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Learning Linux Shell Scripting Second Editionn. Edition
Ganesh Naik Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Ganesh Naik
ISBN(s): 9781788993197, 1788993195
Edition: Second Editionn.
File Details: PDF, 4.83 MB
Year: 2018
Language: english
Learning Linux Shell Scripting
Second Edition
-FWFSBHFUIFQPXFSPGTIFMMTDSJQUTUPTPMWFSFBMXPSME
QSPCMFNT
Ganesh Naik
BIRMINGHAM - MUMBAI
Learning Linux Shell Scripting
Second Edition
Copyright a 2018 Packt Publishing
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ISBN 978-1-78899-319-7
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I wish to dedicate this book to my Gurudev, His Holiness Dr. Jayant Balaji Athavale. I
wish to express gratitude for his guidance, which I have received on how to become good
human being, good professional, and a seeker on the path of spiritual progress.
- Ganesh Sanjiv Naik
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I would like to thank my wife, Vishalakshi, for providing valuable suggestions, support,
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A big thanks to the entire team at Packt: Shrilekha Inani, Priyanka Deshpande, and
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the years.
[ ii ]
Table of Contents
[ iii ]
Table of Contents
[ iv ]
Table of Contents
[v]
Table of Contents
[ vi ]
Table of Contents
[ vii ]
Preface
Shell scripts are an essential part of any modern operating system, such as Unix, Linux, or
Windows. The scripting language and its syntax may vary from OS to OS, but the
fundamental principles remain the same. I first encountered Linux shell scripts during the
development of embedded Linux product development. Shell scripts initialized the
complete product, from basic booting procedure to the user logging, to the complete
operating system being initialized. Another situation was automation of regular activities
such as build and release management of the source codes of very complex products, where
more than 10,000 files were part of the single project. Similarly, another very common
requirement is, automatic routine administration activities.
Initially, I learned scripts to solve practical problems and customize pre-existing products.
This book is a summary of what I have learned over the years about Linux shell scripting
through project development work, consultancy, and corporate training and Q&A sessions.
In this book, we will learn the very basics of shell scripting to real-world complex,
customized automation. By the end of the book, the reader will be able to confidently use
their own shell scripts for the real-world problems out there. The idea is to be as practical as
possible and give the reader the look and feel of what real-world scripting looks like.
This book covers the GNU Bourne Again Shell (BASH) scripting. You can use the
knowledge gained by reading this book for any shell of any of the UNIX flavors or Linux
distributions. You may need to take care of few syntax changes if you are working in other
shells, such as Korn or similar. You should be able to read this book cover to cover, or just
pick it up and read anything you find interesting. But, perhaps most importantly, if you
have a question about how to solve a particular problem or you need a hint, you will find it
easy to find the right solutionbor something close enoughbto save your time and energy.
Preface
$IBQUFS, Drilling Deep into Process Management, Job Control, and Automation, speaks about
basic process management. We will learn about command ps and also about job
management using commands such as jobs, fg, bg, kill, and pkill. Later on, we will learn
about process monitoring tools top, iostat, vmstat, and sar.
$IBQUFS, Using Text Processing and Filters in Your Scripts, speaks about using more, less,
head, and tail commands. We will also learn about text processing tools such as cut, paste,
comm, and uniq. We will learn what is a standard input, output, and standard error. Later
on, we will learn about meta-characters and pattern matching using VI and grep.
$IBQUFS, Working with Commands, explains how shell interprets any command entered on
the command line. We will also learn about command substitution, separators, and pipes in
detail.
$IBQUFS, Exploring Expressions and Variables, speaks about variables in general and
environment variables in particular. This includes how to export environment variables,
set, shift, read-only variables, command-line arguments, and create and handle arrays.
$IBQUFS, Neat Tricks with Shell Scripting, talks about debugging, here operator, and
interactive shell scripts for taking input from keyboard and file handling.
[2]
Preface
$IBQUFS, Automating Decision Making in Scripts, talks about using decision making in
scripts by working with Test, if-else, and switching case. We will also learn about how to
use select with for loop along with the menu.
$IBQUFS, Automating Repetitive Tasks, speaks about repeating tasks such as doing routine
administration activities using the for loop, while loop, and do while loop. We will also
learn how control loops using break statement and continue statement.
$IBQUFS, Working with Functions, speaks about functions in shell scripts. We will learn
how to define and display functions, and further how to remove the function from the
shell. We will also learn about passing arguments to functions, sharing data between
functions, declaring local variables in a function, returning result from a function, and
running functions in the background. We will finally learn about using source and .(dot)
commands. We will use these commands for using the library of functions.
$IBQUFS, Using Advanced Functionality in Scripts, covers using traps and signals. We will
also learn about creating menus with the help of dialog utility.
$IBQUFS, System Start-up and Customizing a Linux System, speaks about the Linux system
start-up, from power on until user login and how to customize a Linux system
environment.
$IBQUFS, Pattern Matching and Regular Expressions with sed and awk, talks about regular
expressions and using sed (stream editor) and awk for text processing. We will learn how
to use various commands and options along with a lot of examples for using sed and awk.
$IBQUFS, Taking Backup and Embedding Other Languages in Shell Scripts, speaks about
taking backup locally as well as across the network. We will also learn about automating it
using crontab. We will learn about embedding other languages in bash scripts such as
Python, Ruby, and Pearl.
$IBQUFS, Database Administration Using Shell Scripts, talks about how to write and
execute MySQL commands in a shell script as well as how to write and execute Oracle
commands in a shell script. By using learnings from this chapter, we will be able to
automate frequently required database administration tasks.
[3]
Preface
During the course, if you find that any particular utility is not installed in Ubuntu or any
Debian-based distribution, then enter the following command to install that utility:
$ sudo apt-get update
$ sudo apt-get install package-name
A good internet connection should be available for the preceding commands to run.
If the internet is connected, then using these commands you can install any command or
utility that is not already installed.
Once the file is downloaded, please make sure that you unzip or extract the folder using the
latest version of:
[4]
Preface
The code bundle for the book is also hosted on GitHub at IUUQTHJUIVCDPN
1BDLU1VCMJTIJOH-FBSOJOH-JOVY4IFMM4DSJQUJOH4FDPOE&EJUJPO. In case there's an
update to the code, it will be updated on the existing GitHub repository.
We also have other code bundles from our rich catalogue of books and videos available
at IUUQTHJUIVCDPN1BDLU1VCMJTIJOH. Check them out!
Conventions used
There are a number of text conventions used throughout this book.
$PEF*O5FYU: Indicates code words in text, database table names, folder names, filenames,
file extensions, pathnames, dummy URLs, user input, and Twitter handles. Here is an
example: "Mount the downloaded 8FC4UPSN ENH disk image file as another disk in
your system."
When we wish to draw your attention to a particular part of a code block, the relevant lines
or items are set in bold:
CJOCBTI
5IJTJTDPNNFOUMJOF
echo "Hello World"
MT
EBUF
Bold: Indicates a new term, an important word, or words that you see onscreen. For
example, words in menus or dialog boxes appear in the text like this. Here is an example:
"Select System info from the Administration panel."
[5]
Preface
Get in touch
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[6]
Other documents randomly have
different content
the Kingdom of Poland in Russia, but stretching eastwards as far as the
Dnieper, and including the north-west and south-west provinces of Russia,
i.e., the governments of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Mohileff, Vitebsk,
Volhynia, Podolia, Kieff.[3] In Austria-Hungary it included Galicia and
originally Austrian Silesia (Teschen); in Germany, so-called Royal Prussia
(West Prussia and Ermland) and Posen. The whole course of the Vistula lay
within its frontiers from its rise in the Carpathians to its debouchment at
Dantzig, which was a Polish port. East Prussia also had been originally a
fief of Poland, and the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg vassals of its king.
Early in the 17th century, however (1611), when Sigismund III was on the
Polish throne, East Prussia ceased to pay its tribute-money and Poland was
in too weak a state to enforce it. From that date therefore, until the
partitions Eastern Prussia was an island, so to speak, in Poland, severed by
the Polish territory on the Vistula from Brandenburg.
For some century and a half before the first partition of Poland in 1772,
the country had been weakly governed, and, as to-day, was split up by many
internal antagonisms, sedulously nourished and fostered by Germany. This
no doubt contributed to her incapacity for a vigorous national existence, but
what really decided her fate, was the international condition of Europe at
the epoch when the partitions were made. England and France to whose
interests it was then to prevent the partitions, which as we can see now,
were the germ which has since developed into the Mittel-Europa policy,
were strongly antagonistic, and Frederick the Great, who was the prime
mover in the partition of 1772 was England’s ally. Thus the possible
interference of the Western Powers in this partition was removed. On the
other side of Poland was Russia, who for the time being made common
cause with Prussia, and secured her own share. The two following partitions
were contemporaneous with the disorganization caused by the French
Revolution, and by them Poland, as a nation, completely disappeared from
the map of Europe. Then followed the Napoleonic wars, in which for a time
Russia was in extreme peril, and it is highly interesting to note that even as
in 1914 when Russia was in peril from German arms, Polish reunion was
promised by the Grand Duke Nicholas, so, when the French peril threatened
Russia, a hundred years before, Prince Michael Oginski in 1802 issued a
proclamation to Poland signed by Alexander I. strangely similar to that of
the Grand Duke Nicholas speaking with the authority of Nicholas II. Yet
perhaps there is little strangeness about it, for similar circumstances evoked
it. It ran as follows:
“Poles! I, as at the head of a nation which, like yourselves is
descended from the valiant Slavs, as one who has sworn to fight to the
last drop of blood for the integrity of my country, for its honour and
independence, and as chief of the Army ... as a monarch full of desire
that Poland should form a sure bulwark for Russia, I hereby declare
before heaven and earth that I will rebuild and restore the Kingdom of
Poland, and calling forth the aid of Almighty God, I put on my head the
Polish crown, a separate crown, but through my person connected with
the Russian empire ... and on that basis I will rule, govern and cooperate
with you to secure and establish your happiness.”
These were fair promises, but Poland, hereby completing her ruin, allied
herself to Napoleon, and when in 1815 the Congress of Vienna met, it
confirmed the partition. Prussia was formally granted such part of the
Ancient state of Poland as is still hers, Austria obtained Galicia, and Russia
the rest, and from that year till to-day Poland has been a nation without one
yard of territory of its own, but has preserved its national language, its
national sentiment, and its national religion, which is Roman Catholic. Thus
it remained until, immediately after the outbreak of the present war, the
Grand Duke Nicholas proclaimed once more that the territories of Poland,
split up between the warring nations should be reunited. But for the one
remaining year in which Poland was in possession of Russia, the
Government took no single step to redeem the promise then made, nor
exerted themselves to convince the Poles of their sincerity. Subsequently we
shall see in more detail what purpose lay behind that promise, and estimate
its real value.
During these ninety-nine years, from the Congress of Vienna up to the
outbreak of the European war, the inhabitants of the dismembered Poland,
shared up between Germany, Austria and Russia suffered diverse treatment
at the hands of the annexing Powers. They were promised at the Congress
that they should enjoy independent political organizations, certain national
rights and certain economical privileges, including, for instance, free
navigation of the whole course of the Vistula. These promises were
variously interpreted by the three nations in whose hands it was placed to
carry them out, and as might be expected, the fulfilment of them was
strongly coloured by the national characteristics of their interpreters. In
order to understand the feelings of the Poles at large on the partition of their
people among three different nations, it is necessary to recount briefly the
treatment they experienced at the hands of each.
From 1815 to 1830 the inhabitants of that part of Poland which fell to
Prussia’s share had nothing to complain of except the outrage of the act of
annexation itself. They had a Polish regent, Prince Anthony Radziwill, the
possession and authority of the Polish nobles was upheld, their religion was
respected and government posts were given to them. The Polish language
was taught in schools, and in the administration of the country it was used
equally with German. But in 1830 occurred the Polish revolution in the
Kingdom of Poland, which, by the partition, went to Russia, and for fear of
a similar insurrection, the liberal policy of Prussia was changed for a far
more rigid Germanization. Prince Radziwill was replaced by a German,
Flottvell, who was made President of the Duchy of Posen.
With the object of smothering the national spirit, the power of the Polish
nobility and clergy was curtailed, the German language began to take the
place of Polish in schools and public business, special encouragements were
given to Prussian settlers in the country, and the Polish officials were
replaced by Prussians. For a while under Frederick William IV. (1840) a
more liberal policy was pursued, but an insurrectionary movement in 1848
caused to be administered to the Poles a redoubled dose of Germanization.
This continued to be the fixed policy of Bismarck, who avowedly did all he
could to stamp out any sense of national existence in the Poles, and to
absorb them in his work of uniting Germany. Religion and language are two
of the strongest ties which hold together those of the same blood, and
Bismarck set to work to loosen these, even as did the Young Turks when
they ordered that a translation into Turkish should be made of the Koran, to
be used in mosques, and that the prayer for the Caliphate should be recited
no longer in Arabic.[4] Polish bishops were imprisoned, church-schools and
charitable institutions managed by the clergy were closed, endowments
were confiscated, and parishes deprived of their pastors. The tie of language
was similarly dissolved, and between 1870 and 1874 Polish was no longer
permitted to be taught in second-grade schools, and German took its place,
so that the next generation it was hoped, would grow up without any
literary knowledge, at any rate, of their own tongue. German was similarly
made the sole official language, and the whole of the administration of the
country, legal and political, was carried on in that tongue. Simultaneously
Poles were prohibited from holding any government post, and the names of
Polish towns were Germanized.
The Polish population, as was found by the census of 1880, was
increasing more rapidly than the German in Prussian Poland, and fresh
steps were necessary for its suppression. All Poles, subjects of Austria and
Russia, were therefore expelled from Prussian Poland, and in 1886 Prussia
voted the sum of 100 million marks for the purchase of land from Polish
proprietors, and the settlement on these lands of Germans. Next year the
complete elimination of the Polish language from all schools was effected
and German was made the only language for religious instruction of Polish
children. With the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 the rigidity of these
restrictions was relaxed for a few years, but in 1894 an even more active
propaganda for the Germanization of Prussian Poland was organized by the
“Ostmarken Verein,” or Hakatist Association (so called after the initials of
its founders Hannemann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann). Another 100
million marks was voted in the Prussian Diet for the purchase of Polish
lands and the settlement thereon of German Colonists, and these were
introduced into villages in solid blocks with their mayor and their Protestant
church. By the aid of the state grants these settlers acquired their land at
ludicrously low prices, but were not permitted to part with it again to Polish
proprietors, and a couple more regulations rounded off the general policy,
the total effect of which was to forbid Poles either to acquire land or to erect
houses. A further grant of 125,000,000 marks was voted in 1908 for fresh
acquisition of land and the establishment of German settlers. Territorially
the result of these measures was entirely satisfactory from a German point
of view, for in 1912, a quarter of the whole territory nationally Polish and
inhabited by Poles was owned by Germany.
But neither these restrictions and prohibitions nor Bismarck’s declared
policy directed against the destruction of Polish nationality have been able
to render moribund the inherent vitality of this nation, or to extinguish the
flame of its individual life. The Prussian Poles organized against the
hostility of the Ostmarken Verein a system of defence for their land, their
language, and their stability, and if we take for consideration a series of
years, say from 1870 to 1900, we find that they developed national banking
corporations in such perfection that they were declared by German
economists to constitute an internal peril. Similarly in spite of legislation
the land in Polish hands was larger at the end of that period than at the
beginning, while, most significant of all, the population of Poles in Prussian
Poland increased more rapidly than that of the nation that aimed at
submerging them. The fact had already been disclosed by the German
census of 1880, and by 1900 the percentage of Germans in Posen had
decreased from being 45 per cent. of the whole population to 38 per cent.
National consciousness and like force alike proved themselves superior to
repressive legislation.
Such in brief has been the hundred years’ history of that part of Poland
which, with promises of liberty and autonomy, was assigned to Prussia. The
policy of Mittel-Europa has striven (and has largely succeeded) in stripping
it of its lands, its religion and its tongue, patching the rents with German
fabric. It is not much to be wondered at that when in November 1916 the
Central Empires proclaimed the independence of Russian Poland, which
they still jointly occupy, its inhabitants put but little faith in the significance
of the boon, for they were familiar with the interpretation placed by the
Germans on the word independence. Their suspicions have been amply
justified.
The three partitions had given to Russia certain Eastern Polish provinces
mentioned above[5] which had formed part of the ancient republic, and by
the Congress of Vienna this arrangement was confirmed and the district
known as the Kingdom of Poland was added. A constitution was granted it
which assured it of equality of citizenship with Russian subjects, liberty, its
own language, to be taught in schools and to be used officially, and a
national government consisting of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The
observation of these pledges was of the shortest duration, and Russia soon
began infringing them and depriving Poland of any semblance of
independence or self-government. The effect of this was the insurrection of
1830, which ended in the victory of the Russian armies and the capture of
Warsaw. Russia thereupon deprived the Kingdom of Poland of its
constitution and of its army, and put at the head of the administration a
Russian general, Paskevitch, who ruled the country by martial law. All
literature dealing with subjects calculated to keep alive feelings of
patriotism among Poles was suppressed, and the national church was
deprived of her position as state church.
The accession of Alexander II. in 1855 saw a more liberal policy
introduced. A Council of administration was established again, Polish was
taught in schools, and Polish officials were employed in the civil
administration. But after the second insurrection of 1863 the separate
administration of the Kingdom of Poland was abolished, the country was
finally incorporated into the Russian empire, Poles were expelled from all
official posts, and their places taken by Russians sent from Russia, and all
shadow of self-government and semblance of liberty was withdrawn. The
possessions of the church were confiscated, communication with the Holy
See was forbidden, and in 1874 the rites of the orthodox church were made
compulsory. Polish schools were suppressed, the Polish language forbidden
in schools and as the official language, and in a word the whole of that part
of the kingdom of Poland which had fallen to Russia was completely
Russified so far as laws and the penalties for breaking them could ensure
the process.
In Lithuania, once also belonging to Poland, this second insurrection was
visited with even greater severity under the administration of General
Muravieff (suitably styled “The Hangman”), who was given unlimited
power to punish the insurgents as he chose, and used that power with the
utmost ability of his savage mind. He treated the Poles as enemies of the
state, he shot the ringleaders, he destroyed whole Polish villages and sent
their inhabitants to Siberia, he suppressed all Polish papers, he prohibited
the use of the Polish language in public altogether, even in conversation in
the streets, and in particular he inflicted heavy fines on landowners and
clergy who did not fall under direct suspicion of having had any part in the
insurrection, in order to render them more powerless for the future. The
proof, even the suspicion of complicity, was not required: perfectly
innocent men were deprived of the power of doing again what they had
never done at all. No Pole was permitted to acquire land in Lithuania or
Little Russia, so that any Pole who wished to sell his land, must sell it only
to a Russian: this measure was supplemented by a further ukase in 1887
which provided that if any Pole not being a Russian subject, inherited real
estate in Lithuania or Little Russia, he had to sell it within two years.
Catholic churches were transformed into orthodox, orthodox monks were
put in possession of Uniat monasteries.
Now revolutions are dangerous things, and the state, among whose
peoples occur such risings as the Polish insurrections of 1830 and 1863, is
perfectly right to put them down, for the state’s first duty is to ensure its
own safety. If it is a liberal and beneficent government, it will remedy the
injustices that have given rise to discontent, but it is primarily its business
to suppress what is dangerous to its own existence. But in the case of
Russian Poland it must be remembered that it was the disregard of the
Russian Government for the promises which it had made to its Polish
acquisitions that directly produced these risings: it had shewn itself an
irresponsible autocracy to whom its own treaties and obligations meant no
more than they mean now-a-days to Germany, and having put down those
risings, Russia in no way redressed the wrongs that had occasioned them,
but aggravated the burdens and disabilities of the people to whom she had
promised rights and liberty. In the democratic crisis that followed the
Japanese war, it is true, certain concessions were made to the Poles, certain
liberties granted them—they sent, for instance, thirty-four members to the
Duma (a number reduced in 1907 to twelve)—but, broadly speaking, during
the hundred years that succeeded the partitions, neither Russia nor Prussia
shewed any sincere intention of fulfilling the obligations they had entered
into after the Congress of Vienna, but both alike pursued the settled policy
of extinguishing the national consciousness of the people whose territories
they had appropriated. In this, though they tried to loose all the ties which
bind a people together, they have utterly failed. The national vitality of the
Poles, as a race, has survived the century of bondage, and exists to-day with
no less vigour than it did when those partitions were made. The tie of blood
has proved to be insoluble by oppression, and the shedding of it has but
cemented its coherence.
The Poles of the province of Galicia, which was assigned to Austria,
fared no better, up to the year 1867, than their fellow-countrymen in Prussia
and Russia. The most rigid system of Germanic bureaucracy was brought to
bear on them, and they suffered barbarous oppression. Economically also
Austria worked for the ruin of the country.[6] She suppressed both the
natural resources of the country and the industries of its inhabitants. But
after Austria’s defeat in the war of 1866, she had to reform her internal
policy and grant rights to her subject races and from that date the conditions
of the Poles of Galicia were greatly ameliorated. Polish, for instance, is the
official language of the province, and is taught in Polish schools, and the
fact that Austria belongs to the Roman communion has assured religious
liberty for the Poles, who have their Archbishop at Lemberg, and three
Bishops at Cracow, Tarnow, and Przemysl. They have freedom of access to
Rome, and are appointed jointly by the Holy See and the Emperor. Galicia
is represented in the Chamber of Deputies at Vienna (which consists of 545
members) by 106 members, of whom 28 are Little Russians, the rest Poles.
The Minister of Galicia who has a seat in the Cabinet at Vienna, is always a
Pole, and in the central administration at Vienna about seven per cent. of the
officials are of Polish birth. Galicia enjoys an autonomy, though a limited
one, with a Diet of its own under a Marshal, 73 per cent. of the members of
which are Poles. The Crown is represented by a Lieutenant-General, who
since 1849 up to the outbreak of war has always been a Pole. Since then the
appointment has been held by two Germans in succession, first General
Collard and then General Diller. Economical exploitation, however, still
continues; there are, for instance, differential tariffs and railways,
facilitating imports from Austria to Galicia and penalizing imports from
Galicia into Austria.
Such in brief have been the fortunes and misfortunes of the nation which
for more than a hundred years has been dismembered and assigned to its
three neighbours. Two of them, Russia and Germany, have, as we have
seen, made no pretence of granting the autonomy they promised to the
people of the territories which they received, and up till the outbreak of the
war, Lithuania and the kingdom of Poland have not enjoyed the autonomy
that was guaranteed them more than have the Polish inhabitants of Posen or
Royal Prussia. In both cases the policy of the annexing nations has been to
absorb, to merge, to kill the consciousness of separate nationality. As far as
legal disabilities, lingual suppression, religious bondage go, they have done
their utmost. But it is one thing to stifle the expressions of national feeling,
and quite another to extinguish the spirit that animates them, and in that
regard they have signally failed. Austria alone for the last fifty years has
acquitted herself of her obligations, and has granted to Galicia a fair
equality of rights with the other races who compose her patch-work Empire,
and a reasonable measure of autonomy. But it is not equality of rights
among the subjects of different nations that the Polish National spirit
desires. It does not ask for decent treatment at the hands of Germany or
Russia or Austria. What it demands, and what the governments of the
Entente have repeatedly promised it, is that it should be reunited and
independent: it does not crave indulgence, but its due. On the grounds of the
rights of smaller nations to exist, it claims that the territories into which
Germany, Russia and Austria have divided it, should be reunited into a
sovereign and independent state. But it is not merely as an act of belated
justice that the Allies have insisted both in separate and in joint
pronouncements on the execution of this: had there been, for instance, no
European war, for other reasons, it cannot be supposed that any of them
would have provoked it in order to give Poland the rights which they now
claim for her. The significance of Poland to them is in relation to the
menace of Germany’s Mittel-Europa policy.
CHAPTER III
But to make her road completely open it is essential to her that Poland,
in the sense of the words in which the statesmen of all countries of the
Entente have used it, namely a United Poland, consisting of some union of
Russian, German and Austrian Poland, should be under the control of Berlin
either directly or indirectly through Vienna. It is equally essential to the
aims of the Entente that it should not. If, in fact, at the end of the war, Posen
and West Prussia remain in German hands, Galicia in Austrian hands and
the Kingdom of Poland, whether joined to Galicia or not (as by the Austrian
solution), in the control either of Austria or Germany, then, whether or not
Germany gives back Belgium with suitable reparation, and restores Alsace
and Lorraine to France, the Entente will have lost the war. Indeed, so vital
to the interests of the Central Empires is the retention of Poland, that M.
Hervé (evidently with information behind him) has suggested that Austria
would be willing even to cede Trieste and Pola to the Italians on condition
of the Entente consenting to see the Kingdom of Poland joined to Galicia
under a Habsburg suzerainty. This junction of the Kingdom of Poland with
Galicia, is known as the “Austrian Solution,” and has been a policy debated
between Germany and Austria since they occupied Poland in 1915. It is
treated of in detail in Part II of this book.
Now it must clearly be understood that it is not merely nor even
primarily in the cause of abstract justice that the pronouncements of the
governments of the Entente have stated and reiterated their declaration with
regard to Poland. A great wrong was undoubtedly done to the country when
by the partitions and the Congress of Vienna more than a hundred years
ago, a free nation was divided and wiped off the map. But the Entente did
not go to war in order to redress that ancient wrong, though undoubtedly
one of the main reasons, indeed the main reason, why they now cannot
arrive at some basis from which peace-discussion could arise, is that they
will not accept any such solution of the Polish question as implies unlimited
German control over these territories. Nor is there any conceivable cause
why Germany should yield in this matter until she is forced to, for the
creation of such an independent Poland as the Entente demands, will be the
most serious check that could possibly be dealt to her Mittel-Europa policy,
and also implies an immense loss of territory for herself.
The historical claims then of Poland to these territories does not concern
the Entente or the objects for which they are fighting. At the most it is a
supplementary consideration marginally noted at the edge of the real
question at issue. The historical claim is admitted, but it does not exercise
weight. Calais once belonged to England, Syracuse once belonged to
Athens, but nobody proposes to restore them to England and to Greece
because they once belonged to them, and the Entente do not propose to
restore either German or Austrian territories to Poland for the similar
reason. But the ethnographical reason is a very different matter: the
population of these lands is neither Russian nor German nor Austrian, but
Polish. One nation inhabits them, and, as a nation, it has a right according to
the programme of the Entente, to a national existence, for it has shown itself
for centuries able to cohere and govern itself, and it was a series of unjust
provisions that tore it apart. And this acceptance by the Entente of this
ethnographical claim coincides with the necessity of securing a check to the
Mittel-Europa expansion of Germany. It is essential for the peace of the
world and the integrity of the British Empire that there should exist just
here a strong state that does not lean on Germany, but shall be in itself a bar
to German absorption eastwards, and shall naturally find its orientation and
its development independent of and opposed to Teutonic penetration. At
present as we all know and deplore, there is chaos east of Poland, and to
lean on chaos is to be engulfed in the whirlwind. But no sane thinker, unless
he believes in the sanity of Bolsheviks can doubt that some day out of chaos
and outer darkness a light shall shine again, and a call of a people’s will
shall be heard, and when fire and tempest have passed shall come the “still
small voice” for which the prophet hearkened. Socialistic, revolutionary
against the order of those things that have been swept away, it will no doubt
be, but what it will not be is the mad destructive hurricane which at present
is the only manifestation of the power behind it. Unless Germany wins the
war, there will be a democratic Russia, sympathetic in blood and in
constitution to a democratic Poland. Out of the disintegration that Germany
has made in the nation of her foe, will arise order again, but it must not be
order as established by Germany. It is vital and essential to the peace of the
world, unless by the “peace of the world” we imply a complete Germanic
domination of the world, that a united and independent Poland should voice
the will of a free people, and that her cry of “Liberty” should be re-echoed
by Russia. Anything that makes for discord between the new Russia and the
new Poland is a nail driven into the coffin that contains the corpse of a free
world.
It is necessary to descend into the bewildering arena (mixed metaphors
are the only way to express it) of Polish politics, in order to understand the
feeling of the country itself with regard to its fate. That country at the
present moment lies in the hand of Germany, but not “tame as a pear late
basking over the wall,” but more like a bomb with a time-fuse attached to it.
It lies there for the moment in Germany’s hand, quite quiet, since it cannot
extricate itself from that iron grip, but it has not only the potentiality, but
the necessity for explosion. Never was there a country so crammed with the
chemicals that make the explosive mixture. Could a plebiscite be taken not
only of the “Kingdom of Poland,” but of Prussian and Austrian Poland as
well, there is no shadow of doubt that an overwhelming majority would
elect for the formation of a national unit, independent of Russia, of Austria
and of Germany, that should form a united State of Poles. Such (and the
numbers that would make up that choice are quite incontrovertible) is the
will of the Poland that the Governments of the Entente have declared that
they will call into being. If the Poles of Russian, Prussian and Austrian
Poland could be given voting papers, there would be so great a majority for
the declared intentions of the Entente, that the minority would rightly be
unrepresented. But of the unrepresented minority the most numerous as the
most powerful factor would not by nationality be Polish or Austrian, or
Russian or Prussian at all, but Jewish. The Jews, of whom there are very
large numbers, as will subsequently be shown, both in Russian and Austrian
Poland (in Prussian Poland their numbers are very insignificant) cannot
possibly be expected to support the union rather than the disintegration of
Poland, and the cause of this is so simple that it hardly needs to be pointed
out. They have no national affinity for Poland at all, nor is there the smallest
reason why they should have. Racially, they were detested by the Poles, and
they were abhorred and persecuted by the Russians during the century in
which Poland was under Russian government. But since Germany has been
in occupation their lot has been vastly ameliorated and their yoke lightened.
She has given them greater liberty and rights than they ever enjoyed in
Russian Poland before; she has admitted them to the Council of State, she
has founded Jewish schools, and above all she has given them “business.”
In both Poland and Russia she has employed the Jews on the mission of
disintegration with the success that up till now has always attended the
policy of Mittel-Europa, and to-day the Judaic interest in the question of
Poland cannot, in the very nature of things, be pro-Polish. Pour le bon
motif, that is to say, for the interest of their nation, they support the German
interest here, there and elsewhere, on patriotic grounds.[7] They have no
national territory at stake; they are but the mistletoe, a strong parasitic
growth, on other trees, and, as regards Poland, they have selected the tree
that they consider most likely to give them nutriment. That tree is Germany.
Here, on behalf of the Entente’s declaration, is another reason for cutting
down the tree. But better still would it be to convince the Jewish element in
Poland that it would be more advantageous to root itself in the tree of the
Entente, than on the world-ash of the Central Powers. It is, indeed, essential
for the prosperity and coherence of the new Poland, that for the shrill
antagonism that to-day exists between Poles and Jews there should be
substituted the concord and community of interest that will make them
friends.
Mittel-Europa is not yet quite entitled to sing its Paeans of victory, for
the whole world knows that the fate of Germany at the present moment,
hangs on the military operations on the West front. Should Germany gain a
victory there, or even obtain an effective stalemate, her Mittel-Europa
policy would proceed precisely as she desires it to proceed. But should
Germany sustain a smashing defeat there, or a stalemate which her internal
conditions render ineffective, all her policy, whether in East or West,
whether Pan-German or Mittel-European must topple and fall. The Jews in
Poland who are a very numerous and important body have definitely betted
on Germany. The Entente has betted against her. While the military
situation in the West remains unresolved, there is no conclusion to be
reached. It is only necessary to note that the Jews of the whole of Poland as
an independent united state, have put their money on Germany, because
they believe that Germany will control the destinies of these territories.
But the Jews in the Kingdom of Poland are not only Pro-German but
also anti-Polish, and it is noticeable that, whereas all Jews in German
Poland declare themselves German, when a census was taken at Lodz after
the German occupation, only 2,300 Jews declared themselves Poles, while
153,000 declared themselves Jews. The Poles claim that originally they
were tolerant and hospitable to Jews, but that in the insurrections of 1830
and 1863, the latter sided against them with the Russians, and that during
the last twenty years they have consistently organized themselves as a
separate nationality, shewing marked hostility to the Poles. About 1907 they
began a boycotting policy against Poles, forbidding their countrymen, for
instance, to consult Polish doctors, and in 1909 when the Poles proclaimed
a boycott of German products in Poland, this boycott failed because the
Jews lent all their support to German commerce. The ill-feeling between the
two has been steadily on the increase, and came to a head when in 1912, at
the election of the fourth Duma, for which M. Kuckarewski and M.
Dmowski were standing at Warsaw, the Jewish vote succeeded in defeating
both of them and electing their own candidate. This led to a Polish
commercial boycott of Jews, and at present the antagonism between the two
is hostile and fierce. The feeling of the Poles towards them is not so much
anti-Semitic as such, but is the antagonism of a race for a foreign and
hostile dweller in its lands. Germany to-day is in possession of Poland, and
the Jews of Poland lean over the shoulders of the landlord, protected by his
bulky form from the hisses and hatred below. For if there is one face that
the Pole, as a nationalist and patriot hates more than the German face, it is
the Jewish face. Whatever the rights and the wrongs of this antagonism are,
the antagonism acutely exists, and no solution, Austrian or otherwise will
dissolve it. The Pole believes that the Jew is at present completely
antagonistic to his national ideal, unless it is a German ideal. But for Poland
to become a united independent state, not fearing German penetration, it is
essential that a liberal policy towards Jews should convince the latter that
their interests are cared for and appreciated by the national government.
(ii) Polish Parties
In the shifting kaleidoscope of Polish politics a party is formed one day
to dissolve or amalgamate itself with another the next, and the trumpetting
that heralds its birth may only imply that a dozen men who happen to agree
with each other have after dinner christened themselves by some high-
sounding name. It would be useless to define the vast majority of these
parties, to render an account of the various shades of opinion which are
congregated into the Parliamentary terms of Left or Right, or explain in
what points the Christian Democrats, for instance, or the National
Federation or the Union of Economic Independence who form part of the
Right differ from each other. But three of these groups with their main
policies must be outlined.
I. A considerable body of opinion among Poles favours the Austrian
Solution, that is to say, the union of Russian Poland with Galicia forming an
autonomous state under a Habsburg prince. The Social Democratic party of
Galicia and Silesia is identified with this, but the policy of the whole group
is based on the notion that this is the best solution that Poland can possibly
hope for, and the pillars that support the structure are not love of Austria,
but hatred of Germany and Russia. Its adherents do not believe that an
independent and united Poland, consisting of German, Russian and Austrian
Poland, is within the horizons of practical politics, and they would prefer to
see Russian and Austrian Poland under the sceptre of the Habsburgs, while
Posen and West Prussia remain German, rather than that the Kingdom of
Poland should remain in German grip. But they accept this because they
consider it the best that can be had. The powers of the Entente, it is hardly
necessary to state, would never willingly consent to such a solution, since it
would defeat the object for which they are fighting. Poland would thus
come under the direct control of the Central Empires, and though nominally
she would enjoy autonomy under Austrian suzerainty, she would assuredly
be fitted into the Mittel-Europa structure. For the Dual Monarchy has in fact
to-day no independent existence. It is Germany and Germany alone that
keeps it together, and Poland partitioned between Germany and Austria,
even though the Austrian province should be granted a large measure of
autonomy, would remain a link in the chain of Mittel-Europa expansion, a
story in the structure of the Mittel-Europa house.
Germany hitherto has never quite admitted the Austrian solution, though
on several occasions since she and Austria have occupied the kingdom of
Poland she has come near to doing so, and, while still they occupy it, may
yet do so, for though it would remove the kingdom of Poland from her
direct control, she knows very well that she controls the Dual Monarchy.
Indeed her domination over Austria would be thereby increased, for she
would no doubt demand as the price of her consent that the seats in the
Austrian Parliament hitherto occupied by Poles should henceforth be
occupied by Germans, for the Poles would no longer have any voice in the
Reichsrat but would sit in the assembly of the newly-made autonomous
state. Germany would thus secure a preponderance in the Austrian
Parliament over the Czech element. These and other points have from time
to time inclined her to the Austrian solution with the condition attached that
she should annex to Germany a certain portion of the Russian Kingdom of
Poland, leaving the greater part to be joined to Galicia.
But on the whole she has hitherto considered that the disadvantages to
her personally of the Austrian Solution outweigh the advantages. Should the
greater part of Poland pass into Austrian control, it would be Austria who
recruited her armies from among the Poles, and thus Germany would not
directly obtain the quarries of man-power which she would like. The more
thorough-going Junkers, such as Hindenburg and the Crown Prince, are in
favour of her annexing the Kingdom of Poland herself, directly and openly,
and what probably keeps her back from so doing is the knowledge that she
would have on her hands a turbulent province always ready to break into
insurrection, for of the nine and a half millions of Poles who inhabit it, there
is not one who would not protest against such an annexation. The fact of her
having declared the existence of a Polish state with all the creaking
machinery of the sham Regency Council and the sham Council of State,
does not for a moment deter her from tearing up the Constitution she has
granted; what does give her pause is her inability to balance pros and cons
and determine in precisely what solution of the Polish problem lies her
greatest aggrandisement. Nor can she at present risk a rupture with Austria,
and in the meantime the question of the appointment of a Regent and the
Austrian Solution hangs fire.
II. The second solid party in the affairs of Poland is not Polish at all but
Jewish. The Jews do not compose even one of the twenty-three parties of
Polish opinion or form a bloc in the Council of State, and for this reason
they are as a rule totally overlooked by those who want to estimate the
values and weights of different sections of Polish politics. Without fear of
contradiction we may say that they are, at the present moment, favourable
to German aims and interests, and will undoubtedly by a grave danger to
the stability of any future Polish state, unless the long-standing quarrel
between the Poles and them is reconciled by liberal and democratic
legislation.
III. The third main group in Polish politics consists of the parties which
uphold and work for an independent and united Poland. Chief of these are
the National Democrats who are allied with the Realists. The Realists in the
main are landowners, and represent the upper classes of Poland. They have
solid interests there, and their patriotism is confirmed, or as their opponents
say, diluted, by the fact that they have a stake in the country.
But when we come to the National Democrats and their allied groups we
find for the first time in this short analysis of the main Polish parties, one
that is as solid as the Jews, as well organised as any political party, largely
dispersed and severed from its native land, can be, completely in accord in
its aims, and representative not only of themselves but of many other parties
in Poland, who would undoubtedly ally themselves to them, if they thought
that the aims of their policy could be realized. These groups have as their
entire aim the unity and independence of Poland. Their ascendancy in
Russia during the years immediately preceding the war may be gauged from
the fact that in the first Duma of 1906 and in the second and third Dumas of
1907 they and their supporters won all Polish constituencies. In the fourth
Duma of 1912 they won all but two, and these two, a witness to the growing
power of Jews and German penetration, were lost by them and won by the
Jewish interest. One of them was the constituency of Warsaw already
alluded to. That their aims constitute the national aims of the Poles taken as
a whole to-day was indicated at the elections to the National Council in
April, 1918, for out of 52[8] of the elected members no less than 37
belonged to the Inter-party club of Warsaw, which adopts the National
Democrat programme as opposed to either the Austrian Solution or any
German disposition of the future of the country. It is, however, important to
remember with regard to the significance of those elections, that the
deputies were elected by certain small bodies called Dietines, which have
no claim to democratic representation, for in the German sphere of
occupation those Dietines were appointed by Germans. Moreover, the
Dietines in which the predominant vote was Radical or Socialist, abstained
altogether from taking part in the elections, and thus the Inter-party Club,
consisting largely of land-owning Realists had matters its own way. A
further consideration is that the Realists, without being in the smallest
degree pro-German, have yet this common bond with them, namely that
both are equally concerned in resisting any revolutionary movement like
that which lately caused the collapse of the Russian Empire, for the Realists
represent the landed classes, while perhaps the greatest danger that faces
Germany on the East is the spread of Bolshevism. We must, in fact, with
regard to their elections realize that there was German support for the Inter-
party Club. Though the Inter-party Club support the National Democratic
programme, it was itself supported by German interest, which, equally with
it, was opposed to the Socialist vote.
At the same time, to us in England, and indeed to the cause of the
Entente generally, the National Democrats are of peculiar interest, since
they, like the spokesmen for the various governments of the Entente, aim at
the unity and independence of Poland, which is among the avowed objects
of us and our allies.
But the National Democrats go further than the declarations of the
governments of the Entente, and their programme now includes not only the
union of Prussian Poland (as partitioned by the Congress of Vienna) of
Austrian Poland and of the Russian kingdom of Poland, but they wish to see
united into one anti-German state, additional territories of the ancient
Republic, which included the North-west and South-west provinces of
Russia, territories which are not nowadays, nor indeed ever were inhabited
by a Polish majority. In the Polish state, as the National Democrats would
construct it, are included, “the whole Lithuanian linguistic territory and the
country south of it as far as the eastern extremity of Galicia, i.e. the present
governments of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, the larger part of Minsk and of
Volhynia.” This quotation, embodying the delimitation of the Eastern
frontier, is taken from a privately printed document of which it may be
affirmed that though, strictly speaking, it is not an official manifesto, it is an
authoritative and correct expression of this party of Polish national feeling,
and is accepted by the National Democrats as a true exposition of their
aims. M. Dmowski is their acknowledged head, recognised as such not only
by them, but also by the statesmen of the Entente, and, whether we agree
with the whole programme or not, we have to give it our most careful
attention, since of all Polish parties, the aims of this party approximate
more closely to the avowed objects of the statesmen of the Entente, for both
have proclaimed and are working for a united and independent Poland.
Since M. Dmowski is the acknowledged spokesman of the National
Democrats and their policy, and has allowed this formal manifesto of their
aims formally accepted by his party to be circulated privately among those
whose business it is to deal with Polish affairs, it is necessary to go into
these aims in a detailed manner, and also to indicate the different shades of
opinion through which M. Dmowski himself has passed.
It says nothing against a serious and exceedingly shrewd politician as M.
Dmowski undoubtedly is, that his opinions have changed, and that in these
changes he has carried a solid and unsplit party with him, but it is important
to recognise that the aims of the National Democrats to-day are not what
they were in August, 1914, and to state the causes which led to this change.
That they have been not only misunderstood but misconstrued is an
additional reason for doing this. Since the outbreak of the war the National
Democrats have taken no share whatever in party politics, but have devoted
themselves entirely to the realization of their national aims. We will state
first the programme as it stands to-day, and the grounds on which it is
based.
The proposal is to restore to the new Polish State the great majority of
the territories that once belonged to the Ancient Republic before its
partitions. The claims on which this proposal are based are: (I) historical,
(II) ethnographical, (III) religious. But though the historical basis is
completely valid, for it is a mere matter of fact that all and more than the
National Democrats claim did once belong to the Ancient Republic, the
ethnographical and religious claims do not so uniformly coincide with it or
with each other. Very often both are commensurate with the historical basis,
but sometimes, as we shall see, not both, but only one of them covers the
historical field. The historical field again in certain instances, stretches itself
out alone, and gets no support from ethnographical or religious
considerations.
Eastwards the National Democrats do not claim the whole of the original
territories which once extended as far as the Dnieper in the South, and from
there ran more or less due north, and included the government of Mohileff,
Vitebsk and a large part of the Ukraine. Instead, as stated above, they would
leave out governments like Mohileff (where Poles are in an infinitesimal
minority) but they include Lithuania, Minsk, and Volhynia. Along the north
they make their frontier the Baltic from the mouth of the Niemen to the
north-west extremity of the Bay of Dantzig. From there the frontier is
drawn roughly south-wards, and includes in the new state the territories of
West Prussia, Posen and Upper Silesia. On the South the Carpathians form a
natural frontier, and thus there is included in the new state the whole of
Galicia. Poland would thus be reunited and, according to the authority
already quoted as a reliable mouth-piece of their aims, “it may be taken for
granted that on the territory of a Polish state, as roughly outlined above, the
population, Polish in language, culture, ideas and feeling would represent
not less than seventy per cent. of the whole number of inhabitants.” New
Poland would on these lines “have an area of about 200,000 square miles—
nearly equal to that of France or Germany, and a population—about
38,000,000—nearly equal to that of France.” It would have its seaboard on
the Baltic with its ports of Dantzig and Koenigsburg, thus exercising a
perpetual veto on the Baltic becoming a mere German lake: its river-road of
the whole course of the Vistula, its immense Silesian coal-fields, its
petroleum-producing area in Galicia, its valuable metallic deposits in the
district of Kielce; its industries in iron, cement, sugar, textiles already
flourishing before the war would revive again, and to them would be added
the industries of Galicia and of Prussian Poland, which, as I think M.
Dmowski clearly sees, is the key-stone of the new structure. It would raise a
national army that would easily suffice to protect its national interests and
independence, its size and population would perhaps even give it rank
among the Great Powers, for already the Poles themselves constitute
numerically the sixth European nation. Dawn would break on the night that
has lasted for a hundred and fifty years of starless darkness. Such are the
aims and the aspirations of the groups of Polish patriots, of whom the
National Democrats are the chief.
Now the advantages both for the Polish nation and for the powers of the
Entente secured by the successful construction of such a state are so
obvious that they need hardly be pointed out. The Polish interests in fact are
identical with those of the Entente, and, as we shall presently see, they form
but a part of the much larger programme for the checking of the Mittel-
Europa expansion in which both are vitally concerned. The strength and
independence of Poland, her affiliation to Slav interests instead of her
subordination to German interests are an essential factor in the aims of the
Entente. An independent and powerful Poland in fact is essential to secure
the failure of the Mittel-Europa scheme. But before passing on to those
wider issues it is necessary to examine the constructive aims of the National
Democrat party, and their acknowledged leader, M. Dmowski, somewhat
more in detail.
The National Democrat Party sprang from the National League which
was organised about 1885, and its aims were to bring together the efforts of
all Poles in all three parts of Poland for the reunion and independence of
their country. In 1895 M. Dmowski founded the Pan-Polonic Review,
which was devoted to the development of this policy, and published its
official programme. In 1907, the year which saw the creation of the Anglo-
Russian Entente, the National Democrats deliberately adopted the
orientation of the Powers of the Entente as opposed to that of the Central
Empires, believing that before long the conflict must break out, and their
motives and policy was fully set forth in “La question Polonaise,” by M.
Dmowski, which was published in Paris in 1909. Here it is stated that
Germany is the chief enemy to Polish aspirations, and that her aim is the
destruction of Polish national ideals. A development of this policy was seen
in the participation of Poles in the so-called “Neo-Slav” movement, the aim
of which was to unite all Slav countries in the coming struggle against
Germany. After the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, when
Austria was preparing for war against Russia, there began (also among
patriotic Poles) a propaganda against Russia, as being a chief enemy to
Polish independence, and General Pilsudski, whose patriotism and honesty
have never been questioned even by those who most disagree with his
policy, organised the Polish legions on behalf of Austria against Russia.
This had the unfortunate effect of splitting up into opposed camps the most
fervent Polish patriots, Pilsudski believing that Russia was the chiefest of
Poland’s enemies, while the National Democrats under the lead of M.
Dmowski had decided to adopt the orientation of the Entente powers as
against Austria and Germany, and thus when the war broke out, we find one
party of Polish patriots in the military service of Austria against Russia,
while the other, by the mouth of M. Jaronski, a Polish member of the Duma,
declared in that assembly, on behalf of the Polish nation, that the Poles
would support Russia against the Central Empires, and expected that the
war would effect the realization of their dream of national unity and
independence. Immediately following on that came the proclamation of
Polish union by the Grand Duke Nicholas, which was accepted by the
National Democrats. As we have seen, this was taken by them to imply the
union of Prussian and Austrian Poland with the Russian kingdom of Poland
under the sceptre of the Tsar, but naturally it did not include Lithuania and
the other Russian provinces which the National Democrat programme now
claims. It was not until the Russian revolution of 1917, when the utter
disorganisation of Russia was evident that the National Democrats put out
the extension of their aims and demanded these Russian provinces also. Up
till then they supported Russia and the aims of the Entente. But on that,
while continuing to support the Entente, they drafted their wider bill.
M. Dmowski, as has been seen from this short analysis of the policy of
the party which he has always led, and of which he is the acknowledged
spokesman, is a politician of the flexible type, or rather his tactics have
been flexible, so to speak, though his strategy has been inflexible. His aims,
that is to say, have never varied, though he has always been willing to ally
himself and his party with any power which he thought was likely to grant
some fraction of his invariable aspirations which throughout have been the
unity and independence of his country. Thus at one time he was violently
opposed to the land-owning Realists, with whom he is now firmly allied, on
the grounds of their being too subservient to the Russian Government.
Opportunist he certainly has been, but it must be remembered that
opportunism only becomes an intellectual or moral dishonesty when the
aim of a policy, not the tactics that are likely to secure it, varies. And M.
Dmowski’s aim has always burned with a flame that has never flickered.
But it is curious to note that while his aims have been invariable, his policy
has always been precisely the opposite of Pilsudski’s. The latter, now
languishing in German internment, has always fought with Poland’s chief
enemy, whoever that was, while M. Dmowski has always made friends with
any who promised concessions.
It was for this last move, namely, the demand for provinces belonging to
a disintegrated country which hitherto he had supported, that his enemies
and opponents, Socialists, Jews and Cadets, chiefly deride his career and
politics as those of a “Facing-all-ways.” It has made him an easy target for
caricature which, to the present writer, misrepresents him or does not
understand him. For he accepted the manifesto of the Grand Duke as giving
Poland the best chance of unity that was then likely to be offered. He staked
then on the success of the Russian arms, and Russia would never give
Poland the Russian provinces which he now includes in his Polish State.
Then came the collapse of Russia, upon which, still staking on the success
of Russia’s allies he enlarged his aims. To make the unity of the Polish
nation complete, he added the provinces which Russia while it existed,
would not give, but which non-existent Russia could not withhold. Without
attempting to justify his policy, or approve of its wisdom, we must realize
that it was not inconsistent. The motive behind it all was to secure the
largest possible measure of unity and independence for Poland, and the
collapse of Russia had now made possible—given that the Entente, minus
Russia, was victorious—a greater Poland than was possible when the Grand
Duke Nicholas made his proclamation, and the National Democrats
accepted it.
His enemies misunderstood this, and on the accusation of political
knavery, they built a further accusation of political imbecility. For they
point to the programme of the National Democrats as it now stands, and
say, “How on earth can this be realized? That Russia should give to Poland
the provinces that belong to her implies a Russian defeat, and a triumph of
German arms. Unless forced to do so, Russia would never give up her own
provinces. On the other hand, Germany and Austria will not give up Galicia
and Prussian Poland unless they are defeated and Russia victorious.
Therefore the Poland that M. Dmowski postulates implies a total defeat of
both sides, which is impossible, and, therefore, M. Dmowski is a political
imbecile.”
Now this is very shallow reasoning, and is based either on
misunderstanding or misrepresentation. As pointed out, the difference in
tactics between the acceptance of the Grand Duke’s manifesto and the
completer demands now made by the National Democrats corresponds to
the difference between the Russian situation of 1914 and the Russian
situation of 1917. What was not possible in 1914 is, theoretically, possible
now, and should the Central Empires be completely beaten, there is no
practical reason why the National Democratic programme should not be
realised. The Entente powers, that is to say, would, if completely victorious,
be able to unite Lithuania and the other Russian provinces with Poland, and
thus accomplish what M. Dmowski’s opponents say was not possible except
on the supposition that both Germany and Russia were simultaneously to
suffer a crushing defeat. Whether that is desirable or not is another question,
but it is not an imbecile dream founded on the total defeat of two opposed
belligerents. It was not possible in 1914, but it must be remembered that the
National Democrats did not put forth that demand then. They accepted the
Grand Duke’s proclamation, for doing which then, and for claiming a
completer Poland now, M. Dmowski has already been labelled a “Facing-
all-ways.” But if he is that, he is not an imbecile in demanding concessions
that imply a total defeat of both sides. His enemies may make their choice
as to which label they attach to him, but they really must not attach both.
One of the two slips off.
But there are points in this programme of the National Democrats which
demand much more serious consideration and criticism. It will be
remembered that the National Democrats aspire to a new Poland of
38,000,000 inhabitants of which not less than 70 per cent. are “Polish in
language, culture, ideas and feeling.” Now 70 per cent. of 38,000,000 is
26,600,000, a number which vastly exceeds the total number of Poles in the
whole area under discussion. Estimates as to this total differ; Mr. Geoffrey
Drage, for instance, in his “Pre-War Statistics of Poland and Lithuania,”
gives the total number of Poles in these territories as 18,626,000, a deficit
of 6,000,000 below those in the privately-printed document. Similarly M.
Olechowski, himself a Nationalist, who likewise makes out a strong case on
behalf of united Poland, puts the total down as 19,400,000, and I have
nowhere been able to find any authority or to construct any system of
calculation which places the aggregate of the true Polish population as
higher than between 21,000,000 and 22,000,000. Or, to apply another test,
let us take in detail the various constituent parts of the new Polish state, and
see how the percentages in them correspond with the percentage given
above. They are as follows:—
Percentage of Poles.
Kingdom of Poland 74.0
Lithuania 18.47
Minsk 10.3
Volhynia 9.97
Galicia 58.55
Teschen 54.9
Posen 61.5
West Prussia 35.5
Government of Allenstein 50.0
These are pre-war statistics, but they are the latest available, and it is at
once clear from them that you cannot get out of them an average of
anything approaching 70 per cent. of Poles. In addition to this, the total
population of the areas under consideration is considerably more than
38,000,000, and must be put down as being over 40,000,000, which again
dilutes the percentage of Poles.
On the other hand, it will be noticed that the author of our document says
that this 70 per cent. is “Polish in language, culture, ideas and feeling,” and
does not definitely say “Polish in blood.” But the reader would rightly infer
that this was meant, since his argument is ethnographical, and he himself
confirms that impression, for he immediately goes on to speak of the
various other nationalities which compose the remaining 30 per cent.,
leaving you to conclude that the 70 per cent. are Poles by blood.
Ethnographically, then, his figures are wrong, and seriously wrong, while if
he means exactly (though misleadingly) what he says, we must suppose that
he includes among “those of Polish culture, etc.,” those of Polish religion,
e.g. the Lithuanians. Some colour is given to this explanation by the fact
that he says that “the Polish state ... ought to include those provinces where
Western (Polish) civilization is ineradicable ... or where the majority of the
inhabitants are Catholics.” Unless he includes all Roman Catholics as
“Polish in culture, etc.,” he cannot justify this 70 per cent., while (apart
from the fact that if he does so include them, he ought to have said so) he
must be aware that a very large percentage of those Roman Catholics are
bitterly and violently anti-Polish. He tells us, for instance, that a great
majority of the Lithuanians would vote for union with Poland, on which
subject we shall speak presently, and on such unsupported assertions I think
that he must base his 70 per cent. By no other means can he possibly arrive
at it, and if these are the means he adopts, it must be noticed that he drops
the ethnographical argument altogether, and substitutes for it the argument
that co-religionists are always amicably inclined to each other. How
dangerous such an assumption is, we shall see when we come in detail to
the question of the inclusion of Lithuania in the Polish state.
Our author recognises that the Jews will be an anti-Polish and pro-
German element, and true to his anti-Jewish views, which are perfectly
sound, as derived from present conditions, admits that “so large a number
(two and a half millions) of Jews on the territory of the Polish states
presents a very serious disadvantage.” But here again, in his desire to
present the stability of his future state, he both magnifies its strength and
underrates its weaknesses, of which the pro-German Jewish population is
among the greatest. For instead of there being only two and a half million
Jews to be reckoned with there must be well over four millions of them, the
various censuses showing:—
Jews.
Russian Poland (1911) 1,716,000
Galicia (1910) 900,000
Lithuania (1897) 697,000
Minsk and Volhynia (1897) 740,000
Prussian Poland (1905) 68,483
4,121.483[9]
To the new state of Poland, of which the Poles, pur sang, do not
probably exceed twenty-one millions at the most, this Jewish element,
consistently anti-Polish, of over four millions is a danger which the
National Democrats do not seem adequately to appreciate. For not only are
they formidable in numbers, they are formidable in position also, when we
consider that 80 per cent. of the total trade in the Kingdom of Poland and
Lithuania before the war passed through their hands.
Certain trades like the leather trade and the stocking trade were entirely
theirs, and Jewish money-lenders infested the small provincial towns,
bringing ruin on their general interests. They are largely town-dwellers, and
in centres of industry they form a much larger fraction of the population
than in country districts, where their influence would be more scattered and
less capable of being concentrated and organized; in Warsaw, for instance,
they make up 35 per cent. of the whole population. Moreover, since the
occupation of the Kingdom of Poland by the Central Empires, the Germans
have opened Jewish schools, removed the disabilities which previously
attached to their race, and done all in their power to encourage them and
strengthen their position, well knowing that by so doing they were
tightening their own grip on Poland. All this our author minimizes, and
hopefully remarks that there has been a “strong tendency among them
towards emigration, which is likely in the future to develop on a larger
scale.” He commits the strategical error, in fact, of underrating the strength
of his adversaries, which the Jews most undoubtedly are. In Lithuania, it is
true, the Germans originally treated the Jews very differently, squeezing and
despoiling them during the earlier months of their occupation, for the
reason that they then contemplated having to give back Lithuania to Russia,
and wanted to make as much out of it as possible, so that they would restore
it in a completely impoverished condition. But in the Kingdom of Poland
they have encouraged Jews as being their allies and coadjutors, for they
never meant to let Poland go back to Russian domination. From this point
of view, it is no wonder that when late in 1917 a Jewish deputation waited
on the Minister of Justice and Social Affairs, asking for further privileges,
the minister replied that the best remedy for Jewish grievances was the
emigration from Poland of Jews. This was a short-sighted and foolish reply,
for the Jewish problem in Poland, if we are to see a strong and united
Poland, is not to be solved by belittling their importance, or by hostility to
them with a view to eliminating them. It cannot, indeed, be too strongly
stated that a liberal policy with regard to Jews is absolutely essential to the
coherence of the new Polish state. They are far too important and numerous
to disregard, and hostility to them would merely result in making a strong
pro-German party in a state which, in order to exist, must purge itself of
pro-German elements. This particular purging cannot be effected in any
other way than by shewing the Jews that Polish prosperity is involved with
their well-being.
(iii) The Question of Lithuania
We now come to a more detailed consideration of the question of
Lithuania, which the author of our document claims for inclusion in the new
state. Historically the whole of Lithuania formed part of the ancient
republic of Poland up to the time of the partitions, and roughly consisted of
the following provinces, viz., Kovno, Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk and
Mohilec. Out of these no claim, quite naturally, is put forward with regard
to Vitebsk and Mohileff, where the percentage of Polish population is so
small as to be completely negligible, for in Vitebsk Poles number only
50,000 out of a total of close on one million and a half inhabitants, while in
Mohileff the percentage of Poles is but a third of that in Vitebsk, for in
Mohileff there are but 18,000 Poles in a population of nearly 1,600,000.
Thus out of “Lithuania,” as considered as a part of the ancient Republic, all
are agreed to omit Vitebsk and Mohileff altogether, for the obvious reason
that they are not Polish at all. Ethnographically the overwhelming majority
of their inhabitants are White Russians, a race closely allied in blood and in
language to Russia proper.
There remain, therefore, on our author’s claim to Lithuania for the new
united Poland, the provinces of Kovno, Vilna, Grodno and Minsk. Of Minsk
he claims the “greater part,” as also of another Russian province Volhynia.
Since he separates the claim for Minsk and Volhynia from the claim for
“Lithuania,” we will follow his grouping, and understand by the term
“Lithuania” the three provinces of Kovno, Vilna and Grodno.
His argument is that they once belonged to the Polish republic (which
everybody allows), and so, on historical grounds, should be returned to it,
and he supplements this by the consideration that the Lithuanians, at any
rate, out of the inhabiting populations are co-religionists with the Poles. But
the real reason on which his case rests, and for which (apart from the
Mittel-Europa question) the Powers of the Entente have all declared
themselves in favour of a united and independent Poland, is not a matter of
history (otherwise England might claim Calais) or of creed (otherwise she
might claim Protestant Germany), but of race. The cause that underlies the
justice of a united Poland is the right of nations, small or great, to exist, and
ethnographically this demand for the annexation of Lithuania, and the
greater part of Minsk and Volhynia, utterly breaks down.
With regard to Lithuania, our author allows that there would be included
in the new Polish state two and a half millions of Lithuanians “linked to the
Poles by religion and civilisation, who would find in the Polish state the
conditions most favourable to their national progress.” Read in its context,
which claims for the new state 38,000,000 inhabitants of which 70 per cent.
are “Polish in culture, etc.,” this sounds as if ethnographically the inclusion
of Lithuania might be admissible. But when we come to look at Lithuania
itself, it wears a very different aspect. For according to the most reliable
information obtainable the census figures for Lithuania are these[10]:—
Total population 5,728,000, of which 18.47 per cent. are Poles; or in
detail:—
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