I Introduction

1.1. NATO and a comprehensive approach

1.1.1 Comprehensive approach

NATO recognises that the military cannot resolve crisis or conflict by itself. Modern
crises and conflicts are often not related to the military and therefore require
assistance from outside the military. The operating environment involves complex
and interlinked areas such as ethnic, religious, ideological and technological issues.
Crisis management requirements have expanded in terms of duration, tasks carried
out, actors involved, complexity and multitude of factors (social, economic,
environmental…).

Achieving acceptable and sustainable solutions requires capabilities that the

military alone cannot provide. A comprehensive political, civilian, and military
approach is necessary to effectively manage today’s complex crises. However, it
requires a strong trust between all parties to make this approach possible. It is
important for the military to recognize that sometimes non-military actors may not
always support the military. A successful resolution to the conflict will depend on a
mutual understanding of both the military’s and the non-military actors’ purpose,
resolve, capabilities, and motivation.

At all levels, including the tactical one, NATO commanders must be empowered to
conduct effective cooperation and coordination to execute operations. This should
include working with international and indigenous local authorities and other non-
military actors. Sometimes local actors can have more power than the formal
leaders. There is the importance for shared understanding engendered through
cooperative working, liaison, education and common language. The Alliance also
stresses the value of collaborative working based upon mutual trust and a
willingness to cooperate. In this sense institutional familiarity and information
sharing are the key.

Comprehensive approach can be understood as a concept, philosophy or mind-set

rather than a documented process or capability. Therefore it is also better to speak
of “a” comprehensive approach instead of “the” comprehensive approach.
Furthermore, this phrasing suggests flexibility in its characteristics instead of a
standardized blueprint. Different operational circumstances will ultimately affect
non-military actors’ procedures in working with the military 1 . NATO defines the
comprehensive approach as follows "combining all political,military and civilian
capabilities, in a concerted effort to attain the desired end state." Thus,
comprehensive approach is a mind-set aiming for synergies by coordinating or at
least de-conflicting political, humanitarian, development and security efforts.
1.1.2 NATOs contribution to a comprehensive
approach
The focus of NATO is upon the collaborative role for better understanding, informing
and working with partner nations 2 and non-NATO-entities. In this context, there are
three goals to NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach:
a. Improve the coherent application of the Alliance’s own crisis management
instruments, including its military and political planning procedures.
b. Improve the Alliance’s practical cooperation at all levels with partners, the UN
and other relevant international organizations, governmental and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), contractors, commercial partners and local
actors when planning and conducting operations.
c. Enhance the Alliance’s ability to support stabilization and reconstruction efforts
in all phases of a conflict in concert with other actors.

NATO contributes to a comprehensive approach through four key areas: planning

and execution of military operations; training, education, exercises and lessons
learned ; interaction with non-military actors; and strategic communications. In the
area of planning, the important requirement is to cooperate with other non-military
actors to identify interdependencies of the respective objectives as this will be a
factor for mission success. The role of the military force must be carefully
considered since achieving military objectives alone will not necessarily lead to the
end state.

Although implementing a comprehensive approach may vary between the levels of

operation (strategic, operational and tactical), and from one crisis to another, a
number of guiding principles apply:
• Proactive engagement between all actors, both before and during a crisis.
• The importance of shared understanding engendered through cooperative
working, liaison, education and a common language.
• The value of collaboration, based upon mutual trust and a willingness to
cooperate, promote institutional familiarity and information sharing.
• Thinking focused on outcomes, ensuring that all actors work towards a common
goal (or outcome) and ideally, mutually agreed objectives underpinned, in the
absence of unity of effort, by harmonization of effort.
• Acknowledging the decision-making autonomy of partner organizations.

1.2. Civil-military interaction

NATO’s engagement in a comprehensive approach to resolve crises is facilitated
through civil-military interaction (CMI), which applies to all military bodies and at all
levels. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) functions are the main facilitator 3 .
Facilitation is done through CIMIC activities including liaison and assessments, as
well as planning, coordination with other capabilities/functions involved in CMI and
enabling local legitimized authorities working to resolve the crisis. CMI is defined
as:

“A group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that

all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military
actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually
increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to
crises 4 .”

Thus, CMI enables processes that are necessary for building and maintaining
relationships with non-military actors. It aims at expanding own knowledge
networks and developing shared situational understanding of the civil environment
with other relevant actors. Due to the fact that diversity of non-military actors is the
reality in almost all operations, unity of effort will be hard to achieve; rather
harmonization of efforts should be aimed upon to avoid negative impacts for the
civil environment and for own operations.

1.2.1 Levels of interaction

Depending on the type of interaction, certain responsibilities will be expected by the
counterpart. The levels of interaction range from coexistence to cooperation.

Possible levels of interaction between responders to a crisis.

1.2.2 Civil-military interaction principles

The following CMI principles are (non-exhaustive) guidelines for an effective CMI:
a. Understand non-military actors and respect their autonomy in decision-making
and so encouraging them to do the same. Nevertheless, aim at promoting
cooperation, reciprocal information sharing and unity of purpose if
circumstances allow.
b. Engage, via proactive communication and on respective level, with all non-
military actors involved in the operation.
c. Interact with respect, knowledge of respective roles, trust and transparency and
be aware of cultural aspects.
d. Incorporate non-military expert advice and factors, if applicable.
e. Promote local ownership and build local capacity. Prepare for transition of non-
military tasks as early as possible.
f. Ensure internal NATO military coherence and consistent NATO messaging in
interacting with non-military actors.
g. Operate within the framework of the NATO mission, responsibilities, authorities
and legal obligations.

1.3. CIMIC in operations

CIMIC is applied across the full spectrum of operations, domains 5 and
environments. However, as operating environments are different, the emphasis
between the CIMIC core functions may change. Combat operations require a
different quantum of CIMIC activities compared to stabilization or disaster relief
operations. The principles of CIMIC remain the same, but the emphasis between the
core functions may change 7 .

CIMIC’s main effort – within the CIMIC core function 6 “support to the force” - is the
CIMIC contribution to operations planning (e.g. to targeting or de-confliction of
mass movements). The CIMIC estimate and assessment has to support to mitigate
effects of the civil environment on our military mission and vice versa.

Due to the tempo of operations early synchronization efforts with the host nation
(HN) and non-military actors is necessary. High operational tempo and changing
situations demand a continuously updated, comprehensive situational awareness at
all times.

1.3.1 Combat
Combat operations may be required to directly defend NATO against an aggressor 8
. The tempo of activities in combat is usually high with accelerated speed and scale
of manoeuvre. The operating environment is characterized by the fact that the
defence will first and foremost involve territory of the member states of the
Alliance; those states are sovereign and generally fully-functioning. The relationship
between the NATO force and the host nation (HN) is governed by long standing
bilateral- and/or multi-lateral agreements, most notably the NATO status of forces
agreements. Many NATO nations have their own structures and procedures in place
to deal with most aspects of CIMIC in the event of armed conflict. Moreover, a joint
task force deployed in a NATO nation can expect that some CIMIC functions will be
undertaken by the host nation. Support to the civil environment will be a national
responsibility and memoranda of understanding may cover many aspects of support
to the force. Even where a NATO nation has been subjected to significant
destruction, it is assumed that the national government will retain both the will and
ability to organize and carry out civil reconstruction of the country, supported by
international organizations other than NATO. CIMIC will focus on `Support the force`
as the HN and other responders will support the civil environment. CIMIC units
liaise primarily with the HN at every level in order to benefit from HN capabilities to
support the operations.

Specific characteristics of combat operations:

• The host nation is responsible for providing basic services to the population.
During combat operations IOs/NGOs may fill in capability gaps as the second
responder although they are likely to be fewer in areas of high intensity combat
due to unsafe operating environments. During early stages of combat,
accessibility into those areas could be limited or non-existent for them. The
military commander, as the last resort, should be prepared to close civilian
capability gaps (key civil life support, humanitarian issues, key civil infrastructure
and civil administration) temporarily and to set the conditions for return of
responsibility to non-military actors. Consequently, planning must be initiated in
the early stages including clarifying responsibilities between the national
government and the commander of a deployed force.
• Regardless of the nature of the operation; military forces will encounter civilians
operating in and around the area of operations (AOO). A 100% evacuation is
unrealistic. Refugees, internally displaced persons and evacuees might result in
interference with Allied forces’ operations. The military has to be ready to
support the control of civil mass movements to complement HN efforts. Military
profile will be high, resulting in resource intensive activities and enhanced
demand for CIMIC liaison to remainders of authorities and/or community leaders
and existing international organizations (IOs) / non-governmental organization
(NGOs). It is important that in the absence of (functioning) HN authorities the
United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees (UNHCR) is the
designated UN agency responsible for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
refugees. As such they will support the HN. The control of civilian movement, as
well as the use of infrastructure (MSRs, APODs/ SPODs) would be vital areas of
coordination with the HN. If a mass movement is expected to
hamper operations, the military, through (CIMIC) liaison, may have to support HN
authorities and IOs/NGOs, facilitating their involvement through appropriate
actions.
• The adversary might target civilians by destroying vital infrastructure or use other
means to destabilize the society, like minority tensions. Moreover, (major) CIMIC
sites of significance, e.g. vital/critical energy infrastructure, have to be taken into
account while conducting operations, especially because the government’s
 accessibility and protection of those locations might be degraded in time and
space.
• CIMIC staff should cooperate with the host nation to integrate the influx of
humanitarian aid and development organizations. Basic civil infrastructure and
life sustaining systems (such as water supply or power) may have been
destroyed during the operation or exist in such poor condition that a rapid
reaction will be needed.
• CIMIC projects will be of lesser significance in combat operations. If conducted,
they should focus on crisis management and compensation of negative effects
for the civil environment and enhancement of the countries’ resilience 9 .

1.3.2 Crisis response

Crisis response operations include multifunctional operations, which contribute to
conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian purposes or crisis management in
pursuit of declared Alliance objectives. Crisis response operations may be as
demanding and intense as combat operations. They can be differentiated into:
a. Military contribution to peace support. Peace support may take place in the
context of both inter-state and intra-state conflict, which imposes challenges to
the military due to the multifaceted nature of security activity. Civil-military
liaison is key to facilitate effective CMI.
b. Non-combatant evacuation operations. Non-combatant evacuation operations
(NEOs) are national diplomatic initiatives, with NATO forces participating in a
supporting role. In preparation for and during the execution of a NEO, the
commander should consider establishing a mission-tailored CIMIC liaison
element to facilitate interaction with non-military actors in order to avoid friction,
competition for resources or duplication of effort. To achieve this, CIMIC liaison
must be established as soon as possible, initially as part of an operational
liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT).
c. Military contribution to humanitarian assistance. Military contribution to
humanitarian assistance is intended to support the efforts of the host nation civil
authorities, who have the primary responsibility to provide assistance in these
cases. IOs and NGOs provide assistance. Generally, the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) facilitates dialogue and interaction
between civil and military organizations.
d. Counter irregular activities. Countering irregular activities requires NATO forces
to have an understanding of the particular character and root causes of the
conflict, its context and its participants. Counter-irregular activities fall into three
categories (counter-insurgency, counterterrorism and counter-criminality) of
which the categories with the most relevance for CIMIC is counter-insurgency
(COIN). CIMIC is to facilitate activities in partnership with the contested
authorities and other stakeholders, in order to contribute to a creation of an
environment in which civil organizations can effectively operate.
e. Military contribution to stabilization and reconstruction. Stabilization and
reconstruction attempts to mitigate complex problems in unstable states during
and after crises. Even though all activities are normally civilian led and ideally
implemented by legitimate local authorities, the military might be tasked to
provide security to facilitate the activities of other actors in insecure
circumstances. Furthermore, early liaison to non-military actors will enhance
effectiveness and the unity of purpose.

1 Different principles of non-military actors, particularly humanitarian NGOs and IOs, limit
their potential level of interaction with the military.

2 Partner nations as defined by the NAC and referenced in MC 0458/3 to include

“Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative (ICI) countries as well as those partners across the globe with a partnership
program with NATO,” and including troop contributing partners to NATO-led operations.

3 For the definition of CIMIC Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.19 dated 09 Nov. 2018. For
further read, see Chapter 2.

4 AJP-3.19.

5 Land, air, maritime, space, cyber.

6 Civil-military liaison, support to the force, support to non-military actors and the civil
environment. See Chapter 2.

7 See Chapter 2.

8 Article 5 NATO treaty.

9 AJP 3.19, Chapter 4, 4.24

"Resilience is a society’s ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from these
situations, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is a
broad concept focusing upon continuation of basic governmental functions. Resilience
is the combination of civil preparedness and military capacity."