DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY OF VIETNAM

ENGLISH FACULTY

PRAGMATICS

LECTURE 6: COOPERATION AND IMPLICATURE; DIRECTNESS AND

INDIRECTNESS

Course instructor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kiều Thị Thu Hương

Group: Group 6

Class: NDHTA-NNA49.4_LT
 PRESENTATION ORDER OF GROUP 6

No Name Student ID

1. Lê Hà My NNA49B10994

2. Nguyễn Thị Hải Lý NNA49B10989

3. Tôn Thành Nam NNA49B10997

4. Nguyễn Thảo Ngân NNA49B11001

5. Nguyễn Trần Yến Nhi NNA49B11017

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lê Hà My - NNA49B10994
I. Cooperation (Hợp tác)
1. Definition of cooperation
2. Cooperative Principles and four maxims (Nguyên tắc hợp tác và bốn phương châm
hội thoại.)
3. Observance and non-observance of the maxims (Sự tuân thủ và không tuân thủ các
phương châm hội thoại.)
3.1. Observing the maxims (Tuân thủ các phương châm hội thoại)
3.2. Non-Observing the maxims (Không tuân thủ các phương châm hội thoại).
4. Violating the maxims (Vi phạm các phương châm hội thoại)
Nguyễn Thị Hải Lý - NNA49B10989
5. Flouting the maxims (coi thường phương châm hội thoại)
5.1. Flouts necessitated by a clash between maxims (sự coi thường do xung đột giữa
các phương châm hội thoại)
5.2. Flouts which exploit a maxim (sự coi thường nhằm khai tác một phương châm)

5.2.1 Flouts exploiting maxim of Quality

5.2.2 Flouts exploiting maxim of Quantity
5.2.3 Flouts exploiting maxim of Relation
5.2.4 Flouts exploiting maxim of Manner
6. Infringing the maxims
7. Opting out the maxims
8. Suspending the maxims
Tôn Thành Nam - NNA49B10997
II. Implicature
1. Grice’s theory of implicature
2. Hedges
3. Conversational implicature / Hàm ngôn hội thoại
4. Generalized conventional implicatures
Nguyễn Thảo Ngân - NNA49B11001
5. Scalar implicatures (hàm ngôn theo thang độ)
6. Particularized conversational implicatures (hàm ngôn hội thoại đặc thù)
7. Properties of conversational implicatures
7.1. Defeasible
7.2. Non-detachable
7.3. Calculable
7.4. Non-conventional
7.5. Not determinable
8. Conventional implicatures (hàm ngôn quy ước)

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III. Directness and Indirectness
1. Notion of directness & indirectness (quan điểm về directness và indirectness)
Nguyễn Trần Yến Nhi - NNA49B11017
2. Factors governing directness/indirectness (Những yếu tố chi phối tính trực tiếp/gián
tiếp)
2.1 Powers
2.2. Social distance (Khoảng cách xã hội)
2.3. Size of imposition (Mức độ yêu cầu/áp đặt)
2.4. Rights and obligations
3. Directness/Indirectness & Culture
4. Directness/Indirectness & Gender
5. Directness/Indirectness & Politeness
6. Measurement and use of indirectness
6.1. Measurement of indirectness (Đánh giá tính gián tiếp)
6.1.1 The role of context in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của ngữ cảnh trong
việc diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
6.1.2. The role of belief in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của niềm tin trong
việc giải thích tính gián tiếp)
6.1.3. Background knowledge and interpreting indirectness (vai trò của kiến thức
nền tảng trong diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
6.1.4. The role of co-text in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của đồng văn cảnh
trong diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
6.1.5. Goals and the interpretation of indirectness (Mục tiêu và cách diễn giải tính
gián tiếp)
6.2. The use of indirectness

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Lê Hà My - NNA49B10994
I. Cooperation (Hợp tác)
1. Definition of cooperation
Oxford Dictionary: “the fact of doing something together or of working together
towards a shared aim.”
(Oxford Dictionary)
Cooperation is a term often used in linguistic literature to characterise human
behaviour in conversation.
(Davies 2000: 1).
“Grice sees cooperation as the necessary outcome from the application of reason to
the process of talk. In other words, cooperation is the realisation of rationality applied at the
level of discourse”
(Davies 2000: 19).
Many times, speakers consider saying indirectly in their utterances instead of saying
exactly what they mean. When people talk with each other, they try to converse smoothly
and successfully. Cooperation is the basis of successful communication. "This sense of
cooperation is simply one in which people having a conversation are not normally assumed
to be trying to confuse, trick, or withhold relevant information from each other" (Yule,
1996: 35). Cooperation can be understood as an essential factor when speakers and listeners
are interacting, in other words, it is the expectation that the listener has towards the speaker.
The speaker is supposed to convey true statements and say nothing more than what is
required.

2. Cooperative Principles and four maxims (Nguyên tắc hợp tác và bốn phương châm
hội thoại.)
The concept of the cooperative principle was introduced by philosopher H. Paul
Grice in his article "Logic and Conversation" (Syntax and Semantics, 1975). In his book
Studies in the Way of Words (Grice, 1989: 26), he argued: “Our talk exchanges do not
normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they
did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at
least a mutually accepted direction."

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 Grice is concerned with this distinction between saying and meaning. His aim is to
discover the mechanism behind this process.
(1) A: Is there another pint of milk?
B: I’m going to the supermarket in five minutes.
(Davies, 2000: 2)
In this exchange, a competent speaker of English would have little trouble inferring
that there is no more milk at the moment but that some will be bought shortly. B does not
explicitly say, "No, there is no milk," but the implication is clear. Grice posited the
Cooperative Principle and its four maxims as a way to explain how such implied meanings
are generated and understood in conversation.
Grice formulated this Cooperative Principle as follow:
“Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.” ( Grice 1975:47)
A principle proposed by the philosopher Paul Grice whereby those involved in Paul
communication assume that both parties will normally seek to cooperate with each other to
establish agreed meaning. It is composed of four maxims: quality, quantity, relation, and
manner
(1) The maxim of quantity:
i. Make your contribution as informative as required;
ii. Do not make your contribution more informative than required.
In his book, Grice uses the following analogy to illustrate the importance of this maxim:
“If you are assisting me to mend a car, I expect your contribution to be neither
more nor less than is required. If, for example, at a particular stage I need four
screws, I expect you to hand me four, rather than two or six.”
(2) The maxim of quality:
i. Do not say what you believe to be false;
ii. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
In his book, Grice uses the following analogy to illustrate the importance of this maxim:
“I expect your contributions to be genuine and not spurious. If I need sugar as
an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not expect you to hand
me salt; if I need a spoon, I do not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”
(3) The maxim of relation:

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 Make your contribution relevant .
In his book, Grice uses the following analogy to illustrate the importance of this maxim:
“I expect a partner’s contribution to be appropriate to the immediate needs at
each stage of the transaction. If I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do not expect to
be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might be an appropriate
contribution at a later stage).”
(4) The maxim of manner:
Be perspicuous , and specifically
i. Avoid obscurity
ii. Avoid ambiguity
iii. Be brief
iv. Be orderly
Note that, unlike the previous maxims, which have to do primarily with what is said, the
maxims of manners have to do with how what is said is said.

3. Observance and non-observance of the maxims (Sự tuân thủ và không tuân thủ các
phương châm hội thoại.)
3.1. Observing the maxims (Tuân thủ các phương châm hội thoại)
When a speaker observes Grice’s maxims, communication is clear, precise, and
effective.
The least interesting case is when a speaker observes all the maxims as in the
following example:
Example:
Husband: Where are the car keys?
Wife: They're on the table in the hall.
(Thomas, 1995: 64)

The wife has answered clearly (Manner) truthfully (Quality), has given just the right amount of infor

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 3.2. Non-Observing the maxims (Không tuân thủ các phương châm hội thoại).
After having stated his Cooperative Principle (CP) and the four conversational
maxims (Grice 1975: 45-46), he set out to examine four types of cases in which
conversational participants fail to fulfil the maxims. His goal in doing so was to examine the
“connection between the Cooperative Principle and maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicature on the other” (Grice 1989: 49), so as to provide a model which
could be able to explain the underdeterminacy of semantic meaning.
But there are many occasions when people fail to observe the maxims. Conversation
normally works on the assumption that Ss, being co-operative, adheres to the maxims as far
as they can and do not break the maxims by lying, sarcasm, etc. Therefore, any violation of
the maxims can be a signal for the H to seek a suitable interpretation of the utterance by a
sequence of inferences.
(Kieu Thi Thu Huong, 2006:56)
Types of failures to fulfil conversational maxims (following Grice 1975):
“A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfil a maxim in various ways, which include
the following:
1. He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases he will be
liable to mislead.
2. He may opt out from the operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative
Principle; he may say, indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to
cooperate in the way the maxim requires. He may say, for example, I cannot say
more; my lips are sealed.
3. He may be faced with a clash: He may be unable, for example, to fulfil the first
maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without violating the second
maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you say).
4. He may flout a maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfil it. On the assumption
that the speaker is able to fulfil the maxim and to do so without violating another
maxim (because of a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of
his performance, trying to mislead, the hearer is faced with a minor problem: How
can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the supposition that he is observing
the overall Cooperative Principle? This situation is one that characteristically gives

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 rise to a conversational implicature; and when a conversational implicature is
generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”
(Grice 1975: 49)

In his first paper (1975: 49) Grice listed three ways in which a participant in a talk
exchange may fail to fulfil a maxim: the speaker may flout a maxim, violate a maxim or opt
out of observing a maxim. He later added a fourth category of non- observance: infringing
a maxim. Several writers since Grice have argued the need for a fifth category —
suspending a maxim.
(Thomas, 1995: 72)
There are five ways of failing to observe a maxim:
- Flouting a maxim
- Violating a maxim
- Infringing a maxim
- Opting out of a maxim
- Suspending a maxim
People may fail to observe a maxim because, for example, they are incapable of
speaking clearly, or because they deliberately choose to lie.
(Thomas, 1995: 64)

4. Violating the maxims (Vi phạm các phương châm hội thoại)
Many commentators incorrectly use the term "Violate" for all forms of non-observance
of the maxims. But in his first published paper on conversational cooperation (1975), Grice
defines Violation' very specifically as the unostentatious non-observance of a maxim. If a
speaker violates a maxim, s/he 'will be liable to mislead' (1975: 49).
(Thomas, 1995: 72)
If a speaker violates the maxim of quantity, they do not give the hearer enough
information to know what is being talked about, because they do not want the hearer to
know the full picture. The speaker is not implying anything; they are 'being economical with
the truth'.
(Cutting, 2002: 40)

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 For example, in the Peter Sellers movie where the Pink Panther asks a hotel
receptionist about a small dog next to his desk:
A. Does your dog bite?
B. No.
A. (Bends down to stroke it and gets bitten) Ow! You said your dog doesn't bite!
B. That isn't my dog.
(Cutting, 2002: 40)
The hotel receptionist technically answered truthfully that her dog does not bite, but
she withheld relevant information that the dog in front of her was not hers. This creates a
humorous misunderstanding because the Pink Panther assumes that the dog in question
belongs to the receptionist.
This kind of ambiguity is often used in comedy, as it plays on miscommunication and
assumptions in everyday language. It also demonstrates the importance of context in
understanding meaning while grammatically correct, the receptionist's response is
misleading because it does not match the shared understanding of the conversation.

Let's take another example of violating the maxim of quality.

Husband: How much did that new dress cost, darling?
Wife: Less than the last one.
Here, the wife covers up the price of the dress by not saying how much less than her last
dress.
(Cutting, 2002: 40)
The wife, when asked 'How much did that new dress cost, darling?' could have
violated the maxim of quality by not being sincere, and giving him the wrong information.
However, not all violations of the maxim of quality are blameworthy. It is perfectly
acceptable to say to a child of five, 'Mummy's gone on a little holiday because she needs a
rest', rather than 'Mummy's gone away to decide whether she wants a divorce or not.' A lie
that protects is a lie with good intentions, what we call a white lie. In the given example,
telling a child that "Mummy's gone on a little holiday because she needs a rest" is a false
statement, but it is meant to shield the child from a difficult or painful truth. Instead of
causing distress by revealing the complexities of a marital crisis, the caregiver opts for a

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simplified, less distressing explanation that is more appropriate for the child’s emotional and
cognitive capacity.
In case of violation of the remaining two maxims, in answer to 'How much did that
new dress cost, darling?' The wife could have answered violating the maxim of relation, in
order to distract him and change the topic: “I know, let's go out tonight. Now, where would
you like to go?” She could have violated the maxim of manner, and said, 'A tiny fraction of
my salary, though probably a bigger fraction of the salary of the woman that sold it to me',
in the hope that that could be taken as an answer and the matter could be dropped.
(Cutting, 2002: 40)

Nguyễn Thị Hải Lý - NNA49B10989

5. Flouting the maxims (coi thường phương châm hội thoại)
Flout is to show that you have no respect for a law, etc. by openly not obeying it.
(Online Oxford Learner’s Dictionary)

“A flout occurs when a speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim at the level of what is
said, with the deliberate intention of generating an implicature.”
(Thomas, 1995: 65)

The process in which a speaker blatantly fails to observe a maxim, not with any
intention of deceiving or misleading, but to prompt the hearer to look for ‘conversational
implicature’ is termed flouting a maxim.
(Thomas, 1995: 65)
Two types of flouts categorized by Thomas (1995): flouts necessitated by a clash
between maxims and flouts exploiting a maxim.

5.1. Flouts necessitated by a clash between maxims (sự coi thường do xung đột giữa các
phương châm hội thoại)
Clash between maxims happens when a speaker finds himself unable
simultaneously to observe both the two maxims without breaking one another. Unlike
violating, the speaker does not intend to mislead, but rather follows one maxim at the
expense of another and prompts his interlocutor to look for an implicature.

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 (Thomas, 1995: 66)

Consider following Grice’s example:

“An example in which a maxim is violated, but its violation is to be explained by the
supposition of a clash with another maxim.
A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in France. Both know that A wants to
see his friend C, if to do so would not involve too great a prolongation of his journey:
A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France. (Gloss: There is no reason to suppose that B is
opting out; his answer is, as he well knows, less informative than is required to meet A’s
needs. This infringement of the first maxim of Quantity can be explained only by the
supposition that B is aware to be more informative would be to say something that infringed
the maxim of Quality, ‘Don’t say what you lack adequate evidence for’, so B implicates that
he does not know in which town C lives.)”
(Grice, 1975: 51-52)
A speaker flouts the maxim of Quantity by blatantly giving either more or less
information than the situation demands.
Thomas explained the process of listener’s deriving implicature as in this example:
“Example 11
The speaker is Rupert Allason (author, M.P. and expert on the British intelligence
services). He is discussing the identity of the so-called ‘Fifth Man’.
“It was either Graham Mitchell or Roger Hollis and I don’t believe it was Roger
Hollis.”
According to Grice, such a response would set in motion a process of informal
reasoning which would lead to the listeners to derive an additional piece of information.
This might work in the following way:
(i) Rupert Allason has blatantly given more information than required (he could
simply have said ‘The Fifth Man was Graham Mitchell’). Allason appears to have breached
the maxim of Quantity.
(ii) However, we have no reason to believe that Allason is being deliberately
uncooperative (i.e. that he is failing to observe the CP).

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 (iii) We must conclude that his failure to observe the maxim of Quantity is due to his
wish to observe the CP in some other way. We must work out why the CP should lead
Allason to give more information than was requested.
(iv) The failure to observe the maxim of Quantity can be explained if we assume that
Allason also wished to observe the maxim of Quality. We conclude that for some reason he
is confronted with a clash between these two maxims (either he tells the truth or he gives
just the right amount of information).
(v) His reply is a compromise, which leads us to deduce that whilst he strongly
believes that Mitchell was the spy, he doesn't have sufficient evidence to assert this as a
fact. He has signalled that his belief may not be accurate.
(Thomas, 1995: 65-66)

5.2. Flouts which exploit a maxim (sự coi thường nhằm khai tác một phương châm)
“According to Grice’s theory, interlocutors operate on the assumption that, as a rule,
the maxims will be observed. When this expectation is confounded and the listener is
confronted with the blatant non-observance of a maxim (i.e. the listener has discounted the
possibility that the speaker may be trying to deceive, or incapable of speaking more clearly,
succinctly, etc.), he or she is gain prompted to look over for an implicature.”
(Thomas, 1995: 67)

Grice (1975) identified four types of maxim exploitation, each corresponding to one
of the four conversational maxims: Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner.

5.2.1 Flouts exploiting maxim of Quality

“Flouts which exploit the maxim of Quality occur when the speaker says something
which is blatantly untrue or lacks adequate evidence, which forces the listener to look for
another plausible interpretation.”
(Thomas, 1995: 67)

This type of flouting is often used to create irony, metaphor, and hyberbole.
01. Irony (châm biếm):

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 Irony is the use of words that say the opposite of what you really mean, often as a
joke and with a tone of voice that shows this.
(Online Oxford Learner’s Dictionary)
Example:
Example 3
Late on Christmas Eve 1993 an ambulance is sent to pick up a man who has
collapsed in Newcastle city centre. The man is drunk and vomits all over the ambulanceman
who goes to help him. The ambulanceman says: ‘Great, that’s really great! That’s made my
Christmas!’
(Thomas, 1995: 55)

The speaker expressed pleasure at having someone vomit over him, which is totally contradictory to
flouts the maxim of Quality by making a clearly
false statement to express annoyance.
(The ambulanceman has expressed at having someone vomit over him, which is totally
contradictory. This forces the listener to infer that he is expressing annoyance.)

02. Metaphor (ẩn dụ):

Metaphor is a word or phrase used to describe somebody/something else, in a way
that is different from its normal use, in order to show that the two things have the same
qualities and to make the description more powerful.
(Online Oxford Learner’s Dictionary)
Example:
Example 13
The speaker was Lady Lucinda Lambton and she was talking about John Patten, who at the
time was Secretary of State for Education: 'I lived in the same house as that man for three
years and he's the man I hate most in all the world. In all my greasy past, he is the biggest
grease spot.'

It is patently false that John Patten is a grease spot, the speaker uses this image to imply that he is a

03. Hyperbole (phóng đại):

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 Hyperbole is a way of speaking or writing that makes something sound better, more
exciting, more dangerous, etc. than it really is.
(Online Oxford Learner’s Dictionary)
Example:
B was on a long train journey and wanted to read her book. A was fellow passenger
who wanted to talk to her:
A: What do you do?
B: I'm a teacher.
A: Where do you teach?
B: Outer Mongolia.
A: Sorry I asked!

Outer Mongolia is seen as somewhere impossibly remote, so that B’s improbable response prompted

(Thomas, 1995: 68)

5.2.2 Flouts exploiting maxim of Quantity

“A flout of the maxim of Quantity occurs when a speaker blatantly gives more or
less information than the situation requires.”
(Thomas, 1995: 69)

Examples:
[1] Giving less information than required
Example 16
Petruchio has come to ask Baptista for his daughter’s hand in marriage.
Pet: And you, good sir! Pray, have you not a daughter Call'd Katherina, fair and
virtuous?
Bap: I have a daughter, sir, call'd Katherina.

By confirming that he has a daughter called Katherina, but omitting any mention to her fairness or v

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 (Thomas, 1995: 69)

[2] Giving more information than required

Example 17
The speaker was a BBC continuity announcer:
At the time of recording, all the cast were members of the BBC Drama Group.

The apparently superfluous information in the first clause generates the implicature that by the time

(Thomas, 1995: 69)

5.2.3 Flouts exploiting maxim of Relation

“The maxim of Relation (‘Be relevant’) is exploited by making a response or
observation which is obviously irrelevant to the topic in hand (e.g. by abruptly changing the
subject or by overtly failing to address the other person’s goal in asking a question).”
(Thomas, 1995: 70)

Examples:
[1] Abruptly changing the subject
Example 18
Geoffrey is a vicar, trying hard to curry favour with his bishop. The speaker is
Susan, his wife, who couldn't care less about the church, religion (or, for that matter, for
Geoffrey). The emphasis is mine:
We were discussing the ordination of women. The bishop asked me what I thought.
Should women take the services? So long as it doesn’t have to be me, I wanted to say, they
can be taken by a trained gorilla. ‘Oh yes,’ Geoffrey chips in, ‘Susan's all in favour. She’s
keener than I am, aren’t you, darling?’ ‘More sprouts anybody?’ I said.

The bishop is likely to come to the conclusion that Susan is not interested in the subject of women’s

(Thomas, 1995: 70)

[2] Overtly failing to address the other person’s goal in asking a question
Example 19
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 I finished working on my face. I grabbed my bag and a coat. I told Mother I was
going out … She asked me where I was going. I repeated myself. ‘Out.’

Her answer does not “address her mother’s goal in asking the question: her mother can see that Oli

(Thomas, 1995: 70-71)

5.2.4 Flouts exploiting maxim of Manner

Flouting the maxim of Manner occurs when a speaker deliberately fails to be clear,
brief, or orderly, often creating ambiguity or excessive wordiness, to generate implicature.

“The following is an example of a flout of the maxim of Manner.

Example 20
This interaction occurred during a radio interview with an unnamed official from the
United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince, Haiti:
Interviewer: Did the United States Government play any part in Duvalier’s
departure? Did they, for example, actively encourage him to leave?
Official: I would not try to steer you away from that conclusion.

The official could simply have replied: ‘Yes’. Her actual response is extremely long-
winded and convoluted and it is obviously no accident, nor through any inability to speak
clearly, that she has failed to observe the maxim of Manner. There is, however, no reason to
believe that the official is being deliberately unhelpful (she could, after all, have simply
refused to answer at all, or said: ‘No comment’).
In this case, it is not a clash of maxims which has caused her to flout the maxim of
Manner in this way. Rather it is occasioned by a clash of goals: the desire to claim credit for
what she sees as a desirable outcome, while at the same time avoiding putting on record the
fact that her government has intervened in the affairs of another country.”
(Thomas, 1995: 71)
(The speaker uses a long-winded, indirect statement to imply something without making an
official statement.)

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6. Infringing the maxims
“A speaker who, with no intention of generating an implicature and with no
intention of deceiving, fails to observe a maxim is said to ‘infringe’ the maxim.
In other words, the non-observance stems from imperfect linguistic performance
rather than from any desire on the part of the speakers to generate a conversational
implicature.
This type of non-observance could occur because the speaker has an imperfect
command of the language (a young child or a foreign learner), because the speaker’s
performance impaired in some way (nervousness, drunkenness, excitement), because of
some cognitive impairment, or simply because the speaker is constitutionally incapable
of speaking clearly, to the point, etc.”
(Thomas, 1995: 74)

7. Opting out the maxims

“A speaker opts out of observing a maxim by indicating unwillingness to cooperate
in the way the maxim is required. Examples of opting out occur frequently in public life,
when the speaker cannot, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons, reply in the way normally
expected. On the other hand, the speaker wishes to avoid generating a false implicature or
appearing uncooperative.
Another reason … is that giving the requested information might hurt a third party
or put them in danger.”
Example 24
Ruth Rendell, a famous crime novelist, was being interviewed by an equally famous
psychiatrist, Professor Anthony Clare. Clare asked Rendell about her husband:
AC: You married him twice. You've been interviewed many times, but I've never seen
a satisfactory expla-nation for that very interesting fact.
RR: Well [pause] I don't think I can give you one. That is not to say that I don't know
it but I do know it but I cannot give it. I don't think that to give it would be a very good idea,
particularly for my husband.

Example 25
The first speaker is a caller to a radio chat show. The second speaker is the host, Nick Ross:

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 Caller: um I lived in uh a country where people some-times need to flee that country.
Ross: Uh, where was that?
Caller: It's a country in Asia and I don't want to say any more.
(Thomas, 1995: 74-75)

8. Suspending the maxims

“Several writers have suggested that there are occasions when there is no need to opt
out of observing the maxims because there are certain events in which there is no
expectation on the part of any participant that they will be fulfilled (hence the non-
fulfillment does not generate any implicatures).”
(Thomas, 1995: 76)

“Suspensions of the maxims may be culture-specific … or specific to particular

events.

Example 26
The speaker in this example and the next is the daughter of a murdered man. She is talking
to Officer Jim Chee of the Navajo Tribal Police:
'Last time you were with that FBI man asking about the one who got killed," she
said, respecting the Navajo taboo of not speaking the name of the dead. You find out who
killed that man?'

Example 27
‘...they told him he could not be cured, Bistie's Daughter said in a shaky voice. She
cleared her throat, wiped the back of her hand across her eyes. "That man was strong she
continued. "His spirit was strong. He didn't give up on things. He didn't want to die. He
didn't hardly say anything at all. I asked him. I said. "My Father, why -” ’ She stopped.

Never speak the name of the dead, Chee thought. Never summon the chindi to you,
even if the name of the ghost is Father.
(Thomas, 1995: 77)

19
Tôn Thành Nam - NNA49B10997
II. Implicature
- The word “implicature” is derived from the verb “to imply”, as is its cognate
“implication” (hàm ý). “to imply” means “to fold something into something else”;
hence, what is implied, is “folded in”, and has to be “unfolded” in order to be
understood. (Mey, 1993: 45)
- An implicature is generated intentionally by the speaker and may (or may not) be
understood by the hearer. To infer is to deduce something from evidence (this
evidence may be linguistic, paralinguistic or non-linguistic). (Thomas, 1995: 58)
1. Grice’s theory of implicature
- Conventional implicature:
“the conventional meaning of the words used will determine what is implicated,
besides helping to determine what is said.” (Grice, 1975: 44)
“The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out;
for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by
an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational
implicature; it will be a conventional implicature.” (Grice, 1975: 50)
- Conversational implicature
He would like to describe a specific type of nonconventional implicature, which he
refers to as conversational implicatures. These implicatures are closely discourse
“certain general features of discourse”. (Grice, 1975: 45)
These features are the following:
(1) COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE: “Make your conversational contribution such as is
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged.” (Grice, 1975: 45)
(2) On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, four
categories containing different maxims and submaxims are proposed: Quantity,
Quality, Relation, and Manner. (Grice, 1975: 45)
(3) There are cases when a speaker fails a maxim or several maxims in conversation
in order to convey additional meaning. (Grice, 1975: 49)

20
 Grice defines the notion of conversational implicature: “A man who, by (in, when) saying (o

- He is to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least

the Cooperative Principle.
- The supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms)
consistent with this presumption.
- The speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker
thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.” (Grice, 1975:
49)
Example from Grice: Suppose that A and B are talking about a mutual friend, C, who
is now working in a bank. A asks B how C is getting on in his job, and B replies, Oh
quite well, I think; he likes his colleagues, and he hasn’t been to prison yet. (Grice,
1975: 43)
In a suitable setting A might reason as follows: “(1) B has apparently violated the
maxim ‘Be relevant’ and so may be regarded as having flouted one of the maxims
conjoining perspicuity, yet I have no reason to suppose that he is opting out from the
operation of the Cooperative Principle; (2) given the circumstances, I can regard his
irrelevance as only apparent if, and only if, I suppose him to think that C is
potentially dishonest; (3) B knows that I am capable of working out step (2). So B
implicates that C is potentially dishonest.” (Grice, 1975: 50)
- Particularly conversational implicature
“To work out that a particular conversational implicature is present, the hearer will
rely on the following data:
(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any
references that may be involved;
(2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims;
(3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;
(4) other items of background knowledge;

21
 (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous
headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this
to be the case.” (Grice, 1975: 50)
- Generalized conversational implicature
“The use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence
of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature.”
(Grice, 1975: 56)
Example from Grice: X is meeting a woman this evening.

Implicate that the person X was meeting was neither his wife, mother, sister, nor even a close

“When someone, by using the form of expression an X, implicates that the X

does not belong to or is not otherwise closely connected with some identifiable
person, the implicature is present because the speaker has failed to be specific in a
way in which he might have been expected to be specific, with the consequence that
it is likely to be assumed that he is not in a position to be specific.”
(Grice, 1975: 57)
2. Hedges
- Oxford’s Learner Dictionary: hedge is ‘a word or phrase that makes what you say
less strong’
- Yule (1996:130): Hedges are cautious notes expressed about how an utterance is to
be taken when giving information.
Theo Yule, từ rào đón là những lời nhắc thận trọng về cách một phát ngôn nên được
hiểu khi truyền đạt thông tin.
Hedges Regarding the Maxim of Quality
- The importance of the maxim of quality for cooperative interaction in English may
be best measured by the number of expressions we use to indicate that what we’re
saying may not be totally accurate. (Yule 1996:38)
Tầm quan trọng của phương châm về chất cho sự tương tác hợp tác có thể được đo
lường tốt nhất bởi những từ ngữ mà ta sử dụng để chỉ ra rằng những gì ta đang nói
có thể không hoàn toàn chính xác.
Some Examples (Yule 1996:38):
[3] a. As far as I know, they’re married.
22
b. I may be mistaken, but I thought I saw a wedding ring on her finger.
c. He couldn’t live without her, i guess.
The conversational context for the examples in [3] might be a recent rumor involving
a couple known to the speakers.
What are the hedges in these 3 examples?
The hedge “As far as i know” “i guess. “I may be mistaken” help the speaker
show that the information can be correct or incorrect, so that the hearer can evaluate
the accuracy of information.
Hedges Regarding the Maxim of Quantity
Example (Yule 1996:38):
[4] a. As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs.
b. So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and ran.
We have 2 hedges here, “As you probably know” and “so, to cut a long story short”.
In this example, the speaker uses hedges to control the amount of information shared
with the listener, keeping the story concise but still containing the main message.
This shows that the speaker is aware of the maxim of quantity.
Hedges Regarding the Maxim of Relation
Example (Yule 1996:39):
[5] a. I don’t know if this is important, but some of the files are missing.
b. This may sound like a dumb question, but whose handwriting is this?
In this example, the speaker (possibly an employee) uses hedging phrases like "I’m
don’t know if this is important" or "This may sound like a dumb question" to politely
interrupt the ongoing conversation and shift the focus to the new information they
want to share. They are aware that the new information might not be directly relevant
to the current topic, so they use these cautious phrases to avoid violating the maxim
of relation.
Hedges regarding the Maxim of Manner
Example (Yule 1996:39):
[6] a. This may be a bit confused, but I remember being in a car.
b. I’m not sure if this makes sense, but the car had no lights.
The hedges “This may be a bit confused” and “I’m not sure if this makes sense”
indicate that the speaker is uncertain about the accuracy of their memory and is

23
 giving the listener advance notice that the information they are about to share may be
inaccurate.
These examples of hedges are good indications that the speakers are not only aware
of the maxims, but that they want to show that they are trying to observe them.
Perhaps such forms also communicate the speakers’ concern that their listeners judge
them to be cooperative conversational partners.
There are, however, some circumstances where speakers may not follow the
expectations of the cooperative principle. In courtrooms and classrooms, witnesses
and students are often called upon to tell people things that are already well-known to
those people (thereby violating the quantity maxim). Such specialized institutional
talk is clearly different from conversation.
3. Conversational implicature / Hàm ngôn hội thoại
- “A conversational implicature is, therefore, something which is implied in a
conversation, that is, something which is left implicit in actual language use.”
(Mey, 1993: 45).
Example (7) (Yule, 1996:40)
Charlene: “I hope you brought the bread and the cheese”
Dexter: “Ah, I brought the bread.”

Dexter's response appears to violate the Maxim of Quantity, but Charlene assumes he is still c

We can represent the additional conveyed meaning by using the symbol +> for an
implicature (b = bread; c = cheese).
Example [Yule, 1996:40]
[8] Charlene: b & c?
Dexter: b (+> NOT c)

24
 It is important to note that it is speakers who communicate meaning via implicatures
and it is listeners who recognize those communicated meanings via inference. The
inferences selected are those which will preserve the assumption of cooperation.
(Yule 1996:40)
Điều quan trọng cần lưu ý là người nói là người truyền đạt ý nghĩa thông qua các
hàm ý và người nghe là người nhận ra những ý nghĩa được truyền đạt đó thông qua
suy luận. Các suy luận được chọn là những suy luận sẽ bảo toàn giả định về sự hợp
tác.
4. Generalized conventional implicatures
- Example (Yule, 1996:40)
[9] a. Doobie: Did you invite Bella and Cathy? (b & c)
b. Mary: I invited Bella. (b +> NOT c)
In the case of [7] and [8], no special background knowledge of the context of
utterance is required to make necessary inferences. In [9], the context is different
from [7], but the general process of identifying the implicature is the same as in [8].
“When no special knowledge is required in the context to calculate the
additional conveyed meaning, as in [7] to [9], it is called generalized conversational
implicature.” (Yule, 1996:41).
One common example in English involves any phrase with an indefinite article of the
type 'a/an X', such as 'a garden' and 'a child' as in [10]. These phrases are typically
interpreted according to the generalised conversational implicature that: an X +> not
speaker's X.
[10] I was sitting in a garden one day. A child looked over the fence.
The implicatures in [10], that the garden and the child mentioned are not the
speaker's, are calculated on the principle that if the speaker was capable of being
more specific (i.e. more informative, following the quantity maxim), then he or she
would have said 'my garden' and 'my child'.

Nguyễn Thảo Ngân - NNA49B11001

5. Scalar implicatures (hàm ngôn theo thang độ)
● Definition of a linguistic scale
First, let’s define what a linguistic scale is.

25
 According to Levinson (1983):
“A linguistic scale consists of a set of linguistic alternates, or contrastive expressions
of the same grammatical category, which can be arranged in a linear order by degree of
informativeness or semantic strength.”
(Levinson, 1983:133)
(Một thang ngữ nghĩa bao gồm một tập hợp các lựa chọn ngôn ngữ thay thế hoặc
những cách diễn đạt tương phản trong cùng một loại ngữ pháp, có thể được sắp xếp theo
thứ tự dựa trên mức độ cung cấp thông tin hoặc sức mạnh ngữ nghĩa.)
● Understanding scalar implicatures
So, what are scalar implicatures?
According to Yule (1996), “A number of generalized conversational implicatures are
commonly communicated on the basis of a scale of values and are consequently known as
scalar implicatures.”
(Những hàm ngôn hội thoại tổng quát thường được giao tiếp trên cơ sở thang giá trị
và do đó được hiểu là những hàm ngôn thang độ)
“Certain information is always communicated by choosing a word which expresses
one value from a scale of values.”
(Có những thông tin nhất định thường được giao tiếp bằng cách lựa chọn một từ
diễn đạt một giá trị lấy từ thang độ các giá trị.)
Example:
<all, most, many, some, few>
<always, often, sometimes>
(Yule, 1996:41)

These scales express quantity, frequency respectively. Besides, they are put in angled bracket
listed from the highest to the lowest value.
(Những thang này lần lượt diễn tả số lượng, tần suất. Bên cạnh đó, chúng được đặt
trong dấu ngoặc nhọn và được liệt kê từ giá trị cao nhất tới thấp nhất)
“When producing an utterance, a speaker selects the word from the scale which is the
most informative and truthful (quantity and quality) in the circumstances.”
(Yule, 1996:41)
(Khi tạo ra một phát ngôn, người nói chọn từ trong thang độ từ nào mang đủ thông
tin nhất và hoàn toàn đúng (số lượng và chất lượng) với tình huống đó)
26
 Example
I’m studying linguistics and I’ve completed some of the required courses.
By choosing the word “some”, the speaker creates an implicature (+> not all).

In saying “some of the required courses”, the speaker also creates other implicatures (e.g. +>

(Yule, 1996:41-42)
Remarkably, Levinson (1983) provided an important insight into scalar implicatures.
He stated:
“if a speaker asserts that a lower or weaker point (i.e. a rightwards item in the
ordered set of alternates) on a scale obtains, then he implicates that a higher or stronger
point (leftwards in the ordered set) does not obtain.”
(Levinson, 1983:133)
(nếu một người nói sử dụng một từ ở vị trí thấp hơn hoặc yếu hơn trên thang (tức là
một từ nằm bên phải trên trục thứ tự), thì họ hàm ý rằng một từ có mức độ mạnh hơn (tức là
nằm bên trái trên thang) không đúng.)
“For example, take the English quantifiers “all” and “some”. These form an
implicational scale <all, some>, because any sentence like (118) entails (119) (i.e.whenever
(l18) is true (119) is true also) but not vice versa:
(118) All of the boys went to the party
(119) Some of the boys went to the party”
(Levinson, 1983:133)
(Nếu (118) đúng, thì (119) cũng đúng (vì tất cả bao gồm cả một số). Nhưng nếu ai đó
chỉ nói (119), người nghe sẽ suy ra rằng không phải tất cả các cậu bé đã đến bữa tiệc.)
“Scalar implicatures have one noticeable feature. When speakers correct themselves
on some details, they typically cancel one of the scalar implicatures.”
(Yule, 1996:42)
(Hàm ý thang độ có một đặc điểm đáng chú ý. Khi người nói tự sửa chữa lời nói của
mình ở một vài chi tiết nào đó, thì họ đã hủy một trong số những hàm ngôn thang độ)
Example
(120) Some of the boys went to the party, in fact all.
(Levinson, 1983:133)

27
 The speaker initially says “some”, which implies “not most”, but they then correct themselve

(Ban đầu, người nói nói “some” (một số), mang hàm ý “không phải tất cả”, nhưng
sau đó người nói lại tự chữa lại lời bằng cách nói thêm “in fact all” (thực ra là tất cả), điều
này đã hủy bỏ hàm ý ban đầu.
“Some” không có nghĩa là “không phải tất cả”, mà chỉ có thể hàm ý điều đó nếu
người nói không bổ sung thông tin khác.)
We can identify some more scalar implicatures. Let’s consider additional examples:
Example
(1) The speaker goes on to describe those linguistics courses:
They’re sometimes really interesting.

By using “sometimes”, the speaker communicates, via implicature, the negative of form high
the scale of frequency (+> not always, +> not often).
(2) It’s possible that they were delayed
“possible” +> not certain (on a scale of likelihood)
(3) This should be stored in a cool place
“cool” +> not frozen (on a scale of temperature)
(Yule, 1996:42)
6. Particularized conversational implicatures (hàm ngôn hội thoại đặc thù)
“Most of the time, our conversations take place in very specific contexts in which locally
recognized inferences are assumed. Such inferences are required to work out the conveyed
meanings which result from particularized conversational implicatures.”
(Trong phần lớn trường hợp, các cuộc hội thoại diễn ra đều nằm trong những bối cảnh rất
riêng biệt, mà trong đó các suy luận nhận thức được một cách cục bộ mới được người ta
nắm bắt. Những suy luận như thế phải làm cho bật ra các ý nghĩa được truyền tải từ những
hàm ý hội thoại đặc thù)
(Yule, 1996:42)
“Particularized conversational implicatures are by far the most common, therefore, they are
typically just called implicatures.
(Các hàm ý hội thoại đặc thù là phổ biến nhất, do đó, chúng thường chỉ được gọi là hàm ý)
(Yule, 1996:43)

28
Thomas also pointed out that “Implicatures are the property of utterances, not of sentences
and therefore the same words carry different implicatures on different occasions.
(Thomas cũng chỉ ra rằng “Hàm ngôn là đặc tính của lời nói, không phải của câu, do đó
cùng một từ mang những hàm ngôn khác nhau tùy vào ngữ cảnh khác nhau)
(Thomas, 1995:80)
Example
1) a) War is war
b) Women are women
These utterances of tautologies are examples of flouting of the Quantity.

At the level of what is said, such remarks are totally noninformative and infringe the maxim o

They are informative at the level of what is implicated, and the hearer’s identification of their

(Grice, 1975:52)
(Phương châm về Lượng của Grice quy định rằng:
- Người nói cần cung cấp đủ thông tin cho người nghe.
- Không cung cấp quá ít hoặc quá nhiều thông tin so với yêu cầu.
Tuy nhiên, các câu lặp lại một cách hiển nhiên (tautologies), như "War is war" (Chiến
tranh là chiến tranh) hoặc "Women are women" (Phụ nữ là phụ nữ), không hề thêm bất kỳ
thông tin mới nào. Chúng chỉ lặp lại điều đã hiển nhiên đúng, khiến người nghe không nhận
được nội dung hữu ích nào ở cấp độ nghĩa đen. Vì vậy, chúng vi phạm phương châm về
Lượng vì không đáp ứng yêu cầu cung cấp đủ thông tin cần thiết.
Mặc dù nghĩa đen của các câu này không chứa thông tin, nhưng chúng vẫn có ý nghĩa ở
cấp độ hàm ý (implicature).
- Khi ai đó nói "War is war", họ không chỉ đơn giản lặp lại khái niệm chiến tranh, mà
có thể đang hàm ý rằng chiến tranh vốn dĩ là tàn khốc, không thể tránh khỏi, hoặc
phải chấp nhận nó.
- Tương tự, "Women are women" có thể mang hàm ý rằng phụ nữ có những đặc điểm
cố hữu, không thể thay đổi.

29
Điều này có nghĩa là, tuy vi phạm phương châm về Lượng ở cấp độ nghĩa đen, nhưng
chúng vẫn có giá trị thông tin ở cấp độ hàm ý.
Người nghe cần diễn giải lý do tại sao người nói chọn cách diễn đạt lặp lại này để hiểu
được hàm ý ẩn đằng sau nó. Nếu không suy luận được ý nghĩa ẩn dụ của câu, họ sẽ chỉ thấy
câu nói vô nghĩa hoặc không cung cấp thông tin.)
2) Queen Victoria was made of iron
Here, by blatantly violating the maxim of Quality, an implicature is generated.

The straightforward interpretation is that since Queen Victoria in fact lacked the definitional

Which particular set of such properties are attributed to her by the utterance of the example ab

(Levinson, 1983:110)
(Về mặt nghĩa đen, câu này sai vì Nữ hoàng Victoria là con người, không phải được làm từ
sắt.
Vì vậy, nếu xét theo phương châm về chất, người nói dường như đang đưa ra một thông tin
không đúng sự thật.
Mặc dù câu nói không đúng về mặt thực tế, người nói không thực sự có ý định nói dối mà
đang sử dụng ẩn dụ để truyền tải một ý nghĩa gián tiếp.
- Đây là một sự vi phạm có chủ ý (flouting the Maxim of Quality), tức là người nói cố
ý vi phạm phương châm này để tạo ra hàm ý (implicature).
- Trong trường hợp này, hàm ý có thể là Nữ hoàng Victoria rất mạnh mẽ, kiên
cường hoặc không linh hoạt, tùy vào bối cảnh.
Trong giao tiếp, người nghe hiểu rằng không phải lúc nào cũng cần bám sát nghĩa đen. Có
nhiều trường hợp vi phạm phương châm về chất mà vẫn được chấp nhận, chẳng hạn:
- Ẩn dụ (metaphor): "She has a heart of stone." (Cô ấy có một trái tim bằng đá) →
Nghĩa đen sai, nhưng người nghe hiểu rằng nó mang hàm ý cô ấy vô cảm.

30
 - Cường điệu (hyperbole): "I’ve told you a million times!" (Tôi đã nói với bạn cả triệu
lần rồi!) → Người nói không thực sự đếm số lần nói, nhưng họ muốn nhấn mạnh
rằng họ đã nói rất nhiều lần.
- Meiosis: trường hợp say rượu trong sách Grice trang 53)
3) Leila: Whoa! Has your boss gone crazy?
Mary: Let’s go get some coffee?

Leila has just walked into Mary’s office and noticed all the work on her desk. Mary’s respons
flout the maxim of relevance.

In order to preserve the assumption of cooperation, Leila will have to infer some local reason

(Yule, 1996:43)
Yule wrote two more examples that are more entertaining, where the responses
initially appear to flout the relevance. I will show you one example, you can take a look at
the another at page 43 in the book “Pragmatics” by Yule.
Example
Bert: Do vegetarians eat hamburgers?
Ernie: Do chickens have lips?

Ernie’s response does not provide a “yes” or “no” answer. Bert must assume that Ernine is be

An additional conveyed meaning in such a case is that, because the answer was so obvious, th

(Yule, 1996:43)
4) Ann: Where are you going with the dog?
Sam: To the V-E-T
The speaker appears not to adhere to (i.e. “flout”) the maxim of manner

31
 In the local context of these speakers, the dog is known to recognize the word “vet”, and hate

7. Properties of conversational implicatures

Grice (1975; 57-58) put forward 5 features of conversational implicatures.
7.1. Defeasible
Firstly, “the first, and perhaps the most important, is that they are cancellable, or more
exactly defeasible”
(Levinson, 1983:114)
“Because these implicatures are part of what is communicated and not said, speakers can
always deny that they intended to communicate such meanings.”
(Bởi lẽ các hàm ngôn là một bộ phận của cái được thông báo và không được nói ra, cho
nên người nói luôn có thể chối bỏ rằng họ không định thông báo những ý nghĩa như vậy.)
(Yule, 1996:44)
“to assume the presence of a conversational implicature, we have to assume that at least the
Cooperative Principle is being observed, and since it is possible to opt out of the observation
of this principle, it follows that a generalized conversational implicature can be canceled in
a particular case. It may be explicitly canceled, by the addition of a clause that states or
implies that the speaker has opted out, or it may be contextually canceled, if the form of
utterance that usually carries it is used in a context that makes it clear that the speaker is
opting out.”
(Grice, 1975:57)
(Để giả định sự tồn tại của một hàm ý hội thoại, chúng ta phải giả định rằng ít nhất Nguyên
tắc Hợp tác (Cooperative Principle) đang được tuân thủ, và vì có thể lựa chọn không tuân
theo nguyên tắc này, nên một hàm ý hội thoại tổng quát có thể bị hủy bỏ trong một trường
hợp cụ thể. Nó có thể bị hủy bỏ một cách rõ ràng bằng cách thêm một mệnh đề tuyên bố
hoặc ngụ ý rằng người nói đã chọn không tuân theo nguyên tắc, hoặc nó có thể bị hủy bỏ
theo ngữ cảnh nếu hình thức phát ngôn thường mang hàm ý đó được sử dụng trong một ngữ
cảnh khiến người nghe hiểu rằng người nói đang không tuân theo nguyên tắc này.)
Example
1) You have won five dollars! (+> ONLY five)
32
 There is a standard implicature associated with stating a number, that the speaker means only

However, this sentence can be changed.

2) You've won five dollars, in fact, you've won ten!

The speaker cancels the implicature by adding further information, often following the expres

(Yule, 1996:44)
7.2. Non-detachable
Secondly, “an important property of implicatures is that (with the exception of those due to
the maxim of Manner) they are, as Grice puts it, non-detachable.”
(Levinson, 1983:116)
“By this Grice means that the implicature is attached to the semantic content of what is said,
not to linguistic form, and therefore implicatures cannot be detached from an utterance
simply by changing the words of the utterance for synonyms.”
(Levinson, 1983:116)
(Grice giải thích rằng hàm ý (implicature) gắn liền với nội dung ngữ nghĩa của phát ngôn,
chứ không phải với hình thức ngôn ngữ, và do đó, hàm ý không thể bị tách rời khỏi một
phát ngôn chỉ bằng cách thay đổi từ ngữ trong phát ngôn đó bằng các từ đồng nghĩa.)
Example
(1) John's a genius
(2) John's an idiot
(2) is the ironic interpretation of (1)

Suppose instead we say any of the sentences in (3) in a context in which it is mutually known that (1

(3) John's a mental prodigy

John's an exceptionally clever human being
John's an enormous intellect
John's a big brain

Then the ironic reading will be shared by aIl the different ways of expressing the proposition that giv

33
 (Levinson, 1983:116-117)
“So implicatures are standardly non-detachable, with the exception of those arising under
the maxim of Manner that are specifically linked to the form of the utterance. And this
property may serve to distinguish conversational implicatures from other kinds of pragmatic
inferences like pre-supposition and conventional implicatures.”
(Levinson, 1983:117)
(Như vậy, hàm ý hội thoại về bản chất là không thể tách rời, ngoại trừ những trường hợp
xuất phát từ phương châm Cách thức, tức những hàm ý cụ thể gắn chặt với hình thức phát
ngôn. Và thuộc tính này có thể giúp phân biệt hàm ý hội thoại với các loại suy luận ngữ
dụng khác như tiên giả định (presupposition) và hàm ý quy ước (conventional
implicature)).
7.3. Calculable
Thirdly, one “distinguish feature of implicatures is that they are calculable”
(Levinson, 1983:117)
Implicatures can be calculated by the listeners via inference.
(Yule, 1996:44)
(Các hàm ngôn có thể được người nghe giải đoán thông qua suy luận.)
“from the literal meaning or the sense of the utterance on the one hand, and the co-operative
principle and the maxims on the other, it follows that an addressee would make the
inference in question to preserve the assumption of co-operation.”
(Levinson, 1983:117)
(từ nghĩa đen hoặc ý nghĩa của phát ngôn ở một phía, và nguyên tắc hợp tác cùng các
phương châm ở phía còn lại, người nghe sẽ suy ra hàm ý đó để duy trì giả định về sự hợp
tác trong hội thoại.)
Tức là: Hàm ý hội thoại có thể được suy luận một cách hợp lý dựa trên:
- Nghĩa đen hoặc ý nghĩa của câu nói – Tức là nội dung bề mặt của phát ngôn.
- Nguyên tắc hợp tác và các phương châm hội thoại – Người nói và người nghe
ngầm thừa nhận rằng họ đang hợp tác để giao tiếp hiệu quả.
Vì vậy, nếu một câu nói dường như vi phạm một phương châm hội thoại, người nghe sẽ suy
luận ra một hàm ý tiềm ẩn để khôi phục lại tính hợp lý của hội thoại. Đây chính là quá trình
tính toán hàm ý mà Grice đề cập.)

34
7.4. Non-conventional
“Fourthly, implicatures are non-conventional, that is, not part of the conventional meaning
of linguistic expressions. expressions. Some reasons for believing this have already been
adduced under cancellability (or defeasibility) and non-detachability.”
(Levinson, 1983:117)
(Hàm ý không mang tính quy ước (non-conventional), nghĩa là chúng không phải là một
phần của nghĩa quy ước của các biểu thức ngôn ngữ. Một số lý do để tin vào điều này đã
được đưa ra trước đó trong phần về khả năng bị hủy bỏ (cancellability hoặc defeasibility)
và tính không thể tách rời (non-detachability).)
“To speak approximately, since the calculation of the presence of a conversational
implicature presupposes an initial knowledge of the conventional force of the expression the
utterance of which carries the implicature, a conversational implicatum will be a
condition that is not included in the original specification of the expression’s
conventional force.”
(Grice, 1975:58)
(Nói một cách tương đối, vì việc tính toán sự tồn tại của một hàm ý hội thoại giả định trước
một sự hiểu biết ban đầu về lực quy ước của biểu thức mà phát ngôn mang hàm ý đó, nên
một hàm ý hội thoại sẽ là một điều kiện không được bao gồm trong đặc điểm ban đầu của
lực quy ước của biểu thức.)
7.5. Not determinable
Finally, implicatures are not exactly determinable.
“An expression with a single meaning can give rise to different implicatures on different
occasions, and indeed on any one occasion the set of associated implicatures may not be
exactly determinable.”
(Levinson, 1983:117-118)
(Một biểu đạt có một ý nghĩa duy nhất có thể tạo ra những hàm ý khác nhau trong những
ngữ cảnh khác nhau, và thực tế, trong một tình huống cụ thể, tập hợp các hàm ý liên quan
có thể không được xác định một cách chính xác.)
Example:
John's a machine

This could convey that John is cold, or efficient, or never stops working, or puffs and blows, or has l

35
 All of these implicatures can have a certain indeterminacy in at least some cases, incompatible with

(Levinson, 1983:118)
(Câu này có thể truyền tải rằng John lạnh lùng, hoặc hiệu quả, hoặc không bao giờ ngừng
làm việc, hoặc thở phì phò, hoặc thiếu chất xám, hoặc thực tế có thể bao hàm bất kỳ hoặc
tất cả những hàm ý này. Những hàm ý này có thể có một mức độ không xác định nhất định
trong ít nhất một số trường hợp, không phù hợp với các ý nghĩa ổn định và xác định thường
được giả định trong các lý thuyết ngữ nghĩa.)
8. Conventional implicatures (hàm ngôn quy ước)
“None of the properties of conversational implicatures apply to conventional
implicatures.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Không có đặc điểm nào của hàm ngôn hội thoại áp dụng cho hàm ngôn quy ước.)
“Grice distinguished two different sorts of implicature: conventional implicature and
conversational implicature. They have in common the property that they both convey an
additional level of meaning, beyond the semantic meaning of the words uttered. They differ
in that in the case of conventional implicature the same implicature is always conveyed,
regardless of context, whereas in the case of conversational implicature, what is implied
varies according to the context of utterance.”
(Thomas, 1995:57)
(Grice phân biệt 2 loại hàm ngôn: hàm ngôn hội thoại và hàm ngôn quy ước. Chúng
có điểm chung là cả hai đều truyền tải một cấp độ ý nghĩa bổ sung, vượt ra ngoài ý nghĩa
về ngữ nghĩa của các từ được nói ra. Chúng khác nhau ở chỗ, trong trường hợp của hàm
ngôn quy ước, cùng một hàm ý luôn được truyền tải, bất kể ngữ cảnh, trong khi trong
trường hợp của hàm ngôn hội thoại, những gì được ngụ ý thay đổi tùy theo ngữ cảnh của
lời nói.)
“The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out;
for even if it can be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument,
the implicature (if present at all) will count as conversational implicature; it will be a
conventional implicature”
(Grice; 1975:50)

36
 (Sự hiện diện của một hàm ngôn hội thoại phải có khả năng được suy luận ra; bởi vì
ngay cả khi có thể trực giác hiểu được, nếu trực giác này không thể được thay thế bằng một
lập luận rõ ràng, thì hàm ý đó sẽ không được tính là một hàm ngôn hội thoại mà sẽ là một
hàm ngôn quy ước (conventional implicature).)
“In contrast to the conversational implicatures, conventional implicatures are not
based on the cooperative principle or the maxims. They don’t have to occur in conversation,
and they don’t depend on special contexts for their interpretation.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Trái với hàm ngôn hội thoại, hàm ngôn quy ước không dựa trên nguyên tắc cộng tác
và các phương châm. Chúng không xuất hiện trong hội thoại, và không phụ thuộc vào ngữ
cảnh đặc biệt nào khi cần giải thích/diễn giải chúng.)
“Not unlike lexical presuppositions, conventional implicatures are associated with
specific words and result in additional conveyed meanings when those words are used.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Tương tự như các tiền giả định từ vựng, các hàm ngôn quy ước liên quan đến những
từ riêng biệt và dẫn đến những ý nghĩa phụ được truyền đạt khi những từ này được dùng.)
“There are comparatively few examples of conventional implicature.”
(Thomas, 1995:57)
Yule (1996:45-46) listed four: “but”, “even”, “yet”, and “and”.
According to Yule (1996:45), “the conjunction “but” in English is one of the specific
words that conventional implicatures are associated with.”
“The interpretation of any utterance of the type p but q will be based on the
conjunction p & q plus an implicature of 'contrast' between the information in p and the
information in q.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Việc diễn giải bất cứ phát ngôn nào theo kiểu p but q (p nhưng q) sẽ dựa trên liên từ
p & q cộng với một hàm ý chỉ “sự tương phản” giữa thông tin ở p và thông tin ở q.)
- Example
a. Mary suggested black, but I chose white,
b. p & q (+>p is in contrast to q)
The fact that ‘ Mary suggested black’ (= p) is contrasted, via the conventional
implicature of ‘but’, with my choosing white (= q).

37
 (Yule, 1996:45)
(Việc Mary đã gợi ý màu đen (=p) tương phản với sự lựa chọn màu trắng của tôi
(=q) nhờ hàm ngôn quy ước của từ “but”.)
“The word “but” carries the implicature that what follows will run counter to
expectations - this sense of the word “but” always carries this implicature regardless of the
context in which it occurs.”
(Thomas, 1995:57)
(Từ “but” (nhưng) mang hàm ý rằng những gì theo sau nó sẽ trái ngược với kỳ vọng
- nghĩa này của từ “but” (nhưng) luôn mang hàm ý này bất kể bối cảnh mà nó xuất hiện.)
“Other English words such as “even” and “yet” also have conventional implicatures.
When “even” is included in any sentence describing an event, there is an implicature of
“contrary to expectation”.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Những từ tiếng Anh khác như “even” và “yet” cũng có những hàm ngôn quy ước.
Khi “even” được đưa vào một câu miêu tả một sự kiện, thì có một hàm ngôn là “tương
phản với sự mong đợi”.)
Example:
a. Even John came to the party.
b. He even helped tidy up afterwards.
There are two events reported (i.e. John's coming and John's helping)
with the conventional implicature of ‘even’ adding a ‘contrary to expectation’
interpretation of those events.
(Yule, 1996:45)
“The conventional implicature of “yet” is that the present situation is expected to be
different, or perhaps the opposite, at a later time.”
(Yule, 1996:45)
(Hàm ngôn quy ước của “yet” là tình huống hiện tại được mong đợi khác với, hoặc
có thể là đối lập với thời điểm sau đó.)
Example:
“Dennis is here” (= p)
a. Dennis isn't here yet. (= NOT p)
b. NOT p is true (+> p expected to be true later)

38
 In uttering the statement in example a, the speaker produces an implicature that she expects th
Dennis is here” (=p) to be true later, as in example
b.
(Yule, 1996:45)
“It may be possible to treat the so-called different ‘meanings’ of ‘and’ in English as
instances of conventional implicature in different structures.”
(Yule, 1996:46)
(Có thể xem xét cái gọi là “các ý nghĩa” khác nhau của “and” trong tiếng Anh như là
những ví dụ của hàm ngôn quy ước trong những cấu trúc khác nhau.)
Example
a. Yesterday, Mary was happy and ready to work (p & q, +> p plus q)
b. She put on her clothes and left the house. (p & q, +> q after p)

When two statements containing static information are joined by ‘and’, as in example

When the two statements contain dynamic, action-related information, as in example [

Because of the different implicatures, the two parts of example [a] can be reversed wi

(Yule, 1996:46)
(Khi 2 vế chứa thông tin có tính tĩnh được kết nối với nhau bằng “and” (và)
như trong ví dụ [a] thì hàm ý đơn giản là “in addition” hay “plus” (thêm vào đó).)
Khi 2 vế chứa thông tin có tính động, về thông tin có liên quan đến hành
động, thì hàm ý của “and” là “and then” (sau đó) chỉ sự nối tiếp.
Do có những hàm ý khác nhau nên 2 vế của ví dụ [a] có thể đổi chỗ cho nhau
mà chỉ thay đổi một chút ý nghĩa, nhưng lại có thay đổi lớn trong ý nghĩa nếu 2 vế
của [b] đổi vị trí cho nhau.
Khi 2 vế của [a] đổi chỗ cho nhau thì sẽ vi phạm the fourth sub-maxim of
manner ‘be orderly”)
“and” in the example of Levinson (1983:108) is as below:
(32) Alfred went to the store and bought some whisky
39
 “For the sequentiality, the “and then” sense of “and” in sentences like (32) is simply a standa

(Levinson; 1983:108)
(Xét về tính tuần tự, nghĩa “and then” trong các câu như (32) – chỉ đơn giản là một
hàm ý tiêu chuẩn do tiểu phương châm thứ tư về Cách thức tạo ra, điều này cung cấp một
lớp phủ ngữ dụng lên nội dung ngữ nghĩa của “and”, bất cứ khi nào các mô tả về hai sự
kiện có thể có tính tuần tự, chúng ta sẽ liên kết chúng theo thứ tự.)

III. Directness and Indirectness

1. Notion of directness & indirectness (quan điểm về directness và indirectness)
Definition
Directness, or direct speech act is defined by Yule as “speech act where a direct relationship
exists between the structure and communicative function of an utterance.”
(Yule, 1996:129)
In contrast, indirectness, or indirect speech act is “speech as where an indirect relationship
exists between the structure and communicative function of an utterance.”
(Yule, 1996:131)
According to Yule (1996:54), three structural forms are declarative, interrogative, and
imperative while three general communicative functions are statement, question, and
command/request.
Thus, a declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act, but a declarative used
to make a request is an indirect speech act.
Example
[21] a. It's cold outside.
b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.
The utterance a. is a declarative. When it is used to make a statement, as paraphrased
in b, it is functioning as a direct speech act. When it is used to make a command/request, as
paraphrased in c, it is functioning as an indirect speech act.
(Yule, 1996:55)
40
Intentional indirectness (Tính gián tiếp có chủ ý)
“Not all indirectness is intentional; some is caused by linguistic inadequacy, for example,
when you do not know the correct word for some object in your own or a foreign language.
The use of indirectness in these circumstances may lead the hearer to infer all sorts of
things about you, but you cannot be said to have generated any implicatures. In pragmatics,
we are interested only in intentional indirectness.”
(Thomas, 1995:120)
(Không phải tất cả sự gián tiếp đều có chủ ý; một số là do sự bất cập về ngôn ngữ. Việc sử
dụng gián tiếp trong những trường hợp này có thể khiến người nghe suy ra mọi điều về bạn,
nhưng không thể nói rằng bạn đã tạo ra bất kỳ hàm ý nào. Trong ngữ dụng học, chúng ta
chỉ quan tâm đến tính gián tiếp có chủ ý.)

Indirectness is costly and risky (Tính gián tiếp tốn kém và rủi ro)
“It is 'costly' in the sense that an indirect utterance takes longer for the speaker to produce
and longer for the hearer to process.”
“It is 'risky' in the sense that the hearer may not understand what the speaker is getting
at.”
(Thomas, 1995:120)
(Nó 'tốn kém' theo nghĩa là một lời nói gián tiếp mất nhiều thời gian hơn để người nói tạo
ra và người nghe lâu hơn để xử lý.
Nó 'rủi ro' ở chỗ người nghe có thể không hiểu người nói đang muốn nói gì.)

Assumption of rationality (Giả định về tính hợp lý)

“It is assumed that the speakers are behaving in a rational manner and, given the
universality of indirectness, that they obtain some social or communicative advantage
through employing indirectness.”
(Thomas, 1995:121)
(Nó được giả định rằng người nói đang hành xử một cách hợp lý và, với tính phổ biến của
lối nói gián tiếp, họ đạt được một số lợi ích xã hội hoặc giao tiếp thông qua việc sử dụng lối
nói gián tiếp.)

41
The principle of expressibility (Nguyên tắc về khả năng diễn đạt)
“For the purposes of the principle of expressibility, we shall ignore the possibility that
something (e.g. a concept or an emotion) cannot be expressed.
In pragmatics most people, with some reservations, subscribe to the 'principle of
expressibility', which states that 'anything that can be meant can be said'.”
(Thomas, 1995: 122)
(Vì mục đích của lập luận này, chúng ta sẽ bỏ qua khả năng điều gì đó (ví dụ như khái niệm
hoặc cảm xúc) không thể diễn đạt được.
Trong ngữ dụng học, hầu hết mọi người, với một số hạn chế, đều tán thành 'nguyên tắc về
khả năng diễn đạt', trong đó tuyên bố rằng 'bất cứ điều gì có ý nghĩa nào đó đều có thể
được nói ra.)

Importantly, “a language doesn’t just employ direct strategies or only indirect strategies.
The realization of language depends on the kind of cultural thought patterns that are
different from culture to culture. For example, native speakers of English, according to
Kaplan (1972), tend to use direct expression and thought patterns; conversely, Asian people,
including the Vietnamese, are likely to adhere to indirect patterns.”
(Kieu Thi Thu Huong, 2006:97)
Nguyễn Trần Yến Nhi - NNA49B11017
2. Factors governing directness/indirectness (Những yếu tố chi phối tính trực tiếp/gián
tiếp)
Nowadays, it can be seen that people use directness in most communication situations due
to its universality and clarity. However, there are some cases that people should use
indirectness. Actually, there are various ways to use indirect speech. Thomas (1995:124)
divides indirectness into four main factors that appear to govern indirectness in all
languages and cultures.
● The relative power of the S over the H (Quyền lực tương đối của người nói so với
người nghe)
● The social distance between the S and the H (Khoảng cách xã hội giữa người nói và
người nghe)
● The degree to which X is rated an imposition in culture Y (Mức độ X được đánh giá
là sự áp đặt trong nền văn hóa Y) - size of imposition

42
 ● Relative rights and obligations between the S and the H. (Quyền và nghĩa vụ tương
đối giữa người nói và người nghe.)
2.1 Powers
We are going to the first factor which is power. The general point is that we tend to use a
greater degree of indirectness with people who have some power or authority over us than
those who do not. (Chúng ta có xu hướng sử dụng mức độ gián tiếp nhiều hơn với những
người có quyền lực hoặc thẩm quyền đối với chúng ta so với những người không có quyền)
For example, you would probably be more indirect about conveying to your employer that
you are annoyed by the fact that he or she always arrives late, than in conveying the same to
your brother. [Thomas, J. (1995), Meaning in Interaction, p.124]
=> In this case, this is partly because your employer can influence your career in a positive
way (reward power) or a negative way (coercive power). (Trong trường hợp này, một
phần là do cấp trên của bạn có thể ảnh hưởng đến sự nghiệp của bạn theo hướng tích cực
(quyền lực khen thưởng) hoặc tiêu cực (quyền lực cưỡng chế). These types of power are
most apparent in obviously hierarchical settings, such as courts, the military or the
workplace. [Thomas, J. (1995), Meaning in Interaction, p.125]

Reward power and coercive power are the most obvious. However, power is
present to a degree in all relationships, at least some of the time.
In addition to the two categories already mentioned, Thomas Thomas (1995:124)
finds 3 powers which are Legitimate power, Referent power, Expert power.
- Legitimate power (quyền lực hợp pháp): One person has the right to prescribe or
request certain things by virtue of role, age or status;
(Một người có quyền quy định hoặc yêu cầu những điều nhất định dựa trên vai trò, tuổi tác
hoặc địa vị)
As so often happens in pragmatics, we often encounter explicit reference to such power (e.g:
‘I’m your mother, I have a right to know)
Như thường xảy ra trong thực dụng, chúng ta thường gặp phải sự đề cập rõ ràng đến sức
mạnh đó (ví dụ: 'Tôi là mẹ của bạn, tôi có quyền được biết)
Thomas (1995:127)
- Referent power (quyền lực tham chiếu): One person has power over another
because the other admires and wants to be like him/her in some respect;

43
(Một người có quyền lực hơn người khác vì người kia ngưỡng mộ và muốn giống anh ấy/cô
ấy ở một khía cạnh nào đó)
It is rather different from the other types of power, in that it is often not exerted consciously
(you may be unaware that someone admires you from afar and emulates you!)
Nó khá khác so với các loại quyền lực khác ở chỗ nó thường không được sử dụng một cách
có ý thức (bạn có thể không biết rằng có ai đó ngưỡng mộ bạn từ xa và noi gương bạn!)
Thomas (1995:127)
- Expert power (quyền lực chuyên mô): one person has some special knowledge or
expertise which the other person needs.
(Trong trường hợp này, một người có kiến thức hoặc chuyên môn đặc biệt mà người kia
cần.)
It is more transient than the other types of power.
E.g: if an individual has great expertise in computing, he or she may have considerable (if
temporary) power over someone who desperately needs to draw on that knowledge. But the
computer expert may, in turn, have to defer to the person he or she was instructing earlier
when it comes to finding out how to prepare a lemon souffle.
Ví dụ: nếu một cá nhân có kiến thức chuyên môn sâu về máy tính, người đó có thể có quyền
lực đáng kể (nếu tạm thời) đối với người đang rất cần sử dụng kiến thức đó. Nhưng đến
lượt chuyên gia máy tính, có thể phải nhờ người mà họ hướng dẫn trước đó khi tìm ra cách
chuẩn bị món bánh souffle chanh
(Thomas, 1995:128)
2.2. Social distance (Khoảng cách xã hội)
The second factor is Social distance.
The term social distance is best seen as a composite of psychologically real factors
(status, age, sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which 'together determine the overall degree of
respectfulness' within a given speech situation.
Thuật ngữ "khoảng cách xã hội" (social distance) được hiểu tốt nhất như một sự
tổng hợp các yếu tố mang tính tâm lý thực tế (địa vị, tuổi tác, giới tính, mức độ thân mật,
v.v.), những yếu tố này "kết hợp lại để xác định mức độ tôn trọng tổng thể" trong một tình
huống giao tiếp nhất định.
In other words, if you feel close to someone, because that person is related to you,
or you know him or her well or are similar in terms of age, social class, occupation, sex,

44
ethnicity, etc., you feel less need to employ indirectness in, say, making a request than you
would if you were making the same request of a complete stranger.
Nói cách khác, nếu bạn cảm thấy gần gũi với ai đó – vì người đó có quan hệ họ
hàng với bạn, bạn quen biết họ rõ, hoặc bạn có những điểm tương đồng về tuổi tác, giai
cấp xã hội, nghề nghiệp, giới tính, sắc tộc, v.v. – thì bạn sẽ ít cảm thấy cần phải sử dụng
cách nói gián tiếp hơn, chẳng hạn khi đưa ra một lời đề nghị, so với khi bạn đưa ra cùng
một lời đề nghị đó với một người hoàn toàn xa lạ.
(Thomas, 1995:128)
2.3. Size of imposition (Mức độ yêu cầu/áp đặt)
The next element is the size of imposition.
When we talk about 'size of imposition' we mean how great is the request you are making?
(Khi chúng ta nói về 'mức độ áp đặt/yêu cầu', nghĩa là nói đến yêu cầu được đặt ra lớn/khó
như thế nào.)
For example, you would probably use a greater degree of indirectness in asking to borrow
£10 than you would in requesting to borrow ten pence.
Thomas (1995:130)

Thomas (1995:130) provides an example:

The speaker was my mother. She made the two following requests to me within the space of
a few minutes:
Shut the window, Jen. (the first request)
(the second request - with a greater degree of indirectness)
Do you think you could find the time to take those invitations to the printers?
Con có nghĩ rằng bạn có thể tìm thấy thời gian để mang những lời mời đó đến nhà in
không?
(Thomas, 1995:130)
Instead of saying, "Take these invitations to the printers.", the mother requested in the form
of a question, with a greater degree of indirectness, but not a yes-no question, besides, we
do NOT even dare to say no.
2.4. Rights and obligations
The last factor is rights and obligations.

45
This dimension is needed in order to explain a situation in which a speech act involving a
major imposition is performed with a minimal degree of indirectness.
(Khía cạnh này là cần thiết để giải thích một tình huống trong đó một hành động lời nói
liên quan đến một sự áp đặt lớn được thực hiện với mức độ gián tiếp tối thiểu.)
(Thomas, 1995:131)
Furthermore, there are some other opinions about the factors governing
directness and indirectness:
As cited in Kieu Thi Thu Huong’s work, Nguyen Q. (1998: 5) proposes 12 factors that may
affect the choice of indirectness in conversations: age, gender, residence, mood, occupation,
personality, topic, place, setting, time pressure, social distance and position.
(Nguyen Q, 1998: 5, cited in Disagreeing in English and Vietnamese: A pragmatics and
conversation analysis perspective by Kieu Thi Thu Huong, 2006)
There are some other factors that are believed to affect Ss' choice of indirectness, viz..
(i) Religion (tôn giáo) : people may be more or less indirect because of their religious
beliefs.
(ii) S/F language acquisition (Sự thu đắc ngôn ngữ của người nói/nghe): those who acquire
more than one language seem affected by values and norms of the culture/language other
than those of their first culture/language in their choice of indirectness.
(iii) Personal relation (Quan hệ cá nhân): Ss may be more or less direct in talk depending on
their interpersonal relations.
(iv) Education (Giáo dục): those who are well-educated normally act differently in terms of
indirectness (người khôn ăn nói dịu dàng dễ nghe)
(v) Intellectual abilities (Khả năng trí tuệ): people may be more or less direct in speaking as
regards their intellectual abilities.
All these suggestive factors, however, need to be empirically tested across speech acts and
cultures.
(Kieu Thi Thu Huong, 2006: 98)
3. Directness/Indirectness & Culture
It would be a mistake if one assumed that a language just employs direct strategies or only
indirect strategies. The realization of language depends on the kind of cultural thought
patterns that are different from culture to culture.

46
Sẽ là sai lầm nếu người ta cho rằng một ngôn ngữ chỉ sử dụng các chiến lược trực tiếp hoặc
chỉ sử dụng các chiến lược gián tiếp. Việc hiện thực hóa ngôn ngữ phụ thuộc vào các mô
hình tư duy văn hóa khác nhau giữa các nền văn hóa.

(Kieu, 2006: 97)

Kaplan (1972) posits four discourse structures to show the differences in cultural thought
patterns. Native Ss of English, according to Kaplan, tend to use direct expression and
thought patterns; conversely, Asian people, including the Vietnamese, are likely to adhere
to indirect patterns.

Kaplan (1972) thừa nhận bốn cấu trúc diễn ngôn để chỉ ra sự khác biệt trong các mô hình
tư duy văn hóa. Theo Kaplan, người bản ngữ nói tiếng Anh có xu hướng sử dụng cách diễn
đạt và các mô hình tư duy trực tiếp; ngược lại, người châu Á, trong đó có người Việt Nam,
có xu hướng tuân theo các mô hình gián tiếp.

(Kieu, 2006: 97)

The pattern of talk, according to Nguyen Q. (1998), seems to be different in English and
Vietnamese. Vietnamese Ss might be considered rude, impolite or too practical if they
mention the purpose of their talk at the very beginning of the conversation. Conversely,
Americans are likely to put the purpose of their conversations at the initial stage.

Mô hình nói chuyện, theo Nguyễn Quang (1998), dường như có sự khác nhau trong tiếng
Anh và tiếng Việt. Người nói tiếng Việt có thể bị coi là thô lỗ, bất lịch sự hoặc quá thực tế
nếu họ đề cập đến mục đích nói chuyện của mình ngay từ đầu cuộc trò chuyện. Ngược lại,
người Mỹ có xu hướng đặt mục đích cuộc trò chuyện của họ ở giai đoạn đầu.
(Kieu, 2006: 97)
Ss are presumably more direct when dealing with safe issues such as weather, and good
news, and more indirect when tackling sensitive topics like gender, religion, money and bad
news. Individuals and cultures widely vary in how, when, why, to whom and what they
apply indirect strategies.
(Kieu, 2006: 97)

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Người nói được đoán định là trực tiếp hơn trong giao tiếp về các vấn đề an toàn như thời
tiết và tin tức tốt nhưng gián tiếp hơn khi truyền đạt về các chủ đề nhạy cảm như giới tính,
tôn giáo, tiền bạc và tin tức xấu. Các cá nhân và các nền văn hóa rất khác nhau về cách
thức, khi nào, tại sao, với ai và cái gì họ áp dụng các chiến lược gián tiếp.
4. Directness/Indirectness & Gender
While there are differences in speech between men and women, not all of these
differences are directly related to the framework discussed. Some linguistic indicators of
female identity and certain paralinguistic features are examples of such differences.
Mặc dù có sự khác biệt trong lời nói giữa nam và nữ, nhưng không phải tất cả những khác
biệt này đều liên quan trực tiếp đến khuôn khổ được thảo luận. Một số chỉ dấu ngôn ngữ
của bản sắc nữ giới và một số đặc điểm cận ngôn ngữ là những ví dụ về sự khác biệt như
vậy.
Empirical tests of Lakoff’s specific claims (that women use more tag questions,
hesitation markers, and ‘trivializing’ adjectives, for example), have by and large failed to
substantiate them in detail (see for example Dubois and Crouch 1975; Crosby and Nyquist
1977; Brouwer, Gerritsen and de Haan 1979; Edelsky 1979; Brouwer 1982; Baroni and
d’Urso 1984), but the argument that women have a distinctive ‘style’, due to their
distinctive position in society, is still being actively pursued, despite the persistence of
negative evidence (no clear sex differences found) in much of the research.
(Brown, Levinson, 1987: 30)
Các thử nghiệm thực nghiệm về những tuyên bố cụ thể của Lakoff (chẳng hạn như phụ nữ
sử dụng nhiều câu hỏi đuôi, dấu hiệu do dự và tính từ mang tính 'tầm thường' hơn) nhìn
chung đã không chứng minh được những tuyên bố đó một cách chi tiết (xem, chẳng hạn,
Dubois và Crouch 1975; Crosby và Nyquist 1977; Brouwer, Gerritsen và de Haan 1979;
Edelsky 1979; Brouwer 1982; Baroni và d’Urso 1984). Tuy nhiên, lập luận rằng phụ nữ có
một ‘phong cách’ đặc trưng do vị trí xã hội đặc thù của họ vẫn đang được theo đuổi, mặc
dù có nhiều bằng chứng phủ định (không tìm thấy sự khác biệt rõ ràng giữa hai giới) trong
phần lớn các nghiên cứu.
=> HIỂU ĐƠN GIẢN LÀ: Nghiên cứu bắt nguồn từ lập luận của Lakoff rằng phụ nữ lịch
sự hơn nam giới phần lớn đã không chứng minh được những tuyên bố cụ thể về sự khác biệt
ngôn ngữ giữa các giới tính. Tuy nhiên, ý tưởng cho rằng phụ nữ có phong cách giao tiếp
đặc biệt do vị trí xã hội của họ vẫn tiếp tục được khám phá.

48
 For example, females contended that implicit requests, such as: “Clean up this
mess!” (Yule, 1996: 51) are more popular than the explicit ones, for instance, “I hereby
order you that you clean up this mess!” (Yule, 1996: 51). (Vaezi & Afghari, 2015)
As Brown and Levinson have said: “Our framework makes available just a few
possible parameters that can account for variation in politeness levels. The most obvious of
these is the P variable: if gender is, as seems to be generally the case, a contributory factor
in the perception of social asymmetry, power and authority, then we might expect to find
that women are more polite to some arbitrary interlocutor than are men from the same
status-bearing group (family, caste, class, etc.); also that, for any arbitrary speaker, there
ought to be more politeness shown to a male than a female addressee of the same status-
bearing group. However, any such simple predictions are likely to be confounded by the fact
that if gender may play a role in P assignments, it certainly plays a (sometimes
compensating) role in D assignments.”
"Khuôn khổ của chúng tôi chỉ đưa ra một số tham số có thể giải thích sự khác biệt
trong mức độ lịch sự. Rõ ràng nhất trong số đó là biến số P: nếu giới tính, như dường như
thường là trường hợp, là một yếu tố góp phần vào nhận thức về sự bất đối xứng xã hội,
quyền lực và thẩm quyền, thì chúng ta có thể kỳ vọng rằng phụ nữ sẽ lịch sự hơn nam giới
đối với một đối tượng giao tiếp bất kỳ thuộc cùng một nhóm có địa vị (gia đình, giai cấp,
tầng lớp, v.v.); đồng thời, đối với bất kỳ người nói nào, cũng có thể có nhiều sự lịch sự hơn
khi hướng đến một người nghe nam so với một người nghe nữ thuộc cùng nhóm địa vị đó.
Tuy nhiên, bất kỳ dự đoán đơn giản nào như vậy đều có thể bị phá vỡ bởi thực tế rằng nếu
giới tính có thể đóng vai trò trong việc xác định P, thì chắc chắn nó cũng đóng vai trò (đôi
khi mang tính bù trừ) trong việc xác định D."
(Brown, Levinson, 1987: 30)

For this is clearly sometimes assessed differently in 5 different subcultures, and it may be
that where gender groups are suffi-cientlysegregated, there is a systematic higher rating of
FTAs by women.
(Brown, Levinson, 1987: 32)

49
In short, while gender differences in language use are observed, their relationship with
politeness and other linguistic phenomena is complex and requires careful examination of
multiple contributing factors.
5. Directness/Indirectness & Politeness
Indirectness is, according to Searle (1979: 36), '...the chief motivation for politeness'.
(Kieu, 2006: 98)
Indirectness là động cơ chính của phép lịch sự

Leech (1983: 108) suggests we may:

...[I]ncrease the degree of politeness by using a more and more indirect kind
of illocution.
(Kieu, 2006: 99)
Chúng ta có thể:.tăng mức độ lịch sự bằng cách sử dụng một kiểu diễn đạt gián tiếp
hơn.

In many circumstances, indirect speech acts are often used instead of their more direct
counterparts as being indirect
It might be the case of English, where indirectness is commonly accepted to correlate with
politeness. In languages other than English indirectness does not necessarily imply
politeness.
Đó có thể là trường hợp của tiếng Anh, nơi tính gián tiếp thường được chấp nhận tương
quan với phép lịch sự. Trong các ngôn ngữ không phải tiếng Anh, gián tiếp không nhất
thiết hàm ý lịch sự.
(Kieu Thi Thu Huong, 2006: 99 )
According to Kieu Thi Thu Huong, There are other expressions: they are either
informal or formal. The S(peakers) may, in a formal setting, express his/her disagreement as
in:
Personally, I wouldn't go so far as to say that.
A literal translation of the utterance into Vietnamese (by Mai X. H. 1996: 197) would
embarrass H as it sounds too formal, superfluous and strange to his/her ears: Cá nhân tôi ở
chừng mực nào đó, tôi không dám nói như vậy
(Kieu, 2006: 101)

50
6. Measurement and use of indirectness
6.1. Measurement of indirectness (Đánh giá tính gián tiếp)
Indirectness does not just refer to the utterance level and to the level of illocutionary
force, but also to the directness with which the speaker achieves his or her illocutionary
goal
(Thomas, 1995: 133)
Tính gián tiếp không chỉ liên quan đến mức độ câu nói và lực ngôn trung mà còn liên
quan đến mức độ trực tiếp mà người nói sử dụng để đạt được mục tiêu ngôn trung của
họ. (Thomas, 1995:133)
- Weizman (1985) discusses indirectness in terms of the relative transparency or
opaqueness of meaning which can occur at utterance level (propositional
transparency/opacity) and at the level of what is implied (illocutionary
transparency/opacity).
Weizman (1985) bàn luận về tính gián tiếp dựa trên mức độ minh bạch hoặc mơ hồ của ý
nghĩa, có thể xảy ra ở cấp độ câu nói (tính minh bạch/mơ hồ về mệnh đề) và ở cấp độ ý
nghĩa hàm ẩn (tính minh bạch/mơ hồ về ngôn trung).

Example 1:
Rehearsing the choirboys at St Mary’s Priority, Lancaster
Stand!
(Thomas, 1995:134)
=> “we have a direct, unmodified imperative (total propositional transparency)”
(Thomas, 1993:134)
Script: According to Thomas, “Stand!" in this case is a direct and unmodified imperative, it
is given in its most straightforward and explicit form, without hedging, politeness markers,
or indirect phrasing.
Example 2:
To adult members of the Lancaster University choir at a public carol.
Would you like to stand?
(Thomas, 1993:134)

51
-> “a highly conventionalized polite request form (can you, could you, will you, would you,
would you like to) requiring minimal processing by the hearers.
(Thomas, 1993:134)
Example 3:
To adult members of the public at the same carol concert:
I think we would sing better if we stood

-> this example “is not a conventionalized form, but nevertheless the choirmaster’s words
contained (in Weizman’s terms); sufficient indications as to the content of act required for
the utterance to be considered propositionally transparent. Yet intuitively most people
would agree that the third utterance seems less direct and to require more processing by the
hearers”

=> these three examples are the same speech act but at the different level of indirectness
Weizman (1985) bàn luận về tính gián tiếp dựa trên mức độ minh bạch hoặc mơ hồ của ý
nghĩa, có thể xảy ra ở cấp độ câu nói (tính minh bạch/mơ hồ về mệnh đề) và ở cấp độ ý
nghĩa hàm ẩn (tính minh bạch/mơ hồ về ngôn trung).
6.1.1 The role of context in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của ngữ cảnh trong việc
diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
There are times when different participants have different expectations of an activity type
(or even believe themselves to be in different activity types).
(Thomas, 1995, p. 136, 137)
Example: (Thomas, 1995, p. 137)
Mr Collins fondly imagines that he is engaged in some sort of flirtatious encounter, in which
Elizabeth is bashfully rejecting his suit (but fully intends to accept the proposal later). 'I am
not now to learn,' replied Mr Collins, with a formal wave of the hand, 'that it is usual with
young ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he
first applies for their favor; and that sometimes the refusal is repeated a second or even a
third time. I am, therefore, by no means discouraged by what you have just said, and shall
hope to lead you to the altar ere long.'
Mr Collins's belief is not totally irrational — there are many cultures in which a hearer is
expected to reject an offer several times, before accepting with a show of reluctance. So

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even though he understands the proposition expressed by Elizabeth, he believes that she is
implicating the exact opposite.
(Thomas, 1995, p. 137)
6.1.2. The role of belief in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của niềm tin trong việc giải
thích tính gián tiếp)
Example: (Thomas, 1995, p. 135, 137)
Elizabeth said: I refuse to marry a complete buffoon!, and this is the thinking of Mr. Collins:
Elizabeth will not marry a complete buffoon; I am not a complete buffoon. Therefore
Elizabeth will marry me.
6.1.3. Background knowledge and interpreting indirectness (vai trò của kiến thức nền
tảng trong diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
It is exceedingly difficult to indicate the differences between “belief” and “knowledge”. We
can see a joke between Thomas and his Japanese friend as an example: (Thomas, 1995, p.
138)
Question: What's the difference between Oxford University and Jurassic Park?
Answer: One's a theme park inhabited by dinosaurs, the other's a film by Stephen Spielberg.
So as to comprehend why this joke is hilarious, it is necessary for us to have background
knowledge of the words in this conversation. Oxford University symbolized a theme park,
and its students, who were very scholarly, could be compared to dinosaurs.
6.1.4. The role of co-text in interpreting indirectness (vai trò của đồng văn cảnh trong
diễn giải tính gián tiếp)
The term 'co-text' refers to the linguistic (rather than situational) context in which a
particular utterance occurs. One example of co-text is the adjacency pair (cặp kế cận).
'Adjacency pairs' are consecutive, contingently related utterances produced by two different
speakers. Adjacency pairs may be reciprocal (e.g. greeting/greeting) or non-reciprocal (e.g.
question/answer). (Thomas, 1995, p. 138)
What has been said before constrains the way in which we interpret the response, as in the
following example: (Thomas, 1995, p. 139)
A : Are you coming to the cinema?
B: I've got an exam tomorrow.
A gave a Yes/No question to B, and A predicted to receive Yes or No as an answer. B
decided to employ an indirect sentence, and the answer was heard as No. Therefore, the

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range of possible implications of an indirect pragmatic utterance is greatly reduced.
(Thomas, 1995, p. 138, 139)
However, on many other occasions, the possible range of interpretations of an utterance is
not heavily constrained either by context or by co-text, so the process in which we interpret
the utterance becomes much more complicated as in the example below: (Thomas, 1995, p.
139)
This is a reconstruction of a conversation which took place between a friend and Thomas
when she was working in the (then Soviet) Ukraine:
A : I'd like to go walking on Saturday if it's fine.
B: It's Lenin's birthday.
A : It's my niece's birthday. And Shakespeare's birthday.
The first utterance from A can be deemed as either a suggestion or an invitation, which can
be followed by various responses from B such as a counter-suggestion, acceptance, refusal,
agreement, disagreement, etc. It is conspicuous that A’s statement did not substantially
constrain the range of appropriate responses, so A failed to understand whether B wanted or
did not want to come, whether B could or couldn’t come.
6.1.5. Goals and the interpretation of indirectness (Mục tiêu và cách diễn giải tính gián
tiếp)
The path from the illocutionary act to its illocutionary goal may be very short or pretty
complex, as can be seen in these following examples: (Thomas, 1995, p. 139,140)

Initial state Action 1 Intermediate Action 2 Final state

state

S feels cold S says: Switch H understands H switches on S feels warmer

on the heater! that S wants heater
the heater on

Initial state Action 1 Intermediat Intermediat Action 2 Final state

e state 1 e state 2

S feels cold S says: H H H switches S feels

Cold in understands understands on heater warmer

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 here, isn’t that S is that S wants
it? aware that it the heater
is cold on

The illocutionary act of S in both of the given examples is a request: Please switch on the
heater. In the first example, there are three stages between the initial and the final, desired
state. However, in the second example, there are four stages.
There are many approaches to pragmatics, but Thomas argued that the speaker will
remember the interpretive steps taken by the hearer so as to interpret what is said, and this
also constrains how the speaker formulates his or her utterance. Similarly, the hearer, in
interpreting what is said by the speaker, necessarily considers the social (and other)
constraints upon him or her. (Thomas, 1995, p. 140).
On many occasions, it may take us a long deducing process to work out the intended
meaning of the speaker’s utterance based on what the speaker has said. However, on many
other occasions, when we have a good idea of the speaker’s goal, this process can be
shortened. We can see this example: (Thomas, 1995, p. 141)
A professor telephones room-permits office:
A: Do you have a room for twenty on Monday nights?
B: Just a minute. Yes, I do. Give me your name, department and course number, please.
The “Yes/No” question given by A is interpreted as a request to book a room, and B has
(correctly) assessed A's goal in asking the question. Often, we are able to assign
illocutionary force only when we have worked out why the speaker is speaking in a
particular way.
It is sometimes straightforward to work out the meaning of the speaker’ goal when this
person is asking a question. Whereas, it is sometimes so difficult and even impossible to do
so, and therefore to assign pragmatic force to the question. Let’s move on to other examples.
(Thomas, 1995, p. 141)
These two questions were given to Thomas by his colleague on different occasions:
(Thomas, 1995, p. 141)
1. Have you got a bicycle pump?
2. Are you going home soon?
Thomas has another example: (Thomas, 1995, p. 141)
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A : Is that your car?
B: Why do you want to know?
It was easy for Thomas to suppose that the first speaker aimed to borrow his bicycle pump,
while the second speaker aimed to be given a ride home. Meanwhile, in question 3, Thomas
failed to know whether it is a complaint, a request for a lift, etc.) and also to know the
reason behind this question. As soon as the speaker explained what she did, Thomas
eventually was able to assign force to her utterance.
In some situations it is the illocutionary goal which is unclear, on other occasions the
speaker's illocutionary goal is perfectly obvious, but the pragmatic force of the utterance is
not, as the following example (Thomas, 1995, p. 142) shows:
If I were you, I'd leave town straight away.
Here there can be no doubt as to the speaker's illocutionary goal (to get the hearer to leave
town). What is unclear is whether the utterance constitutes a piece of advice, a warning, an
order or a threat.
6.2. The use of indirectness
According to Thomas, there are variety of reasons has been put forward for the
universal use of indirectness, including:
• The desire to make one's language more/less interesting
• To increase the force of one's message
• Competing goals
• Politeness/regard for 'face'.
(Thomas: 143)
1. “Interestingness” is probably the least significant of the reasons given above, but
nevertheless its importance should not be underestimated. People may use
indirectness because they enjoy having fun with language. For instance, I once heard
a news item in which a World War II pilot described a Shackleton aircraft as, "20,000
rivets flying in loose formation". He could have described the aircraft as “a very
poorly constructed machine.
(Thomas, 1995: 143)

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 2. Increasing the force of one’s message: “you can increase the 'impact' or effectiveness
of your message by employing indirectness. If hearer has to work at understanding
the message, he or she has a greater 'investment' in that message. This is particularly
true of jokes, irony and poems as the following examples illustrate.
(Thomas, 1995: 144)

3. Competing goals
Pyle (cited in Dascal 1983) notes that we often employ indirectness because we have two
goals which compete. For example, if a teacher has to tell a student that the student's work is
not up to standard, the teacher's need/duty to tell the truth may conflict with the desire not to
hurt the student's feelings or discourage him or her.
(Thomas, 1995: 145)

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 REFERENCE LIST
Tài liệu tiếng Anh:
1. Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax
and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
2. Thomas, J. (1995). Meaning in interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics. USA,
England: Longman.
3. Yule, G. (1996). Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tài liệu tiếng Việt:

5. Giáp, N.T. (2004). Dụng học Việt ngữ. NXB Đại học Quốc gia Hà Nội.

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