0720 Macgregor.

pgs 1/8/00 5:06 PM Page 25

USS Coronado leaving

Pearl Harbor for
RIMPAC ’98.

Fleet Imaging Command Group, Pacific (August Sigur)

Command and Control
for Joint Strategic Actions
By D O U G L A S A. M A C G R E G O R

A
decade after the dissolution of the War- the validity of existing single-service doctrine, or-
saw Pact, and following a series of de- ganization, and tactics. Thus the United States
fense policy reviews, the most critical risks wasting the opportunity to make significant
security question remains unanswered: gains on rival militaries. A revolution in military
What kinds of forces, strategies, and resource com- affairs (RMA) will occur whether defense leaders
mitments are needed for the future? This is no ac- encourage it or not. The choice is whether to be
cident. A 30 percent reduction in the defense the beneficiary or victim.
budget since 1989 and a reluctance on the part of Such a revolution is evidenced in potential
the services to adopt any plan that fails to reaffirm enemies—nations, failed states, and subnational
their traditional roles and force structures com- groups—dispossessed by modernization and each
bine to obstruct meaningful change. In fact, the trying to acquire capabilities to strike decisively
budget topline imposed by defense reviews and with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Strate-
legislation has intensified interservice rivalry and gists must assume that future adversaries will pos-
prompted the senior military leadership to stress sess not only some form of WMD but precision-
guided munitions along with electronic
intelligence and satellite imagery provided by
Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA, is chief of the Joint Operations third powers.
Center (J-5) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 25

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0720 Macgregor.pgs 1/8/00 5:07 PM Page 26

■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

Marines during LOE3,

Urban Warrior.

2d Marine Division (Craig J. Shell)

Opponents will attempt to outpace the Amer- mind, this piece builds on concepts introduced in
ican response to their capabilities and present the the author’s Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for
United States with a strategic fait accompli. More- Landpower in the 21st Century and argues for a top-
over, by threatening a war of attrition or the use down transformation of the joint force land com-
of WMD to avenge battlefield successes by the ponent command (JFLCC) concept.2 The idea is to
Armed Forces, enemies will seek to eliminate po- take advantage of new technology, operational
litical resolve. This strategy deserves our attention. concepts, and warfighting organizations to more
Part of the solution involves projecting rapidly project and jointly employ ground forces.
ground forces into the unified commands much By building on experience with Army and Marine
more rapidly and with greater mobility, fire- Corps structures, the changes outlined here are
power, and force protection. Fundamental change designed to achieve a flatter, less hierarchical com-
in the way ground forces organize to deploy and mand structure that can reduce the time for
fight is essential to cope with these new dynam- ground elements to begin combat operations. This
ics. Army ground forces must become more expe- transformation involves establishing joint opera-
ditionary. Marine ground forces must accept that tional command and control (C2) structures for
an island hopping campaign is now no more deploying tactical ground forces that are subordi-
probable than a defense of the Fulda Gap. Both nate to the regional unified commands.3
forces will have to cooperate closely with each
other and with airpower to exploit America’s Adjusting to New Dynamics
growing air and space capabilities. Landpower At the height of their military glory, the
must become an amalgamation of Army and Ma- Spartans sent a deputation to the oracle at Delphi
rine capabilities within a more agile, operational and demanded arrogantly: “Can anything harm
joint framework.1 Sparta?” The oracle answered, “Yes, luxury.”4 To
Changes in strategy have always derived from the same question about the Armed Forces, the
the ability to fight new kinds of war. With that in oracle might answer, “Yes, bureaucracy.” Ever
since the Soviet collapse gave the United States
unprecedented military dominance, the ratio of
command, control, and support to fighting forces
has actually grown without any increase in

26 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99

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Macgregor

combat power or flexibility where it is most from rapid deployment, ground forces must be able to
needed—on the battlefield. This is interesting be- conduct offensive, defensive, or peace enforcement oper-
cause the opposite is true for American business. ations almost on arrival in regional unified commands.
■ Permitting conflicts to drag on rather than rap-
Corporate headquarters continue to shrink. This
idly crushing an opponent risks failure. The prolifera-
paring of top-heavy management has helped pro-
tion of WMD and the RMA technology to employ them
ductivity climb to record highs while exhibiting suggest the danger of delay.6
historically unique flexibility. Downsizing, ■ The newer the technology or its application, the
reengineering, outsourcing, and decentralization more important it becomes to design its use with the
have cut corporate staffs and the functions con- world in mind. Single service, theater-specific remedies
centrated at headquarters. Information technol- are features of the past.
ogy has reduced meetings and created function- ■ The direction of the current RMA points to a
based organizations that share critical data. system of systems that encircles the earth. It will be crit-
Rosabeth Moss Kanter of the Harvard Busi- ical for ground forces to integrate seamlessly into the
ness School characterizes the private sector’s re- global strike capabilities this system will make possible
both to exploit its potential and to guarantee the safety
sponse to change in the strategic environment of
of those forces.
business in World Class. Her words suggest new
directions for the way ground forces can be com- The ability of CINCs to gain quick access to
manded and controlled. ready ground forces and to their command and
control operationally and tactically will thus be
Across industries, forces for change are similar:
decisive. In practice this means that Army and
industry consolidation, changing regulation, new
Marine ground forces must be prepared to deploy
technology, more demanding customers, and pressures
2d Marine Division (Craig J. S ell)

on a telephone call. Given the reduced size of the

for lower cost, higher quality,
active Army component since 1991 and the re-
greater speed. The responses
in Force XXI the Army is are also similar: a search for
quirement for rapid force projection, these points
underline the need for a C 2 unanimity which
concentrating on developing new markets (often interna- transcends service lines. Thus the Army and Ma-
tionally), acceleration of new
a tactical C2 structure from rine Corps should look hard at streamlining their
product development, and im-
operational level C2 within a joint framework.
the ground up plementation of a new organi-
In Force XXI the Army is concentrating on
zational model, one that com-
developing a tactical C 2 structure from the
prises fewer layers, faster processes, greater use of
ground up, taking for granted all existing nodes
teams, employees educated to solve problems au-
and echelons.7 Experience in Germany and Korea
tonomously, deeper relationships. . . . Change is a
reinforces a preference for theater-specific Army
matter not of failure but of success. The most change
command and control structures. However, it is
is occurring in the most successful companies.
no longer possible to limit the scope of Army C2
Military progress tends to follow civilian to predetermined locations and narrow tactical
progress, though at a considerable distance. One missions. Deployments since the mid-1980s show
reason for the lag is that in military culture the the need for a more global approach.
burden of proof falls on the advocate. Thus
changes in the nature of warfare must be widely Top-Down versus Bottom-Up
recognized within the military in order for inno- Jointness exists when services develop
vation to occur. In 1929, for example, there was mechanisms—operational and tactical structures,
still no sense in America’s professional military processes, and expertise—for bridging service dif-
that World War I had really changed anything. ferences and extracting strategic value from in-
Opponents of mechanization and defenders of terservice cooperation. In this sense, joint C2 is
the horse cavalry even suggested that “An unfed defined as a joint system of command links/
motor stops; a starved horse takes days to die.”5 nodes integrating maneuver forces and strike as-
While there is not space here to debate how sets, informed by a variety of sensors such as dig-
much has changed, it is possible against the back- ital and other communication and data links.
drop of Panama, southwest Asia, Somalia, Haiti, Viewed as a unified system, this conceptual
and Bosnia to offer some observations about the structure provides information for planning and
direction of change as it pertains to American executing coordinated “all arms” operations. 8
ground forces. The critical step, however, is to create joint C2
■ For the foreseeable future, rapid response to structures on the operational level that help
crises around the world will be in much greater demand warfighting CINCs respond quickly to events
than a static territorial defense of central Europe or within their regions. The question is how.
northeast Asia.
■ How quickly a force can deploy is as important as
how much force to assemble. To obtain a real advantage

Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 27

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■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

One approach to joint C 2 architecture for know what is important, more information will
ground forces is to borrow from the experience of not help. Still, provided the C2 structure is simple
naval forces, whose global focus led to a different in organization, today’s technology will deliver
C2 evolution. They have tended toward a top- the information. This is a critical reason why
down rather than bottom-up approach on the using the close/deep/rear framework as the con-
strategic and operational levels. This has bridged ceptual basis for C2 organization on the opera-
the gap between an efficient global command tional level offers significant advantages. Each
and control structure and tactical autonomy by military decisionmaker (close/deep/rear) has an
stressing functionally-based organizations and area of authority distinct from the others (modu-
modularity. This is the approach of the Marine larity), commands pass in only one direction (hi-
expeditionary force (MEF), the service’s principal erarchy), and each decisionmaker determines
warfighting organization for large contingencies. within the higher commander’s intent how to ex-
Unlike the Army Corps structure so essential ecute commands (operational autonomy).10
to division warfighting, an MEF can vary in size Extrapolating from the MAGTF structure to
and composition from 5,000 to 50,000. At the the operational level suggests a JFLCC model with
heart of this expeditionary structure is the Marine close/deep/rear functionality. The three-star com-
air-ground task force (MAGTF), which provides a manding a structure based on either the Army
microcosmic model for joint C 2 on the opera- Corps or Marine MEF has an independent mobile
tional level for both Army and Marine forces. headquarters element and three autonomous,
The building-block approach to MAGTF or- mobile headquarters under general officers. For
ganization is based on a simple formula that reasons that will become clear, in the notional
organizes task forces into discrete command and JFLCC structure outlined here major generals
control elements. At the top is the command ele- were selected to command the close/deep/rear
ment for planning and execution. The three sub- headquarters. Depending on the crisis, conflict,
ordinate C2 elements are one to direct ground or peacetime mission, one or all of these head-
combat operations, one for air-to-air combat, quarters could be deployed. The number of offi-
close air support, air reconnaissance, electronic cers and other ranks assigned to all three ele-
warfare, and control of aircraft and missile sys- ments could total as few as 500. Ideally, these
tems, and one providing the full range of support headquarters are configured for rapid deployabil-
functions from sea bases aboard naval shipping or ity with strategic airlift that includes wheeled
from temporary bases ashore. In addition, the armor, helicopters, and satellite communications.
modular structure lends itself to rapid expansion Within this framework one major general
by adding forces to the core units of each ele- within JFLCC commands the close combat forces
ment.9 A joint C2 system on the operational level deployed to it. Such formations could consist of
could mirror this simple, discrete, and modular Army or Marine Corps armor, airmobile infantry,
approach. However, it would have to consistently or attack helicopters in support of the close fight.
provide useful real-time information in a form In some actions, for instance, Marine infantry
that helps the commander recognize key events, might cooperate closely with Army armored and
formulate responses, and transmit them to subor- helicopter reconnaissance. In practice, this joint
dinates in time for implementation. This is be- commander supplants the Army or Marine divi-
cause in addition to moving thousands of subor- sion commander and headquarters who otherwise
dinate entities and striking targets, land force would have to deploy from the continental United
commanders must deal with a thinking enemy States (CONUS). It should be transparent from the
who is reacting to their every move. strategic and operational levels whether the tacti-
In this setting the opportunity for informa- cal maneuver formation is Army or Marine.
tion overload cannot be overstated. Conse- A second major general commands deep
quently, the need for functional simplicity as combat operations. The term deep in this context
seen in MAGTF is enormous. Masses of informa- can be misleading. Time, target, and effect rather
tion flowing through sensors and aggregated by than merely space actually separate the deep and
computer power into pre-formatted messages will close fights. Further, deep in land warfare is oper-
not reach the critical points of authority in time ational, not strategic in the sense of strategic air
if the complexity of the command and control operations. This is not to suggest that precision
structure impedes its flow. None of this is to sug- weapons and dramatically increased firepower
gest that new information technology will pro- from rocket artillery and airpower do not create
vide answers that have eluded commanders in the need for a joint C2 structure on the ground
the past. If the commander does not already that can exploit these capabilities. On the con-
trary, for ground force maneuver to succeed, the
means to employ strike assets are critical. Sophis-
ticated intelligence collection and targeting

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Macgregor

Sustainment operations offer rich opportu-

nity for joint C2 under the third major general in
the structure. Some weaponry and technology will
remain service-specific in the near term, but the
Army and the Marines can share logistics support
in such areas as cross-service equipment, supply
transportation, storage, transfer, port opening
services, prepositioning afloat, and over-the-shore
logistics. As seen during Desert Storm, rationaliz-
ing sustainment operations for ground forces
within a joint C2 framework simply institutional-
izes practices that emerge under the pressure of

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (Chris Tourge)

war anyway.11 In the long term such a transition
will reinforce the need for greater independence
in tactical formations and could eliminate the rear
area except as a communications zone.12
This JFLCC structure could contribute sub-
stantially to the formation of a mission-specific
joint task force (JTF) headquarters. Three possi-
bilities come to mind. In the simplest case—a
large-scale crisis or theater war—the regional
Maritime special pur- CINC assumes the commander JTF (COMJTF) du-
poses force aboard
ties and the Army-Marine JFLCC is involved as a
USS Belleau Wood.
subordinate. One JFLCC could control up to
analysis are of limited value without the C2 struc- 50,000 troops. If the ground force were larger, a
ture to quickly exploit both information and second from U.S. Atlantic Command or part of a
strike capabilities. CONUS-based JFLCC could be deployed. For in-
With the emergence of a system of systems stance, a second close combat headquarters
global strike complex, the deep fight commander’s could be added if JFLCC determined that the ac-
links to the complex and the Army and Marine cession of more close combat formations made
tactical formations become the span of control too great for one.
theater antiballistic and pivotal. This structure In the case of a three-star COMJTF, the re-
emerges as the critical bond gional commander could designate the appropri-
cruise missile defense to the joint force air compo- ate component commander, whose component
missions will also become nent commander (JFACC), command staff would form the bulk of the JTF
staff, augmented by the other two component
integral to the deep structure who will want to exploit the
capabilities residing in commands. A three-star Air Force commander
ground strike and maneuver could recruit the deep fight JFLCC commander
forces to suppress or defeat enemy air defenses and his headquarters if ground forces were
and missile attacks. For that matter, theater an- needed to augment Air Force suppression of
tiballistic and cruise missile defense missions will enemy air defense elements. For the volatile
also become integral to the deep structure. Balkans a JFLCC in the Mediterranean could com-
In the event that combat maneuver forces mand and control 50,000 troops in combat or
are tasked to strike deep into enemy territory, this peace enforcement operations.
headquarters would also command those ele- In the case of a smaller JTF led by a two-star
ments. This suggests that the deep headquarters COMJTF from within the appropriate component
and not the close combat headquarters would element, that command would again contribute
control airmobile formations operating in con- the bulk of the staff, augmented by the other
junction with attack helicopters in front of ad- component commands. An example could be dis-
vancing friendly ground forces. This deep C 2 aster relief in a place like Papua, New Guinea,
structure would be postured to deconflict and when it was struck by a tidal wave. A major gen-
harmonize Air Force air and Army and Marine op- eral with close, deep, or rear headquarters already
erations in the deep fight, ensuring mutual sup- assigned to the regional command could provide
port and fratricide prevention. When force move- the core headquarters and assume mission re-
ment changes the spatial disposition of ground sponsibility. This helps solve the problem of es-
forces, the close combat commander or even the tablishing JTF headquarters that are both knowl-
rear sustainment commander could assume con- edgeable about the region and formed on short
trol of these elements. notice for an immediate crisis.

Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 29

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■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

conditions, historical development, and political

Figure 1. Warfighting CINC (Regional Unified Command)
life. Experience in Vietnam, Southwest Asia, So-
malia, and Bosnia indicates that use of military
power can go awry without that appreciation.
There is an acute need for operational command
CINC and control structures, subordinated directly to
the regional CINC, to be focused on likely re-
gional contingencies. The world is too complex to
suppose that an operational headquarters based in
the United States can go anywhere and execute a
broad range of complex military tasks on short
JFLCC
notice. A possible distribution for JFLCC structures
This joint headquarters is structured to control land forces and includes is shown in figure 3 (see page 31).
one lieutenant general in command with three major generals
oriented on close, deep, and rear functions. These can be Marine or Army-based Scrapping many single-service component
headquarters with at least one of the major generals from the other service. headquarters in the unified commands and in
There can be two types of JFLCCs: standing (with assigned forces) the United States allows for organizing future
and contingency (without assigned forces). In the case of embedded joint task forces around functional areas. The re-
operational joint C4I, JTFs can be formed as necessary for regional employment. sulting joint forward-deployed land force head-
quarters would then be positioned to replace the
CONUS-based Army division and corps head-
quarters that require months to deploy. Tactical
ground maneuver formations could then rotate
to regional commands to both exercise and exe-
Figure 2. Traditional and Proposed Command Elements cute forward presence missions much as naval
forces rotate in and out of the regional com-
Traditional Command mands. Similar economizing could be applied to
Element CONUS-based Marine headquarters with the ob-
ject of reallocating general officers and staffs to
JFLCCs in the regional commands. These meas-
Aviation Combat Ground Combat Combat Service ures would not only reduce deployment times
Element Element Support Element for both the Army and Marine Corps but also
save money. It should be remembered that
change in force employment has jointness conse-
quences for force development.
Proposed JFLCC Headquarters
C2 for Strategic Responsiveness
Lieutenant General
(joint force land component commander) Weapons of mass destruction and the
fragility of alliances under crisis conditions make
an extended preparation of ground forces risky
Major General/ Major General/ Major General/
deputy commander deputy commander deputy commander
for operations close to enemy forces. The enemy
(close combat operations) (deep/precision strike operations) (sustainment) will seize all available time to organize or to dis-
rupt the deployment of ground troops. It is there-
fore dangerous to concentrate combat power too
directs JTF combat groups directs JTF rocket artillery, aviation, directs JTF rear groups early. Subordinating operational level joint C2 to
and air defense groups the regional unified commands allows packaging
Army and Marine tactical forces for rapid deploy-
ment. Without the enormous administrative
overhead of Cold War headquarters structures,
Army and Marine tactical elements could be con-
How many JFLCC headquarters structures figured to move much more rapidly from widely
should exist and how should they be focused? In dispersed staging areas overseas and in CONUS.
the regional commands, the role specialization The theater, army, corps, and division struc-
proposed here could call for JFLCCs comprising tures were designed for the mass mobilization of
designated Army and Marine commanders and industrial age war. Laminating them with tons
joint staffs with responsibility for planning and of electronic hardware and computer software is
executing operations within the close/deep/rear unlikely to simplify command arrangements,
framework. Land force commanders must inte- improve readiness, or reduce response time for
grate political directives and military power with a
thorough knowledge of regional socioeconomic

30 JFQ / Autumn/Winter 1998–99

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Macgregor

home would provide a training environment

Figure 3. Proposed JFLCC Organization and Distribution
conducive to rapid deployment of tactical forma-
tions to the regional unified commands. These
commanders would manage core competency
training up through and including training cen-
ter rotations. This suggests a two-dimensional
Combined Forces Command/
U.S. Forces, Korea:
system containing an administrative logistical
standing JFLCC with ACOM U.S. European Command: command structure that supervises and supports
active component corps (-) CONUS-based two standing JFLCCs
deployable JFLCCs (2) (one corps/Army-based and training and an operational command structure
one contingency/
with active component
Marine Corps-based) subordinate to the regional unified commands
Army and Marine forces
U.S. Pacific Command:
functionally organized for deploying ground forces in joint training or
(close/deep/rear) and
standing JFLCC with
rotational readiness system
conflict within a particular unified command.
one Marine Expeditionary Force U.S. Central Command:
(Marine Corps-based contingency or The Navy currently employs a similar approach.
in Pacific) standing JFLCC
U.S. Southern Command: Such a top-down method of organizing C2
deployable JFLCC and ground forces promises a flatter command
structure with more rapid decisionmaking and
strategic responsiveness. More important, it rec-
JFLCCs can be either Army or Marine Corps-based ognizes that Army and Marine forces are likely to
(preponderance of Marine assets highlighted in red).
be combined into the core elements of most fu-
ture joint task forces. Of course these changes will
also necessitate modifications to Army National
Guard and Reserve structures for command and
deploying ground forces. For example, brigades control. The impact of disestablishing unneeded
are still structured to deploy as part of larger di- Reserve headquarters is no less important than in
visions. Divisions are structured to deploy as the active component.
part of larger corps. Deploying one without the The potential for integrating information
other means selectively moving mission-critical systems with the C 2 process in support of the
elements from one to another. The readiness of arrangements outlined here is limitless. Given the
one or more of these formations to deploy and need for simplicity in C2 structures and for train-
fight is thus inevitably degraded. ing, leadership, and equipment to achieve greater
Strategic responsiveness means organizing autonomy and dispersion on the tactical level,
ground forces that can be activated before the airborne and space-based sensors expanding cov-
peace is lost. Grouping ground tactical forces erage beyond line-of-sight will allow tactical com-
based on functions—close/ manders to exploit opportunities much more rap-
deep/rear—confers greater in- idly. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the old
Army and Marine forces are dependence on tactical forma- adage “Give them artillery and you’ve made them
tions smaller than divisions independent” will soon be replaced with “Give
likely to be combined into them unmanned aerial vehicles and joint C4ISR
that can deploy rapidly and
the core elements of most operate across the conflict and you’ve made them independent.” Robert
spectrum. When structured for Killebrew describes the type of communications
future joint task forces capability that could support the modular JFLCC
joint C2, these forces provide
an agile mix that can domi- envisioned here.
nate maneuver and precision strike within the JTF Communications nets of all kinds can be lodged
framework. Packaging tactical forces on a close/ in space, with databases on the ground and data
deep/rear basis also creates visibility for critical transferred over dense, redundant nets using virtually
Army assets such as rocket artillery and attack and unlimited bandwidth. These changes can free maneu-
transport helicopters, currently submerged in the ver units from dependence on bulky terrestrial systems
amorphous Cold War structure. that are easier to intercept and jam than those in
The JFLCC structure presented here ad- space or near-space. The explosion of space-based
dresses the urgent need for rapid deployment commercial systems, now on the horizon, suggests
and operational readiness of ground forces that most, if not all, future space-based military com-
within a joint framework. As mentioned earlier, munications may be carried by commercial vendors.13
designating major generals as close/deep/rear Almost imperceptibly, personal computers
commanders eliminates the need for sending di- have gone from unconnected to connected. And
vision and corps headquarters from the United networked embedded processors are starting to
States. At the same time, post commanders at integrate diverse activities in the private sector for
greater adaptability and transparency. This trend

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■ COMMAND AND CONTROL

AV–8B landing at
Twentynine Palms.

2d Marine Division (E.J. Young)

will inevitably impact on joint command, con- only one of several critical steps. Joint training,
trol, communications, computers, intelligence, doctrine, education, and modernization are also
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. essential. Based on progress in these arenas, the
Off-the-shelf commercial technology is far more JFLCC concept outlined could be adapted to in-
advanced than that fielded in the Armed Forces. clude senior officers from all services. Integrating
How can the military keep up with the madden- Army and Marine leadership on the operational
ing pace of change in communications? level is, however, a plausible start in this much
The selection of joint C2 systems with the longer process.
desired level of baseline interoperability may re- Having said that, American ground forces
quire leasing operational and strategic C4I hard- now need a joint warfighting C2 structure on the
ware and software from the private sector. There operational level with joint C4ISR that facilitates
is not much point to investing scarce defense cap- the rapid deployment of tactical formations by
ital in outright purchase of C4I equipment in the strategic air and fast sealift to the scene of action
current environment. Technology is outpacing in the unified command. The concept presented
defense research, development, and procurement. here is designed to meet the need for speed and
Leasing such systems could provide regular up- agility while offering an alternative to debilitating
grades to guarantee state-of-the-art capability. force structure cuts. The JFLCC approach prom-
ises long-term economy by reallocating human
Closing Thoughts and matériel resources from the World War II mo-
Senior officers on the operational level are bilization headquarters structure to the regional
central to the drama that translates strategic goals unified commands where JFLCCs can be organ-
into tactical action. They must not only constantly ized and positioned to contribute to JTF head-
link the strategic and tactical levels but compre- quarters establishment and be ready for immedi-
hend the actions of their opponents in a similar ate joint strategic action.
context. How they interpret missions and employ As mentioned at the outset, the bureaucratic
their forces dominates operations. This is why an and technological legacies of the Cold War con-
integrative structure of multiservice command and tinue to divert attention from the social, political,
control must exist on the operational level that in- economic, and technological change in the strate-
duces military leaders to interpret information and gic environment since 1989. Yet the international
activity in ways that exploit capabilities across situation is becoming more dangerous, and noth-
service lines. This is the underlying purpose of the ing is emerging to replace the European world
JFLCC structure described here. It is, of course, order. This necessitates reshaping the U.S. military
system for conflict across the spectrum, across the
globe. The concepts here are part of an adaptive

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approach at the beginning of a new RMA that will NOTES

allow Army and Marine landpower to absorb
emerging technologies. Ideally, a unified com- 1 Williamson Murray, “In Search of the Army after

mand should be selected to examine these con- Next: Another Perspective,” Marine Corps Gazette, vol.
cepts in a joint operational environment. 82, no. 1 (January 1998), p. 71.
Adaptation, however, is not just a function 2 Douglas A. Macgregor, in Breaking the Phalanx: A

of technology. The Russian officer who witnessed New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century (Westport,
Prussia’s titanic victory over Austria at Koniggratz Conn.: Praeger, 1997), outlines concepts for reorganiz-
in 1866, Major General Dragomirov, dismissed ing the Army and the contribution of a joint command
newspaper claims that new breech-loading rifles and control structure for landpower.
3 The boundaries of the levels of conflict tend to blur
were responsible for Prussian success. “It wasn’t
and may not correspond to levels of command. Never-
the needle gun by itself . . . but the men who car- theless, in the American system the strategic level is usu-
ried it.” And the French military attaché was ally the concern of the National Command Authorities
probably more insightful when he noted that re- and the highest military commanders, the operational
gardless of what technological advantage the Aus- level that of theater commands, and the tactical level
trians possessed, it would not have changed the that of sub-theater commands. Essays on Air and Space
2d Marine Division (E.J. Young)

outcome in 1866: the war was won by the Pruss- Power, vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University
ian high command.14 Press, 1997), p. 13.
4 Earl Wavell, The Good Soldier (London: Macmillan,
To adapt to this new environment, a com-
mon view of what can work and what is neces- 1948), p. 43.
5 Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story (New York:
sary must shape the design of ground forces. If
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), p. 58.
the Army and the Marines cannot articulate a col- 6 For instance, cruise missiles are attractive strategic
lective, coherent vision, the defense bureaucracy weapons. They offer a first strike and retaliatory capabil-
will more likely supply the force structure it ity. They are relatively small and can be launched from
knows than the one the Nation needs. Some of various platforms, including trucks, submarines, and
these changes involve the recognition that sur- aircraft. They are easy to hide and disperse. W. Seth
face ships have not become significantly faster Carus, Cruise Missile Proliferation in the 1990s (Washing-
and that Army and Marine Corps combat forces ton: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
can thus reach the scene much faster by air. 1992), p. 45.
7 “Force XXI: Division Redesign,” Army Times, June

22, 1998, p. 5.
Making judicious choices today about mod- 8 F.E. Littlebury and D.K. Praeger, Invisible Combat:
ernization and configuring tactical ground forces C3CM: A Guide for the Tactical Commander (Washington:
for rapid deployment in the close/deep/rear joint AFCEA International Press, 1986), p. xi.
framework will equip forces with the operational 9 U.S. Marine Corps, Expeditionary Organizations

reach, force protection, and mobility that both (1998), chapter 3, p. 5.

Army and Marine crisis response forces lack. At 10 S.L. Brodsky, “Control Aspects of C2” in Selected

the same time, prudent requests for further addi- Analytical Concepts in Command and Control, edited by
tions to air and fast sealift transport and preposi- John Hwang et al. (London: Gordon and Breach Science
tioning capabilities can augment the JFLCC role Publishers, 1982), pp. 56–57.
11 Terry J. McKearney, “Rethinking the Joint Task
in boosting tactical responsiveness of landpower.
Force,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 120, no. 11
The alternative—keeping headquarters that are
(November 1994), p. 54.
no longer strategically relevant and relying on 12 Alvin H. Bernstein and Martin C. Libicki, “High-
new information technology to enable Cold War Tech: The Future of War? A Debate,” Commentary, vol.
organizations to fight the last war better—will 105, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 28–34.
not transform the force. Moreover, it risks wast- 13 Robert B. Killebrew, “Learning from Wargames: A

ing the opportunity to steal a dramatic march on Status Report,” Parameters, vol. 28, no. 1 (Spring 1998),
potential enemies. Paraphrasing the oracle of Del- p. 133.
14 Gordon Craig, The Battle of Koniggratz: Prussia’s
phi, “Missed opportunities to make real changes
are luxuries that can harm the U.S. military in the Victory over Austria, 1866 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
21st century.” JFQ Publishers, 1964), p. 174.

Autumn/Winter 1998–99 / JFQ 33