the hands of global capitalist elites to generate
consequence of neoliberalism, as much as conflicts wherever it turns out to be financially
globalisation served as neoliberalism’s acceptablebeneficial for them. It is easy to prove that all major
public image. At the same time, the resurgence of wars in the 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries have been
nationalism in an authoritarian form is an generated by nationalism. Of course, in the
announcement of a new phase in capitalism’s background, they have all been fought for interests
development, the phase of hyper-capitalism, in of global capitalist elites, but on the public level
which further, unlimited extraction of capital will
they have always been interpreted as wars for
be protected by radicalised nationalism articulated
‘national interests’. On the global geopolitical level,
through authoritarian regimes and populist nationalism was also the main tool for
methods. In this context, chauvinism and transformation of the entire world, for dissolution
xenophobia, authoritarianism, populism and of large mercantilist empires and their
fascism are all to be interpreted only as more robust
transformation into a number of nation-states. That
forms of nationalism, rather than some inherently was a perfect tool in the hands of the British
distinct phenomena. Empire, to destroy all competing empires through
‘national revolutions’, without having fought real
Yoram Hazony, an Israeli philosopher, Bible wars against them, imposing simultaneously the
scholar and political theorist, wrote in his book system of global free market.
“The Virtue of Nationalism” that nationalism is a
virtuous idea of the world, the middle ground Is there a relation, or a link, in your opinion,
between tribalism (the enemy of peace) and between nationalism and the concept of ethnically
imperialism (the enemy of freedom) - an exclusive territories? How could the two key
absolutely current model to oppose globalism. principles of international law - territorial
What do think of this statement? integrity and self-determination - be reconciled?
This statement is totally a-historical. Tribalism, as The concept of ethnically exclusive territories
a pre-modern form of social relations, clearly would not exist without nationalism as its frame.
precedes capitalism, while imperialism – just like This concept was simply irrelevant prior to the
nationalism and globalism – is one of political emergence of nationalism. In all pre-modern, pre-
forms in which capitalism was manifested in nationalist periods of history, legitimacy for
different periods. Also, tribalism is not an articulate conquest of particular territories was to be found in
political ideology, it is rather a structure of relations the power of the conquerors. With nationalism,
between social units in pre-modern, pre-capitalist creation of ethnically exclusive territories –
societies. So, it cannot rightfully be compared to depicted as ‘national territories’ – has become the
imperialism, globalism and nationalism, as three ultimate source of legitimacy for both the creation
modern political ideologies which served as tools of new states and conquests of other states’
for promotion of global capitalist interests. Besides, territories. Indeed, there are nationalisms which do
as I have already said, globalism is a product of not insist on ethnic exclusivity, but rather on
neoliberalism, and so is the contemporary, robust, homogeneity through multi-ethnic assimilation;
authoritarian nationalism, whereas classical, 19th- however, even homogeneity achieved by
century nationalism was a product of classical assimilation leads to yet another form of
liberalism. So, I think that the author has missed so exclusivity. As for the principles you mention, it
many points, historically and methodologically. should be noted that territorial integrity is a key
principle of international law, whereas self-
Can nationalism drive geopolitics and lead to determination is rather a key principle of Anglo-
wars or conflicts? Could it be the root cause of a American geopolitics; in other words, relies on
conflict? Or does it simply play a role in arbitrary application of foreign policy influence.
exacerbating conflicts? Take the Versailles Conference as a paradigm of
this would-be conflict, a conflict on two totally
The former is one of nationalism’s basic purposes.
different levels: it was totally against international
Just as nationalism makes capitalist society
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law that the victorious powers – Great Britain, the can see in the Greater Serbian programme, called
USA, and France – dismantle the defeated Austro- “Načertanije”, up to the 1860s Orthodox Christians
Hungarian Empire; however, as a bypass, they and Catholics in Bosnia perceived themselves as
introduced the principle of ‘self-determination of Bosniaks, rather than Serbs and Croats. However,
peoples’ in order to dismantle the defeated state. this programme sought to redefine the former as
Paradoxically, none of the newly created nation- Serbs, and eventually bring them under control of
states had ever fought an actual war for ‘self- the Serbian state. A similar pattern was applied to
determination’ – instead, they were ‘self- Montenegrins, who were also proclaimed Serbs,
determined’ by these three victorious powers. Now, despite the fact that they had created their own state
how can we speak of ‘self-determination’ as a in the former Ottoman territory, parallel to the
principle of international law? It has been Serbian one. This has remained a problem in
introduced as a principle to circumvent Montenegrin politics to the present day. The same
international law, and it has retained this quality. happened to today’s Macedonians, due to their
Orthodox religion, although both Serbia and
What are the characteristics that nationalism Bulgaria fought for decades to impose their
assumes in the Balkans? Can it influence the respective national identities on Macedonians. Such
current and future geopolitical perspectives of the attempts have not ceased within some Bulgarian
Balkan states, with particular reference to multi- nationalist circles, who still claim that Macedonians
ethnic states, such as Macedonia and Bosnia- are in fact Bulgarians, and enjoy significant support
Herzegovina? Do you believe that the future of all in London and Paris to cede the eastern part of
Balkans states lies within the European Union? Macedonia to a Greater Bulgaria. This pattern of
national identification on the basis of religious
In the Balkans, just as elsewhere, national identity was spreading to other groups as well, so as
identities are a product of geopolitical games of to assimilate all Catholics into a Croatian national
relevant powers, and these are commonly Great identity, and so on. According to the Greater
Britain and France, whose general 19th-century Serbian programme, all Muslims in Bosnia, Serbia
strategy was to dismantle the competing empires – and Montenegro, were to be perceived as ‘Turks’
instead of fighting wars against them – through and were projected to be exterminated or expelled
nationalist movements and revolutions. At the to Turkey. During the communist Yugoslavia, there
beginning of the 19th century, this area was were some efforts to assimilate them into either
controlled by two empires, Habsburg Empire and Serbian or Croatian national identity, but eventually
Ottoman Empire, both of which were defined along they were recognized as a distinct ethnic group and
the lines of their dominant religions – the Habsburg have recently been named ‘Bosniaks’, which is,
Empire was a de facto successor of the Catholic again, a historical fallacy because this name refers
Holy Roman Empire, while the Ottoman Empire to the entire population of Bosnia, irrespectively of
defined itself as a successor of the Islamic their religious identity. To put it briefly, the
Caliphate. Britain and France, as their competitors problem in Bosnia and Macedonia is not the
and adversaries, realized that their strategy of existence of a multitude of ethnic groups – there are
instigating nationalist movements and revolutions so many ethnic groups in the United States of
would function best in the Balkans if nationalist America, and they still function as part of the
movements against these two empires were to be American nation. The problem is the pattern of
defined along religious lines, as a religious translation of religious identities into national ones,
insurgency of Orthodox Christians against the rule regardless of where the territories in which distinct
of an Islamic empire, in today’s Serbia, Greece, and religious groups live are actually located. For,
Bulgaria. Amongst South Slavs, Serbian national nations, by definition, seek to establish their own
identity was thus derived from Orthodox states. Try to apply this pattern to any multi-
Christianity; inversely, Orthodox Christians were religious country in the world, and it will quickly
identified as Serbs. The nascent Serbian state, as fall apart, probably in a civil war. This pattern does
the main pillar of the Anglo-French influence in the not permit formation of national identities and
Balkans, thus adopted a model of anti-Ottoman and nation-states on the civic or cultural or historical
anti-Habsburg expansion by assimilating Orthodox grounds: a national identity is not permitted to
Christians in other parts of the Balkans into the develop within a particular territory despite its
Serbian nation, with a prospect of annexation of distinct history and culture, and even already-
their territories into a Greater Serbian state. As we existing statehood; instead, territory and statehood
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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

must be dissolved if there are different religious

groups within, and new nation-states must be
created so as to embrace respective religious groups
in their entirety. This pattern therefore generates
permanent instability, which is going to last until
the pattern itself is dismantled. The perverse idea of
attainment of a Greater Serbia, Greater Croatia,
Greater Bulgaria, or Greater Albania, promoted and
supported by the British diplomacy to the present
moment, shall never create any degree of stability
in the Balkans, but rather permanent instability and
occasional bloodshed. And that is precisely what
the British foreign policy has been trying to achieve
in the Balkans since the beginning of the 19th
century, labelling it ‘Balkanization’. Since the
European Union has never opposed these
geopolitical designs and games, there are enough
reasons to believe that the European Union does not
want the Balkans to be its part and that,
accordingly, the Balkan countries should not take
the European Union as a desirable framework for
their own future. The future for the Balkan
countries lies in turning to their own interests, so as
to promote stability and prosperity for their region.
As long as we live in the world of nation-states, this
is possible only through rejection of the pattern of
religiously based nationalisms and development of
civic national identities, as the least bad option.

NOTE: Interview republished with the permission

of World Geostrategic Insights. Original Source:
https://wgi.world/nationalism-capitalism-and-
geopolitics-interview-with-zlatko-had-idedi/.

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Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021 www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro

THE MIDDLE EAST

With a new US presidency, an increasingly reconfiguration – as far as the autocracy,

assertive Saudi crown prince, unprecedented Arab- individualism and despotism of the governing
Israeli peace agreements, and a particularly system. However, are the Saudi and Emirati
complex Saudi-Iran dynamic, British author societies ready and willing to agree to the
Christopher M. Davidson shares his views on the dictatorial return to the former imamates,
current and future state of Middle East politics in sheikhdoms and sultanates, even under the pretext
the interview offered to Geostrategic Pulse of social, economic and moral modernization?
magazine.
It definitely seems the case that the vast majority
Geostrategic Pulse: In the political geography of of Saudi and Emirati citizens (and in particular
the Middle East, the regional and global almost all young citizens) are fully supportive of
evolutions following the Arab Spring have turned the new autocracies. They see these regimes as the
the "oil monarchies" from the Arabic-Persian best bet of properly reforming oil dependent
Gulf into very dynamic and polymorphic strategic economic systems, and (in Saudi Arabia’s case)
actors on the political, military and security stage challenging religious and traditional institutions
of this region. From this point of view, to what that have historically restricted their social
extent can we ascertain the theory that in this part freedoms.
of the Middle East we are currently witnessing a
shift in its identity paradigm and the establishment With specific reference to Saudi Arabia, it is well
of a new and genuine pole of power and known that the birth and remanence of the Saudi
influence, equally important and challenging to state is based on the sacred pact signed two
the regional system and to its relationship to the centuries ago between the Muslim Salafi
outside world? Wahhabism and the leader of the Al-Sa'ud tribe.
Since the Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman
Christopher Davidson: To some extent, it’s did not hesitate to take actions, to what extent do
certainly true that the Gulf oil monarchies have you believe that the price of “modernization”
become increasingly assertive international actors, could actually mean the undermining of the very
willing to intervene in a range of conflicts, core fundaments of the monarchy and the
especially in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings. Wahhabi state?
They were concerned with the prospect of new
regimes or even democracies forming in once Time will tell, but there is no doubt that the Saudi
friendly states; or in some cases saw the prospect of crown prince has gone much further than any
removing old enemies once and for all (Gaddafi in previous Saudi rulers in this respect. In the space
Libya, Assad in Syria). That said, for the most part of just a few years he has essentially stripped Saudi
their actions and interventions seem to have been Arabia’s most powerful clerics of their remaining
undertaken with Western permission and powers, either by co-opting them or removing
assistance, most notably in Libya and Syria (and them. In turn, this has effectively brought to an end
more recently in Yemen). the centuries-old ruling pact between the Al-Saud
and the descendants and followers of Al-Wahhab.
In "From Sheikhs to Sultanism" you approach Undoubtedly there will at some point be resistance,
"the reformist revival" which, notably in Saudi but it seems unlikely that at this stage many Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates brings forth citizens would join forces with ultra-conservative
two new important icons - crown prince traditionalists.
Muhammad Bin Salman (Saudi Arabia) in
Riyadh and crown prince Muhammad Bin Zayed The 41st summit of the Gulf Cooperation
(the United Arab Emirates) in Abu Dhabi. Many Council that took place in January 2021, in the
commentators see in them archetypes of a Saudi city of Al-Ula, ended the three-and-a-half-
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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

year long expulsion of Qatar. It was accepted back in. Do you believe this could happen?
into the organization, with the pledge that all
countries "remain united to face any threats If Trump had been re-elected, I think it would
aimed at one or all of the members of the Gulf have been almost certain that Saudi Arabia would
Cooperation Council". have eventually joined in. With Biden in power,
To what extent may we venture to believe in a however, the crown prince is more likely to drag
real reconciliation between the ruling families and his heels, as there will probably be less pressure
in the willingness of the six member countries to from the White House (this particular, economy-
jointly achieve something they have not been able driven peace process was, after all, a Trump era
in the 40 years of existence of the origination? initiative). Moreover, the crown prince will prefer
not to risk antagonizing certain sections of his
It’s possible that there will be genuine progress in population at a time when he needs to initiate
rebuilding and making the GCC even stronger, enormous and sweeping domestic economic and
especially under Biden’s presidency. However, social reforms.
Biden may only be in power for four years, and
there is no guarantee that his successor would The Arab-Israeli relationship normalization is,
similarly promote reconciliation. In this scenario, in its legal basis, an issue of national sovereignty.
future US presidents (perhaps Trump again, or At the same time, an equally old and influential
someone similar such as Pence or Pompeo) might concept continues to be used in the inventory of
prefer to ‘take sides’ with individual GCC members slogans and in the traditional rhetoric of the Arab
such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. More regimes, even if only at the level of declarations of
generally, it’s also unclear to what extent Saudi "good-will" - "Joint Arab Action". Saudi Arabia
Arabia and the UAE have fully ‘forgiven’ Qatar for has been, ever since 2002, the patron of an "Arab
its long-running support of Islamist organizations Peace Initiative" that stipulates Arab recognition
and—as they claim—more extremist organizations of the State of Israel and establishment of
such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. relations with the country, in exchange for the
establishment of a Palestinian state within the
The new American administration, led by the borders in 1967 with Eastern Jerusalem as capital
Democrat Joe Biden, was perceived in the Middle and the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab
East in general and in the Gulf in particular with territories. How feasible and realistic do you see a
feelings ranging from hope to concern. With form of coordination among all six countries in
regard to this, and looking at the Middle-Eastern the Gulf Cooperation Council, and with the other
policies evolutions and expected changes, do you six Arab nations that have direct relations with
tend to see the glass half full or half empty, Israel (the EAU, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt
progress or disillusionment? and Jordan) or those maintaining low profile
contacts with the Israelis, with a view to unlock
It’s perhaps too early to predict, but so far the the Palestinian file and reach a positive solution
signs seem good. Biden has given strong signals to it? Even more so, since the Biden
that the destructive and long-running war in Yemen administration seems to be open to, and support
needs to come to an end, and he also seems keen to the "two state solution".
get Iran to return to the negotiating table. On the
other hand, however, many of Biden’s advisors and I think it’s certainly feasible, and under a Biden
colleagues are the same as those who worked with administration I think it’s more likely that such a
Obama, and many regional governments will be solution will be driven by diplomatic compromises
distrustful of US officials who ostensibly backed rather than Trump-like economic incentives.
the Muslim Brotherhood’s government in Egypt Undoubtedly now, compared to 2002, there are a
and - so it seems - sponsored and facilitated a range substantial number of Arab states that already have
of CIA ‘shadow wars’ stretching from North Africa de facto diplomatic and economic relations with
to the Levant. Israel, and on this basis there is much less
reputational risk for Arab governments in formally
Two of the six Arab monarchies in the Gulf - recognizing Israel and moving forward with a two
The EAU and Bahrain - have joined the state solution.
"Abraham Peace Process" to normalize bilateral
relations with Israel, and the odds seem to be that Joe Biden has also inherited from the previous
this could go on, with the Saudi Kingdom joining administration the Iranian "nuclear

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Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021 www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro

file" (JCPOA), which is subject of a media frenzy they can offer Tel Aviv an extremely
with all sorts of pros and cons. On the 6th of comprehensive and potentially lasting agreement
January, the USA has decided to revoke the with the majority of Arab states, thus cutting off the
(Trump administration’s) decision to include the support base for groups such as Hamas. On the
Houthi rebels in Yemen on the list of foreign other hand, however, it’s also possible that this was
terrorist organizations. The decision was an ill-judged media response and as such should not
confirmed by the State Department only one day be interpreted as being a future Biden
after President Trump stated that, out of administration bargaining chip.
humanitarian reasons, he no longer supported the
campaign led by Saudi Arabia in its proxy wars
against Iran and Yemen. How do you interpret
these signals? Good-will gestures to soften the
position of the Iranians considering the upcoming
presidential elections? As a shift in the American
approach of the cooperation policy with the Saudi
monarchy, or just an act in a multiple act regional
play?
Biden’s Iran policy is undoubtedly complex, as on
the one hand he needs to keep on board key US
partners in the region (most notably Israel, Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE), but on the other hand he is
keen to rescue the Obama administration’s key
foreign policy achievement. In this context it is
most likely that Biden will try to play at both ends,
guaranteeing Saudi and UAE security (ie.
safeguarding their territories from Houthi or Iranian
missile attacks), while at the same time reviving the
US’ role in the JCPOA and ensuring that Saudi
Arabia and the UAE withdraw and effectively
concede Yemen to Iran-linked proxies. It’s
possible too, that Biden will try to find some sort of
compromise agreement in Lebanon, where Iran-
linked groups (most notably Hezbollah) currently
hold the upper hand, while Saudi and Western-
linked allies (most notably the Hariri family) are
presently embattled.
On the 6th of February, during a media
appearance, the secretary of state Antony Blinken
stated that depending on regional evolutions, the
USA might reconsider its (Donald Trump's)
recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Golan
Heights - "over time if the situation were to
change in Syria, that’s something we look at, but
we are nowhere near that”. To this, the Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu promptly
and clearly responded that “Golan Heights will
remain forever a part of the State of Israel.”
Can this foretell clouds in the US-Israel
relations, as during Obama's mandate?
It’s certainly possible that the Biden
administration might try to pressure Israel into
conceding the Golan Heights, especially if they feel
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www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Michael RÜHLE is the Head of the Hybrid Challenges and Energy Security Section in NATO’s Emerging Security
Challenges Division. Previously he was Head, Speechwriting, in NATO’s Political Affairs Division, and Senior Political
Advisor in the NATO Secretary General’s Policy Planning Unit. In these positions, he wrote speeches and articles for six
Secretaries General.
Mr. Rühle has published widely on international security issues and is a frequent speaker on NATO affairs. He is an Honorary
Ancien of the NATO Defense College and a recipient of the Star of Lithuanian Diplomacy and the Bene Merito Medal
bestowed by the Republic of Poland.
Iulia Monica OEHLER-ŞINCAI has a PhD in economics, specialization international economic relations, scientific
researcher at the Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy since March 2008.
Ms. Oehler-Şincai studied at the Faculty of International Economic Relations, Bucharest University of Economic Studies.
During October 2010-September 2012 she was a post-doctoral researcher in a training program for elite scholars (SPODE),
with the research topic trade and investment flows between the EU and the BRICS. She visited many research institutions
abroad and participated in scientific events in Romania and abroad (Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland,
Hungary, Bulgaria, China).
Jiří ŠEDIVÝ is the Chief Executive of the European Defece Agency (EDA) since May 2020. He was appointed by the
Steering Board on 5 March 2020 following a recommendation by the Head of the Agency, Josep Borrell.
Mr Šedivý brought with him extensive experience in the defence domain, having served as Defence Minister of the Czech
Republic (2006-2007), Deputy Defence Minister (2010-2012), NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and
Planning (2007-2010) and Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic to NATO (2012-2019). He also was Deputy
Minister for European Affairs of the Czech Republic (2007) and special representative for resilience and new threats at the
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019-2020).
Monika HOHLMEIER was elected as a Member of the European Parliament in 2009. She is the current chair of the
Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) and serves additionally as a member of the Committee on Budget (BUDG) as well
as a substitute member of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). She was Co-rapporteur for the
Special Committee on Terrorism until 2018. Before joining the European Parliament, Monika Hohlmeier served as State
Secretary in the Bavarian Ministry for Education and Culture between 1993 and 1998 followed by her announcement as
Bavarian Minister for Education and Culture between 1998 and 2005.
Achim HURRELMANN is a Professor of Political Science. He is Co-Director (with Joan DeBardeleben) of the Centre for
European Studies (CES), a Carleton University Research Centre focused on European affairs. He is cross-appointed to the
Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (EURUS).
Achim’s scholarly work focuses on the politics of the European Union. He is particularly interested in political discourses
about European integration (in parliaments, the media, and among citizens), democracy and legitimacy in the EU, as well as
Canada-Europe relations.
Ambassador Ion I. JINGA is a career diplomat and has been working for the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs since
1992. He served as Deputy Head of Mission and Chargé d'affaires a.i. at the Mission of Romania to the European Union in
Brussels, and was Director General for the European Union within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was served as the
Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Romania to the Kingdom of Belgium, and to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland. Since 2015 he has been the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations.

Alexandru GHIŞA is a historian and diplomat. He took his doctoral degree in history at “Babeş-Bolyai” University, on the
subject “The beginning of the diplomatic relations between Romania and Hungary, 1918-1921”.
He was a teacher of history and geography and a main researcher at the Center for Transylvanian Studies, Cluj-Napoca and
served as a diplomat in Budapest and Stockholm. Gişa was a diplomatic counselor in the Department of Diplomatic
Archives and associated professor at “Babeş-Bolyai” University, Faculty of History, Department of International Relations
and Contemporary History.
Angela GRĂMADĂ is the President of the Association “Experts for Security and Global Affairs”, Romania.
She has a PhD in Political Science, specialized on International Relations at the National University of Political Science and
Public Administration in Bucharest.

Vladimir SOCOR is a Senior Fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation and its flagship publication, Eurasia
Daily Monitor (1995 to date), where he writes analytical articles on a daily basis. An internationally recognized expert on the
former Soviet-ruled countries in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, he covers Russian and Western
policies, focusing on energy, regional security issues, Russian foreign affairs, secessionist conflicts, and NATO policies and
programs.
Zlatko HADŽIDEDIĆ is the Founder and Director of the Center for Nationalism Studies, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. He
was Associate Professor at the American University in the Emirates in Dubai, UAE, Assistant Professor at the Sarajevo
School of Science and Technology, Bosnia-Herzegovina. He received a PhD degree from the University of Sarajevo, Faculty
of Political Science, an MPhil degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science and his MA from the
Central European University, Budapest.
Christopher M. DAVIDSON has long-standing research interests in the comparative politics of the Gulf states, and was
previously a reader at Durham University and an assistant professor at Zayed University, UAE.

Full biographies of the authors can be found on the Geostrategic Pulse site.

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Geostrategic Pulse, No 284, January - February 2021 www.pulsulgeostrategic.ro

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