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Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
oppress a part of their number, and precautions are needed against
this as against any other abuse of power. So much will be readily
granted by most, and yet no attempt has been made to find the
fitting adjustment between individual independence and social
control.
The object of this essay is to assert the simple principle that the
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection—that the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others, either by
his action or inaction. The only part of the conduct of anyone for
which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of
right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the
individual is sovereign.
This principle requires, firstly, liberty of conscience in the most
comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling; absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological—the liberty even of
publishing and expressing opinions. Secondly, the principle requires
liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit
our own character; of doing as we like, so long as we do not harm
our fellow-creatures. Thirdly, the principle requires liberty of
combination among individuals for any purpose not involving harm
to others, provided the persons are of full age and not forced or
deceived.
The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing
our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to
deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Mankind
gains more by suffering each other to live as seems good to
themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the
rest.
 Coercion in matters of thought and discussion must always be
illegitimate. If all mankind save one were of one opinion, mankind
would be no more justified in silencing the solitary individual than
he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. The
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of opinion is that it is robbing
the whole human race, present and future—those who dissent from
the opinion even more than those who hold it. For if the opinion is
right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for
truth; and if wrong, they lose the clear and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.
All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility, and, as
all history teaches, neither communities nor individuals are infallible.
Men cannot be too often reminded of the condemnation of Socrates
and of Christ, and of the persecution of the Christians by the noble-
minded Marcus Aurelius.
Enemies of religious freedom maintain that persecution is a good
thing, for, even though it makes mistakes, it will root out error while
it cannot extirpate truth. But history shows that even if truth cannot
be finally extirpated, it may at least be put back centuries.
We no longer put heretics to death; but we punish heresies with
a social stigma almost as effective, since it may debar men from
earning their bread. Social intolerance does not actually eradicate
heresies, but it induces men to hide unpopular opinions. The result
is that new and heretical opinions smoulder in the narrow circles of
thinking and studious persons who originate them, and never light
up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or deceptive
light. The price paid for intellectual pacification is the sacrifice of the
entire moral courage of the human race. Who can compute what the
world loses in the multitude of promising intellects too timid to
follow out any bold, independent train of thought lest it might be
considered irreligious or immoral? No one can be a great thinker
who does not follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may
lead. In a general atmosphere of mental slavery a few great thinkers
may survive, but in such an atmosphere there never has been, and
never will be, an intellectually active people; and all progress in the
human mind and in human institutions may be traced to periods of
mental emancipation.
Even if an opinion be indubitably true and undoubtingly believed,
it will be a dead dogma, and not a living truth, if it be not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed. If the cultivation of the
understanding consists of one thing more than another, it is surely in
learning the grounds of one's own opinions, and these can only be
fully learned by facing the arguments that favour the opposite
opinions. He who knows only his own side of the case knows little of
that. Unless he knows the difficulties which his truth has to
encounter and conquer, he knows little of the force of his truth. Not
only are the grounds of an opinion unformed or forgotten in the
absence of discussion, but too often the very meaning of the
opinion. When the mind is not compelled to exercise its powers on
the questions which its belief presents to it, there is a progressive
tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies, until it
almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human
being. In such cases a creed merely stands sentinel at the entrance
of the mind and heart to keep them empty, as is so often seen in the
case of the Christian creed as at present professed.
So far we have considered only two possibilities—that the
received opinion may be false and some other opinion consequently
true, or that, the received opinion being true, a conflict with the
opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling
of the truth. But there is a commoner case still, when conflicting
doctrines share the truth, and when the heretical doctrine completes
the orthodox. Every opinion which embodies somewhat of the
portion of the truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be
considered precious with whatever amount of error and confusion it
may be conjoined. In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace that
a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are
both necessary factors in a healthy political life. Unless opinions
favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property, and to
equality, to co-operation and to competition, to sociality and to
individuality, to liberty and to discipline, and all the other standing
antagonisms of practical life are expressed with equal freedom, and
enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no
chance of both elements obtaining their due. Truth is usually
reached only by the rough process of a struggle between
combatants fighting under hostile banners.
It may be objected, "But some received principles, especially on
the highest and most vital subjects, are more than half-truths." This
objection is not sound. Even the Christian morality is, in many
important points, incomplete and one-sided, and unless ideas and
feelings not sanctioned by it had constituted to the formation of
European life and character, human affairs would have been in a
worse condition than they now are.

II.—Individuality as One of the Elements of Well-Being

We have seen that opinions should be freely formed and freely

expressed. How about actions? If a man refrains from molesting
others in what concerns him, and merely acts according to his own
inclination and judgment in things which concern himself, the same
reasons which show that opinion should be free prove also that he
should be allowed to carry his opinions into action. As it is useful
that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions,
so it is useful that there should be different experiments of living,
that free scope should be given to varieties of character short of
injury to others, and that the worth of different modes of life should
be proved practically. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do
not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. When,
not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of
other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the
principal ingredients of human happiness and quite the chief
ingredient of individual and social progress.
No one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do
absolutely nothing but copy one another. On the other hand, it
would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if
experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode
of existence or of conduct is preferable to another. No one denies
that people should be so taught and trained in youth as to know and
benefit by the results of human experience. But it is the privilege of
a mature man to use and interpret experience in his own way. He
who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life
for him has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of
imitation. He, on the other hand, who chooses his plan for himself,
employs all his faculties—reasoning, foresight, activity,
discrimination, resolution, self-control. We wish not automatons, but
living, originating men and women.
So much will be readily conceded, but nevertheless it may be
maintained that strong desires and passions are a peril and a snare.
Yet it is desires and impulses which constitute character, and one
with no desires and impulses of his own has no more character than
a steam-engine. An energetic character implies strong, spontaneous
impulses under the control of a strong will; and such characters are
desirable, since the danger which threatens modern society is not
excess but deficiency of personal impulses and preferences.
Everyone nowadays asks: what is usually done by persons of my
station and pecuniary circumstances, or (worse still) what is usually
done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine?
The consequence is that, through failure to follow their own nature,
they have no nature to follow; their human capacities are withered
and starved, and are incapable of any strong pleasures or opinions
properly their own.
It is not by pruning away the individual but by cultivating it
wisely that human beings become valuable to themselves and to
others, and that human life becomes rich, diversified, and
interesting. Individuality is equivalent to development, and in
proportion to the latitude given to individuality an age becomes
noteworthy or the reverse.
Unfortunately, the general tendency of things is to render
mediocrity the ascendant power. At present, individuals are lost in
the crowd, and it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now
rules the world. And public opinion is the opinion of collective
mediocrity, and is expressed by mediocre men. The initiation of all
wise and noble opinions must come from individuals, and the
individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought
is necessary to correct the tendency that makes mankind acquiesce
in customary and popular opinions.

III.—The Limits of the Authority of Society Over the

Individual

Where, then, does the authority of society begin? How much of

human life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to
society?
To individuality should belong that part of life in which it is
chiefly the individual that is interested; to society, the part which
chiefly interests society.
Society, in return for the protection it affords its members, and
as a condition of its existence, demands, firstly, that its members
respect the rights of one another; and, secondly, that each person
bear his share of the labours and sacrifices incurred in defending
society for its members. Further, society may punish acts of an
individual hurtful to others, even if not a violation of rights, by the
force of public opinion.
But in all cases where a person's conduct affects or need only
affect himself, society may not interfere. Society may help individuals
in their personal affairs, but neither one person, nor any number of
persons, is warranted in saying to any human creature that he may
not use his own life, so far as it concerns himself, as he pleases. He
himself is the final judge of his own concerns, and the
inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable
judgment of others are the only ones to which a person should ever
be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which
affects his own good, but which does not affect the interests of
others.
But how, it may be asked, can any part of the conduct of a
member of society be a matter of indifference to the other
members?
I fully confess that the mischief which a person does to himself
may seriously affect those nearly connected with him, and even
society at large. But such contingent and indirect injury should be
endured by society for the sake of the greater good of human
freedom, and because any attempt at coercion in private conduct
will merely produce rebellion on the part of the individual coerced.
Moreover, when society interferes with purely personal conduct, the
odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong places, as the
pages of history and the records of legislation abundantly
demonstrate.
Closely connected with the question of the limitations of the
authority of society over the individual is the question of government
participation in industrial and other enterprises generally undertaken
by individuals.
There are three main objections to the interference of the state
in such matters. In the first place, the matter may be better
managed by individuals than by the government. In the second
place, though individuals may not do it so well as government might,
yet it is desirable that they should do it, as a means of their own
mental education. In the third place, it is undesirable to add to the
power of the government. If roads, railways, banks, insurance
offices, great joint-stock companies, universities, public charities,
municipal corporations, and local boards were all in the government
service, and if the employees in these look to the government for
promotion, not all the freedom of the Press and the popular
constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country
free otherwise than in name. And, for various reasons, the better
qualified the heads and hands of the government officials, the more
detrimental would the rule of the government be. Such a
government would inevitably degenerate into a pedantocracy
monopolising all the occupations which form and cultivate the
faculties required for the government of mankind.
To find the best compromise between individuals and the state is
difficult, but I believe the ideal must combine the greatest possible
dissemination of power consistent with efficiency, and the greatest
possible centralisation and diffusion of information.
 JOHN MILTON
Areopagitica
It has been said of "Areopagitica, a Speech of Mr. John
Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament
of England," that it is "the piece that lies more surely than
any other at the very heart of our prose literature." In 1637
the Star Chamber issued a decree regulating the printing,
circulation, and importation of books, and on June 14, 1643,
the Long Parliament published an order in the same spirit.
Milton (see Vol. XVII) felt that what had been done in the
days of repression and tyranny was being continued under
the reign of liberty, and that the time for protest had arrived.
Liberty was the central principle of Milton's faith. He regarded
it as the most potent, beneficent, and sacred factor in human
progress; and he applied it all round—to literature, religion,
marriage, and civic life. His "Areopagitica," published in
November, 1644, was an application of the principle to
literature that has remained unanswered. The word
"Areopagitica" is derived from Areopagus, the celebrated
open-air court in Athens, whose decision in matters of public
importance was regarded as final.

I.—The Right of Appeal

It is not a liberty which we can hope, that no grievance ever

should arise in the Commonwealth—that let no man in this world
expect; but when complaints are freely heard, deeply considered,
and speedily reformed, then is the utmost bound of civil liberty
attained that wise men look for. To which we are already in good
part arrived; and this will be attributed first to the strong assistance
of God our Deliverer, next to your faithful guidance and undaunted
wisdom, Lords and Commons of England.
If I should thus far presume upon the meek demeanour of your
civil and gentle greatness, Lords and Commons, as to gainsay what
your published Order hath directly said, I might defend myself with
ease out of those ages to whose polite wisdom and letters we owe
that we are not yet Goths and Jutlanders. Such honour was done in
those days to men who professed the study of wisdom and
eloquence that cities and signiories heard them gladly, and with
great respect, if they had aught in public to admonish the state.
When your prudent spirit acknowledges and obeys the voice of
reason from what quarter soever it be heard speaking, I know not
what should withhold me from presenting ye with a fit instance
wherein to show, both that love of truth which ye eminently profess,
and that uprightness of your judgment which is not wont to be
partial to yourselves, by judging over again that Order which ye have
ordained to regulate printing: that no book, pamphlet, or paper shall
be henceforth printed unless the same be first approved and
licensed by such, or at least one of such, as shall be thereto
appointed.
I shall lay before ye, first, that the inventors of licensing books
be those whom ye will be loth to own; next, what is to be thought in
general of reading, whatever sort the books be; last, that it will be
primely to the discouragement of all learning and the stop of truth. I
deny not that it is of greatest concernment in the Church and
commonwealth to have a vigilant eye how books demean
themselves, as well as men. For books are not absolutely dead
things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as
that soul was whose progeny they are.
Nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and
extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as
lively and as vigorously productive as those fabulous dragon's teeth;
and, being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men.
And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good
almost kill a man as kill a good book. Many a man lives a burden to
the earth; but a good book is the precious life-blood of a master
spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to life beyond life. 'Tis
true, no age can restore a life, whereof perhaps there is no great
loss; and revolutions of ages do not oft recover the loss of a rejected
truth, for the want of which whole nations fare the worse.
We should be wary, therefore, how we spill that seasoned life of
man, preserved and stored up in books, since we see a kind of
homicide may be thus committed, that strikes at that ethereal
essence, the breath of reason itself, and slays an immortality rather
than a life.

II.—The History of Repression

In Athens, where books and wits were ever busier than in any
other part of Greece, I find but only two sorts of writings which the
magistrate cared to take notice of—those either blasphemous and
atheistical, or libellous. The Romans, for many ages trained up only
to a military roughness, knew of learning little. There libellous
authors were quickly cast into prison, and the like severity was used
if aught were impiously written. Except in these two points, how the
world went in books the magistrate kept no reckoning.
By the time the emperors were become Christians, the books of
those whom they took to be grand heretics were examined, refuted,
and condemned in the general councils, and not till then were
prohibited.
As for the writings of heathen authors, unless they were plain
invectives against Christianity, they met with no interdict that can be
cited till about the year 400. The primitive councils and bishops were
wont only to declare what books were not commendable, passing no
further till after the year 800, after which time the popes of Rome
extended their dominion over men's eyes, as they had before over
their judgments, burning and prohibiting to be read what they
fancied not, till Martin V. by his Bull not only prohibited, but was the
first that excommunicated the reading of heretical books; for about
that time Wickliffe and Huss, growing terrible, drove the papal court
to a stricter policy of prohibiting. To fill up the measure of
encroachment, their last invention was to ordain that no book,
pamphlet, or paper should be printed (as if St. Peter had
bequeathed them the keys of the press also out of Paradise), unless
it were approved and licensed under the hands of two or three
glutton friars.
Not from any ancient state or polity or church, nor by any
statute left us by our ancestors, but from the most tyrannous
Inquisition have ye this book-licensing. Till then books were as freely
admitted into the world as any other birth. No envious Juno sat
cross-legged over the nativity of any man's intellectual offspring.
That ye like not now these most certain authors of this licensing
Order, all men who know the integrity of your actions will clear ye
readily.

III.—The Futility of Prohibition

But some will say, "What though the inventors were bad, the
thing, for all that, may be good?" It may be so, yet I am of those
who believe it will be a harder alchemy than Lullius ever knew to
sublimate any good use out of such an invention.
Good and evil in the field of this world grow up together almost
inseparably. As the state of man now is, what wisdom can there be
to choose, what continence to forbear, without the knowledge of
evil? I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue, unexercised and
unbreathed, that never sallies out and sees her adversary, but slinks
out of the race, where that immortal garland is to be run for, not
without dust and heat. That which purifies us is trial, and trial is by
what is contrary. And how can we more safely, and with less danger
scout into the regions of sin and falsity than by reading all manner of
tractates and hearing all manner of reason? And this is the benefit
which may be had of books promiscuously read.
'Tis next alleged we must not expose ourselves to temptations
without necessity, and next to that, not employ our time in vain
things. To both these objections one answer will serve—that to all
men such books are not temptations, nor vanities, but useful drugs
and materials wherewith to temper and compose effective and
strong medicines. The rest, as children and childish men, who have
not the art to qualify and prepare these working minerals, well may
be exhorted to forbear, but hindered forcibly they cannot be by all
the licensing that sainted Inquisition could ever yet contrive.
This Order of licensing conduces nothing to the end for which it
was framed. If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify
manners, we must regulate all recreations and pastimes, all that is
delightful to man. No music must be heard, no song be set or sung,
but what is grave and Doric. There must be licensing dancers, that
no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our youth but what by
their allowance shall be thought honest. Our garments, also, should
be referred to the licensing of some more sober workmasters to see
them cut into a less wanton garb. Who shall regulate all the mixed
conversation of our youth? Who shall still appoint what shall be
discoursed, what presumed, and no further? Lastly, who shall forbid
and separate all idle resort, all evil company? If every action which is
good or evil in man at ripe years were to be under pittance and
prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name?
When God gave Adam reason, he gave him reason to choose,
for reason is but choosing. Wherefore did he create passions within
us, pleasures round about us, but that these rightly tempered are
the very ingredients of virtue?
Why should we then affect a rigour contrary to the manner of
God and of nature, by abridging or scanting those means which
books freely permitted are both to the trial of virtue and the exercise
of truth?
 IV.—An Indignity to Learning

I lastly proceed from the no good it can do to the manifest hurt

it causes in being, first, the greatest discouragement and affront that
can be offered to learning and to learned men. If ye be loth to
dishearten utterly and discontent the free and ingenuous sort of
such as were born to study, and love learning for itself, not for lucre
or any other end but the service of God and of truth, and perhaps
that lasting fame and perpetuity of praise which God and good men
have consented shall be the reward of those whose published
labours advance the good of mankind, then know that so far to
distrust the judgment and the honesty of one who hath but a
common repute in learning, and never yet offended, as not to count
him fit to print his mind without a tutor and examiner, is the greatest
displeasure and indignity to a free and knowing spirit that can be put
upon him.
When a man writes to the world he summons up all his reason
and deliberation to assist him; he searches, meditates, is industrious,
and likely consults and confers with his judicious friends. If in this,
the most consummate act of his fidelity and ripeness, no years, no
industry, no former proof of his abilities can bring him to that state
of maturity as not to be still mistrusted and suspected, unless he
carry all his considerate diligence to the hasty view of an unleisured
licenser, perhaps much his younger, perhaps far his inferior in
judgment, perhaps one who never knew the labour of book-writing,
and if he be not repulsed or slighted, must appear in print with his
censor's hand on the back of his title, to be his bail and surety that
he is no idiot or seducer, it cannot be but a dishonour and
derogation to the author, to the book, to the privilege and dignity of
learning.
And, further, to me it seems an undervaluing and vilifying of the
whole nation. I cannot set so light by all the invention, the art, the
wit, the grave and solid judgment which is in England, as that it can
be comprehended in any twenty capacities how good soever, much
less that it should not pass except their superintendence be over it,
except it be sifted and strained with their strainers, that it should be
uncurrent without their manual stamp. Truth and understanding are
not such wares as to be monopolised and traded in by tickets and
statutes and standards.
Lords and Commons of England, consider what nation it is
whereof ye are, and whereof ye are the governors—a nation not
slow and dull, but of a quick, ingenious and piercing spirit, acute to
invent, subtle and sinewy to discourse, not beneath the reach of any
point the highest that human capacity can soar to. Is it for nothing
that the grave and frugal Transylvanian sends out yearly from as far
as the mountainous borders of Russia, and beyond the Hercynian
wilderness, not their youth, but their staid men, to learn our
language and our theologic arts? By all concurrence of signs, and by
the general instinct of holy and devout men, God is decreeing to
begin some new and great period in His Church, even to the
reforming of Reformation itself. What does He, then, but reveal
Himself to His servants, and as His manner is, first to His
Englishmen?
Behold now this vast city—a city of refuge, the mansion house of
liberty, encompassed and surrounded with His protection. The shop
of war hath not there more anvils and hammers waking to fashion
out the plates and instruments of armed justice in defence of
beleaguered truth than there be pens and heads there, sitting by
their studious lamps, musing, searching, revolving new notions and
ideas wherewith to present, as with their homage and their fealty,
the approaching Reformation; others as fast reading, trying all
things, assenting to the force of reason and convincement. What
could a man require more from a nation so pliant and so prone to
seek after knowledge? Where there is much desire to learn, there, of
necessity, will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for
opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making. A little
generous prudence, a little forbearance of one another, and some
grain of charity might win all these diligencies to join and unite in
one general search after truth, could we but forego this prelatical
tradition of crowding free consciences and Christian liberties into
canons and precepts of men.
Methinks I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing
herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible
locks. Methinks I see her as an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and
kindling her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam; purging and
unsealing her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly
radiance; while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with
those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she
means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of
sects and schisms.
What should ye do then? Should ye suppress all this flowery crop
of knowledge and new light? Should ye set an oligarchy of twenty
engrossers over it, to bring a famine upon our minds again, when
we shall know nothing but what is measured to us by their bushel?
Believe it, Lords and Commons, they who counsel ye to such a
suppressing do as good as bid ye suppress yourselves. If it be
desired to know the immediate cause of all this free writing and free
speaking, there cannot be assigned a truer than your own mild, and
free, and humane government. It is the liberty, Lords and Commons,
which our own valorous and happy counsels have purchased us,
liberty, which is the nurse of all great wits. Give me the liberty to
know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all
liberties. And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play
upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by
licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and
Falsehood grapple. Whoever knew Truth put to the worse in a free
and open encounter? For who knows not that Truth is strong, next
to the Almighty? She needs no policies, nor stratagems, nor licensing
to make her victorious. Those are the shifts and defences that error
uses against her power. Give her but room, and do not bind her
when she sleeps.
 PLUTARCH
Parallel Lives
Little is known of the life of Plutarch, greatest of
biographers. He was born about 50 A.D., at Chæronea, in
Bœotia, Greece, the son of a learned and virtuous father. He
studied philosophy under Ammonius at Delphi, and on his
return to his native city became a priest of Apollo, and
archon, or chief magistrate. Plutarch wrote many
philosophical works, which are enumerated by his son
Lamprias, but are no longer extant. We have about fifty
biographies, which are called "parallel" because of the
method by which Plutarch, after giving separately the lives of
two or more people, proceeds to compare them with one
another. The "Lives" were translated into French in Henry II.'s
reign, and into English in the time of Elizabeth. They have
been exceedingly popular at every period, and many authors,
including Shakespeare, have owed much to them. Plutarch
died about 120 A.D.

I.—Lycurgus and Numa

According to the best authors, Lycurgus, the law-giver, reigned

only for eight months as king of Sparta, until the widow of the late
king, his brother, had given birth to a son, whom he named
Charilaus. He then travelled for some years in Crete, Asia, and
possibly also in Egypt, Libya, Spain, and India, studying
governments and manners; and returning to Sparta, he set himself
to alter the whole constitution of that kingdom, with the
encouragement of the oracles and the favour of Charilaus.
The first institution was a senate of twenty-eight members,
whose place it was to strengthen the throne when the people
encroached too far, and to support the people when the king should
attempt to become absolute. Occasional popular assemblies, in the
open air, were to be called, not to propose any subject of debate,
but only to ratify or reject the proposals of the senate and the two
kings.
His second political enterprise was a new division of the lands,
for he found a prodigious inequality, wealth being centred in the
hands of a few; and by this reform Laconia became like an estate
newly divided among many brothers. Each plot of land was sufficient
to maintain a family in health, and they wanted nothing more.
Then, desiring also to equalise property in movable objects, he
resorted to the device of doing away with gold and silver currency,
and establishing an iron coinage, of which great bulk and weight
went to but little value. He excluded all unprofitable and superfluous
arts; and the Spartans soon had no means of purchasing foreign
wares, nor did any merchant ship unlade in their harbours. Luxury
died away of itself, and the workmanship of their necessary and
useful furniture rose to great excellence.
Public tables were now established, where all must eat in
common of the same frugal meal; whereby hardiness and health of
body and mutual benevolence of mind were alike promoted. There
were about fifteen to a table, to which each contributed in provisions
or in money; the conversation was liberal and well-informed, and
salted with pleasant raillery.
Lycurgus left no law in writing; he depended on principles
pervading the customs of the people; and he reduced the whole
business of legislation into the bringing up of the young. And in this
matter he began truly at the beginning, by regulating marriages. The
man unmarried after the prescribed age was prosecuted and
disgraced; and the father of four children was immune from
taxation.
Lycurgus considered the children as the property of the state
rather than of the parents, and derided the vanity of other nations,
who studied to have horses of the finest breed, yet had their
children begotten by ordinary persons rather than by the best and
healthiest men. At birth, the children were carried to be examined by
the oldest men in council, who had the weaklings thrown away into
a cavern, and gave orders for the education of the sturdy.
As for learning, they had just what was necessary and no more,
their education being directed chiefly to making them obedient,
laborious, and warlike. They went barefoot, and for the most part
naked. They were trained to steal with astuteness, to suffer pain and
hunger, and to express themselves without an unnecessary word.
Dignified poetry and music were encouraged. To the end of his life,
the Spartan was kept ever in mind that he was born, not for himself,
but for his country; the city was like one great camp, where each
had his stated allowance and his stated public charge.
Let us turn now to Numa Pompilius, the great law-giver of the
Romans. A Sabine of illustrious virtue and great simplicity of life, he
was elected to be king after the interregnum which followed on the
disappearance of Romulus. He had spent much time in solitary
wanderings in the sacred groves and other retired places; and there,
it is reported, the goddess Egeria communicated to him a happiness
and knowledge more than mortal.
Numa was in his fortieth year, and was not easily persuaded to
undertake the Roman kingdom. But his disinclination was overcome,
and he was received with loud acclamations as the most pious of
men and most beloved of the gods. His first act was to discharge the
body-guard provided for him, and to appoint a priest for the cult of
Romulus. But his great task was to soften the Romans, as iron is
softened by fire, and to bring them from a violent and warlike
disposition to a juster and more gentle temper. For Rome was
composed at first of most hardy and resolute men, inveterate
warriors.
To reduce this people to mildness and peace, he called in the
assistance of religion. By sacrifices, solemn dances, and processions,
wherein he himself officiated, he mixed the charms of festal pleasure
with holy ritual.
He founded the hierarchy of priests, the vestal virgins, and
several other sacred orders; and passed most of his time in
performing some religious function or in conversing with the priests
on some divine subject. And by all this discipline the people became
so tractable, and were so impressed with Numa's power, that they
would believe the most fabulous tales, and thought nothing
impossible which he undertook. Numa further introduced agriculture,
and fostered it as an incentive to peace; he distributed the citizens
of Rome into guilds, or companies, according to their several arts
and trades; he reformed the calendar, and did many other services
to his people.
Comparing, now, Lycurgus and Numa, we find that their
resemblances are obvious—their wisdom, piety, talent for
government, and their deriving their laws from a divine source. Of
their distinctions, the chief is that Numa accepted, but Lycurgus
relinquished, a crown; and as it was an honour to the former to
attain royal dignity by his justice, so it was an honour to the latter to
prefer justice to that dignity. Again, Lycurgus tuned up the strings of
Sparta, which he found relaxed with luxury, to a keener pitch; Numa,
on the contrary, softened the high and harsh tone of Rome. Both
were equally studious to lead their people to sobriety, but Lycurgus
was more attached to fortitude and Numa to justice.
Though Numa put an end to the gain of rapine, he made no
provision against the accumulation of great fortunes, nor against
poverty, which then began to spread within the city. He ought rather
to have watched against these dangers, for they gave birth to the
many troubles that befell the Roman state.
 II.—Aristides and Cato

Aristides had a close friendship with Clisthenes, who established

popular government in Athens after the expulsion of the tyrants; yet
he had at the same time a great veneration for Lycurgus of Sparta,
whom he regarded as supreme among law-givers; and this led him
to be a supporter of aristocracy, in which he was always opposed by
Themistocles, the democrat. The latter was insinuating, daring,
artful, and impetuous, but Aristides was solid and steady, inflexibly
just, and incapable of flattery or deceit.
Neither elated by honour nor disheartened by ill success,
Aristides became deeply founded in the estimation of the best
citizens. He was appointed public treasurer, and showed up the
peculations of Themistocles and of others who had preceded him.
When the fleet of Darius was at Marathon, with a view to
subjugating Greece, Miltiades and Aristides were the Greek generals,
who by custom were to command by turns, day about; and Aristides
freely gave up his command to the other, to promote unity of
discipline, and to give example of military obedience. The next year
he became archon. Though a poor man and a commoner, Aristides
won the royal and divine title of "the Just." At first loved and
respected for his surname "the Just," Aristides came to be envied
and dreaded for so extraordinary an honour, and the citizens
assembled from all the towns in Attica and banished him by
ostracism, cloaking their envy of his character under the pretence of
guarding against tyranny. Three years later they reversed this
decree, fearing lest Aristides should join the cause of Xerxes. They
little knew the man; even before his recall he had been inciting the
Greeks to defend their liberty.
In the great battle of Platæa, Aristides was in command of the
Athenians; Pausanias, commander-in-chief of all the confederates,
joined him there with the Spartans. The opposing Persian army
covered an immense area. In the engagements which took place the
Greeks behaved with the utmost firmness, and at last stormed the
Persian camp, with a prodigious slaughter of the enemy. When, later,
Aristides was entrusted with the task of assessing the cities of the
allies for a tax towards the war, and was thus clothed with an
authority which made him master of Greece, though he set out poor
he returned yet poorer, having arranged the burden with equal
justice and humanity. In fact, he esteemed his poverty no less a
glory than all the laurels he had won.
The Roman counterpart of Aristides was Cato; which name he
received for his wisdom, for Romans call wise men Catos. Marcus
Cato, the censor, came of an obscure family, yet his father and
grandfather were excellent soldiers. He lived on an estate which his
father left him near the Sabine country. With red hair and grey eyes,
his appearance was such, says an epigram, as to scare the spirits of
the departed. Inured to labour and temperance, he had the sound
constitution of one brought up in camps; and he had practised
eloquence as a necessary instrument for one who would mix with
affairs. While still a lad he had fought in so many battles that his
breast was covered with scars; and all who spoke with him noted a
gravity of behaviour and a dignity of sentiment such as to fit him for
high responsibilities.
A powerful nobleman, Valerius Flaccus, whose estate was near
Cato's home, heard his servants praise their neighbour's laborious
life. He sent for Cato, and, charmed with his sweet temper and
ready wit, persuaded him to go to Rome and apply himself to
political affairs. His rise was rapid; he became tribune of the soldiers,
then quæstor, and at last was the colleague of Valerius both as
consul and as censor.
Cato's eloquence brought him the epithet of the Roman
Demosthenes, but he was even more celebrated for his manner of
living. Few were willing to imitate him in the ancient custom of tilling
the ground with his own hands, in eating a dinner prepared without
fire, and a spare, frugal supper; few thought it more honourable not
to want superfluities than to possess them. By reason of its vast
dominions, the commonwealth had lost its pristine purity and
integrity; the citizens were frightened at labour and enervated by
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