The Structure of Comparison in the Study of Revolution

Author(s): Colin J. Beck

Source: Sociological Theory , JUNE 2018, Vol. 36, No. 2 (JUNE 2018), pp. 134-161
Published by: American Sociological Association

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777004
research-article2018
STXXXX10.1177/0735275118777004Sociological TheoryBeck

Original Article

Sociological Theory

The Structure of Comparison

2018, Vol. 36(2) 134­–161
© American Sociological Association 2018
DOI: 10.1177/0735275118777004
https://doi.org/10.1177/0735275118777004

in the Study of Revolution st.sagepub.com

Colin J. Beck1

Abstract
The social scientific study of revolution has been deviled by a lack of progress in recent
years, divided between competing views on the universality of patterns in revolution. This
study examines the origins of these epistemologies. Drawing on an insight that different
modes of comparison yield different types of knowledge, I argue that the network structure
of how cases are compared constrains or enables the development of a field’s theoretical
sensibilities. Analysis of comparative studies of revolution published from 1970 to 2009
reveals that the field overall is most amenable to knowledge about particular cases rather
than the phenomenon of revolution broadly. Analysis of the changing structure of comparison
over time reveals that comparison precedes the development of an epistemology. The
results suggest that conclusions about the possibility, or lack thereof, of generalization may
be an artifact of the comparative method.

Keywords
revolution, comparative methods, theory

With the sudden onset of the 2011 “Arab Spring” in the Middle East and North Africa, the
phenomenon of revolution has new life in the social sciences. Recent accounts of the events
stress various causal dimensions: weak states and divided elites (Goldstone 2013; Goodwin
2011; Mann 2013; Ritter 2015), processes of contagion and diffusion (Beck 2014; Diani
2011; Hale 2013), strengths of movements and coalitions (Austin Holmes 2012; Foran 2014;
Lawson 2015; Leenders 2012), and the contingency of collective action (Kurzman 2012;
Weyland 2012). Each explanation has its roots in years-old paradigms for understanding
revolution. Scholars of revolution have known for decades that weak states and elite schisms
can generate revolution (e.g., Goldstone 1991; Goodwin 2001; Skocpol 1979) and that con-
tention can spread from one society to another (e.g., Katz 1997; Markoff 1996; Sohrabi
2002). Similarly, coalitions have long been a hallmark of revolution studies (Dix 1984;
Foran 2005; Markoff 1988), and the importance of contingent processes for understanding
revolution is over a decade old (Keddie 1995; Kuran 1995; Kurzman 1996). Theorization of
revolution in general therefore appears to have slowed to a crawl (Lawson 2016).

1Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:
Colin J. Beck, Department of Sociology, Pomona College, 420 N. Harvard Ave, Claremont, CA 91711, USA.
Email: [email protected]

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Beck 135

The lack of progress in revolution theory signals different things to different scholars. On
the one hand, some researchers interpret it to mean that generalizable models of revolution
should be created, either through the incorporation of new factors and causes (Beck 2014;
Goldstone 1998, 2003; Halliday 1999; Lawson 2016) or the parsimony of necessary and
sufficient causation (Goodwin 2001; Mann 2013). On the other hand, some take the lack of
progress to be evidence of the failure of generalizable propositions and thus emphasize the
inherent uniqueness of revolutionary events (Ermakoff 2015; Kurzman 2004; McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).
The meta-theoretical stances of these two views on revolution extend beyond the results
of any one study or the propositions of any one theory. Rather, they are epistemological and
ontological positions. As in social science in general, each perspective affects which events
are to be considered part of the phenomenon in question, what the purposes of research
should be, and which type of theories can be developed (Reed 2011).
I draw on a classic insight from Skopcol and Somers (1980)—that different analytic stances
necessitate different sorts of comparisons—to explore the origins of the contemporary episte-
mologies in revolution theory. I argue that the logic of Skocpol and Somers can be inverted.
That is, different types of comparison are more or less likely to lend themselves to different
types of knowledge and the development of different epistemologies. This argument is essen-
tially about inductivism in social scientific research. In comparative methodology, cases are
investigated and theories developed in an iterative fashion (George and Bennett 2005; Goertz
and Mahoney 2012). As such, theories reflect cases as much as deductive first principles.
Which cases have been investigated and which comparisons have been drawn therefore will
structure the development of theory for the individual study. A parallel process occurs at the
level of a comparative field. Here, the underlying patterns of multiple studies’ comparisons
will structure a field’s epistemological stances. In short, comparison precedes epistemology.
To substantiate the argument, I use two analytic approaches. The first is to consider a
knowledge system as a whole with a life of its own beyond the individual study.
Conceptualizing knowledge this way is a classic approach in the sociology of science
(Abbott 2001; Collins 2000; Kuhn 1962; Reed 2011), and it is distinct from approaches that
consider the complex ways knowledge is made by scholars rooted in particular social sites
(see Camic, Gross, and Lamont 2012; e.g., Bourdieu 2004; Latour 1987; Merton 1973). This
way of thinking contrasts with the cottage industry of comparative-historical methodolo-
gists, which tends to focus on the lessons of singular noteworthy studies (e.g., Collier and
Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990; Mahoney 1999, 2000; Parigi and Henson n.d.). In contrast,
the argument here is at the level of the field—an epistemology rather than a theory, a uni-
verse of cases rather than a singular case comparison.
Thinking of a field as a whole system leads to the second analytic approach. I conceptual-
ize comparison as a network of cases, suited for the tools of social network analysis. In
comparative studies, cases do not just exist as independent units—rather, they lie in interde-
pendent webs of comparison. This conceptualization is commensurate with a relational soci-
ological approach, which emphasizes the dynamics between social entities (see Emirbayer
1997). A comparison between cases sets a relation between them, and the appearance of a
case in multiple publications links the studies together. With repeated and new comparisons
across a universe of cases, a network of ties develops. The resulting structure of comparison
undergirds an entire comparative field’s theoretical development. The structure of this net-
work, its cases, and their evolution over time reveal what type of knowledge about revolu-
tion can and should be expected to develop.
The argument here is thus one of macro-macro causation (see Jepperson and Meyer
2011). As such, I examine all identifiable comparative case studies of revolution published

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136 Sociological Theory 36(2)

in English between 1970 and 2009. The data are both novel and robust as they cover an
entire field of comparative study in its modern incarnation. And the approach follows in the
tradition of methodological reflection by comparative-historical sociologists (see e.g.,
Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Steinmetz 2004), of which
revolution studies are no small part (Goldstone 2003).
The investigation yields a few key findings. First, the field of revolution has a clear pref-
erence for particular types of cases. Surprisingly, however, these are not the great revolutions
of old but modern events, particularly those with leftist bases or insurgent modes of conten-
tion. The Nicaraguan Revolution of 1979, for example, is the most studied case. Second,
comparison displays great homophily. Cases that are similar to each other are the most likely
to be compared, and clusters of compared cases tend to fall within spatial and temporal
boundaries. Third, analysis of change in the field over time confirms that the structure of
comparison precedes the development of a meta-theoretical position, and it suggests increas-
ing fragmentation in revolution studies in the past decade. Altogether, the results indicate
that the study of revolution is not well positioned to adjudicate between competing episte-
mologies. The possibility, or lack thereof, of generalizability remains an open question.

Epistemologies of Revolution and the Structure of

Comparison
Since the origins of social science, the study of revolution has undergone four primary gen-
erations of scholarship (Goldstone 1982, 2001). The earliest generations included the natural
histories of revolution (e.g., Brinton 1938; Edwards 1927; Pettee 1938) and the general
approaches of social strain theory (e.g., Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Huntington 1968; Smelser
1962). By the 1970s, the beginning of the time period under investigation here, an early
third-generation structuralist, sometimes Marxist, account of revolution emerged (e.g.,
Moore 1966; Paige 1975; Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1964; Wolf 1969). In 1979, Theda
Skocpol published States and Social Revolutions, which ushered in a new paradigm for
understanding revolution—state breakdown theory. Skocpol’s parsimonious definition of
what constitutes a “social revolution” animated scholarship and gave it a clear object of
focus. State-centered theories of revolution thus dominated the field for over a decade (e.g.,
Goldstone 1991; Goodwin 2001) and constituted the highpoint of the third generation of
revolution theory.
However, discontent with a state-centered view grew, particularly in its most abstract
formulations. Scholars turned toward theories that explored challengers’ capacity to mobi-
lize and the role of contingency and historical accident (e.g., Foran and Goodwin 1993;
Kuran 1995; Kurzman 1996; Parsa 2000; Reed and Foran 2002; Selbin 1993; Weyland
2009). This work, while accompanying the cultural and agentic turn in social science, was
also influenced by a new way of thinking about causality. Tilly (1995, 2001) proposed that
social science should reject abstract generalizations in favor of mechanisms that could com-
bine and recombine in different fashions in different cases. As the view developed, so did the
types of mobilization considered analyzable as revolutions—failed mobilizations and nega-
tive cases (Foran 2005; Goodwin 2001; Tilly 1993), electoral and pacted transitions (Lawson
2005), and nonviolent mass protest (Beissinger 2013; Nepstad 2011; Ritter 2015; Stephan
and Chenoweth 2008; Zunes 1994). These post–state breakdown theories constitute what is
known as the fourth generation of revolution theory (Foran 1993; Goldstone 2001; Lawson
2016).
The third and fourth generations of revolution theory were each accompanied by a broader
epistemology. As with any epistemology, there was a sense of what a revolution is and what

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Beck 137

the purposes of investigation should be. Certainly, specific theories diverged from the gen-
eral framework of the generation, but the overall thrust was clear. This is what makes them
generations, after all (Clemens 2007; Goldstone 1982). The primary dividing line between
the most recent generations is whether or not there are universal causes of revolution. Third-
generation structuralists sought generalizability across time and space, whereas fourth-gen-
eration scholars emphasized the inherent uniqueness of events, often due to agency and
contingency. This debate remains unresolved today (Lawson 2016). Thus, both epistemolo-
gies persist as the Arab Spring is considered: universalists (e.g., Mann 2013; Ritter 2015)
and particularists (e.g., Ermakoff 2015; Kurzman 2012).
I prefer not to refer to the epistemic divide as one of generalizability. First, generalizabil-
ity is a loaded word in comparative social science, and second, it is usually thought of as a
property of a specific theoretical proposition. More fitting terms, when thinking about the
overall theoretical style of a generation, may be Parigi and Henson’s (N.d.) portable and
grounded knowledge. Portable knowledge is applicable to instances beyond the cases of its
initial development. Grounded knowledge remains much closer to its cases and sets tighter
bounds on its applicability elsewhere. These are ideal-types. Any given study may display
some degree of portability and groundedness in its analysis. And other words could be used,
such as universal or particular, general or specific. Yet at the level of the field as a whole, I
find the terminology of portable and grounded fitting to describe broad sensibilities. That is,
they provide a way to characterize an epistemology without drawing claims about the spe-
cific nature of its individual theoretical propositions. I thus use portability and groundedness
to characterize the generations of revolution theory without making claims about the nature
of individual studies within each generation. For instance, state-centered theory tends toward
an epistemology of portability—that revolutions have some general and universal patterns—
and theory of contingency tends toward an epistemology of groundedness—that revolutions
depend on particular, historically bounded contingencies.
What accounts for the continued epistemic division between portability and groundedness
in contemporary revolution theory? To address this question, I rely on an insight from Skocpol
and Somers (1980) that different styles of comparative history necessitate different types of
cases and comparison. They identify three different modes of analysis. The first is parallel
demonstration of theory, where the researcher juxtaposes various instances to show that a
theory applies to all cases that it logically ought to fit. Cases examined thus represent many
possible comparisons across a range of types (Skocpol and Somers 1980). This method tends
to generate portable knowledge as its very intent is generalizability. The second mode of analy-
sis is contrast of contexts. Here, cases are used to highlight their unique features and show how
their uniqueness affects the theoretical propositions, with comparison usually controlling for
geography or era (Skocpol and Somers 1980). Contrast of contexts typically produces grounded
knowledge close to its cases as this is its very intent. Finally, macro-causal analysis seeks to
provide causal inferences about larger processes. Cases are used to show the veracity of an
explanation, and comparison seeks to control for other factors by placing some historical
bounds on investigation, often familial types (Skocpol and Somers 1980). This yields some
portability in knowledge but with some groundedness due to its familial typical boundaries.
Taken together, the three analytic styles form a triangle of comparative history (see Skocpol
and Somers 1980:Figure 2) where theory may be applied in a top-down method, developed in
a bottom-up process, or generalized within certain scope conditions. This remains an excellent
way to think of the purposes of comparative analysis—different types of comparison suit dif-
ferent types of analysis and thus generate different types of knowledge.
Skocpol and Somers’s (1980) account implies different comparative configurations of
cases. I thus argue that comparison can be thought of in network terms. Cases can be

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138 Sociological Theory 36(2)

conceived of as nodes and the comparisons between cases as ties between two nodes. Each
mode of comparative history would thus result in a different type of network. To illustrate,
imagine three cases that have all been compared to each other in a single study. The network
structure is the same no matter the mode of investigation—a triad of three nodes and three
edges. But what comprises the network structure will differ. In parallel demonstration of
theory, the cases are diverse, coming from various times, places, and even types. In contrast
of contexts, the cases are more similar, sharing a time or a place. Finally, in macro-causal
analysis, there is some variation among cases, but they are bounded in a legible and logical
fashion along the lines of familial types. Thus, what method of analysis is used for a study
could be understood by considering its network of comparison alone, even without reading
the text.
But epistemologies do not come from a single, however influential, study of a phenome-
non. Rather, they are the accumulation of knowledge in an entire field. Thus, the epistemic
positions of a comparative field can be determined by considering its structure of compari-
son as a whole. Figure 1 provides idealized sketches of the possibilities. In the first network
(Figure 1a), comparison is evenly spread throughout the universe of 10 cases; all cases have
been compared to all other cases. This network is akin to parallel demonstration of theory,
and portable knowledge will likely accumulate. In the second network (Figure 1b), cases are
compared to each other in isolated clusters. Grounded knowledge is the likeliest result; com-
parison is not portable to other contexts because there are no bridging ties between clusters.
Finally, Figure 1c shows a mix of the two previous ideal types—some clustering in compari-
son occurs, but clusters are linked to each other. This suggests a balance between portability
and groundedness, as in macro-causal analysis.
I argue that these networks of comparison, for a comparative field as a whole, precede the
accumulation of knowledge and the development of an epistemology. As cases are linked, or
not, to each other through strong and weak ties, different configurations develop. This net-
work structure affects the likelihood that a given epistemological position will have the
empirical support to develop, as Skocpol and Somers (1980) argue. The preceding structure
of comparison thus points the way to subsequent theory generation. Metaphorically speak-
ing, if Skocpol had not written States and Social Revolutions or McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
had not published Dynamics of Contention, then we would have had to invent them.
I next examine the evidence for which structure of comparison dominates the study of
revolution using two sets of analyses: investigating cases and comparisons in the network
overall and over-time analyses that confirm comparison precedes epistemology.

Data on Revolutionary Cases and Comparative

Networks
The data for this study are a near complete sample of social scientific studies of revolution
that use the case comparative method published in English between 1970 and 2009. I
searched peer-reviewed articles and books listed in three central social science databases
(Sociological Abstracts, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, and PAIS International) and
one general database (Books in Print) using subject headings with wildcard variants of the
keyword revolution.1 This method yielded 6,621 entries from 1970 to 2009 (although in the
case of Books in Print, not necessarily unique works because reprints are counted). I verified
the results using two annotated bibliographies to check for missing studies—Goodwin’s
(2001) appendix and Tilly’s (2005) personal bibliography made public by Christian
Davenport after Tilly’s passing in 2008.
From these lists, I identified comparative case studies for inclusion in the data set using
two criteria. First, the study must examine at least two or more cases (whether actual historic

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Beck 139

Figure 1. Three modes of comparative history as ideal-typical networks of 10 cases.

events or negative cases), per the author of the study’s own treatment of what constitutes a
case.2 Second, the strategy of analysis must be comparative, again relying on authors’ own
assessment of their methodology. In the absence of explicit claims of comparative method
(which occurs in a notable minority of studies; see Beck 2017a), two or more cases that are
given roughly equal treatment are considered comparative. These criteria encompass works
that use multiple analytic strategies; for instance, Paige’s (1975) study of agrarian revolution
includes both case comparisons and basic statistical tests.

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140 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Figure 2. Network of comparative cases of revolution, 1970–2009.

This method of identification yielded a sample of 148 comparative case studies, ranging
from small N studies, as in Skocpol’s (1979) famous analysis, to medium N studies that use
methods like qualitative comparative analysis, as in Foran’s (2005) survey of Third World revo-
lutions. The studies cover 203 different revolutionary events that have been studied multiple
times, yielding 639 cases. The cases are from 96 countries or regions, occurring as early as the
third century BCE to as recently as 2005 and including successful revolutions, failed or ongoing
revolutionary situations, and negative cases where revolutionary contention did not occur.
With this sampling strategy, I attempted to identify the entire population of studies that use the
case comparative method, but there are possible limitations and biases. First, the selection strat-
egy does not capture studies of single revolutions or include the (few) solely statistical studies of
revolution. It also excludes comparisons that are made in passing as implications or contrasts,
which leaves aside the voluminous literature on revolutions in humanistic fields like history as
well as general surveys, theoretical treatises, and other works with non-empirical goals.3
Consequently, the data do not account for the turn in historical sociology toward the framing “in
comparative perspective” used by studies that primarily focus on a single case. As such, the
sample best represents a method—the increasingly formalized case comparison (see George and
Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). The social science of revolution pre-
dominantly relies on case comparison to develop its theories (Goldstone 2003), even though it is
only one form of historical sociology (Steinmetz 2004). This suggests that comparative case
studies are a good representation of knowledge in the field more broadly. There is also an analytic
choice made here: focusing on comparison allows for an investigation of the relationship between
multiple studies’ empirical bases and how they generate an epistemology.
Second, the sample only covers works published in English. Non–English language stud-
ies might have different patterns. However, given the lingua anglo of contemporary social
science, it is an acceptable boundary to the sample. It is also reasonable to suspect that

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Beck 141

non-English sources in regional publications would focus on local events, which would only
magnify the patterns I discuss in the following. As with any sample, the absence of a study
or two is unlikely to change the overall patterns of epistemology described.

Case Attributes
I identified and coded six characteristics of the cases from the studies and secondary sources.
First is the era of a case, in world-historical terms, determined by the year of the case’s
onset.4 Next, I coded the geographic location of a case by region. The few cases that are
multiregional events are coded as such. Third, although revolutions are complex events, it is
possible to identify their primary mode of contention to help distinguish between types of
revolution (e.g., Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). I identified four different types of conten-
tion, differentiating between those conducted through organized violence, mobilization
more typical of social movement repertoires, revolutions from above, and interstate or cross-
border conflicts. Given the presence of negative cases in the sample and the complexity of
some cases, I categorized each of these separately.
Ideological character is another attribute of revolution that distinguishes its type. Ideology
is often dynamic and emergent in revolutionary situations, but the popular understanding of
revolutions settles in their aftermath, allowing for such an appraisal (Parker 1999). I coded
challengers’ primary ideological basis in seven categories—leftist, democratic, national-
separatist, religious, and reactionary, with separate categories for complex cases and nega-
tive cases. Finally, I coded the outcome of a revolutionary case in an ordered fashion: social
revolutions that change both regime and society (per Skocpol’s [1979] definition and
Goodwin’s [2001] and Foran’s [2005] determinations), political revolutions that change a
regime or governance structure but do not lead to lasting social change (see Goldstone 1991),
and cases of failure or ongoing contention (which approximates Tilly’s [1993] definition of
a revolutionary situation as effective, incompatible dual claims to sovereignty). As with the
other attributes, I included categories for negative cases and other outcomes. Table 1 sum-
marizes the sample overall and the distribution of attributes for the 639 comparative cases.

Constructing Network Data

I used cases’ joint appearance in the same study to construct one-mode network data where
a unique case is the node and a comparison is the edge. For example, a study with two cases
would yield one reciprocal dyad, a study with three cases would yield one triad, and so on.
Where cases appear in multiple studies, studies’ case comparisons are linked to each other
through strong and weak ties. Figure 2 presents the resulting network of 203 nodes encom-
passing 1,756 dyads, composed of a main core and six isolated sets of relationships. The
overall sum of ties (i.e., joint appearance in one or more studies) is 5,278, with maximum tie
strength of 20, and the overall network density is .129. The disconnected subgraphs (which
will be discussed in more detail) represent individual studies, such as Katz’s (1997) study of
revolutionary waves, or distinct sub-literatures, such as the study of the postcommunist
Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe.
I analyze these data in two different ways. First, I examine the comparative network as a
whole, investigating which cases are the most popular for study, which attributes of cases are
most common, and what type of knowledge might result. Second, I consider the change over
time in cases and the structure of comparison to show that the practice of case comparison
precedes the development of the revolution field’s epistemologies. Finally, I discuss an
implication of this work—to what extent casing and comparison represents the actual uni-
verse of revolutionary events.

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142 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Table 1. Frequency of Study of Comparative Cases by Revolutionary Attributes, 1970–2009.

Attribute 1970–2009 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Era
Before 1500 3 0 1 1 1
1500–1775 24 2 6 12 4
1776–1913 123 33 16 47 27
1914–1945 68 20 12 18 18
1946–1988 367 45 78 163 81
1989 on 54 − − 13 41
Region
 Western Europe/Anglo North America 91 20 16 29 26
Eeastern Europe/former USSR 103 10 13 27 53
 Latin America/Caribbean 243 22 48 129 44
 Middle East/North Africa 65 12 10 28 15
Sub-Saharan Africa 46 13 8 11 14
Asia 89 23 18 28 20
 Global/multiregion 2 0 0 2
Primary mode of contention
Insurgency, terrorism, civil war 334 58 74 138 64
 Mass uprising, social movement 177 23 26 63 65
 From above, coup, repression 40 11 3 17 9
Interstate war, cross-border 5 1 2 0 2
Other, complex 30 4 2 11 13
Negative case 53 3 6 25 19
Contenders’ primary ideological basis
 Leftist, Marxist, anarchist 257 34 55 119 49
Democratic, republican, inclusive 140 18 13 45 64
National-separatist, anti-colonial 83 28 18 21 16
Religious 38 0 8 20 10
Reactionary, right-wing, statist 22 8 3 6 5
Other, complex 46 9 10 18 9
Negative case 53 3 6 25 19
Outcome
Social revolution 256 42 52 109 53
Political revolution, regime change 136 32 15 35 54
Ongoing contention, failure 149 18 33 65 33
Other, complex 45 5 7 20 13
Negative case 53 3 6 25 19
N of cases 639 100 113 254 172
N of unique cases 203 51 59 107 101
N of studies 148 24 31 54 39
Mean cases per study 4.3 4.1 3.7 4.7 4.4

The Structure of Comparison, 1970–2009

I now turn to the nature of cases and structure of comparison overall in case comparative
study of revolution since 1970. I begin by presenting which cases are most preferred for
study. Second, I examine the network of case comparisons to reveal what type of empirical
knowledge is most likely to be generated. I investigate clustering in the network to establish
its commonality and determine what composes clusters. Then I examine homophily in dyadic

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Beck 143

Table 2. Cases of Revolution Studied Comparatively 10 or More Times, 1970–2009.

Event N of Times Studied Normalized Degree Centrality

Nicaragua, 1979 39 4.93
Cuba, 1959 31 5.07
Russia, 1917 30 2.35
France, 1789 24 2.17
Iran, 1979 23 2.40
El Salvador, 1980 22 3.59
China, 1927 18 2.65
Vietnam, 1946 17 2.57
Mexico, 1910 14 2.52
Guatemala, 1960 12 3.19
Bolivia, 1952 11 1.83
England, 1642 10 1.36
Mean all cases 3.2 .64

comparison to see the patterns in the juxtaposition of cases. The results suggest considerable
homophily in comparison and clusters, especially by geography and era, which is most ame-
nable to a relatively grounded epistemology.
It is no secret that particular revolutions are particularly popular, returned to by scholars
numerous times. These cases might be especially fertile for analysis or represent prototypes
to which other cases are compared (Gerring 2007; Goertz and Mahoney 2012); they could
even be considered “model organisms” for the social science of revolution (Guggenheim and
Krause 2012). What is surprising, however, is which events are the most popular. Table 2
presents the cases that have been studied 10 or more times in the past 40 years. The Nicaraguan
Revolution of 1979 is the most common case, having been studied 39 different times and
making up 6 percent of all cases by itself. The second most popular case is another Latin
American socialist revolution—Cuba in 1959. Classic cases do not appear until the third and
fourth places, the Russian Revolution of 1917 and France in 1789. This pattern is repeated
across the most popular events—the Salvadoran Civil War is almost as popular as the more
historically notable Islamic Revolution in Iran, and mid–twentieth century revolutionary situ-
ations in Guatemala and Bolivia outpace the English Civil War and Glorious Revolution of
the seventeenth century. Overall, popular revolutions for study seem to be either Latin
American or classic cases.
Altogether, the dozen most popular cases comprise 39 percent of all units of analysis
(meaning that 191 other cases make up the remaining 60 percent) and are far above the mean
popularity of 3.2. The picture is much the same in network terms. Each of the most studied
cases ranks quite high in normalized valued degree centrality—the number of cases that
have been compared to a particular node—and altogether hold a 27 percent share of network
ties. Not surprisingly, valued degree centrality correlates highly with the frequency of a
case’s study (ß = .801, p < .001). This is not a pattern a historiographer of revolution might
expect. World historically important events, such as the great revolutions of 1848 in Europe
or the collapse of communism of 1989, do not make the list at all. And seemingly historically
trivial cases, like the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, are popular.
But what of comparisons between cases? As previously argued, comparisons that gener-
ate portable knowledge tend to be made between cases that cross temporal and spatial
bounds. If comparison crosses type families of cases, then a parallel demonstration of theory
epistemology could result. Accordingly, we would expect such a network to be fairly

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144 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Table 3. Cluster Size, Density, E-I Score, and Exemplars from Louvain Community Detection
Algorithm, 1970–2009.

Ties within Density within

Cluster Nodes Group Group E-I Index Exemplars
a 53 1,234 .448 −.514 Vietnam, Iranian Islamic Revolution
b 50 622 .254 −.591 Russian Revolution, French Revolution
c 34 1,844 1.643 −.473 Cuban Revolution, Nicaraguan
Revolution
d 20 112 .295 −.189 Malay Emergency, Mau Mau Rebellion
e 15 148 .705 −1.000 Orange Revolution, Rose Revolution
fa 10 90 1.000 −.250 Brazilian Revolution of 1930, Albanian
June Revolution
g 9 44 .611 −.700 Solidarity, Hungarian Uprising of 1956
hb 3 6 1.000 −1.000 Arab Nationalism, Marxism-Leninist
Wave
ib 3 6 1.000 −1.000 War of Spanish Succession, Camisard
Revolt
jb 2 2 1.000 −1.000 Estonia 1989, Latvia 1989
kb 2 2 1.000 −1.000 Irish Nationalists, Narodnya Volna
lb 2 2 1.000 −1.000 Rwandan Genocide, Sri Lankan
CivilWar
Network 203 3,512 .129 −.508
aFrom primarily one study.
bFrom only one study (isolated subgraph).

cohesive, with limited isolates and clusters, creating the potential for portable theoretical
inferences. On the other hand, comparisons that generate grounded knowledge, a contrast of
contexts epistemology, tend to fall within spatial and temporal boundaries. A network of this
sort would be more fragmented and have clusters determined by era and place. In between
the two poles is historically bounded knowledge that is portable to other contexts, as in
macro-causal analysis. Although clustering in the network occurs here, the clusters are leg-
ible as distinct sets of cases and there would be dense connections between clusters.
The entire comparative network, as presented in Figure 2, has clear clustering, several
isolates, and a number of pendants. Pendants form when relatively understudied cases are
compared to a relatively more popular one, and isolates are the result of no bridging ties.
Clearly, comparison is not evenly distributed among the cases studied. A meta-theoretical
position of the complete portability of theories of revolution is thus less likely to develop
from revolution studies as a whole. But clustering can lend itself to grounded or portable
knowledge, depending on which comparisons comprise clusters. I thus examine clustering in
more detail using the Louvain community detection algorithm as implemented in Pajek. This
procedure identifies the sets of cases that are more connected to each other than to other
nodes, and it allows clusters’ boundaries to be seen. The algorithm identifies 12 distinct com-
munities in the network overall.5 Table 3 presents information about these clusters, which are
represented in Figure 2: their size, their density, and a measure of homophily between nodes,
the E-I Index, which compares in-group ties to out-group ties to determine how homophilous
a cluster is on a scale of −1 to 1. Smaller E-I scores indicate greater homophily.
Of the 12 clusters, 5 are disconnected subgraphs, and all but 1 of these are exclusively
made up of one study that has events not studied elsewhere (clusters h, i, j, k, and l in Table
3). The remaining clusters tell us more about the structure of comparison. The two largest

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Beck 145

Table 4. Ten Most Frequent Comparisons of Revolutions, 1970–2009.

Case 1 Case 2 N of Comparisons

Nicaragua, 1979 Cuba, 1959 20
Russia, 1917 France, 1789 18
Nicaragua, 1979 El Salvador, 1980 17
Nicaragua, 1979 Iran, 1979 13
El Salvador, 1980 Guatemala, 1960 11
Russia, 1917 China, 1927 11
Nicaragua, 1979 Guatemala, 1960 10
Cuba, 1959 Vietnam, 1946 9
France, 1789 England, 1642 9
Cuba, 1959 Bolivia, 1952 9
N dyads 1,756
Mean tie strength 1.50

clusters, a and b, seem to represent twentieth-century semi-peripheral revolutions (53 nodes)

and classic great revolutions (50 nodes), respectively, and cover about half of the unique
cases studied overall. The third largest community, c with 34 cases, is primarily Latin
American revolutions. Cluster d focuses on the mostly nonviolent or pacted transitions of the
1980s and early 1990s, and cluster e is the disconnected subgraph of the Colour Revolutions
literature. Finally, clusters f and g appear to be small sets of studies focused on military revo-
lutions and mid–twentieth century resistance to communism.
The densest and most intraconnected cluster is that of the Latin American revolutions
(cluster c), which means numerous studies have used comparisons within this region alone.
Of the other large clusters, the great revolutions community (cluster b) is less dense but has
relatively high homophily (given by the E-I index score of –.591). The great social revolu-
tions are not studied as frequently as some other clusters, and they tend to be compared to
one another. Similarly, semi-peripheral revolutions (cluster d) and Latin American revolu-
tions are relatively homophilous. These results, and the perfectly homophilous Colour
Revolutions cluster (e), suggest that clusters form along lines of region and era primarily and
only secondarily according to type of case. There is little evidence that clusters are the result
of cross-typological comparisons that would create perfectly portable knowledge. Rather,
the clustering that occurs is most likely to produce grounded knowledge within sets of simi-
lar cases.
To assess this pattern further, I consider which comparisons are most frequently drawn.
Table 4 presents the most common dyads within the entire network. The Nicaraguan
Revolution compared to the Cuban Revolution is the most common comparison. In close
second place is comparison of the Russian Revolution to the French Revolution. Comparison
between Latin American cases makes up half of the 10 most frequent dyads, and not a single
top 10 comparison breaks either era, geographic, or familial type boundaries.
This impression is supported by analyses using quadratic assignment procedures (QAP).
QAP correlation compares random permutations of dyadic ties in a network to the observed
ties to generate estimates of statistical significance based on attributes of the node. In other
words, it allows us to see if cases that share similar attributes are more or less likely to be
compared to one another than chance alone would dictate. I use the coding of case attributes
detailed previously as a measure of homophily. Thus, the variables are dyads that share the
same era, region, mode of contention, ideological basis, or outcome. Table 5 reports the
results of QAP correlation of the homophily between cases.

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146 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Table 5. Quadratic Assignment Procedures Pearson Correlation of Revolutionary Cases with Same
Attributes and Observed Dyads, 5,000 Permutations.

Attribute Whole Network 2+ Study Network

Era of onset −.023 .289***
Region of occurrence .004 .414***
Mode of contention −.004 .132***
Ideological basis .006 .151***
Outcome .005 .116***

***p < .001.

As 52 percent of cases are only studied once, it is not surprising that there is no significant
correlation between case attributes and the likelihood of comparison for the entire network.
Key to my argument is that comparison in the field as a whole, not individual studies, gener-
ates epistemologies. Thus, I also calculate QAP correlations for cases that have been com-
pared more than once, which indicates some consensus about how these cases can be used.
Here, there is significant homophily across all characteristics. The strongest correlation is for
cases that share the same time period, with the same region the second strongest. Positive
correlation among mode, ideology, and outcome are also statistically significant yet with
weaker effects. The correlation for these latter attributes may be weaker because of the use of
negative cases (17 percent of all unique cases), which are coded as not sharing the attributes
of others. In other words, there is a high degree of homophily in comparison, and it is most
likely to occur because of temporal-spatial boundaries first and familial types second.6
In summary, analyses of the overall structure of cases and comparison in the comparative
study of revolution point to the same conclusion. Casing seems to be driven by a particular
image of what constitutes a revolution or, at least, a revolution worth studying. And this
image is not that of a great, classic revolution like France in 1789 but a more modern form—
the leftist, insurgent social revolution. The form is historically bounded, occurring primarily
in the post–World War II era, and certainly reached one of its apogees in Latin America,
which might explain that region’s prevalence. Accordingly, comparison tends to cluster
along temporal and spatial boundaries or, secondarily, within familial types of revolutions.
Similarity in time and space also strongly predicts dyadic comparison, and case comparisons
of similar events predominate in general. This makes sense in that scholars often try to con-
trol for time and space in their comparative design. But this has an implication for the knowl-
edge that can develop.
There does not appear to be an empirical foundation that would generate an epistemology
of entirely portable knowledge, as in the parallel demonstration of theory mode of analysis.
Because some comparisons are made within families of cases, the comparative study of
revolution as a whole can generate a degree of portable macro-causal knowledge. But since
most cases and comparisons fall within temporal and spatial boundaries, the epistemological
position most likely to result is that of grounded knowledge, as in contrast of contexts. In
short, the structure of comparison in the social science of revolution is best positioned to
produce historically bounded knowledge and support an epistemology that prefers ground-
edness to portability.
Yet different epistemologies have dominated the field at different times, as previously
described. The key argument of this article is that the empirical basis of the field predates the
development of an understanding of what revolution is in general. I present the evidence for
this argument in the next section.

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Beck 147

Table 6. Five Most Frequently Studied Cases of Revolution by Decade.

1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Event N Event N Event N Event N

Russia, 1917 8 Nicaragua, 1979 11 Nicaragua, 1979 21 Nicaragua, 1979 7
China, 1911 6 Cuba, 1959 8 Iran, 1979 13 Russia, 1917 6
Cuba, 1959 6 El Salvador, 1980 6 Cuba, 1959 12 Ukraine, 2004 6
Japan, 1867 5 France, 1789 5 El Salvador, 1980 11 Cuba, 1959 5
Vietnam, 5 Iran, 1979 5 France, 1789 11 El Salvador, 1980 5
1946
Russia, 1917 5 Russia, 1917 11 Georgia, 2003 5
Vietnam, 1946 5 Iran, 1979 5
Serbia, 1999 5
Mean case 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.7
popularity

Cases and Comparisons over Time

If the empirical basis of a comparative field affects the sort of knowledge that can be had,
then analysis of the change in the structure of comparison over time should show that an
empirical configuration precedes the development of an epistemology of revolution. In this
section, I present over-time analyses in a fashion parallel to the preceding section: examina-
tion of popular cases and comparisons, followed by analysis of the comparative network. As
described previously, recent epistemologies of revolution theory have two key timepoints.
An epistemology of portable causes of revolution emerged in the late 1970s and lasted pri-
marily through the 1980s, and an epistemology of grounded knowledge emerged in the mid-
1990s and persisted throughout the 2000s. I thus use the decade as the primary unit of time
to investigate the patterns. The number of studies in each decade varies, from as few as 24
in the 1970s to a high of 54 in the 1990s, but the average number of cases in each study is
fairly constant around 4 (see Table 1). Thus, changes in comparative methods (see Mahoney
2004; Ragin 2008) have not much affected the number of cases used by scholars.
Table 6 presents the five most popular revolutionary cases for study by decade. Even
before considering which cases are popular, there is a notable pattern in how many rank
among the most frequently studied. In the 1970s, there was a clear top five with no ties for a
rank, but by the 2000s, five cases tie for the fourth most popular. This suggests a growing
fragmentation in which cases are emphasized. The top five list also changes substantially
from decade to decade. In the 1970s, the focus was on classic cases of revolution—Russia in
1917, China in 1911, and Japan in 1867—with a couple of Marxist insurgencies, Cuba and
Vietnam, also being popular. Interestingly, a majority of these are clear cases of leftist move-
ments. But these cases do not remain as popular over time. By the 1980s, Latin American
events begin to dominate—Nicaragua in 1979 emerges as the most popular case and remains
so through 2009. Cuba maintains its popularity, and other Latin American cases appear, such
as El Salvador. In the 2000s, the Colour Revolutions of Ukraine, Georgia, and Serbia emerge
as another focus. This suggests that the recency of a case may influence its popularity and
that the field grows through incorporation of new events rather than repeated examination of
a consensually defined terrain.
Yet recency alone is not enough to explain popularity, as the example of Iran in 1979
demonstrates.7 Although recent and popular in the 1980s, the case never receives the atten-
tion that Nicaragua does in subsequent decades. And the collapse of communism in 1989, as

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148 Sociological Theory 36(2)

either a global event or individual country cases, never rises to among the most popular. In
fact, all the cases beginning in 1989 have only been studied 19 times overall, far less than the
Nicaraguan Revolution and still less than events of the similarly momentous year 1946,
which have been studied 39 times.
As previously noted, Table 1 presents changes over time in scholarly focus. In the 1970s
and 1980s, social revolutions are associated with greater popularity. By the 1990s, however,
a Latin American setting and leftist mobilizations also result in more casing, and in the
2000s, insurgencies fall out of favor as a focus on nonviolent revolutions like the Colour
Revolutions emerges. Supplementary regression analyses support this interpretation.8 Only
the outcome of social revolution consistently predicts popularity across the decades. Leftist
cases, as well, predict popularity in the 1990s and 2000s. Overall, this suggests social revo-
lutions are the most popular for study no matter the decade, and an increasing number of
other factors are significantly associated with popularity as the decades pass. In short, in
later decades, more and different cases become popular, and their popularity is driven by
more and different characteristics. By the 2000s, there is increasing fragmentation in the
field. And a fragmented field of study is not well suited to develop portable explanations of
revolutions. Grounded knowledge is the logical result.
Change in the structure of comparison also supports this interpretation. Figure 3 presents
the network of case comparisons for each decade. We see a visible fragmentation of the field
over time. In the 1970s, the network shows only a few clusters that are not particularly
denser than the network as a whole, suggesting that they are not strongly bounded compari-
sons. In the 1980s, pendants increase, and the clusters grow in density. By the 1990s, a net-
work that looks like the overall structure of comparison emerges and persists throughout the
2000s: several isolates, increasing numbers of pendants, and clusters that are more tightly
drawn. Over time, the density of the network overall decreases slightly, and the average
number of ties increases. In other words, the number of comparisons rises, like the number
of cases considered, but they increasingly take place within particular clusters.
This is borne out by Louvain community detection for each decade’s network. In the
1970s (Figure 3a), we find 5 clusters, and all are legible as family types: Third World leftist
revolutions like the Chinese Civil War, Cuban Revolution, and Mexican Revolution of 1910
(cluster a); semi-peripheral revolutions as previously described, like the Young Turks and
Egypt in 1952 (cluster b); the classic, great revolutions (cluster c); anti-colonial insurgencies
like that of the Mau Mau and Irish Republican Army (cluster d); and finally, 1960s decolo-
nization cases such as in the Portuguese colonies and Vietnam (cluster e). In the 1980s
(Figure 3b), we see nine clusters, and in the 1990s (Figure 3c), 10 clusters are detected. By
the 2000s (Figure 3d), we find 13 communities. Notably, these clusters become less legible
as types of revolutions, in contrast to the 1970s, and display greater spatial and temporal
bounding. For instance, the 1980s network in Figure 3b includes two Latin American clus-
ters (a and d). In the 1990s (Figure 3c), clusters are formed from regions like Latin America
(cluster b) and Eastern Europe (clusters c and f) but also from twentieth-century Cold War
events (clusters e). And in the 2000s (Figure 3d), we find even fewer legible clusters and an
increasing number of isolates. The only cluster of the main core that is identifiable is a great
revolutions cluster (cluster b).9
More tellingly, homophily in dyadic comparison also changes over time. Table 7 presents
the most common dyadic comparisons by decade. In the 1970s, classic cases of revolution
predominate, with the Russian Revolution compared to China’s Revolution of 1911 being
the most popular. The pattern switches in the 1980s as Latin American cases receive more
attention. By the 1990s, only one popular dyad involves non–Latin American cases—the
classic comparison of the Russian Revolution to the French Revolution. In the 2000s, Latin

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Beck 149

(continued)

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150 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Figure 3. Network of comparative cases of revolution by decade.

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Beck 151

Table 7. Five Most Frequent Comparisons of Revolutions by Decade.

1970s 1980s

Case 1 Case 2 N Case 1 Case 2 N

Russia, 1917 China, 1911 5 Nicaragua, 1979 Cuba, 1959 5
Russia, 1917 France, 1789 4 Nicaragua, 1979 El Salvador, 1980 5
France, 1789 China, 1911 3 Cuba, 1959 Bolivia, 1952 3
Japan, 1867 China, 1911 3 France, 1789 England, 1642 3
France, 1789 Prussia, 1806 3 Nicaragua, 1979 Iran, 1979 3
Russia, 1917 Prussia, 1806 3 Russia, 1917 France, 1789 3
N dyads 232 N dyads 189
Mean tie strength 1.14 Mean tie strength 1.15

1990s 2000s

Case 1 Case 2 N Case 1 Case 2 N

Nicaragua, 1979 Cuba, 1950 11 Nicaragua, 1979 Cuba, 1959 4
Nicaragua, 1979 El Salvador, 1980 9 Nicaragua, 1979 Iran, 1979 4
Russia, 1917 France, 1789 8 Ukraine, 2004 Serbia, 2000 4
El Salvador, 1980 Guatemala, 1960 7 Ukraine, 2004 Georgia, 2003 4
Nicaragua, 1979 Guatemala, 1960 6 Russia, 1917 China, 1946 3
Nicaragua, 1979 Iran, 1979 6 Russia, 1917 France, 1789 3
Cuba, 1959 El Salvador, 1980 3
N dyads 720 Nicaragua, 1979 El Salvador, 1980 3
Mean tie strength 1.68 El Salvador, 1980 Peru, 1980 3
Cuba, 1959 Vietnam, 1946 3
Nicaragua, 1979 Vietnam, 1946 3
N dyads 895
Mean tie strength 1.06

Table 8. Quadratic Assignment Procedures Pearson Correlation of Revolutionary Cases with Same
Attributes and Observed Dyads by Decade, 5,000 Permutations.

Attribute 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s

Era of onset .117** .204*** .282*** .319***
Region of occurrence .131*** .372*** .448*** .204***
Mode of contention .082* .117*** .168*** .107***
Ideological basis .160*** .201*** .209*** .030
Outcome .045 .086*** .207*** .055***

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

American comparisons are still popular, but comparisons of the recent Colour Revolutions
emerge. What matters here is the pattern of homophilous comparison. Popular dyads tend to
share times and geographies, with family type making a few appearances.
QAP correlations by decade confirm this trend (see Table 8). For each decade, similarity
among cases correlates to the likelihood of their comparison (except for ideology, which
falls out of favor in the 2000s), but the strength of the correlation changes markedly. In the
1970s, ideology is the strongest correlate of comparison but still has only relatively weak

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152 Sociological Theory 36(2)

influence. By the 1980s, however, region and time emerge as significant correlations with
much greater effect. This is most pronounced in the 1990s and then lessens in the 2000s,
which is when the other analyses indicate the study of revolution becomes less cohesive. In
short, homophily in comparison, particularly for region and era, tends to increase over time
until fragmentation sets in.
These results all substantiate the key argument of this article—the structure of compari-
son in revolution studies predates the epistemologies of the field and in fact may create
them. For example, take the study of revolution in the 1970s. Here, what a revolution actu-
ally is is fairly well understood—revolutions are great social revolutions. Accordingly, com-
parison takes place somewhat evenly among the cases considered; when clustering occurs,
it is within historically bounded familial types rather than temporal or spatial boundaries.
This structure of comparison is amendable to an epistemic mixture of macro-causal analysis
and parallel demonstration of theory. My argument expects such an empirical basis to gener-
ate portable knowledge. This is exactly what happens in 1979, when Skocpol publishes
States and Social Revolutions. Her work advocates a macro-causal framework for under-
standing revolution—state breakdown theory—which has portable implications for cases
beyond her initial scope conditions (see Skocpol 1982, 1994). If Skocpol had not published
a macro-causal analysis, then someone else would have. The structure of comparison clearly
pointed to it.
Contrast this to the situation of the mid-1990s, when an epistemology of the inherent
uniqueness of every revolution and mechanistic perspectives began to emerge. Beforehand,
at the turn of the 1980s, new events like Nicaragua took place and quickly dominated cas-
ing. More and different events were incorporated into study over time, and popularity was
less centered on just a few classic cases. This could have been good news for the generation
of portable theories applicable to many different cases, but the structure of comparison
became more and more driven by homophily. Furthermore, comparisons of the 1980s and
throughout the 1990s moved away from the macro-causal approach of familial types and
toward contrast of contexts region- and era-bounded examinations. My theory anticipates
that this comparative field would generate an increasingly grounded epistemic position
about revolution, which is in fact what resulted. If the effect went in the other direction—a
general understanding of revolution creates the structure of comparison—then we would
expect to see the empirical traces of portable epistemologies in the 1980s and a structure of
grounded epistemologies appear in the later 2000s. This is not the case. Comparison pre-
cedes epistemology.

Representing the Universe of Revolutions

If the epistemology of a field is based on which cases it considers, the question is how well
the cases examined capture the universe of cases that actually exists. Perhaps revolution in
general tends to a particular form, and thus the time, space, and type bounding identified
here creates no issue for developing knowledge about revolution broadly. Alternatively, per-
haps historical bounding has created selection bias as other variants of revolution have not
been investigated as fully.
To answer this puzzle is quite difficult. It requires knowing what the universe of revolu-
tions actually looks like and comparing what has been studied to what could be studied. In
the absence of a near complete and consensual database of revolutionary events, definitive
conclusions cannot be drawn. Yet inferences can still be made. I turn to a list of revolutionary
events that is independent of the cases identified by this study: Charles Tilly’s (1993) event
catalogue of revolutionary situations that occurred in six different regions of Europe between
1492 and 1992.

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Beck 153

Table 9. Distribution of Attributes of Unique Cases in Comparative Case Studies and Tilly’s (1993)
European Revolutions.

Percentage of Unique Percentage of Tilly’s

Cases in Comparative Revolutionary
Attribute Studiesa Situations
Mean year of onset (SD) 1925 (58) 1877 (53)
Region
 Low Countries 0 2.7
Iberia 10.3 39.8
Balkans and Hungary 33.3 39.8
British Isles 7.7 3.5
 French states 15.4 7.1
Russian states 25.6 7.1
European-wide 7.7 0
Primary mode of contention
Insurgency, etc. 23.1 40.7
 Mass uprising, etc. 59.0 26.6
Revolution from above, etc. 7.7 22.1
Interstate war, cross-border 5.3 3.5
Other, complex 5.3 7.1
Contenders’ primary ideological basis
 Leftist, etc. 25.6 8.9
Democratic, etc. 51.3 27.4
Nationalist-separatist, etc. 12.8 35.4
Religious, etc. 0 0
Reactionary, etc. 2.6 17.7
Other, unclear, complex 7.7 10.6
Outcome
Social revolution 25.6 6.2
Political revolution 28.2 33.6
Contention, failure 33.3 54.0
Other, complex, unclear 12.8 6.2
N of unique cases 39 113
aThe data for comparison include only events from 1789 to 1992 that occurred in Tilly’s six regions of Europe, not

including negative and counterfactual cases.

I make the contrast as fair as possible. First, from the sample of comparative revolution
studies, I only include events that took place in Europe within the regions Tilly considered:
the French states, the British Isles, the Low Countries, the Iberian Peninsula, the Balkans
and Hungary, and the Russian states. Second, given that some have argued revolution is a
modern phenomenon (Goodwin 2001), I limit the comparison to events on both lists that
occurred from 1789 to 1992. This accounts for the possibility that some scholars would not
count the diversity of early modern events in Tilly’s catalogue, including civil wars and reli-
gious conflicts, as revolutionary (cf. Beck 2011). Table 9 summarizes the resulting lists by
their attributes.
From 1789 to 1992, Tilly identifies 113 distinct revolutionary situations, whereas the
comparative studies list I collected includes only 39 unique cases. The two lists have 24
cases in common, which is 62 percent of the events in the comparative studies list but merely
21 percent of Tilly’s catalogue. Notably, the comparative studies’ cases do not seem to

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154 Sociological Theory 36(2)

represent the “universe” of Tilly. The mean start year is much later for comparative studies,
1925, than in Tilly, 1877. Comparative studies’ cases predominately take place in Eastern
Europe and Russia, whereas Tilly identified many more events on the Iberian Peninsula.
Modes of contention and ideological bases differ substantially as well. A majority of the
comparative studies’ cases have a mass uprising mode of contention, and Tilly’s list has a
plurality of insurgent forms of contention. The aforementioned revolutions are also much
more common in Tilly than in the comparative studies. The ideological basis of revolution-
ary situations in Tilly tends to be nationalist-separatist or democratic, whereas comparative
studies prefer democratic or leftist cases and discount reactionary contention. Finally, both
lists agree that failure is the most common outcome, but comparative studies prefer social
revolutions to Tilly’s emphasis on regime change through political revolutions.
If we take Tilly’s catalogue to be more exhaustive, due not only to its size but also its
focus and cataloguer’s skill, then we must conclude that comparative studies do a poor job
of replicating the actual universe of revolution. This suggests that the accumulated knowl-
edge of the comparative study of revolution, no matter its theoretical portability or ground-
edness, may have problems. Most of the knowledge garnered is on the basis of a handful of
cases, and casing tends to prefer a particular type of revolution that is not reflective of the
larger universe of events that have occurred. In short, casing may be limited by its historical
bounds of time, place, and type. This conclusion requires further validation, but its plausibil-
ity should serve as a warning to those who claim consistent findings about how and why
revolutions occur (e.g., Beck 2017b; Goldstone 2001, 2003; Goodwin 2001; Mann 2013).

Conclusions
I have argued that the meta-theoretical stance of a comparative field regarding its object of
study is affected by its structure of comparison. Comparison, an inductive method, makes
different types of knowledge more likely to accumulate dependent on its practice. At one
extreme, it can lend itself to completely portable knowledge through the examination of
many cases that are exhaustive of the phenomenon’s universe, as in the parallel demonstra-
tion of theory. At the other extreme, it can be most conducive to the development of entirely
grounded knowledge, where the temporal and spatial boundaries of comparison are para-
mount, as in the contrast of contexts. In between these two ends lies knowledge of the sort
that macro-causal analysis generates, where the conclusions have implications for other
cases but are, in the first place, bounded by type or history. Of course, individual studies can
and do create different types of knowledge. To think otherwise would be to commit an eco-
logical fallacy. The argument is thus at the level of a field overall and its general pattern of
knowledge accumulation.
For the comparative study of revolution, all the analyses point to the same conclusion. In
the field overall, a certain type of revolution is most commonly studied, and this is driven
primarily by geography and era. Also, comparison in general is highly homophilous and
strongly determined by similarities in space and time. This suggests the field of revolution has
been most likely to develop grounded, rather than portable, knowledge. Changes in the struc-
ture of comparison over time suggest that empirics precede meta-theory. In the 1970s, the
comparative study of revolution was well positioned to create an epistemology of the porta-
bility of findings and theories, which it had done by the 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the
study of revolution developed more geographically and temporally bounded comparisons that
suggested an epistemology of grounded knowledge, which is exactly what emerged in the late
1990s and early 2000s. The evidence is clear—in the study of revolution, the structure of
comparison has preceded general understandings of what can or should be learned from
studying revolution.

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Beck 155

There are three possible objections to this interpretation. First, I treat each comparative
study equally and do not account for a study’s reception in the field. I do so for good reason.
I seek here to identify what the community of scholars is actually doing, not what they are
citing. Such a weighting would obscure the approach of this analysis—that meta-theoretical
stances are the product of the structure of comparison as a whole. Second, given the lag time
between a study’s origination and publication, can thought actually be traced over time? In
my view, thought is the proverbial tree falling in the woods. Until a comparative study is
published, the outside observer cannot discern it. A future analysis could attempt to control
for publication lag time by examining the delivery dates of related conference papers and
reshaping the data accordingly. In any case, the analysis undertaken here focuses on blocks
of time rather than individual years, which helps account for this issue. Third, new events
might drive epistemologies as much as structure of comparison does, as the recent explosion
of nonviolent revolution research demonstrates (e.g., Lawson 2015; Nepstad 2011; Ritter
2015; Stephan and Chenoweth 2008). The data show that new events can change the struc-
ture of comparison. The Nicaraguan Revolution seems to bring attention to Latin America,
and the Colour Revolutions bring postcommunist states into focus. But the data also show
that some new events have little impact, such as the notable absence of 1989. It is also rea-
sonable to ask why the Cuban Revolution did not make popular inroads before its compari-
son to Nicaragua or why the nonviolent uprisings of the 1980s—Philippines, Burma, and
Eastern Europe—did not have such an impact before the 2000s. In short, it is not the occur-
rence of a revolution by itself that seems to matter here. It is how a new revolution fits with
the prior structure of comparison.
A natural extension of this conclusion is to consider the structure of comparison in the
2000s and what the future holds for the study of revolution. All the analyses point to increas-
ing fragmentation in the past decade—there are more cases, more comparisons, and more
predictors of a case’s popularity. Homophily in comparison has decreased a bit, but cluster-
ing remains along temporal and spatial lines, and the number of literatures disconnected
empirically from the main field has grown (e.g., studies of the Colour Revolutions). We
would expect this structure of comparison to generate increasingly fragmented knowledge
and an epistemology of area studies expertise to emerge. I believe this is just what is happen-
ing, even as the Arab Spring has reinvigorated the study of revolution. Many early accounts
of the Arab Spring seem to be empirically self-referential and seek to provide an explanation
of the revolutions as a regional phenomenon or an expression of the zeitgeist (see e.g., Beck
2014; Goldstone 2013; Lawson 2015; Lynch 2013). Only a few authors have tried to make
more portable comparisons (e.g., Ritter 2015). This stands in stark contrast to the empirical
reality of these events, which could easily be compared to their forerunners (and inspirers)
in the Colour Revolutions, the revolutions of 1989, or any other number of historically
monumental cases. “Arab Spring studies” thus may very well develop as a mostly isolated
cluster of comparisons. In short, the field is not yet on the cusp of a reemergence of episte-
mology that prioritizes portable knowledge.
The second implication for studies of revolution lies in the question of whether there actu-
ally are causes of revolution that are generalizable. The data suggest that the social science
of revolution overall has not been, and still is not, well positioned to judge between compet-
ing causal imageries. Comparative studies tend to focus on a relatively small number of
cases and comparisons that fit a particular image of revolution. Most cases considered revo-
lutionary by scholars are studied only once, and most comparisons between cases have been
drawn only once. A case’s popularity is determined by only a few characteristics, and the
prevalence of certain types of cases in the literature is not merely a reflection of what revo-
lutionary events have occurred. The possible universe of revolution is much more diverse
than what has been studied.

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156 Sociological Theory 36(2)

Moreover, the social science of revolution has evolved increasingly in the direction of
specialty fields with a less broad empirical foundation, even as more events are considered
revolutionary. A field that focuses heavily on a few cases and types of comparison is likely
to generate an increasing number of explanations as each study tries to carve out a unique
contribution to the well-established literature on a case. Sub-literatures, which are empiri-
cally disconnected from prior studies, would thus develop. Debates would occur in relative
isolation from larger empirical referents and reject comparisons across different types of
cases. In such a situation, causal factors and mechanisms would proliferate as there would
be little adjudication between competing explanations and generalizable conclusions would
be difficult to identify. Knowledge accumulation would accordingly be modest. This is in
fact what seems to have occurred. The findings here suggest that a deficit of identifiable and
generalizable causal conditions of revolution actually may be an artifact of the structure of
comparison rather than in the nature of the phenomenon itself. The generalizability of expla-
nations of revolution, or lack thereof, thus remains an open question.
There are also two implications for the practice of comparative-historical sociology more
broadly. Much recent work on comparative-historical methods emphasizes the logic and
strategies of causal inference when using single cases and small N comparisons (Gerring
2007; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ragin 2008). Less attention is paid to how the selection of
comparisons can enable and constrain different types of knowledge. Yet Skocpol and Somers
(1980) knew this dilemma well. The comparative scholar should go beyond merely being
explicit about his or her case selection strategy and engage in explicit reflection about how
the selection can influence his or her inductive theory development. Otherwise, it can be
easy to mistake the findings of a comparative study for the truth of the phenomenon rather
than just the truth of its comparisons.
Second, comparative fields may inherently run the risk of theoretical and empirical frag-
mentation. A common strategy of causal inference is to control for alternative explanations
by comparing cases that are most similar to each other (Gerring 2007). This strategy appears
to be the primary one present in the study of revolution as geographic and temporal homoph-
ily typify comparison. Yet such groundedness can create the conditions under which knowl-
edge accumulation slows. One antidote is for a subfield to embrace a wider diversity of
methods of inference so that its structure of comparison remains robust. Another is to self-
consciously consider the role of “model systems” in knowledge accumulation (Guggenheim
and Krause 2012). There could be a risk of narrowness in continual visits to single cases,
especially if the case is not a seminal one, as we see in the focus on the Nicaraguan Revolution.
But when compared widely and frequently, such prototypes could anchor a field and prove
a testing ground for competing theories, just as Skocpol and Somers (1980) might imagine.
In short, comparative-historical sociology can learn how to improve its practice from the
cautionary example of the sociology of revolution over the past two decades.
This study also suggests an opportunity for sociology of science. I have documented the cor-
respondence between the preceding structure of comparison and the sensibility of the subsequent
theoretical generation. This suggests that social scientific knowledge systems may evolve some-
what differently from what followers of Kuhn (1962) would expect. Epistemological shifts do
not appear to come from the accrual of contradictory findings but rather from the accrual of
contradictory modes of analysis. Method points to theory. Yet the evidence here cannot tell us the
mechanisms behind this pattern. For this, the social organization of the subfield, the networks of
scholars, and their attributes require further investigation, in line with classic approaches (e.g.,
Bourdieu 2004; Latour 1987; Merton 1973). For example, it is striking that so few scholars of
revolution hold positions in major research universities. This might be due to the pressures of
academic hiring and career advancement. Revolution is certainly a boutique topic within the
boutique subfield of comparative history. The field, in Bourdieusian terms, thus might not

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Beck 157

support anything but stagnation in knowledge accumulation. Or perhaps revolution studies is less
likely to develop schools of thought that can sustain themselves across scholarly generations,
from master to pupil (see Collins 2000). Networks of revolution scholars are thus likely to be
limited in scope and may not be able to perform the work of theory development. Initial appraisal
of scholarly networks in the study of revolution—revealed by the acknowledgments sections of
books—suggests this is the case. Only a handful of researchers reciprocally acknowledge each
other, and there are few master-pupil ties among the authors, particularly since the 1980s.
A sociology of knowledge approach might also explain some of the quizzical patterns
found in the data presented here. For instance, there is a clear preference for Nicaragua over
Iran, even though both events occurred in 1979, the same year the field was revived with the
publication of States and Social Revolutions. Perhaps this preference is due to ideological
bent or an experience of activism: A socialist revolution might be more compelling to a
scholar than a religious one. Or perhaps this focus is due to practical reasons. Researchers,
at least in the United States where most sociology of revolution is made, are more likely to
speak Spanish than Farsi, and thus one case is more accessible than the other. We also see a
surprising occlusion of the collapse of communism as an object of study. The year 1989
figures prominently in studies of democratization and socioeconomic transformation, but it
seems to have been forgotten by revolution scholars, perhaps because it does not fit with the
dominant type of revolution investigated. We thus must conclude that Latin Americanists,
for whatever reasons, tend to see their cases as ones of revolution, whereas postcommunism
scholars do not. This case again suggests that world-historical importance is not the primary
driver of theorization. Comparisons and the resulting epistemologies thus may be due to the
nature of scholarly production rather than the nature of revolution itself.
The explanation for why comparison precedes epistemology likely lies in such approaches.
The idiosyncrasies and knowledge of individual researchers and the opportunities and struc-
ture of the epistemic community may help generate particular comparisons that lead in turn
to particular theoretical imageries at particular times. Future research should examine these
possibilities more deeply than space allows for here. Such analysis could reveal the mecha-
nisms of the relationship between epistemology and comparison identified by this study.
Overall, this study has demonstrated the utility of considering an entire subfield to draw
inferences about empiricism and theorization. The consistency of the results indicates there
are analytic advantages to conceptualizing comparative social science as a network. Other
fields that focus on sets of cases, such as studies of social movements or democratization,
might fruitfully adapt this approach. If the argument of this study holds more generally, then
in those fields, too, comparison will precede epistemology.

Acknowledgments
The author thanks Reuben J. Thomas, Nicholas Hoover Wilson, Paolo Parigi, Charles Ragin, Henning
Hillmann, John W. Meyer, Evan Schofer, and Robin M. Cooper for their extensive comments.

Notes
Previous versions were presented at the Social Science History Association meeting in 2010, the Irvine
Comparative Sociology Workshop in 2013, and the American Sociological Association Annual Meetings
in 2014 and 2015.
1. The initial searches were completed in summer of 2010. Because indexing, particularly for recent
publications, can change, I reexamined the searches and sources in fall of 2012. The first full decade
in all the databases is the 1970s, so I begin there and then end with the last full decade of the 2000s.
Keyword synonyms for revolution, such as uprising, are not included because the issue is about the
self-conscious field of revolution studies rather than all information available about revolutions.

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158 Sociological Theory 36(2)

2. In a few instances, the need to consolidate cases into network nodes necessitates putting co-occurring
events into conglomerates that are usually considered as one case in the literature, for example, the
second civil war and the 1980s coup d’états in Sudan.
3. I do not include explicit reprints of studies, but comparative analyses are often published in both article
format and as part of a larger book project. Because the unit of analysis is the study and not the scholar,
I include these multiple instances—the logic being that the analysis passed the muster of peer review
twice and was allowed as separate publications by different editors.
4. For cases that cover a general period of time, for example, the seventeenth-century Ottoman crisis
(Goldstone 1991), onset is set to the first year, for instance, 1600.
5. The best fitting resolution parameter is .75 as Cramer’s V is 1.00, showing a perfect correlation
between different iterations.
6. The results of quadratic assignment procedures regression, where the strength of a tie (i.e., how many
times two cases have been compared) is predicted by homophily, confirms that cases with similar
regions, eras, and outcomes are more likely to be compared repeatedly.
7. Regression of popularity on the year of onset also shows no statistically significant relationship.
8. Results available from the author on request.
9. Full numeric descriptions of clusters are available from the author on request.

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Author Biography
Colin J. Beck is associate professor of sociology at Pomona College. He is the author of Radicals,
Revolutionaries, and Terrorists (Polity, 2015) and has published award-winning articles on revolutionary
waves in Theory and Society and Social Science History. His other work on radicalism in social movements
and terrorism has appeared in Social Forces, Mobilization, and other journals. His current book projects
include a large scale meta-analysis of comparative studies of revolution and a co-authored volume on the
future of revolution theory.

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