194 C HAP TE R 8

CHAPTER
81. Campbell, 108.
82. Wamick,119.

9
83. McKerrow, 7 ff.
84.
85.
McKerrow, 9.
Whately, ix.
Contemporary
86.
87.
Whately, xi.
Whately, 90. Rhetoric I: Argument,
88. Whately, 91.
89.
90.
Whately, 92.
Whately, 112. Audience, and Science
91. Whately, 112-113.
92. Whately, 116.
93. Kennedy, 240.
94. Kennedy, 241.

When Einstein discovered rationality in nature, unaided by

any observation that had not been available for at least fifty
years before, our positivistic textbooks promptly covered
up the scandal by an appropriately embellished account of
his discovery.
-Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge'

The twentieth century opened in the Western world with interest in rhetorical
theory at perhaps its lowest point since the systematic discussion of rhetoric began in
ancient Greece. Scientific thinking was ascendant, and the methods of reasoning and
speaking about contingent matters that had traditionally been studied and taught
under the name of rhetoric were derided as decidedly inferior to scientific method.
Logical positivism, or the intellectual effort to bring scientific standards to bear on
the resolution of all issues, had apparently rendered rhetoric obsolete.
However, as the century progressed, confidence in scientific thinking as appropri-
ate to the solution of human social and moral problems began to diminish. Events such
as World War II, and "scientific" approaches to social structuring such as those under-
taken by fascists in Europe, left the intellectual world reeling. In addition, as news of
Stalin's often brutal tactics started to reach the West, many intellectuals began to ques-
tion whether "scientific socialism" could indeed be a viable response to fascism and
the inequalities of industrial capitalism. Whereas science had made major advances in
such areas as medicine, it had failed to provide solutions to persistent human problems
like aggression, racism, economic exploitation, and class polarization.
Perhaps science could not provide solutions to these problems, for its methods
of reasoning were suited to investigating natural rather than social phenomena, and it

I
dealt best with clear cases of physical causation. Science did not provide a means of
investigating human motivation, the place of values in human choice-making, the in-
tricacies of how power is achieved and maintained, or how political leaders come to
196 CHAPTER 9 Contemporary Rhetoric I: Argument, Audience, and Science 197

wield the kind of massive influence that had been a major factor in bringing the ture in which there are few agreements about values. He and colleague Madame L.
world to war. Olbrechts- Tyteca searched for a nonscientific but also nontheistic foundation for dis-
A new means of discussing human values was required, one suited specifically course involving values.e This search led them to the ancient discipline of rhetoric and,
to resolving perennial problems that engaged human values and moral commit- more specifically, to argumentation and the audience. "What we preserve of the tradi-
ments. Recognizing the importance of everyday reasoning processes to our delibera- tional rhetoric," they write in their major work. The New Rhetoric, "is the idea of the
tions about such problems, some thinkers turned their attention to the structures that audience, an idea immediately evoked by the mere thought of a speech."3 Sounding
undergird "everyday" or "marketplace" arguments. Others looked to the classical like rhetoricians from classical Greek or Rome, they write that "knowledge of those
tradition in rhetoric for help in discovering a new language, a new rhetoric, of human one wishes to win over is a condition preliminary to all effectual argnmentation/"
values. In this search for a new logic and a new rhetoric, attention was focused on Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca begin with the assumption that no claim or con-
two foundational components of rhetoric: argumentation and the audience. clusion is self-evidently true, and that resort to absolutes such as God or a specific re-
Not only had science not provided solutions to social problems, but also scien- vealed truth will not uphold arguments about important issues of value in our
tists were increasingly willing to admit as the twentieth century progressed that contemporary, pluralistic social setting. Only through a sustained process of public ar-
much of the discourse of science was not formulary, clinical, and syllogistic, but de- gumentation could propositions of value and policy be tested and established as suffi-
cidedly strategic, argumentative, and rhetorical. The theory that "won out" over ciently reasonable, or rejected as lacking rational merit. Thus, their particular concern
competing theories in scientific debates was often the theory presented in the most is the argumentative processes involved in testing ideas by engaging and convincing
persuasive manner, not the one supported by the greatest weight of evidence. More- audiences.P Much of their groundbreaking book, The New Rhetoric, is a catalog of
over, human motives were seen to play an enormous role in interpreting data, creat- various types of arguments common to everyday discourse, along with discussions of
ing the institutional arrangements in which science was practiced, allocating funding how different arguments achieve their effects and examples of each type.
to research, and even in the process of formulating theories. Science, it turned out Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca, as we shall see, place great emphasis on the au-
after more than a century of intellectual dominance, was in several important re- dience. "All argumentation," as they see it, "aims at gaining the adherence of minds,
spects rhetorical. Scholars in fields as varied as economics, astronomy, psychology, and, by this very fact, assumes the existence of intellectual contact:>6 That is, rheto-
literature, and even biology and mathematics were acknowledging that rhetoric ric inseparably intertwines the concepts of audience and argumentation. Moreover,
played a major role in their professional lives. these writers contend that the quality and significance attributed to an argument
depend on the astuteness and skill of the audience it succeeds in persuading. As Per-
elman and Olbrechts- Tyteca put the point, the audience "will determine to a great
Argumentation and Rational Discourse extent both the direction the arguments will take, and the character, the siguificance
that will be attributed to them."? The audience, then, plays a role equal to that of the
One of the important accomplishments of twentieth-century rhetorical studies has orator in the testing of ideas publicly. A closer look at Perelman and Olbrechts-
been to examine and provide a means of discussing the structure of everyday argu- Tyteca's theory of audience is in order, as theirs is perhaps the best developed analy-
mentation. The work of scholars such as Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman, and sis of this topic in contemporary rhetorical theory.8 A closer look at their theory of
Jurgen Habermas has been directed toward revealing the logical structure of every- audience will be helpful to understanding their rhetorical theory.
day arguments, demonstrating the place of values in such arguments, and providing
a theory about the conditions under which such arguments are most equitably ad-
vanced. The goal of this important intellectual work has been to improve the practice
The Centrality of Audience
of discourse in contemporary society, and to thus improve the quality of human Three audiences are particularly important in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's theory
social life. . of rhetoric. This is because these three audiences can reliably test the rational quality
of arguments. 'The first such audience," they write, "consists of the whole of man-
kind, or at least, of all normal, adult persons; we shall refer to it as the universal audi-
Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca: ence,"? The universal audience is advanced as a possible test of the reasonableness of
A New Rhetoric arguments that transcends local and personal biases. to The second audience they con-
sider is "the single interlocutor whom a speaker addresses in a dialogue," while the
Chairn Perelman (1912-1985) was a Belgian philosopher and legal theorist who third audience that can test the reasonableness of arguments is "the subject himself
became interested in the question of how moral claims can be proven rational in a cul- when he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions.t"! We will examine in
198 CHAPTER 9 Contemporary Rhetoric I: Argument, Audience, and Science 199

some detail their discussion of these and other audiences, and consider how audiences monly held values, values arranged into hierarchies, and preferences such as the pref-
may enhance the quality of public rhetoric. erence for group over individual decision making in an organization. From such points
of agreement, further agreements may be reached through the processes of argumenta-
Particular Audiences, Starting Points, and Values. Though the universal audi- tion. Again, the central concern of these authors is to establish a rational method for
ence, the audience of the single interlocutor, and the audience of self provide impor- discussing questions of value in a modern, pluralistic social setting. Their call for re-
tant checks on the reasonableness of arguments, Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca newed attention to classical theories of argumentation is a major part of this effort.
locate social and personal values in particular audiences. A particular audience is Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca recognized the very serious problems associ-
the actual audience of persons one addresses when advancing an argument publicly. ated with arguments about matters of value before real audiences. Rhetoric based
In fact, this regard for particular audiences and their "opinions and values" is what strictly on the beliefs of a particular group may be biased, narrow, and parochial. Ar-
Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca see as distinguishing a rhetorical approach to argu- guments capable of winning the adherence of only a particular audience often are not
ment from other possible approaches. "What ... characterizes the rhetorical point of acceptable to most reasonable people. To solve this problem associated with argu-
view in philosophy is a fundamental concern with the opinions and values of the au- ments addressed to particular audiences, Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca introduced
dience that the speaker addresses, and more particularly with the intensity of his au- what was to become their most famous concept.
dience's adherence to each of these invoked by the speaker." 12
When we recall the importance of public values as starting points of argument in
Greek and Roman theories of rhetoric, we recognize Perelman and Olbrechts- The Universal Audience
Tyteca's debt to these theories. Whether in ancient or modern settings, rhetors must Who decides which ideas are truly rational, if the judgments of different particular
attend to what real audiences believe and value, and adapt their arguments to the be- audiences clash? In some instances we turn to elite audiences. These are audiences
liefs of particular audiences. "Every social circle or milieu is distinguishable in terms of trained specialists in particular disciplines who can assist in "the attempt to for-
of its dominant opinions and unquestioned beliefs, of the premises that it takes for mulate norms and values such as could be proposed to every reasonable being."16
granted without hesitation." Does one, then, question such beliefs as simply the But even the judgments of experts must be brought back to the test of the particular
shifting opinions of the public, as Plato did, or take them as the basis of rhetorical audience. Otherwise we run the "risk of the philosopher-king who would use the po-
appeals, as Aristotle did? Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca apparently side with Aris- litical authority and power of the State" to impose one set of values on everyone. 17
totle. "These views form an integral part of its culture, and an orator wishing to per- The universal audience is also important in the effort to develop sound argu-
suade a particular audience must of necessity adapt himself to it."13 ments for particular audiences without bowing to the local prejudices these audi-
Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca devote considerable time in The New Rhetoric ences often endorse. Looking beyond persuading only their immediate audience,
to the notion of the starting points of argument. Starting points are points of agree- conscientious rhetors will consider how an imagined audience of highly rational in-
ment between a rhetor and an audience that allow for argumentation to develop. Be- dividuals would respond to a particular argument. In his book, Justice, Perelman
cause of their interest in forging a rhetoric that allows for a rational discussion of writes, "I do not see [reason] as a faculty in contrast to other faculties .... I conceive
human values, the concept of starting points as places for finding agreement between of it as a privileged audience, the universal audience."18 Perelman and Olbrechts-
disagreeing parties is important to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's rhetorical the- Tyteca seek an imagined audience of reasonable people available at all times, and not
ory. '''The unfolding as well as the starting point of argumentation," they write, "pre- subject to the limitations and biases of any particular audience.
supposes indeed the agreement of the audience." 14 In the universal audience, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca reveal their convic-
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca divide starting points into two general classes. tion that a reasonable and moral advocate must possess a vision of rationality that
The first class of starting points they call simply "the real," which includes "facts, transcends particular social groups or geographical locations. A rational advocate
truths, and presumptions." The other category they call "the preferable," which takes in "seeks to conform to principles of action which are acceptable to everyone [and}
"values, hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the preferable.t'P Thus, one considers as unreasonable a rule of action which cannot be universalized.t'J'' The rea-
source of the agreements needed to begin constructive argumentation is found in what sonable advocate looks beyond the immediate and recognizes that "a principle of
both speaker and audience accept as well-established facts, widely accepted truths, or action which others would consider acceptable and even reasonable cannot arbi-
uncontested commitments, called presumptions. Recall that presumptions were dis- trarily favor certain people or certain situations: what is reasonable must be able to
cussed in the last chapter when we considered the argument theory of Hugh Blair. The be a precedent which can inspire everyone in analogous circumstances.t'-''
clearest example of a presumption accepted by most Americans is the presumption of The "highest point" of assurance that an argument is reasonable "is reached when
innocence in judicial settings. A second source of starting points is discovered in com- there is agreement of the universal audience," which audience is "a universality and
200 CHAPTER 9 Contemporary Rhetoric I: Argument, Audience, and Science 201

unanimity imagined by the speaker, to the agreement of an audience which should be course, even in self-deliberation, reasons may be invented simply to justify a partic-
universal."21 Argumentation which wins the assent of the universal audience must ular decision rather than reasonably to explore options.
reach a very high standard indeed. It must "convince the reader that the reasons ad- The universal audience consists of the speaker's conception of all rational peo-
duced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an absolute ple. Reasons addressed to this audience are to be compelling. self-evident, and time-
and timeless validity independent of local or historical contingencies.t'P less, thus independent of local concerns. The speaker's character is reflected in the
conception she forms of the universal audience. The audience of the single hearer
provides a check on each step in the reasoning process. The goal of discourse ad-
The Audience of One dressed to this audience is not to "win" a debate, but to engage in dialogue leading to
How can we know, in a practical sense, if our arguments are ready for appeal to the a reasonable decision. The interlocutor may be seen as a manifestation of all reason-
universal audience? Though Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are not explicit in their able people, as an instance of the universal audience. Self-deliberation is viewed as a
answer to this question, there are some clear suggestions in The New Rhetoric about kind of argumentation, and not as a distinct cognitive activity. We employ the same
practical tests of one's arguments. One of these is the careful scrutiny that takes place arguments to persuade others that we use to persuade ourselves. The secrecy of a
when one person argues directly with another. "Argumentation before a single hearer" personal, internal debate is seen as a guarantee of its sincerity, as we are not inter-
can also make a special claim to reasonableness, and provides another kind of test of ested in deceiving ourselves.
arguments. In The New Rhetoric, Plato's Gorgias is an example of the role of the au-
dience of a single hearer: "Each of Socrates' interlocutors is the spokesman ... of a Regardless of the type of discourse one advances-scientific. political. judicial.
particular viewpoint and their objections must first be disposed of in order to facilitate religious-an audience is being addressed. Argumentation, for Perelman and Olbrechts-
public adherence to the proposed theses."23 Tyteca, cannot be adequately understood apart from a theory of audience. Discourse
The single hearer sometimes acts like an audience of one's opponents by advanc- is not simply addressed to, but adapted to and affected by its audience. Here is both
ing the counterarguments to one's own arguments. The single listener or reader care- a fact about rhetoric and a criticism of it that has been advanced ever since Plato
fully checks each step in the argumentation, raising objections to it, asking for raised the concern in Gorgias. But, does this fact mean that argumentation must then
clarifications, providing arguments in response.P' The individual listener can in some be unreasonable? Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca think not, and they respond with
cases fulfill this role so well that he or she represents the universal audience. "The both a theory of audiences and of arguments intended to secure the rationality of dis-
hearer is assumed to have the same reasoning power at his disposal as the other mem- course about moral issues that engages values and beliefs. And finding a rational ap-
bers of the universal audience."25 Thus, if our arguments succeed before an audience proach to moral discourse is perhaps the most pressing problem of rhetorical theory
of a single, careful critic, they may be ready for the test of the universal audience. in the twentieth century.

The Self as Audience Presence

We are all familiar with argumentation before a large audience, and each of us has We have considered Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca's theory of audience and its
likely advanced arguments before an audience of a single hearer. But do we typically centrality to their "new rhetoric." Another of their concepts has also been influential
think of ourselves as an audience for our own arguments? Perelman and Olbrechts- and deserves attention. Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca call this concept "presence."
Tyteca wish to draw our attention to this audience as well, the audience of the self. The immediate goal of argumentation, according to Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca,
"The self-deliberating subject," they write, "is often regarded as an incarnation of the is to make certain facts present to an audience. Establishing presence involves the
universal audience."26 The individual "endowed with reason" who directs her own choice to emphasize certain ideas and facts over others, thus encouraging an audi-
arguments privately to herself "is bound to be contemptuous of procedures aimed at ence to attend to them. Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca write that presence "is an es-
winning over other people." Moreover, such an individual "cannot avoid being sin- sential factor in argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in rationalistic
cere" in this process, and "is in a better position than anyone else to test the value" of conceptions of reasoning."28 The presence of a fact or an idea is almost a sensory ex-
her arguments.27 perience rather than a purely rational one; "presence," they write, "acts directly on
Self-deliberation is crucial to the process of inventing or coming up with argu- our sensibility."29
ments. It is also important to justifying arguments as reasonable. We might say that Thus, in argumentation a rhetor seeks to bring his or her audience to the point of
the self is the first audience whose adherence is sought in argumentation, and, for seeing the relevant facts, or experiencing the truthfulness of an idea. Thus, Perelman
reasons Perelman and Olbrechts- Tyteca articulate, among the most important. Of and Olbrechts- Tyteca can write, "one of the preoccupations of a speaker is to make
202 CHAPTER 9 ContemporaryRhetoricI: Argument,Audience,and Science 203

present, by verbal magic alone, what is actually absent" but what is considered "impor- the same logical type (emphasis added)."35 Geometrical proofs, navigational calcu-
tant to [the] argument.v'? This statement, particularly with its reference to rhetoric as a lations, arguments from statistical data, arguments based on criteria for inclusion in
kind of magic, sounds like something the Sophist Gorgias or a Renaissance humanist a category, and arguments applying laws to particular cases-all of these, according
like Ficino might say. Indeed, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca share Gorgias' and the to Toulmin, belong to different fields. Thus, some of the criteria relevant to evaluat-
humanists' intrigue with rhetoric's power to direct thought, particularly rhetoric in the ing each type of argument will differ from some of the criteria appropriate to evalu-
control of a skilled rhetorician. But their confidence in argumentation as a rational ating any of the others. That is, not all arguments are subject to evaluation by the
foundation of discourse is decidedly stronger than was Gorgias' . same criteria or standards. Thus, Toulmin rejects the logician's idea that validity-a
concern for an argument's structure without consideration of its content-is the
single universal standard of argument analysis. But, even within a particular domain
Stephen Toulmin and the Uses of Argument of argument, law, for example, arguments may belong to different fields. Thus, argu-
ments about whether to apply a particular law to a particular action, and judicial ar-
In 1958, British philosopher and scientist Stephen Toulmin published his ground- guments based on generalizations about human character, would belong to different
breaking study of argumentation, The Uses of Argument.3! Thus, his work appeared fields. Arguments are from the same field when it makes sense to compare them to
in England just one year before The New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts- one another and to judge them by similar special criteria.
Tyteca. His analysis of everyday or marketplace arguments on a model derived from
logical studies is reminiscent of Aristotle's reference to the enthymeme as a "rhetor-
Field-Dependent and Field-Invariant Standards
ical syllogism." Toulmin also drew on the study of legal argumentation in establish-
ing his system for assessing arguments.F However, he affirmed that the standards Toulmin introduces the concept of field, then, for a particular reason: He wishes to
for assessing arguments varied depending on the subject matter under consideration. explore the rational standards by which arguments can be assessed. Some standards
The authors of Handbook of Argumentation Theory write, ''Toulmin's central thesis for assessing arguments belong specifically to a particular field, and these standards
is that every sort of argumentation can in principle claim rationality and that the cri- Toulmin called field-dependent. Other standards for assessing arguments apply re-
teria to be applied when determining the soundness of the argumentation depend on gardless of the field in which the argument is advanced. Toulmin called these stan-
the nature of the problem to which the argumentation relates."33 To demonstrate this dards field-invariant. Thus, in an argument about whether a particular law should be
possibility, Toulmin developed a scheme for analyzing arguments that has become applied to a particular action, standards appropriate to the interpretation of law
extremely popular, and which we will review momentarily. would be among the field-dependent factors that might come into play. Standards re-
garding the underlying logic of the arguments advanced-for example, whether a
logical fallacy had been committed-would be among the field-invariant standards
Argument Fields
that could be applied to the arguments on both sides.
Toulmin questioned the ancient idea of logical validity as applicable to the analysis
of ordinary arguments. In order to make his case, Toulmin introduced the concept of
Modal Qualifiers
argument fields into his discussion of arguments. "The first problem we have set
ourselves," writes Toulmin in The Uses of Argument, ,''(~anbe re-stated in the ques- As one application of his idea that some of the standards by which arguments are as-
tion, 'What things about the form and merits of our arguments are field-invariant and sessed vary with argument fields, Toulmin expresses interest in certain terms "which
what things about them are field-dependent?'" Toulmin explains the distinction in have always been of interest to philosophers and have come to be known as modal
the following way: terms."36 Modal qualifiers, words that indicate the degree of confidence or force as-
signed to a conclusion, include terms such as must, possibly, probably, certainly, and
What things about the modes in which we assess arguments, the standards with reference cannot. The "force" of these terms does not vary from one field of argument to an-
to which we assess them and the manner in which we qualify our conclusions about other, "but the criteria applied in order to determine whether a given modal term has
them, are the same regardless of field (field-invariant), and which of them vary as we been used rightly or wrongly in a given context are field-dependent.t'-? In modals,
move from arguments in one field to arguments in another field (field-dependentj'P" Toulmin sees a reflection of the rational processes involved in decision making and
an important clue to the nature of everyday reasoning.P The standards used to assess
Specifically, "two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when the whether a modal has been properly employed will vary with a variation in the argu-
data [evidence] and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, respectively, of ment's field. For example, the term must is justified by the rules of mathematics in
204 CHAPTER 9 Contemporary Rhetoric I: Argument, Audience, and Science 205

the following example from Toulmin: "In view of the preceding steps in the argu- min's analysis of modals and fields, provided a means of evaluating the rationality of
ment, the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle must be equal to the everyday arguments. This possibility was important to those interested in informal or
sum of the squares of the other two sides."39 However, the term must is justified by marketplace arguments, because logicians under the influence of logical positivism
rules of professional behavior in the statement, "You must not make demeaning had charged that such arguments can stake no claim to being rational. Thus, Toulmin's
comments to your colleagues at work." Toulmin takes this variation from one field to analysis of arguments was highly influential on both U.S. and European thinkers. The
another to be one typical use of modals. next theorist we will consider, Jurgen Habermas, found some helpful ideas in Toul-
But notice the different sense of must in the following example from The Uses of min's work, though the goals of his own efforts are quite different from Toulmin's.
Argument: "Under the circumstances, there is only one decision open to us; the child
must be returned to the custody of its parents."40 Imagining ajudicial setting for the
discussion of a child's custody, advocates may employ modals such as this one to in- Jurgen Habermas and the Conditions
dicate their confidence that certain evidence and certain laws must, that is, ought to of Rational Discourse
be, interpreted in a particular way. But must in this example does not mean "by logi-
cal necessity" as it does in the first example drawn from mathematics. Thus, modal Jurgen Habermas, like virtually every European intellectual that lived through the di-
qualifiers play various roles in arguments. Again, the field or domain of argument saster, was greatly affected by the experience of World War II. He came to see polit-
must be considered in interpreting a modal qualifier's meaning. ical corruption, criminality, and class warfare as major problems to be addressed by
the humanities, Habermas, like Foucault, believed that "critical rationality consists
in the unflinching examination of our most cherished and comforting assump-
Toulmin's Famous Model
tions."42 But beyond this point of agreement, these writers' approaches to reason and
Toulmin's concern for the structure of arguments and for modal terms come together society "diverge dramatically." Habermas sought to develop a theory of communica-
in his famous model of argument. The Toulmin Model identifies a variety of ele- tion rooted in a concept of an "ideal speech community," a theory that has as its ulti-
ments in an argument, and arrange'S these elements on a diagram. Briefly, Toulmin mate goal emancipation of the self.43 Habermas begins with a critique of the sources
noted that arguments consist of a claim, or conclusion, some data, or evidence to of human knowledge.e' His critical work is guided by a vision of a functional and
support the claim, and a warrant, or generalization that tends to link some data to a just human society rooted in the rational tradition of Western philosophy. He credits
claim. Toulmin also noted the presence of backing, or support for the warrant, re- Stephen Toulmin as one of the people who did important work in understanding the
buttals, or potential conditions on the acceptance of the claim, and modal qualifiers logical foundations of narural language.P
in his model. Toulmin presents the following example to introduce his model:

[Data] [Qualifier] [Claim]

Communicative Action and the Rational Society
Harry was born in Bermuda -+ So, presumably, Harry is a British subject Habermas's rational society is built on the foundation of rationally liberated individ-
I r uals speaking to one another as equals. To Habermas's way of thinking, establishing
a rational society requires both the correct interpretation and the subsequent transfor-
Since Unless
mation of the present society. In a rational society, individuals are allowed a greater
[Warrant] J,
degree of choice across a wider range of options, resulting in personal emancipation.
A man born in Bermuda [Rebuttal] In such a society, "assent secured by custom or tradition is replaced by ... rational
will generally be a
British subject."
I evaluations of claims," a view that places Habermas squarely in the Enlightenment
Both his parents were tradition of confidence in reason as emancipating.w All views are not equally ratio-
I aliens/he has become a nal; each claim or proposition must pass muster before it assumes the title "rational."
On account of naturalized American! ... Thomas McCarthy, a leading expert on Habermas's thought, writes that Habermas
[Backing] insists on the validity of "the distinctions between truth and falsity, right and
The following statutes and wrong."47 But, then, how does one know which claims are "truer" than others?
other legal provisions. For Haberrnas, claims are subject to proof or refutation through the process of
communication itself. We must also subject our received cultural traditions to a pro-
This model became popular for two reasons. First, it allowed scholars to label and cess of scrutiny through argumentative discourse. ''The ideas of reason, truth, justice
discuss the components of everyday arguments. Second, the model, coupled with Tool- ... serve as ideals with reference to which we can criticize traditions we inherit."48