PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

CASE DIGESTS

Submitted by:
2E PIL Class (AY 2020-2021)
Submitted to:
Atty Darniel Bustamante
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Kuroda v Jalandoni 1

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh 3

Ichong v Hernandez 6

Gonzalez v Hechanova 9

Mejoff v Director of Prisons 12

Paquete v Habana 14

Mijares v Ranada 16

Pharmaceutical & Healthcare Assoc. v. Duque 17

Colombia v Peru 21

Reagan v CIR 23

Agustin v Edu 24

Republic v Sandiganbayan 26

Tanada v Angara 29

Bayan Muna v Romulo 30

Vinuya v Romulo 32

Holy See v Rosario 35

Sapphire Case 38

People v Perfecto 40

Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v Cibario 42

Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabatino 43

Oetjen v Central Leather 47

Underhill v Hernandez 48

PCGG v Sandiganbayan 50

Baer v Tizon 52

Syquia v Almeda Lopez 54

USA v Guinto 56

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USA v Rodrigo 58

USA v Ceballos 60

USA v Vergara 61

USA v Ruiz 63

USA v Reyes 64

Island of Palmas Case vs. UN 68

Report of Int. Arb. Awards, 231; Apr 4, 1928 68

Clipperton Island Case 70

Magallona v Ermita 71

Fisheries Case 74

In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration 76

Joyce v Director of Public Prosecution 78

The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon 79

Lotus Case 81

Pimentel v Executive Secretary 82

WHO v Aquino 83

DFA v NLRC 84

Reyes v Bagatsing 86

Bayan v Zamora 89

Lasco v UN Revolving Fund 91

China Machinery v Santa Maria 92

GTZ v CA 94

JUSMAG-Philippines v NLRC 97

ICMC v Calleja 98

Liang v People 101

Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading 102

Deutsche Bank v CIR 104

Guerrero Transport v Blaylock 107

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USA v Purganan 109

USAFFE v Treasurer of the Philippines 112

Abaya v Ebdane 114

DMB v Kolonwel Trading 117

Philip Morris v CA 118

Province of North Cotabato v GRP 120

Santos v Northwest Airlines 123

Adolfo v CFI 125

US (ALEXANDER TELLECH) v AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY 128

Canevaro Case 130

The Nottebohm Case 132

US Chattin v Mexico 133

Noyes Case: US v Panama 134

Youmans Case: US v Mexico 136

Galvan Case: Mexico v US 138

Jane Case: US v Mexico 140

US (North American Dredging Co) v Mexico 142

Harvey v Santiago 144

Savarkar Case 145

Secretary of Justice v Lantion 146

Belgium v Senegal 148

Chirskoff v Commission of Immigration 150

Cuevas v Munoz 152

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Olalia Jr 155

Rodriguez v Presiding Judge, RTC Manila 156

Government of Hongkong - SAR v Munoz 158

Dogger Bank Case, Scott 160

Naulilaa Incident Arbitration Case 163

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People v Alvero 165

Laurel v Misa 168

Yamashita v Styler 170

People v Agoncillo 171

Gibbs v Rodriguez 173

People v Godinez 175

Wilson v Berkenkotter 177

Raquiza v Bradford 179

Haw Pia v Banking Corp 181

Springbok Case 183

Marcos v Manglapus 185

J Leonen, SJS Officers v Lim 189

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait 191

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Kuroda v Jalandoni

GR No. L-2662 ; Mar 26, 1949

FACTS: Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and
Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during the Japanese
Occupation, was charged before the Military Commission due to the cruelty that was done
against non combatant civilians and prisoners. His trial was in pursuant to EO No. 68 which
established the National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the
trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda seeks to establish the illegality of this Order on the ground
that it violates not only the provisions of constitutional law but also local laws, to say nothing of
the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules
and Regulations covering Land Warfare and, therefore, heis charged of 'crimes' not based on law,
national and international. Thus, the Commission is without jurisdiction to try his case.

ISSUE/S:

1. Is EO No. 68 unconstitutional?

2. Does the Military Commission have jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts committed in
violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention despite not being a
signatory to the first

RULING:

1. NO. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that the Philippines renounces
war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation. In accordance with the generally
accepted principles of international law of the present day, including the Hague
Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or civilian,
who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of

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 the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor.
Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of EO No. 68, the President of the
Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of
international law which are part of our Constitution. The promulgation of said executive
order is an exercise by the President of his powers as Commander in Chief of all our
armed forces. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to
consummate this unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war
criminals, through the issuance and enforcement of EO No. 68.

2. YES. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva
conventions form part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of
international law. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined
to the recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

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Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

G.R. No. L-5 ; Sept 17, 1945

FACTS: On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila. The

Commander in chief proclaimed military administration and that in so far as the military
administration permits, all laws now in force in the commonwealth shall continue to be effective.
Order No. 1 organized Philippine Executive Commission which was instructed to proceed to the
immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and of judicial courts, with
the approval of the said commander in chief. Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 proclaimed that SC,
CA, CFI, and judges and justices under the commonwealth were continued with the same
jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions.

The Philippines was liberated by General Douglas MacArthur in 1944. A petition for mandamus
was filed by Co Kim Chan praying to compel respondent judge of the lower court to continue
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 3012 which were initiated under the regime of the so-called
Republic of the Philippines established under Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Respondent judge refused to do so on the ground that under the proclamation of Douglas
MacArthur on October 23, 1944 announcing that all laws, regulations, and processes of any other
government in the Philippines than that of said Commonwealth are null and void and without
legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control, effectively
invalidated judicial acts and proceedings of the courts under the Japanese military regime.
Moreover, respondent judge argues that the governments established during the Japanese
occupation were not de facto governments.

ISSUE/S:

1. Do the principles of International Law apply in this case?

2. Whether the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur during the liberation of the
Philippines invalidated all judgements and acts and proceedings of the said Courts.

3. Whether the same Courts may continue those proceedings pending in the said Courts,

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RULING:

1. YES. The Court in deciding the case applied the principles of International Law, in
connection with the municipal law in force in this country, before and during Japanese
occupation. Questions of International Law must be decided as matters of general law
and International Law is no alien in this Tribunal, as, under the Constitution of the
commonwealth of the Philippines, it is a part of the fundamental law of the land. As
International Law is an integral part of our laws, it must be ascertained and administered
by this Court, whenever questions of right depending upon it are presented for our
determination, sitting as an international as well as a domestic Tribunal.

Since International Law is a body of rules actually accepted by nations as regulating their
mutual relations, the proof of the existence of a given rule is to be found in the consent of
nations to abide by that rule; and this consent is evidenced chiefly by the usages and
customs of nations, and to ascertain what these usages and customs are, the universal
practice is to turn to the writings of publicists and to the decisions of the highest courts of
the land. By virtue of the Doctrine of Incorporation, our Courts have applied the rules of
international law. In a number of cases even if such rules had not previously been subject
of statutory enactments, because these generally accepted principles of international law
are automatically part of our own laws.

2. NO. The government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto
government. It is a legal truism, in political and international law, that all acts and
proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial department of a de facto
government are good and valid. The proclamation of MacArthur did not invalidate the
judicial processes during the Japanese occupation. In interpreting the phrase “processes
of any other government”, one must take into consideration the well-known principles of
international law that all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of political
complexion, were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had

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 come again into the power of the titular sovereign. Thus, it should be presumed that
MacArthur did not intend to violate said principles of international law. A statute ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains. A contrary construction would create great inconvenience and public hardship.
To declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the
rights and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by
the enemy. A law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time
empower another to undo the same. Thus, the proclamation of MacArthur did not
invalidate the judicial acts and proceedings which are not of political complexion.

3. YES. The same courts may continue the proceedings pending in said courts. From a
theoretical point of view, administration of justice is suspended as a matter of courts as
soon as military occupation takes place. In practice, however, the invader does not
usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunal to administer the laws of the country if not absolutely prevented.
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “law once
established continues until changed by some compete nt legislative power. It is not
changed merely by change of sovereignty. Courts, being creatures of statutes, and their
existence depends upon the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, the
same continues absent any legislative acts repealing such law. Thus, enabling laws or acts
providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued are not required by mere
change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts
are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking
cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein.

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Ichong v Hernandez

GR No L-7995; May 31, 1957

FACTS: Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade Nationalization Law, on the premise
that it violated several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a generally accepted
principle of international law, should be observed by the Court in good faith. Republic Act No.
1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the
Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail
trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said
business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engage therein, unless their licenses
are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in
case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of
the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business)
for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures and labor
and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business
to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their
businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and
their offices and principal offices of juridical entities (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.

ISSUE: Is the Retail Trade Nationalization Law unconstitutional?

RULING: NO. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the
rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp.
2932), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p.

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39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human
Rights can be inferred from the fact that members of the United Nations Organization, such as
Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of
the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted. The Treaty of Amity
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of
treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country."
But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries,
except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all
prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the
said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S.
vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict thePublic
International Law Module 1 6 scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania,
58 L. ed. 539.)

Here, The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The reason given by the Court was that the
Retail Trade National Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot be
bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The law in question was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future. Resuming what we have
set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the
scope of the police power of the state, through which and by which it protects its own personality
and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due process of the law clause; because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation
and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident - as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but

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actually necessary - and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
legislature, with whose power and discretion the judicial department of the Government may not
interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislature of the segment of the population affected; and that it
cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

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Gonzalez v Hechanova

GR No. L-21897; Oct 22, 1963

FACTS: Respondent Executive Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign
rice to be purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee composed
of the other respondents herein for the implementation of said proposed importation. Petitioner,
Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and corn filed a
petition, asserting that in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the
respondents are acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because Republic Act No.
3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the
importation of rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency" It was averred by the respondents that the Government of the Philippines has already
entered into two contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with Vietnam, and another with Burma;
that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under international law; and that in
case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and aforementioned contracts, on
the other, the latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each
other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American jurisprudence — in favor of the one
which is latest in point of time; that petitioner assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative
to foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the Philippines
having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable letters of credit in
favor of the sell of the said commodity.

ISSUE/S:

1. Do the contracts entered into constitute valid executive agreements under international
law?

2. Is the American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a
statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, applicable?

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 3. May an international agreement be invalidated by our courts?

RULING:

1. NO. The parties to said contracts do not appear to have regarded the same as executive
agreements. Even assuming that said contracts may properly be considered as executive
agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional
viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452. The President may, under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative authority, however, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws
enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the
same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act
prohibited by said laws.

2. NO. Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States
is signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the
legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the
principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are
fundamental in our constitutional set up and that of the United States

3. YES. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by
providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of
its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ
of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts in — (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". Hence, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

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Mejoff v Director of Prisons

G.R. No. L-4254; Sept 26, 1951

FACTS: Petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter’s regime in the
Philippines. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter
Intelligence Corps. The People’s Court ordered his release but the Deportation Board taking his
case found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country and must
referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After corresponding investigation, the
Immigration Board of Commissioners declared that Mejoff entered the Philippine illegally and
therefore must be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then
under custody. After repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to
Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa where he has been confined up to the present time. Two years had
elapsed but the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the
country although it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no
fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.

ISSUE: Should Mejoff be released from prison pending his deportation?

RULING: The Philippines adopts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since it is a
generally accepted principle of international law. It should be applied also to illegal aliens like
Mejoff so that it would be a violation of the said international law to detain him for an
unreasonable length of time since no vessel from his country is willing to take him. Considering
that the Government desires to expel the alien and does not relish keeping him at the people’s
expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out the decree of exclusion by the highest
officer of the land. On top of the presumption, assurances were made during the oral argument
that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of Mejoff. The petitioner can be
released if there is a record shown that the deportee is being imprisoned under the pretense of
awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government admit that it can not deport him or
he is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere. Article 2 of the Philippine
Constitution states that, “The Philippines renounces war as instrument of national policy, adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to

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the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. The
protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality.

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Paquete v Habana

175 US 677; 1900

FACTS: During the early days of the war between the United States and Spain,two fishing smacks,
The Paquete Habana and The Lola, were regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba, sailing
under the Spanish flag, and each owned by a Spanish subject, residing in Havana; her crew, who also
resided there. Each vessel left Havana on a coast fishing voyage, and sailed along the coast of Cuba
about two hundred miles to the west end of the island; the sloop there fished for twenty-five days in
the territorial waters of Spain, and the schooner extended her fishing trip a hundred miles farther
across the Yucatan Channel, and fished for eight days on the coast of Yucatan.

On her return, with her cargo of live fish, along the coast of Cuba, and when near Havana, each was
captured by one of the United States blockading squadron. Neither fishing vessel had any arms or
ammunition on board, had any knowledge of the blockade, or even of the war, until she was stopped
by a blockading vessel, made any attempt to run the blockade, or any resistance at the time of her
capture, nor was there any evidence that she, or her crew, was likely to aid the enemy.

Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key West. A libel for the condemnation of
each vessel and her cargo as prize of war was there filed on April 27, 1898; a claim was interposed
by her master on behalf of himself and the other members of the crew, and of her owner

Each vessel was thereupon sold by auction; the Paquete Habana for the sum of $490 and the Lola for
the sum of $800. There was no other evidence in the record of the value of either vessel or of her
cargo.

When the owners appealed, they argued that both customary international law and writings of leading
international scholars recognized an exemption from seizure at wartime of coastal fishing vessels

ISSUE: Are coastal fishing vessels with their cargoes and crews excluded from prizes of war?

RULING: Yes. The vessels of fishermen have been generally declared exempt from confiscation
because of the eminently peaceful object of their humble industry and of the principles of equity and
humanity. The exemption includes the vessel, the implements of fishing, and the cargo resulting from
the fishery. This usage, eminently humane, goes back to very ancient times, and although the

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immunity of the fishery along the coasts may not have been sanctioned by treaties, yet it is
considered today as so definitely established that the inviolability of vessels devoted to that fishery is
proclaimed by the publicists as a positive rule of international law, and is generally respected by the
nations.

At the present day, by the general consent of the civilized nations of the world, and independently of
any express treaty or other public act, it is an established rule of international law, founded on
considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of
belligerent states, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews,
unarmed and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and bringing in fresh fish, are
exempt from capture as prize of war.

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or their vessels if employed for a
warlike purpose, or in such a way as to give aid or information to the enemy, nor when military or
naval operations create a necessity to which all private interests must give way. Nor has the
exemption been extended to ships or vessels employed on the high sea in taking whales or seals or
cod or other fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or otherwise cured and made a
regular article of commerce. This rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the
law of nations are bound to take judicial notice

In case at bar, each vessel was of a moderate size, such as is not unusual in coast fishing smacks, and
was regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba. The crew of each were few in number, had no
interest in the vessel, and received, in return for their toil and enterprise, two-thirds of her catch, the
other third going to her owner by way of compensation for her use. Each vessel went out from
Havana to her fishing ground and was captured when returning along the coast of Cuba. The cargo of
each consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea and kept alive on board. Although one
of the vessels extended her fishing trip across the Yucatan channel and fished on the coast of Yucatan,
we cannot doubt that each was engaged in the coast fishery, and not in a commercial adventure,
within the rule of international law.

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Mijares v Ranada

GR No: 139325; Apr 12, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners were victims of human rights violations during the Marcos era. A final
judgement was held in their favor abasing the estate of the late President Ferdinand Marcos. The
US court awarded $1.9 billion as compensation for the torte it had during the said era. The said
judgement was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. For the enforcement, petitioners filed a
complaint in RTC Makati and paid filing fees of Php 410 since the value of the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The heirs of Marcos filed a motion to dismiss because of the
said filing fees paid by the petitioners. The Makati RTC dismissed the case because the subject
matter was capable of pecuniary estimation since it involved a judgement from a foreign court.
Thus, it can be ascertained because it is a payment of definite sum even if it is in a foreign
currency. The proper filing fee should be Php 472 Million to enforce a judgement awarded to
them by the foreign court.

ISSUE: Can a foreign judgement be recognized in the Philippines?

RULING: YES. There is no obligatory rule regarding treaties entered into by the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgements or enforcement thereof. Exception to the rule is when it is a
generally accepted principle of international law, where the Philippines adhere through the
incorporation clause provided in the constitution even if there are no treaty obligations. A
generally accepted principle of international law must comply with the following requisites:
established, widespread and consistent practice on part of the states and a psychological element
known as opinio juris side necessitates or belief that the practice is considered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law.

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Pharmaceutical & Healthcare Assoc. v. Duque

G.R. No. 173034, Oct. 9, 2007

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued E. O. No. 51 (Milk Code) on October 28, 1986 which
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA), to the
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.

In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article
24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish
infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, especially parents and
children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.

On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed Admin. Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled,
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as
The “Milk Code,” Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for
Other Purposes (RIRR).

Petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk substitutes posits that
the RIRR is not valid and unconstitutional.

Hence, it filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

ISSUE:

Is the RIRR unconstitutional?

Is the RIRR in accord with TMC?

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 Are the pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines part of the law
of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR? if so, is the RIRR in accord
with such international agreements?

RULING:

NO. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is
based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions
however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.

Ratio:

1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of the land?

- The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:

(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child

(2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights

(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against

Women

- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to
prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing of
breastmilk substitutes

- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instruments
which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes

- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law in 2
ways:

18
(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation

● Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7,
Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless
concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate”

● The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they haven’t been
concurred in by the required 2/3 vote.

● HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation that is TMC.

○ Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but it’s
TMC.

■ While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it

did not adopt the latter’s provision on the absolute prohibition on
advertising of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the
MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are approved by a
committee.

(2)Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have

the force of domestic law

● This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land

● In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as

binding as a result of two elements:

1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state

2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity.

19
● Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or
customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all
kinds of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally

● Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law
has two factors:

1.) Material factor – how states behave

The consistency and the generality of the practice

2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the way they do

Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave
they do. Is it out of courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of
behavior is obligatory

● When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international
law which is then incorporated into our domestic system

20
Colombia v Peru

ICJ Rep 266; Nov 20, 1950

FACTS: Haya de la Torre a Peru national was charged with instigation and rebellion, this was
connected with the military rebellion which broke out in Peru. Because of these charges, after a
few months after the rebellion started, Haya fled to the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru.

Being charged with crimes, he was sought out by the Peruvian authorities but they were not able
to get custody of him because he has been granted asylum as a refugee in Colombia. The
Colombian Ambassador requested a safe-conduct agreement in order for Haya to leave the
country. This was granted in accordance to the Havana Convention.

The government of Peru refused to accept the qualification of Haya de la Torre as a refugee and
refused to grant him safe passage, claiming that since Haya de la Torre committed common
crimes he cannot be entitled to enjoy the benefits of asylum as provided by Articles 1 and 2 of
the Havana Convention. A diplomatic correspondence ensued which terminated in signature and
the case at bar was submitted to the International Court of Justice.

ISSUE: Did Colombia’s act of granting asylum to Haya de la Torre violate the Havana
Convention?

RULING: YES. Article 1 of the Havana Convention prohibits States to grant asylum to persons
accused or condemned of common crimes as stated those who committed such common crimes
and seek asylum should be “surrendered upon request of the local government”. Torre’s
accusation related to a military rebellion, which the court concluded was not a common crime
and as such the granting of the asylum complied with Article 1 of the Convention.

Although Article 1 of the Havana Convention it is not in conformity with Article 2(2) which
stated that “Asylum granted to political offenders in legations, warships, military camps or
military aircraft, shall be respected to the extent in which allowed, as a right or through
humanitarian toleration, by the usages, the conventions or the laws of the country in which
granted and in accordance with the following provisions: First: Asylum may not be granted
except in urgent cases and for the period of time strictly indispensable for the person who has

21
sought asylum to ensure in some other way his safety”. In the case at bar Torres was accused of a
crime but he could not be tried in a court because Columbia granted him asylum. The court held
that “protection from the operation of regular legal proceedings” was not included in Article 2(2)
of the Havana Convention.

22
Reagan v CIR

GR No. L-26379; Dec 27, 1969

FACTS: Petitioner Reagan, a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical

assistance to the US Air Force in the Philippines, questioned the payment of the income tax
assessed on him by respondent CIR on an amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to
a member of the US Marine Corps, the transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base
at Pampanga. It is his contention, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax. He seeks that an
amount of P2,979.00 as the income tax paid by him be refunded.

ISSUE: Is the Clark Field Air Base a foreign property therefore excluded from the power of
Philippine taxation?

RULING: NO. it was not excluded since the said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or
territory. Under the [Military Bases] Agreement, it should be noted that the Philippine
Government merely consents that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The
consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency over the bases as part of
the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed
therein. This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a limitation
upon the rights of the Philippine Government.

The State is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that
such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They
are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it
is with the bases under lease to the American Armed Forces by virtue of the Military Bases
Agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.

23
Agustin v Edu

GR No L-49112 ; Feb 2, 1979

FACTS: Letter of Instruction No. 229 was enacted for the putting of early warning devices
which shall be placed by users of motor vehicles. Agustin states that the enactment of such a
letter of instruction violates the constitutional guarantee of due process among others.

Said instruction was signed into law by then President Marcos in order to prevent accidents on
streets and highways which includes expressways or limited access roads which is caused by the
presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles which do not have early warning devices.
It should be noted that the Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and SIgnals and the United Nations Organizations. The Vienna convention was ratified by
the Philippine government under PD 207

ISSUE: Does LOI 229 violate the constitutional guarantees of due process?

RULING: NO. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police
power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the
submission of the former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended
against the due process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter
point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power, which
was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty"
was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: "Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of
Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized

24
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna
Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *." It
cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, * * *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is
impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it
had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude,
which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality

25
Republic v Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 104768; July 21, 2003

FACTS: Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Marcos, the AFP Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas,
finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of ₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 against Ramas.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military
Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that
Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an
army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by taking undue
advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was an
illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for
lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry, and land
titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner argues that
the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the
date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in

26
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

ISSUE: Did the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remain in effect during the
interregnum?

RULING: NO. However, the Court ruled that the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum. Even during the
interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. The revolutionary
government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant."
Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories
to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the
Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights of individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum. The Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. As the de
jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s
good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law. It was only upon the
adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,

27
rendered such directives and orders void. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The
directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the Declaration.

In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect
to the items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was
therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.

28
Tanada v Angara

GR No 118295; May 2, 1997

FACTS: respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of Trade and Industry, signed the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations on behalf of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. By signing the Final Act, the Republic of the
Philippines agrees to the following: (a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the
consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seek approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and (b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions. Afterwards, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution 97 which concurs with the
ratification of the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the WTO. The
WTO Agreement provides that "each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations
and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements."

ISSUE: does the WTO Agreement unduly limit, restrict, and impair Philippine sovereignty?

RULING: No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to
by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably,
the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the
world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which
are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed
in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding
obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound
to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken."

29
Bayan Muna v Romulo

GR No 159618 ; Feb 1, 2011

FACTS: The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with “the power
to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx
and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted
to cover those considered grave under international law, such as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The RP signed the Rome Statue which, by its
terms is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval” by signatory states. As of the filing of the
instant petition, the PH has not yet completed the ratification, approval, and concurrence process.
Then Ambassador Ricciardone sent a US Embassy Note to the DFA proposing the terms of the
non-surrender agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. The RP agreed
and accepted the US proposals, which put it into effect. In esse, the Agreement aims to protect
what it defines as “persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harrassment suits that might be
brought against them in international tribunals. In response to a query of SolGen Benipayo as to
the status of the non-surrender agreement. Ambassador Ricciardone replied that the exchange of
diplomatic not constituted a legally binding agreement under international law, and that under
US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent o the US Senate.

ISSUE: Does RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement contravene the Rome Statute?

RULING: NO. Under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-Party
and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a signatory
state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,
whereas a State-Party, on the other hand, is legally obliged to follow all the provisions of a treaty
in good faith. In this case, RP is only a signatory to the Rome Statute and not a State-Party for
lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. Furthermore, a careful reading of said Art. 90 would
show that the Agreement is not incompatible with the Rome Statute. Specifically, Art. 90(4)
provides that "[i]f the requesting State is a State not a party to this Statute the requested State, if
it is not under an international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall
give priority to the request for surrender from the Court. x x x" In applying the provision, certain

30
undisputed facts should be pointed out: first, the US is neither a State-Party nor a signatory to the
Rome Statute; and second, there is an international agreement between the US and the
Philippines regarding extradition or surrender of persons, i.e., the Agreement. Clearly, even
assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of
international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a
State-Party to the Rome Statute.

31
Vinuya v Romulo

GR No 162230 ; Apr 28, 2010

FACTS: Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the second world war. Petitioners narrate that during the second world war, the Japanese
army attacked villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the
village. Their communities were bombed, houses were looted and burned, and civilians were
publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered. Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and
held them in houses or cells, where they were repeatedly raped, beaten and abused by Japanese
soldiers. As a result of the actions of their tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in
misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the
Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already
been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and
Japan.

ISSUE: Did the Executive Department commit grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners’ claim for official apology and other forms of repatriation against Japan?

RULING: NO. This is a political question. In Tañada v Cuenco, the Court held that political
questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom not legality of a particular measure.”

It is well-established that “the conduct of the foregin relations of our government is committed
by the Constitution to the executive and legislative - the political - departments of the

32
government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” To be sure, not all cases implicating foregin relations
present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate
treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter,
the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to
the political branches.

In the present case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for repatriation against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant
petition for certiorari. The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’
cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.

From a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle - and
particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s
conclusion and our consideration - the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the
interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere,
traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the international
legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic
action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own
right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Furthermore, it has been argued that, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect
its nationals and act on his/her behalf when rights are injured. However, at present, there is no
sufficient evidence to establish a general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic
protection of their own nationals abroad. Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor

33
opinion juris has evolved in such a discretion. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and
not a legal duty, and there is no means of enforcing its fulfillment.

Thus, for us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of
the foreign policy judgments by a coordinated political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed. Hence, it is not within the power of this Court to
order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners’ cause. The Court only has the power
to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners’ cause.

34
Holy See v Rosario

GR No. 101949 ; Dec 1, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome,
Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio. Private respondent, Starbright
Sales Enterprises, Inc., (Starbright) is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

The case stemmed from a controversy over a parcel of land (Lot 5-A) located in Parañaque,
Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B
and 5-D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were
sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers.
Afterwards, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to Starbright. In view of the refusal of the
squatters to vacate the lots sold to Starbright, a dispute arose as to who among the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Further, petitioner sold Lot 5-A to
Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

Starbright filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific
performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana. It prayed for: (1) the
annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand, and Tropicana
on the other; (2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; (3) specific performance of the
agreement to sell between it and the owners of the lots; and (4) damages.

Petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint, petitioner for lack of
jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper
party.

ISSUES:

1. Is the Holy See immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot
to a private entity?

35
 2. Is statehood vested in the Vatican City or Holy See?

RULING:

1. YES. The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign
sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic
representations with the Philippine government since 1957. This appears to be the
universal practice in international relations.

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the Philippines has

adopted the generally accepted principles of international law. Even without this
affirmation, such principles of international law are deemed incorporated as part of the
law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly
established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its
consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer
or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to
public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure
gestionis.

In the case at bench, if the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a
real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.
However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A
were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission
or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said
claim. Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.
The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of the petitioner to
construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a
foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

36
 In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil
and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to
private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the
envoy holds on behalf of the sending state for the purposes of the mission. If this
immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more reason should immunity
be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the Holy See.

2. YES. In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy
recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the
Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to
send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to
International Law. The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for
the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of
guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations".

37
Sapphire Case

11 Wall 64; 1870

FACTS: The case was one of a collision between the American Ship Sapphire and the French
transport, Euryale, which took place in the harbor of San Francisco on the morning of December
22, 1867, by which the Euryale was considerably damaged.

A libel was filed in the District Court two days afterwards, in the name of the Emperor Napoleon
III, then Emperor of the French, as owner of the Euryale, against the Sapphire.

The claimants filed an answer, alleging, among other things that the damage was occasioned by
the fault of the Euryale. Depositions were taken, and the court decreed in favor of the libellant,
and awarded him $15,000, the total amount claimed. The claimants appealed to the Circuit Court
(of United States for the District of California), which affirmed the decree. They then, in July
1869, appealed to this court (US Supreme Court).

In the summer of 1870, Napoleon III was deposed.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Emperor of France have the right to bring the suit in our courts?

2. Had the suit not become abated by the deposition of the Emperor Napoleon III?

RULING:

1. NO. The sovereign of a country, the public rights or property of which have been destroyed, or
injured, by a citizen of another country, cannot maintain suit against such citizen, in the judicial
tribunals of the country to which such citizen belongs, to recover compensation for the injury.
The remedy, and the only remedy of the foreign sovereign is by diplomatic correspondence and
arrangement between two countries. The repose of nations and their intercourse with each other,
cannot be maintained, if sovereign rights are to be ascertained and adjudicated by a suit, in the
name of the foreign sovereign against a private citizen by whom they may have been violated.

38
The case before the court illustrates the propriety of the principle and reason upon which the
position is taken. The claimants cannot all upon Napoleon, to answer interrogatories, upon oath,
under the admiralty rule which requires libellants to answer. The owners of the Sapphire, say that

the collision was caused by the fault of the French transport. Admitting this to be true, they
cannot obtain a warrant for the arrest of a vessel belonging to the navy of France, and which is in
our harbor in the charge of an officer of the French navy.

2. NO. Supposing that the suit could yet be maintained if Napoleon III were now emperor, it
would seem certain that it cannot be continued, he being now deposed, and reduced to the state
of a private person. The Euryale is a vessel of the French government; a government with which
he has nothing whatever now to do; being banished and a fugitive.

39
People v Perfecto

G.R. No. 18463; Oct 4, 1922

FACTS: Fernando Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, discovered that certain
documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of
oil companies, had disappeared from his office. He informed the Philippine Senate of such fact
and stated that steps were taken by him to discover the guilty party. Thereafter, the newspaper La
Nacion, edited by Mer. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article criticizing the Senate and its
members regarding their failure to resolve the robbery of records in the Senate. Thus, an
information was filed against Perfecto for violation of Article 256 of the Penal Code, which
punishes "Any person who by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the
Crown or other person in authority . . ., "

Trial judge found Perfecto guilty as charged. It explained that notwithstanding the change of
sovereignty, Art 256 will continue to be in force until it shall be repealed or superseded, and thus,
anyone who made an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable
under it.

Defendant asserted that Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force because it
was abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
because it was inconsistent with democratic principles of government.

ISSUE: Was Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code still in force despite change from Spanish to
American sovereignty over the Philippines?

RULING: NO. It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the
previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. All
laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and
Constitution of the new government would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect.

40
Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect
Spanish officials who were the representatives of the king. However, with the change to
American sovereignty, there is no longer a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such
exalted position. "The President and Congress framed the government on the model with which
Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interest and the protection of individual rights and privileges." Thus, in the eye of the present
Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freedom, and has equal rights with
every other man.

Thus, Article 256 of the Penal code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the
American character and systems of government. This article was crowded out by implication as
soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

41
Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v Cibario

235 NY 255 ; Mar 6, 1923

FACTS: This action is brought by plaintiff Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic in its
alleged capacity of a sovereign State, to compel the defendants to account for moneys which, it is
claimed, the defendant Cibrario fraudulently obtained under a contract made by him on July 24,
1918, with the Cinematographic Committee of the Commissariat of Public Instruction, which is
alleged to be a subordinate government body of the plaintiff. In substance plaintiff charges that
Cibrario made large secret profits in connection with his purchases, that the materials purchased
were not in compliance with the contract, but were in large part worthless, and that the time
limitation prescribed by the contract was not observed.

The first objection raised by the defendants is, that the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet
Republic," never having been recognized as a sovereignty by the executive or legislative
departments of the United States government, has no capacity to sue in the courts of the United
States, or of any of the States.

ISSUE: Is a foreign power’s right to sue a matter of right?

RULING: NO. A foreign power brings an action in the courts not as a matter of right. Its power
to do so is the creature of comity. Until such government is recognized by the United States, no
such comity exists. The plaintiff concededly has not been so recognized. There is, therefore, no
proper party before us. We may add that recognition and consequently the existence of comity is
purely a matter for the determination of the legislative or executive departments of the
government. Who is the sovereign of a territory is a political question. In any case where that
question is in dispute the courts are bound by the decision reached by those departments. It is not
for the courts to say whether the present governments of Russia or Mexico or Great Britain
should or should not be recognized. They are or they are not. That is as far as we may inquire.
Upon the facts in that case, if the defendant was not an existing government it might not be sued.
There was no party before the court. If it were, as was alleged and admitted, the same result
followed not because of comity, but because an independent government is not answerable for its
acts to our courts.

42
Banco Nacional de Cuba v Sabatino

376 U.S. 398; 1964

FACTS: In February and July of 1960, respondent Farr, Whitlock & Co., an American
commodity broker, contracted to purchase Cuban sugar from a wholly owned subsidiary of
Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba (C.A.V.), a corporation organized under
Cuban law whose capital stock was owned principally by United States residents. Farr, Whitlock
agreed to pay for the sugar in New York upon presentation of the shipping documents and a sight
draft.

On July 6, 1960, the Congress of the United States amended the Sugar Act of 1948 to permit a
presidentially directed reduction of the sugar quota for Cuba. On the same day, President
Eisenhower exercised the granted power. The day of the congressional enactment, the Cuban
Council of Ministers adopted "Law No. 851” as a countermeasure for the reduction of sugar
quota. The law gave the Cuban President and Prime Minister discretionary power to nationalize
by forced expropriation of property or enterprises in which American nationals had an interest.
The Cuban President and Prime Minister, acting pursuant to Law No. 851, issued Executive
Power Resolution No. 1. It provided for the compulsory expropriation of all property and
enterprises, and of rights and interests arising therefrom, of certain listed companies, including
C.A.V., wholly or principally owned by American nationals.

In consequence of the resolution, the consent of the Cuban Government was necessary before a
ship carrying sugar of a named company could leave Cuban waters. In order to obtain this
consent, Farr, Whitlock, on August 11, entered into contracts, identical to those it had made with
C.A.V., with the Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Banco exterior), an instrumentality
of the Cuban Government.

Banco Exterior assigned the bills of lading to petitioner, also an instrumentality of the Cuban
Government, which instructed its agent in New York, Societe Generale, to deliver the bills and a
sight draft in the sum of $175,250.69 to Farr, Whitlock in return for payment. Societe Generale's
initial tender of the documents was refused by Farr, Whitlock, which on the same day was
notified of C.A.V.'s claim that, as rightful owner of the sugar, it was entitled to the proceeds. In

43
return for a promise not to turn the funds over to petitioner or its agent, C.A.V. agreed to
indemnify Farr, Whitlock for any loss. Farr, Whitlock subsequently accepted the shipping
documents, negotiated the bills of lading to its customer, and received payment for the sugar. It
refused, however, to hand over the proceeds to Societe Generale. Shortly thereafter, Farr,
Whitlock was served with an order of the New York Supreme Court, which had appointed
Sabbatino as Temporary Receiver of C.A.V.'s New York assets, enjoining it from taking any
action in regard to the money claimed by C.A.V. that might result in its removal from the State.
Following this, Farr, Whitlock, pursuant to court order, transferred the funds to Sabbatino, to
abide the event of a judicial determination as to their ownership.

Petitioner brought this action alleging conversion of the bills of lading to recover payment from
the broker and to enjoin from exercising dominion over the proceeds. The District Court
sustained federal in personam jurisdiction despite state control of the funds. It found that the
sugar was located within Cuban territory at the time of expropriation, and determined that, under
merchant law common to civilized countries, Farr, Whitlock could not have asserted ownership
of the sugar against C.A.V. before making payment. It concluded that C.A.V. had a property
interest in the sugar subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Cuba. The court then dealt with the
question of Cuba's title to the sugar, on which rested petitioner's claim of conversion. While
acknowledging the continuing vitality of the act of state doctrine, the court believed it
inapplicable when the questioned foreign act is in violation of international law. Proceeding on
the basis that a taking invalid under international law does not convey good title, the District
Court found the Cuban expropriation decree to violate such law in three separate respects: it was
motivated by a retaliatory, and not a public, purpose; it discriminated against American
nationals; and it failed to provide adequate compensation.

ISSUE: Should the Act of State doctrine should be applied?

RULING: YES. The Court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that the Act of State
Doctrine applies. The Supreme Court held that it will not decide the validity of a decree by a
foreign government absent a treaty or other agreement. Moreover, The Court found that the
Cuban seizure did not violate international law, because there was no clear international opinion
that a seizure of land or property in a country by the government of that country was illegal.

44
Even in a situation whereby international law has been violated, the clear implication of past
cases is that the Act of State Doctrine is applicable because the Act of State doctrine does not
deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case.

Under the Bernstein exception, a court may determine the legality of the foreign expropriation if
the Executive indicates to the court that it does not oppose such judicial consideration. In the
given case, The Court found that there was no need for the Executive branch to ask the courts to
apply the Act of State Doctrine. According to the court “Often, the State Department will wish to
refrain from taking an official position, particularly at a moment that would be dictated by the
development of private litigation but might be inopportune diplomatically. Adverse domestic
consequences might flow from an official stand which could be assuaged, if at all, only by
revealing matters best kept secret. Of course, a relevant consideration for the State Department
would be the position contemplated in the court to hear the case. It is highly questionable
whether the examination of validity by the judiciary should depend on an educated guess by the
Executive as to probable result, and, at any rate, should a prediction be wrong, the Executive
might be embarrassed in its dealings with other countries.”

The court also held that the act of state doctrine, although it shares with the immunity doctrine a
respect for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise
applicable rule of law. It is plain that, if a recognized government sued on a contract with a
United States citizen, concededly legitimate by the locus of its making, performance, and most
significant contacts, the forum would not apply its own substantive law of contracts. Since the
act of state doctrine reflects the desirability of presuming the relevant transaction valid, the same
result follows; the forum may not apply its local law regarding foreign expropriations.

The expropriation was legal because it was an official act of another country, not subject to
question in US courts.

45
46
Oetjen v Central Leather

No. 268, 269 ; Mar 11, 1918

FACTS: In January, 1914, General Francisco Villa, while conducting independent operations as
a duly commissioned military commander of the Carranza government, which had then made
much progress in its revolution in Mexico, levied a military contribution, and, in enforcing it,
seized and sold some hides then owned and possessed by a citizen of Mexico. Held that the act
could not be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court in replevin.

ISSUE/S: Can the act be reexamined and modified by a New Jersey court?

RULING: NO. We have a duly commissioned military commander of what must be accepted as
the legitimate government of Mexico, in the progress of a revolution, and when conducting
active independent operations, seizing and selling in Mexico, as a military contribution, the
property in controversy at the time owned and in the possession of a citizen of Mexico, the
assignor of the plaintiff in error. Plainly this was the action, in Mexico, of the legitimate Mexican
government when dealing with a Mexican citizen, and, as we have seen, for the soundest
reasons, and upon repeated decisions of this Court such action is not subject to reexamination
and modification by the courts of this country. The principle that the conduct of one independent
government cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of another is as applicable to a case
involving the title to property brought within the custody of a court, such as we have here, as it
was held to be to the cases cited, in which claims for damages were based upon acts done in a
foreign country, for it rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency. To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign state to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly "imperil the amicable relations
between governments and vex the peace of nations."

47
Underhill v Hernandez

168 US 250; Nov 29, 1897

FACTS: A revolution commenced in Venezuela in 1892 against the administration which the
Revolutionists claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. The principal parties were
those who were under the control and leadership of Crespo and those who acknowledged Palacio
as their head. Gen. Hernandez belonged to the anti-administration party also known as the
revolutionists and commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar. On Aug. 8, 1892, an
engagement took place between the armies of the two parties at Buena Vista, some seven miles
from Bolivar, in which the troops under Hernandez prevailed.

On the 13th of Aug, Hernandez entered Bolívar, and assumed command of the city. All of the
local officials had in the meantime left, and the vacant positions were filled by Gen. Hernandez
who was the civil and military chief of the city and district. In October the Crespo party had
achieved success generally and was formally recognized as the legitimate government of
Venezuela by the United States

George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who had constructed a waterworks system
for the city of Bolivar, under a contract with the government. He was engaged in supplying the
place with water and also carried on a machinery repair business.

Sometime after the entry of Gen. Hernandez, underhill applied to him as the officer in command
for a passport to leave the city. Hernandez refused this request. On Oct. 18, a passport was given
to him and Underhill left the country. Underhill brought an action to recover damages for the
detention caused by reason of the refusal to grant him passport and for the assault suffered by
Hernandez’s army

The Circuit court of the United States for the Eastern district of New York ruled in favor of the
defendant Hernandez, on the ground that 'because the acts of defendant were those of a military
commander, representing a de facto government in the prosecution of a war, he was not civilly
responsible therefore. Underhill appealed the judgment to the circuit court of appeals where the
judgment was affirmed. The circuit court of appeals held that the acts of the defendant were the

48
acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in
the courts of another government. The cause was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari

ISSUE: Can Underhill file a suit against Hernandez?

RULING: NO. Hernandez’s acts are acts of another country which is the Venezuelan
government hence it cannot be subject to the adjudication of the United States government and
courts. As stated, “Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.”

“Public agents, military or civil, of foreign governments, whether such governments be de jure or
de facto, cannot be held responsible, in any court within the United States, for acts done within
their own states, In the exercise of the sovereignty thereof, or pursuant to the directions of their
governments; and this immunity extends to the agents of a revolutionary government, set up by a
part of the citizens of a foreign country, which is ultimately established and recognized by the
government of the United States.”

The government and the courts of the United States cannot pass judgment or subject Hernandez
under their adjudication because his acts are acts of the government of Venezuela. As a rule, each
and every state must observe respect for the sovereignty of the other states – especially in this
case where United States expressly recognized the new government

49
PCGG v Sandiganbayan

GR No. 124772; Aug 14, 2007

FACTS: On April 7, 1986, in connection with criminal proceedings initiated in the Philippines
to locate, sequester and seek restitution of alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the Marcoses and
other accused from the Philippine Government, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote
the Federal Office for Police Federal Office for Police Matters in Berne, Switzerland, requesting
assistance for the latter office to: (a) ascertain and provide the OSG with information as to where
the ill-gotten fortune of the Marcoses and other accused are located, the names of the depositors
and the banks and the amounts involved; and (b) take necessary precautionary measures, such as
sequestration, to freeze the assets in order to preserve their existing value and prevent any further
transfer. The Office of the District Attorney in Zurich, pursuant to the OSG’s request, issued an
Order directing the Swiss Banks in Zurich to freeze the accounts of the accused. In compliance
with said Order, Bankers Trust A.G. (BTAG) of Zurich froze the accounts of Officeco Holdings,
N.V. (Officeco).

Officeco made representations with the OSG and the PCGG for them to officially advise the
Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters to unfreeze Officeco’s assets. The PCGG required
Officeco to present countervailing evidence to support its request, but instead of complying with
the PCGG requirement for it to submit countervailing evidence, Officeco filed the complaint
with the Sandiganbayan praying for the PCGG and the OSG to officially advise the Swiss
government to exclude from the freeze or sequestration order the account of Officeco with
BTAG and to unconditionally release the said account to unconditionally release the said account
to Officeco. A motion to dismiss was filed but it was denied hence, a petition was brought to the
Supreme Court claiming that the civil action in effect seeks a judicial review of the legality or
illegality of the acts of the Swiss government since the Sandiganbayan would inevitably examine
and review the freeze orders of Swiss officials in resolving the case. This would be in violation
of the “act of state” doctrine which states that courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another in due deference to the independence of sovereignty of
every sovereign state.

ISSUE: Can state immunity from suit be invoked in the instant case?

50
RULING: NO. The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their
national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the
other two being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly
related to a State's obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not
requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settle their disputes without
their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes
relating to legislative or other governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its
territorial limits.

It is petitioners' contention that the Sandiganbayan "could not grant or deny the prayers in
Officeco's complaint without first examining and scrutinizing the freeze order of the Swiss
officials in the light of the evidence, which however is in the possession of said officials" and
that it would therefore "sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another country." The
Court disagrees.

Even assuming that international law requires the application of the act of state doctrine, it bears
stressing that the Sandiganbayan will not examine and review the freeze orders of the concerned
Swiss officials in Civil Case No. 0164. The Sandiganbayan will not require the Swiss officials to
submit to its adjudication nor will it settle a dispute involving said officials. In fact, as prayed for
in the complaint, the Sandiganbayan will only review and examine the propriety of maintaining
PCGG's position with respect to Officeco's accounts with BTAG for the purpose of further
determining the propriety of issuing a writ against the PCGG and the OSG. Therefore, the act of
state doctrine finds no application in this case and petitioners' resort to it is utterly mislaid.

51
Baer v Tizon

GR No. L-24294; May 3, 1974

FACTS: Respondent Edgardo Gener filed a complaint for injunction against petitioner, Donald
Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo. He alleged that he was engaged
in the business of logging in an area situated in Morong, Bataan and that the American Naval
Base authorities stopped his logging operations. He prayed for a writ of preliminary
injunction—which was then issued by respondent Judge—restraining petitioner from interfering
with his logging operations. Upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines,
the counsel of petitioner entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its
consent. Petitioner argued that he is the chief or head of an agency or instrumentality of the
United States of America, with the subject matter of the action being official acts done by him
for and in behalf of the United States of America. In directing the cessation of logging operations
by respondent Gener within the Naval Base, petitioner was entirely within the scope of his
authority and official duty, the maintenance of the security of the Naval Base and of the
installations therein being the first concern and most important duty of the Commander of the
Base. Respondent Judge issued an order granting respondent Gener's application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the opposition to
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Is the Doctrine of State Immunity applicable to Baer?

RULING: Yes. The Court cited the case of Raquiza v. Bradford which then quoted Coleman v.
Tennessee, the Court ruled herein that, “It is well settled that a foreign army, permitted to march
through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign,
is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place.” In this case, what was sought by
private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with
the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers
possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. The doctrine of
state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the
sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from

52
doing an affirmative act pertaining directly and immediately to the most important public
function of any government - the defense of the state — is equally as untenable as requiring it to
do an affirmative act.

53
Syquia v Almeda Lopez

GR No L-1648; Aug 17, 1949

FACTS: Petitioners Pedro, Gonzalo and Leopoldo Syquia are joint owners of properties in
Manila, namely, the North Qyauia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel
Apartments. In 1945, they executed contracts for lease of the apartments to USA, with the term
being until the war has ended and six months after, or unless terminated sooner by USA, as the
buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of te US armed forces stationed in the
Manila Area. George Moore, a Commanding General of the US Army, and Erland Tillman, Chief
of the Real Estate Division to the US Army in Manila who was under the command of Moore,
was said to be in control of the apartment buildings and had authority in the name of USA to
assign officers of the army to the buildings or order them to vacuate the same. When Japan
surrendered on September 2, 1945, the lease would be terminated six months after. The
petitioners approached the predecessors of Moore and Tillman and requested the buildings to be
returned to them, as per contract agreement. However, they were advised that the US Army
wanted to continue their occupancy of the buildings, and refused to execute new leases but
advised that they will vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, not the original terms of the
contract agreement. Petitioner-plaintiffs sued before the Municipal Court of Manila with the
demand to get the properties as their agreement supposedly expired, and furthermore asked for
increased rentals until the premises were vacated. Respondent-defendants were part of the armed
forces of the US moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. The
MTC of Manila granted the motion to dismiss the suit, sustained by the CFI of Manila, hence the
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Does the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, that the USA has not given their consent to be a respondent?

54
RULING: No. Considering the facts involved therein as well as those of public knowledge of
which we take judicial cognizance, we are convinced that the real party in interest as defendant
in the original case is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease
agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement themselves were executed
in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or rentals was always paid
by the U. S. Government. The original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of
these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of this court that any back rentals or
increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already
stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the
premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the
terminations of hostilities.

55
USA v Guinto

G.R. No. 76607; Feb 26, 1990

FACTS: Private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force stationed in Clark
Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in
the base. On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area
Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James
F. Shaw. Among those that submitted their bids were the private respondents. The bidding was
won by Ramon Dizon over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had
made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in
the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter,
through its representatives petitioners Reeves and Shouse, explained that the Civil Engineering
concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation.
Dizon was already operating this concession and the expiration of the contract had been
extended. Private respondents filed a case to compel PHAX to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding, and by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operation of concessions
pending litigation.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the
United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendant, as
official employees of the US Air Force, were also immune from suit. Trial court denied the
petition on the basis that the Court's attention is called by the relationship between the plaintiffs
as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the bidding or
solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as well as the
defendants, including the US Government.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner immune from suit?

RULING: YES. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial

56
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise
of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of
the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes. The barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the United States
government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the
United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the
American servicemen. This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from the
complaint filed by the private respondents in the court below.

57
USA v Rodrigo

G.R. No. 79470; Feb 26, 1990

FACTS: Fabian Genove, a cook in the U.S. Air Force Recreation Center at the John Hay Air
Station in Baguio City, was dismissed because as testified by one of the respondents, he poured
urine in the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia,
the club manager referred this incident to a board of arbitrators where he was found guilty.
Genove filed a complaint against the respondents in the RTC Baguio City. The respondents,
joined by the U.S.A moved to dismiss the complaint but was denied. It ruled that although
defendants acted initially in their official capacities, their going beyond what their functions
called for brought them out of the protective mantle of whatever immunities they may have had
in the beginning. Thus, the allegation that the acts complained of were illegal, done with extreme
bad faith and with pre-conceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff, gains
significance. The petitioners (former respondents) then came to this Court seeking certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Are the petitioners immune from suit?

RULING: No. There is a need to distinguish between jure imperii – sovereign and governmental
acts and jure gestionis – private, commercial and proprietary acts because state immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperii. In this case, Lamachia, the manager of Open Mess Complex at
John Hay Air Station, is responsible for eleven diversified activities generating an annual income
of $2 million. Under his executive management are three service restaurants, a cafeteria, a
bakery, a Class VI store, a coffee and pantry shop, a main cashier cage, an administrative office,
and a decentralized warehouse which maintains a stock level of $200,000.00 per month in resale
items. He supervises 167 employees, one of whom was Genove, with whom the United States
government has concluded a collective bargaining agreement.

From these circumstances, the Court can assume that the restaurant services offered at the John
Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the United States
government in its proprietary capacity. Such services are not extended to the American
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in the Armed Forces of the United States.

58
Neither does it appear that they are exclusively offered to these servicemen; on the contrary, it is
well known that they are available to the general public as well, including the tourists in Baguio
City, many of whom make it a point to visit John Hay for this reason. All persons availing
themselves of this facility pay for the privilege like all other customers as in ordinary restaurants.
Although the prices are concededly reasonable and relatively low, such services are undoubtedly
operated for profit, as a commercial and not a governmental activity.

The consequence of this finding is that the petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of state
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit against them by Genove. Such defense will
not prosper even if it be established that they were acting as agents of the United States when
they investigated and later dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United States
government itself can claim such immunity. The reason is that by entering into the employment
contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of
its sovereign immunity from suit.

But these considerations notwithstanding, we hold that the complaint against the petitioners in
the court below must still be dismissed. While suable, the petitioners are nevertheless not liable.
It is obvious that the claim for damages cannot be allowed on the strength of the evidence before
us, which we have carefully examined.

The dismissal of the private respondent was decided upon only after a thorough investigation
where it was established beyond doubt that he had polluted the soup stock with urine. The
investigation, in fact, did not stop there. Despite the definitive finding of Genove's guilt, the case
was still referred to the board of arbitrators provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
This board unanimously affirmed the findings of the investigators and recommended Genove's
dismissal. There was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings. The petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent's employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
It is surprising that he should still have the temerity to file his complaint for damages after
committing his utterly disgusting offense.

59
USA v Ceballos

GR No : 80018; June 16, 2015

FACTS: The respondent, Louis Bautista, was arrested pursuant to RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act) in a buy-bust operation conducted by the petitioners, Tomi J. King, Darrel D. Dye and
Stephen F. Bostick, who were officers and special agents of the US Air Force and Air Force
Office of Special Investigators. He was charged before the RTC which caused his dismissal as a
barracks boy in Camp O’Donnell, an extension of Clark Air base. Bautista then filed a complaint
against the petitioners. The petitioners, in defense, filed a motion to dismiss the case with the
contention that they were acting in official capacity when the acts were committed, hence the suit
against them is, in effect, a suit against the US. The motion was denied by the judge, with the
contention that the immunity covers only civil cases that are not criminal under the Military
Bases Agreement. Ergo, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition for
preliminary injunction. A TRO was issued.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners invoke State Immunity?

RULING: YES. The individually-named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of their
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and
thereafter testified against him at his trial. The said petitioners were in fact connected with the
Air Force Office of Special Investigators and were charged precisely with the function of
preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs and prosecuting those guilty
of such acts. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or
unofficial capacity when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows
that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded
for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

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USA v Vergara

US Case: Case No. 16-15059; Mar 15, 2018

FACTS: Vergara returned to Tampa, Florida on a cruise ship from Cozumel, Mexico, with three
phones: a Samsung phone inside a bag in his luggage, an LG phone, and an iPhone. An officer
with Customs and Border Protection, identified Vergara and searched his luggage. When Ragan
found the Samsung phone in Vergara’s luggage, he asked Vergara to turn the phone on and then
looked through the phone for about five minutes and found video of two topless female minors.
A special agent with the Department of Homeland Security, decided to have all three phones
forensically examined.A forensic examination of the Samsung and LG phones conducted that
day revealed more than 100 images and videos, “the production of which involved the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and the visual depictions were of such conduct.”A
grand jury later indicted Vergara on two counts: (1) that he “did knowingly transport in and
affecting interstate and foreign commerce one or more visual depictions, the production of which
involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depictions
were of such conduct”; and (2) that he “did knowingly possess numerous matters that had been
shipped and transported using any means and facility of interstate and foreign commerce,
including by computer, which matters contained visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct and the production of which involved the use of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.”

ISSUE: Did the warrantless forensic searches of two cell phones at the border violate the Fourth
Amendment (US Constitution)

RULING: No. Border searches “never” require probable cause or a warrant. The Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause..” Ordinarily, “where a search is
undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
reasonableness . . . requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” But searches at the border, “from
before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, have been considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.” The

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forensic searches of Vergara’s phones required neither a warrant nor probable cause. “The
Supreme Court has consistently held that border searches are not subject to the probable cause
and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.”And “[t]here has never been any additional
requirement that the reasonableness of a border search depended on the existence of probable
cause.”At the border, the highest standard for a search is reasonable suspicion, and Vergara has
not challenged the finding of the district court that reasonable suspicion existed for the searches
of his phones.

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USA v Ruiz

GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985

FACTS: Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain naval
projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequently,
the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price. In June 1972, the company
received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects. The
company then sued the United States of America and individual petitioners demanding that the
company perform the work on the projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties
concerning the project.

ISSUES:

1) Did the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?

2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING:

1. YES. The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends
only to governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign.

2. NO. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of the government.
As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have no jurisdiction
over the case for the US government has not given consent to the filing of this suit.

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USA v Reyes

G.R. No. 79253; Mar 1, 1993

FACTS: Private respondent, hereinafter referred to as Montoya, is an American citizen who, at

the time material to this case, was employed as an identification (I.D.) checker at the U.S. Navy
Exchange (NEX) at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters
in Quezon City. She is married to one Edgardo H. Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman
employed by the U.S. Navy and stationed in San Francisco, California. Petitioner Maxine
Bradford, hereinafter referred to as Bradford, is likewise an American citizen who was the
activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters.

On January 22, 1987, after working as the duty ID checker from 7:45 to 11:45 a.m., plaintiff
went shopping and left the store at 12:00 noon of that day. That on the way to her car while
already outside the store, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, also an ID checker, upon the instruction of the
store manager, Ms. Maxine Bradford, approached plaintiff and informed her that she needed to
search her bags. That plaintiff went to defendant, who was then outside the store talking to some
men, to protest the search but she was informed by the defendant that the search is to be made on
all Jusmag employees that day; That the search was thereafter made on the person, car and bags
of the plaintiff by Mrs. Yong Kennedy in the presence of the defendant and numerous curious
onlookers; That having found nothing irregular on her person and belongings, plaintiff was
allowed to leave the premises; That feeling aggrieved, plaintiff checked the records and
discovered that she was the only one whose person and belonging was (sic) searched that day
contrary to defendant's allegation as set forth in par. 5 hereof and as evidenced by the
memorandum dated January 30, 1987 made by other Filipino Jusmag employees, a photocopy of
which is hereto attached as ANNEX "A" and made integral (sic) part hereof: That moreover, a
check with Navy Exchange Security Manager, R.L. Roynon on January 27, 1987 was made and
she was informed by Mr. Roynon that it is a matter of policy that customers and employees of
NEX Jusmag are not searched outside the store unless there is a very strong evidence of a
wrongdoing; That plaintiff knows of no circumstances sufficient to trigger suspicion of a
wrongdoing on her part but on the other hand, is aware of the propensity of defendant to lay
suspicion on Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. That plaintiff formally protested the illegal

64
search on February 14, 1987 in a letter addressed to Mr. R.L. Roynon, a photocopy of which is
hereto attached as ANNEX "B" and made integral (sic) part hereof; but no action was undertaken
by the said officer; That the illegal search on the person and belongings of the plaintiff in front of
many people has subjected the plaintiff to speculations of theft, shoplifting and such other
wrongdoings and has exposed her to contempt and ridicule which was caused her undue
embarrassment and indignity; That since the act could not have been motivated by other (sic)
reason than racial discrimination in our own land, the act constitute (sic) a blow to our national
pride and dignity which has caused the plaintiff a feeling of anger for which she suffers sleepless
nights and wounded feelings; That considering the above, plaintiff is entitled to be compensated
by way of moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00; That to serve as a deterrent to those
inclined to follow the oppressive act of the defendant, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 should also be awarded.

Montoya opposed Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX
JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s
authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on
sovereign immunity; (3) Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.

ISSUE/S:

1. Is this a suit against the State?

2. Does Bradford enjoy diplomatic immunity?

RULING:

1. No. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent,
it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against
such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against
them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been

65
 formally impleaded.It must be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as
to be applicable under all circumstances.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc.,
et al. "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for
the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of
the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that,
while claiming to act or the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights
of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which
he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the
State may not be sued without its consent."The rationale for this ruling is that the
doctrinaire of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.

They state that the doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked
where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary
citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually
arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal
private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

2. No. In the latter, even on the claim of diplomatic immunity — which Bradford does not
in fact pretend to have in the instant case as she is not among those granted diplomatic
immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the
JUSMAG — this Court ruled:

66
 Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions.
It reads:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except
in the case of:

3. x x x xxx xxx

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the

diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).

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Island of Palmas Case vs. UN

Report of Int. Arb. Awards, 231; Apr 4, 1928

FACTS: Palmas (also referred to as Miangas) is an island about two miles long by three fourths
of a mile wide which at the time of this case had a population of about 750 and was of little
strategic or economic value. It sits about halfway between the islands of Mindanao in the
Philippines and Nanusa in the Netherlands Indies. It is, however, within the boundaries of the
Philippines as defined by Spain and thus ceded to the United States in 1898. In 1906 an
American General, Leonard Wood, visited Palmas and discovered that the Netherlands also
claimed sovereignty over the island.

An agreement was signed on January 23, 1925, between the United States and the Netherlands to
submit the dispute to binding arbitration. The Swiss jurist, Max Huber, was the selected
arbitrator acting for the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Both the United States (P) laid claim to the ownership of the Island of Palmas. While the U.S.
(P) maintained that it was part of the Philippines, the Netherlands (D) claimed it as their own.
The claim of the U.S. (P) was back up with the fact that the islands had been ceded by Spain by
the Treaty of Paris in 1898, and as successor to the rights of Spain over the Philippines, it based
its claim of title in the first place on discovery. On the part of the Netherlands (D), they claimed
to have possessed and exercised rights of sovereignty over the island from 1677 or earlier to the
present.

ISSUE: Does US have sovereignty over the Las Palmas Islands.

RULING: No. Spain could not transfer more rights than she herself possessed. Thus, the US
cannot claim sovereignty. The Netherlands title of sovereignty, acquired by continuous and
peaceful display of state authority during a long period of time going probably back beyond the
year 1700, therefore holds good. Titles of acquisition of territorial sovereignty in present- day
international law are either based on: (a) an act of effective apprehension, such as occupation or
conquest; (b) cession which presuppose that the ceding and the cessionary Power or at least one
of them, have the faculty of effectively disposing of the ceded territory. (c) natural accretion can

68
only be conceived of as an accretion to a portion of territory where there exists an actual
sovereignty capable of extending to a spot which falls within its sphere of activity.

First, Spain was silent on the matter. Second, Spain nor the US did not provide evidence of
exercising actual sovereignty. If we consider as positive law at the period in question the rule that
discovery as such, i.e., the mere fact of seeing land, without any act, even symbolical, of taking
possession, involved ipso jure territorial sovereignty and not merely an ―Inchoate title,‖ a jus ad
rem, to be completed eventually by an actual and durable taking of possession within a
reasonable time, the question arises whether sovereignty yet existed at the critical date. If Spain
had been exercising sovereignty then there should be evidence of conflict between Spain and the
Netherlands. In any case, it is conclusive that Spain may have had title to the island upon
discovery, but it failed to maintain it as it did not exercise its authority.

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Clipperton Island Case

26 AJIL; 1932

FACTS: Clipperton Island, an uninhabited island coral atoll in the eastern Pacific Ocean,
southwest of Mexico, west of Costa Rica, and northwest of Galapagos Islands, Ecuador, is
claimed to have been occupied by the French. Mexico also claimed that Spain discovered it and
that it was its successor due to the activities undertaken therein as early as 1848-1849. In 1858,
Emperor Napoleon III annexed it as part of the French colony of Tahiti but there were no
apparent acts of sovereignty thereafter. The island also remained without population. In 1909,
Mexico and France signed a compromise, agreeing to submit the dispute regarding sovereignty
over Clipperton Island to binding arbitration by King Emanuel of Italy.

ISSUE: Does France have sovereignty over Clipperton Island?

RULING: YES. Besides the animus occupandi, the actual, and not the nominal, taking of
possession is a necessary condition of occupation. The taking of possession consists in the act or
series of acts by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and
takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. Strictly speaking, and in ordinary cases, that
only takes place when the state establishes in the territory itself an organization capable of
making its laws respected. This, however, is but a means of procedure to the taking of possession
and therefore is not identical with the latter. There may be cases where it is unnecessary to have
recourse to this method. Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely
uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at
the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession
must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed. There is no
reason to suppose that France has subsequently lost her right by derelictio, since she never had
the animus of abandoning the island, and the fact that she has not exercised her authority there in
a positive manner does not imply the forfeiture of an acquisition already perfected.

70
Magallona v Ermita

G.R. No. 187167; July 16, 2011

FACTS: In 1961, RA 3046 was passed which provides among others the demarcation lines of
the baselines of the Philippines as an archipelago. This is in consonance with UNCLOS I. RA
5446 amended RA 3046 in terms of typographical errors and included Section 2 in which the
government reserved the drawing of baselines in Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522. The change was prompted
by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among
others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and
classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough
Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA
9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,embodying the terms of the
Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties,and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security, contravening the country's nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. In addition, petitioners contend that
RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large
maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

ISSUE: Is RA 9522 unconstitutional?

RULING: NO. First, RA 9522 did not delineate the territory of the Philippines but is merely a
statutory tool to demarcate the country’s maritime zone and continental shelf under UNCLOS III.

71
The Court emphasized that UNCLOS III is not a mode of acquiring or losing a territory as
provided under the laws of nations. UNCLOS III is a multi-lateral treaty that is a result of a
long-time negotiation to establish a uniform sea-use rights over maritime zones and continental
shelves. In order to measure said distances, it is a must for the state parties to have their
archipelagic doctrines measured in accordance to the treaty. RA 9522, by optimizing the
location of base points, increased the Philippines total maritime space of 145,216 square nautical
miles. Second, the classification of KGI and Scarborough Shoal as Regime of Islands is
consistent with the Philippines’ sovereignty. Had RA 9522 enclosed the islands as part of the
archipelago, the country will be violating UNCLOS III since it categorically stated that the
length of the baseline shall not exceed 125 nautical miles. So, the classification is in accordance
with the Philippines sovereignty and State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Third, the new base line introduced by RA 9522 is without
prejudice with delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. And lastly, the UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the
Constitution’s delineation of internal waters. Petitioners contend that RA 9522 transformed the
internal waters of the Philippines to archipelagic waters hence subjecting these waters to the right
of innocent and sea lanes passages, exposing the Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards. The Court emphasized that the Philippines exercises sovereignty
over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath, regardless whether internal or archipelagic waters. However,
sovereignty will not bar the Philippines to comply with its obligation in maintaining freedom of
navigation and the generally accepted principles of international law. It can be either passed by
legislature as a municipal law or in the absence thereof, it is deemed incorporated in the
Philippines law since the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus
automatically incorporated thereto. This does not mean that the states are placed in a lesser
footing; it just signifies concession of archipelagic states in exchange for their right to claim all
waters inside the baseline. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to
delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows

72
an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in
safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

73
Fisheries Case

ICJ Reports 116; 1951

FACTS: Since 1911, British trawlers had been seized and condemned for having violated
measures taken by the Norwegian Government specifying the limits within which fishing was
prohibited to foreigners. In 1935, a decree was enacted delimiting the Norwegian fisheries zone.
The decree covers the drawing of straight lines, called “baselines” 4 miles deep into the sea. This
4-mile area is reserved fishing exclusive for Norwegian nationals. On September 28th, 1949, the
Government of the United Kingdom filed with the Registry an Application instituting
proceedings before the Court against Norway, the subject of the proceedings being the validity or
otherwise, under international law, of the lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone
laid down by the Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935. The Application referred to the Declarations
by which the United Kingdom and Norway had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. The UK Government contended
that 1) Norway could only draw straight lines across bays; 2) that the length of the baselines
drawn across the waters lying between the formations of the skjaergaard must not exceed 10
miles; 3) certain lines did not follow the general direction of the coast, or did not follow it
sufficiently closely, or that they did not respect the natural connection existing between certain
sea areas and the land formations separating or surrounding them; and 4) that the Norwegian
system of delimitation was unknown to UK and that the system lacked essential notoriety to
provide the basis of historical title enforceable upon the UK. On the other hand, Norway argued
that the baselines had to be drawn in such a way as to respect the general direction of the coast
and in a reasonable manner.

ISSUE: Is 1935 Decree concerning the delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries valid under the
international law of the lines of delimitation?

RULING: YES. The ICJ ruled that the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries
zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree of 1935 is valid and not contrary to international law. The
judgment of the court first examined the applicability of the principles put forward by the
government of the UK, then the Norwegian system, and finally the conformity of that system
with international law. The first principle put forward by the UK is that the baselines must be low

74
water mark, this indeed is the criterion generally adopted by most states and but differ as to its
application. The court considered the methods of drawing the lines but, the court rejected the
“trace Parallele” which consists of drawing the outer limits of the belt following the coast and all
its sinuosity. The court also rejected the “courbe tangente” (arcs of a circle) and it is not
obligatory under international law to use these methods of drawing the lines. The court also paid
particular attention to the geographical aspect of the case. The geographical realities and historic
control of the Norwegian coast inevitably contributed to the final decision by the ICJ. The coast
of Norway is too indented and is an exception under international law from the 3 miles territorial
waters rule. The fjords, Sunds along the coastline which have the characteristic of a bay or legal
straits should be considered Norwegian for historical reasons that the territorial sea should be
measured from the line of low water mark. So it was agreed on the outset of both parties and the
court that Norway had the right to claim a 4 mile belt of territorial sea. The court concluded that
it was the outer line of the Skaergaard that must be taken into account in admitting the belt of the
Norwegian territorial waters.

The law relied upon mainly international Law of the sea; how far a state can modify its territorial
waters and its control over it, exclusively reserving fishing for its nationals. In this case, rules
that are practiced for instance how long a baseline should be. Only a 10 mile long straight line is
allowed and this has been the practice by most states however it is different in the case of
Norway because of Norway's geographic indentation, islands and islets and that Norway always
opposed any attempt to apply it to its coast.

The Court established the existence and the constituent elements of the Norwegian system of
delimitation, further finds that this system was consistently applied by Norwegian authorities and
that it encountered no opposition on the part of other States. It was also stated that the lines
drawn were in accordance with the traditional Norwegian system and moreover, pointed out that
they were a result of a careful study initiated by Norwegian authorities as far back as 1911.

75
In the matter of the South China Sea Arbitration

P.C.A. 2013-19; Oct 29, 2015

FACTS: The Philippines initiated arbitration proceedings against China seeking the declaration
that the Parties’ respective rights and obligations with regard to the waters, seabed and maritime
features of the South China Sea are governed by UNCLOS, and that China’s claims based on its
“nine dash line” are inconsistent with the Convention and therefore invalid. Throughout the
proceedings, China has rejected and returned correspondence from the Tribunal sent by the
Registry, explaining on each occasion its position that it does not accept the arbitration initiated
by the Philippines.

ISSUE/S: Are China’s claims based on its “nine dash line” valid?

RULING: NO. As between the Philippines and China, the UNCLOS defines the scope of
entitlements in the South China Sea, which may not extend beyond the limits imposed therein.
China’s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction are contrary to the
UNCLOS and without lawful effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and substantive
limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the UNCLOS. Within the meaning of Art. 121(1)
of the UNCLOS (Regime of islands), naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water, which
are above water at high tide, However, under Art. 121(3) of the UNCLOS, the high-tide features
at Scarborough Shoal are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own and accordingly shall have no EEZ or continental shelf. Both parties are obliged to comply
with the Convention regarding the resolution of disputes, and to respect the rights and freedoms
of other States under the UNCLOS.

Alleged Interference with the Philippines' Sovereign Rights in the EEZ and Continental
Shelf

76
China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels, breached Art. 77 of the
UNCLOS (Rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf) with respect to the
Philippines’ sovereign rights over the non-living resources of its continental shelf in the area
of Reed Bank. The Tribunal further finds that China has, by promulgating its 2012 moratorium
on fishing in the South China Sea (including areas falling within the EEZ of the Philippines),
breached Art. 56 of the UNCLOS (Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the
EEZ) with respect to the Philippines’ sovereign rights over the living resources of its EEZ.

Alleged Failure to Prevent Chinese Nationals from Exploring the Philippines’ Living
Resources

China has, through the operation of its marine surveillance vessels at Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal in May 2013, failed to exhibit due regard for the Philippines’ sovereign
rights with respect to fisheries in its EEZ. Accordingly, China has breached its obligations
under Art. 58(3) of the UNCLOS (Rights and duties of other States in the EEZ.

China’s Actions in respect of Traditional Fishing at Scarborough Shoal

China has, through the operation of its official vessels at Scarborough Shoal from May 2012
onwards, unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from engaging in traditional fishing at
Scarborough Shoal.

77
Joyce v Director of Public Prosecution

House of Lords; Dec 10, 1945

FACTS: Petitioner was born in America in 1906 and at the age of 3 years old, he was brought to
Ireland. In 1921, he came to England where he stayed until 1939. Note, however, that in 1933 he
applied for a British passport describing himself as a British subject by birth, born in Galway.
The purpose of the passport was for a holiday tour throughout Europe. He was then granted the
passport for a period of 5 years which was continually renewed until 1939. Sometime in 1939,
Petitioner left the United Kingdom. He was arrested in 1945 where it was proven that he had
been employed by the German Radio Company of Berlin as an announcer of English news and
he had broadcast propaganda on behalf of the enemy. The passport was not found in his
possession when he has arrested. He was then charged with High Treason by adhering to the
King’s enemy outside the King’s real which is in German realm. This is contrary to Treason Act
1351. He was convicted of High Treason. Hence, this case

ISSUE: Can Joyce be convicted of treason outside the United Kingdom?

RULING: YES. An alien abroad holding a British passport enjoys the protection of the Crown
and if he is adherent to the king’s enemy, he is guilty of treason so long as he has not renounced
that portion. The capability of a state to prosecute and punish its nationals on the sole basis of
their nationality is based upon loyalty which person charged with the crime owes to the State of
which he is a national. It is now generally accepted that a state may prosecute its nationals for
crimes committed anywhere in the world. Moreover, the protective principle was accepted by the
House as providing a substitute basis for jurisdiction. Therefore, this appeal was dismissed

78
The Schooner Exchange v McFaddon

11 U.S. 116; 1812

FACTS: Two Americans, John McFaddon and William Greetham, claimed that they owned and
were entitled to the schooner Exchange they seized on the high seas. The claim which the United
States Attorney put forward for the prevention of the ship leaving was that the ship which was
owned by the Emperor of France had been forced to enter the port of Philadelphia due to bad
weather conditions. During this time, US and France were on friendly terms. The United States’
request for the dismissal of ownership and release of the ship was granted by the district court.
However, this judgment was reversed by the circuit court and this did not prevent the United
States from appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Are national ships of war viewed as exempted by the consent of the power of the
friendly jurisdiction whose port the ship enters?

RULING: YES. A public vessel of war of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States,
coming into our ports and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, is exempt from the
jurisdiction of the country.

The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory, is exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of
no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction deriving validity from an external source
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of that restriction, and an investment of
that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.

All exceptions to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be
traced up to the consent of the nation itself.

The Exchange, being a public armed ship in the service of a foreign sovereign with whom the
government of the United States is at peace, and having entered an American port open for her
reception on the terms on which ships of war are generally permitted to enter the ports of a
friendly power, must be considered as having come into the American territory under an implied
promise that while necessarily within it and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should
be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.

79
80
Lotus Case

PCIJ; Sept 7, 1927

FACTS: There was a collision of a French vessel and Turkish vessel in the high seas. The
Turkish vessel sank which had 10 survivors and killed 8 Turkish nationals. Those who survived
were brought to Turkey riding the Fence vessel. The captain and officer of the French vessel was
manslaughter in Turkey. Officer Demons, a French man, was sentenced to 80 days imprisonment
and a fine. The French Government protested and demanded officer Demon’s release or transfer
jurisdiction to a French court. Both Turkey and France decided to bring the case to the
Permanent Court of International Justice.

ISSUE: Did Turkey violate International law when Turkish court exercised jurisdiction over a
French man who committed a crime outside Turkey?

RULING: NO. Jurisdiction is territorial. A state cannot exercise jurisdiction outside its territory
unless there is an international treaty or generally accepted principle of international law.
However, a state may exercise jurisdiction within its territory even if there is no specific rule of
international law allowing it to do so. It is the state who has discretion which is limited by the
rules of international law.

In the case at bar, both countries had concurrent jurisdiction over the accident. A ship in the high
seas is absorbed by the flag it carries. The flag state may exercise jurisdiction over the ship the
same way over its territory. . The court absorbed the Turkish vessel as if it is on their land which
the Turkish laws cannot be challenged even if committed by foreigners. Thus, Turkey had
jurisdiction over this case.

81
Pimentel v Executive Secretary

GR No 158088 ; July 6, 2005

FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and theDepartment of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute
of the InternationalCriminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over
the most seriouscrimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
aggression as defined by theStatute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory state.

Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

ISSUE: Can the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President?

RULING: NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external
relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the
mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In treaty-making, the President has the
sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid.
(Sec. 21, Art VII). The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in
the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

82
WHO v Aquino

GR No L-35131; Apr 9, 2021

FACTS: This case is an action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside respondent judge’s
refusal to quash a search warrant which he issued against the petitioner. Petitioner Dr. Leonce
Verstuyf is an official of the WHO (World Health Organization) assigned to the Regional Office
in Manila as acting Assistant Director of Health Services.

The case stems when petitioner Verstuyft’s personal effects contained in 12 crates entered the
Philippines as unaccompanied baggage, the baggages were allowed entry free from duties and
taxes, the respondent judge upon the insistence of respondent COSAC (Constabulary Offshore
Action Center) officers issued a search warrant for the items and baggages for violating RA 4712
of the Tariff Customs Code.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is
cloaked in diplomatic immunity, with him being a member of diplomatic missions pursuant to
the Host Agreement; with this being said he prayed for the dismissal of the search warrants. The
Solicitor General also joined the petitioner for the quashal of the search warrant.

ISSUE: Is the petitioner exempted from search and seizure under diplomatic immunity?

RULING: YES. It is a recognized principle of international law under our system of separation
of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to
look beyond a determination by the executive branch of government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive department it is the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity.

83
DFA v NLRC

GR No. 113191 ; Sept 18, 1996

FACTS: On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against
Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the
other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor
Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from
legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1)
and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in
relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government
Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived
its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor of Magnayi. The
ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on November 3, 1993, the DFA referred the matter to
the NLRC and in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When
DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Is ADB immune from suit?

2. Has ADB descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction?

RULING:

1. YES. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal
process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations,
as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part,
enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The
Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty
covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must
be respected.

84
 Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs
and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,
such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. NO, ADB did not descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction.
Otherwise, it should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit through entering
into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts
of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to classical or
absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts
of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the
sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not
with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.

Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be
the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is
whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the
foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction
must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident
thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In this case, the service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by
the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not
attach. Therefore, the act of ADB does not constitute a waiver of its immunity from suit.

85
Reyes v Bagatsing

GR No L-65366; Nov. 9, 1983

FACTS: Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a
permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from
2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United
States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a
short program would be held. During the course of the oral argument, it was stated that after the
delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the
International Conference for General Disbarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the Embassy or
any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the United States
Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such
conference. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to
ensure a peaceful march and rally."

It turned out that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact
as the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to police
intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for." To be more specific, reference was made to persistent
intelligence reports affirm[ing] the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or
disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend."
Respondent Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police
authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or
any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public
may be ensured."

There is a novel aspect to this case, If the rally were confined to Luneta, no question, as noted,
would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another park. As previously mentioned
though, there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of
the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard. That would be followed by the handing over of a

86
petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The
Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in
1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of
ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with
the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was
binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving
State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission
or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the
law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or
damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.

ISSUE: Did Mayor Bagatsing violate petitioners constitutional rights?

RULING: Yes. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the
State] has a right to prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably
for consultation and discussion of matters Of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the
utmost deference and respect. It is hot to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as 's
the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent.

As noted, on the afternoon of the hearing, October 25, 1983, this Court issued the minute
resolution granting the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march and rally scheduled

87
for the next day. That conclusion was inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. There was no justification then to deny the
exercise of the constitutional rights of tree speech and peaceable assembly. These rights are
assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. It is to be
admitted that it finds support In the previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations. There was no showing, however, that the distance between the
chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a
condition is satisfied. it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he
did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued
that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is less
than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated, Should it come, then the qualification
and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside.
The high estate accorded the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

88
Bayan v Zamora

G.R. No. 138570, Oct 10, 2000

FACTS: In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991,
the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On Sept 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the
Philippine panel to exchange notes on the complementary strategic interests of the United States
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other things, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement. On Oct 5, 1998, the VFA was ratified.

ISSUE: Can the President be faulted for grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the VFA and
referring the same to the Senate?

RULING: No. As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds
vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the
subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President,
in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by
the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress
itself is powerless to invade it.53 Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the President
involving the VFA-specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts - squarely fall within the sphere of
his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this
Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.

It is the Court’s considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the
same to the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in
him by the Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude
of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article
VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provision.
Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment,

89
may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the
Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the
fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised
a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the
VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of
Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred,
much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and
capricious manner.

90
Lasco v UN Revolving Fund

GR Nos 109095-109107; Feb 23, 1995

FACTS: Lasco, et al, were dismissed by the UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources
Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the UN. the
UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the UN for
exploration work in Dinagat Island. UNRFNRE argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction
and invokes its diplomatic immunity from suit

ISSUE: Does the UNRFNRE enjoy diplomatic immunity?

RULING: Yes. The diplomatic immunity of UNRFNRE was sufficiently established by the
letter of the Department of Foreign Affairs, recognizing and confirming the immunity of
UNRFNRE in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations where the Philippine Government was a party. Private respondent is not engaged in a
commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence here is by virtue of a joint project entered
into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat
Island. Its mission is not to exploit our natural resources and gain pecuniarily thereby but to help
improve the quality of life of the people, including that of petitioners.

91
China Machinery v Santa Maria

GR No. 185572 ; Feb 7, 2012

Facts: The Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the DOF entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU, hereinafter), wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine Government to finance the Northrail Project. The
Chinese government designated EXIM bank as the lender, while the PH government named the
DOF as the borrower. Under the MOU Thereafter, the Chinese Ambassador to the PH, Wang
Chungui, wrote a letter to DOF Sec. Camacho informing him of China National Machinery &
Equipment Corp. (Group), CNMEG hereinafter, designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail Project.Northrail and CNMEG executed a CONTRACT AGREEMENT for the
construction of Sec 1 Phase 1 of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on
a turnkey basis. The contract price for the Northrail project was USD 421, 050,000. Thereafter,
the PH Government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement. In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor of the PH Government in order to finance the construction of Phase 1 of the
Northrail Project.

Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract alleging that the Contract Agreement
and the Loan Agreement were void for being contraty to (a) the Constitution, (b) RA No 9184,
otherwise known as the Government Procurmenr Reform Act; (c) PD No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) EO 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Is the Contract Agreement an executive agreement?

RULING: NO. To be considered an executive agreement, the following three requisites

provided under the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be
between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must be governed by international law.

In this case, the first and third requisite are not present. The Contract Agreement was not
concluded between the Philippines and China, but between Northrail and CNMEG. By the terms

92
of the Contract Agreement, Northrail is a government-owned or -controlled corporation, while
CNMEG is a corporation duly organized and created under the laws of the People’s Republic of
China. Thus, both Northrail and CNMEG entered into the Contract Agreement as entities with
personalities distinct and separate from the Philippine and Chinese governments, respectively.
Also, Article 2 of the Conditions of Contract, states: “The contract shall in all respects be read
and construed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.” Since the Contract Agreement
explicitly provides that Philippine law shall be applicable, the parties have effectively conceded
that their rights and obligations thereunder are not governed by international law.

93
GTZ v CA

GR No 152318; Apr 16, 2009

FACTS: In 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the
Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical Co-operation in Bonn, capital of then
West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries’ “common interest in promoting the
technical and economic development of their States from closer technical co-operation” and
allowed for the conclusion of “arrangements concerning individual projects of technical
co-operation.” Thereafter, in 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs
Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in
furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. The Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of both
governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health Insurance - Networking and
Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to “enable Philippine families - especially poor
ones - to maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality.” It appears that
SHINE had already been in existence prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement though the
record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless, the Arrangement
stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments.

Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE. On
the other hand, Anne Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE project manager.
Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in various matters. The
dispute culminated in a letter, signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and
copies furnished to officials of the DOH, PhilHealth, and the director of the Manila office of
GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up
several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response. Negotiations ensued
between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents
received a letter from Nicolay informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of
employment on the grounds of “serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting in
loss of confidence and trust.” Thus, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the NLRC, naming as respondents GTZ, the director of its Manila office Hans Peter
Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay.

94
GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental
functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

ISSUE: Does GTZ enjoy immunity from suit?

RULING: NO. The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or foreign state,
is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that “the State may not be
sued without its consent.” Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a
private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The
logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or
profit. If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany,
there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is
whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ.
It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are the parameters of the legal personality of
GTZ.

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that
it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.

95
In the present case, GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own
official internet website in the “Corporate Profile” section. This self-description of GTZ in its
own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners’ argument that GTZ is
entitled to immunity from suit because it is “an implementing agency.” The statement does not
dispute the characterization of GTZ as an “implementing agency of the Federal Republic of
Germany,” yet it bolsters the nation that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal
personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is entirely possible that
under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been vested or has
been specifically deprived of the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the
proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it
has not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We
adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular
subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines, and following the most
intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled
corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly
consented to be sued.

Hence, the Court holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with
satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the
Federal Republic. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within
proper bounds when they refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the
complaint against it.

96
JUSMAG-Philippines v NLRC

GR No. 108813 ; Dec 15, 1994

FACTS: Florencio Sacramento was one of the seventy-four (74) security assistance support
personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group-Philippines
(JUSMAG-Philippines). His services were later on terminated allegedly due to the abolition of
his position. Afterwards, he filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG.
Meanwhile, JUSMAG moved to dismiss the complaint; arguing that it was immune from suit as
an agency of the U.S.. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
Sacramento appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC relied on the case of Lyons vs. U.S., where the U.S.
Government was considered to have waived its immunity from suit by entering into a contract of
stevedoring services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the local courts.

ISSUE: Is JUSMAG immune from suit?

RULING: YES. The existence of a contract does not, per se, mean that sovereign states may, at
all times, be sued in local courts, as what was ruled in Lyons vs. U.S.. In U.S. vs. Ruiz, it was held
that if the contract was entered into in the discharge of its governmental functions, the sovereign
state cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. In this case, it is apparent that
when JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was performing a governmental function on
behalf of the U.S. pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The Military Assistance
Agreement was an agreement between the Philippine Government and the U.S. Government;
which created JUSMAG whose primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines on air force,
army and naval matters. Hence, JUSMAG is correct that the suit is, in effect, one against the U.S.
Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the complaint. Considering that the U.S. has not
waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper.

97
ICMC v Calleja

GR No: 85750; Sept 28, 1990

FACTS: As an aftermath of the Vietnam War, the plight of Vietnamese refugees fleeing from
South Vietnam's communist rule confronted the international community. In response to this
crisis, an Agreement was forged between the Philippine Government and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees whereby an operating center for processing Indo-Chinese
refugees for eventual resettlement to other countries was to be established in Bataan.

ICMC was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee
processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of
the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work.
It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and
enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. As an international organization rendering voluntary and
humanitarian services in the Philippines.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members
employed by ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on the ground that it is an international
organization registered with the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic immunity.

Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), reversed the Med-Arbiter's
Decision and ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. At that time, ICMC's
request for recognition as a specialized agency was still pending with the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DEFORAF).

Subsequently, DEFORAF, granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding
diplomatic privileges and immunities, as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement between
the Government and ICMC. ICMC then sought the immediate dismissal of the TUPAS Petition
for Certification Election sustaining the affirmative of the proposition citing:

(1) its Memorandum of Agreement with the Philippine Government giving it the status of
a specialized agency, (infra);

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 (2) the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by
the UN General Assembly on 21 November 1947 and concurred in by the Philippine
Senate through Resolution No. 91 on 17 May 1949 (the Philippine Instrument of
Ratification was signed by the President on 30 August 1949 and deposited with the UN
on 20 March 1950) infra; and

(3) Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which declares that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

ISSUE: Does the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extend to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws?

RULING: YES. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of
separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts
should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity
upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer
acting under his direction.

Hence, in adherence to the settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction as to
embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted
doctrine that in such cases the judicial department of the government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction.

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC is clearly necessitated by its international
character and respective purposes.

The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very
purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance
with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice
of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their
functions.

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ICMC's immunity from local jurisdiction by no means deprives labor of its basic rights, which
are guaranteed by Article II, Section 18, Article III, Section 8, and Article XIII, Section 3
(supra), of the 1987 Constitution.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section
31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United
Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of
settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which
the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of
Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of
privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in
fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as
evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)
wherein “both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of
maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees.”

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Liang v People

G.R. No. 125865; Mar 26, 2001

FACTS: Two criminal Informations for grave oral defamation were filed against petitioner
Jeffrey Liang, a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). The information alleged that on separate occasions, petitioner allegedly uttered
defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical staff of ADB.

Having been advised by DFA that the petitioner enjoyed immunity from legal processes, MTC
dismissed the criminal informations against him. The MTC Decision, however, was annulled and
set aside by RTC.

The Supreme Court likewise ruled in its January 28, 2000 Decision that the immunity granted to
officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. It further held that the immunity cannot cover the commission of a crime such as
slander or oral defamation in the name of official duty.

ISSUE: Were the statements allegedly made by petitioner uttered while in the performance of his
official functions to fall under the diplomatic immunity of ADB?

Ruling: NO. There is no cogent reason to disturb the Decision of January 28, 2000. The slander
of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity
granted to ADB officers and personnel. This decision, however, does not have the effect of
prejudging the criminal case for oral defamation against him. What is meant here is that slander,
in general, cannot be considered as an act performed in an official capacity. The issue of whether
or not petitioner's utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to determine.

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Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading

G.R. No. L-14279; Oct 31, 1961

FACTS: Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and
garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila. In as much as none of the shipments had the
certificate required by Central Bank Circular Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods
imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of Section
1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the said circulars. It is argued by
Eastern Sea Trading that, among other things, the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported
from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only because the same seeks
to implement an executive agreement — extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial
Agreements with Japan — which (executive agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity, but,
also, because there is no governmental agency authorized to issue the import license required by
the aforementioned executive order.

ISSUE: Is the executive agreement subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate?

RULING: NO. While the concurrence of the Senate is required by the Constitution in the
making of "treaties," "executive agreements" may be validly entered into without such
concurrence. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two
thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the
need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress.

Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as
executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or
"protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or
otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to
undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time
to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the

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trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in
character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer
to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of
the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on
shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations
generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights,
etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter,
such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims
against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

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Deutsche Bank v CIR

GR No. 188550; Aug 19, 2013

FACTS: In accordance with Section 28(A)(5)4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
of 1997, petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent on 21 October 2003 the amount of PHP
67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)
on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB
Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.

Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR Large
Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative claim for
refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the
same date, petitioner requested from the International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a
confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty.

Alleging the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA on 18 October 2005. Petitioner reiterated its claim for the refund or issuance of its
tax credit certificate for the amount of PHP 22,562,851.17 representing the alleged excess BPRT
paid on branch profits remittance to DB Germany.

ISSUE: Does the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 deprive persons of the benefit
of a tax treaty.

RULING: NO. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the
objective of RMO No. 1-2000. Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles
of international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored international principle of
pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of
the states that enter into the agreement. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and
obligations under the treaty must be performed by them in good faith. More importantly, treaties
have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction. Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the
national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid

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simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions." CIR v. S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc. further
clarifies that "tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the elimination of international
juridical double taxation, which is defined as the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more
states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter and for identical periods. The
apparent rationale for doing away with double taxation is to encourage the free flow of goods
and services and the movement of capital, technology and persons between countries, conditions
deemed vital in creating robust and dynamic economies. Foreign investments will only thrive in
a fairly predictable and reasonable international investment climate and the protection against
double taxation is crucial in creating such a climate." Simply put, tax treaties are entered into to
minimize, if not eliminate the harshness of international juridical double taxation, which is why
they are also known as double tax treaty or double tax agreements. "A state that has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." Thus, laws and issuances
must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto.
The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs
provided for under international agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does
not provide for any pre-requisite for the availment of the benefits under said agreement.
Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a
deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We
recognize the clear intention of the BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s
outright denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly comply with the prescribed period is not
in harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that the benefits granted under
tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations. Bearing in mind the rationale of
tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as required by RMO
No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a violation
of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the availment of
tax relief for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the
administrative issuance would impair the value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a
tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to
the relief. The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of
RMO No. 1-2000. Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on

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international relations, and unduly discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought
to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an administrative procedure, these may be
remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the imposition of a fine or penalty.

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Guerrero Transport v Blaylock

GR No L-41518; June 30, 1976

FACTS: On June 1, 1972, the United States Naval Base authorities at Subic, Zambales,
conducted a public bidding for a five-year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the
transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero,
owner- operator of Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc., herein petitioner, over Concepcion F.
Blaylock, the then incumbent concessionaire doing business under the name of "Blaylock
Transport Services", whose 395 employees are members of respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN.
When petitioner, after the commencement of its operation on January 1, 1973, refused to employ
the members of the respondent union, the latter. On January, 12, 1975, filed a complaint with the
National Labor Relations Commission docketed as NLRC Case No. 214, against Guerrero's
Transport Services, Inc. and Santiago Guerrero, to compel them to employ its members pursuant
to Article 1, Section 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement dated May 27, 1968. This case was
dismissed by the National Labor Relations Commission on March 13, 1973, upon petitioner's
motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee relationship
between the parties.

ISSUE: Can the employees of respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN compel the petitioner to
employ them.

RULING: YES. pursuant to Section 6 of Article I of the Philippine-U S. Labor Agreement of

May 27, 1968, the United States Armed Forces undertook, consistent with military requirements,
"to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the
United States Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessionaire to give priority
consideration to affected employees for employment. As above indicated, under the Compromise
Agreement as embodied in the Resolution of this Court dated October 24, 1975, the parties
agreed to submit to the Secretary of Labor the determination as to who of the members of the
respondent union BTEA-KILUSAN shall be absorbed or employed by the herein petitioner
Guerrero's Transport Services, Inc., and that such determination shall be considered as final.

107
108
USA v Purganan

GR No 148571; Sept 24, 2002

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,
through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from
filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.

The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud
the United States and to commit certain offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud; (4) false
statements; and (5) illegal campaign contributions

ISSUES:

1. Is Jimenez entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued?

2. Is Jimenez entitled to bail?

RULING:

1. NO. It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the
word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them,
and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent
to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended
the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of

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 urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued.

By using the phrase "if it appears," the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such an early stage. The trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition.From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.

Also in Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does
not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized."

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not
sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If
a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite --
would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated predisposition to flee.

2. NO. Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a

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case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. That the
offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is
not an argument to grant him one in the present case. He should apply for bail before the
courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. The denial
of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to
Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily
surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their
detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the
emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need
for their speedy disposition. It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of the respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in
that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those
proceedings could be completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes
prescribed under its laws. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.

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USAFFE v Treasurer of the Philippines

GR No. L-10500; June 30, 1959

FACTS: In October 1941, by two special orders, General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding
General of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (known as USAFFE) placed under his command
all the Philippine Army units including the Philippine Constabulary, about 100,000 officers and
soldiers. Out of the total amounts thus appropriated by the U.S. Congress as itemized,
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the Philippines Armed Forces by means of vouchers
which stated "Advance of Funds under Public law 353-77th Congress and Executive Order No.
9011". This amount was used (mostly) to discharge in the Philippine Islands the monetary
obligations assumed by the U.S. Government as a result of the induction of the Philippine Armed
Forces into the U.S. Army, and of its operations beginning in 1941. Part of these obligations
consisted in the claims of Filipino USAFFE soldiers for arrears in pay and in the charges for
supplies used by them and the guerrillas. Of the millions so transferred, there remained
unexpended and uncommitted in the possession of the Philippine Armed Forces as of December
31, 1949 about 35 million dollars. As at that time, the Philippine Government badly needed
funds for its activities, President Quirino, through Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central
Bank proposed to the corresponding officials of the U.S. Government the retention of the
35-million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in ten annual installments. After protracted
negotiations the deal was concluded, and the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was signed in
Washington on November 6, 1950, by the then Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P.
Romulo, and the then American Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder.

In this appeal, the Usaffe Veterans reiterated with extended arguments their basic propositions.
They insists: first, the money delivered to the U.S. to the Armed Forces of the Philippine Island
were straight payments for military services; ownership thereof vested in the Philippine
Government upon delivery, and consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as
a loan; and second, the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was void because it was not binding on the
Philippine Government for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same.

ISSUE: Is the Romulo-Snyder Agreement void because it was not binding on the Philippine
Government for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same?

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RULING: NO. That the agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the Constitution, is
conceded. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 10
(7)). However, it must be noted that a treaty is not the only form that an international agreement
may assume. For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senate does not
exhaust the power of the government over international relations. Consequently, executive
agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even without the concurrence of
the Senate.

Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts
affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be
termed as presidential agreements and (2) agreements entered into in pursuant of acts of
Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.

The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on
September 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the
Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of the United
States, its agencies or instrumentalities. Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative
authorization, it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and validly
entered into to conform to the second category, namely, "agreements entered into purely as
executive acts without legislative authorization." This second category usually includes money
agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that this
method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind.

113
Abaya v Ebdane

GR No. 167919 ; Feb 14, 2007

FACTS: Based on the Exchange of Notes dated December 27, 1999, the Government of Japan
and the Government of the Philippines, through their respective representatives, Ambassador
Yoshihisa Ara and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo L. Siazon, have reached an
understanding concerning Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines. In accordance with
the agreement reached by the Government of Japan and the Philippine Government, the
Philippines obtained from and was granted a loan by the JBIC (Loan Agreement No. PH-P204).
The proceeds of the loan was to be used to finance the Arterial Road Links Development Project
(Phase IV). Subsequently, the DPWH caused the publication of the invitation to bid for the
implementation of the project in two leading national newspapers. A total of 23 foreign and local
contractors responded to the invitation, but only eight contractors were evaluated or considered
eligible to bid as concurred by the JBIC. One of them, however, withdrew; thus, only seven
contractors submitted their bid proposals. After evaluations, the contract was recommended by
Mr. Ezawa, Project Consultant of the Project, to be awarded to private respondent China Road &
Bridge Corporation. Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012 was issued recommending the award in
favor of private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract or the
implementation of civil works. A Contract of Agreement was entered into by and between the
DPWH and private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation for the implementation of the
project.

The petitioners seek to nullify DPWH Resolution No. PHJL-A-04-012, and the contract of
agreement subsequently entered into by and between the DPWH and China Road & Bridge
Corporation. They assert that the award of the contract to private respondent violates RA 9184
known as the Government Procurement Reform Act particularly Sec. 31 thereof. In connection
to this, the petitioners insist that the Loan Agreement PH-P204 between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government is neither a treaty, an international nor an executive agreement that would
bar the application of RA 9184. They point out that to be considered a treaty, an international or
an executive agreement, the parties must be two sovereigns or States whereas in the case of Loan

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Agreement PH-P204 here, the parties are the Philippine Government and the JBIC, a banking
agency of Japan, which has a separate juridical personality from the Japanese Government.

ISSUE: Is the Loan Agreement PH-P204 between the Government of Japan and the Philippine
Government an executive agreement?

RULING: YES. The Loan Agreement was executed by and between the JBIC and the Philippine
Government pursuant to the Exchange of Notes executed by and between Ambassador Ara, and
then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, on behalf of their respective governments. The Exchange
of Notes expressed that the two governments have reached an understanding concerning
Japanese loans to be extended to the Philippines and that these loans were aimed at promoting
our country’s economic stabilization and development efforts. Loan Agreement No. PH-P204
was executed and declared that it was so entered by the parties with a view to promoting the
economic stabilization and development efforts of the Republic of the Philippines. Under the
circumstances, the JBIC may well be considered an adjunct of the Japanese Government.
Further, Loan Agreement No. PH-P204 is indubitably an integral part of the Exchange of Notes.
It forms part of the Exchange of Notes such that it cannot be properly taken independent thereof.
In this connection, it is well to understand the definition of an "exchange of notes" under
international law. According to the United Nations Treaty Collection, an "exchange of notes" is a
record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law contract. The
agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession
of the one signed by the representative of the other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting
State repeats the text of the offering State to record its assent. The signatories of the letters may
be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads. The technique of exchange of notes
is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or, sometimes, to avoid the
process of legislative approval.

It is stated that "treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda

of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes" all refer to "international instruments
binding at international law."Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an
executive agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without the need of a

115
vote by the Senate or Congress. According to Francis B. Sayre, former United States High
Commissioner to the Philippines, “Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our
scheme of government than are the more formal instruments – treaties and conventions. They
sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated "agreements" or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between
this and other governments ends and agreements – whether denominated executive agreements
or exchange of notes or otherwise – begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It
would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such,
concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into
under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments.”

116
DMB v Kolonwel Trading

GR No 175608; June 8, 2007

FACTS: In the middle of 2005, DepEd requested the services of the DBM-PS to undertake
procurement project which is to be jointly funded by the World Bank (WB), thru the Second
Social Expenditure Management Program (SEMP2) of the RP-IBRD Loan Agreement No.
7118-PH and the Asian Development Bank (ABD) thru SEDIP Loan No. 1654-PHI. In October
2005, the DBM-PS called for a bidding for the supply of the Makabayan textbooks and teachers
manuals. Of the entities, foreign and local, only eleven (11) bidders submitted, including private
respondent Kolonwel.

Following the bid and the book content/body evaluation process, DBM committee issued a
resolution disqualifying, among others, Kolonwel for “failure in cover stock testing “. Kolonwel
was informed of this and subsequently filed with RTC Manila a special civil action for certiorari
with a prayer for TRO. In support of its TRO application, Kolonwel alleged, among other things,
that the supply-awardees were rushing with the implementation of the void supply contracts to
beat the closing-date deadline. After summary hearing, the Manila RTC issued a 20-day TRO,
and later issued a decision wherein Resolution 001-2006-A of the DBM was annulled and set
aside. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was the resolution of the DBM disqualifying Kolonwel proper?

RULING: NO. Under the fundamental international principle of pacta sunt servanda, the RP, as
borrower, bound itself to perform in good faith the duties and obligations under Loan No.
7118-PH. Applying this postulate, the DBM IABAC, was legally obliged to comply with, or
accord primacy to the WB guidelines on the conduct and implementation of the
bidding/procurement process in question.

Foreign loan agreements with international financial institutions, such as Loan No. 7118-PH,
partake of an executive or international agreement within the purview of Sec. 4 of RA9184.
Significantly, whatever was stipulated in the loan agreement, shall primarily govern the
procurement of goods necessary to implement the main project.

117
Philip Morris v CA

GR No 91332 ; July 16, 1993

FACTS: Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Virginia, United States of America, and not doing business in the Philippines. They are registered
owners "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration issued by the
Philippine Patent Office.

They asserted that even if they are not doing business in the Philippines and are suing on an
isolated transaction, Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes
bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of
Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the
case from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs maintain that since their trademarks are entitled to protection by treaty obligation under
Article 2 of the Paris Convention and since this is an action for a violation or infringement of a
trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of
proof to support it.

For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with
the Philippine Patent Office. Private respondent alleged further that it has been authorized by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK",
and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated.

ISSUE: Does Philip Morris have rights over the patent pursuant to the treaty of the Paris
Convention of 1965?

RULING: NO. To sustain a successful prosecution of their suit for infringement, petitioners
considered to be of significant interest and which they desire to impress upon the Court, the
protection they enjoy under the Paris Convention of 1965 to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat the matter with an
extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to the 1965 international covenant due
to Pact Sunt Servanda had been acknowledged in La Chemise.

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Petitioners, as foreign corporations not engaged in local commerce, rely on section 21-A of the
Trademark Law reading as follows:

“Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or trade-name has been
registered or assigned under this act may bring an action hereunder for infringement, for unfair
competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it has been
licensed to do business in the Philippines under Act Numbered Fourteen hundred and fifty-nine,
as amended, otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings complaint: Provided,
That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person is a citizen or in which it
is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a similar privilege to corporate or juristic
persons of the Philippines.” (As inserted by Sec. 7 of Republic Act No. 638.)

To drive home the point that they are not precluded from initiating a cause of action in the
Philippines on account of the principal perception that another entity is pirating their symbol
without any lawful authority to do so. Judging from a perusal of the aforequoted Section 21-A,
the conclusion reached by petitioners is certainly correct for the proposition in support thereof is
embedded in the Philippine legal jurisprudence.

Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving trademarks, there can be no
disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in
business in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily because of
Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners
have done in the case at hand.

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Province of North Cotabato v GRP

GR No 183591; Oct 14, 2008

FACTS: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF were to sign a MOA
on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Upon motion of petitioners, this Court issued a TRO enjoining the
GRP from signing the same. While peace negotiations were still on-going, the MILF took control
of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Then President Estrada carried out an
“all-out-war” against the MILF. When President Gloria Arroyo assumed office, she asked
Malaysia to convince MILF to return to the negotiating table. Formal talks took place in Tripoli,
Libya. The Tripoli Agreement 2001 contained the Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and
Ancestral Domain Aspect. Another round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia which
ended with the signing of Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect. In 2005, several
exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the
MOA-AD which was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

ISSUES:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and
the right to information when they negotiated and later initiated the MOA-AD?

2. Were the contents of the MOA-AD contrary to law?

RULING:

1. Yes. It is provided under Section 7, Article III on the Bill of Rights: The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. In this case, the MOA-AD is a matter
of public concern. It involves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large. as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to
information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under Section 28,

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 Article II of the Constitution reading: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the
right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise
of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda and
these are: 1. E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997.

2. YES. These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to
vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province,
city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part
of Philippine territory for independence.,

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not comply with Article X, Section 20 of the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions. Article II, Section 22 of the
Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights
of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development." An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may
be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national
government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in

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international practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity. Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD
is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the
Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.

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Santos v Northwest Airlines

GR No. 101538; June 23, 1992

FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent
Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota,
U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. On October
21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his
flight from San Francisco to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from
Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return to San Francisco.

On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA counter in the San Francisco
airport for his scheduled departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and
re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to Manila.
He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in
the RTC of Makati. On April 13, 1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as follows: Art. 28.
(1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has
been made, or before the court at the place of destination. The private respondent contended that
the Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of business. Neither was the
petitioner’s ticket issued in this country nor was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the
United States. Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Does the Philippines have jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: NO. The Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The
petitioner’s allegations are not convincing enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the
Convention considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most convenient forums for
the litigation of any claim that may arise between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished
from all other places. Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed

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by aircraft for hire. Whether the transportation is “international” is determined by the contract of
the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides
for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals “within the
territories of two High Contracting Parties,” the provisions of the Convention automatically
apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

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Adolfo v CFI

GR No L-30650; July 31, 1970

FACTS: On September 1, 1969, the Municipal Judge of Subic, Zambales, the Honorable Nicolas
C. Adolfo, against the Court of First Instance of that province and a certain Albert L. Merchant,
to reverse the decision of respondent CFI that annulled the petitioner’s order in a criminal case
pending before him declaring as non-existent the custody receipt issued by the Commander of
the United States Naval Base at Subic Bay for the provisional liberty of the respondent Albert L.
Merchant, the accused in that case, so that the warrant for his arrest could be reissued pursuant to
Article 13 of the United States-Philippines Military Bases Agreement of 1937.

The 1947 Military Bases Agreement provides : "In all cases over which the Philippines exercises
jurisdiction the custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted
without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing
that such accused has been delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the
Philippines and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when
required by it. The commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney)
with a copy of the information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the
competent court." It likewise alleged that the clause "in all cases over which the Philippines
exercises jurisdiction" did obviously refer to the second paragraph of the same article which
reads: " The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
committed outside the bases by any member of armed forces of the United States."

"There is no dispute that the crime for which respondent Albert L. Merchant is charged was
committed outside a base and said respondent, though a citizen of the United States, is a civilian
employee or component of the U.S. Naval Base at Subic Bay, thus not a member of the armed
forces of the United States within the purview of the oft-repeated Base Agreement."

The respondent CFI justifies that even if the right of custody of a commanding officer over the
person of an accused civilian component of the base is not prescribed by the original Base
Agreement, nonetheless such a right is now provided for in paragraph 5 of the Agreed Official

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Minutes of the Agreement, entered into between the Philippines and the United States on August
10, 1965.

ISSUE: Are the exchange of notes binding?

RULING: NO. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy
and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. "

"We can thus see that executive agreements cover such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, property relations like patent rights, trademark and copyrights, postal, navigation,
settlement of private claims, tariff and trade matters. These types of agreements are certainly not
in the plane of one, like the U.S. — P.I. Military Bases Agreement, which affects and reduces to
a certain degree the territorial authority, the jurisdiction and even the dignity of the country and
its people. Said Base Agreement undoubtedly involves more than a national policy, and is
practically of a permanent nature (99 years or longer, Art. XXIX, ibid.). Therefore, said
Agreement is a treaty which must be ratified, as it was ratified, by the Senate." 7 The petition
reinforced the above conclusion with this argument: "Since the power to make treaties is lodged
under our Constitution with the President with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, the
power to amend these treaties must similarly be vested in those organs of the government. After
all, an amendment to a statute produces one law, usually the statute as amended. (Black.

Interpretation of Laws, P. 574). In pari materia is the observation that only Congress, with its
legislative power, can make laws and alter or repeal them.

Therefore, as applied to this case, the making of the treaty having been undertaken under the
joint auspices of the President and the Senate, its amendment or revision must similarly be
undertaken by both agencies of the State as directed by the Constitution. The August 10, 1965
notes to the U.S.-P.I. Military Bases Agreement of 1947, not having been ratified yet by the
Senate, remain as mere proposals."

126
127
US (ALEXANDER TELLECH) v AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

Tripartite Claims Commission; May 25, 1928.

FACTS: This claim is put forward by the United States on behalf of Alexander Tellech for
compensation for time lost and for alleged suffering and privation to which he was subjected,
first through internment in Austria, and then through enforced military service in the
Austro-Hungarian army.

The claimant was born in the United States of Austrian parents on May 14, 1895. Under the
Constitution and laws of the United States he was bv birth an American national. Under the laws
of Austria he also possessed Austrian nationality by parentage. This created a conflict in
citizenship, frequently described as "dual nationality". When the claimant was five years of age
he accompanied his parents to Austria, where he continued to reside. In August, 1914, the
claimant, while residing in Austria a short distance from the Russian border, was subjected to
preventive arrest as an agitator engaged in propaganda in favor of Russia. After investigation he
was interned and confined in internment camps for 16 months. He then took the oath of
allegiance to the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and was impressed into service in the
Austro-Hungarian army. A decision of the sharply controverted claim that this oath was taken
under duress and that he protested that he was an American citizen is not necessary to a
disposition of this case. It appears that in 1915 and later representatives of the Government of the
United States in Austria interested themselves in securing his release, but the application was
denied. In July, 1916, the claimant deserted from the Austro-Hungarian army and escaped into
Russia, where he was arrested and held by the Russian army authorities as a prisoner of war until
the outbreak of the Kerensky revolution, when he was released and thereupon returned to Prague,
where he still lives and where he is practicing medicine. The action taken by the Austrian civil
authorities in the exercise of their police powers and by the Austro-Hungarian military
authorities, of which complaint is made, was taken in Austria, where claimant was voluntarily
residing, against claimant as an Austrian citizen.

ISSUE: Does the law of Austria apply despite the dual citizenship of Alexander Tellech?

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RULING: YES. His arrest in August, 1914, of claimant, a national of Austria and United States,
residing in Austria, as an agitator, followed by his internment and his being impressed into
service in Austro-Hungarian army. Held that claim for compensation for lost time, suffering and
privation falls outside terms of the Treaty of Vienna. Citizenship is determined by rules
prescribed by municipal law. Under the law of Austria, to which claimant had voluntarily
subjected himself, he was an Austrian citizen. The Austrian and the Austro-Hungarian authorities
were well within their rights in dealing with him as such. Possessing as he did dual nationality,
he voluntarily took the risk of residing in Austrian territory and subjecting himself to the duties
and obligations of an Austrian citizen arising under the municipal laws of Austria. Assuming that
the claimant suffered the loss and injury alleged and had not lost his American citizenship by
taking the Austrian Army oath, the Commissioner finds no provision of the Treaty of Vienna or
of Budapest obligating Austria and/or Hungary to make compensation therefor. Wherefore the
Commission decrees that under the Treaty of Vienna and the Treaty of Budapest the Government
of Austria and the Government of Hungary are not obligated to pay to the Government of the
United States any amount on behalf of the claimant herein.

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Canevaro Case

PCA; 3 May 1912

FACTS: Raphael Canevaro has on several occasions conducted himself as a Peruvian citizen,
both by standing as a candidate for the Senate, where none are admitted except Peruvian citizens
and where he went on to defend his election, and also especially in accepting the office of Consul
General of the Netherlands, after having solicited the authorization of the Peruvian Government
and then of the Peruvian Congress.

The firm of José Canevaro & Sons was a Peruvian company which held payment drafts in the
amount of 77,000 pounds sterling, issued by the Peruvian government in December 1880 in
order to settle a previous debt to this firm. These drafts were not paid at the date fixed for
payment.

In 1889 Peru enacted legislation concerning the settlement of its domestic debt, which provided
that the debt would be paid in the form of bonds bearing interest at the rate of one per cent. In
reliance on this law, Peru refused the full payment of the Canevaro firm’s claim. The Canevaro
firm transferred the payment drafts to two of the heirs of José Canevaro, who were Italian
nationals, who in turn sought payment.

Italy and Peru agreed to submit to arbitration the questions of this case.

ISSUE:

1. Did the Canevaro Brothers have the right to demand the total of the amount claimed and was
the Peruvian government obligated to pay in cash or in accordance with the 1889 legislation?

2. Did Rafael Canevaro have the right to be considered as an Italian claimant?

RULING:

1. NO. Rafael Canevaro, was Italian jus sanguinis and Peruvian jus soli. The tribunal held
(1912) that “Peru has a right… to deny his status as an Italian claimant” because “as a matter
of fact, Rafael Canevaro has on several occasions acted as a Peruvian citizen” by running

130
 as a candidate for the Peruvian Senate and defending his election thereto and by securing the
authorization of the Peruvian Government and Congress for his acceptance of the office of
Consul General of the Netherlands.

2. NO. Whereas, according to Peruvian Legislation (34 of the Constitution), Rafael Canevaro is
a Peruvian by birth because born on Peruvian Territory, and, whereas, on the other hand,
according to Italian legislation (Article 44 of the Civil Code) he is of Italian nationality
because born of an Italian father; whereas, as a matter of fact, Rafael Canevaro had on
several occasions acted as a Peruvian citizen, both by running as a candidate for the Senate,
where non are admitted except Peruvian citizens and where he succeeded in defending his
election, and, particularly, by accepting the office of Consul-General for the Netherlands,
after having secured the authorization of both the Peruvian Government and the Peruvian
Congress; under these circumstances, whatever Rafael Canevaro’s status as a national may be
in Italy, the Government of Peru has a right to consider him a Peruvian citizen and deny
his status as an Italian claimant.

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The Nottebohm Case

ICJ Reports; April 6, 1955

FACTS: Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Hamburg, Germany, and was a German citizen,
although he moved to Guatemala in 1903, and conducted a business in trade, banking and
plantations with his brothers, but never became a citizen of Guatemala.

In 1939, he applied to become a citizen of Liechtenstein. His application was approved and he
became a citizen, even though a requirement was that he be in residence there for at least 3 years,
but there was an exception and he became a citizen of Liechtenstein. When he tried to re-enter
Guatemala in 1943, he was refused entry. Liechtenstein offered Nottebohm protection against the
government of Guatemala and sued Guatemala in the International Court of Justice. However,
the government of Guatemala argued that Nottebohm did not gain Liechtenstein citizenship for
the purposes of international law.

ISSUE: Is the conferment of the Lichtenstein citizenship contrary to international law?

RULING: NO. The court agreed with Guatemala and held that claims by Lichtenstein were
inadmissible. Although the Court stated that it is the sovereign right of all states to determine its
own citizens and criteria for becoming one in municipal law, such a process would have to be
scrutinized on the international plain in questions of diplomatic protection. The Court upheld the
principle of effective nationality, where the national must prove a meaningful connection to the
state in question. This principle was previously applied only in cases of dual nationality to
determine which nationality should be used in a given case. However, Nottebohm had forfeited
his German nationality and thus only had the nationality of Liechtenstein.

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US Chattin v Mexico

Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol IV; 1927

FACTS: In this claim before the General Claims Commission, the United States seeks indemnity
on behalf of B.E. Chattin. Action came after Chattin, an employee for the Ferrocarril
Sud-Pacifico de Mexico (Southern Pacific Railroad Company of Mexico) and who performed his
duties in the State of Sinaloa, was arrested on a charge of embezzlement. Imprisoned, Chattin
was imprisoned. He was never properly informed of the charges against him. Additionally, he
was given the opportunity to testify only after 6 months of incarceration. Finally, the hearings for
his case lasted only 5 minutes in actuality, thus depriving him of his ability to properly defend
himself. Chattin now posits a denial of justice on his part by the Government of Mexico.

ISSUE: Was Chattin denied justice by the government of the United Mexican States?

RULING: YES. Under International Law, a direct denial of justice occurs when there is
convincing evidence showing the judicial acts of a country are tainted with outrage, bad faith,
wilful neglect of duty, or manifestly insufficient governmental action. In this case, Chattin was
deprived of speedy proceedings by the court with jurisdiction; he was only given a chance to
testify 6 months after his arrest. Neither were such proceedings properly conducted, as no
attempts to further investigate other involved parties were made. Finally, Chattin was not given
the opportunity to actually freely express himself. Thus, due to this apparent lack of seriousness
as well as the clear indications of neglect by the court with jurisdiction, a denial of justice
occurred.

133
Noyes Case: US v Panama

Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol VI; May 22, 1933

FACTS: In this case a claim is made against the Republic of Panama by the United States of
America on behalf of Walter A. Noyes, who was born, and has ever remained, an American
citizen. The sum of $1,683 is claimed as an indemnity for the personal injuries and property
losses sustained by Mr. Noyes through the attacks made upon him on June 19, 1927, in, and in
the neighborhood of, the village of Juan Diaz, situated not far from Panama City. The claim is
based upon an alleged failure to provide to the claimant adequate police protection, to exercise
due diligence in the maintenance of order and to take adequate measures to apprehend and
punish the aggressors.

At about 3:00 p.m. the claimant passed through the village in his automobile, on his return to
Panama City from a trip to the Tapia River bridge. In the center of the village a crowd blocked
the road and Mr. Noyes stopped and sounded his horn, whereupon the crowd slowly opened.
Whilst he was progressing very slowly through it, he had to stop again, because somebody
lurched against the car and fell upon the running-board. Thereupon members of the crowd
smashed the windows of the car and attacked Mr. Noyes, who was stabbed in the wrist and hurt
by fragments of glass. A police officer who had been giving orders that gangway should be made
for the automobile, but who had not before been able to reach the car, then sprang upon the
running board and remained there, protecting the claimant and urging him to get away as quickly
as possible. He remained with Mr. Noyes, until the latter had got clear of the crowd. At some
distance from Juan Diaz the claimant was further attacked by members of the same crowd, who
pursued him in a bus and who forced him to drive his car off the road and into a ditch. He was
then rescued by General Pretelt who, having come from the opposite direction, had, after
reaching the plaza of the village, returned upon his way in order to protect Mr. Noyes against his
pursuers.

ISSUE: Is Republic of Panama liable for injuries sustained by the American National from an
unruly and intoxicated crowd in a small village?

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RULING: NO. It having been shown that the local police force of three members was reinforced
when disorder was apprehended, that a policeman and the police chief himself tried actively to
protect Noyes when he was attacked, and that it was not possible to pinpoint the culprits in view
of the tumultuous nature of the incident. The mere fact that an alien has suffered at the hands of
private persons an aggression, which could have been averted by the presence of a sufficient
police force on the spot, does not make a government liable for damages under international law.
Special circumstances must be shown circumstances from which the responsibility of the
authorities arises: either their behavior in connection with the particular occurrence, or a general
failure to comply with their duty to maintain order, to prevent crimes or to prosecute and punish
criminals. There were no such circumstances in the present case. Accordingly a lack of
protection has not been established. The claim is also based upon the failure of the Panamanian
authorities to prosecute the perpetrators of the aggressions upon the claimant. It is a fact that no
prosecutions were instituted. Taking into account however the conditions under which the events
had taken place, the Commission cannot conclude liability of the Panamanian Government in
this respect. The claim is disallowed

135
Youmans Case: US v Mexico

Opinions of the Commission; November 23, 1926

FACTS: Claim for damages in the amount of $50,000.00 is made in this case by the United
States of America against the United Mexican States in behalf of Thomas H. Youmans, the son
of Henry Youmans, an American citizen, who, together with two other Americans, John A.
Connelly and George Arnold, was killed at the hands of a mob in Mexico. Henry Youmans,
Connelly, and Arnold were employees engaged in the construction of the San Hilario Tunnel in
the town of Angangueo in the State of Michoacán, Mexico. The construction was being done by
Mexican laborers resident in the town under the supervision of the Americans. On March 14,
1880, Connelly, the Managing Engineer in the construction, had a controversy with a laborer,
Cayentano Medina, over a sum of money the latter insisted was due to him as wages. Connelly,
however, ejected Medina from his house. Subsequently after, Medina, along with several
companions began to throw stones at Connelly and approached him with a drawn machete.
Connelly, trying to frighten the assailants, fired shots in the air and then went inside his house
where Youmans and Arnold also reside. Medina and his companions attempted to enter, and
Connelly thereupon fired at Medina wounding his legs. Soon, the house was surrounded by a
threatening mob. Connelly undertook to surrender to police authorities but failed to do so as he
was driven back to the house by the mob. Their employer then requested the Mayor to endeavor
to protect the Americans, but he was unable to quiet the mob. The Mayor then ordered the
Lieutenant of the Michoacan forces to quell the riot. However, the troops, upon arriving at the
scene, instead of dispersing the mob, opened fire in the house, causing the death of Arnold. The
mob renewed their attack against the Americans and set fire to the roof forcing Connelly and
Youmans to leave, and as they did so, they were killed by the troops and members of the mob.
Their bodies were dragged through the streets and left under the pile of stones by the side of the
road so mutilated as scarcely to be recognizable.

ISSUE: Is the Mexican Government liable?

RULING: YES. The liability on the part of the Mexican Government was sustained by the
evidence in the record. The record shows a lack of diligence in the punishment of the persons
implicated in the crime. Citations have been made to evidence with respect to the participation of

136
the soldiers in the killing of the three Americans. The judicial record also shows that some
soldiers were arrested but were not sentenced. Evidence before the commission does not disclose
whose weapons killed the Americans, but the participation of the soldiers with the members of
the mob is established. With respect to the question of responsibility for the acts of soldiers there
are citations in the Mexican Government's brief of extracts from a discussion of a subcommittee
of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International
Law. The passage quoted, which deals with the responsibility of a State for illegal acts of
officials resulting in damages to foreigners, begins with a statement relative to the acts of an
official accomplished "outside the scope of his competency, that is to say, if he has exceeded his
powers." An illegal act of this kind, it is stated in the quotation, is one that cannot be imputed to
the State. Apart from the question whether the acts of officials referred to in this discussion have
any relation to the rule of international law with regard to responsibility for acts of soldiers, it
seems clear that the passage to which particular attention is called in the Mexican Government's
brief is concerned solely with the question of the authority of an officer as defined by domestic
law to act for his Government with reference to some particular subject. Clearly it is not intended
by the rule asserted to say that no wrongful act of an official acting in the discharge of duties
entrusted to him can impose responsibility on a Government under international law because any
such wrongful act must be considered to be "outside the scope of his competency.” Citation is
also made in the Mexican brief to an opinion rendered by Umpire Lieber in which effect is
evidently given to the well-recognized rule of international law that a Government is not
responsible for malicious acts of soldiers committed in their private capacity. But the General
Claims Commission do not consider that the participation of the soldiers in the murder at
Angangueo can be regarded as acts of soldiers committed in their private capacity when it is
clear that at the time of the commission of these acts the men were on duty under the immediate
supervision and in the presence of a commanding officer. Soldiers inflicting personal injuries or
committing wanton destruction or looting always act in disobedience of some rules laid down by
superior authority. There could be no liability whatsoever for such misdeeds if the view were
taken. The Commission therefore decides that the Government of the United Mexican States
must pay to the Government of the United States of America the sum of 520,000.00 (twenty
thousand dollars) without interest on behalf of Thomas H. Youmans.

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Galvan Case: Mexico v US

Reports of International Arbitral Awards Vol IV; May 24, 1954.

FACTS: On the morning of August 25, 1921, Galvan had a slight altercation with the son of
Kondall who supplied drinking water to the workmen. Upon learning, Kondall was angered and
proceeded to his house where he probably procured a pistol. When he returned to the workplace
of Galvan, there is evidence that the latter, when he knew that Kondall was armed with a pistol,
proceeded with a raised hammer in his hand toward the spot where Kondall and another man
were standing, and that Kondall thereupon twice shot Galvan who died shortly thereafter.
Kondall was immediately taken into custody by the local authorities and charged with murder.
He was given a preliminary hearing before a justice of the peace at which several eyewitnesses
of the shooting were examined. The accused was required to give a $25,000 as a bond for his
appearance at its October, 1921 term. No indictment was returned against Kondall at that term of
the court, but in the following March an indictment was found against him, charging him with
the murder of Galvan, and trial was set for April 20, 1922. Subsequently the accused was
admitted to bail in the sum of $5,000. Moreover, it is shown that the trial of Kondall was further
continued at the instance of the State “because of a defaulting witness" and set for hearing at the
term of court beginning on October 25, 1926, and still further continued at that term of court
until April, 1927, on account of absence of material witnesses for the State. 6. The record
contains an affidavit executed on November 24, 1925, by George C. Westervelt, District
Attorney for the Counties of Nueces, Kleberg, Kenedy, Willacy and Cameron, Texas. It is stated
in this affidavit that several subpoenas were issued for the appearance at the several terms of
court of Louis F. Johnston, an eye witness to the shooting of Galvân. and that the State could not
safely and successfully go to trial without the production of this witness. It is alleged on behalf of
Mexico that there was an unnecessary delay in the prosecution of a person charged with a capital
crime, and that under international law the United States should make compensation.

ISSUE: Was there a failure of compliance with the general principle of international law
requiring authorities to take proper measures to apprehend and punish a person who appears to
be guilty of a crime against an alien?

138
RULING: YES. At the trial testimony, it seems to be obvious that a grand jury could not
properly fail to return an indictment for murder against Kondall. An indictment was found by a
grand jury in March 1922. After that it is plain that the authorities failed to take the proper steps
to try the accused. There is no satisfactory explanation of continuances of the proceedings from
time to time. Justification for the failure to bring the accused to justice cannot be found on the
ground stated in the affidavit made by the District Attorney as late as November 24, 1925, that a
certain eye witness had not been located. There is no reason to suppose that the legal machinery
of the state of Texas is so defective that in a case in which a preliminary trial reveals that there
were at least five eye witnesses to the shooting of Galvan the authorities during a period of six
years after the shooting found themselves unable to conduct a proper prosecution. If any such
defect had existed it would not be an adequate defence to the claim presented by Mexico. If
witnesses actually disappeared during the course of the long delay in the trial, then as argued by
counsel for Mexico, that would be evidence of the evil incident to such delay. It may be observed
that the argument on behalf of the United States appeared to be directed more to the question of
the measure of damages than to a justification of the delay in the proceedings against the
accused. Therefore, the Government of the United States of America shall pay to the
Government of the United Mexican States on behalf of Salomé Lerma de Galvân the sum of
$10,000 without interest.

139
Jane Case: US v Mexico

Reports of International Arbitral Awards Vol IV; Nov 16, 1925

FACTS:This claim is presented by the Government of the United States of America on behalf of
Jane Joynt Davies and Thomas W. Davies, mother and brother of the late Aubert J. Davies, who
was murdered by a Mexican national on September 5, 1916, in the State of Lower California,
Republic of Mexico.

In 1916, Aubert J. Davies was a resident of the State of Lower California, United Mexican
States, where he and his brother. Thomas W. Davies, were interested in a stock ranch known as
"El Topo" situated in the northern District of that State. On September 5, 1916, one Adrian
Corona presented himself at what is known as the headquarters of the ranch and asked Aubert J.
Davies for something to eat. The latter granted the request with pleasure and promptly and
willingly provided him with food. After finishing the meal, Corona requested Davies to allow
him to use his rifle saying that he wished to kill some crows which were perched on the top of a
nearby tree. This request was likewise granted, but instead of shooting at the birds, Corona, after
retreating a few steps, aimed the weapon in the direction of Aubert J. Davies, and without a word
of warning of any kind, shot and instantly killed him. Immediately after the shooting Corona
seized a horse belonging to Davies and fled. He was later apprehended and after trial by the
Court and was sentenced to death. In view of the facts set forth, the United States of America, in
behalf of Jane Joynt Davies and Thomas W. Davies, mother and brother of the late Aubert J.
Davies, seeks indemnity from the United Mexican States in the sum of S25.000.00 United States
currency or its equivalent, with interest.

ISSUE: Are they entitled to compensation?

RULING: NO. The provisions of the Article quoted exclude all ideaS of punishment. It is a
question only of very natural measures of prevention for the purpose of preventing the insane
person from causing further damage. But that same provision establishes different forms by
means of which, according to circumstances, the authorities are able to comply with that duty of
social protection. Neither the Article referred to nor the sentence of the Supreme Court of Lower
California, establishes, as the American Agency appears to believe, that Corona must be forcibly

140
confined in an asylum in expiation of the crime he committed unconsciously. The international
duty of Mexico was fulfilled with the apprehension and trial of the accused and any failure or
omission subsequent to the sentence which exempted him from criminal responsibility, even in
the event of its being fully proven, would not involve the Mexican nation in any international
responsibility. Those failures or omissions do not constitute a denial of justice such as that which
results from those cases wherein, there exists a failure or omission punishable by law, the
authorities of a country refuse to comply with their own legal provisions as interpreted by the
courts. The Commission, therefore, considers and so decides that the claim of the United States
of America on behalf of Jane Joynt Davies and Thomas W. Davies must be disallowed.

141
US (North American Dredging Co) v Mexico

Reports of International Arbitral Awards Vol. IV pp. 26-35; Mar 31, 1926

FACTS: On November 23, 1912, the North American Dredging Company of Texas, an
American corporation, entered into a contract with the Government of Mexico for dredging at
the port of Salina Cruz. Article 18 of the subject contract states: “The contractor and all persons
who, as employees or in any other capacity, may be engaged in the execution of the work under
this contract either directly or indirectly, shall be considered as Mexicans in all matters, within
the Republic of Mexico, concerning the execution of such work and the fulfillment of this
contract. They shall not claim, nor they shall have, with regard to the interests and the business
connected to this contract, any other rights or means to enforce the same than those granted by
the laws of the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any other rights than those

established in favor of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of any rights as aliens, and
under no conditions shall the intervention of foreign diplomatic agents be permitted, in any
matter related to this contract." This is known as the “Calvo clause.” The company, inconsistent
with the Calvo clause, sought the aid of the American government instead of enforcing their
claim in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Mexico.

ISSUE: Does the Calvo clause preclude a state from exercising its sovereign right to protect its
citizens which may be found in a foreign state.

RULING: NO. The commission does not hesitate to declare that there exists no international
rule prohibiting the sovereign right of a nation to protect its citizens abroad from being subject to
any limitation whatsoever under any circum-stances. What Mexico has asked of the North
American Dredging Company of Texas as a condition for awarding it the contract which it
sought is, "If all of the means of enforcing your rights under this contract afforded by Mexican
law, even against the Mexican Government itself, are wide open to you, as they are wide open to
our own citizens, will you promise not to ignore them and not to call directly upon your own
Government to intervene in your behalf in connexion with any controversy, small or large, but
seek redress under the laws of Mexico through the authorities and tribunals furnished by Mexico
for your protection?" and the claimant, by subscribing to this contract and seeking the benefits

142
which were to accrue to him there-under, has answered, "I promise". Under the rules of
international law may an alien lawfully make such a promise? The Commission holds that he
may, but at the same time holds that he can not deprive the government of his nation of its
undoubted right of applying international remedies to violations of international law committed
to his damage. Such a government frequently has a larger interest in maintaining the principles of
international law than in recovering damage for one of its citizens in a particular case, and
manifestly such citizen can not by contract tie in this respect the hands of his Government. But
while any attempt to so bind his Government is void, the Commission has not found any
generally recognized rule of positive international law which would give to his Government the
right to intervene to strike down a lawful contract, in the terms set forth in the

preceding paragraph 10, entered into by its citizen.

The Commission decides that the case as presented is not within its jurisdiction and the motion
of the Mexican Agent to dismiss it is sustained and the case is hereby dismissed without
prejudice to the claimant to pursue his remedies elsewhere or to seek remedies before this
Commission for claims arising after the signing of the Treaty of September 8, 1923.

143
Harvey v Santiago

GR No: 82544 ; June 28, 1988

FACTS: American petitioners Harvey and Sherman together with Dutch petitioner Elshout were
Amon the 22 suspected alien pedophiles apprehended by CID agents. 17 of the 22 apprehended
chose self deportation and left the country, one was released due to lack of evidence and one was
not charged as a pedophile but for working without a working visa. Out of the 22, three chose
deportation. An arrest warrant was issued against petitioners for violation of sections 37, 45 and
46 of the immigration act and section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Can the Commissioner of Immigration issue a valid warrant of arrest?

RULING: YES. One of the requirements of a valid search or arrest warrant is that there must be
probable cause. The arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause since there was a 3 month
surveillance done which was evidenced by photographs. Even if the petitioners were not caught,
the act does not make their arrest illegal. The probable cause requirement does not extend to
deportation proceedings. The only requirement is that there be a specific charge against an alien
intended to be arrested and deported after a fair hearing with assistance of a counsel and be
proven with substantial evidence. The right to bail is a matter of discretion of the Commissioner
of Immigration and since deportation is not a criminal proceeding, the right to bail cannot be
invoked by the petitioners.

Power to deport is an act of a state. It is an inherent power of a sovereign state to exclude aliens
from its territory when it is proper for sled preservation or public interest. It is an exercise of
police power against aliens that are considered injurious to public good and domestic tranquility
of the citizens. The act of the Commissioner of Immigration to deport the subject aliens was
proper to protect public interest especially children who need special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development.

144
Savarkar Case

Reports of International Arbitral Awards; Feb 24, 1911

FACTS: The case concerned the escape of a British-Indian subject, Mr. Vinayak Damodar
Savarkar, who was detained aboard a British commercial vessel harboured at Marseille while en
route to India where he was to be tried for the abetment of murder. Mr. Savarkar swam ashore
but was chased by crew and arrested by a brigadier of the French maritime gendarmerie. Acting
under the mistaken belief that the escapee was a member of the crew, the brigadier brought him
on board and turned him over to British agents. The next morning the ship left Marseille with
Mr. Savarkar on board.

The French government did not approve of the manner in which Mr. Savarkar had been returned
to British custody and demanded his restitution to France, on the grounds that his delivery to
British authorities amounts to a defective extradition. The British government contended that,
according to the arrangements made for the security of the prisoner while the ship was in port,
the French authorities had been obliged to prevent his escape.

The two governments agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration.

ISSUE: Should the British Government have custody of Mr. Savarkar?

RULING: YES. The Tribunal found that all those agents who had taken part in the incident had
demonstrated good faith. The Tribunal concluded that despite the irregularity committed in the
arrest of Mr. Savarkar, such irregularity did not result in any obligation on the British
government to restore Mr. Savarkar to the French government.

145
Secretary of Justice v Lantion

GR No 139465; Oct 17, 2000

FACTS: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Person Who Have Committed Crimes in a
Foreign Country.” On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon,
representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the
“Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America. The Senate expressed its concurrence in the
ratification of said treaty. On June 18, 1999, the United States Government, through Department
of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522, requested the Philippine Government for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez of private respondent, to the United States.

On the same day, petitioner designated and authorized a panel of attorneys to take charge of and
handle the case. Pending the evaluation of the foretasted extradition documents, Mark Jiminez
through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request
after he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request
for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising
out of a request for extradition. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the RTC a petition against
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau
of Investigation, for mandamus; certiorari; and prohibition, with an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in
favor of Jimenez.

The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000 and
by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to
furnish Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

ISSUE: Should the RP-US Extradition treaty be considered superior to the Constitution?

146
RULING: NO. The Constitution’s guarantee of the human rights of a person is always supreme,
and takes precedence over treaty rights. As provided by the doctrine of incorporation, efforts
must be made in order to harmonize the conflicting statutes. However in cases where it is
irreconcilable then the municipal law must always be upheld.

Although international law has been made part of the law of the land it cannot be upheld as
superior to our municipal law especially in our municipal sphere. With our state having the
constitution as the highest law of the land, it cannot be considered inferior to treaties and statutes
that are in conflict with it.

The convergence of petitioners' favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible. We have ruled time and again that this
Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be availed
of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements. The
constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for "justice outside legality," since
private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are
protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we
choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in
keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised. Hence,
petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence

147
Belgium v Senegal

ICJ Judgment; July 20, 2012

FACTS: Hissène Habré, currently a resident of Senegal, was the President of the Republic of
Chad from 1982 until 1990. During that time, he established a brutal dictatorship which, by the
bias of its political police, the Bureau of Documentation and Security (Direction de la
Documentation et de la Sécurité (DDS)) caused the deaths of tens of thousands of individuals.

Proceedings have commenced and failed against him in the Republic of Chad, Senegal, and most
recently in Belgium. The latter State issued an international arrest warrant for Habré in 2005 for
charges of crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture and serious violations of international
humanitarian law. The request was never complied with; the Court of Appeal of Dakar in
Senegal held that Habré enjoyed immunity and it was incompetent to rule on the validity of the
arrest warrant for a former Head of State. Belgium instituted proceedings before the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that Senegal was in violation of its obligation to prosecute or
extradite Habré under the Convention Against Torture.

ISSUE: Was Senegal in violation of its obligation to prosecute or extradite Habré under the
Convention Against Torture?

RULING: YES, the ICJ ruled that Senegal was indeed in breach of its obligations under the
Convention and should proceed without further delay to the prosecution of Habré. It cannot rely
on its internal law or financial difficulties to evade the implementation of this obligation. The
Court considers that Article 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture obliges the State concerned
to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, irrespective of the
existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect. This obligation may or may not
result in the institution of proceedings, in light of the evidence before the authorities However, if
the State in whose territory the suspect is present has received a request for extradition, it can
relieve itself of its obligation to prosecute by acceding to that request. Extradition is an option
offered to the State by the Convention, whereas prosecution is an international obligation under
the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act engaging the responsibility of the State.

148
Although the prohibition of torture is a norm of jus cogens and customary international law, the
obligation to prosecute alleged perpetrators of acts of torture under the Convention only applies
to facts that have occurred after the entry into force of the Convention for the State concerned.
Thus, Senegal’s’ obligation to prosecute does not apply to acts allegedly committed before the
Convention entered into force for Senegal on 26 June 1987. Senegal’s duty to comply with its
Convention obligations is not affected by the decision of the Court of Justice of ECOWAS nor
can its failure to comply be justified by financial difficulties or its internal law . It is implicit in
Article 7(1) that the obligation to prosecute must be implemented within a reasonable time, in a
manner compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. Therefore, having failed to
adopt all measures necessary for the implementation of its obligation under Article 7(1) as soon
as possible, in particular, once the first complaint had been filed in 2000, Senegal has breached
and remains in breach of its obligations under Article 7(1) of the Convention Against Torture.

149
Chirskoff v Commission of Immigration

GR No L-3802; Oct 26, 1951

FACTS: Chirskoff entered the Philippines on June 19, 1946 with a passport duly visaed by the
United States Consul in Shanghai, for the purpose of making repairs on and taking delivery of
certain vessels purchased by or in behalf of the Java China Trading Co., Ltd. The vessels having
been repaired and dispatched to Shanghai, the petitioner remained behind and stayed for the
reason, according to him, that he had "suffered an economic collapse and his return to Shanghai
became impracticable."

Chirskoff obtained employment in a lumber concern in Bataan and later in a similar concern in
Floridablanca, Pampanga. It was while working at the latter place that he was arrested by order
of the Commissioner of Immigration on March 16, 1948, charged with aiding, helping and
promoting "the final objective of the Hukbalahaps to overthrow the Government." After
that arrest, specifically on April 5, 1948, the Deportation Board ordered the petitioner’s
deportation to Russia, not on the ground stated in the warrant of arrest but on the purported
ground that he "violated condition of the temporary stay given him by failing to depart
from the Philippines upon its expiration, thus rendering himself subject to deportation under
section 37(2) (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended." No formal charges
for giving aid to Hukbalahaps have ever been filed.

The immigration authorities were unable to carry out the deportation order, and it is alleged that
because of that inability the petitioner repeatedly expressed his desire to leave the country on his
own account but that his request was not heeded. The petitioner says that he could easily have
departed from the Philippines without any expense on the part of the Government when, upon
express authority of the respondent Commissioner of Immigration, he secured employment in the
Swedish S.S. Axel Salem which was to sail from the Philippines in 1948, but, so he states, the
respondent Commissioner of Immigration for no valid and practical reason withdrew the said
authority.

ISSUE: Can petitioner be held in detention?

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RULING: NO. We held that foreign nationals, not enemy, against whom no criminal charges
have been formally made or judicial order issued, may not indefinitely be kept in detention;
that in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" approved by the General Assembly of
the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to human beings were proclaimed; that the theory on
which the court is given power to act is that the warrant of deportation, not having been able to
be executed, is functus officio and the alien is being held without any authority of law (U. S. v.
Nichols, 47 Fed. Supp. 201); that the possibility that the petitioners might join or aid disloyal
elements if turned out at large does not justify prolonged detention, the remedy in that case being
to impose conditions in the order of release and exact bail in reasonable amount with sufficient
sureties.

it is ordered that the writ issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: The petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the
immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed
adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to
deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall
be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of
abuse. He shall also put up a bond for the above purpose in the amount of P5,000 with sufficient
surety or sureties, which bond the Commissioner of Immigration is authorized to exact by
section 40 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.

151
Cuevas v Munoz

G.R. No 140520, Dec 18, 2000

FACTS: The Hong Kong Magistrate’s Court at Eastern Magistracy issued a warrant for the
arrest of respondent for seven (7) counts of accepting an advantage as an agent contrary to
Section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong, and seven (7)
counts of conspiracy to defraud, contrary to the common law of Hong Kong.3 Said warrant
remains in full force and effect up to the present time.

The Philippine Department of Justice (hereafter, "Philippine DOJ") received a request for the
provisional arrest of the respondent from the Mutual Legal Assistance Unit, International Law
Division of the Hong Kong Department of Justice (hereafter, "Hong Kong DOJ")5 pursuant to
Article 11(1) of the "Agreement Between The Government Of The Republic Of The Philippines
And The Government Of Hong Kong For The Surrender Of Accused And Convicted Persons"
(hereafter, "RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement"). The Philippine DOJ forwarded the request
for provisional arrest to the Anti-Graft Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

For and on behalf of the government of Hong Kong, the NBI filed an application for the
provisional arrest of the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The RTC of
Manila issued an Order granting the application for provisional arrest and issuing the
corresponding Order of Arrest. Respondent was arrested pursuant to the said order and is
currently detained at the NBI detention cell.

Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with application for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus assailing the
validity of the Order of Arrest. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Order of
Arrest null and void on the ground that the request for provisional arrest and the accompanying
warrant of arrest and summary of facts were unauthenticated and mere facsimile copies which
are insufficient to form a basis for the issuance of the Order of Arrest, among others.

ISSUE: Is the request for the provisional arrest of respondent valid?

152
RULING: YES. There is no requirement for the authentication of a request for provisional arrest
and its accompanying documents.

While Article 11(1) does not require the accompanying documents of a request for provisional
arrest to be authenticated, Article 9 of the same Extradition Agreement makes authentication a
requisite for admission in evidence of any document accompanying a request for surrender or
extradition. In other words, authentication is required for the request for surrender or
extradition but not for the request for provisional arrest.

The RP-Hong Kong Extradition Agreement, as they are worded, serves the purpose sought to be
achieved by treaty stipulations for provisional arrest.

The process of preparing a formal request for extradition and its accompanying documents, and
transmitting them through diplomatic channels, is not only time-consuming but also
leakage-prone. There is naturally a great likelihood of flight by criminals who get an intimation
of the pending request for their extradition. To solve this problem, speedier initial steps in the
form of treaty stipulations for provisional arrest were formulated.30 Thus, it is an accepted
practice for the requesting state to rush its request in the form of a telex or diplomatic cable, the
practicality of the use of which is conceded.31 Even our own Extradition Law (P.D. No. 1069)
allows the transmission of a request for provisional arrest via telegraph.32 In the advent of
modern technology, the telegraph or cable have been conveniently replaced by the facsimile
machine. Therefore, the transmission by the Hong Kong DOJ of the request for respondent’s
provisional arrest and the accompanying documents, namely, a copy of the warrant of arrest
against respondent, a summary of the facts of the case against him, particulars of his birth and
address, a statement of the intention to request his provisional arrest and the reason therefor, by
fax machine, more than serves this purpose of expediency.

Respondent’s reliance on Garvida v. Sales, Jr.33 is misplaced. The proscription against the
admission of a pleading that has been transmitted by facsimile machine has no application in the
case at bar for obvious reasons. First, the instant case does not involve a pleading; and second,
unlike the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which do not sanction the filing of a pleading by
means of a facsimile machine, P.D. No. 1069 and the RP Hong Kong Extradition Agreement do
not prohibit the transmission of a request for provisional arrest by means of a fax machine.

153
154
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Olalia Jr

GR No 153675; Apr 29, 2007

FACTS: Munoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with a total of 10 crimes and warrants
of arrest were issued against him. Later on, the NBI arrested and detained Munoz. The Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition
of Munoz. The case was raffled off to Judge Ricardo Bernardo. Munoz then filed a petition for
bail which was denied by Judge Berardo because there was no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that Munoz was a high flight risk.

ISSUE: Is a potential extraditee entitled to post bail?

RULING: Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
not impaired.

155
Rodriguez v Presiding Judge, RTC Manila

GR No. 157977 ; Feb 27, 2006

FACTS: The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed by the Government of the
United States through the DOJ against the petitioners. After their arrest, petitioners applied for
bail which the trial court granted. The bail was set for 1 Million pesos each, for which petitioners
then posted cash bonds. The US Government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail, but
the motion was denied by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US Government filed a petition for
certiorari with this court. Thereafter, the trial court was directed to resolve the matter of bail. In
compliance with such, the trial court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond
of petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners then filed a very urgent
motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail. The motion was heard and denied.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Did respondent judge commit serious and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in cancelling the bail of petitioners without prior notice and hearing of
its cancellation?

RULING: YES, but only insofar as co-petitioner Imelda Rodriguez is concerned. According to
jurisprudence, a prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of his pending arrest.
But this is for cases pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest, not in a cancellation of a bail that
had been issued after determination that the extraditee is a no-flight risk. The policy is that a
prospective extraditee is arrested and detained to avoid his flight from justice. On the extraditee
lies the burden of showing that he will not flee once bail is granted. If after his arrest and if the
trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. With the trial court’s knowledge in this
case, co-petitioner has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had
posted a cash bond of 1 million pesos each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary
extraition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is
already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an
existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her sixties, sickly and under
medical treatment, the Court believes that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail

156
should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner
being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be
discontinued. Thus, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her
right due to process. Hence, considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a
danger to the community, she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled.

157
Government of Hongkong - SAR v Munoz

GR No. 207342 ; Aug 16, 2016

FACTS: Juan Antonio Munoz, as head of the Treasury Department of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, was instructed by the Central Bank Governor to raise US$700M in order to fund the
buyback of Philippine debts and the purchase of zero coupon U.S. Treasury Bonds. Thereafter,
an agreement was entered into between the Central Bank of the Philippines, as represented by
Munoz, and Mocatta Group - London, as represented by Mocatta Group - Hong Kong, which
resulted in a series of transactions involving gold backed loans and gold swaps. The rebates for
the loans and swaps were paid to a certain “Sundry Creditors Account”. The funds from this
account were subsequently disbursed to the benefit of the Chief Executive of the Mocatta Group
- Hong Kong and Munoz personally. However, none of the payments were known and were sent
to the Central Bank of the Philippines. Eventually, 10 criminal actions were filed against Munoz
in Hong Kong, i.e. three counts of accepting an advantage as an agent, contrary to Section
9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 and seven counts of conspiracy to
defraud, contrary to the common law of HKSAR. After a series of events, the trial court ruled,
among others, that the crimes of conspiracy to defraud and accepting an advantage as an agent
were extraditable offenses and that both crimes satisfied the double criminality rule. On appeal,
the CA initially affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, it later on ruled that the crime
of accepting an advantage as an agent should be excluded from the charges under which Munoz
would be tried due to non-compliance with the double criminality rule.

ISSUE: Is the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent compliant with the double criminality
rule?

RULING: YES. Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal
under the laws of both the requesting and the requested states. In this case, the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent under Section 9(1)(a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance
(POBO), Cap. 201 is defined as “any agent who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse,
solicits or accepts any advantage as an inducement to or reward for or otherwise on account of
his doing or forbearing to do, or having done or forborne to do, any act in relation to his
principal's affairs or business”. However, it is quite evident that this particular provision deals

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with private sector bribery; despite the interpretation under Section 2 of the POBO that an "agent
includes a public servant and any person employed by or acting for another”. In line with this,
Section 9(1)(a) has a parallel POBO provision, Section 4, applicable to public servants, which
provides that “any public servant who, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, without lawful
authority or reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage as an inducement to or reward
for or otherwise on account of his performing or abstaining from performing, or having
performed or abstained from performing, any act in his capacity as a public servant, shall be
guilty of an offense. Considering that the transactions were entered into by and on behalf of the
Central Bank of the Philippines, an instrumentality of the Philippine Government, Munoz should
be charged for the offenses not as a regular agent or one representing a private entity, but as a
public servant or employee of the Philippine Government. Yet, because the offense of accepting
an advantage as an agent charged against him is one that deals with private sector bribery, the
conditions for the application of the double criminality rule are obviously not met.

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Dogger Bank Case, Scott

Hague Court Reports 403; 1916

FACTS: In the early 1900s, Russia was in conflict with Japan. Russian fleets were directed to
beware of torpedo boats disguised as fishing boats. One dark night in the North Sea, the Russian
fleet saw a green rocket shot into the sky. The rocket was fired by a group of British fishing boats
and was a directional indication from the leader of the fishing expedition to others in the
expedition. Russian lookout men saw the fishing boats but thought they looked suspicious, and
were potentially torpedo boats. The Russian fleet opened fire, killing two fishermen and causing
severe damage to the fishing fleet. Great Britain wanted to bring the Russian admiral to trial.
Russia did not want to submit its admiral to a British trial, but eventually agreed to submit the
question of liability and punishment to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The commissioners
hearing the inquiry were five admirals, from Great Britain, Russia, the United States, France, and
Austria.

ISSUE: Is Admiral Kojdestvensky liable for the damage caused to the trawlers?

RULING: YES. The majority of the commissioners express the opinion, on this subject, that the
responsibility for this action and the results of the fire to which the fishing fleet was exposed are
to be attributed to Admiral Kojdestvensky.

Fire was immediately opened on this second object, and was, therefore, being kept up on both
sides of the ship, the line of ships having resumed their original course by a correcting movement
without changing speed. The fire, which lasted from ten to twelve minutes, caused great loss to
the trawlers. Two men were killed and six others wounded; the Crane sank; the Snipe, the Mino,
the Moulmein, the Gull, and the Majestic were more or less damaged. On the other hand, the
cruiser Aurora was hit by several shots.

The majority of the commissioners observe that they have not sufficiently precise details to
determine what was the object fired on by the vessels; but the commissioners recognize
unanimously that the vessels of the fishing fleet did not commit any hostile act, and the majority

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of the commissioners being of opinion that there were no torpedo boats either among the trawlers
nor anywhere near, the opening of fire by Admiral Rojdestvensky was not justifiable.

The Russian commissioner, not considering himself justified in sharing this opinion, expresses
the conviction that it was precisely the suspicious-looking vessels approaching the squadron with
hostile intent which provoked the fire.

This mistake might have been caused by the fact that this vessel, seen from astern, was
apparently showing no light, and by a nocturnal optical illusion which deceived the lookout on
the flagship.

The majority consider that, as has already been said, they have not before them sufficient data as
to why the fire on the port side was continued.

In any case, the commissioners take pleasure in recognizing, unanimously, that Admiral
Rojdestvensky personally did everything he could, from beginning to end of the incident, to
prevent trawlers, recognized as such, from being fired upon by the squadron.

Finally, Dmitri Donskoi, having signaled her number, the Admiral decided to give the general
signal for "cease firing." The line of his ships then continued on their way, and disappeared to the
southwest without having stopped.

On this point the commissioners recognize, unanimously, that after the circumstances which
preceded the incident and those which produced it, there was, at the cessation of fire, sufficient
uncertainty with regard to the danger to which the division of vessels was exposed to induce the
Admiral to proceed on his way.

Nevertheless, the majority of the commissioners regret that Admiral Rojdestvensky, in passing
the Straits of Dover, did not take care to inform the authorities of the neighboring maritime
powers that, as he had been led to open fire near a group of trawlers, these boats, of unknown
nationality, stood in need of assistance.

In conclusion, the commissioners declare that their findings, which are therein formulated, are
not, in their opinion, of a nature to cast any discredit upon the military qualities or the humanity
of Admiral Rojdestvensky, or of the personnel of his squadron.

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162
Naulilaa Incident Arbitration Case

Portugese-German Arbitral Tribunal; 1928

FACTS: During World War I, a party of German officials and officers entered the neutral
Portuguese colony of Angola to negotiate the purchase and transportation of food supplies from
the Portuguese. An altercation arose and three Germans were mistakenly shot and killed in
Naulila on the border of Angola. The incident did not violate any international laws. However,
due to the incident, Germany carried out a military raid, causing several casualties and severe
property damage. Though German military action did not rise to the level of war, it was directed
at no less than five distinct posts. The German action was not preceded by any demand
satisfaction for the killings of the three men prior to the attacks nor by any attempt to negotiate a
peaceful resolution of the impending conflict. The German government characterized its military
action as a reprisal, apparently for crimes perpetrated against its officials and citizens on
Portuguese territory. Portugal, on the other hand, established a special arbitral tribunal based on
the Treaty of Versailles, seeking to hold Germany responsible for the attacks.

ISSUE/S: Was a reprisal legally undertaken by the German government?

RULING: NO. Before reprisals could be legally undertaken, a number of conditions had to be
satisfied: 1. there had to be a previous act by the other party that violated international law; 2.
reprisals had to be preceded by an unsatisfied demand for reparation or compliance with the
violated international law; and 3. there must be proportionality between the offence and reprisal.

Thus, in this case, the conduct of the Germans was illegal. The killing of the three German
nationals was the result of a miscommunication and was not the result of any violation of
international law. Accordingly, Germany was not justified in taking its reprisal on Portugal.
Further, even if Portugal’s killings were in violation of international law, Germany’s attacks
would still not be justified because (1) Germany did not demand satisfaction from Portugal prior
to the attacks, and (2) the reprisal was not proportional to but much more excessive than the
original killings. Because Germany’s reprisal was not legal, Portugal is entitled to reparations.

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164
People v Alvero

GR No. L-820; Apr 11, 1950

FACTS: Aurelio Sevilla Alvero alias Reli was charged with treason on twenty-two (22) counts
(Annex A) before the People's Court, After trial, said Court in a 45-page decision penned by
Judge Jose S. Bautista, Associate Judge of said Court, concurred in by Associate Judges Dizon
and Tancinco, found the defendant guilty on all counts except the 10th relative to his interview
v/ith Leonardo Garcia, and the 18th which refers to his alleged ordering, helping in and causing
the burning of the buildings west of Taft Avenue and south of Libertad street in Pasay, and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P10,000 plus
costs, crediting him with one-half of the preventive imprisonment; he has already suffered.

Appealing from that decision of conviction, Alvero in a 112-page brief, assails the decision,
assigning forty-two (42) errors said to have been committed by the trial court, asking that the
judgment of conviction be totally reversed and that he be acquitted.

The People's Court grouped the 22 counts under three main classifications: economic, political,
and military collaboration. Under economic collaboration come counts 2 and 3 referring to
appellant's business or trading activities, buying war materials and selling them to the enemy,
under his company called ASA TRADING which trade-name stands for his name Aurelio
Sevilla Alvero. In political, collaboration are included three groups, namely: the letter of
congratulations to President Laurel relative to his declaration of war against the United States
and Great Britain (count 4); defendants membership in the KALIBAPI (count 1); and the
formation and organization of the New Leaders' Association (counts 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 19, 21, and
22). Under military collaboration, come five groups, which are: defendant's relations with and
membership in the MAKAPILI (counts 5 and 20); his organization of the "Bisig Bakal Ñg
Tagala" (counts 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17); the meeting at the Ayuntamiento de Manila ([City Hall],
count 17); organization of OUR PEOPLE'S OWN GUERRILLA ([O.P. O. G.], count 11); and
the burning of buildings in Pasay (count 18), The last seven pages of the decision of the trial
court ate devoted to discussion and findings on the appellant's adherence to the enemy.

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Appellant also urges that the People's Court erred in holding that the Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala was
organized for treasonous activities or that it engaged in such treasonous activities. The very
objectives of the Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala, its organization into a military unit with arms, uniforms,
and military discipline, its activities in taking over and guarding the barracks and installations
and equipment left by the Japanese Army in the City of Manila and the offer made by the
appellant of this Bisigbakal organization to help in the maintenance of peace and order which at
that time included the suppression of the activities of the guerrillas which was then regarded as
subversive by the Japanese, abundantly show that this organization which the appellant helped to
found and to organize, was of a military character intended to and actually used to help the
Japanese Armed Forces in their work of maintaining peace and order, suppressing the resistance
movement and defending the City of Manila against the American Liberation Forces and their
guerrilla colleagues.

Under his 3rd assigned error, appellant maintains that the People's Court erred in finding and
holding that his desire and efforts to maintain peace and order constituted treason and in support
thereof, he cites article 297 of the United States Rules of Land Warfare as regards the right of a
military occupant to demand and enforce from the inhabitants of occupied territory such
obedience as may be necessary for the security of its forces, and for

ISSUE: Can the appellant’s treasonous sympathies and intention be translated into overt acts of
treason?

RULING: YES. It is to be borne in mind however, that according to international law (Hague
Conventions of 1907, Art. 43), the duty to maintain peace and order is imposed upon the military
occupant and not upon the inhabitants of the occupied territory. In the present case, the appellant
through his Bisig Bakal Ñg Tagala not only offered to assist but actually assisted in the
maintenance of peace and order through his military organization. In so doing, his purpose
according to himself was to relieve the Japanese Armed Forces of the necessity of detailing and
assigning a portion of their forces for the maintenance of peace and order, so that they could
concentrate on defending the City of Manila against those trying to enter it, who we all know
were none other than the American Forces and their guerrilla colleagues. Furthermore, as already

166
stated, the maintenance of peace and order at that time meant the suppression of the guerrillas
who were regarded as subversive elements because they were killing Japanese soldiers and spies.

Adherence alone is not indictable. In a free and democratic country like the Philippines, there is
freedom of thought and free and unhampered discussion and expression of sentiment. But when
he translated such as joining the Makapili, establishing his military organization Bisig Bakal Ng
Tagala and offering its services to take charge of the maintenance of peace and order, which
included the suppression of the guerrillas, so that the Japanese could concentrate their forces in
defending the City of Manila by fighting against the American and guerrilla forces trying to enter
and liberate it, then he (appellant) breached as it were the walls of allegiance and loyalty which
the treason law has erected to surround and protect the security and integrity of the nation, and he
may then be held criminally liable.

167
Laurel v Misa

G.R. No. L-409; Jan 30, 1947

FACTS: Anastacio Laurel, petitioner herein filed for a petition for habeas corpus based on a
theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to an enemy by giving them aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for the reason that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines was suspended, and that there was a
change of sovereignty over the Philippine islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic.

ISSUE: Was the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines suspended during
the Japanese occupation?

RULING: NO. The Court ruled that the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred to the occupier and must therefore necessarily remain vested in the legitimate
government. The sovereignty vested in the titular government, which is the supreme power
which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state, must be distinguished from
the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, severed and transferred to
another, but cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended
without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof. What may be suspended in
this case is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, as the control and government of the
territory is temporarily passed on to the military occupant. As a corollary of the conclusion that
the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance
of the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists. Therefore there is no such
thing as suspended allegiance. It is worth noting that while the offenses against public order to be
preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader, unless
adopted by him, and also considered as inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied territory,
Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code will still be applicable in terms of treason committed
against the national security of the legitimate government. It is because the inhabitants of the
occupied territory are still bound by their allegiance to the legitimate government during the
enemy occupation. It is therefore held that absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants

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of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated
or severed by the enemy occupation. Hence the act of an inhabitant of an occupied territory
giving aid and comfort to the military occupant, regardless if it was through force, threat or
intimidation, is an act of treason punishable under Article 114 of the RPC.

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Yamashita v Styler

GR No L-129; Dec 19, 1945

FACTS: Tomoyuki Yamashita, erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group of the
Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines, and now charged before an American Military
Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever committed against the American and Filipino
peoples, comes to this Court with a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces, Western Pacific. It is
alleged therein that petitioner after his surrender became a prisoner of war of the United States of
America but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an accused war
criminal charged before an American Military Commission constituted by respondent Lieutenant
General Styer. He now asks that he be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war

ISSUE: Can a petition for habeas corpus reinstate Yamashita to his former status as prisoner of
war?

RULING: NO. The court believes and so holds that the petition for habeas corpus is untenable.
It seeks no discharge of petitioner from confinement but merely his restoration to his former
status as a prisoner of war, to be interned, not confined. The relative difference as to the degree
of confinement in such cases is a matter of military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond
the jurisdiction of civil courts. Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen.
Wilhelm D. Styer. The military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and
although it may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case
proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

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People v Agoncillo

G.R. No. L-985; Jan 23, 1948

FACTS: Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is inferable
from the following alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20, 1944, while the appellant
was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina Cepeda, Olimpio Do, examined appellant's
clothes and found therein appellant's identification card written in Japanese and Chinese
characters tending to show that the appellant was a Japanese undercover; and (b) In January,
1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol
and that Japanese notes were no longer accepted in said place.

In the evening of the next day, Rufina Cepeda was arrested and asked about things she saw in
Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her release, the appellant came to her house and
got some chickens for the consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also used to
sleep once in a while in the appellant's house.

Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to the enemy are
summarized in the brief for the Government as follows: In the middle of April, 1944, the
appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction
company operated by the Japanese Army.

Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some 100 pieces of water pipes, the
price of which was not known then the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push a
handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the intermediate or high school
premises then used by the Japanese Army as a motor pool.

ISSUE: Is Agoncillo guilty of treason?

RULING: NO. The Court held that the overt acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly
proven. With respect to the sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution
witness Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by any other
witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes, counsel for the appellee

171
admits that the price thereof was not known. An essential part of the overt act charged in the
information was therefore lacking.

The only detail that may at most be considered established by the prosecution refers to the fact
that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart loaded with such articles, and the evidence is
even uncertain in one respect, namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school
premises or the high school building.

However even if the appellant had really sold alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not
constitute treason. These items were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did not
necessarily carry an intention to adhere to the enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the
sale was treasonable in view of the other proven acts showing the appellant's adherence to the
enemy. It appears that the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took place after
the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the appellant made the sale, his motive
was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two
probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will
be adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G. R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947.) Appellant is acquitted.

172
Gibbs v Rodriguez

GR No. L-1494; Aug 3, 1949

FACTS: In 1941, Allison J. Gibbs, acting for himself and as attorney-in-fact for Allison D.
Gibbs and Finley J. Gibbs, sold two parcels of land to Raymund Raymundo F. Navarro and R. F,
Navarro & Co. for $125,000. Navarro paid $12,500 in cash and mortgaged the same property to
Allison D. Gibbs and Finley J. property to Allison D. Gibbs and Finley J. Gibbs to Gibbs to
secure the payment of the balance. The first installment was paid but none of the other
installments were paid. Navarro sold the property to Eugelio Navarro sold the property to
Eugelio Rodriguez Sr. for P40,000 who also assumed or P40,000 who also assumed the
mortgage. E. Rodriguez then assigned his rights to E. Rodriguez then assigned his rights to the
property to Luzon Surety Co. for P42,556.21 with the agreement that E.Rodriguez would remain
jointly and remain jointly and severally and severally liable with Luzon Surety to be liable with
Luzon Surety to the Gibbs.

The plaintiffs allege that during the Japanese occupation in 1943, Rodriguez and Luzon Surety
unlawfully secured a cancellation of the mortgage. While the defendants allege that the
Department of Enemy Property established by the Japanese Military Administration in the City
of Manila required the defendants to pay to said department the debt due from them to use from
them to the plaintiffs, who were considered as enemy nationals. Plaintiffs argued that the
Department of Enemy Property had no authority to demand and had no authority to demand and
accept payment. Meanwhile the defense produced evidence which showed that Gibbs agreed to
consider the payment to the Japanese as war credit. This was shown through the affidavit of
Luzon’s lawyer Arturo Tolentino, who visited Gibbs when the Japanese ordered the payment.
Gibss stated that he understood the situation of Luzon and would consider the payment as war
damage. The defendants had to take out a loan of P120,000 to pay the Japanese. The CFI
declared that the payment to the Japanese was invalid.

ISSUE: Was the payment to the Japanese as war damage valid?

RULING: YES. The Court ruled that the payment to the Japanese as war damage was valid. If
the Japanese military occupant had power to sequestrate, as in this case it has sequestrated, the

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credit of an American creditor, it had subrogated itself into the rights, or stepped in the shoes, of
the said creditor and, therefore, had the right to demand and accept, through the Japanese Enemy
Property Custodian, the payment of all the debtor’s debt to said creditor in Japanese military
notes without of course compelling the debtor to pay interests not yet then due, and completely
released thereby said obligation, without prejudice to the creditor’s right to demand, through
their government from the Japanese after the war, the reimbursement of the full value of their
sequestered credit.

The present case is similar to the case of HSBC v Samanillo. In both cases, the question is
whether or not the payment to the Japanese was a confiscation of the credit of the creditor. The
Court also applied the ruling in Haw Pia v China Banking Corp. in the present case because they
relied on the ruling in the Samanillo Case. In Haw Pia, the SC held that the collection by the
Bank of Taiwan of the China Banking Corporation's credit from the latter's debtor by order of the
order of the Japanese Military Administration was not a confiscation but a sequestration of the
enemy private personal property, and therefore the payment by the plaintiff Haw Pia to the Bank
of Taiwan was valid and released plaintiff's obligation to the defendant bank. Therefore, they
also have to reverse the decision of the lower court in the present case. The SC also stated that
the plaintiff's contention that the debt of the defendants in the present case was payable in dollars
or its equivalent in Philippine peso at the option of the plaintiffs is immaterial, because both the
Philippine pesos and American dollars at the rate of one dollar for two one dollar for two pesos
were then legal tender in the Philippines.

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People v Godinez

GR No L-895; Dec 31, 1947

FACTS: Godinez (herein accused-appellant) was a shipmaster in the Philippines coastwise trade
before the Pacific War. After the Japanese invasion, from May, 1942 to June, 1943, he rendered
services to the Japanese Navy, as pilot in the Port of Cebu, bringing their ships into harbor and
otherwise performing work connected with navigation. He was paid monthly salaries. After a
period of rest due to ill health, he was again engaged by the Japanese Army to do the same
chores from May, 1943 to October, 1944, at varying rates of compensation. He was prosecuted
and thereafter convicted for treason. The accused defended that he had to serve the Japanese
because he was required by them to do so, that he could not give any valid excuses, that if he
made any false statements he would be caught, and killed; and that even if he could escape, the
many members of his immediate family would be left to their ruthless ill-will. It was contended
however that Godinez’ help to the Japanese together with criminal intention to betray, render him
guilty of treason. Proof of this traitorous intent is made to consist of five circumstances described
in the brief of the Solicitor General: 1) Accused often went to the coffee shop of S. P. Banis and
during the discussion between Banis and appellant, the latter always showed his pro-Japanese
sentiments. On one occasion, Banis told him about the expected arrival of the Americans, and the
appellant exclaimed that Banis was crazy in believing that the Americans were coming back to
the Philippines, because according to the appellant, the American forces would never back to
these Islands; 2) Appellant was seen inside his own automobile which carried a Japanese flag
and on his left arm, appellant was wearing a band with Japanese characters; 3) When the
Japanese landed in Cebu City, the accused with two other persons went up a Japanese ship
anchored alongside the Pier, presented his respects to the Japanese officer in charge of the boat,
handed to him a revolver which was examined by said Japanese officer. The appellant showed
how the firearm worked by firing the pistol; 4) For about two years, the appellant had a Japanese
flag placed on the door of his house situated at D. Jakosalem Street, Cebu City about a foot wide
and about two feet long and on the left side of the door was a piece of board with Japanese
Characters written on it; and 5) When American planes were dropping bombs in Cebu City, the
appellant who was in the lawn of his house said, more or less, “Those sons of the bitches of

175
Americans (referring to the American aviators) are the gangsters of the United States; they are
drunk, they will go down".

ISSUE/S: Should Godinez be held guilty for treason?

RULING: NO. On the first point, the accused denied having stated the Americans could never
come back, admitting, however, having expressed the belief that it was not easy for them to
return, in view of the successive victories of the Imperial hordes at that time. The Court held that
even if appellant had uttered the words attributed to him, it is doubtful whether they exhibited
adherence to the foe, unless it is shown that he wanted, or rejoiced in the inability to return of the
American forces. It is hard to believe appellant wished the defeat of our allies, because he had
two sons in the guerrilla forces. Regarding the second point, although there was proof about a
Nippon flag fluttering on the automobile the appellant rode, no evidence was adduced that the
car belonged to him. On the third point, the Court held Godinez’ statement to be credible.
Godinez swore that when the Japanese arrived in Cebu, they arrested him, and when they found,
after investigation, that he was a marine officer they ordered him to report the next day to the
Port Surveyor, bringing any firearms he had in his possession; that he did as directed and
surrendered his pistol. On the Fourth point, it was admitted by the witness of the prosecution that
after the fall of Cebu City the Japanese issued orders requiring every resident to hoist a Japanese
flag in their houses and that refusal to obey meant death. The appellant then merely complied
with the order. Lastly, Godinez did not make insulting statements against the American aviators
that raided Cebu. The Court reaches the conclusion that the defendant's disloyal heart or
treacherous mind has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. He is then absolved.

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Wilson v Berkenkotter

GR No L-4476; Apr 20, 1953

FACTS: In 1950, Wilson consigned in the Court of First Instance of Manila the sum of P625.51.
He alleged that said amount consigned was the equivalent of P37,530.40 in Japanese currency
which Berkenkotter paid for him in 1944 to the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China. He
alleged that had made an offer of payment of P625.51 to the defendant but the latter refused to
accept payment without any justifiable cause. He prayed that after due hearing the court declare
the consignation as properly made.

Berkenkotter in his answer alleged that in 1938 he and plaintiff Wilson and Gulick obtained a
loan of P90,000 from the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and that they signed a
promissory note wherein they jointly and severally promised to pay said loan to the bank. During
the occupation of the Philippines during the Pacific war the Japanese Military authorities placed
the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and other enemy banks under liquidation and
for that purpose designated the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator of enemy banks; that upon demand
by the Bank of Taiwan Berkenkotter paid the sum of P112,591.22 in military notes as full
payment of the P90,000 loan including interest from 1941 up to 1944, the date of payment. He
made a demand on both Wilson and Gulick for the settlement of their shares in said obligation
with a certain offer to which Gulick accepted the offer and paid P18,902 but Wilson refused to
take advantage thereof and instead tendered the amount of P625.51 as payment of his share in
the solidary and joint obligation. This tender of payment was refused and so he made demand
upon Wilson for payment of his share of the P90,000 with interest but Wilson refused to make
payment.

The trial court rule in favor of Wilson and ordered Berkenkotter to received the consigned
amount as full payment of the indebtedness.

ISSUE/S: Can Berkenkotter be subrogated with the rights of the bank?

RULING: NO. Appellant does not, as claimed by his counsel, step into the shoes of the bank.
He cannot enforce the original obligation created in 1938. The bank could collect the whole

177
amount of the loan from any one of the solidary co-debtors, and in fact did from one of them.
This, the appellant may not do just because he paid the entire loan. According to article 1145 of
the Civil Code, payment by one of the solidary debtors entitles him to claim from his co-debtors
only the share pertaining to each with interest on the amount advanced, and this is what the
appellant is doing, only that he wants to collect the whole amount paid by him for Wilson in
genuine Philippine currency instead of the equivalent thereof under the Ballantyne schedule.
Moreover, on grounds of equity appellant may not be allowed to collect from the appellee more
than the real value of what he paid for him, especially when the difference between the military
notes and the genuine Philippine currency in November, 1944, was so great.

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Raquiza v Bradford
G.R. No. L-44; Sept 13, 1945

FACTS: Alleging in their petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated August 30, 1945, that they
have been and are being "confined, restrained and deprived" of their liberty in the Correctional
Institution for Women, petitioners, Lily Raquiza, Haydee Tee Han Kee and Emma Link Infante,
pray that the officers therein named, to wit, Lt. Col. L.J. Bradford and Capt. Inez L. Twindle of
the CIC, U.S. Army, "or whoever acts in her place or stead," be directed to appear before this
Court and produce the bodies of petitioners, and to show cause why petitioners should not
forthwith be set at liberty.

Respondent Lt. Col., Bradford, having been served with this Court's order to show cause dated
August 31, 1945, made return thereto dated September 5, 1945, to which are attached as parts
thereof certain commitment orders, the first and last emanating from the Headquarters of the
Sixth Army, 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment, and the second from that of the
United States Army Forces in the Far East, 493rd Counter Intelligence Corps
Detachment.Respondent Captain Caroline De Eason, WAC, having been served with this Court's
order to show cause dated September 7, 1945, made return thereto dated on the same day.

It appears from these returns, as well as from the arguments of counsel, that by virtue of the
proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur on December 29, 1944, petitioner Lily
Raquiza was on March 13, 1945, arrested by the 306th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
of the U.S. Sixth Army, and detained under Security Commitment Order No. 385 wherein she
was charged “deemed a risk to the security of the U.S. Forces for the reasons set forth above. The
commanding officer of any military stockade, jail, or comparable installation in which this
person may be confined is authorized and directed to detain him in custody until released by
competent military authority.”

In said Schedule A the specific complaint or charge against complaint or charge against
petitioner Lily Raquiza is "Espionage activity for Japanese."As to petitioner Haydee Tee Han
Kee, the specific complaint or charge against petitioner Tee Han Kee in Schedule A-2 is "Active

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collaboration with the enemy." With regard to petitioner Emma Link Infante, she was charged
with "Active collaboration with the Japanese."

General of the Army MacArthur therein published and declared it to be his purpose, among other
things, to hold in restraint the persons referred to, when apprehended, "for the duration of the
war; whereafter, I shall release them to the Philippine Government for its judgment upon their
respective cases."

ISSUE: Was the war already terminated within the meaning of the proclamation made by
General MacArthur?

RULING: NO. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminates at the same time of,
some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the province of
the political dept, & not the judicial dept, to determine if war has ended. Fact that delivery of
certain persons under custody of the US Army has already begun doesn’t mean that the war has,
in the legal sense, already terminated, w/c clearly it hasn’t. Delivery w/in power of military
authorities to make even before was terminated.

As such, Civil Courts shouldn’t interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a friendly
country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil & criminal jurisdiction of the place. Grant of
free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during passage (let them exercise
their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops
would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to
proper military authorities.

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Haw Pia v Banking Corp

GR No L-554; Apr 9, 1948

FACTS: Haw Pia instituted an action against Banking Corporation to cancel the mortgage on
the property described in the complaint and to deliver to the plaintiff the TCT. The cause of
action is that the plaintiff had a debt of P5,103.35 by way of overdraft in an account payable on
demand from Banking Corporation. This, together with its interests were paid on different
occasions to the respondent through the Bank of Taiwan, Ttd., that was appointed by the
Japanese Military authorities as liquidator of the Banking Corp. After the hearing of the case,
the trial court rendered a decision holding that, as there was no evidence presented to show that
the defendant Banking Corporation had authorized the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd., to accept the
payment of the plaintiff's debt to the said defendant, and said Bank of Taiwan, as an agency of
the Japanese invading army, was not authorized under the international law to liquidate the
business of the Banking Corporation, the payment has not extinguished the indebtedness of the
plaintiff to the said defendant under article 1162 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Japanese Military Administration have authority to order the liquidation or
winding up of the business of defendant-appellee Banking Corporation, and to appoint
the Bank of Taiwan liquidator authorized as such to accept the payment by the
plaintiff-appellant to said defendant-appellee?

2. Did such payment by the plaintiff-appellant extinguish her obligation to said

defendant-appellee?

RULING:

1. Yes. The Japanese military authorities had power, under the international law, to order the
liquidation of the Banking Corporation and to appoint and authorize the Bank of Taiwan
as liquidator to accept the payment in question, because such liquidation is not
confiscation of the properties of the bank appellee, but a mere sequestration of its assets
which required the liquidation or winding up of the business of said bank. All the

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 arguments to the contrary in support of the decision appealed from the predicated upon
the erroneous assumption that the liquidation or winding up of the affairs of the Banking
Corporation, in order to determine its liabilities and net assets to be sequestrated or
controlled, was an act of confiscation or appropriation of private property contrary to
Article 46, section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907.

2. Yes. It having been shown above, that the Japanese Military Forces had power to
sequestrate and impound the assets or funds of the Banking Corporation, and for that
purpose to liquidate it by collecting the debts due to said bank from its debtors, and
paying its creditors, and therefore to appoint the Bank of Taiwan as liquidator with the
consequent authority to make the collection, it follows evidently that the payments by the
debtors to the Bank of Taiwan of their debts to the Banking Corporation have
extinguished their obligation to the latter. Said payments were made to a person, the Bank
of Taiwan, authorized to receive them in the name of the bank creditor under article 1162,
of the Civil Code. Because it is evident the words "a person authorized to receive it," as
used therein, means not only a person authorized by the same creditor, but also a person
authorized by law to do so, such as guardian, executor or administrator of estate of a
deceased, and assignee or liquidator of a partnership or corporation, as well as any other
who may be authorized to do so by law. The fact that the money with which that debts
have been paid were Japanese war notes does not affect the validity of the payments. The
provision of article 1170 of our Civil Code to the effect that "payment of debts of money
must be made in the species stipulated and if it not to deliver such specie in silver or gold
coins which is legal tender," is not applicable to the present case, because the contract
between the parties was to pay Philippine pesos and not some specifically defined species
of money. The Philippine peso and half-pesos including the Philippine Treasury
Certificate was and is legal tender in the Philippines under section 612 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 4199.

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Springbok Case

72 U.S. (5 Wall. 1) 1; 1867

FACTS: The British owned bark Springbok sailed from London, December 8. 1862. and was
captured by a United States vessel of war on February 3d, 1863, about one hundred and fifty
miles east of the British port of Nassau on the Island of New Providence. This port was near the
southern coast of the United States, and it was a matter of common knowledge that it had been
largely used as one for the call and trans-shipment of cargoes intended for the ports of the
insurrectionary States of the Union, then under blockade by the federal government. The vessel
was brought into the port of New York, and after a hearing in the United States district court,
both vessel and cargo were condemned. On appeal to the supreme court of the United States, the
vessel was released, but the decree of the lower court as to the cargo was affirmed.The ship's
papers were on their face regular, and it was said by Chief Justice Waite, "they all showed that
the voyage on which she was captured was from London to Nassau, both neutral ports within the
definition of neutrality furnished by international law. The shippers, too, were really genuine and
there was no concealment of any of them and no spoliation. The owners were neutrals and do not
appear to have any interest in the cargo. There is no sufficient proof that they had any knowledge
of its alleged unlawful destination."

ISSUE: Does the Doctrine of Continuous Voyage apply in the case at bar.

RULING: YES. Where the papers of a ship sailing under a charter party are all genuine and
regular and show a voyage between ports neutral within the meaning of international law, where
there has been no concealment nor spoliation of them, where the stipulations of the charter party
in favor of the owners are apparently in good faith, where the owners are neutrals, have no
interest in the cargo, and have not previously in any way violated neutral obligations, and there is
no sufficient proof that they have any knowledge of the unlawful destination of the cargo, in such
a case, its aspect being otherwise fair, the vessel will not be condemned because the neutral port
to which it is sailing has been constantly and notoriously used as a port of call and transshipment
by persons engaged in systematic violation of blockade and in the conveyance of contraband of
war, and was meant by the owners of the cargo carried on this ship to be so used in regard to it.

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The facts that the master declared himself ignorant as to what a part of his cargo, of which
invoices were not on board (having been sent by mail to the port of destination) consisted, such
part having been contraband, and also declared himself ignorant of the cause of capture, when
his mate, boatswain and steward all testified that they understood it to be the vessel's having
contraband on board, held not sufficient, of themselves, to infer guilt to the owners of the vessel,
in no way compromised with the cargo. But the misrepresentation of the master as to his
knowledge of the ground of capture held to deprive the owners of costs on restoration.

A cargo was here condemned for intent to run a blockade where the vessel was sailing to a port
such as that above described, the bills of lading disclosing the contents of 619 packages of 2007
which made the cargo, the contents of the remaining 1388 being not disclosed; where both they
and the manifest made the cargo deliverable to order, the master being directed by his letter of
instructions to report himself on arrival at the neutral port to H., who "would give him orders as
to the delivery of his cargo;" where a certain fraction of the cargo whose contents were
undisclosed was specially fitted for the enemy's military use and a larger part capable of being
adapted to it; where other vessels owned by the owners of the cargo, and by the charterer, and
sailing ostensibly for neutral ports were, on invocation, shown to have been engaged in blockade
running, many packages on one of the vessels, and numbered in a broken series of numbers,
finding many of the complemental numbers on the vessel now under adjudication; where no
application was made to take further proof in explanation of these facts, and the claim of the
cargo, libeled at New York, was not personally sworn to by either of the persons owning it,
resident in England, but was sworn to by an agent at New York, on "information and belief."

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Marcos v Manglapus

GR No: 88211, Oct 27, 1989

FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non -
violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering
the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists

3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms

dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar

4. Honasan’s failed coup

5. Communist insurgency movements

6. secessionist movements in Mindanao

7. devastated economy because of

a. accumulated foreign debt

b. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them
their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar
Marcos from returning to the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return
to the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the

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interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President
acted outside her jurisdiction.

According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without
due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to
travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a
court order.

ISSUES:

1. In the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, may the President prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines?

2. Did the President act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the
Philippines posed a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return?

RULING: NO to BOTH ISSUES.

Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power”
although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons... (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined and
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include
the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people,

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promote their welfare and advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary
powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain
peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.

The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the
circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions gua ranteeing liberty of abode and
the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in
and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the
Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The
supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self- preservation of the country and protection of the people. She
has to uphold the Constitution.

Cruz, Dissenting

1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It
is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal,
tyrant, etc.

2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national
security. Fears were mere conjectures.

3. Residual powers– but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not
expand.

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Paras, Dissenting

1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow the State to impair Marcos’ right to
return to the Philippines. .

2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried
w/in 10 days.

3. Untenable that without legislation, the right to travel is absolute & the state is powerless
to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if national security,
public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all
the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.

4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are
speculative & the military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to
handle Marcos’ return/

Padilla, Dissenting

Sarmiento, Dissenting

1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be
agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

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J Leonen, SJS Officers v Lim

G.R. Nos. 187836; Nov 25, 2014

FACTS: These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.
(G.R. No. 156052), where the Court declared that the subject City of Manila Ordinance No.
8027, enacted during the term of Mayor Atienza, ordering the relocation and transfer of the
Pandacan oil terminals is constitutional. On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former
Mayor Lim, who succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No.
8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No.
8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent
therewith thereby allowing, once again, the operation of petroleum refineries and oil depots in
the Pandacan area.

The petitioners argue that the enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of
police power because the measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the
people. They further argue that Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II
of the Constitution of the Philippines on the duty of the State “to protect and promote the right to
health of the people” and “protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology.” Moreover, they argue that despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and
notwithstanding that the conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of Ordinance No.
8027 remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to
recognize that “judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.” Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in
violation of health and environment-related municipal laws, and international conventions and
treaties to which the Philippines is a state party.

Respondents aver that petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance is a
valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare clause and public
policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution, municipal laws,
and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of
validity of the assailed ordinance.

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ISSUE: Is the enactment of No. 8187, allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the
depots, is invalid and unconstitutional?

RULING: YES. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city”
subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be
modified or repealed by another ordinance.” These have been properly applied in G.R. No.
156052, where the Court upheld the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the
land subject of the Ordinance, and declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise
annulled by the courts. In the same case, the Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents — that the removal
of the oil depots from the Pandacan area is necessary “to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.”

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations
of the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ
to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the
matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or
political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the “general welfare” of
the city does not after all gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the
council as to which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.

Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on
the matter, favoring the city’s economic-related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for
this Court to make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific
right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals
that there is truly no such thing as “the will of Manila” insofar as the general welfare of the
people is concerned. If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara by Justice Laurel, we say when
the judiciary mediates we do not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang

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Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them.

Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tanon Strait

GR No. 180771, Apr 21, 2015

FACTS: June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.

May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait. A
multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done to
determine the area's underwater composition.

January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-Tañon
Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001, wherein it adopted the Initial Environmental
Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended the approval of
JAPEX's application for an ECC.

March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX for the
offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait. Months later, on November 16, 2007,
JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town
in the western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until February 8, 2008.

Petitioners then applied to this Court for redress, via two separate original petitions both dated
December 17, 2007, wherein they commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from
implementing SC-46 for, among others, violation of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Is the service contract valid?

RULING: Yes. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of

indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil

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Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the utilization
of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum benefit to the
Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government.

Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in 1972,
before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless otherwise
repealed.

Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction should
be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on Elections expounding on this point,
pronounced: It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Note that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service
contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, as will be discussed below,
the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only
through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area.

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