Aratuc vs.

COMELEC
88 SCRA 251

Facts:
The case involves two petitions, one filed by Aratuc et. al., and the other by Mandangan.
Petitioners were independent candidates for representatives to the Interim Batasang Pambansa
under the banner of the unregistered political group, Kunsensiya ng Bayan. The election in question
was held on April 7, 1978, in Region XII. Petitioners alleged massive election irregularities,
including substitution of voters, tampering of election returns, and failure to conduct elections in
certain voting centers. They sought the exclusion of certain election returns from the canvass.

The COMELEC partially upheld the petitioners' claims, excluding some returns but ultimately
proclaiming several Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) candidates as winners. Petitioners then filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the COMELEC's resolution, arguing
that it committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in its handling of the election
returns and the canvass process.

Ruling:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its handling of the election
returns and the canvass process. The Court held that under Section 168 of the Revised Election
Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision on over the
board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the
sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the
Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to
in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May
23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred
by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code,
but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the
above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate
to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control
over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.
US vs. Dorr
2 Phil 331

Facts:
The defendants, Dorr and O'Brien, were convicted defendants were convicted upon a
complaint charging them with publishing a false and malicious libel against Senor Benito Legarda,
a United States Philippine Commissioner. The complaint is based under Section 8 of Act No. 292,
which criminalizes the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The alleged
libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom", a newspaper owned by
Dorr and edited by O'Brien, under the caption of" A few hard facts" which included sensational
headlines such as "Traitor, seducer and perjurer" and made various allegations against Legarda,
including claims about his personal life and character. The article claimed that the Civil
Commission had appointed "rascally natives" to important positions, described the fiscal system as
"rotten and corrupt," and accused the judiciary of failing to convict insurgents. It also questioned
the integrity of native Commissioners and suggested that the government was arbitrary and corrupt.
The defendants appealed the conviction, arguing that the headlines were legitimate deductions from
a privileged report and that they were entitled to a jury trial under the U.S. Constitution.

Issue:
WON the publication of the article constitutes an offense under Section 8 of Act No. 292.

Ruling:
No. The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United
States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as respects both the Commission as a
body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by
which the authority of the United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a
Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character of the men who are
intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute
by impugning the purity of their motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the
wisdom of their policy.

In modern political science, by the term "government", that institution or aggregate of

institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are
necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that
society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the
aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By "administration" again, we understand in modern
times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands
the reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)."

The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency being apparent, constitutes no
offense under Act No. 292, section 8.
Poindexter vs. Greenhow
114 US 270

Facts:
In an action of detinue for personal property distrained by the defendant for delinquent taxes in
payment of which the plaintiff had duly tendered coupons cut from bonds issued by the State of
Virginia under the Funding Act of March 30, 1871.

Issue:
WON the acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of January 28, 1882, and the amendatory
Act of March 13, 1884 constitutional.

Ruling:
No. The act of the General Assembly of Virginia of January 26, 1882, "to provide for the more
efficient collection of the revenue to support government, maintain the public schools, and to pay
interest on the public debt," requiring tax collectors to receive in discharge of the taxes, license
taxes, and other dues gold, silver, United States Treasury notes, national bank currency, and nothing
else, and thereby forbidding the receipt of coupons issued under the Act of March 30, 1871, in
payment therefor, although it is a legislative act of the government of Virginia, is not a law of the
Virginia, because it impairs the obligation of its contract, and is annulled by the Constitution of the
United States.

The right to pay in coupons cannot be treated as a mere right of setoff, which is part of the
remedy merely, when given by the general law, and therefore subject to modification or repeal,
because the law which gave it is also a contract, and therefore cannot be changed without mutual
consent. The acts of the General Assembly of Virginia of January 28, 1882, and the amendatory Act
of March 13, 1884, are unconstitutional and void because they impair the obligation of the contract
of the state with the coupon holder.
United residents of Dominican Hills vs. COSLAP
353 SCRA 782

Facts:
The United Residents of Dominican Hill, Inc. (UNITED), a community housing association of
non-property owning residents, applied to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. The
application was referred to the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), which consented to
act as the originator for UNITED. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed, stipulating that PMS
would sell the property to HIGC, which would then sell it to UNITED at a price of P75.00 per
square meter. HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED and after UNITED made its
final payment, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed.

Private respondents, who were members of the Dominican Hill Baguio Residents Homeless
Association (ASSOCIATION), entered the property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses.
Petitioner obtained a demolition order from the city mayor, but the private respondents filed an
action for injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, which resulted in a temporary
restraining order but later denied their request for a preliminary injunction. While this case was
pending, the ASSOCIATION filed another case for damages and annulment of the Memorandum
of Agreement, which was dismissed by the trial court.

The private respondents filed a petition for annulment of contracts with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), which issued a status quo order on the same day. Petitioner then filed a petition for
prohibition and declaratory relief, questioning COSLAP's jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON COSLAP, created under Executive Order No. 561, has jurisdiction to hear and decide a
petition for annulment of contracts, including issuing status quo orders.

Ruling:
No. Section 3(2) of Executive Order 561 patently indicates that the COSLAPs dispositions are
binding on administrative or executive agencies. The history of the COSLAP itself bolsters this
view. Prior enactments enumerated its member agencies among which it was to exercise a
coordinating function. The COSLAP discharges quasi-judicial functions. However, it does not
depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial
functions. Still, administrative agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the
judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.
Anak Mindanao vs. The Executive Secretary
GR No. 166052
August 29, 2007

Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued, Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364 and 379. E.O. No.
364 transformed the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) into the Department of Land Reform
(DLR). It consolidated the functions of agrarian reform, urban land reform, and ancestral domain
reform under the DLR. It also placed the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) and
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the supervision and control of the
DLR. On the other hand E.O. No. 379 amended E.O. No. 364 by redesignating the NCIP as an
attached agency of the DLR.

Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants Organization,
Inc. (MDOI) filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for injunctive relief,
alleging that these orders violated constitutional principles, specifically the separation of powers,
agrarian reform policy, indigenous peoples ’ rights, and the right to effective participation in
decision-making. AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were created by statutes,
they can only be transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive orders. While
AMIN concedes that the executive power is vested in the President who, as Chief Executive, holds
the power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices, it posits that this broad
power of control including the power to reorganize is qualified and limited, for it cannot be
exercised in a manner contrary to law.

Issue:
WON the President has the authority to reorganize executive departments and agencies,
including the DAR, PCUP, and NCIP, through executive orders.

Ruling:
Yes. As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that
he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office,
or interfere with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also
has the duty of supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to
enable him to discharge his duties effectively. The Constitution ’ s express grant of the power of
control in the President justifies an executive action to carry out reorganization measures under a
broad authority of law.
Beja, Sr. Vs. CA
207 SCRA 689

Facts:
Petitioner was employed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in various capacities,
starting as an arrastre supervisor in 1975 and eventually becoming a Terminal Supervisor in 1988
after a reorganization. On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager filed Administrative Case
No. 11-04-88 against Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful
violation of office rules, and conduct prejudicial to the service. The charges stemmed from alleged
erroneous assessments of storage fees, causing a loss of P38,150.77 to the PPA. The case was later
dismissed for lack of merit.

On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed
against Beja for similar offenses, including fraud amounting to P218,000.00. This case was
redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and referred to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) Administrative Action Board (AAB). Beja was then
placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. No. 807. He sought continuance
of the hearing, but the AAB proceeded and eventually dismissed him from service, forfeited his
leave credits and retirement benefits, disqualified him from re- employment, and recommended the
cancellation of his eligibility. Beja filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition.

Issue:
WON the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB, and the AAB itself
had jurisdiction to hear and decide administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of
Assistant General Manager.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the DOTC Secretary and the AAB lacked jurisdiction to hear and
decide administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
The PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors are the proper disciplining authorities for
such cases. The PPA, as an attached agency to the DOTC, retains significant independence in
personnel management.

An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department and the attached
agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination." With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and
supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department's
administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and
other personnel actions " in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the
administrative Code of 1987.
Iron and Steel Authority vs. CA
249 SCRA 538

Facts:
The ISA was established by PD No. 272 with the primary objective of developing and
promoting the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. The ISA was granted various powers,
including the authority to initiate expropriation of land necessary for iron and steel facilities.
Initially, ISA was created for a term of five years, which was later extended for another ten years by
Executive Order No. 555.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC), a subsidiary of the National Development Corporation,
initiated an expansion program that included the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan
City. To facilitate this, Proclamation No. 2239 was issued, reserving a large tract of public land for
NSC's use. However, this land was occupied by MCFC's non-operational chemical fertilizer plant.
Consequently, Letter of Instruction No. 1277 was issued, directing NSC to negotiate with MCFC for
compensation regarding its occupancy rights. If negotiations failed, ISA was to exercise its power
of eminent domain.

Negotiations between NSC and MCFC did not succeed, leading ISA to file for expropriation
in the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City. The court issued a writ of possession in favor of ISA.
However, during the trial, ISA's statutory existence expired. MCFC filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that ISA, having ceased to exist, could no longer be a party to the case. The RTC granted
the motion to dismiss, stating that ISA was no longer a juridical person and that the expropriation
was not for public use but for NSC, a government-controlled private corporation.

ISA appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC's dismissal. The Court of
Appeals held that ISA, as a government regulatory agency, had no winding-up period after its term
expired and that the expropriation could not proceed in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Solicitor General, representing ISA, argued that the Republic of the Philippines, as the
principal of ISA, should be substituted as the party-plaintiff. MCFC countered that the expiration of
ISA's term indicated a legislative intent to terminate its existence and that the expropriation was
improper as it benefited NSC, not the public.

Issue:
WON the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in the expropriation
proceedings after ISA's term expired.

Ruling:
Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributed normally associated with
juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing
general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the government.
The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the RP,
or more precisely of the Government of the Philippines.
 When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties and functions
as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by the RP, in the
absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.

Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having
been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or
delegate or representative of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC,
even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved.
MIAA vs. City of Pasay
GR No. 163072
April 02, 2009

Facts:
The City of Pasay issued Final Notices of REal Property Tax Deliquency to MIAA for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001, concerning properties located in the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) Complex. MIAA, which operates the NAIA under Executive Order No. 903, received
notices of levy and warrants of levy from the City Treasurer of Pasay on August 24, 2001. The City
Mayor threatened to auction the properties if the delinquent taxes were not paid. In response,
MIAA filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with the Court of Appeals, seeking to prevent
the City from imposing real property taxes on the NAIA properties. The Court of Appeals
dismissed MIAA's petition, ruling that MIAA was not exempt from real property taxes under the
Local Government Code, which had withdrawn tax exemptions for government-owned
corporations. MIAA's motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:
WON MIAA is a government-owned and controlled corporation

Ruling:
No. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only
difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,
police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the
powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Executive Order."

Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government

instrumentality which is exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments. Indeed, the
exercise of the taxing power of local government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in
Section 133 of the Local Government Code. Under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code,
local government units have no power to tax instrumentalities of the national government like the
MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property tax for the NAIA Pasay properties.
UP vs. Dizon
GR No. 171182
Augustt 23, 2012

Facts:
UP, represented by its then President Jose V. Abueva, entered into a General Construction
Agreement with Stern Builders for the construction and renovation of the College of Arts and
Sciences Building at the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB). During the contract's
execution, Stern Builders submitted three progress billings, but UP only paid two, withholding the
third billing of P273,729.47 due to disallowance by the Commission on Audit (COA). Despite the
lifting of the disallowance, UP failed to pay the third billing, leading Stern Builders and Dela Cruz
to file a lawsuit against UP and its officials for the unpaid amount and damages. The RTC ruled in
favor of Stern Builders, ordering UP to pay a total of P16,370,191.74, which included the third
billing, actual damages, moral damages, and attorney's fees. UP's motion for reconsideration was
denied, and UP filed a notice of appeal, which was later deemed late by the RTC. The RTC
subsequently issued a writ of execution, leading to the garnishment of UP's funds. UP contested the
garnishment, arguing that government funds could not be seized under a writ of execution. The
Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's decision, prompting UP to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the funds of UP are subject to garnishment to satisfy the judgment award.

Ruling:
No. UP is a government instrumentality, performing the State ’ s constitutional mandate of
promoting quality and accessible education. All the funds going into the possession of the UP,
including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any banking institution, constitute
a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned with the UP’s mission
and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA.

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the
income accruing from the use of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this action could not be validly
made the subject of the RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment rendered
against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented was not immediately enforceable by
execution against the UP, because suability of the State did not necessarily mean its liability.
Liban vs. Gordon
GR No. 175352
July 15, 2009

Facts:
A petition was filed by the petitioners, who sought to declare that Gordon forfeited his Senate
seat upon accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board Governors. The petitioners argued that
the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, and thus, Gordon's acceptance of the
position violated Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits senators from
holding other government positions.

Issue:
WON Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government-owned or controlled
corporation.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run
charitable organization. The PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. The vast
majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the
PNRC Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to
membership in the PNRC for one year. Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members
of the PNRC.

Although the PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a

government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government.
Repubic vs. City of Paranaque
GR No. 191109
July 18, 2012

Facts:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA), created by Presidential Decree No. 1084 in 1977, was
designed to manage and develop reclamation projects on behalf of the government. In 2004, it was
renamed the Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA).

PRA reclaimed several portions of Manila Bay, including properties in Parañaque City, and
obtained certificates of title for these lands. On February 19, 2003, Parañaque City Treasurer issued
warrants of levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties for tax delinquencies for the years 2001 and 2002.
PRA filed a petition for prohibition with a request for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against the levy. The TRO request was denied and a public auction took place despite PRA ’ s
request for deferment. PRA’s motion for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied as the auction
had already occurred.

The Regional Trial Court ruled that PRA was liable for the taxes, classifying PRA as a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and therefore taxable under the Local
Government Code (LGC).

Issue:
WON PRA is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) and therefore taxable
under the Local Government Code (LGC).

Ruling:
No. Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides authorizes Congress to create
GOCCs through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the
common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may
have passed the first condition of common good but failed the second one - economic viability.
Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial
activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no
other competing reclamation companies being operated by the private sector.

The Court is convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2(3) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The facts, the evidence on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was
not organized either as a stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to
operate commercially and compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government
instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated
government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property tax.
CIR vs. Philam Insurance
453 SCRA 668

Facts:
Respondents paid a total of P29,575.02 in taxes under protest to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
from August 1971 to September 1972. This amount represented a 3% tax imposed on their interest
income from mortgage and other loans, as stipulated in Section 195-A of Commonwealth Act No.
466, which was the National Internal Revenue Code at the time. The respondents contended that
they were not lending investors and thus should not be subject to this tax. On January 31, 1973, the
respondents filed a letter-claim for a refund of the taxes paid under protest. After receiving no
response, they filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on April 26, 1973.
The CTA archived the case for several years while awaiting the resolution of a similar case in
higher courts. Upon reinstatement, the CTA ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that they were
not taxable as lending investors. The CTA's decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, leading to the present petition for review by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Issue:
WON the findings of fact of the CTA are are generally conclusive before the SC.

Ruling:
Yes. Dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems, the CTA has
necessarily developed an expertise in the subject of taxation that this Court has recognized time and
again. For this reason, the findings of fact of the CTA, particularly when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are generally conclusive on this Court absent grave abuse of discretion or palpable error,
which are not present in this case.
Humprey vs. US
292 US 602

Facts:
President Roosevelt fired Mr. Humphrey, a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), in violation of a statute that said that a commissioner could only be removed for
"inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." The executor of Humphrey's estate
(plaintiff) sued the United States (defendant) for back pay. The government responded that back
pay was not merited because the removal restriction was unconstitutional. The case came before the
United States Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON the President has unrestricted power, under the U.S. Constitution, to remove a
government officer whose functions are of a legislative and judicial nature where Congress
provides specific grounds upon which the officer may be removed from office.

Ruling:
No. The President had no constitutional power to remove Humphrey outside of the reasons
specified by Congress. When Congress provides for the appointment of officers whose functions,
like those of the Federal Trade Commissioners, are of legislative and judicial quality, rather than
executive, and limits the grounds upon which they may be removed from office, the President has
no constitutional power to remove them for reasons other than those so specified.

The power of removal here claimed for the President falls within this principle, since its
coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission, which is not only wholly
disconnected from the executive department, but which, as already fully appears, was created by
Congress as a means of carrying into operation legislative and judicial powers; and as an agency of
the legislative and judicial departments.
De la Llana v. Alba
112 SCRA 294

Facts:
The petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which
reorganized the judiciary, appropriated funds for it, and included provisions that would lead to the
separation of judges from their positions unless they were appointed to the newly established
inferior courts. The petitioners argued that this legislation violated the constitutional provision
ensuring the security of tenure for judges, as it effectively terminated their incumbency.

Issue:
WON there is a lack of good faith in the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Ruling:
No. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. In this case, no
removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the validity of the
abolition of their offices. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal
nor separation of the incumbents. And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith.

The Court found no evidence of bad faith in the legislative process, as the law was the result of
extensive study and deliberation by a committee tasked with judicial reorganization. The ruling
underscored the principle that the judiciary must adapt to changing societal needs while
maintaining its independence, and that the legislature has a legitimate role in ensuring the effective
administration of justice.
Banda v. Ermita
GR No. 166620
April 20, 2010

Facts:
The case originates from the issuance of Executive Order No. 378 (EO 378) by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, amending EO No. 285 which was issued by former President Corazon C.
Aquino. EO No. 285 established the National Printing Office (NPO) by merging the Government
Printing Office with relevant units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA), granting it
exclusive printing jurisdiction over government forms, ballots, and public documents. EO 378,
however, removed the NPO ’ s exclusive printing jurisdiction, allowing government agencies to
source printing services from the private sector under certain conditions and limited the NPO’ s
appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income.

Petitioners, consisting of 67 employees of the NPO, filed a petition directly to the Supreme
Court, characterizing their action as a class suit on behalf of all NPO employees. They challenged
EO 378 on two grounds: (1) that President Arroyo does not have the authority to amend or repeal
EO No. 285, and (2) EO 378 violates the petitioners’ security of tenure.

Issue:
WON President Arroyo can amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 by the mere issuance of
another executive order (Executive Order No. 378)

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed that the President has the power to reorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control
over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize
executive offices under existing statutes. The Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President
continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President.
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
GR No. 196425
July 24, 2012

Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12), which
established the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) with the authority to investigate
administrative cases against presidential appointees. On November 15, 2010, President Benigno
Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), which abolished the PAGC and
transferred its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), specifically to a newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).

Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed a complaint against Pichay and other members of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) Board of Trustees for grave misconduct related
to the purchase of shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc. Following this, Pichay received an order
from Executive Secretary Ochoa requiring him to submit a written explanation regarding the
complaint. Pichay filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that a similar case was already pending before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Claiming a lack of adequate legal remedy, Pichay filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 13 on several grounds, including
usurpation of legislative powers, violation of due process, and encroachment upon the powers of
the Ombudsman.

Issue:
WON E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for usurping the power of Congress to delegate
quasi-judicial powers to administrative agencies.

Ruling:
No. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.
Lacson – Magallanez, Co., Inc. v. Pano
21 SCRA 895

Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said
land was a forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his
rights to Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño and other
farmers filed their application to buy the same parcel of land. At the same time, LMC also applied
to buy the same land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s application and gave due course to the
application of LMC. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied Paño ’ s appeal hence it was
elevated to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. Now,
LMC subsequently filed a case in the Court of First Instance, seeking to declare the Secretary's
decision as having full force and effect and to nullify the Executive Secretary's decision. The lower
court dismissed the case, leading to the appeal.

Issue:
WON decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when
approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and is controlling not only upon
courts but also upon the President.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said
that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to
the Office of the President.
Montes v. CAB
101 Phil 490, 492-493

Facts:
Montes was employed as a watchman in the Floating Equipment Section of the Ports and
Harbors Division under the Bureau of Public Works. An administrative case, designated as Case
No. E-8182, was initiated against him due to allegations of negligence in his duties. Initially, the
Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated Montes based on findings from a committee. However,
the Civil Service Board of Appeals later modified this decision, finding him guilty of contributory
negligence for not performing his duty to pump out the water. Consequently, the Board ordered that
he be considered resigned effective from his last day of duty, with pay, but without prejudice to
possible reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer. Montes subsequently filed an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila seeking to review the Board's decision. However, the
court dismissed his action on a motion to dismiss, ruling that he had not exhausted all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention.

Issue:
WON Court of First Instance err in dismissing Montes' action for failing to exhaust all
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review.

Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting
this remedy before the courts will act. The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity
and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative agency
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature
resort to the courts.

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression of the policy or
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the Civil Service
directly falls in our administrative system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant
the remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be
made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Enage
152 SCRA 80

Facts:
The dispute between Lianga Bay Logging Company (petitioner) and Ago Timber Corporation
(respondent) pertains to the correct boundary line of their adjacent licensed timber areas in the
Philippines. Petitioner ’ s concession was described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49,
covering 110,406 hectares in Surigao, while respondent ’ s concession under Ordinary Timber
License No. 1323-60 covered approximately 4,000 hectares in Agusan, a portion of a larger area
originally licensed to Narciso Lansang.

Conflicts over encroachment led the Director of Forestry to order a survey to establish the
common boundary. The survey’s findings, favoring the petitioner’s interpretation of the boundary,
were protested by the respondent. Despite various levels of administrative review, including the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President, conflicting
decisions were rendered. Eventually, the Office of the President, through Assistant Executive
Secretary Gilberto Duavit, affirmed the Director of Forestry’s decision favoring petitioner.

In 1968, Ago filed a new action in the Court of First Instance of Agusan, seeking judicial
review of the administrative decisions regarding the boundary line. The respondent judge issued a
temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the Office of the President's decision

Issue:
WON respondent judge have the authority to review the administrative decisions made by the
Director of Forestry and the Office of the President.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil
Case No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the
common boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by
respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made.
Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9,
1968 and the order affirming the same dated October 2, 1968 of the Office of the President.

The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board
or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed
except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or
with grave abuse of discretion.
Smart Communications v. NTC
408 SCRA 678

Facts:
NTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 on June 16, 2000, which established rules
and regulations regarding the billing of telecommunications services. Key provisions included
requirements for timely billing statements, no charges for calls diverted to voice mail, verification
of prepaid SIM card purchasers' identities, and a reduction in billing units from one minute to six
seconds.

ISLACOM and PILTEL filed a complaint against the NTC, its Commissioner, and Deputy
Commissioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking to declare the Memorandum
Circular null and void. They argued that the NTC lacked jurisdiction over the sale of consumer
goods, that the Circular was oppressive and violated due process, and that the requirements
imposed were unreasonable. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order against the NTC's
implementation of the Circular. The NTC subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied this motion and granted
a preliminary injunction against the NTC. The NTC then sought certiorari and prohibition from the
Court of Appeals, which annulled the trial court's orders and dismissed the case.

Issue:
WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies in the case, given the
nature of the controversy.

Ruling:
NO. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation

issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set
of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its
quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial
power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances.
Eastern v. International Communications Corporation
435 SCRA 55

Facts:
The events leading to the case began with the formulation of the National Telecommunications
Development Plan (NTDP) in October 1990, aimed at fostering competition in the
telecommunications industry, which had previously been dominated by a few players. The
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) issued guidelines to rationalize local
exchange telecommunications services, leading to the National Telecommunications Commission
(NTC) defining local exchange areas and authorizing only one local exchange carrier per area. On
March 3, 1995, ICC was granted a Provisional Authority (PA) by the NTC to operate local exchange
services in Quezon City, Malabon, Valenzuela, and the Bicol region. Meanwhile, TTPI received a
PA on September 25, 1996, to operate in several provinces and cities, including Manila and Navotas.
However, on November 10, 1997, ICC was granted another PA to operate in Manila and Navotas,
areas already assigned to TTPI. This prompted TTPI and ETPI to file a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, arguing that the NTC had committed grave abuse of discretion in granting ICC
the PA for areas already assigned to TTPI. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, leading to
the present case.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in sustaining the NTC's grant of provisional authority to ICC.

Ruling:
No. The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals in
sustaining the NTC's grant of provisional authority to ICC. The power of the NTC to grant a
provisional authority has long been settled. As the regulatory agency of the national government
with jurisdiction over all telecommunications entities, it is clothed with authority and given ample
discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. It also has the authority to issue Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and maintenance of
communications facilities and services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems, including the authority to determine the areas of operations of applicants for
telecommunications services. In this regard, the NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on
matters solely within its competence.

The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC, as these are matters that are
addressed to its sound discretion, being the government agency entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under its special and technical forte. Moreover, the exercise of administrative
discretion is a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by the government agency
concerned, and not by the courts.
Sta. Rosa Realty v. Amante
453 SCRA 432

Facts:
Amante and others, residents of Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna, filed an action for
injunction with damages against SRRDC and its security personnel in the Regional Trial Court of
Laguna, alleging illegal dispossession of their lands. They claimed to have occupied the land since
1910, but SRRDC, which was the registered owner of the property, denied these allegations and
sought to evict them through several ejectment cases filed between 1986 and 1987. The Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) ruled in favor of SRRDC, but the RTC dismissed the cases, stating that the land
was agricultural and fell under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The
CA upheld the dismissal, noting that SRRDC failed to prove prior physical possession. In August
1989, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage, placing the
land under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). SRRDC protested, claiming the
land was unsuitable for agriculture and that the occupants were squatters. The DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) ruled in favor of compulsory acquisition, and the CA affirmed the decision.
SRRDC filed a petition with the Supreme Court, which remanded the case to DARAB for
re-evaluation of the land’s nature. SRRDC argued that the land was classified as a municipal park
and part of a watershed, making it exempt from CARP. However, evidence showed that the land
had been used for agriculture since at least 1979. The DARAB found that the land was suitable for
agriculture and had been cultivated by the farmer- beneficiaries. SRRDC challenged the DARAB’s
jurisdiction to determine CARP coverage, claiming it was a matter for the DAR Secretary.

Issue:
WON the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction to determine CARP coverage and not the DARAB.

Ruling:
Yes. There is no question that the power to determine whether a property is subject to CARP
coverage lies with the DAR Secretary. The DAR’s jurisdiction under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 is
two-fold. The first is essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration of the
laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance, while the second is
judicial and involves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties. Administrative
Order No. 06-00, which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI)
Cases, govern the administrative function of the DAR. Under said Rules of Procedure, the DAR
Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over classification and identification of landholdings for
coverage under the CARP, including protests or oppositions thereto and petitions for lifting of
coverage.

Thus, the power to determine whether a property is agricultural and subject to CARP coverage
together with the identification, qualification or disqualification of farmer-beneficiaries lies with
the DAR Secretary.
LLDA v. CA
231 SCRA 292

Facts:
The controversy arose from the City Government's responsibility to manage the disposal of
approximately 350 tons of garbage collected daily, which was being dumped at an open dumpsite in
Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. This situation raised significant health and
environmental concerns among the residents of the area. The Task Force Camarin Dumpsite,
representing the local parish, filed a complaint with the LLDA to halt the dumping operations due
to their harmful effects. Following an investigation, the LLDA found that the City Government had
not secured the necessary Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or clearance from the
LLDA, as mandated by various environmental laws. Consequently, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order against the City Government, which was initially complied with. However, dumping
resumed after failed negotiations between the parties. The LLDA then issued an Alias Cease and
Desist Order, which the City Government defied, leading to the LLDA enforcing the order with
police assistance. The City Government subsequently filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, seeking to declare the LLDA's cease and desist order null and void. The trial court
issued a temporary restraining order against the LLDA, which prompted the LLDA to seek relief
from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals, which ruled
that the LLDA lacked the authority to issue such orders, leading to the LLDA's petition for review.

Issue:
WON the LLDA has authority to issue such orders.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that the cease and desist order issued by the LLDA cannot be stamped as
an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No.
4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes the
LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or pollution." Section 4, par. (d)
explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as
are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also
such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the exercise,
therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi- judicial body with
respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease
and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper
agency.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under
its charter and its amendatory laws.
Soriano v. Laguardia
GR No. 164785
April 29, 2009

Facts:
Eliseo F. Soriano, host of the television program “Ang Dating Daan” aired on UNTV 37,
made offensive remarks including phrases such as "Lehitimong anak ng demonyo" and "masahol
ka pa sa putang babae." These remarks targeted Michael Sandoval, a minister of Iglesia ni Cristo
(INC) and a host of “Ang Tamang Daan.” As a result, Jessie L. Galapon and seven other members
of INC filed complaints with the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB),
prompting a hearing notice to Soriano for the use of cuss words. The MTRCB issued a notice for a
hearing on August 16, 2004, and subsequently ordered a 20-day preventive suspension of "Ang
Dating Daan." Soriano sought reconsideration of this order but later withdrew his motion and filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, challenging the preventive
suspension. On September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano liable for his remarks and imposed
a three-month suspension from his program.

Issue:
WON the preventive suspension order issued by the MTRCB against "Ang Dating Daan"
constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:
No. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative,
investigatory, regulatory, quasi- legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be
conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are
granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has
certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the
authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD
1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged
order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.

The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCB ’ s
authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), as
quoted above, which empowers the MTRCB to "supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel,
permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television
programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are
determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x
x exhibited and/or broadcast by television." Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms
part of the MTRCB’s express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory
and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would
render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory.
PHIC v. Chinese General Hospital and Medical Center
456 SCRA 459

Facts:
The dispute arose from claims filed by CGH for medical services rendered to patients from
1989 to 1992, amounting to a total of P14,291,568.71. The claims were initially submitted to the
Social Security System (SSS) before the enactment of Republic Act No. 7875, which established
PhilHealth as the successor to the Philippine Medical Care Commission (PMCC). Following the
enactment of R.A. 7875 on February 14, 1995, PhilHealth was mandated to take over the functions
and assets of the PMCC, including the handling of health insurance claims. Despite CGH's
compliance with the necessary requirements for filing claims, PhilHealth only approved a portion
of the claims, specifically P1,365,556.32, citing that the majority were filed beyond the 60-day
period stipulated in the implementing rules of R.A. 7875. CGH subsequently filed additional claims
for services rendered from 1998 to 1999, amounting to P7,554,342.93, which were also denied for
late filing. PhilHealth's final decision denied CGH's claims, leading CGH to file a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of CGH, ordering
PhilHealth to pay the full amount of the claims based on a liberal interpretation of the 60-day filing
rule.

Issue:
WON the 60-day rule for filing claims under Section 52 of the IRR of RA 7875 should be
strictly enforced against CGH.

Ruling:
No. The unreasonably strict implementation of the 60-day rule, without regard to the causes of
delay beyond respondent’s control, will be counter-productive to the long-term effectiveness of the
NHIP. This Court will not hesitate, whenever necessary, to allow a liberal implementation of the
rules and regulations of an administrative agency in cases where their unjustifiably rigid
enforcement will result in a deprivation of legal rights. In this case, respondent had already
rendered the services for which it was filing its claims. Technicalities should not be allowed to
defeat respondent’s right to be reimbursed, specially since petitioner’s charter itself guarantees such
reimbursement. While it is doctrinal in administrative law that the rules and regulations of
administrative bodies interpreting the law they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law, these
issuances are by no means iron-clad norms. Administrative bodies themselves can and have in fact
"bent the rules" for reasons of public interest.
SEC v. Interport
GR No. 135808
October 6, 2008

Facts:
On 6 August 1994, the IRC Board approved a Memorandum of Agreement with Ganda
Holdings Berhad (GHB), which entailed IRC acquiring all capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings,
Inc. (GEHI), in exchange for issuing 40.88 billion shares to GHB. Concurrently, IRC would acquire
a significant stake in Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI).

The SEC received reports alleging that IRC failed to disclose negotiations with GHB timely
and that some directors traded IRC shares using insider information. The SEC demanded the
submission of the Memorandum of Agreement and an explanation from IRC. Subsequently, the
SEC found IRC in violation of disclosure rules and determined some officers and directors
contravened Section 30 in relation to Section 36 on the Revised Securities Act. IRC and its directors
filed motions challenging the SEC’s authority and procedures, leading to the SEC forming a special
investigating panel. This decision was contested, prompting a petition filed by the respondents at
the Court of Appeals, which led to an injunction against the SEC, halting further action.

The Court of Appeals ruled against the SEC, finding that no civil, criminal or administrative
actions can possibly be had against the respondents in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act due to the absence of implementing rules and that the proceedings against
the respondents violated their rights to due process and equal protection.

Issue:
WON the absence of implementing rules nullifies Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act.

Ruling:
No. The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and
regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations for various
and varying details of management. To rule that the absence of implementing rules can render
ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised Securities Act, would empower the
administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by delaying the implementing rules. To assert
that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the
Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a
state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. It is well
established that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and regulations
conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as purport to carry into effect
its general policies. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that the rules and regulations cannot assert for
themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate from the mandate of the statute. Moreover,
where the statute contains sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation.
Tio v. VRB
151 SCRA 208

Facts:
Valentin Tio, doing business under the name and style of OMI Enterprises filed a petition
challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987, which established the Videogram
Regulatory Board with extensive powers to regulate the videogram industry. The decree aimed to
address the unregulated proliferation of videograms, which had significantly harmed the movie
industry, leading to a 40% decline in theater attendance and substantial losses in government
revenue. Additionally, on November 5, 1985, Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National
Internal Revenue Code, imposing a tax on processed video-tape cassettes. The Greater Manila
Theaters Association and other industry groups were allowed to intervene in the case, arguing that
their rights were threatened by the unchecked spread of film piracy. The petitioner raised several
constitutional objections against the decree, including claims of harsh taxation, overregulation of
the videogram industry, and undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative
body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

Issue:
WON the decree involve an undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that the DECREE does not contain an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited
period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the
Board" is not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and implementation." The true distinction is between
the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." Besides, in the
very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed
and limited period" with the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and
control of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and
corruption would not stigmatize the DECREE as unconstitutional.
Rabor v. CSC
244 SCRA 614

Facts:
Petitioner was employed as a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, having
started his government service on April 10, 1978, at the age of 55. By May 1991, Rabor was advised
by Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the same office, to apply for retirement since he had reached
the age of 68 years and had completed 13 years and 1 month of service. Rabor presented a
"Certificate of Membership" from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), which
indicated that he was extending his service to meet the 15-year requirement for retirement benefits.
Following this, the Davao City Government sought guidance from the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) regarding Rabor's situation. Director Filemon B. Cawad of the CSC Region XI advised
Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte that Rabor's continued service was contrary to Memorandum Circular
No. 65 from the Office of the President, which mandated that employees reaching the compulsory
retirement age of 65 should not be retained unless for extremely meritorious reasons, and even then,
only for a maximum of six months. Consequently, on August 8, 1991, Mayor Duterte informed
Rabor to cease reporting for work effective August 16, 1991.

Rabor subsequently requested an extension of his service until he could complete the required
15 years, asserting his capability to perform his duties. This request was denied. Rabor then
appealed to the Office of the President, which referred his case back to the CSC. The CSC
dismissed Rabor's appeal, affirming the earlier decision. Rabor sought reconsideration, citing the
Supreme Court's ruling in Cena v. Civil Service Commission, but this was also denied. Rabor
continued to pursue his case, ultimately filing a petition with the Supreme Court, challenging the
CSC's resolution and the Mayor's decision.

Issue:
WON the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Mayor exercise their discretion
appropriately in denying Rabor's request for extension.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court's decision was grounded in the interpretation of relevant laws and
administrative regulations governing retirement in the civil service. It reaffirmed the principle that
while government employees reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 may request extensions
to complete the 15-year service requirement, such requests are subject to the discretion of the head
of the agency.

The Court distinguished Rabor's case from the precedent set in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission, noting that in Cena, the agency had not exercised its discretion, whereas in Rabor's
case, the Davao City Government had validly exercised its discretion to deny the extension based
on legitimate reasons, including Rabor's age and the filling of his position.
PAL v. CAB
279 SCRA 536

Facts:
GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity which was assigned
CAB Case No. EP-12711. The CAB set a hearing for December 16, 1994, and required GrandAir to
notify all scheduled Philippine domestic operators. GrandAir filed a compliance request for a
Temporary Operating Permit (TOP). PAL, which holds a legislative franchise for air transport
services, opposed GrandAir's application, arguing that the CAB lacked jurisdiction to hear the
application since GrandAir did not possess a legislative franchise, a requirement under Section 11,
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The CAB denied PAL's opposition, asserting its
jurisdiction to hear the application. Subsequently, the CAB issued a TOP to GrandAir for three
months, which was later extended. PAL ’ s petition to the Supreme Court contended that CAB
overstepped its authority in accepting GrandAir’s application and issuing a temporary permit since
GrandAir lacked a legislative franchise.

Issue:
WON Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the
operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional
mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary.

Ruling:
Yes. Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or to
authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of
administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency towards the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of the practice by the courts. It is generally
recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated
agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to
agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that
privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a
legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.

Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate
or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue
the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may
operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government
agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.

Given the foregoing, the Court found that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to
issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a
domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the
other requirements prescribed by the law.
Associated Communications & Wireless Services-United Broadcasting Network v. NTC
397 SCRA 574

Facts:
Act No. 3846 was enacted which mandated that no person or entity could operate a radio
broadcasting station without a congressional franchise. In 1965, Republic Act No. 4551 granted a
franchise to Marcos J. Villaverde, Jr. and Winfred E. Villaverde, which was later transferred to
ACWS in 1969. ACWS operated several radio stations. Upon termination of petitioner's franchise
on December 31, 1981 pursuant to P.D. No. 576-A, it continued operating its radio stations under
permits granted by the NTC. However, confusion arose regarding the necessity of a congressional
franchise due to
conflicting laws and executive orders from the Martial Law era. The NTC sought clarification from
the Department of Justice (DOJ), which issued Opinion No. 98 in 1991, stating that a franchise was
still required for radio and television operations. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was
established between the NTC, the Committee on Legislative Franchises of Congress, and the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, which reiterated the need for a congressional franchise.
ACWS applied for a franchise with Congress but it was not acted upon due to failure to submit
required documents. The NTC issued a temporary permit for Channel 25 in 1995, which was
renewed in 1997. However, in 1998, the NTC ordered ACWS to cease operations for lack of a
congressional franchise, leading to Administrative Case No. 98-009. The NTC's decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, prompting ACWS to file a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
WON a congressional franchise is a necessary requirement for the operation of a radio and
television broadcasting system.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court cited its ruling in Radio Communication of the Philippines, Inc. v. National
Telecommunications Commission, "a franchise is distinguished from a CPC in that the former is a
grant or privilege from the sovereign power, while the latter is a form of regulation through the
administrative agencies."

Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state
and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police
power through its administrative agencies. The CPC was required by the Board at the same time
that P.D. No. 576-A required a franchise to operate radio and television stations. The function of the
NTC to issue CPC under E.O. No. 546 is thus nothing new and exists alongside the requirement of a
congressional franchise under P.D. No. 576-A. There is no conflict between E.O. No. 546 and P.D.
No 576-A; Section 15 of the former does not dispense with the franchise requirement in the latter.
US v. Tang Ho
43 Phil 1

Facts:
The Governor-General of the Philippines issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold, in response to an extraordinary rise in prices due to market
conditions. Subsequently, on August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against Ang Tang Ho, accusing
him of selling rice at an excessive price of eighty centavos (P0.80) per ganta, which exceeded the
price set by Executive Order No. 53 issued by the Governor-General. The complaint alleged that
this sale violated the provisions of Act No. 2868, which penalized the monopoly, hoarding, and
speculation in rice, palay, and corn. The lower court found Ang Tang Ho guilty and sentenced him
to five months' imprisonment and a fine of P500. Ang Tang Ho appealed the decision, arguing that
the Executive Order was not in effect at the time of the alleged offense, as it had not been published
until August 20, 1919, after the sale occurred.

Issue:
WON Act No. 2868 improperly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General by
allowing him to fix the prices of rice without specific guidelines.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that the Act improperly delegated legislative power to the
Governor-General. The Act left too much discretion to the Governor-General on determining
causes and conditions for implementing the Act and fixing prices, without clear guidelines or
standards.

The court's reasoning centered on the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. It
emphasized that the Legislature must define the law clearly and cannot leave essential elements,
such as the conditions under which prices may be fixed, to the discretion of the executive. The
court noted that Act No. 2868 did not provide a clear standard for what constituted an
"extraordinary rise" in prices or what constituted a valid proclamation. The lack of a defined
standard rendered the law vague and unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court highlighted that Ang
Tang Ho could not be convicted of a crime based on an Executive Order that was not published
until after the alleged offense occurred, thus violating the principle of legality in criminal law. The
ruling reinforced the importance of the separation of powers and the necessity for laws to be clear
and published before enforcement.
Pp. v. Rosenthal
68 Phil 328

Facts:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were charged with violating Act No. 2581, also known
as the Blue Sky Law, for trading speculative securities without the necessary permit. The case
involves two separate informations:

1. Case No. 52365: Between October 1, 1935, and January 22, 1936, Rosenthal and Osmeña, as
promoters and incorporators of O.R.O. Oil Co., Inc., sold shares without the required permit.
Osmeña sold 163 shares, and Rosenthal sold 21 shares, at prices ranging from P100 to P300 per
share.
2. Case No. 52366: During the same period, Rosenthal and Osmeña, as promoters and
incorporators of South Cebu Oil Co., Inc., sold shares without a permit. Osmeña sold 185
shares, and Rosenthal sold 12 shares at similar prices.

Upon joint trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila found both defendants guilty, imposing
fines of P500 to P2000 depending on the case and the defendant. They appealed on several grounds,
questioning the constitutionality of Act No. 2581 and the findings regarding the speculative nature
of the securities and their conduct.

Issue:
WON Act No. 2581 (Blue Sky Law) unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Act No. 2581 is constitutional. Act No. 2581 provided sufficient
standards for the Insular Treasurer to follow in issuing or canceling permits for the sale of
speculative securities, thus not constituting an undue delegation of legislative authority. The law's
purpose was to protect the public from fraudulent schemes, and the term "public interest" served as
a guiding principle for the Insular Treasurer's decisions. The Court also noted that the shares in
question were speculative in nature, as their value depended on future developments rather than
existing assets.
Calalang v. Williams
70 Phil 726

Facts:
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and taxpayer, challenged the resolutions
of the National Traffic Commission recommending restrictions on animal-drawn vehicles on
certain sections of Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue in Manila to facilitate traffic flow. This
recommendation, endorsed by A.D. Williams, the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission,
was subsequently approved by the Director of Public Works with amendments, and finally ratified
by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

As a result of the enforcement of these rules, animal-drawn vehicles were prohibited from
operating on the specified roads during certain hours, adversely affecting the livelihood of their
owners and the convenience of the public. Calalang contested the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 548, under which these rules were promulgated, arguing that it constituted
an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue:
WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 548. The
Court held that the delegation of authority under Commonwealth Act No. 548 was not a delegation
of legislative power but rather an administrative function to execute the law. The law itself aimed to
promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads, which is a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power. The Court cited previous jurisprudence, emphasizing that the legislature can
delegate the authority to determine facts or circumstances necessary for the execution of the law
without relinquishing its power to make the law itself.

In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment
of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations.
Ynot v. IAC
148 SCRA 659

Facts:
Restituto Ynot, the petitioner, transported six carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. The animals
were confiscated by the police station commander in Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for allegedly violating
Executive Order No. 626-A, which prohibited the interprovincial movement of carabaos. In
response, Ynot filed a suit for recovery and managed to secure a writ of replevin after posting a
supersedeas bond of P12,000 with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The court, however,
eventually ruled in favor of upholding the confiscation and ordered the bond forfeited since the
carabaos could no longer be produced. Moreover, the trial court chose not to pass judgment on the
constitutionality of the executive order, citing lack of authority and presumption of its validity.

Dissatisfied, Ynot appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Ynot then elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, challenging the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

Issue:
WON EO No. 626-A is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose
of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of
the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers
to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority
that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and
therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. Hence, Executive Order No. 626-A
unconstitutional.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
GR No. 206566
November 19, 2014

Facts:
The petitions. were filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul the provisions
of the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2013 that provide for the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) and other lump-sum discretionary funds. The petitioners argue that these
provisions violate the principles of separation of powers, checks and balances, and accountability,
and perpetuate a culture of patronage politics and political dynasty. They also contested the
executive’ s use of the Malampaya Funds under Section 8 of PD 910 and the Presidential Social
Fund under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for purposes they claimed were
unconstitutional.

Issue:
WON the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential
Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the
limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may
be used.

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund
may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second
indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social
Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however,
gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure
development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same.
Pelaez v. Auditor
15 SCRA 569

Facts:
The President of the Philippines issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124, and 126 to 129,
creating thirty-three (33) municipalities. Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez, acting as a taxpayer,
filed a special civil action against the Auditor General on November 10, 1964, seeking to restrain
the audit and disbursement of public funds for these newly created municipalities. Pelaez
challenged the validity of these Executive Orders, arguing they were null and void under Section 68
of the Revised Administrative Code, claiming this section had been implicitly repealed by Republic
Act 2370 and constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

Issue:
WON Section 68 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court held that although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law,
it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate— and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be
no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the
very foundation of our Republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
Abakada Guro v. Ermita
469 SCRA 1

Facts:
The case involves multiple petitions questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9337, also known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax (E-VAT) Law. The petitioners include the
ABAKADA GURO Party List, various senators led by Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and several
associations of petroleum dealers. The petitions were filed in response to the enactment of R.A. No.
9337, which amended several provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) to increase
the value-added tax (VAT) rate from 10% to 12% under certain conditions. The petitioners assert
that R.A. 9337 contains provisions which delegate the legislative power of taxation to the executive
branch, specifically granting the President the authority to increase the VAT rate under certain
conditions. This, along with other provisions on the imposition of VAT, input tax credits, and final
withholding tax, is claimed to be unconstitutional. The lower courts dismissed the petitions, leading
to the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
WON R.A. No. 9337 ’ s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance,
constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:
No. The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence
of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. Congress does not
abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible.
Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The intent and
will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the task of the President is to simply
execute the legislative policy. That Congress chose to use the GDP as a benchmark to determine
economic growth is not within the province of the Court to inquire into, its task being to interpret
the law.
SEC v. Universal Rightfield Property Holding
GR No. 181381
July 20, 2015

Facts:
URPHI is a corporation registered under Philippine laws, primarily engaged in providing
residential and leisure-related services to the middle and upper middle-income market. The SEC
issued an Order revoking URPHI's Registration of Securities and Permit to Sell Securities to the
Public due to its failure to timely file its Year 2001 Annual Report and Year 2002 Quarterly Reports,
as mandated by Section 17 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC), Republic Act No. 8799.
Following this, URPHI filed a Manifestation/Urgent Motion to set aside the revocation order, which
the SEC granted after URPHI complied with its reportorial requirements and paid a reduced fine of
P82,000. However, URPHI subsequently failed to meet the same reportorial obligations again.

SEC notified URPHI to show cause why its Registration should not be suspended for failure to
submit the 2003 Annual Report and 2004 1st Quarter Report. During the hearing, URPHI explained
its shortcomings due to a reduced accounting staff and audit delays. The SEC suspended URPHI’s
Registration due to non-compliance and warned of possible revocation. URPHI requested further
extensions to comply. Despite these extensions, URPHI only filed its required reports in December
2004. The SEC then revoked URPHI ’ s Registration due to non-fulfillment of its reportorial
obligations. URPHI appealed, but the SEC denied this appeal.

URPHI then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals (CA), which set aside the
SEC’s revocation due to a lack of due process in revoking registration without separate notice and
hearing for revocation. The SEC sought reversal of the CA decision before the Supreme Court,
arguing compliance with due process standards.

Issue:
WON notice and hearing are indispensable when an administrative agency exercises
quasi-judicial functions.

Ruling:
Yes. The revocation of registration of securities and permit to sell them to the public is not an
exercise of the SEC's quasi-judicial power, but of its regulatory power. A "quasi-judicial function"
is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies,
who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. Although Section 13.1 of the SRC requires due notice and hearing before issuing an order of
revocation, the SEC does not perform such quasi-judicial functions and exercise discretion of a
judicial nature in the exercise of such regulatory power. It neither settles actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, nor adjudicates private rights and
obligations in cases of adversarial nature. Rather, when the SEC exercises its incidental power to
conduct administrative hearings and make decisions, it does so in the course of the performance of
its regulatory and law enforcement function.
Patalinghug v. COMELEC
GR No. 178767
Jan 30, 2008

Facts:
During the national and local elections held on May 14, 2007, in Lapu-Lapu City, the
petitioners contested local positions such as mayor, vice-mayor, and councilor. During the
canvassing process, the petitioners raised objections regarding the composition of the Board of
Canvassers (BOC) and the inclusion of certain election returns (ERs). The BOC ruled against their
objections, prompting the petitioners to file notices of appeal and subsequently a Pre-Proclamation
Petition with the COMELEC, challenging the legality of the BOC's composition and proceedings.
They also filed another appeal seeking to exclude 182 ERs from the canvass based on alleged
violations of the Omnibus Election Code. On May 25, 2007, the COMELEC First Division ordered
the BOC to proclaim the winning candidates, which occurred on May 26. Dissatisfied, the
petitioners sought to nullify this proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed their Pre-Proclamation
Petition and subsequently issued an Omnibus Resolution which excluded the petitioners' cases
from the list of active pre-proclamation cases. The petitioners filed a certiorari petition challenging
the COMELEC's resolutions.

Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners'
Pre-Proclamation Petition and excluding their cases from the list of active pre-proclamation cases

Ruling:
No. The determination by the COMELEC of the merits of a pre-proclamation case definitely
involves the exercise of adjudicatory powers. The COMELEC examines and weighs the parties ’
pieces of evidence vis-à-vis their respective arguments, and considers whether, on the basis of the
evidence thus far presented, the case appears to have merit. Where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions
of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi- judicial.

For an action for certiorari to prosper, there must be a showing that the COMELEC acted with
"grave abuse of discretion," which means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof. In the present case, petitioners have not
sufficiently shown that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in excluding their cases from
the list of those that shall continue. Apart from petitioners’ bare allegations, the record is bereft of
any evidence to prove that petitioners ’ pre-proclamation cases appear meritorious. Let it be
stressed that under Section 16 of Article 7166, the proceedings may continue when "on the basis of
the evidence thus far presented," the COMELEC determines that the pre-proclamation petition
appears meritorious.
City Engineer of Baguio v. Banigued
GR no. 150270
November 26, 2008

Facts:
Generoso Bonifacio, acting for Purificacion de Joya and others, filed a complaint seeking the
demolition of Rolando Baniqued’s house in Upper Quezon Hill, Baguio City, alleging that it was
constructed illegally without permits. On May 19, 1999, then-Mayor of Baguio City, Mauricio
Domogan, issued a Notice of Demolition against Rolando and Fidela Baniqued, stating their
structures were illegal. Rolando Baniqued contested the notice by filing a complaint for prohibition
with a TRO/injunction at the RTC, citing a lack of due process and arguing that demolition
required a court order and prior relocation under RA 7279.

The RTC issued a TRO but later dismissed Baniqued’s action for lack of cause, ruling that the
mayor ’ s functions were neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, and citing procedural failure due to
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC ’ s decision was upheld on a Motion for
Reconsideration. Baniqued appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which overturned the RTC
decision, recognizing the mayor ’ s quasi-judicial function and presence of cause of action, and
remanded the case to RTC for further proceedings. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
WON the CA erred in ruling that the mayor’s issuance of a Notice of Demolition constitutes a
quasi-judicial function.

Ruling:
No. There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing
demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in
determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are
involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally
guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise
quasi-judicial powers. Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial
function as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of
quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.
Tadlip v. Borres
474 SCRA 441

Facts:
The Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued OCT No. P-106 and Emancipation Patent No.
A-028380 to Eusebio E. Arce, granting him ownership of 3,908 square meters of agricultural land in
Mambajao, Camiguin, previously owned by Angel Madarieta. A Deed of Transfer was executed
between Madarieta and Arce, wherein the land was transferred to Arce in exchange for 750
kerosene cans of palay. After Arce's death his two minor daughters became his heirs, while Tadlip,
his nephew, took over the responsibility of tilling the land. Tadlip filed a petition for reallocation of
the land, which was granted by respondent Borres. However, unbeknownst to Tadlip, Borres later
issued an order canceling the original title and ordering the issuance of a new title in favor of
Madarieta without notifying Tadlip or the heirs of Arce. This order was based on Madarieta's
petition, which claimed that she had not been able to exercise her right of retention and that the land
was idle and unproductive. Tadlip discovered the cancellation only when he received a copy of the
order. He filed an urgent motion for reconsideration, which was denied by Borres. Subsequently,
Borres ruled against Tadlip in a related complaint filed by Madarieta, and granted her motion for
execution pending appeal despite Tadlip's objections. Tadlip filed an administrative complaint
against Borres, alleging multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
procedural irregularities in the handling of the cases.

The IBP found that respondent violated Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
disregarding and failing to apply the specific provisions of the 1994 New Rules of Procedure
(DARAB Rules) in disposing of DARAB Case Nos. X-99-02 and X-99-04 and recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Issue:
WON the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) appropriate
given the circumstances of the case

Ruling:
No. While the Court agreed with the findings of the IBP, it held that the recommended penalty
is quite slight for the infractions done by respondent. Respondent is not only a lawyer practicing his
profession, but also a provincial adjudicator, a public officer tasked with the duty of deciding
conflicting claims of the parties. He is part of the quasi-judicial system of our government. Thus,
by analogy, the present dispute may be likened to administrative cases of judges whose manner of
deciding cases was similarly subject of respective administrative cases. It has also been held that
when the law violated is elementary, the failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. The disregard of established rule of law which amounts to gross ignorance of law makes a
judge subject to disciplinary action.

A member of the bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations.
Respondent, as a Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB, was reposed with a higher gravamen of
responsibility than a lawyer in private practice. The recommended penalty of two months
suspension is too light under the circumstances, and a penalty of six (6) months’ suspension more
appropriate.
Comelec v. Espanol
417 SCRA 554

Facts:
Florentino A. Bautista, the official candidate of the Lakas party for Municipal Mayor of Kawit,
Cavite, filed an Affidavit-Complaint against several individuals for violations of the Omnibus
Election Code, specifically for vote buying. The complaint was docketed as EO Case No. 98-219,
and 44 out of 77 witnesses provided affidavits supporting the allegations. Following a preliminary
investigation, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 99-0346 authorizing the filing of
information against the respondents in the proper Regional Trial Court. The case was assigned to
the RTC of Cavite, specifically to Branch 90, presided over by Judge Espaol. The court ordered a
reinvestigation of the case.

Meanwhile, a separate complaint for vote selling was filed against the witnesses of Bautista,
leading to the issuance of a resolution by the Office of the Cavite Provincial Prosecutor which
found probable cause against the respondents for violations of the Omnibus Election Code. The
cases were subsequently raffled to various RTC branches, including Branch 90, which handled
Criminal Cases Nos. 7960-00 to 7969-00. The respondents appealed the resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor to the COMELEC, asserting that the Commission had exclusive authority over the
prosecution of election offenses. The COMELEC initially denied the appeal but later approved a
recommendation to nullify the Provincial Prosecutor's resolution and exempt the respondents from
prosecution. The Law Department of the COMELEC filed an Omnibus Motion to dismiss the cases
pending in Branch 90 because the accused are exempt, under Section 28(4) of Republic Act No.
6646, from prosecution and that the prosecution of election offenses were under the sole control of
the COMELEC. The trial court denied the motion, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration
was also denied.

Issue:
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting immunity to the
witnesses.

Ruling:
No. The power to grant exemptions is vested solely on the petitioner. This power is
concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute
those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial
court. Neither may this Court interfere with the petitioner’s exercise of its discretion in denying or
granting exemptions under the law, unless the petitioner commits a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. There is no showing in the record that the petitioner
committed abuse of discretion in granting immunity to the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99
and in nullifying the Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor in I.S. No. 1-99- 1080. It cannot be
over-emphasized that the authority given to the petitioner to grant exemptions should be used to
achieve and further its mandate to insure clean, honest, peaceful and orderly elections.
RCPI v. NTC
215 SCRA 455

Facts:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams
through petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to
his sister and brother-in-law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, llocos Norte,
with the following identical texts: MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY. Both
telegrams did not reach their destinations on the expected dates. Thus, private respondent filed a
letter-complaint against the RCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for
poor service, with a request for the imposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the
company. NTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. It found RCPI administratively
liable for deficient and inadequate service defined under Section 19(a) of C.A. 146 and imposed the
penalty of FINE payable within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof in the aggregate amount of PHP
1,000.00. RCPI then filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed. Hence, the petition.
Petitioner RCPI invoked, C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public Service
Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. The Office of the Solicitor General
contended that the power and authority of the NTC to impose fines is incidental to its power to
regulate public service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities, which are now
clearly defined in Section 15, Executive Order No. 546

Issue:
WON the NTC has jurisdiction to administratively impose fines on a telegraph company
which fails to render adequate service to a consumer.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that the NTC lacked jurisdiction to impose fines. The NTC stepped "into
the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service
Act. The Board in other words, did not possess the power to impose administrative fines on public
services rendering deficient service to customers, ergo its successor cannot arrogate unto itself such
power, in the absence of legislation.

No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the
Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant
of power to impose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies,
which have failed to render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of
the supervisory and regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to
reiterate the settled doctrine in administrative law that: "Too basic in administrative law to need
citation of jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like
respondent Commission, are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from those
granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdiction is
void and ineffective..."
SLU v Olairez
GR No. 197126
January 19, 2021

Facts:
Baby Nellie Olairez (Olairez) and a group of graduating students from Saint Louis University
(SLU)'s College of Medicine batch 2001 filed their Complaint for Mandatory Injunction with
Damages and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial
Court against Dean Elizabeth Dacanay, and certain unidentified individuals working under SLU,
challenging the implementation of the revised version of Comprehensive Oral and Written
Examination (COWE), a prerequisite for graduation from SLU's medicine course. The revised
COWE was allegedly contrary to SLU's handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation.

Olairez submitted her graduation application (with waiver) and was allowed to attend the
graduation rites; thereafter, RTC granted the writ of Preliminary Injunction preventing SLU and
Dean Dacanay from enforcing the revised COWE. Subsequently, Olairez and company obtained
clearances from various departments except for two, with Dean Dacanay refusing to issue
certification in their favor which led to Olairez's petition praying for the release of certificates,
clearances, diploma, and to declare the COWE as moot and academic insofar as they were
concerned. RTC held that COWE was indeed moot and academic on the ground that SLU had
already allowed the group to attend the graduation rites, and the Commission on Higher Education
had already issued a certification that the Olairez group had completed requirements
notwithstanding grant of autonomy. Aggrieved, petitioners interposed an appeal with the CA. The
CA rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming in toto the ruling of the RTC. Hence, the
petition. Petitioners contend, in the main, that the imposition of the Revised COWE is a reasonable
exercise of its academic freedom, justified by the public policy on the need to elevate the standards
of medical education. In addition, petitioners assert that the case has not been rendered moot and
academic because SLU possesses the autonomy to confer degrees independent of CHED's actions.

Issue:
WON the CA erred when it dismissed petitioner's appeal for being moot and academic.

Ruling:
No. It is apparent that "the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of
higher education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions,
public and private, belong to the CHED." In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter
fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make
them perform their duties. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions
in order to render the power real and effective. The grant of autonomous status in favor of SLU
does not negate the power supervision conferred by law upon CHED. The legal maxim that "when
the law does not distinguish, neither should the court" applies in this case. Since SLU failed and
refused outright to confer respondents' degrees notwithstanding their fulfillment of all the
requirements for the attainment thereof, CHED validly stepped in after its Jurisdiction was invoked
by said respondents. CHED acted well within its power when it recognized respondent's
completion of all the requisites necessary for the conferment of their Doctor of Medicine degrees.
All told, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it dismissed petitioners' appeal for being
moot and academic.
Philhealth v. COA
GR No. 250089
November 9, 2021

Facts:
COA ’ s audit team issued Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 2013-01(12) disallowing the
payment of various allowances and benefits totaling P56,577,286.88 to employees of the petitioner
for the year 2012. Benefits such as Shuttle Service Allowance, Medical Mission and Critical
Allowance, Birthday Gift, and several others were disallowed by COA for lacking proper
authorization and approval from the President or appropriate agencies, as required. The petitioner
appealed the disallowance to the COA-Corporate Government Cluster (COA-CGS). The
COA-CGS upheld the disallowance, stating GOCC ’ s power to determine compensation is not
absolute and must conform to statutory standards. The petitioner then lodged a Petition for Review
before the COA-Commission Proper (COA-CP), which dismissed the petition as it was filed out of
time. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied by COA, reaffirming the liability of
officials for the refund due to lack of good faith. A petition for certiorari was filed with the
Supreme Court challenging the COA’s Decision and Resolution, invoking fiscal autonomy under
R.A. No. 7875.

Issue:
WON R.A. No. 7875 confer fiscal autonomy to PhilHealth to determine personnel
compensation independently of established compensation standards and presidential approval.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that while R.A. No. 7875 grants PhilHealth the authority to set
compensation, it must still adhere to prevailing laws like P.D. No. 1597 which requires presidential
approval for additional allowances. Such authority should not be construed in isolation from other
legal mandates.

As a matter of course, GOCCs are always subject to the supervision and control of the
President. The Revised Administrative Code further elaborates that GOCCs are part of the
executive department for they are attached to the appropriate department with which they have
allied functions. In Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) v. Commission on Audit, this
Court has aptly emphasized that under our system of government, all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices are under the control of the President of the Philippines. Such principle is
embodied in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Invariably, its very nature as a GOCC
dictates that while it may have the mandate to fix the compensation of its personnel, the President
may nevertheless exercise the powers of supervision and control over it by approving its grant of
allowances and other benefits, pursuant to P.D. No. 1597.
PSALM v. CIR
GR. No. 198146
August 8, 2017

Facts:
The Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM), a
government-owned and controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 9136 (Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or EPIRA), sought to manage the sale, disposition, and
privatization of the National Power Corporation (NPC) assets in an orderly manner. This included
the Pantabangan-Masiway and Magat Hydroelectric Power Plants, which were sold through public
biddings won by First Gen Hydropower Corporation and SN Aboitiz Power Corporation,
respectively. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) demanded the payment of P3,813,080,472 as
deficiency value-added tax (VAT) for the sales. PSALM remitted this amount under protest and
filed a petition with the Department of Justice (DOJ), contesting the VAT imposition. The DOJ
ruled in favor of PSALM, declaring the VAT imposition null and void and ordered a refund. The
BIR contested the DOJ’s jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be within the purview of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Court of Appeals sided with the BIR, nullifying the DOJ’s decisions
for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:
WON the DOJ has jurisdiction to settle the dispute.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that since the case is a dispute solely between PSALM and NPC, both
government-owned and controlled corporations, and the BIR, a National Government office, PD
242 clearly applies and the Secretary of Justice has jurisdiction over this case. It is only proper that
intra-governmental disputes be settled administratively since the opposing government offices,
agencies and instrumentalities are all under the President's executive control and supervision.
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution states unequivocally that: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."

Clearly, the President's constitutional power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus
and offices cannot be curtailed or diminished by law. "Since the Constitution has given the
President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which
can curtail such power." This constitutional power of control of the President cannot be diminished
by the CTA. Thus, if two executive offices or agencies cannot agree, it is only proper and logical
that the President, as the sole Executive who under the Constitution has control over both offices or
agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead of the courts. The judiciary should not
intrude in this executive function of determining which is correct between the opposing
government offices or agencies, which are both under the sole control of the President. Under his
constitutional power of control, the President decides the dispute between the two executive offices.
The judiciary cannot substitute its decision over that of the President. Only after the President has
decided or settled the dispute can the courts' jurisdiction be invoked. Until such time, the judiciary
should not interfere since the issue is not yet ripe for judicial adjudication. Otherwise, the judiciary
would infringe on the President's exercise of his constitutional power of control over all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Venus Commercial v. DOH
GR No. 240764
November 18, 2021

Facts:
Venus Commercial Co., Inc. (Venus) found itself in contention with the Department of Health
(DOH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) following the issuance of FDA Personnel
Order No. 2014-220. This dispute originated from a letter by the EcoWaste Coalition to the FDA
regarding the allegedly high lead content in Venus’s Artex Fine Water Colors. No FDA approval
was on record for these products. Acting on the complaint, the FDA conducted laboratory tests on
purchased samples of the subject water colors, which revealed lead content exceeding allowed
limits. Consequently, the FDA attempted to enforce FDA Personnel Order No. 2014-220 to enter
Venus’ premises for inspection and possible seizure of the said water colors, citing public health
safety concerns. Venus resisted, arguing constitutional rights violations, specifically against illegal
search and seizure and due process. Venus took the matter to court, challenging the
constitutionality of certain provisions under the Republic Acts 9711 and 3720, and their
Implementing Rules and Regulations. Venus asserted there was no law permitting the
Director-General of the FDA to padlock a production facility.

Issue:
WON the Director-General is authorized to padlock erring establishments.

Ruling:
Yes. there is no express provision in RA 3720, as amended, authorizing the FDA
Director-General to padlock a production facility pending hearing before the FDA. This authority,
however, is deemed subsumed in the statutory powers of the FDA Director-General "(to) issue
orders of seizure, to seize and hold in custody any article or articles of food, device, cosmetics,
household hazardous substances and health products that are adulterated, counterfeited, misbranded,
or unregistered; or any drug, in-vitro diagnostic reagents, biologicals, and vaccine that is
adulterated or misbranded." In other words, the grant of such authority to the FDA
Director-General necessarily includes all such powers, even those not expressly stated, that are
necessary to effectuate such authority. This is the doctrine of necessary implication.

Another, Section 30(6) of RA 3720, as amended by RA 9711, specifically allows the

Director-General to "exercise such powers and functions as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of this Act." This catch-all provision clearly grants the Director-General all
necessary and incidental powers that are reasonably germane to his or her functions under the law.
This is supplemented by Section 22 of the law which mandates the DOH to promulgate, in
consultation with the FDA, IRR of the law within 120 days after its passage. This is precisely why
Article VII, Section 3, paragraph (b)(2) of the IRR was enacted by the DOH. It specifically
provided that the Director-General can order the padlocking of establishments suspected to have
violated the FDA Act for the purpose of preventing the disposition or tampering of evidence, the
continuance of acts being complained of, and the flight of the respondent, as the case may be.
Syjuco Jr. v. Abaya
GR 215650, 215653, 215703, 214704 & 216735
March 28, 2023

Facts:
The consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and/or Prohibition,2 assailed the constitutionality of
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)3 Department Order No. 2014-014
(D.O. No. 2014-014), which mandated the application of the "user-pays" principle and adopted a
uniform base fare for the Light Rail Transit (LRT) Lines 1 and 2 and the Metro Rail Transit (MRT)
Line 3 of PHP 11.00 plus PHP 1.00 per kilometer of distance traveled.

Petitioners alleged, in substance, that D.O. No. 2014-014 violates the due process clause of the
Constitution as it was issued without prior notice and hearing.5 They insisted that the effective 50 to
87% increase in the fare rates is ruthless, arbitrary,6 and without basis in fact and in law.7
Ultimately, they pray that D.O. No. 2014-014 be struck down as illegal and unconstitutional, and
that respondents be permanently enjoined from implementing the provisions thereof. Petitioners
argued that the public respondents, in issuing D.O. No. 2014-014, exceeded their authority as
conferred by law and acted in violation of the prescribed procedure for the setting of public
transportation fares. Further, the issuance of D.O. No. 2014-014 is quasi-judicial in nature,
correctible through certiorari.

Issue:
WON the DOTC exceeded its authority.

Ruling:
No. The exercise of subordinate legislation must always be circumscribed by the completeness
test and the sufficient standard test. For a valid delegation of legislative power, the legislature must
have: (1) set forth the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (2)
prescribed sufficient guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority. Thus, when an administrative agency establishes a rate, "its act must both be
non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature;
otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional."

The Administrative Code of 1987 sets forth the DOTC's mandate and declared policy. To
pursue such mandate, Section 3 (15), Chapter 1, Title XV, Book IV vested in the Department the
power, among others, to determine, fix or prescribe charges or rates pertinent to postal services and
to the operation of public air and land transportation utility facilities and services. Further, the
Administrative Code of 1987 has vested in the secretaries of each department the authority and
responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the department and for the discharge of its powers
and functions. The department secretary shall have supervision and control over the department.

Considering all the foregoing provisions, the then DOTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
rule-making power, is limited by the DOTC's declared policy and mandate - viability, efficiency,
speed, safety, dependability, and reliability. In other words, the legislature validly delegated its
rate-fixing power to the DOTC, such power having been appropriately circumscribed by complete
policies and sufficient guidelines. Anyhow, this Court has ruled that when it comes to rate-fixing,
"the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just." In the absence of an express
requirement as to reasonableness, the standard is considered implied.

Clearly, public respondent DOTC Secretary Abaya merely exercised such rate-fixing and
rule-making authority through subordinate regulation by promulgating D.O. No. 2014-014.
Rosales v. ERC
GR No. 201852
April 5, 2016

Facts:
The MCC/RFSC is a fund collected from EC member-consumers to finance the expansion,
rehabilitation, or upgrading of the ECs' electric power systems. It is governed by ERC Resolution
No. 20 (2009) and Resolution No. 14 (2011). The funds are to be used exclusively for capital
expenditures, placed in a separate account, and treated as contributions from member-consumers. If
a member-consumer terminates their contract with the EC, their contribution cannot be withdrawn
and is instead treated as Contribution in Aid of Construction (CIAC) or converted into share capital
for ECs registered under the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA).

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on the unconstitutionality of the
Members' Contribution for Capital Expenditures (MCC) later renamed as Reinvestment Fund for
Sustainable Capital Expenditures (RFSC) imposed by Electric Cooperatives pursuant to the Rules
and Resolution of the Energy Regulation Commission (ERC). Petitioners argue that the
MCC/RFSC:
1. Violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
2. Constitutes taking property without just compensation, as member-consumers are not fairly
compensated for their contributions.
3. Violates the constitutional provisions on social justice and the promotion of cooperatives.
4. Contradicts the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 269 (PD 269), which governs ECs.

Petitioners claim that the MCC/RFSC should be treated as patronage capital, an equity or
investment that can be withdrawn by member-consumers upon termination of their contract with
the EC.

Issue:
WON Rule 65 is the correct remedy to question the validity of RSEC-WR and Resolution No.
14.

Ruling:
No. Certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate only when a tribunal, board, or officer acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The ERC exercised neither judicial
nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and implementing the RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it
was not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner,
discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Instead, RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were
done in the exercise of the ERC's quasi-legislative and administrative functions. It was in the nature
of subordinate legislation, promulgated in the exercise of its delegated power. Quasi-legislative
power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of powers flowing
from the separation of the branches of the government. Particularly, the ERC applied its
rule-making power as expressly granted by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136.
 Granting arguendo, that the MCC/RFSC imposition is in the exercise of the ERC's
quasi-judicial function, still, the petition should have been filed before the Court of Appeals, which
may entertain a petition for certiorari whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Indeed, petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Petitioners should have first
exhausted administrative remedies by filing their claims with the ERC before seeking judicial relief.
Alliance for Family Foundation v. Garin
GR. No. 217872 / 221866
April 26, 2017

Facts:
Petitioners opposed the unilateral act of the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) on
re-certifying the contraceptive drugs named Implanon and Implanon NT; the basis of their
opposition hinges on the fact that these drugs are abortifacients. Thus, according to them, they
should have been given notice of the certification proceedings, and a chance to present evidence
that indeed such drugs are abortifacients.

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioners are not entitled to notice and hearing
because the said proceedings are done in the exercise of its regulatory power, not quasi-judicial
power; also, they alleged that the Honorable Supreme Court is incompetent to rule on the instant
controversy due to the same reason.

Issue:
WON the certification proceedings conducted by the FDA in the exercise of its regulatory
powers is beyond judicial review.

Ruling:
No. The Court held that it has the power to review all acts and decisions where there is a
commission of grave abuse of discretion. No less than the Constitution decrees that the Court must
exercise its duty to ensure that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction is committed by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Such is committed
when there is a violation of the constitutional mandate that "no person is deprived of life, liberty,
and property without due process of law." The Court's power cannot be curtailed by the FDA's
invocation of its regulatory power. When there is grave abuse of discretion, such as denying a party
of his constitutional right to due process, the Court can come in and exercise its power of judicial
review. It can review the challenged acts, whether exercised by the FDA in its ministerial,
quasi-judicial or regulatory power.