Heike M.

Grimm Editor

Public Policy
Research in the
Global South
A Cross-Country Perspective
Public Policy Research in the Global South
Heike M. Grimm
Editor

Public Policy Research

in the Global South
A Cross-Country Perspective
Editor
Heike M. Grimm
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy
University of Erfurt
Erfurt, Germany

ISBN 978-3-030-06060-2 ISBN 978-3-030-06061-9 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9

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Foreword

For my generation, scholars of public policy were analogous to immigrants. We

were typically educated in a traditional academic discipline, such as political science,
sociology, or economics. Our research topic, however, led us to depart from our
comfortable academic homeland to the new, unknown, and unexplored terrain of the
unchartered territory of public policy. The scholars venturing into this new territory
of public policy brought with them the academic values, norms, and methodologies
from their native discipline. What did it take to be a public policy scholar? As in
many other important manners, the answer was provided by the giant of a scholar,
poet, writer, and philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, some two centuries
ago, “The greatest thing a father can give his son is roots. The second greatest thing
is wings to escape those roots.”
On a good day, public policy research exhibited diversity, tolerance, creativity,
and a coming together of the different views, perspectives, and academic disciplines
inherent in public policy research and thinking. On a bad day, it was more like the
Tower of Babel.
This book shows how far public policy research has come. As the editor, Heike
Grimm, makes clear in her introductory chapter, public policy has emerged as an
academic discipline. Thanks to the development of formal and systematic research
and education, programs such as the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the
University of Erfurt have spawned a new generation for which public policy research
is their native academic discipline. Skeptics looking for a common methodology and
approach, as has been claimed to be the gold standard of academic disciplines such
as economics, will be disappointed. However, as the author Mark Twain once
responded that “rumors of my death have been greatly exaggerated,” so too perhaps
the primacy of a common methodology and approach has been overstated. Back
when Heike and I were colleagues in the Max Planck Society, my concern about a
paucity of methodological coherence in public policy research led me to ask two
colleagues, one in physics and the other in chemistry, what actually constitutes a
bona fide academic discipline. Without hesitation, the answer from the natural
sciences was, “It’s obvious—money and interest.”

v
vi Foreword

There is no shortage of interest in public policy issues, challenges, and problems.

However, as this book makes clear, most of the resources, i.e., “money,” have been
skewed towards addressing the problems and challenges confronting public policy in
the developed countries, or the North. Even while the globalization of the past two
decades has convinced us that no man or country is an island, public policy research
remains fixated on the North. This book breaks the mold by providing a gateway to a
fertile new frontier and context for public policy research—the South.
Public policy research consists not just of theory and methods but also context.
This book not only ushers in the emergence of public policy as a bona fide academic
discipline, but also a new context which has been ignored for far too long for public
policy research—the South. It has been a long time coming but will, without doubt,
be appreciated for a long time.

Institute for Development Strategies, David B. Audretsch

Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN, USA
Acknowledgements

I wish to acknowledge the many individuals that, in various ways, have supported
me in composing and publishing this book. First, my gratitude goes to the authors of
the chapters of this volume; they have always responded straight away when
submitting their chapters and revising them. Without their commitment to and
enthusiasm for the idea and mission of this publication, the project would not have
been realized. Some authors displayed great patience during the publication process
because we aimed for the best results. Thank you for your collegiality and patience.
My deep appreciation goes to Richard Rose and David B. Audretsch for contrib-
uting to this volume and for supporting the endeavor in creating a platform for
researchers from the Global South. Both scholars stand out as distinguished scholars
who further developed public policy research in the last decades in an innovative and
trail blazing way in different fields. Richard Rose taught us about the lesson-drawing
approach in policy designing and policy making decades ago, which served as an eye
opener to me when I started teaching students in a public policy program, often
coming from the so-called less-developed and fragile countries. Instead of giving
standardized and, therefore, rather useless recommendations, the art of lesson-
drawing helped to grasp severe and complex problems in very specific contexts
for which there are no easy solutions. David B. Audretsch advanced entrepreneur-
ship, growth, and public policy research in all dimensions and facets during the last
decades, and it was always such an honor and a pleasure to participate in some of the
many projects he pursued and pushed forward. He has pointed to the magic and
importance of entrepreneurship and start-ups for job creation and development since
the early 1990s. Quite a few countries of the so-called Global South managed to
develop substantially in the last years due to bottom-up entrepreneurial activity
without depending on state or donor support and advice from the Global North.
His excellent and profound research influenced this process, demonstrating that
entrepreneurship results in development, at last.
I thank Donovan Gregg for revising the contributions with care and diligence and
an amazing sense of language. It was quite some task to align all contributions from
diverse backgrounds and countries to one style. Donovan managed to succeed

vii
viii Acknowledgements

without influencing and changing the streaming of writings and style of the papers.
With patience, constructive comments, and friendly reminders, he supported our
publication outcome a lot. Without Donovan, this volume would not have been
finalized in such a professional way.
I would further like to express my appreciation to Johannes Glaeser from Springer
for his enthusiastic support of this book and his valuable advice and effort in guiding
the process from idea generation to a final publication.
Finally, I thank my family for their continuous encouragement and unparalleled
love and support. This journey would not have been possible if not for them, and I
dedicate this personal milestone to them.
Contents

Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research

in the Global South . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Heike M. Grimm

Part I Theoretical Considerations and Global Public Policy Implications

Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications
of the North-South Divide from Today’s Policy Perspective . . . . . . . . . . 17
Juliane Corredor Jiménez
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Richard Rose and Caryn Peiffer
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Anja Mihr
Public Policy and Ideation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Atif Ikram Butt

Part II Case Studies

The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia . . . 87
Juan David Rivera Acevedo, Jorge Sellare, and Lina Martínez
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic
Discipline in Brazil: Push or Pull? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics
of Economic Diversification in Kazakhstan Throughout 2011–2016 . . . . 119
Mergen Dyussenov

ix
x Contents

The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory

Governance in Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing
Countries: The Case of a Donor-Funded Community-Driven
Development Program in The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
Lamin O. Ceesay
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values”
in the Emigration Policies of the Philippines? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Exequiel Cabanda and Meng-Hsuan Chou
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics
of Continuity and Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Anwesha Ghosh
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control
Program Through the Lens of Multiple Streams Framework . . . . . . . . . 231
Maitreyee Mukherjee
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup
Development: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Fernando Luis Ramirez Gonzalez
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free
and Compulsory Education in Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Atif Ikram Butt
List of Contributors

Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham Department of Classics and Philosophy,

University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana
Juan David Rivera Acevedo DB CARGO AG, Mainz, Germany
Atif Ikram Butt Center for Communication Programs Pakistan, Islamabad,
Pakistan
Exequiel Cabanda School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University
(NTU) Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
Lamin O. Ceesay Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt,
Erfurt, Germany
Meng-Hsuan Chou School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University
(NTU) Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
Mergen Dyussenov Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University
of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, Singapore
Anwesha Ghosh Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt,
Erfurt, Germany
Fernando Luis Ramirez Gonzalez President’s Delivery Unit of the Republic of
Paraguay, Asunción, Paraguay
Heike M. Grimm Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt,
Erfurt, Germany
Juliane Corredor Jiménez Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of
Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
Lina Martínez POLIS (Observatory of Public Policies), Universidad Icesi, Cali,
Colombia

xi
xii List of Contributors

Anja Mihr Center on Governance Through Human Rights, HUMBOLDT-

VIADRINA Governance Platform, Berlin, Germany
Maitreyee Mukherjee Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National Univer-
sity of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, Singapore
Caryn Peiffer School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
Richard Rose Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde,
Glasgow, Scotland, UK
European University Institute Florence, Florence, Italy
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Jorge Sellare Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development,
Georg-August-University Göttingen – GRK 1666 “GlobalFood”, Göttingen,
Germany
Introduction: The Added Value of Public
Policy Research in the Global South

Heike M. Grimm

1 Purpose

What is the purpose of the book and what does the editor hope to achieve? After
teaching and researching at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the
University of Erfurt, Germany, since 2002 in an international program which
attracts foremost young, mature, and ambitious students from the Global South,
I continuously and increasingly faced the challenge that the standard literature
rarely provides answers to the most pressing challenges of the South. Furthermore,
access to research and publications from colleagues from the South is often denied
or at least difficult to obtain; a substantial number of scholars face difficult
conditions in higher education institutions and are often challenged by the frus-
trating consequences of censorship or corruption. Nevertheless, their knowledge is
important if not crucial for policy making specifically in contexts that are charac-
terized by volatile conditions.
The goal of this book is, therefore, to present topical research about the emergence
of public policy as a field of research and as an academic discipline in countries of the
Global South to enhance the portfolio of academic literature beyond the Global
North’s perspective and paradigm. When teaching and discussing public policy
theory and practice, we first and foremost draw on academic literature of scholars
from the Global North which is without any doubt mostly excellent and very useful
for solving policy problems in certain contexts and under specific conditions; but we
face the drawback that transferring this knowledge to highly different political, social,
economic, cultural, and, above all, fragile contexts has severe limitations for policy
making and decision taking by public organizations and politicians and can even
cause damage and regression. Every place has its own context and its own unique

H. M. Grimm (*)
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_1
2 H. M. Grimm

situation which is important to consider and analyze before drawing lessons for policy
designing and policy making.
Public policy has been established and acknowledged as an academic discipline
during the last decades in many of the so-called developed countries. Nonetheless, the
rise of the new, interdisciplinary academic discipline was often traced with skepti-
cism in the early years with the consequence that it was acknowledged in some
countries earlier than in others. Nonetheless, we observe the rise of public policy as an
academic discipline in countries worldwide although we still know little about the
experts and knowledge in the field including the various facets of public policy theory
and practice from many country perspectives. This is specifically true for so-called
less developed and fragile countries where transformations take place rapidly and
knowledge about public policy in general and tools and techniques of policy making
specifically are significant for development, recovery, and reconstruction. From my
standpoint, the acknowledgement of public policy as an academic discipline by
political leaders and educators can play a vital role for professional and accountable
policy making, for political advocacy, and for the development of institutions spe-
cifically in countries of the Global South which are often challenged by growing
societal, economic, and environmental problems.
Cognizant of the deeply interdisciplinary nature of public policy, the book considers
aspects of history, economics, political science, governance, sociology, and law as
components of public policy theory development and investigates how these theories
have influenced policy making and agenda setting in countries of the Global South. The
contributions cover a wide range of policy issues in many fields including democrat-
ization, migration, emigration, integration, corruption, economic development, environ-
ment, education, and entrepreneurship and integrate theories of the policy process such
as the Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon 2002) or the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2014).

2 The Global South and the Brandt Commission

The Global South is a term which is highly debated in academia and political
discussions. I agree with the critique stating that the term has deficiencies, but it is
from my point of view better suited than its predecessors to describe places under
certain conditions. The reference point in this volume is context and conditions
rather than the geographical boundaries of the Global South which are a source of
ongoing discussions for good reasons (Wolvers et al. 2015).
The conditions of countries in the Global South are often described as economi-
cally poor and politically fragile as well as by social inequalities, endemic corrup-
tion, high crime rates, etc. which are labels and generalizations that are misleading,
sometimes wrong, and even derogatory if applied to the Global South in its entirety.
In this book, we will demonstrate how multifaceted the conditions are in places of
the Global South and how important it is to contextualize them before drawing
lessons for public policy agenda setting and policy making. The research and case
Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South 3

studies further underline the considerable advancement of public policy research in

the Global South.
The terminological predecessors pinpointed, to a high degree, to the economic
status of countries in the Global South referring to less developed, lower developed,
or undeveloped countries while generalizing and assuming a high degree of poverty
across all places in these categories. The same was expressed with the term Third
World summarizing all poor countries in contrast to the First World (the capitalist
countries) and the Second World (socialist or communist countries). With the fall of
the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the naïve tripartition vaporized
quickly. At about the same time, the newly industrializing countries and tiger
economies demonstrated that Global South countries have the potential to grow
substantially over a short time period. The city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore,
for example, ranked among the poorest in the world after World War II and
developed impressively due to a variety of innovative economic policies transferring
manufacturing industries into innovation hot spots (Audretsch 2015). Also, China
does not fit into any category and is, nonetheless, classified as a Global South
country. These few examples show that the Global South is diverse and dynamic
(Rigg 2015).
Olaf Kaltmeier (2015) points to another advantage of introducing and using the
term Global South; he emphasizes that it opened up a new research vein reintegrating
studies from Africa, Asia, and Latin America into the research field. This book
demonstrates that his statement is justified in highlighting contributions from diverse
countries of the Global South. Kaltmeier nevertheless sees limitations similar to
those of the Third World concept because of the assumed geographical North-South
divide. The advanced research integrated in this volume by scholars from the Global
South shows that the divide is getting smaller; the expertise and academic profes-
sionalism of the contributors rather indicate that the Global South and the Global
North have much in common.
The South is a term brought forward, among others, by the Brandt Commission
Reports published in 1980 and 1983 which promoted the North-South dialogue to
overcome mainly economic disparities identifying a North-South line, also known as
Brandt line (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980,
1983).1 Although published many years ago, the thoughts and statements by Willy
Brandt, former Chancellor of Germany from 1969 to 1974 and Nobel Prize laureate
in 1971, and the commission are highly relevant today:
Waste and corruption, oppression and violence, are unfortunately to be found in many
parts of the world. The work for a new international order cannot wait until these and
other evils have been overcome. We in the South and the North should frankly discuss
abuses of power by elites, the outburst of fanaticism, the misery of millions of refugees, or
other violations of human rights which harm the cause of justice and solidarity, at home
and abroad. (Brandt 1979, p. 7)

1
Juliane Corredor Jiménez contributes a chapter about the topicality of the Brandt Reports in this
volume.
4 H. M. Grimm

This quote of Willy Brandt from 1979 is highly topical and makes politicians
even doubt whether any progress has been made. The former Vice Chancellor of
Germany, Sigmar Gabriel, for example, points out:
Reading the Commission’s reports makes one wonder what we’ve been doing for the past
40 years; for these reports deal with paths out of poverty, with halting arms races, with
environmental degradation, population growth, fair global trade and steps away from
development aid towards a true partnership between the countries of the North and those
of the South.2

“The courage to act” (Quilligan 2002, p. 62) is one of the main themes of the Brandt
Reports, and taking action is, by definition, linked to entrepreneurial activity. “The best
way to predict the future is to create it.” This quote by Willy Brandt along with his global
perspectives in solving complex issues became the leading theme of the Willy Brandt
School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, which was named after
him, and from which a considerable number of authors in this volume received their
graduate and doctoral degrees. Brandt’s vision was to “create the future” by developing,
implementing, and assessing innovative policies rather than transferring policies without
prior efforts in lesson-learning or geographic, cultural or, political contextualization
(Rose 1991). How can the future be created? How can local, national, and global
problems be analyzed, addressed, and solved? How can decision-makers in policy
making and politics be trained and supported in reaching goals while sticking to Willy
Brandt’s vision?
The Brandt School in Erfurt aims to answer these questions. With the majority of
students coming from countries of the so-called Global South, the traditional approach in
teaching public bureaucrats turned out to have severe limitations in the context of
accelerated globalization. The concepts, methods, and tools in policy making known
and applied in the Western hemisphere turned out to have shortcomings when trans-
ferred to developing or fragile contexts. In this context, the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues chaired by Willy Brandt, in 1980, pointed to the
limitations of just transferring large-scale resources from North to South on the basis that
a restructuring of the global economy will allow developing countries to facilitate and
determine their own ways of economic growth and development.

3 A Brief Global North Perspective: What Is Public Policy?

The definitions of public policy are various, and there is no unanimous consensus
about the term. Public policy can be described as an overall framework within which
government actions are translated and realized to achieve public goals and to create
public value (Moore 2013; Meynhardt 2009). Cochrane and Malone (2014, p. 3)

2
Speech by former German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel at the conference #Brandt2030,
31.8.2017, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/170831-bm-brandt-kommission/
292232, accessed on September 25, 2018.
Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South 5

suggest a working definition of public policy “(. . .) being the study of government
decisions and actions designed to deal with a matter of public concern.” They focus
strongly on purposive government actions dealing with perceived problems and
questions. Policy analysis tries to examine and answer these questions with the
goal to consult and inform governments and political decision-makers using scien-
tific insights and investigations and to help formulate a decision that is ideally suited
to the needs of the public and all interest groups involved. An academic discipline
striving to master this challenging task and to develop consensus must inevitably
build bridges across politics, administration, citizens, social groups, and science
(Lasswell 1951, 1956; Ostrom 2005).
Thomas R. Dye (1972) explained that public policy is a form of governing that
adheres to certain motives for action and brings about change (“What governments do,
why they do it, and what difference it makes”). Dye also stressed that public policy can
mean refraining from action (ibid., p. 2). A policy is a consciously made government
decision, particularly when not only the solution proposal but also the change affected
by the policy is of interest (Howlett et al. 2009, p. 4). In order to summarize the nature of
public policy, DeLeon used three key words: effective public policy must be problem-
oriented, multidisciplinary, and value-oriented (DeLeon 2006, p. 40).
Public policies go through a policy cycle and process including problem definition
and agenda setting, policy formulation, policy legislation, policy implementation,
and—to a lesser extent—policy evaluation which may result in policy change as the
outcome of a full policy cycle. This book puts special emphasis on policy formulation
and agenda setting of the policy cycle assuming that bringing complex issues into the
agenda is linked to the emergence of public policy in general.
But can public policy really make a difference? Yes, it can. Audretsch (2015,
p. 104) refers to the divergent developments of two neighboring states in the United
States, North and South Carolina, one of which turned into a high-tech location, while
the other one remained trapped in old manufacturing industries. The reason for the
striking difference lies in public policy; policy makers in North Carolina designed and
emphasized policies to transfer the state from its dependence on unskilled labor in
manufacturing into putting emphasis on knowledge and entrepreneurship (Link 1995).
Such a phenomenon can be observed worldwide; Singapore and Hong Kong are the
most prominent cases being driven by strong state policy to bring about the modern-
ization of a city-state in a successful manner.
The academic study of public policy emerged as a subfield within the discipline of
political sciences in the United States in the 1950s. While in the Anglo-American
world public policy education was established from the 1960s onward, policy
consultation and public policy research and education developed comparatively
late in the European countries. In Germany, for example, the study of political
science was re-established guided by the Anglo-American equivalent after the
Second World War. As a result, political scientists used the concept of government
as the starting point of scientific research. Thus, the scientific field of comparative
government was established, addressing institutions and procedures of political rule
and decision-making and addressing public administration challenges (Schuppert
2003). The German scientist Wilhelm Hennis critically analyzed this phase of
6 H. M. Grimm

reorientation of political science in his 1965 treatise Aufgaben einer modernen

Regierungslehre (tasks of a modern government). For him, the main focus of
political science was not on government as an institutionalized order but on the art
and tools of governing and the analysis of governing techniques. He pointed to the
questions which emphasized content (policies) as well as structures and processes.
He formulated the aim of a new political science which aimed at looking at structure,
processes, and procedures as well as content emphasizing that:
(. . .) we urgently need political scientists who possess scientific knowledge of significant
matters such as healthcare, infrastructure, defense, education, and who by virtue of their
background in political science are able to view these matters as public tasks, i.e. in relation
to governing technique and political decision-making. (Hennis 1965, p. 413)

Hennis, therefore, was the first one in postwar Germany to formulate the agenda of
a policy-oriented political and administrative science and, simultaneously, policy-
oriented training for public service (Hennis 2000). This new focus on public policy
and governance emerged due to the fact that political and administrative procedures
were increasingly seen as problem-solving processes which were coined by the
shaping and transformation of political institutions and administrative structures in
the 1980s and 1990s (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995). Moreover, the increasing complex-
ity of coping with social problems and creating new solutions for social problems lead,
in return, to the question of good governance. These topics became increasingly
important in political science (Benz 2003; Jann 2003), which also explains the
increasing demand for consultation.
This short review of the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in
Germany shows that it took many years before it was established and acknowledged
by scholars, politicians, policy makers, and the public in a country of the Global
North. This book will emphasize countries of the Global South to further enhance
our knowledge of the role and establishment of public policy as an academic
discipline in an inclusive way.3
The reasons for this approach are manifold, among them, that the importance of
policy analysis and policy studies further increased globally in the last several years
which is reflected by the rising number of published academic articles and official
documents as well as organized conferences and activities and associations emerging
that focus on public policy or policy issues. Reflecting on the extraordinary global
changes, we face new challenges in policy making which affect public policy and
social sciences in theory and practice. Due to new political parameters, debates, and
threats to liberal democracies as well as the renaissance of populist parties and actors,
increased migration, financial crises, endemic corruption, climate change, digital-
ization, and the perceived next industrial revolution, long-lasting warfare in fragile
states, and far more issues, the demand for interdisciplinary, transformative, solution-
oriented policy analysis is high. Hence, more research from the Global South is
needed to cope with the many and complex policy issues on our policy agenda.

3
Lamin O. Ceesay explains the meaning of public policy from a Global South perspective in this
volume.
Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South 7

4 Who Is Contributing and Which Topics Are Addressed?

The book presents research by young scholars and leading senior professors from all
over the world. They have diverse backgrounds and have made significant contri-
butions to public policy research while working on a vast array of policy issues. Each
contributor has had complete freedom to address a topic of high policy relevance that
best fit his or her individual or contextual expertise. To decrease the risk of fuzziness
and a high variance of topics, the book was split in two parts. The first part aims at
contributing to theory building; the second part includes a selection of country case
studies which focus on the emergence of public policy, on the one hand, and agenda
setting, on the other hand. In other words, the book has a strong emphasis on the
early stages of public policy designing. Understanding how a policy agenda is set,
when, and by whom is a prerequisite to comprehend how policy is agreed on and
implemented (Zahariadis 2016, p. 4).
In a nutshell, the focus is on the emergence of public policy and the role of
agenda setting for policy making in countries and regions of the Global South. The
authors selected diverse topics of policy concern which are very relevant for
public policy research, among them, the role of civil society and think tanks for
democratization; the question what promotes democratization, how to sustain it,
and how this is linked to public policy programs offered by higher educational
institutions; the driving forces of economic and civil development and, in that
context, the influence of multinational organizations; the role of donor agencies for
community development; the causes of migration and the impact of migration on
host countries; wider effects of emigration and labor migration on home families;
the relationship between environmental policy making and media coverage; the
role of education policy for lower developed countries; and the emergence of
entrepreneurship education as driving force for development. Furthermore, the
authors applied theories of the policy process for their analyses such as the
Multiple Streams Theory (Kingdon 2002) or the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2014) and could further enhance the transfer
of this theory to research in a Global South context. The authors applied inno-
vative qualitative and quantitative methods and focused on policy issues in a
global context as well as on country cases, in particular, on Brazil, Colombia,
Paraguay, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Ghana, the Gambia, and
Kazakhstan. Some authors presented a first draft of the included contributions at
the International Public Policy Associations’ conference in Singapore participating
in the panel titled The Emergence of Public Policy and Agenda Setting: Case
Studies from the Global South, on June 29, 2017.
The book is addressed to scholars, students, and practitioners. On the one hand,
scholars and graduate students of public policy and related topics will receive
firsthand analyses on selected policy issues that matter in Global South countries.
On the other hand, practitioners, managers, and consultants will find in-depth
information and knowledge from scholarly experts who offer professional research
while taking into consideration context, historical trajectories, and geographic
8 H. M. Grimm

peculiarities. One thing that all of the case studies have in common is that they were
analyzed with cultural empathy and respectful consideration for context and envi-
ronmental variables.

5 Organization of Parts and Chapters

The first part of the book contributes to theory building and a better understanding of
terms and terminologies and looks at selected policy issues, namely, corruption and
migration, from a global perspective. In the second part of the book, the authors present
case studies focusing on public policy agenda setting and designing specifically while
examining, among others, education, environmental, economic, entrepreneurship, and
other important fields of policy making across countries. The question and importance of
democratization and the role of civil society play a crucial role in most of the contri-
butions and seem to be of prime importance for the development and for policy making
in the Global South.
The second chapter is titled Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications
of the North-South Divide from Today’s Policy Perspective and builds on the intro-
duction of this volume while further exploring and explaining the concept of the Global
South.4 Juliane Corredor Jiménez refers to different terminologies which were applied in
the past to describe the division of the world into “poorer” and “wealthier” countries.
Parting from the two Brandt Reports as reference points, she argues that the concept of a
Global North and Global South is still relevant today, as it conceptualizes global
differences in economic power and political representation. She further underlines that
it is important to acknowledge different needs and interests among the two poles and,
furthermore, to take into consideration the context and diversity of places for developing
smart and sustainable public policies. From her standpoint, ignoring the divide may lead
to ineffective policy outcomes.
In the chapter entitled Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts, the
authors Richard Rose and Caryn Peiffer review theories about the definition, causes,
and consequences of corruption in the Global North and the Global South. Once
these parameters are established, the authors compare various assessments of differ-
ent country’s levels of corruption around the globe and ultimately conclude that
grouping countries according to geography or culture fails to accurately capture this
nuanced and multifaceted problem. Thereafter, the authors present nine key princi-
ples for reducing retail corruption that hold a high practical value, in particular when
it comes to the practice of moving the delivery of services away from face-to-face
model and toward an electronic model in order to reduce the chances for corrupt
behavior to occur.

4
I am grateful to Donovan Gregg for his thoughtful comments and contributions summarizing the
individual chapters.
Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South 9

The next contribution is written by Anja Mihr, entitled “Glocal” Public Policy in
Times of Global Migration, and explores the ways in which policies around the world
are growing both more local and more global simultaneously, in particular with regard to
the ways that migrants of all types are being treated while themselves impacting on
public policy making. She argues that all variants of migrants, be they working migrants,
asylum seekers, trafficked persons, or refugees, are key actors and advocates within the
Advocacy Coalition Framework. The chapter addresses how more space can be made in
the public sphere and discourse for migrants to participate in the political process if
global norms and standards are abided at a local level as well.
Atif Ikram Butt discusses the very recent ideational turn in new institutionalism in
his contribution titled Public Policy and Ideation. Recent theoretical advancements in
ideational institutionalism have created a fundament on which institutional analysis
could be sufficiently carried out in countries of the Global South that do not necessarily
present facets of pluralistic societies or of well-established liberal democracies. This
introductory chapter advances theoretical application of ideational institutionalism by
developing conceptual clarity about types of ideas, their origin, and the mechanisms
through which they affect public policy outcomes. It further presents an ideational
framework of public policy for understanding the mechanism through which ideas
originate and affect public policy outcomes. The framework allows for categorization
of different types of ideas as per their influence on the policy process and its outcomes.
The second part of the volume starts with the chapter entitled The Rise of Policy
Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia presented by Jorge Sellare, Juan David
Rivera Acevedo, and Lina Martínez. It focuses on democratization and economic and
civil development and traces the history of public policy in Colombia by looking at the
key national and international actors and institutions that have shaped the policy making
process as public policy evolved into an academic discipline. The chapter shows which
actors in the agricultural sector as well as which multinational development banks and
agencies played a pivotal role in shaping decision-making in Colombia. The authors
further demonstrate that the country frequently adopted foreign development models to
apply in its own context serving as the basis for its own policies and subsequent demand
for policy analysts as the field of public policy grew.
Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti contributes with his chapter Re-Democratization
and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic Discipline in Brazil: Push or Pull? and
discusses the recent emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Brazil. It
traces this development from the 1960s onward while specifically taking into consider-
ation the roles of re-democratization, social participation, and state reformation after
the end of the military dictatorship. Further, he investigates the role of historical,
social, and political factors in influencing the studies in this area of knowledge, citing
state reforms and the reopening for social participation as the two main driving forces
that contributed to the offset of public policy as an independent academic discipline in
Brazil. The chapter concludes with an overview of Brazilian public policy, public
management, and public administration study programs which were established in
course of acknowledging public policy as an academic discipline in this country.
The following contribution is written by Mergen Dyussenov and entitled Who Sets
the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic Diversification in
10 H. M. Grimm

Kazakhstan Throughout 2011–2016. The chapter seeks to better flesh out the discussion
surrounding the agenda setting phase of the policy cycle of Kazakhstan by discerning
who exactly sets the agenda in regard to economic diversification. The author identifies
two ways that the existing literature has been hitherto insufficient, namely, that they have
not empirically established who sets the agenda for a certain policy issue, nor have they
employed internet research methods. Upon examination, the author finds that think tanks
are the primary agenda setters when it comes to policies related to economic diversifi-
cation in Kazakhstan and that the government itself is more directly in control of shaping
the debate about these policies thereafter.
In the following, Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham presents the chapter The Role and
Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory Governance in Ghana. He explores the
growth of Ghana’s democracy and civil society actors, since 1994. In particular, the
author analyzes the growth of think tanks and the activities that they pursue in order to
promote citizen participation in governance. After a systematic analysis of the themes
and activities developed and employed by these think tanks, the author concludes that
there appears to be a link between the activities undertaken by policy think tanks and
citizen awareness and/or participation in governance and policy making.
The chapter written by Lamin O. Ceesay focuses on the influence and interventions
by donor organizations at different stages of the Gambia’s local government reform and
decentralization policy making processes. It pays particular attention to a community-
driven development program and how experiences and lessons gathered from inter-
national intervention have influenced local government structures and practices in the
Gambia. Before focusing on the case, the author presents a treatise of the nature of the
policy processes from a developing country perspective. He offers an introduction to
the question what a policy is as well as the origin of policies and the actors that set the
agenda, formulate, and implement public policies in developing countries. He then
applies his theoretical framework to his case study and demonstrates what influence
supra-institutions exert on decentralization and community development referring to the
emergence of new governance structures, administrative functions, and funding models.
The next chapters of the book look into different perspectives on emigration and
immigration as they relate to public policy and the Global South. The first lens through
which these phenomena are examined offers the chapter Designing the Export of
Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in the Emigration Policies of the Philippines by
Exequiel Cabanda and Meng-Hsuan Chou. The scholars explore how governments
reconcile the positive utility of promoting labor migration and the wider effects that
emigration has on the families left behind, specifically focusing on the case of nurses in
the Philippines. The authors analyze the problem within the context of “Asian values”
and trace policy makers’ policy narratives in the design process of the Philippine
Nursing Act of 2002 and reveal how the debates revolved around securing the market
for the Philippines’ nurse-migration industry. They conclude that though the country
belongs to the cultural heritage of Asia, its governance structure and regulatory practices
have reconfigured Asian values to promote and prioritize economic growth over the core
values of the family in terms of women’s central role.
The contribution entitled Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response:
Dynamics of Continuity and Change chooses instead to focus not on a government
Introduction: The Added Value of Public Policy Research in the Global South 11

actively promoting the expatriation of its own people but on the policy responses of a
government that is dealing with a large influx of migrants. Anwesha Ghosh highlights
that population movement has become one of the defining aspects of
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, looking specifically at Afghan migration to Pakistan,
since 1979. By reviewing Pakistan’s policies toward this group of migrants, the author
seeks to identify the major factors influencing these shifts, lastly trying to determine
the potential role of Afghan refugees in the Pakistan context.
The next piece of research deals with water pollution, environmental policy, civic
engagement, and the role of media coverage finally resulting in policy and political
change in India. Maitreyee Mukherjee examines when and how the issue of polluting
the Ganges River was given public attention covering a time period of three decades
(1985–2016). Her contribution entitled Agenda Setting in India: Examining the
Ganges Pollution Control Program Through the Lens of Multiple Streams Frame-
work discusses the pollution of the Ganges River during this time frame. She applies
a discourse analysis and shows how Kingdon’s multiple streams approach material-
ized over the period of investigation and subsequently resulted in the opening of a
favorable policy window, in 2014. The opening of this policy window was facili-
tated by carefully planned collective action of few political entrepreneurs and actors
sharing similar political ideas and ideologies. The deteriorating and devastating
condition of the river and the continuous failure of the government to tackle this
severe environmental issue finally allowed the opposition party to create a national
sentiment followed by media coverage then resulting in political change.
The final chapters of this book look at what is widely considered to be one of the
fundamental pillars of development and growth, education. The first chapter examines
the effectiveness of one of the latest waves in pedagogical theory, namely, entre-
preneurial education, and is entitled Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of
Start-ups: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay contributed by Fernando Luis Ramirez
Gonzalez. The chapter attempts to add further empirical analysis to a particular
type of entrepreneurship education program (EEP), called “Education through Entre-
preneurship,” in order to discern if EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and
attitudes toward start-up development increase significantly after having completed
the program. From the results of the empirical analysis, the author supports the
findings of other studies that have found statistically significant increases in EEP
participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and perceived behavioral control and a
positive, yet not statistically significant, effect on EEP participants’ personal attitude.
The last chapter builds on the introductory chapter on ideational institutionalism
contributed by Atif Ikram Butt in this volume and analyses the role of ideas in policy
formulation. It draws attention to discursive practices in policy making. The author
examines the passage of the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act of
Pakistan by assessing the ideational traces for the Act. He finds out that historical
context matters as much as the colonial past and the British constitutional heritage.
He further concludes that the legislation was mainly the result of international
pressure and the expectations placed upon the government of Pakistan because of
its international commitments. The analysis confirms, among others, that actors in
the policy process are strategic and that they rely on multiple criteria for favoring
12 H. M. Grimm

certain strategies over others. The author shows that ideas at the normative level are
rather used for the justification of new public policy prescriptions, while ideas at the
cognitive level are used in the foreground of policy formulation.

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Heike M. Grimm is Aletta Haniel Professor for Public Policy and Entrepreneurship at the Willy
Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, and currently Director of the
School. Prior, she was Professor in Policy Analysis and Public Management with the Faculty of
Economics, Management and Accountancy of the University of Malta. Heike Grimm has held
visiting appointments and fellowships, among them, at the Higher School of Economics of the State
University Moscow, Russia; the School of Public and Environmental Studies, Indiana University,
USA; and the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft. She served as visiting fellow at the
Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. Her research and publications focus on the
link between entrepreneurship policy, social entrepreneurship, development; the role of entre-
preneurship in higher education policy; and public and nonprofit management. She studied political
science, economics, economic history, and Arabic at the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in
Munich and at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) University of London.
 Part I
Theoretical Considerations and Global
Public Policy Implications
Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions
and Implications of the North-South Divide
from Today’s Policy Perspective

Juliane Corredor Jiménez

1 The North-South Dichotomy

In the years after World War II and in the course of decolonization, the “Global
South,” first, in geographic terms referring to the region below the equator, gained
what was a prerequisite of visibility and representation in global politics: statehood.
The emergence of new state actors was embedded in a new global political order
shaped by the United Nations organization and the Bretton Woods institutions as
well as the increasing globalization of trade. In this historical context, different
terminologies emerged to describe the now tangible divide between the “North”
and the economically poor and less developed states in the Southern hemisphere—a
representation of the imbalance of powers in the international system. Among the
most prominent of the various categories were “Third World” coined by Alfred
Sauvy (1952) in reference to le tiers état describing the group of people not
belonging to the clergy and nobility at the time of the French revolution; “the
under-developed countries,” later “developing countries”; and the concept of “cen-
tre, semi-periphery and periphery” (Wallerstein 1974).
The term “Global South” was conceptualized by Oliver Shewell Frank, while the
concept of “North-South Dialogue” was later used in reference to the Conference on
International Economic Cooperation of 1975–1977 (see Williams 1984). As illus-
trated by William Clark, the dichotomy between North and South emerged to fill the
void left when the two poles of the East and West diminished after the end of the Cold
War:
(. . .) during the Cold War, the world had become accustomed to a division into two political
blocs, but the existence of a third segment—developing nations—was now becoming
increasingly obvious, and hence it was perhaps better to see the world as divided into
‘North’ and ‘South’. (Clark 1965 in Solarz 2014, p. 122)

J. C. Jiménez (*)
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 17

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_2
18 J. C. Jiménez

The “North-South” dichotomy owed its rapid rise in popularity and widespread
recognition in particular to the report by the Independent Commission on Interna-
tional Development Issues. This commission and the reports it issued were also
named after its chairman, Willy Brandt, and established on the initiative of the
World Bank in 1977. The “Brandt Reports” (North-South: A Program for Survival
published in 1980; Common Crisis: North-South Cooperation for World Recovery
published in 1983) were “widely hailed as the world’s first internationally repre-
sentative proposals on global development and economic interdependence”
(Quilligan 2002, p. 5). Yet, the term “North-South” has been legitimately criticized
by several authors for its geographical and political imprecision (Duck 2015). The
Independent Commission on International Development Issues themselves criti-
cized the term in 1980, remarking that the Brandt Line’s1 division into a North and
South was too simplistic, acknowledging that two rich industrialized countries
(Australia and New Zealand) were actually situated in the “South” (Brandt et al.
1980). Other authors disapprove the North-South Divide because it considers a
division on the basis of national categories, assuming that the states belonging to
the South and North, respectively, constitute a unity (Thérien 1999, p. 734; Solarz
2014, p. 133).
While the Brandt Line as a division of the world into poor and rich countries on the
basis of a geographical distinction might challenge its proper legitimacy, the basis
upon which it was drawn remains a political and social reality today. Besides being a
graphical illustration of the global distribution of economic power, the Brandt Line
also represented the South’s dependence on the North which dominated “the inter-
national rules and institutions for trade, money and finance” (Quilligan 2002, p. 1).
Throughout the 1990s, the Brandt Line can be drawn on the basis of “the North as the
OSCE and EAPC,” “the North as the OECD,” or “the South as the G-77” (Solarz
2014, p. 140) illustrating its significance in today’s policy making.
The economic and resulting social imbalances between the South and the
North, fostered by protectionist regimes, unequal terms of trade, economic hege-
monies, and increasing privatization, still divide the world into “haves” and “not
haves” and hindered economic development in poor countries (Brandt et al. 1980).
Arrighi et al. (2003) emphasize the continuing hegemony of the North, represented
by membership in the OECD (with exception of Chile who joined in 2010): “(. . .)
if an unequal income distribution is characterized by little long-term upward or
downward mobility, it can be taken as underlying hierarchy of wealth, for wealth
is nothing but ‘long-term income’” (Harrod 1958 in Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 5). In
Ankie Hoogvelt’s words, the relationship between core and periphery is becoming
a social relationship, and no longer a geographical one (Hoogvelt 1997, p. 145).
This is consistent with the literature that suggests that OECD countries constitute a
“convergence club” (Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 4). Milanovic reiterates that the trend

1
The Brandt Commission identified a North-South line (or Brandt Line), a geographical conve-
nience based on the fact that most of the poor world lies in the South latitude 30○ North (Rigg 2015;
see also Brandt et al. 1980).
Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North. . . 19

after the 1970s “reinforced the strong domination of Western countries at the very
top of the income distribution” (Milanovic 2005, p. 61). While polarizing tenden-
cies between rich and poor are still at work, they are increasingly obvious within
rather than across countries (Arrighi et al. 2003).
The divide between North and South is still a relevant concept today. We apply
the term “Global South” in this book deliberately as a symbolic acknowledgment
that, despite changing distribution patterns and emerging regional powers (Grugel
and Hout 1999), there still exists a divide between the economically poor and rich
countries which should not be ignored (Lees 2011; Boatca 2015).

2 The Brandt Reports

As mentioned beforehand, the Brandt Reports constitute a representative proposal on

economic development (Quilligan 2002), so we consider it worthy to analyze their
recommendations and implications for public policy making at this point. In the
introduction to the first report Brandt writes:
It [the report] discusses North-South relations as the great social challenge of our time. We
want to emphasize our belief that the two decades ahead of us may be fateful for mankind.
We want responsible world citizens everywhere to realize that many global issues will come
to a head during this period. But we also raise problems to be dealt with at once, long before
we have come to the end of the century. (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 7)

Cooperation was seen as a principal tool to enhance worldwide development with

development being defined as “to lead to self-fulfillment and creative partnership in
the use of a nation’s productive forces and its full human potential” (Brandt et al.
1980, p. 23). Aiming at reviving a failing economic system, the commission
advocated a large-scale transfer of resources from North to South also with a view
to allowing developing countries to promote their own development and economic
growth paths.
The reports identify mutual interests shared by North and South and undermine the
fact that both poles depend upon each other. Yet, the reports also emphasize that
public knowledge and political acceptance of this mutual interdependence are very
limited. The concern over mutual interests was generally shared by the North,
whereas the argument as to why the North needs Southern cooperation centered
around food security, economic benefits, and potential security threats (see Ehrlich
1980). At this point, the Brandt Reports emphasize that the North’s self-interest must
be sacrificed in order to ensure their own and the South’s survival and avoid
reciprocal impoverishment of the world at large.
Parallel to the works of the Brandt Commission, the Global South first united as
G77 during the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
which has hence served the South as an effective instrument to join forces in
international negotiations. As expressed by Mendez (2015), “(. . .) South-South
cooperation is coming to occupy an important place in the changing theory and
20 J. C. Jiménez

discourse of development.” The united Global South later demanded for a “New
Economic World Order” in concordance with the recommendations of the Brandt
Reports (Amuzegar 1976, p. 550). Yet, the South-South Dialogue assessed that
“while the South had succeeded in giving a high political visibility to its concern
for an equitable world order, the concrete results of the North-South Dialogue (. . .)
had been extremely disappointing,” lamenting that the North had started to reject the
South’s proposals for change without offering any creative solution. The North was
reluctant to change its negative attitude “unless the South could become better
organized for dialogue and negotiation” (South-South Dialogue 1979, p. 117).
The North’s approach to a dialogue with the South was primarily motivated by
economic issues. As expressed by Arrighi et al. (2003, p. 6):
catching up with the standards of wealth of first world countries [remained] the generally
accepted objective of Third World developmental efforts, but the narrowing of the industri-
alization gap between Third and First World countries was just as generally considered to be
the most essential and effective means in pursuit of that objective.

This argument is shared by Thérien, who states that between the two competing
paradigms of world poverty, the one understanding poverty as “a temporary
misadaptation of markets” and focusing on “(. . .) get[ting] poor individuals to
adapt to [the existing economic system]” is generally the predominant one (Thérien
1999, p. 730). The author gives an alternative paradigm, called the UN Paradigm,
according to which the divide between North and South is, unlike as seen by the
competing Bretton Woods paradigm, not being bridged. As expressed by Thérien, the
UN Paradigm “offers the most coherent narrative on world poverty, and aligns with
the recommendations made by the Brandt Reports as it emphasizes the need for a
strengthened cooperation among North and South” (ibid.). Arrighi et al.’s findings
provide further evidence that, against the widely made claim, the North-South Divide
has not diminished. They found that “(. . .) convergence in the degree of industrial-
ization (. . .) has not been associated with convergence in levels of income enjoyed on
average by residents of the two groups of countries” (Arrighi et al. 2003, p. 3). The
authors further argue that this contention is based on the false identification of
“industrialization” with “development” and “industrialized” with “wealthy” (ibid.).
This statement is consistent with reflections of scholars from the South who assert that
“the real objective of the North-South Dialogue (. . .) [should be] the economic
decolonization of the Third World, as (. . .) a continuous liberation from the past
patterns of economic, cultural and political dependency” (South-South Dialogue
1979, p. 118), which illustrates that instead of finding new patterns of economic
development, different terms are applied to preserve the existing patterns.
Quilligan (2002) assesses the state of implementation of recommendations made
in the Brandt Reports under a so-called report card. According to the author, efforts to
improve issues such as “hunger, poverty, armaments and security, money and
finance, global negotiations” all failed, while issues such as “trade, technology and
corporations, debt, aid, women” are poorly performing (graded “D”). The author’s
evaluation hints at a general failure of international development politics. Lees states
that “thirty years [after the Brandt Reports] on, international relations theory has
Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North. . . 21

chosen to ignore the Brandt Line” (Lees 2011, p. 1), while the divide between North
and South continues to “form one of the central cleavages in the international system”
(ibid.).

3 Implications of the North-South Dichotomy for Current

Policy Making

The ignorance of the Brandt Line constitutes a growing threat to stability for both
Global North and South. In this part we will point out the divide’s implications for
today’s political landscape.
Quilligan concludes that the economic system seeks “global wealth without glob-
alization of benefits” and understands globalization short as “global privatization,”
resulting in the determining question of “who wants to be the lender of the last resort?”
(Quilligan 2002, p. 33). Latin America’s crisis in the 1980s, Asia’s foreign direct
investment crisis in the late 1990s, and the global financial breakdown of 2007–2008,
to mention just a few, undermine the legitimacy of the Brandt Commission’s claims
for a more inclusive and balanced global economic system.
Especially as to how the global threat of climate change and the challenge of
attaining a sustainable development as defined by the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals2 are concerned, global cooperation has proven to be indispens-
able. Ignorance of the North-South Divide leads to even more ineffective policy
outcomes because only consideration of all the diverging needs and interests linked
to this issue will bring about the desired solution. As the first Brandt Report
emphasizes:
the strain on the global environment derives mainly from the growth of the industrial
economies, but also from that of the world population. It threatens the survival and
development opportunities of future generations. All nations have to cooperate more
urgently in international management of the atmosphere and other global commons, and
in the prevention of irreversible ecological damage. (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 148)

The first and the second Brandt Reports both conceptualize climate change and
environmental politics. The first report dedicates a chapter entitled “Population-
Growth, Mobility and Environment” to environmental concerns. The second report
stresses a need to coordinate food and energy production of all countries, taking into
account different needs from a global perspective (Brandt 1983). Sanwal argues that
“disproportionate burdens on the global ecosystem require a policy focus not only on
globalized material flows and related scarcity but also on the social, economic, and
environmental systems that structure society’s use and distribution of natural
resources” (Sanwal 2015, p. 211). Strong reiterates that a “unifying theme of all
commissions [on North-South and development issues] is that growing global

2
See official website of the UN SDGs https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-
development-goals/ accessed on 9 September 2018.
22 J. C. Jiménez

interdependence needs now, as never before, a high level of international cooperation”

(Strong 1993, p. 306).
When the environment emerged as a new political priority during the 1980s,
several authors identified it as an area of North-South confrontation (Hurrell and
Kingsburry 1993) but the environmental debate above all diluted the “distinctive
character of Third World collective interests” (Thérien 1999, p. 726). The
Brundtland Commission did recognize that “developing countries (. . .) endure
most of the poverty associated with environmental degradation” (World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development 1987, part IV, p. 103); “but its chief message
was that environmental challenges are characterized first and foremost by their
“integrated and interdependent nature”” (Thérien 1999, p. 726). While characterized
as a North-South confrontation, the environment also constituted the opportunity for
North and South to come together around a common concern, as illustrated by
Richard Sandbrook before the Brundtland Commission: “it has not been too difficult
to push the environment lobby of the North and the development lobby of the South
together. (. . .) they are coming to have a common consensus around the theme of
sustainable development” (WCOED 1987, p. 64).
Global debates over the distribution of resources forged the concept of “common
but differentiated responsibilities” (see UNFCCC 2015; United Nations 1998).
Analogous to this approach, the Kyoto Protocol distinguished the degree of respon-
sibilities and legally binding targets through a distinction between Annex B and
Non-Annex countries which generally corresponds to North and South as defined by
the Brandt Line (United Nations 1998). While this distinction represented an attempt
to distribute costs of climate change and development justly, the respective respon-
sibilities defined in the Kyoto Protocol did not balance out the unjust distribution of
real damages and losses the South faced due to climatic and developmental condi-
tions. In the Paris Agreement, the Brandt Line was dissolved with Nationally
Determined Contributions that would leave flexibility for each country to define
thresholds according to its capacity and necessity.
In theory, when two parties depend upon a common ground that finds itself in
danger, the logical assumption is that they will both work toward saving their own
and consequently their common survival. Unfortunately, awareness of the mutual
dependency in issues related to climate protection is not very high. Landes and
Porcher (2015) argue that the choice of a threshold of 2 ○ C in international climate
negotiations condemns island states to suffer from severe land loss and is a reflection
of unequal power relations (p. 16), again pointing to a divide between policy
objectives of the North and the South. The authors go even further and claim that,
contrary to a logical supposition of jointly protecting a common public good like the
climate, leaders and executives choose to deny climate change and give it only
secondary attention (ibid.).
If we look at the debates around sustainable development in particular, the
importance of issues varies across North and South, influenced by factors such as
economic wealth and development stage but also geographic and climatic condi-
tions. As Bo Kjellén described the negotiations toward the United Nations Conven-
tion to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), countries from the South (mainly African
Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North. . . 23

countries), which are directly affected by desertification and droughts caused by a

rise in temperatures, faced a certain reluctance from the North. The latter were more
interested in the protection of their own biospheres, such as forests, for example
(Kjellén 2008). After long negotiations, the convention was established, in 1994, as
a legally binding international agreement, aiming to achieve “Land Degradation
Neutrality”3 but its implementation is still far from being accomplished.
Sylvia Karlsson points out a dimension of the North-South Divide with important
implications for sustainable development. She claims that an existing global knowl-
edge divide between South and North reinforces power structures in international
negotiations, since the South often lacks scientific data to back up the arguments
necessary for the defense of its interests (Karlsson 2002). Karlsson advocates for
assisting the Global South in developing resources for native research and develop-
ment, fostering partnerships between Northern and Southern research and teaching
institutions, and encouraging Northern researchers to include the South in their
research designs. Beyond Karlsson’s recommendations, the idea of transfers as pro-
nounced in the Brandt Reports has proven unfeasible and thus unsuccessful in
alleviating the North-South Divide. While technological and financial transfers in
particular constitute a crucial part of the negotiations and implementation of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as Deputy Executive
Director of the Green Climate Fund, Javier Manzanares admits transfers are still not
sufficiently executed (Manzanares 2018).
Landes and Porcher (2015) argue that the blind confidence in market mechanisms
has proven to be ineffective in leading to sustainable development. Moreover,
ineffective policies counteract sustainability efforts vividly illustrated by the fact
that fossil fuel energy companies received subsidies 20 times the entire investments
in renewable energies in 2014 (Landes and Porcher 2015, p. 27). This reiterates the
aforementioned discourse about the ineffectiveness of the Bretton Woods paradigm
to solve the world’s development issues (see Thérien 1999). By now, finance
institutions of South-South cooperation (such as BRICS Bank, Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank, or Silk Road Bank) apply different concepts of development
cooperation as traditional North-South development finance institutions (like the
IMF or World Bank) which might eventually constitute a positive leverage for
sustainability (Cui 2016).
As alternatives to transfers we propose bottom-up initiatives incentivizing inno-
vation, research, and entrepreneurship. Incentivizing entrepreneurship has the poten-
tial to help attain various Sustainable Development Goals at a time. Above all,
entrepreneurship can help local actors strengthen their autonomy and lead to
improved local networks that benefit communities and that can adapt to local
needs. Furthermore, we advocate for increased sharing of experiences and lessons
learning especially in hindsight of capacity building for the South (Rose 1991; see
also chapter “‘Glocal’ Public Policy in Times of Global Migration” in this volume).
The South-South Dialogue remarked that “a major weakness of the South (. . .) had

3
See https://www.unccd.int/convention/about-convention accessed on 9 September 2018.
24 J. C. Jiménez

been the lack of an appropriate organizational framework to provide adequate and

sustained technical support to Southern policymakers and negotiators” (South-South
Dialogue 1979). In addition, the South itself recognized that the responsibility for its
development lies essentially with them and their own efforts (South-South Dialogue
1979; Strong 1993, p. 310). While the adjustment of international treaties and terms
of trade would be highly beneficial to bridge the North-South Divide, it is also highly
unlikely to succeed. Even a change of terms of trade is no longer sufficient but rather
a global transition toward trade, production, and consumption patterns that favor
sustainability has become indispensable. Such a transition would necessarily
embrace the global substitution of GDP as an indicator for development and progress
(see Landes and Porcher 2015, p. 48; Stiglitz et al. 2009).
Perhaps Brandt’s most emblematic vision was to maintain “the earth in balance.”
In the first Brandt Report, the Commission writes that while “the divide between
North and South (. . .) has not been noticed as a decisive driving factor of the Global
Crisis,” “humanity is slowly realizing how (. . .) in one world economy, South and
North depend upon each other” (Brandt et al. 1980, p. 41). There should be, on the
one hand, efforts at international level and, on the other hand, internal political and
economic reforms in order to reach a more balanced world order (Brandt et al. 1980,
p. 160). Both the Northern and Southern perspectives have their relevance and
implications on how to solve global poverty and respond to the sustainability
challenge. As a conclusion, we have to ask “whether or not this generation and the
next (. . .) can come to terms with the political realities of an economically divided
North-South world?”(Amuzegar 1976, p. 549) and, if the answer is no, how will we
come to common terms?

4 Conclusion

This contribution attempts to take the Brandt Reports as a thematic reference point in
order to develop converging worldviews. It attempts to make a contribution to
bridging the knowledge divide as mentioned by Sylvia Karlsson by taking on
perspectives from both North and South. A central question remains: What do the
Brandt Reports imply for today’s policy making? As demonstrated, ignoring the
Brandt Line jeopardizes development policy objectives, in particular the fulfillment
of the UN Sustainable Development Goals. While there has been some convergence
between North and South, a number of issues maintain the North-South Divide, such
as (to mention only one example) interests and decisions related to climate change
adaptation and mitigation. The ultimate goal of the North-South Dialogue is to
achieve cooperation on issues that are of common interest to the entire world
community. The knowledge divide and the inequality between the amount of data
on “South”- and “North”-related affairs should be reduced in order to make respec-
tive policy decisions on a more equal basis. Instead of a focus on research transfers
as pronounced by the Brandt Commission, the authors advocate for bottom-up
initiatives that foster entrepreneurship and local development. In the spirit of the
Ignoring the Brandt Line? Dimensions and Implications of the North. . . 25

Brandt Reports, public policy should be sensitive to the North-South Divide and act
toward a convergence of the two poles as it serves global peace, sustainability, and
prosperity.

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Juliane Corredor Jiménez is a research assistant and doctoral candidate at the University of
Erfurt. Her research interests include sustainability politics, green entrepreneurship, and interna-
tional development. She holds an M.A. degree in Environmental Policy from Paris Institute of
Political Studies, Sciences Po, Paris.
Understanding Corruption in Different
Contexts

Richard Rose and Caryn Peiffer

1 Introduction

Social scientists offer a multitude of definitions of the word corruption, and there is
no agreement on a standard meaning. Without standards for defining these terms, the
result is confusion. In countries where the payment of bribes for public services is
not a matter of everyday life, the academic conclusion may be that the term is useless
or even that there is no such thing as corruption. But it is a luxury to ignore
corruption in countries where the illegal payment of money to get access to public
services can affect millions of people who rely on government to deliver education,
health care, and personal security. Corruption can also affect the award of govern-
ment contracts worth billions to those private enterprises and multinational corpo-
rations that benefit (Rose and Peiffer 2019).
How the process of governance is evaluated reflects the standards used to define
corruption, as well as how public officials behave. When ordinary Russians describe
politicians as corrupt, they usually have in mind officials abusing their public office
for private gains that can be worth billions of rubles. When Britons refer to
politicians as corrupt, they often have in mind behavior that would be unacceptable
among friends, such as making misleading statements. When dictators in poor
countries are accused of corruption by taking money in return for awarding public
contracts to private enterprises owned by their relatives, they may claim they are

R. Rose (*)
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin, Germany
C. Peiffer
International Public Policy and Governance, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol,
Bristol, UK

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 27

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_3
28 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

simply following their country’s traditional practice of supporting their extended

family.
The first challenge of public policy is to define corruption in a sufficiently clear
way that it can be used to diagnose the abuse of public authority and, where this is a
problem, to make policy prescriptions to reduce corruption that wastes money and
deprives citizens of benefits to which they are entitled by law. Making the definition
of a concept relative to national context or loading it up with a dozen or more
different meanings risks stretching it to the point at which it is no longer scientifically
useful.
To compare good and bad governance in countries around the world today, a
definition of corruption is needed that goes beyond accepting that whatever is done
in a given national context is internationally acceptable. It is even more needed by
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank, which annually spends
many billions in trying to improve economic and social conditions in countries in
which its efforts can be frustrated when its money is wasted and spent corruptly.

2 Corruption: A Word with Many Meanings

Corruption is a behavioral relationship between governors and governed. A narrow

definition of governance is that it is about relations within government between
principals, who decide what government institutions do, and public officials who act
as their agents in the process of governance (cf. Peters and Pierre 2004). While these
relationships are important for high-level politics, this focus ignores how public
officials deal with the great mass of citizens living outside the national capital.
Institutions provide the laws, money, and public employees that produce public
services, while governance determines the experience that ordinary people have
when they deal with officials delivering these services. These outputs include both
the “good,” goods of public policy, such as education and health care, and necessary
but not always welcome services, such as court judgments.
Corruption differs in impact between capital-intensive goods that cost many
millions to produce and public services that are retail in scale because they are
relatively cheap to provide, such as birth certificates. Services also differ in who is
involved. Capital-intensive activities such as building bridges or producing military
aircraft involve a relatively small number of corporations that have the resources
needed to produce such expensive high-tech goods. In countries where bureaucratic
standards are weak, the prospect of big profits is an incentive for enterprises to offer
big bribes for contracts and for groups of high-ranking politicians to accept them.
Government negotiation of contracts for capital-intensive goods is handled over the
heads of ordinary people.
Ordinary people are directly involved in retail services delivered by public
employees based in schools, clinics, and other public agencies in their community.
Public officials have the power to decide whether or not a person is entitled to receive
a desired service or excused from meeting an obligation. Bureaucratic laws and
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 29

regulations set out in detail the procedures that public officials ought to follow when
deciding whether a person is entitled or obligated to receive a service. The extent to
which officials have discretion varies greatly between services. The decision about
whether a woman is pregnant involves objective tests. A decision about whether a
person has a mental illness entitling him or her to receive a disability benefit in cash
or kind leaves officials with substantial discretion.
To describe governance in positivist language as the normal way in which public
officials relate to citizens can be taken to mean that the way public officials usually
behave is how they ought to behave. In countries where good governance tends to
prevail, this can be a distinction without a difference. However, where officials often
do not behave as they ought to, a positivist definition ignores the normative difference
between good and bad governance. Where corruption is persisting, a behavioral
characterization may interpret activities that appear corrupt by international standards
as an equilibrium maintained by the holders of power delivering policies that benefit
themselves and their supporters and that are accepted with resignation by people who
lack the political influence to promote good governance (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015).
Socially Constructed Definitions The meaning of corruption cannot be determined
by citing whatever is recorded in a dictionary. It is socially constructed according to
the context in which it is used and the normative standards of those using the term;
these standards tend to differ between social scientists, journalists, and ordinary
people. Review articles chronicle many different contemporary uses of the word
(Kurer 2015). The number of meanings increases greatly when comparisons are made
across time and space (see, e.g., Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002, Part One).
The English word corruption is derived from the Latin corrumpere, something
that fails to meet a particular standard. A computer program can be described as
corrupt if it does not meet the standard set by the computer’s operating system.
Corruption has a family of meanings with a degree of kinship; it also has family
disputes. Because corruption invariably has negative connotations, it tends to be
used as a synonym for bad governance.
Contemporary social science favors reducing the meaning of corruption to a single
numerical scale that makes corruption a matter of degree. The scale can then be used
in quantitative statistical analyses testing theories of the causes and consequences of
corruption. This ignores the need to name things before counting them or assigning
them numbers. A legal approach divides activities into two categories, those that are
corrupt and those that are not. It relies on written texts that specify illegal practices in
the delivery of public services. The only numbers employed are those used in
enumerating the clauses of a law. Transparency International’s definition of corrup-
tion is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (www.transparency.org). Its
anti-corruption glossary lists 60 entries with different examples of corruption; doing
so undermines the concept of having a clear and consistent meaning. Yet the
significance of corruption for governance means that it cannot be abandoned.
We stipulate corruption as having two fundamental criteria: the violation of
formal bureaucratic standards and the violation of informal normative standards
about how public officeholders ought to behave. Formal bureaucratic standards are
30 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

set out in laws and regulations. Violations of these standards can be assessed through
normal legal processes and enforced by courts. Informal standards are norms about
how governors ought to behave. These standards are “soft” laws. They are social
psychological expectations held in the mind rather than recorded in statute books. If
there is a consensus within a society that a public official has broken an informal
standard, then he or she can be punished for corrupt behavior in the court of public
opinion. A single political action can violate both standards.
When both formal and informal standards of political behavior are weak or
lacking, then politicians decide for themselves how to behave. The breakdown of
the Soviet Union led to the transformation of communist societies by behavior that
appeared corrupt to Western advisors but was justified on the grounds of the “primacy
of surviving by mutual social favours” (Sajo 2002, p. 2; cf. Rose 2009, Chap. 5). An
economic theory based on the premise that individuals pursue their own self-interest
can lead to public officials profiting surreptitiously from the sale of state-owned assets
such as oil or diamonds or even “stealing the state” by transferring assets to a new
breakaway entity that they control (Solnick 1998). Doing whatever is necessary to
ensure survival is especially relevant in countries engaged in internal war. In the
absence of a state with the effective power to enforce any standards, the optimal
outcome is, in the words of an economist, “efficient predatory behavior in a lawless
world” (Dabla-Norris 2002).
To describe the behavior of public officials as corrupt, there must be laws formally
setting standards that public officials ought to apply impartially when making deci-
sions. In other words, public officials should behave like bureaucrats in a modern
state (Weber 1947). If they do not, then their behavior is corrupt. In a political system
that has not adopted the bureaucratic rules of a modern state, corruption in this sense
cannot exist. If an official shows favoritism in appointing relatives and friends to
public jobs for which they are not qualified, in a given political system, such
patronage may be considered normal. If an official is given money after delivering
a benefit to an individual or waiving an obligation, in the absence of a law making this
illegal, it is not bribery. Anthropologists describe this as a customary act of gratitude
and economists as a rational transaction in which you get what you pay for.
Only by importing modern standards can customary behavior be described as
corrupt. The introduction of bureaucratic institutions challenges the customary appli-
cation of particularistic standards in which who you are and who you know are
important to getting public services. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, p. 24) describes parti-
cularism as acceptable behavior in societies in which people expect officials with
whom they share identities to favor their own kind. In the words of an Indian
anthropologist (Gupta 1995, p. 397), “a highly placed official who fails to help a
close relative or fellow villager obtain a government position is often roundly
criticized by people for not fulfilling his obligations to his kinsmen and village
brothers.” Although favoritism involves officials abusing bureaucratic standards, it
is done not in exchange for money but as an expression of solidarity ties with those
whom they favor.
Even if an action does not break a law, if it violates an informal normative
standard of behavior, it can be labeled corrupt in the court of public opinion. Public
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 31

officials tend to be held to higher normative standards than people in charge of

private sector enterprises in which making money is the standard that matters most.
They are also held to higher standards than entertainment celebrities who shame-
lessly seek attention and judge their behavior according to the publicity that
they gain.
Taking both legal and normative standards into account creates four different
ways of evaluating whether public officials can be described as acting corruptly.
Ideally, public services should be delivered in keeping with bureaucratic standards
that stipulate under what conditions individuals are or are not entitled to receive a
social benefit or obligated to comply with regulations. There is also informal
agreement that impartiality, treating people in like circumstances in the same way,
is the right way to behave. When these two criteria are met, the outcome meets both
standards of good governance. By contrast, a system of governance is doubly corrupt
if officeholders violate laws for their own advantage and their behavior is inconsis-
tent with the normative values of a society.
When legal and normative definitions produce conflicting assessments, calling
something corrupt is in dispute. Behavior that is illegal may be tolerated when legal
standards are inconsistent with informal practices of a society. For example, laws
that define speeding at a level that most drivers think is below that needed to ensure
safe driving are regularly violated. Traffic police are expected to tolerate speeding on
an empty road if this does not create the danger of an accident. The violation of a law
can also be informally tolerated if it is regarded as a relic of out-of-date moral
standards, for example, a law making same-sex relations illegal. In a country in
which an authoritarian government represses critics, breaking repressive laws may
be deemed a desirable weapon of subjects whose legal resources for opposition
are weak.
Even if a public officially acts in accord with the law, their actions can informally
be assessed as corrupt by informal normative standards. A governing party may
accept a substantial sum of money from a business that acts in accord with laws about
party finance that are written by politicians who benefit most from the loopholes that
they contain. By definition this action is legal. However, if the government adds a
special clause in a tax law that favors its financial donors, this will appear corrupt by
the informal standards of public opinion. Likewise, politicians can be described as
behaving shamefully if they proclaim standards in public and violate them in private,
for example, emphasizing the importance of everyone paying taxes while sheltering
their own income in a bank in a country with regulations that protect from exposure
the bribes they receive.
Because corruption is a political issue, standards are often objects of political
dispute. Politicians have the rhetorical skills to argue that accusations against them
for corruption are false facts made up by their partisan opponents. Lawyers have
professional skills to get a court to rule that there is nothing illegal in the way a
politician has violated informal standards of behavior by taking money from a big
business in exchange for favors. Even if evidence of breaking informal standards is
acknowledged, if this does not lead to a conviction in a court of law, a politician can
32 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

argue that a formal investigation has cleared him or her of blame and dismiss charges
as politically motivated.
The multiple meanings of corruption are increased by the term being stretched to
describe as wrong anything that a person does not like. However, as more and more
activities are labeled corrupt, the umbrella term becomes a vast shopping mall
offering so many different definitions that the word loses any meaning.

3 Social Scientists Differ in Explaining Corruption

The variety of issues raised by corruption requires an interdisciplinary approach, but

social scientists are divided into disciplines with different intellectual frameworks
and methods. This results in a plurality of explanations that give priority to the
assumptions of a single discipline rather than an integrated explanation. The follow-
ing paragraphs review different propositions about major causes of how corruption
varies between countries and within a country, between individuals. Discussing each
explanation separately for purposes of exposition does not mean that they are
mutually exclusive. A multiplicity of explanations may be empirically significant;
however, the scale of their impact on corruption can differ substantially.
The history of a country is a given, and decisions and practices institutionalized in
the past have created formal and informal procedures that influence governance
today. This makes it difficult for reforms to alter established routines by enacting
new laws. When international aid agencies seek to reduce corruption in developing
countries by introducing legal and bureaucratic institutions, they have often met
resistance from national political elites benefiting from traditional practices incon-
sistent with contemporary bureaucratic standards.
Theories of path dependence explain the persistence of both good and bad forms
of governance (Pierson 2004). The persistence of a low level of corruption in
Northern Europe is explained as a consequence of a nineteenth-century history in
which structural changes in traditional methods of administration were replaced by
bureaucratic institutions. What Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) has called “becoming
Denmark,” that is, achieving a high standard of governance, was a very lengthy
process. Countries that began socializing public officials into bureaucratic practices
long before mass welfare state services were introduced should therefore be low in
corruption. By contrast, if major social benefits were introduced while traditional
customs such as clientelism were still practiced, this can account for a government
being deemed corrupt today. Historical differences can create a stable equilibrium
that maintains good governance in Scandinavia and corrupt governance in places
such as the successor states of the Soviet Union (cf. Hellman 1998).
Theories of political culture explain the presence of good or bad governance as a
consequence of collective norms. Each new generation is socialized into a common
understanding about how government works and the standards that adults ought to
apply in their relations with public officials. Insofar as this happens, people regard
the way in which government works as normal in both the behavioral and the
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 33

normative senses. Since cultural norms develop in a particular national and historical
context, what is regarded as normal in South Africa can be different from what is
regarded as normal in Sweden. In a country with relatively good governance, people
are prepared to wait patiently in a queue for a service or to accept a refusal to provide
it as fair, and cases of corruption are seen as exceptions to the rule. By contrast, in a
culture where favoritism and bribery are regarded as a fact of life, behavior that
appears corrupt by universalistic standards appears normal (cf. Persson et al. 2013;
Manzetti and Wilson 2007).
Institutional theorists reject the idea of classical philosophers that the absence of
individual virtue is the primary cause of corruption. Any tendency of politicians or
their agents to practice corruption needs to be subject to monitoring by an indepen-
dent audit office, an independent legal team with the power to prosecute those who
break laws, and courts with the power to enforce laws against corruption. Theories of
democratic institutions explain the absence of corruption as due to free elections
giving voters the power to decide who governs. If the principals of a democratic
government tolerate corruption, voters have an opportunity to vote them out of
office. In anticipation of the threat of losing office, governors are expected to resist
opportunities to abuse their powers for personal gain (cf. Potter and Tavits 2011).
Theories of sociology explain governance relationships as reflecting social status.
Who you are and how you are perceived by others affect the way in which you are
treated by public officials. Class differences in individual income and education may
result in people of higher social status being more likely to experience good
governance and those lower down the social ladder being bullied to pay bribes.
People can protect themselves from the effect of corruption in a particular public
service by having no contact with it. Individuals without children are not at risk of
corruption in education because they have no children in school. However, older
people are vulnerable to corruption in the health service because they cannot do
without health care.
Social psychologists stress that expectations that people have about how they will
be treated when seeking a public service explain how they behave. Expectations
about how government ought to work and perceptions of how public officials
actually behave can cue people to respond in opposing ways. People would like to
experience good governance but may perceive political institutions as corrupt. If this
is the case, they will be more ready to understand hints from public officials asking
for bribes as a condition of giving them what they want.
In political economy it is a given assumption that economic conditions affect how
a country is governed (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman and Soreide 2011). However, this
leaves open what specific features of an economy are important. A high correlation
between a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and its rating on the
Corruption Perceptions Index is often interpreted to mean that the more prosperous a
country is, the lower its level of corruption. However, when gross domestic product
per capita is included in a multivariate statistical analysis testing potential determi-
nants of national-level corruption, it fails to achieve statistical significance (Rose and
Peiffer 2015, Table 6.2). Moreover, there are good theoretical reasons for
interpreting economic prosperity as a consequence rather than a cause of a low
level of corruption (cf. Lambsdorff 2007, p. 72ff). Freedom from corruption can
34 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

boost economic growth. Enterprises can invest with confidence because they are not
harassed by public officials administering economic regulations in ways that are
inefficient and arbitrary and require the payment of bribes.
There are theoretical reasons for expecting specific economic conditions to
encourage corruption. The national government of a country rich in natural resources
will enjoy a large inflow of money from multinational corporations wanting to
extract its resources and export them at a profit. Corrupt governors may demand
large payments be made to their private bank accounts overseas in exchange for
giving them permission to do so. Moreover, in a country that is at a low level of
economic development, foreign aid becomes a very important source of national
income, and governors may want to divert a proportion of foreign aid for their
private benefit, thus reducing the amount available to invest in actions of public
benefit such as building roads and hospitals.
Rational choice economic theories disregard normative values; they assume that
individuals are self-interested actors ready to pay for what they want. Where there is
a choice between providers, people do not have to wait indefinitely in a queue or pay
a bribe to receive what may be an inferior service. Instead, they may turn to an
alternative provider, whether a not-for-profit or a profit-making enterprise, if they
can afford to do so. Since many public services are monopolies, in a system of bad
governance, the only choice that individuals may have is that of paying a bribe or
going without a service they want. In such circumstances, a simple cost-benefit
calculation can determine whether a bribe is paid.
A public policy explanation emphasizes that differences between services are
important in determining whether a service is more or less likely to involve corrup-
tion. Collective goods such as military defense and the rate of inflation affect every
individual and institution in a society. In the language of economics, collective
goods are non-excludable, because everyone in the population is included in their
impact (Samuelson 1954). Since this is the case, the officials making collective
goods decisions cannot collect a bribe from individuals wanting to avoid their
effects. Since every citizen shares in the risks of modern war, the only way in
which a person can avoid this is to leave the country.
Although there are lots of theories offering explanations of corruption, there is
limited statistical testing of the extent to which their hypotheses are supported by
empirical analysis. One reason is that many do not specify clear testable links
between cause and effect. Relatedly, many forms of corruption are portrayed as
part of a complex syndrome of bad governance (Johnston 2014). Case studies of
villages by anthropologists or of corrupt behavior by elites can be insightfully drawn
from firsthand observation. However, narrowly focused case studies are often not
fitted into a broader theoretical framework. Testing alternative theories of corruption
requires comparable data about variations in national context, individual attributes,
and different types of public services (see Rose and Peiffer 2019, Chaps. 3–5).
Capital-intensive corruption differs between continents and within, as shown by
the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency International.1 In

1
See https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi accessed on July 15, 2018.
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 35

Fig. 1 Big variations in corruption within every continent. Sources: Transparency International
Corruption Perceptions Index for 176 countries, 2016. Anglo-American countries: New Zealand,
90; Canada, 82; Australia, 79; and the United States, 74. As reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019,
Fig. 3.1)

recognition of uncertainties about the reliability and validity of any single source
of evidence, the CPI uses multiple sources with different ways of making up its
composition rating of a country. It places each country on a scale ranging from
0 to 100; this permits a far greater degree of differentiation than sorting countries
into two categories, those that are corrupt and those that are not. Of the 176 coun-
tries assessed in the 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, Denmark and
New Zealand have the highest rating, 90, while Somalia is lowest, 10. There is
a tendency for bad governance to be more common; the median country has a CPI
rating of 38, significantly closer to the most corrupt country than to the highest-
rated country.
Comparing countries around the globe shows that generalizing about corruption
in countries grouped according to geography or culture is misleading (Fig. 1).
Variations in national context within continents are greater than differences between
the mean ratings of continents. In Asia there is a spread of 72 points between
Singapore and North Korea.
Asian values are neither conducive to corruption nor to high levels of integrity
(Fukuyama 2001). African ratings likewise reject generalizations about continent-
wide African cultural values (Ekeh 1975), because there is a range of 50 points
between the CPI ratings of Botswana and Somalia. The range between countries in
Latin America and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is likewise large.
Soviet Union show the least variation around a mean of 31 points, with Georgia high
36 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

at 57 and Uzbekistan low at 21 points. This reflects their lengthy common experience
of being governed by Communist principles rather than bureaucratic procedures.
High CPI ratings are not confined exclusively to countries with European values
and culture. Among European Union countries, there is a spread of 49 points
between the highest-ranking country, Denmark and Bulgaria, and 46 points between
Denmark and Greece. Singapore has a better CPI rating than 24 member states of the
European Union. Of the 68 countries that have a better rating than the lowest EU
member states, 32 are developing or newly developed countries from outside Europe
and the Anglo-American world.
There are also big differences in the risk of an individual paying a bribe. Contact
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this to happen. During the year more
citizens have contact with the output side of politics, public services, than with the
input side, voting for MPs. On every continent almost three-quarters annually have
contact with at least one major service. Notwithstanding big differences in the
economic capacity of governments, the extent of contact differs very little across
continents. The average ranges from 78% in Asia to 69% in formerly communist
EBRD countries.
Aggregate labeling of countries as corrupt implies that virtually everyone there
who contacts public services pays a bribe. However, this is not the case, according to
the evidence of the Global Corruption Barometer survey of 155,122 individual
respondents in 122 countries around the globe (see Rose and Peiffer 2019,
Chap. 4). The payment of bribes is confined to a minority of people. In West
European countries, an average of only 2% reported paying a bribe in the past
year. At an average level of 23% paying a bribe annually, the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) is the region with the highest percentage of bribe payers, with
Asia close behind at 21%. Yet even where bribery is high, it is the annual experience
of less than half the population. Among the 73 countries surveyed in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America, there were only four—Haiti, India, Vietnam, and Liberia—in
which a majority of respondents reported paying a bribe in the past year. On average,
the Global Corruption Barometer found that bribery affects 18% of a country’s
population each year (Fig. 2).
Conventional geographical categories group together countries with very differ-
ent levels of grassroots bribery. The gap is greatest in Asia, a difference of almost
61 percentage points between India and Vietnam compared to Japan. It is least
among the 15 old member states of the European Union, where the range is just
under 7% between Greece and two Nordic states, Sweden and Finland. In the new
EU member states, the legacy of communism increases bribery, rising to 22% in
Lithuania but as low as 2% in Slovenia.
Bribery varies between services too. Generalizations about corruption in public
services imply that bribery is much the same for every service. This is not the case.
The 2016 Global Corruption Barometer found that bribes are most often paid for the
health service and for permits (Table 1). By contrast, the fewest people pay bribes for
court services. The chief reason is that far fewer people have, or want to have,
contact with the courts than with health and education. Controlling for contact gives
a different rank order. Among people who contact the service, almost one-quarter
pay bribes to the courts and to the police. The apparent high level of bribery for
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 37

Fig. 2 Bribery varies between and within continents. Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2016,
as reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019, Fig. 4.3)

Table 1 Bribery for services after controlling for contact (percentages)

No contact Contact, no bribe Contact, bribe Bribe % contact
Health 42 49 9 16
Education 64 31 5 14
Permits 61 32 7 18
Police 75 19 6 24
Courts 87 10 3 23
Source: Global Corruption Barometer, 2016, as reported in Rose and Peiffer (2019, Chap. 4,
Table 2)

health and education services is because these are much needed and used services.
After controlling for contact, the percentage of users paying a bribe for health care or
education is significantly lower than that of people paying bribes to law enforcement
officials.
The more contacts people have with public services, the more likely they are to
pay at least one bribe, but the increase is not proportional. Among GCB respondents
using one service, 14% pay a bribe. However, when the number of services
contacted doubles, the proportion paying a bribe increases by only one-quarter,
and when it quadruples, the proportion paying bribes just doubles. Among heavy
users of public services, the median respondent paid a bribe for only one service (see
Rose and Peiffer 2015, Fig. 4.4).
38 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

Altogether, the experience that individuals have when contacting grassroots

officials reflects a combination of three sets of influences: differences between
people, between national contexts, and between specific public services (Rose and
Peiffer 2019; Chap. 5). The need to contact public services such as education differs
with stages in an individual’s life cycle. The institutions that deliver these services
differ in their national history and contemporary context. Differences between public
services such as health care and policing affect whether an individual pays a bribe for
one service but not another.

4 Reducing Corruption

Politicians who win control of the government with a promise to get rid of corruption
are tempted to believe that their victory removes all the obstacles that are a legacy
from their predecessors. However, overcoming obstacles to the reform of bad
governance requires patience. Corruption in the body politic is a phenomenon that
can take many forms. The diagnosis of corruption usually focuses on characteristics
that are pervasive throughout the body politic as a whole. Prescriptions based on
such a diagnosis do not take into account differences between public services. In
order to reduce corruption, each form requires a diagnosis that identifies its distinc-
tive characteristics, which part of the body politic it affects and what its specific
causes are. Without doing so, any prescription will tend to fall back on general
recommendations that have no specific application to the corrupt delivery of a
particular public service.
When individuals and business enterprises pay bribes, they are not paid for public
services as a whole. Bribes are paid to obtain a specific public service, and services
differ in what is delivered and how much they are vulnerable to corruption. Public
services delivered to individuals at the grass roots are vulnerable to bribes being paid
far from the sight of policymakers in the national capital. By contrast, capital-
intensive services are delivered by decisions about contracts made by high-level
policymakers in the national capital.
Capital-intensive goods such as airports and electricity-generating stations are
lumpy not only in physical terms but also economically. A large chunk of money is
required to construct them. By contrast, retail public services such as a driving
license or passport are literally pocket-sized and cheap to produce. The scale of
capital-intensive projects makes it difficult for outsiders to evaluate whether paying
hundreds of millions or a billion is a fair price to build a dam or a power station or
whether it has been inflated to cover the cost of bribes that can be hidden behind
opaque entries in a lengthy and complex budget. The individuals who make the
decisions that commit their government to approve contracts paying millions to a
private enterprise do not bear the cost. It is met from tax revenue and borrowing; in
developing countries foreign aid can also bear a portion of the cost.
The supply of many capital-intensive goods is globalized, because of the amount
of capital and technical skills required to produce such goods as military aircraft or
Understanding Corruption in Different Contexts 39

Table 2 Nine principles for reducing retail corruption

Repeal unnecessary laws, regulations, and processes that facilitate the collection of bribes
Increase the use of objective criteria for deciding eligibility for receiving services
Use computers to reduce citizens having to come into contact with public officials
Monitor entitlements and the delivery of services electronically
Give citizens easy access to public records about themselves
Supply services at a level that matches what citizens are entitled to and what the state is obligated
to provide
Give citizens a publicly funded choice between obtaining a service from state and non-state
organizations
Legalize payments for some public services
Align public laws with informal standards
Source: Summarized from Rose and Peiffer (2019, Chap. 9)

complex computer systems. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United

Nations promote codes of conduct that stigmatize transnational corruption. But
such codes normally lack legal sanctions, and any notional reputation loss an
enterprise incurs for shadowy dealings is more than offset by the profits from getting
big-buck contracts. When capital-intensive corruption is transnational, this makes it
difficult for a single national government to prevent it. Business enterprises deter-
mined to win contracts if need be by hook or by crook can pay bribes to foreign bank
accounts of consultancy firms or family members acting as agents of corrupt
policymakers in other countries. Anglo-American countries have adopted laws
making it illegal for multinational corporations based on their jurisdiction to pay
bribes to foreign government officials and imposing large fines as and when such
behavior is revealed. National and intergovernmental aid agencies providing grants
to finance capital-intensive projects have the right to monitor how aid money is spent
and, if the political will is there, to suspend payments if evidence of corruption is
revealed.
At the grass roots, the most effective way to reduce corruption is not by local
protests but by national policymakers using their formal powers to disrupt laws and
institutions that give corrupt local officials opportunities to use their public office for
private gain. Table 2 sets out nine principles for reducing corruption in the retail
delivery of services at the grass roots. Given the differences between services, some
will apply to multiple services, and some services will be vulnerable to attack in
more than one way.
Applying principles to reduce grassroots corruption does not require a change in
the hearts and minds of public officials. Doing require such things as removing the
need to pay bribes to some public officials by abolishing their post. Face-to-face
contacts between claimants and officials can be eliminated by introducing computers
that enable individuals to get what they want by the online completion of forms that
follow bureaucratic rules consistent with good governance. Onerous laws and
regulations requiring permits and licenses that give officials opportunities to collect
40 R. Rose and C. Peiffer

bribes can be repealed. Such actions not only reduce opportunities for bribery but
also increase the efficiency and ease of using public services.
Breaking the low-level equilibrium trap that maintains a national economy at a
subsistence level requires disruptive action to start a progressive process of improve-
ments (Hirschman 1963). A strategy to disrupt corruption requires policymakers to
make a visible and substantial change that can establish a political momentum
leading to more changes. A bonfire of unpopular regulations that low-level public
officials may use to extract bribes from ordinary people nationwide can stimulate
public support. Introducing online services that people can access using free apps on
their mobile phones cuts out public officials entirely. To be effective, disruptive
changes must be targeted at particular services. Doing so will not bring about across-
the-board abolition of corruption in all services in a world in which bribery is the
price that 1.8 billion people pay each year for access to public services. Any actions
that reduce bribery and increase the quality of public services are better than no
progress, and removing the burden of bribery from 10% of those who now pay
bribes will benefit 180 million people annually.

References

Dabla-Norris, E. (2002). A game theoretic analysis of corruption in bureaucracies. In G. T. Abed &

S. Gupta (Eds.), Governance, corruption, and economic performance (pp. 111–134).
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Ekeh, P. P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement.
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17(1), 91–112.
Fukuyama, F. (2001). Asian values in the wake of the Asian crisis. In F. Iqbal & J.-I. You (Eds.),
Democracy, market economics and development (pp. 149–168). Washington DC: World Bank.
Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the
imagined state. American Ethnologist, 22(2), 375–402.
Heidenheimer, A. J., & Johnston, M. (2002). Political corruption: Concepts and contexts (3rd ed.).
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Hellman, J. S. (1998). Winners take all: The politics of partial reform in postcommunist transitions.
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Johnston, M. (2014). Corruption, contention and reform: The power of deep democratization.
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Kurer, O. (2015). Definitions of corruption. In P. M. Heywood (Ed.), Routledge handbook of
political corruption (pp. 30–41). Abingdon: Routledge.
Lambsdorff, J. G. (2007). The institutional economics of corruption and reform. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Manzetti, L., & Wilson, C. J. (2007). Why do corrupt governments maintain public support?
Comparative Political Studies, 40(8), 949–970.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013). Becoming Denmark: Historical designs of corruption control.
Social Research, 80(4), 1259–1286.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2015). The quest for good governance: How societies develop control of
corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013). Why anticorruption reforms fail: Systemic cor-
ruption as a collective action problem. Governance, 26(3), 449–471.
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Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2004). Multi-level governance and democracy: A Faustian bargain? In
I. Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), Multi-level governance (pp. 78–89). Oxford: Oxford University
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Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions and social analysis. Princeton:
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Potter, J. D., & Tavits, M. (2011). Curbing corruption with political institutions. In S. Rose-
Ackerman & T. Soreide (Eds.), International handbook on the economics of corruption
(pp. 52–80). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Rose, R. (2009). Understanding post-Communist transformation: A bottom up approach. London:
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Rose, R., & Peiffer, C. (2015). Paying bribes for public services: A global guide to grass-roots
corruption. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Richard Rose is a pioneer in the comparative study of politics and public policy through
quantitative and qualitative analysis. He is the Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy
at the University of Strathclyde, the first public policy institute in a European university. In addition
to his professorship at Strathclyde in Glasgow, he is a Fellow at the British Academy and a Visiting
Professor at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and the Robert Schuman Centre of the European
University Institute, Florence. Rose has held visiting appointments and fellowships at Cambridge
University, Stanford University, the Johns Hopkins University, the Central European University,
and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He has been a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings
Institution; the Max Planck Institute, Berlin; the Paul Lazarsfeld Gesellschaft; the European Centre
for Social Policy Research, Vienna; and many others. He was one of the eight founders of the
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and of the British Politics Group (APSA). In
public policy, Rose has produced many comparative books followed by books on public employ-
ment, taxation, laws, and inheritance in public policy. He has advanced public policy research with
his publications Lesson-drawing in Public Policy: A Guide to Learning Across Time and Space
(1993, Chatham House) and Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide (2005,
Routledge). He has given seminars in 45 countries across Europe, North and South America, Africa,
and Asia, and his writings have been translated into 18 languages.

Caryn Peiffer is Lecturer in International Public Policy and Governance at the School for Policy
Studies, University of Bristol, United Kingdom. She researches problems of governance in devel-
oping countries across Africa and Asia using a mixture of qualitative, quantitative, and experimental
methods.
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global
Migration

Anja Mihr

1 Introduction

In December of 2018, 164 UN Member States formally adopted the UN Global

Compact on Refugees and Migrants. Many member states abtained due to domestic
struggles and politics. This compact was one of many that the UN had initiated to
address global challenges on migration over the past decades. This non-binding
agreement had come into place as an urgent precondition for a global legal and
politically binding treaty among all UN member states in 2018 and one that would
deal with one of the world’s most critical emerging challenges: how to handle and
govern mass migration in the twenty-first century (Hurrel 2008). Migration is one of
the most urgent global public policy issues, which differs from other global chal-
lenges such as climate change and cybersecurity because mass migration can be
directly traced back to bad governance and ineffective (domestic) public policy
regimes.1 Thus, there is a level of state accountability that is directly linked to global
governance (Held 2005). During mass migration, people are driven from their homes
and communities by crises ranging from conflict, poverty, and drought. These mass
migrations are often a direct result of governments and the decisions of policy
makers in the affected countries.

1
The root causes for migration can range from climate change-induced migration, overpopulation
and bad distribution of resources, poverty, labor situation for young people, war and conflict, ethnic,
religious- and faith-based disputes, career options and social status, and female marriage migration
due to male surplus—just to mention a few. But to tackle them, one has to include these people and
the way and level on which this can be done, depending on the legal status of migrants, whether they
are legal, illegal, documented, undocumented, labor, refugee, or slave.

A. Mihr (*)
Center on Governance Through Human Rights, HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance
Platform, Berlin, Germany
http://www.anjamihr.com

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 43

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_4
44 A. Mihr

In this context, “glocal” public policy means to develop global norms for dealing
with migration and to convert them into domestic and community-based policies, for
example, when adapting the norms of the UN Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990 (2003), in
domestic policies. Glocal public policy refers, on the one side, to a set of global
norms and agreements generally defined by UN bodies, such as human rights and
international law,2 and on the other side local policy processes which aim to
implement these norms and also deal with the consequences of migration at the
end of the migration trail, namely, by providing adequate housing, health, work,
education, and other forms of social and political inclusion measures. Therefore,
glocal policy decisions often include international organizations on the one side and
city mayors and councils on the other side. They also impact (local) private compa-
nies and their management decisions and civil society organizations (CSOs). They
all are stakeholders of glocal policies on the international or global level. These are,
among many more, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the Orga-
nization of American States (OAS), the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which
all are part of the glocal policy regime dealing with different aspects of migration.
Referring to the commonly agreed UN definition, an international migrant is a person
who has been living and working in a country other than his or her country of birth for
over 3 years. Such a person is also defined by domicile or domestic state policies and
principle (citizenship), meaning that someone who is not a citizen of the country in
which he or she resides is considered a migrant (UN Department of Economic and
Social Affairs International Migration Report 2015). As highlighted above, a migrant
can be an expatriate, a refugee, or an asylum seeker. However, although there are
universal as well as different domestic and local norms and standards differentiating
refugees, asylum seekers, or labor migrants, those standards are being dramatically
modified and adapted by governments according to their own political or economic
interests and popular mode. In other words, how a migrant is defined and what rights he
or she may enjoy are in the hands of state governments and, as such, are part of the
domestic public policy processes overall. However, this is dramatically changing at the
time of mass migration, and the urge for global norms that are binding for domestic and
local policy makers is rising.
Regardless of the root causes for migration and the level of responsibility that
policy makers bear, all migrants share a common key characteristic, whereby they all
leave one place for another (often to a destination abroad) and are thus uniting
(foreign) governments in a common struggle to handle new settlements and mass
migration of people—in particular transborder migration. Therefore, global migra-
tion impacts both domestic and local politics and policies, on the one side; and
migration flows change global and international norms and standards, such as UN
norms, by definition, on the other side. This makes migration today more “glocal”

2
UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CMW/
Pages/CMWIndex.aspx (Accessed December 2017).
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 45

than ever. Hence, the endeavor to find the best modes to govern migration and
peoples’ mobility subsequently unites nations, countries, and governments as well as
private and corporate actors such as civil society organization (CSOs) and businesses
on local and global levels. This is where multilevel (i.e., agreements between
international organizations and domestic and local governments) and multi-
stakeholder governance approaches (i.e., agreements between governments, CSOs,
business, and international organizations) shape glocal policy discourses and help to
assess the way in which public policy regimes are shaped in light of migration
(Mareck 2014).
More than ever, international security and stability are dependent on the capacity
of states to manage migration. Conversely, it is almost, by definition, impossible for
one government alone to manage or control migration either unilaterally or bilaterally
or without the collaboration of local governments, CSOs, or private business
(Hollifield 2012, p. 200). Glocal migration policy making is a joint, multilevel,
stakeholder governance and policy endeavor. Because of its interdependency, migra-
tion policies became a central focus of global governance and public policy-related
matters to also apply a multi-stakeholder approach when solving problems (UNDP
2012). This is largely because global challenge-related matters require global norms
and standards to act as normative benchmarks and guidelines to set agendas, decide
on solutions and pathways forward, and implement policies on national, local, or
community levels (Held 2005). Local and community-related policy solutions
require the involvement of all stakeholders and actors concerned, private businesses,
CSOs, city councils, and mayors.
Consequently, global public policy-related matters, such as migration, can only be
effectively dealt with in a glocal, multi-stakeholder, and multilevel governance-based
approach. There is also an interlinkage between glocal migration policies and the
advocacy coalition framework (ACF), because social movements and advocacy
groups not only help to assess public policy processes in this matter but also explain
why and how glocal regimes. Migration shapes glocal policy processes by the
adaptivity or incapacity of domestic policy makers to adapt a broader vision for
policy making. The ACF explains how policy making depends on multiple actors and
levels of (domestic) government and takes years of policy cycles to turn decisions into
outcomes but also include experts, CSOs, and policy specialists. Since governments
are part of international organizations, the ACF focuses on the long-term domestic
policy change triggered by advocate coalitions, policy learning, belief systems, and
political systems; these actors and modes are heavily influenced by global norms,
external drivers such as migrations, and regime changes (Sabatier 1988). Therefore,
mass migration does impact the outcome of policies within the ACF, as I will argue
throughout this chapter.
46 A. Mihr

2 Background

Despite the indisputable struggles to find common and global norms to govern
migration that is poverty, gender, climate, and conflict induced, the matter of
“legality” and citizenship of people who migrate is in the core of glocal migration
policy. To have and be citizen of a country defines status and social well-being. The
incoherence of governments on how to integrate and treat refugees and so-called
“illegal” or “undocumented” migrants and their families divides governments and
even within states on the level of municipalities and their respective policy solutions.
The withdrawal of the US government from the migration-related UN compact is
just one of many symptoms that show how difficult it is to agree on common global
and normative standards on how to treat and deal with migrants at an international
level. For example, this can include what legal status they enjoy, whether they are
entitled to work and earn their own living, whether they receive language or other
skill training, and whether their children have a right to go to school in the new
country. Global standards, however, have to give benefits to all people alike regard-
less of the states they live in. But state policies vary from country to country and not
only among those that either deploy—for whatever reasons—migrants abroad, the
so-called sending states or countries of origin, because their national gross income
often already depends on receiving remittances from those “being sent abroad,” for
whatever reasons. In 2016 alone, the UN estimated that migrants from developing
countries are sending around USD413 billion in remittances home to their families
on a regular basis (UN Migration Report 2017, p. 6). And these are only the official
estimated numbers of remittances sent by those migrants with legal status in the
country of destination. For example, in the USA alone, the estimate is that 11 million
undocumented working migrants contribute to the economy in the country—surely
without any form of protection or participation—and at the same time, they send
millions of dollars to families and communities in their country of origin. Their
economic impact and remittances surpass many national budgets, which in
exchange, motivates many domestic governments in developing countries to encour-
age and even force women and men to go (illegally) work abroad instead of
providing good education and working conditions in their home country.
Thus, and without a doubt, migration belongs to the top ten global challenges
named by all UN member states in line with (1) climate change, (2) cybersecurity and
Big Data, (3) health and epidemics, (4) justice and human rights, (6) poverty,
(7) gender equality, or (8) food security.3 However, in comparison to all the other
challenges that unite governments and countries to find common glocal solutions,
migration is one that triggers often exceptional governmental responses that lead on
the one side to new global standards and on the other side to dramatic
renationalization and popular nationalistic or state-centric policy outcomes. There-
fore, national policies of refusal and to differentiate “valuable” from “unworthy”

3
Global Issues overview, 207, UN http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/global-issues-over
view/ (Accessed December 2017).
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 47

people who may enter a country and seek better life is the rule, not the exception.
Even in times in which borders are seen as obstacles to everyone’s personal devel-
opment, building walls and isolation camps in Australia, in Hungary or Macedonia, in
Jordan, in Israel, or in the USA and expelling people from Thailand and Myanmar are
only the peak of the iceberg but are nevertheless seen as an approbate domestic policy
solution to hold back migration—often in light of no better and immediate alternative
policy solutions. We have seen how populism, renationalization, and right-wing
policies are fueling short-term public policy responses that have led governments in
the EU and the USA also to unilaterally withdraw from international regime agree-
ments or compacts. This response is also visible in other related subject matters, for
example, mentioning the withdrawal of Burundi from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) in The Hague and the dramatic expulsion of the minority group of
Rohingyas from Myanmar to seek refuge in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and India.
Additionally, the US government’s withdrawal from the global compact on migra-
tion; the refusal of EU member states such as Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic,
and Hungary to adhere to the EU quota for distributing war refugees from Syria; and
the closure of refugee harbors in France and Italy are just some of the many examples
of exceptionalism in recent years that illustrate the helplessness of national govern-
ments to deal with global challenges (Simmons 2009). This is not due to the lack of
global standards but that of different national migration policies.
After the withdrawal of key countries that receive migrants such as the USA,
Austria, Italy, Australia and other UN Member State from the compact in 2017 and
later in 2018, the chair of the UN General Assembly, Miroslav Lajčák from
Slovakia, called upon the other member states to take this and other compacts
more seriously and consider migration a global challenge that needs more multilat-
eralism and multi-stakeholder and polycentric governance instead of more national
exceptionalism.4
But these controversies illustrate the hopelessness of many current domestic
public policy regimes if exceptionalism and nationalistic policies are the answers
to global challenges. The lack of embracing globalization and all its related areas
such as migration, for what it is, is becoming a day-to-day policy reality. Thus,
dealing with migration has become one of the core indicators to assess whether and
how sustainable and effective public policy regimes are today. And last but not least,
it is often the civil society and the electorate in a country that determine how
governments change and adapt their migration policies. And it is within this spec-
trum where we can see the changes for public policy systems.
Herewithin, the core message for this discourse is that global norms determine not
only national and domestic policy processes but also local and community ones even
in autocratic and more centralistic states such as China, Russia, the United Arab
Emirates, and Nigeria—all states that are heavily affected by internal or foreign
migration that send and receive migrants. It is in these less or weakly democratic
countries in which the multi-stakeholder approach comes into the game of multilevel

4
UNGA Resolution, 3 December 2017.
48 A. Mihr

and polycentric policy diplomacy through the back door of autocratic governance
practice, showing that this approach can facilitate communication and agreements
among the stakeholders, private and public, international and local. Global or
international norms and standards also ask for more transparency and accountability
from all sides because the multi-stakeholder agreements are usually either public or
made public. By doing that, many autocratic countries are forced up to global policy
regimes, whether they like it or not. But the core question remains which of the
countless and different stakeholders to include in the process of agenda setting and
decision-making and later in the implementation and evaluation stages of the
domestic, local, or global policy cycle (Aguirre 2006, p. 85). How legitimate are
private or autocratic stakeholders versus those that are democratically elected? These
questions remain, irrespective of the level of democracy of one’s country. In
democratic countries, stakeholder organizations of refugees and migrants are more
likely to be invited to the table to present their needs and ideas than they are in
autocratic and state-centric countries. And it is in these countries in which the ACF
predominantly helps to explain certain policy outcomes. But this is changing. Local
and international advocacy groups today are more involved in the decision-making
processes, even in autocratic societies such as China and Russia, and not only
because of internet-based communication technology. Businesses, city mayors,
and even CSOs are also included based on how they present themselves as being
useful and essential agents in upholding peace and security in the country.
If domestic public policy processes often fail to be effective in corrupt, traditional,
or autocratic societies, then this also carries significant consequences for migration
policies. It means that if a government does not involve migrants and their repre-
sentatives in the policy cycle, these policies will be less likely to be successful in
meeting their anticipated goals such as the integration of undocumented migrants.
But to end human trafficking and illegal immigration, governments and cooperation
should extend to migrants themselves and not only talk vis-à-vis governments.
Consequently, to apply the multi-stakeholder process is a challenge not only for
democratic countries but in particular for authoritarian regimes in which policy
decisions are still predominantly matters of central governments and authorities.
Entrepreneurs of glocal migration policies emphasize, for example, the fact that
fundamental freedom rights and social and economic human rights in terms of
health, salaries, working hours, shelter and housing, education, and participation
have to be guaranteed by all UN member states, regardless of what status the people
living in that particular country have. Thus, these standards are also valid for
migrants, regardless of the domestic legal status (Rasche and Kell 2010). However,
on domestic levels, we still find over 190 states, each with different legislations
responding in their own “traditional” ways to the challenges of labor migrants,
refugees, illegal migrants, and stateless people. Some countries, like China, even
title their own citizens migrants if they move from one city to another within their
own territory, and by doing so they lose major citizen rights. More than ever, the
legal status of a migrant depends on local and municipality policies as well as their
social, political, and legal practice.
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 49

In terms of figures, however, migration is one dramatically growing number that

poses various challenges to public policies. The IOM estimates that approximately
250 million people are currently on the move. They are uprooted, expelled, or
otherwise driven to migrate outside their countries, homes, and communities.5 If
we add people who are forced to migrate and move within their own state borders for
economic or security reasons, this group adds another 740 million people. All
together this amounts up to almost one billion migrants out of a total world
population of seven billion people. That means that one out of seven people in the
world is at risk of becoming a migrant under precarious and disadvantaged circum-
stances or because she/he wants to migrate in the strive of more and better skill-based
working and living conditions.
Out of these numbers, 75 million are officially refugees of some sort, forced to
leave their homes (15 million transborder plus 60 million internal displaced persons).
Even though the majority moves within their own country or region, moving homes
and locations often deprives them from civic rights, entitlements, inheritances, and
access to resources such as education or work and justice, as seen, for example, in
Chinese internal migration policies. Therefore, people moving from one province to
another lose their right of free education and basic health services for their children.
They become “illegals” in their own country, and by unwillingly overstepping legal
borders, they often get criminalized and then punished simply by having become a
migrant against their own intention (Peilin and Roulleau-Berger 2013).
Today, there are three times more international migrants than in 1970, but relative
to the population, it has remained stable over the last few decades; approximately
3.5% of the world’s population are officially international forced or unwilling
migrants (not including domestic ones). But even though world population has
grown, each migrant person has a need that needs to be dealt with and thus requires
policy solutions. Thus, the absolute numbers rise, but the state resources remain the
same. Almost half of them (48%) are women, and today the average age of a migrant
is 39 years of age. Among them, around 20 million people are trafficked and forced
into labor or marriage, and out of this number, half are women, 20% men, 20%
minors, and 10% infants. But there are no official numbers, and the actual numbers
are much higher. More women (55%) are trafficked in total than males or infants.
Human trafficking is one of the major global “industries” with an annual profit of
USD150 billion for the traffickers. Consequently, human trafficking also increases
illicit financial flows that also pose a challenge to domestic economies and taxation
regimes and crime rate.6 Parallel to the rising numbers of migrants, organized crime
is a growing industry in close collaboration with corrupt governments that in return
carefully either fuel conflicts or maintain poverty that force people to migrate. People
who are trafficked and enslaved are mostly undocumented and forced into labor and

5
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Data Analysis Centre, https://gmdac.iom.int/
(Accessed December 2017).
6
UNDOC https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/2016_Global_Report_on_
Trafficking_in_Persons.pdf (Accessed December 2017).
50 A. Mihr

slavery and are never even registered or appear in any official data set. That is even
more worrisome for public policy processes, because they do not appear at any stage
of the policy cycle. When we see that approximately 40% (120 million migrants) of
all migrants move within the Global South and thus either move away and toward
weak democracies, autocratic and corrupt regimes. Two of the top ten countries
whose populations are made up of more than 50% migrants are Qatar and the United
Arab Emirates. Both countries are receiving migrants from India, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and China. A much smaller number of migrants, 55 million, move North-
North such as within Europe and North America. In 2015, two thirds (67%) of all
international labor migrants were living in just 20 countries. Statistically and in total
numbers, the largest group of international migrants (47 million) resides in the USA
and Germany, and the Russian Federation host the second and third largest numbers
of migrants worldwide (around 12 million each), followed by Saudi Arabia (10 mil-
lion) (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs International Migration
Report 2015). Hence, the largest part of all transnational and border-crossing labor
or “economic” migrants (around 86 million) move from the South to North, partic-
ularly from the South to North America and from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia
toward Europe.7
This North-South divide is also reflected by the countries which have or have not
ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families from 2003. This UN Convention has been ratified
almost exclusively by those countries which “send” migrants to Europe and to North
America, such as Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. In Africa, these
countries are Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Egypt Cameron, Senegal, Mali, and Togo,
meaning that these countries by sending their labor forces to North America or
Europe receive together billions in remittances per year, in return, which if otherwise
they would need to provide labor and vocational training for their population. In
Europe only Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and Turkey have signed and ratified the
treaty—again countries that send more labor forces abroad than receive them in
return.8 The convention was one of the first, after the end of the Cold War in 1990,
that was tabled to the UN General Assembly upon the initiative by countries in the
Global South who, for once, wanted to set the human rights-based agenda after
decades of Cold War blockade policies (Krivenko 2017).
The lack of acknowledgment of the UN Convention and the suspicion by the
countries of the Global North that countries of the South only wanted this convention
in order to safeguard the rights of their citizens abroad and to secure remittances and
financial flows from the North to the South led to the ineffectiveness of the
convention. Nevertheless, this unsuccessful early attempt to govern glocal migrant

7
In comparison to the total figure of almost 90 million migrants moving to the North, 14 million
migrants move from the North to the South, and the majority among them belong to an educated
labor, skilled and contracted experts and ex-pad community.
8
List of Ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families in 2017: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/
StatRatCMW.pdf (Accessed December 2017).
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 51

policies through the UN Human Rights Treaty body regime also highlighted the
deficits and challenges that global migration would pose in the decades to come.
Issues such as the sovereignty of states, legal entitlements, citizenship, and,
consequently, full or not full participation of migrants in their “new home” countries
had not been mentioned in the convention and yet would have to be of pivotal
importance for countries that receive migrants in the present times.

3 Migration and Global Governance

If glocal public policy is the way in which governments design their policies
according to global norms and standards and domestic interests, then the global
migration regime and the UN global compact is a driving force to further shape
glocal policy structures. Yet, in most parts, the glocal public policy regime largely
remains fragmented between the levels of governance and stakeholders and without
common norms, standards, and modes of governance. The right mix between
top-down and bottom-up and the right balance between central, local, stakeholder,
and global decision-making and implementation are yet to be experienced. There is a
plethora of ideas—on global and domestic levels alike—on what rights and entitle-
ments migrants have according to their status.
However, regardless of whether migration is the cause or a consequence of
globalization and a domestic failure of good governance, the way most states deal
with it in terms of residence rights, working permissions, family reunification, or
refugee status is in almost all aspects at odds with international human rights norms.
Even domestic migration policies within the EU countries vary greatly. EU migra-
tion policy is focusing less on global development but more on border control
through Frontex, and migrants are mostly seen as a factor for economic growth or
decline and less of a cultural or humanitarian aspect.9 That is why in the context of
globalization, Hay argues, public policy processes that deal with migration and
immigration cannot be held to account publicly in domestic terms only, because
cultural values, behavior, and adherence to norms are values that are held in equal
regard to economic values (Ignatieff 2017). There are no global institutions, power
regimes, or otherwise legal entities that could be held accountable when millions of
uprooted people—for whatever reasons—get on the move. Yet, generally speaking,
democratic and public policy-based societies are the ones that are on the receiving
end of refugees in the Global North. But those migrants who illegally and econom-
ically speaking move among Global South countries, as the figures of the Gulf states
show, enjoy even less or no civil rights and protection. This cannot be left aside in

9
EU Commission Migration policy priorities (2017) “Towards a European agenda on migration”
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/migration_en (Accessed December 2017).
52 A. Mihr

glocal policy processes because the level of democratic decision-making in migra-

tion policies will both determine the future outcome of the top ten global challenges
and their subsequent policy solutions.10
The major challenge thus remains, that migrants everywhere do not enjoy full
citizenship rights, and thus lack of political participation is global. Migrants are dealt
with under either asylum and refugee laws or under labor immigration laws, which
give them only limited access to participation and resources in policy making. This
also hampers the idea of free and shared responsibility and accountability when
implementing joint or multilevel stakeholder policies, let alone the ACF.11 If one
doesn’t have full access to participation, he or she can also not take up full respon-
sibility for any wrongdoing—in case it applies. Thus, globalization and the rapid pace
of cross-border mobility—willingly or unwillingly—challenges the policy making
capacity and sovereignty of the nation state (Hay 2008, p. 590) resulting in an urgent
delegation of functions from public institutions to civil society groups and private
enterprise (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006) including human traffickers and other criminal
offenders (Davies 2015).
Triggered by these massive global shifts and domestic realities, Ian Goldin (2011)
calls for a paradigm shift in public policy matters and sees these moves as a chance for
a “new civilization” based on global citizenship. Global citizenship challenges
domestic public policy making. It would guarantee all human beings the same rights
and entitlements and means to make a decent living. Furthermore, every human being
would be guaranteed free movement without many restrictions—irrespective of their
national citizenship or passport (Dower and Williams 2002). Thus, according to those
advocating global citizenship, exclusive national citizenship and passports should no
longer matter in determining who enjoys full civil, political, cultural, and economic
human rights regardless of national borders. Nevertheless, despite the vision of a
“global travel document” for all, people are still linked to local entities, cities, and
districts in which they have their residency and in which they can, on the one side,
actively participate in decision-making processes and, on the other side, be held
accountable for their actions (Mihr 2017). The basic idea is that mobility should no
longer depend on national borders or passports, and yet someone’s entitlement to
participate in policy processes only depends on where he and she lives and has
residency and not on ones’ citizenship. This global citizenship therefore is one that
plays according to the global and universal standards and rules (human rights) that are
implemented and enforced anywhere in the world (Goldin 2011).
In the light of global citizenship, the outline of the UN global compact for
migration states that the remaining 192 UN member states aim to find common
global rules for labor rights, women, child protection, and humanitarian assistance,
regardless of whether they are categorized as a migrant or a refugee. If at least one in

10
Center for Immigration studies, Washington DC. https://cis.org/Map-Sanctuary-Cities-Counties-
and-States (Accessed December 2017).
11
SHARES project by the University of Amsterdam, http://www.sharesproject.nl/ (Accessed
December 2017).
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 53

seven people will become migrants in their lifetimes, the likely trends indicate that
this will soon become one in six or even one in five people in part because
undocumented migrants or illegal refugees often pass their status to the next
generation. Therefore, the strive for glocal solutions beyond national borders is
stronger than ever.
It is most likely that labor policies in the local labor sector will change current
migration policies. This is where migration is most visible in countries. Migrants’
needs and demands change expectations of policy makers to pursue some course of
action with the help and support of certain policy techniques and instruments such as
campaigns, laws, guidelines, missions, doctrines to integrate migrants, and full citi-
zens. These new policies ought to be based on values, visions, ideas, concepts, and
strategies that are neutrally applied to both citizens and noncitizens (Lasswell 1958).
However, these changes are predominantly driven by organized (local) migrant
communities, such as refugee councils, faith-based organizations, cultural heritage
groups, etc., as part of the stakeholder process. They may not carry the country’s
citizenship and thus cannot fully participate in democratic decision-making processes
through elections, but they are a vivid part of the local community and business and
can participate through other channels of community-based dialogues or through
businesses and other stakeholder groups. Consequently, the plethora of migrants
must adapt to democratic procedures through civic volunteer activism when aiming
to influence policy making. Nevertheless, migrants trigger public debates and contro-
versies and even change belief systems which are pivotal for ACF, in particular, in
terms of values, habits, and religion. In order to achieve the anticipated outcome of
more inclusion of their traditions and culture, migrants often form advocacy coalitions
on local and transnational level, organize groups, and become an active part of policy
making, despite their dispraised status (Larason Schneider and Ingram 2007).

4 The Potential of Advocacy Coalition Framework Glocal

Policies

The ACF helps to assess the shortcomings and possibilities of the glocal migration
regime. This framework predominately describes the role of the state actors in policy
making and explains the interface between public and private groups in developing
and implementing public policies, which again impact local, domestic, or interna-
tional regime development. Therefore, this framework is not only an assessment tool
of policy processes, but it also helps to see how governance regimes are getting
shaped over a period of time by the level of involvement and participation of
different stakeholders (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, p. 11). Willingly or unwill-
ingly, the needs and desires of migrants and the simple fact that migration continues
to happen trigger policy actors, business, and CSOs to organize pressure and interest
groups that force policy makers to respond and issue policy reforms according to
global human rights norms and standards. Yet, non-organized groups (apart from
54 A. Mihr

celebrities) without connection to local policy makers remain unheard and hardly
influence policy making in this respect.
If migrants themselves are excluded from the public policy making cycle due to
lack of citizenship and legal entitlements or are excluded because of language
impairment or for religious reasons, policy outcomes might be less inclusive and
beneficiary for all than they otherwise would be if migrants were included. There-
fore, the ACF explains this actor-specific process of change.
The ACF stands opposed to the narrative policy framework (NPF) that focuses on
the deliberative powers that common narratives, debates, and knowledge transfer
have on policy transfer (McBeth et al. 2014). However, one way of assessing the
policy processes does not entirely exclude the other. As illustrated above in the
context of global challenges, migration poses a unique challenge to global and local
policies to which actors and stakeholders can be directly held accountable. In the
context of migration, narratives only have a limited influence on policy making,
although the rise of populism and xenophobia against migrants and refugees
claiming them to be “terrorists” or criminals triggers less desirable policy processes
and outcomes in terms of immigration laws.
On a less explanatory and narrative note, the ACF illustrates how migrants
become policy brokers and, as such, shape domestic policies as they currently
stand: among others they change policy making, subsystems, learning, and beliefs
(Sabatier 1988). The fact that the UN Convention on working migrants was almost
exclusively ratified by “sender” countries is one example that illustrates why gov-
ernmental advocacy has not succeeded. The ACF assesses policies that are actor
specific regardless whether these are governmental or not and thus includes a
plethora of stakeholders such as CSOs and business, too. It does not matter whether
the ACF pressure groups are domestic CSOs or NGOs, refugees, noncitizens,
undocumented persons, or skilled workers. They share a common interest, namely,
that of living and working in dignity in a different place other than their homes.
One’s dignity not only encompasses the human right to speak up and express
opinions but also the fundamental right to participate freely, to start up an enterprise
in the place of their new residence, and to enjoy access to public education and health
facilities and thus inherently must also include the right to be heard and be included
in the agenda-setting and decision-making processes of public policy. Different
migrant groups have different interests that also depend on their legal status, and
thus they are forming different organized coalition networks to interact with policy
makers in order to change policies. Civil society, relief organizations, and local
business that need migrant labor, as well as urban planners, mayors, city councils,
hospitals, and school administrations, respond to these pressure groups, either
through direct integration of migrants, for example, in schools and educational
institutions, or through adaptation by providing housing or relief. However, policy
reactions can also be driven by racism, xenophobia, and fear of “waves of migrants”
that lead to exclusion and discrimination that the NPF would support. Many of these
exclusionary policies are based on the lack of participation. Those who have no legal
working status, for example, are less likely to be integrated and participate and may
therefore be more inclined to survive on petty crimes, which in turn leads to the
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 55

vicious cycle of conflict and more exclusive policies (Massey et al. 2009). Despite
these observations, the largest coalitions for migrants are cultural and value-based
(i.e., Muslim religious communities, church and relief organizations, foundations,
etc.) and not business or labor groups, despite the fact that migrants are seen mostly
under the lenses of labor or economic cost-benefit assessment, which makes the
cultural and value-based fact even more interesting to look at in terms of policy
change.
Cultural, language, ethnic, or faith-based groups are policy brokers within the
ACF shape that influence or change domestic values, even that of democracy,
freedom, and rights. Migration is always cultural migration, too, which leads to
many more conflicts and tensions, to which policy makers have to respond, than
socioeconomic and labor integration. Religious habits, gender traditions, language
impairments, and value systems often conflict with the ones in the country of new
destination, whereas working habits, rules, and specific skills to complete tasks do
not vary or do so to a much lesser extent. A nurse has to be able to complete certain
tasks in such a manner that he helps the patient, just as a construction worker needs
to satisfy his customer, regardless of his or her personal, religious affiliations. Thus,
the reason for these problems is not the working place, the nature of different
cultures, and habits where problems, tensions, and conflicts between migrants and
nonmigrants and other citizens occur. These cultural tensions, however, are central
to the future of local communities and their peaceful coexistence. That is yet another
reason why local community stakeholders and majors are extensively involved in
changing glocal migration policies.
Organized coalitions mostly can influence policy makers on all levels to change
existing policies in order to make them reflect changing attitudes, sociocultural
values, and social structures, as well as the constitutional setups of the destination
countries, which may need to be reconsidered in light of these new, modern
challenges (Weible and Sabatier 2007, pp. 124–125). However, whereas business
actors, for example, lobby to change laws and regulations to allow for working
permits and flexible labor policies for migrants, the same migrant, who is now part of
the domestic labor system, does not have the same legal opportunity to lobby for his
interests of political or cultural matters if they are not part of the citizen-based
electorate. They work, pay taxes, and contribute to domestic income and business
but cannot fully politically participate. But even in being forced to be passive, they
are part of the ACF, through “nonparticipatory forced silence.” Of course, there are
other ways to raise one’s voice and interest, but democratic elections remain outside
of this scope.
The ACF addresses the difficult relationship between state-based power institu-
tions and coalitions or CSOs which are used to form new parameters such as laws
based on commonly agreed-upon rules and attitudes. This is similar to how these
actors shape regimes, because these coalitions consider changes in ideas and per-
ceptions as a central factor of policy shifts (Sabatier and Weible 2014). In the context
of the current conversation on migration, the ACF conceptualizes local as well as
global governance regimes, as seen in IOM or UN policy processes, and their ways
to jointly set up new standards for migrant communities around the world in order to
56 A. Mihr

best govern the dramatically transforming relationship between state and an increas-
ingly multicultural, plural society. Migrant organizations of all sorts are part of the
decision process. Local urban communities, cities, their policy makers, and CSOs
are the key actors in these policy shifts because they not only have experience in how
to govern migration, i.e., in sanctuary cities, but also they have to respond to local
pressure and interest groups to solve problems and distribute resources on a day-to-
day basis. Such communities and groups are today represented at such storied
institutions as the World Economic Forum, at UN assemblies, and EU summits,
and thus, they exercise their universal right to speak and participate despite their
precarious status. Interestingly, it was the World Economic Forum and the UN that
called for glocal policy solutions in the first place. Around the year 2000, and in the
context of globalization, a dialogue about global migration started at the World
Economic Forum followed by the UN (MDG/SDG). The UN Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families12
that followed shortly was only ratified by 43 member states in the Global South. It
indicated that the past approaches have partly failed because sending and receiving
states were not on equal footing and did not have a dialogue about common
standards.
Consequently, on the global level, the ACF can help to evaluate the practicability
of how global norms, i.e., international conventions and guidelines set by the IOM or
UN and EU, respond to current demands and how they can or cannot impact the
swift and peaceful integration of migrants. The ACF also explains how policy
brokers, such as migrant groups, change domestic public policy processes and
make them more global and local at the same time.

5 Migrants as Policy Brokers

Advocacy groups are policy brokers and an important force, even in routine policy
making and even more so in networked transnational societies. Social movements or
mass movements, such as migrants, are advocacy groups in “self-styled” manner, as
Goodin et al. (2006, p. 24) call them. Self-styled groups are slowly grown organized
or less organized groups that represent interests and needs to which policy makers
have to react. They differ from “duly elected” or state-based lobbyist groups. As this
chapter illustrates, global movements and developments as well as organized
migrants can thus change priorities in public policy matters, although, generally
speaking, globalization is seen to challenge the public nature of domestic public
policy by summoning a series of nonnegotiable, external, and largely economic
imperatives. Thus, as Colin Hay (2008, p. 587) highlights, globalization is seen as

12
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of Their Families: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx (Accessed
December 2017).
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 57

the enemy of policy process, public or otherwise, not only in economic terms but
also in political, democratic value, and cultural terms. Globalization, similarly to
global migration, leads to interdependencies that are associated with powerful
tendencies to depoliticize, privatize, and technicize because the actors, beneficiaries,
concerned persons, and non-state citizens are, generally speaking, outside the
domestic public policy framework. Nevertheless, migrants dramatically impact all
major public policy sectors and belief systems, such as the labor sector, the formal
education and the health sector, as well as in housing, family, and community
matters. Migration of whatever kind also impacts public debates about values and
governance regimes and, as such, triggers civil engagement. The questions are not
only around issues of integration into the labor or housing sector but also in terms of
what a culturally diverse society should look like in the present and future. Advocacy
coalition groups help to support integration and are often formed around language,
religion, faith, or ethnic background. In these coalitions, migrants share common
experiences. They become interest groups when negotiating the best deal for their
migrant groups in the new country, regardless of whether these settlements are
temporary or permanent. Apart from common values, faith, language, cultural, or
other interests, they also need to engage to a nontrivial degree with the majority of
society in order to achieve policy change (Weible and Sabatier 2007, p. 128). By
engaging with the status quo society, migrant groups change public policies (Brettell
2012, p. 133).
Labor migrants, even within EU countries, for example, only have limited access
to policy making in their “host” and new country of residency. Refugees, settlers, or
migrant workers from outside national boarders (or EU borders) do not enjoy any, so
they depend on framing partnerships and coalitions with citizen groups of that
respective country. However, by doing that, the coalitions formed, for example,
labor unions and faith-based or religious organizations that can have political
influence. Full access to policy making in terms of voting or being elected is not
among those legal entitlements and status. Whereas refugees may primarily seek
security and basic work to survive and later return to their home country, labor
migrants or skilled workers from the same country seek careers, the ability to
exercise their mother tongue and faith, live with their families and practice their
culture, and to participate in public life. Migration communities are highly
fragmented, as is their status by definition and by law and consequently their access
to policy making. Thus, a common global, normative, and legally binding frame-
work, such as the UN compact, is needed to define the interests of all migrants,
regardless of why they had to or wanted to migrate—namely, to work for a living, to
live in peace and with dignity, and to maintain their core cultural identity.
Similar to public policy processes are international politics (still), state-centered
and not necessarily multilevel or multi-stakeholder, let alone global. In other words,
borders and state sovereignty still matter, despite climate change or global migration.
Participation at the UN or in other international regimes, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or G 20, is based on member states and their governments, not
on people. Some of them are democratically elected, but most are not and instead are
highly corrupt. Thus, the level of legitimacy of these organizations is rather low.
58 A. Mihr

Although multi-stakeholder, multilevel, and polycentric governance principles are

entering all spheres of public policy as well as global governance (Enderlein et al.
2012), these regimes are far from being fully democratically legitimate. At the same
time, the lack of democracy in many countries is the root cause for migration in the
first place, such as from the DRC, Sudan, Bangladesh, or the Philippines. There is,
nevertheless, a causal relationship between the lack of democracy, conflict, and
migration within these countries.
On the receiving end, in the desired destination countries for refugees or working
migrants, such as in Europe, the rule of law and fundamental lack of democracy are
not the main problems. Interestingly, in the rule of law-abiding societies such as the
EU member states, Australia, the USA, New Zealand, and Canada, migration poses a
problem because their rule of law regimes are too state centric and leave little leeway
to adapt to transnational and global policy issues. Henry Shue illustrates this step as
the necessity of public policy actors to ask the question: “Who is in, and who is out?”
(Shue 2008, p. 709). Shall public policy actors deal with global policy matters only if
they are directly connected to domestic concerns or open up to those who are
affected by the matter, even if it is future generations, stateless, or refugees on issues
who do not seem to neither be part of foreign relations nor international politics at the
first sight? Thus, are migrants only a domestic policy concern once an asylum
seeker, a refugee, or economically driven person asks at one’s border control center
to enter the country? Can migration and migrants be considered as a global concern
even if a country exempts from the discourse and refuses migrants to enter the
country? Not surprisingly, along with the global mass migration, the perceptions of
territorial state sovereignty, nation-states, and borders have dramatically shifted and
so has the perception of who governs “borderless states” and fluid borders (Bens and
Zenker 2017).
Every person who is not citizen is trapped in some sort of foreign or alien status
which restricts him or her from full participation. Furthermore, democratic countries
have to run elections and compete for public support. With the rise of anti-migrant
sentiments and hostilities worldwide, populism emerges and asks governments to
restrict not only entry visas but also levels of participation and mobility of non-
citizens once they have entered the country. The mandate for their governments to
negotiate a satisfactory glocal policy solution for all may move to a far distant future
as seen in the case of the USA’s backing out of the Paris Accords in 2017 and its
immigration legislation against sanctuary cities. Due to the fact that democratic
societies, civil society, and local governing bodies act more autonomously than in
authoritarian regimes, they do integrate migrants in a much less conflict-prone but
very bureaucratic way other than top-down autocratic regimes, such as the UAE or
Singapore, which often react fast, restrictively and without consulting with CSOs.
Thus, there is a chance that through means like the ACF, a bottom-up approach will
form both domestic and global migration policies in the interests of all sides.
Nevertheless, free and equal citizenship is the core of legitimate political decision-
making and of ACF. At the same time, the political legitimacy of governments in
receiving and hosting countries depends on defensible reasons, explanations, and
accounts of public decisions. Hence, the key objective of coalitions is the
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 59

transformation of private preferences via the process of deliberation into positions

that can withstand public scrutiny and testing (Held 2005, p. 237). This is the
spectrum within which the ACF, in terms of migration, works and at the same
time shapes the glocal accountability of governments and policy making bodies.
The glocal concept challenges state-centric public policy concepts by pushing
national borders and rule of law regimes to the margins of their domestic governance
spectrum. Global migration brings noncitizens into the center of governance and
policy concerns in a way that many domestic constitutions, parliaments, and political
regimes are not prepared for, as Hay argued (Hay 2008). It forces governments to
think about citizenship and civic rights and to adapt to global norms to guarantee
peaceful and sustainable development within the growing migrant-driven, culturally
diverse society. Hence, the concept of domestic public policy is shifting, and policy
makers are urged to, first, connect public services with the global norms and
standards; second, adapt to cultural shifts brought in by migrants; and third, adopt
flexible local public policy processes including multiple stakeholders to make
effective decisions and implement international norms, such as sanctuary cities
and glocal policy outcomes.
Migration-related global public policy solutions given by IOM, UN, or EU in
terms of labor, health, education, political, and civil integration are directly linked to
the possibilities and resources of local communities, city councils, and urban
governance regimes. Today, the vast majority of migrants live and work in urban
areas not rural ones. They are not farmers or fishers but factory, health, or service
workers—except for seasonal workers in the food sector and in the case of exploi-
tation of natural resources. Even if they come as refugees or without legal status, they
aim to be integrated as soon as possible in the permanent labor market, even if they
aim to go back to their country of origin one day. Personal security and contract
guarantees for a better life are a top priority of these migrants. Thus, migration
policies affect specific urban areas. Only after they are settled into local communities
is their impact, i.e., economical or cultural, seen on the national level.
This is also due to the fact that over 250 million transborder migrants today do not
fit into the two neat categories—if they ever existed in the first place—of (1) working
migrants and settlers and of (2) refugees and asylum seekers. And regardless of
whether they come as labor force, are trafficked, refugees, illegals, asylum seekers,
or ex-pats, they do not enjoy immediate citizen rights in the country of destination,
and thus their possibility of influencing and impacting domestic public policy
processes are marginal with a tendency to zero.
Therefore, and not surprisingly, starting as far back as the 1990s when globali-
zation first challenged state sovereignty and domestic public policy making, migra-
tion was already mentioned among the core triggers that would change domestic
policy making in the decades to come. As early as 1997, Wolfgang Reinicke (1997)
summarized in Foreign Affairs what later became a standard assumption among
policy advisors, namely, that interdependence and multilateralism will lead to new
forms of global governance and public policy regimes. However, as he argues,
neither interdependence nor globalization can challenge the legal sovereignty of a
state, only other states can. Today, one could add that it is domestic and local
60 A. Mihr

pressure that challenges this sovereignty as well. So is the case with transnational
migration moves, during which the sending state—intentionally or
unintentionally—forces other states to change their migration policy. It challenges
the operational sovereignty of a government, that is, its ability to exercise sover-
eignty in the daily affairs of policy making and thus politics, as Reinicke argued. The
internal dimension of sovereignty is challenged by the external one by which states
engage with and become members of global, international, or supranational regimes,
such as the UN or the EU. In return, this also shapes the relationship between the
state and civil society advocates.
By engaging in UN compacts and global human rights norms through human
rights regimes, a government no longer has a monopoly of the legitimate power over
the territory within which they operate. By no means does this imply that govern-
ments are no longer core players in policy making. Instead, they are advised to
follow a different organizational logic which advises them to share power and
sovereignty and thus decision-making with both international and global forces
and with local ones in order to maintain their power within state boundaries. Thus,
while globalization and migration integrate markets, they fragment policy processes
at the global and the local level and within the private sector.
Consequently, these multilevel shifts of power from the national/domestic level to
the global/international and to the local/community level as well as its interaction
with multiple, private, governmental, and civil stakeholders threaten centralistic state
sovereignty and power. Due to the increasing number of migrants in modern
societies and industrial countries, policy making and elections without allowing
migrants to participate on local or national level will cast doubt on internal sover-
eignty of the state. To permanently or systematically exclude approximately 10 or
more per cent of population from fully participating can impede the quality of
democracy or at least legitimacy of state institutions. Trust in institutions and policy
makers who ignore the needs, claims of migrants because they are excluded, will
face deficits.

6 Responses by Policy Makers

Democratically elected policy makers are predominantly bound to domestic law, the
nation, the country, and foremost to their electorate—not to migrants that have no
full citizenship or none at all. They respond to the challenges of domestic sover-
eignty threats in two ways, either (1) defensive or (2) offensive. Defensive interven-
tions rely on economic or resource-related policy measures such as the type of aid,
relief, or access the labor markets and public services that migrants can receive
(Weible 2014, pp. 3–24). However, if these measures fail to obtain broad popular
support, the responses are protests and public resistance, xenophobia, and even
violence against migrants who are without any political protection except interna-
tional regimes and organizations. Policy makers can also intervene offensively with
subsidies or competitive deregulation for migrants in terms of a benefit and other
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 61

public support for their cultural values such as language, traditions, and religion.
Under these circumstances, states themselves become global competitors within the
migration regimes, seeking to become influential in changing or amending global
norms, such as the UN compact for migrants.
Interestingly enough, and against this backdrop, in March 2017 at the World
Economic Forum, Chinese Prime Minister LiKeqiang expressed his deepest concern
that the “world is entering a period of political and economic upheaval,” (The
Guardian 2017) referring to the rise of unpredictable state leadership in world
politics and the reluctance to respond to global challenges, such as migration, by
withdrawing or ignoring globally adhered principles. His expression drew much
intention, because it came from a policy maker who is neither democratically elected
nor represents a country that stands for an open and democratic public policy
process, let alone one that adheres much to global norms and standards. But it
shows that local problems can more and more only be solved with the support of
global regimes. His statement also raised the question who can be legitimate partner
in global public policy issues such as trade or peace negotiation, when even
democratically elected state leaders exempt from international agreements and
hide behind national borders? His concerns were already shared during the forum
meeting in 2016 by leaders pleading for firm and reliable global rule of law-based
state commitments to face the ten biggest global challenges, both globally and
locally.13
Obviously, domestic modes of governance, whether democratic or
nondemocratic, have lost much authority and thus reliable and trustworthy leader-
ship and much of their popular legitimacy to solve world’s problems, let alone their
own domestic ones. In a glocal world that requires collaboration among various
actors, business, CSOs, and political leaders, governance has become a polycentric
necessity, not a vision, and unilateral agreements no longer seem viable when
solving problems. A hegemon can no longer make effective decisions to solve
problems. The size of this legitimacy gap is also reflected in the SDG/Agenda
2030 which highlights migration as a core challenge and the way the UN has called
upon all types of private and public institutions and actors to work jointly on facing
this challenge,14 and hence, shifts in the way legitimacy of governance and sover-
eignty of a state in relation to its leaders, citizens, and noncitizens is perceived
(Cohen 2012).
In the midst of globalization, global mass migration forces less democratic
societies to adapt other forms of policy making, including multilevel and
stakeholder-based solutions. Parallel to these diametric developments, private and
civil actors have become a valuable part of governance systems around the world,

13
The World Economic Forum (2016). Mastering the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Annual Meet-
ing, Davos, 2016‚ http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AM16_Report.pdf (Accessed
December 2017).
14
UN Sustainable Development Goals (Agenda 2030), New York, 2015, http://www.un.org/
sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/ (Accessed December 2017).
62 A. Mihr

infiltrating public policy processes. Businesses and CSOs integrate migrants through
work and community services, churches are providing shelter, non-state actors such
as Médicine Sans Frontièrs are providing first aid, companies such as Google are
providing access to Internet, UNICEF fills the education gap, and mayors of
sanctuary cities allow undocumented migrants to stay, work, and live within their
city boundaries (OECD 2017).
Against this backdrop, the flow of migration and migrants will contribute to shift
public policy frames democratizing by merging local actors and their problem-
solving with global norms as seen in the UN SDG’s Agenda 2030. Sanctuary cities
are seen as an interim solution for local problem-solving when it comes to handling
undocumented migration as well as migrant settlements in general (New York Times
(2017, 6 February). Thus far glocal migration policies are dealt with on, first,
horizontal and local levels, because migrants first meet local policy makers and
not national governments once they are in the country. City councils are then often
urged to a factual breach (and consequently end up in court) of existing domestic
migration laws while solving problems and integrating, for example, undocumented
minors. They ought to have flexible and catalytic migration practices (wage, tem-
porary employment, giving permits, etc.). Secondly, they are dealt with on a vertical
governmental level in terms of security of national borders and maintaining citizen-
ship versus noncitizens. Thirdly, policy brokers come from the private and civic
actors’ coalitions. The ACF-specific approach explains that migrants have already
shifted priorities in policy making from the domestic level to the global and the local.
This is also highlighted by the “open-border” literature. It proposes similar
approaches to migration. Bauder argues that the mobility of people across border
is still highly controlled and limited, and thus borders remain a main source not only
of labor inefficiencies but also of human suffering and injustices (Bauder 2015). He
emphasizes the importance of policy shifts toward open-border and no-border
practices as a chance for global development and mobility in a similar vein as Goldin
argues from an economic and political point of view (Goldin 2011). A recognized
no-border concept would help to overcome major obstacles of domestic public
policy concerning the migration regime. This concept is ACF driven, namely,
because it is locally driven by members of various (migration) coalitions regardless
of their legal status; secondly, this concept accepts global norms as guiding princi-
ples for policy making.

7 Conclusion

The fear in many societies that migrants only aim to seek social benefits, impose new
and alien cultural values and habits, abuse the welfare regime of the destination
countries, and take jobs for lower wages has not ever been proven anywhere over the
medium- or long-term run. Rather, the level of integration depends on whether, how,
and under what concept migrants can be included in public policy making?
“Glocal” Public Policy in Times of Global Migration 63

With distribution and settlement policies in the long run, however, migration
figures are balanced out by the economic and cultural benefit these migrant com-
munities pose to the resident society. Values change, but deliberately, not by force of
imposition through mass migrants. It is at this point where the ACF helps to explain
the shifts in glocal migration policies.
The inclusion of migration as one of the top ten challenges and policy issues to
deal with globally and locally in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and
the aim to establish a global compact for migration and refugees in 2018 confirms
and reinforces the important relationship between migration and development. By
integrating migration, including forced displacement into the SDGs, the heads of
state and governments acknowledged that migration needs to work for development
and that development needs to work for migration as highlighted by the OECD
(OECD Report 2017).
Nevertheless, labor migration, for example, remains rather stable in terms of
numbers and world population (approximately 3.5%)—although not equally distrib-
uted among the world’s countries—and has had a long-standing impact on the
economic and societal development of the receiving country. Hence, the global
migration regime within the frame for glocal policy solutions needs to be discussed
under cultural and societal aspects and overall political participation aspects. Migra-
tion is overall the mobility of social capital, and this always has an impact on public
sector such as health, values, human rights, good governance, and education, to
name but a few public issues.
Even progressive and reformist governance attempts, such as by most member
states of the EU since 2005 as part of their Global Approach to Migration and
Mobility (GAMM), in which they combined national migration politics, i.e., visa
and labor policies, with development and aid policies in third sending countries,
have their limits and are still state centric (European Commission 2017). Similarly,
the EU’s neighborhood policies are based on domestic migration policies, i.e.,
refugee and asylum policies. This policy is based on a rule of law-based domestic
public policy system, although it aims to build trust between the EU and its member
states in general and the sending countries out of which migrants come to the
EU. However, it mostly ignores the need for more flexibility on local and city levels.
The European migration regime focuses on business and labor issues, security
threats and border control, and thus criteria to exclude and discourage migration
toward Europe instead of guiding it. Despite many CSO-based ACF initiatives, the
EU’s migration regime is not a cultural and social and neither an inclusively political
one (European Commission 2011, 8 November). However, as long as destination
countries or regions, such as North America, Australia, and Europe condone the
employment of illegal migrant workers and have no effective control over their
borders, security, and safety policies (building borders and fences instead in Mac-
edonia and the USA), it will remain a domestic policy problem of the receiving
countries, not one of the source or sending countries (Koslowski 2004, p. 19). SDG
goal number 11 on cities, for example, aims to respond to this shortcoming by
referring to the potential and the benefits local communities and cities today have
when welcoming and including migrants in the core sense of the medieval terms
64 A. Mihr

“citizens,” namely, those who live and work in cities and thus enjoy the same rights
as all citizens of that city, regardless of their origin.15
For those on the public policy process that deal with global challenges, migration
policy research can be seen as an intriguing investigation into a win-win situation,
how, whether, and under what circumstances domestic policy actors open up to glocal
policy solutions or not—beyond mere foreign relations. As illustrated, glocal devel-
opments and global movements impact regimes as well as domestic politics. Today’s
working migration and refuge seekers alike epitomize the following, namely, that
these (1) people migrate to cities/urban areas to work, live, and share their skills and
values which are not always free of conflicts and (2) in the case of socioeconomic and
cultural disadvantages of participation, they move on to another place somewhere
around the world (Pogge 2008).

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the millennium. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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C. Weible (Eds.), Theories of the policy process (pp. 225–266). Boulder: Westview Press.
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A. Mihr, & T. Thorp (Eds.), Climate change, migration and human rights, law and policy
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66 A. Mihr

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Anja Mihr is Program Director of the Center on Governance through Human Rights at
HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA Governance Platform in Berlin, Germany, and Professor for Gover-
nance at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzsistan. She held professorships at the Netherlands
Institute for Human Rights at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, the Hebrew University,
Israel, and at the University of Erfurt, Germany. She has published in the area of human rights,
transitional justice and democracy, climate justice and internet governance.
Public Policy and Ideation

Atif Ikram Butt

1 Introduction

Public policy as a concept is as old as the notion of government. The scholarly quest
for the answers to how and why public policies evolve and their outcomes arise is
also at least two centuries old. Yet, there is no unifying theory of public policy. The
ones that exist either implicitly subscribe to the basic features of American pluralism
or are limited by their origins in high-income democratic settings (Nelson 1998,
p. 553; Osman 2002, p. 37; Smith and Ketikireddi 2013, p. 201). There is hardly any
scholarly attention drawn to understanding the politics and environment of policy
making in countries of the Global South. Part of this problem is the complex and
multifaceted nature of the public policy process. The process often does not follow
any standardized procedures or routinized approaches and has many actors and
variables whose relationships span across time and issues (Cairney 2012, p. 12;
John 2003, p. 481; McCool 1995, p. 398). As a result, existing theories of public
policy present only some but not all of the facets of this process and its outcomes.
Greenberg et al. elucidate this point and write, “Although the theories [of public
policy] seemed perfectly applicable to the few cases used by their authors to illustrate
them originally, the propositions did not fit so neatly when applied to a number of
examples not expressly chosen for explanation and illustration” (Greenberg et al.
1977, p. 1532). Existing theories of public policy derived from developed countries
are also of limited scope in the context of countries of the Global South due to their
inability to transcend beyond any given structural and contextual variations in
political systems and societal conditions.
In the last two decades, however, advances in the institutional perspective have
come to take a central place in the understanding of political decision-making. These
advances combine insights from across disciplines and utilize a multidimensional
nature of inquiry. This has been loosely dubbed as “new institutionalism.” The

A. I. Butt (*)
Center for Communication Programs Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 67

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_5
68 A. I. Butt

ideational turn in new institutionalism is by far the most recent and has the potential
to examine public policy decisions regardless of political, societal, and socioeco-
nomic conditions. The ideational turn gives supremacy to ideas in institutional
analysis and contends that institutionalists can investigate both the path of institu-
tional change and the origins of change itself. It may be argued that the ideational
scholarship is still very much a work in progress and lacks a coherent school of
thought. Recent theoretical advancements, however, have built enough foundation
on which institutional analysis could be sufficiently carried out in countries, i.e.,
Global South, that do not necessarily present facets of pluralistic societies, i.e., the
United States (US), or of well-established liberal democracies. This chapter contrib-
utes toward burgeoning interest in the role of ideas and discourse in policy studies.
An attempt is made to overcome theoretical shortcomings in the application of
ideational institutionalism by building conceptual clarity on types of ideas, their
origin, and the mechanism through which they affect public policy outcomes.

2 The Ideational Turn in New Institutionalism

New institutionalism lacks a unified body of thought. There is, however, some
degree of consensus that new institutionalism falls into three broad categories,
those of rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalisms. These three
schools of thought developed quite independently of one another, but they all have in
common their discontent with the behavioral perspectives of the 1960s and 1970s.
At the same time, while all three approaches agree that institutions matter, they
disagree over the extent to which they matter. Rational choice institutionalists
consider institutions to be only an intervening variable affecting individuals’ choices
and actions, while their strategic calculation remains the central pillar. They concede
that institutions set parameters in regard to individuals’ actions, but they are also the
creation of utility-maximizing rationalists in order to overcome unpredictability
(Koelble 1995, p. 232). Rational choice institutionalists, therefore, see institutions
as a system of rules and incentives created by rational, profit-maximizing decisions.
Historical institutionalists consider institutions to have a determinant role in indi-
viduals’ actions, as their preferences are formed by the institutional context in which
they calculate their interests. Interests, therefore, are the product of interaction
among various groups, ideas, and institutional structures. Institutions, for historical
institutionalists, are thus continuous and path-dependent. For sociologists, indi-
viduals’ interests are a product of a broader institutional setting where culture, society,
and organizational identity are all a contributing factor and where even institutions
themselves are dependent on society and culture. For sociologists, institutions are a
web of interrelated formal and informal norms that shape the parameters of choice
and where actors are embedded in a network of personal relationships, which serves
as an evaluation framework for their choices (Nee and Ingram 1998, p. 40). For all
three established new institutionalisms, this effectively describes an ontological
standpoint whereby institutions are seen in stable equilibrium, whether with fixed
Public Policy and Ideation 69

rationalist preferences, self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms,

all of which serve as constraints on agents’ actions. This deterministic view of insti-
tutions has led to difficulties for new institutionalists who seek to explain how such
institutions can be changed (Bell 2011, p. 883). This predicament in new institution-
alism explains the turn to ideas, applied as more of a corrective measure and even
implying a tacit acknowledgment of their theoretical limitation in explaining insti-
tutional change (Schmidt 2008, p. 304). Blyth (1997, p. 229) calls this initial interest in
ideas among the new institutionalists as “an ad hoc attempt to account for theoretical
problems.” This instrumental and functional treatment of ideas and an attempt to
grapple with questions of institutional change served as the origin of a distinct body of
scholarship within new institutionalism referred to here as ideational institutionalism
(Schmidt 2006). At around the same time when the three new institutionalisms came
to be recognized, there began an increasing impetus on bringing these three
established schools of thought under comparative lenses. Ideas, on the one hand,
became the bridge among different schools of thought within new institutionalism
through which they sought commonalities and which resulted in erecting a distinct
theoretical body—ideational institutionalism—in its own right.
Initially, the study of ideas in the work of new institutionalism was regarded as
less than optimistic. Subsequent work on the role of ideas in explaining political
change in the context of new institutionalism is now dubbed as the fourth new
institutionalism, and in some of the latest compendiums on new institutionalist
scholarship, the ideational school is now given a distinct space and recognition.
The importance of ideational processes in policy making and the understanding of
institutional change and continuity have now formed a distinct identity of its own.
Different adjectives have been used to distinguish it from the three established new
institutionalisms, i.e., ideational, discursive, and constructivist institutionalism.
Here, the term ideational is preferred over other adjectives as the focus is on the
role of ideas rather than the means, i.e., interpretive or interactive processes, through
which institutions are created, sustained, and changed and policies are influenced,
contested, and shaped. Regardless of the adjective one chooses to use, what they all
have in common is the interest in the role ideas play and the practice of ontologically
considering policy making a more dynamic process rather than a result of an
equilibrium-focused outcome in a static, institutional setting. Its purpose lies in the
desire to capture, describe, and analyze institutional disequilibrium. Before an
attempt can be made to define institution within the ambit of ideational institution-
alism, it is essential to first delineate what is meant by ideas.

3 Defining Ideas

In the institutional literature, there seems to be no general consensus among authors

on what ideas are and what they constitute. The understanding of the concept of
ideas is greatly influenced by one’s ontological standpoint. For instance, the rational
choice institutionalists ascribe to an understanding whereby they see ideas secondary
70 A. I. Butt

to interests and as justification, rationalization, and an instrument of persuasion

(Fiorina 1995). Those who subscribe to historical institutionalism consider ideas to
be purposes and projects which define the roles of individuals in relation to their
institutional environment and constitutive of the self and also of the concepts of
rationality, preferences, and interests (Smith 1995, p. 136). More recent definitions
of ideas, however, are tending to be minimalist in their application. Such is the case
with Lieberman (2002, p. 698), who considers ideas to be a “medium by which
people can imagine (. . .) and such imaginings spur them to act to try and make
changes.” Similarly, Hay (2006, p. 63) understands ideas as perceptions comprising
desires, preferences, and motivations that reflect a normative orientation. These
various conceptions of ideas stem from a particular ontological standpoint and
explore the concept from within the limits of their individual schools of thought.
A noteworthy exception to this rule can be found in the advancements undertaken by
John Campbell and Vivien Schmidt.
Building upon the work of Peter Hall on policy paradigms, Campbell (1998,
p. 398) gives, for the first time, an elaborate conception of ideas as providing specific
solutions to policy problems, constraining the cognitive and normative range of
solutions that policy makers are likely to consider, and constituting symbols and
concepts that enable actors to construct frames which legitimize their policy pro-
posals. Campbell (1998, p. 398) here considers ideas to be serving as constraining
structures on actors, which is in line with the arguments of the three established new
institutionalisms. In a later article, Campbell (2002, p. 21) gives a more holistic
definition of ideas, calling them “theories, conceptual models, norms, world views
frames, principled beliefs and the like, rather than self-interests, affect policy
making.” In this case, Campbell clearly distinguishes ideas from interests and treats
them as two distinctive concepts. Vivien Schmidt is the most revolutionary of
ideational institutionalists and is among the forerunners of giving this particular
offshoot in institutionalist debate a distinct identity. She writes of ideas as:
simultaneously constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning, which are
internal to ‘sentient’ (thinking and speaking) agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’
explain how they create and maintain institutions at the same time that their ‘foreground
discursive abilities’ enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to
change (or maintain) them. (Schmidt 2010, p. 4)

While synthesizing different definitions and conceptions of ideas, Schmidt also

provides a functional understanding and distinguishes ideas as per their most base
level of generality, i.e., specific to a particular policy, encompassing a wider
program, or constituting an underlying philosophy, and in terms of its appeal, i.e.,
cognitive for constituting interests and normative to appeal to values and norms
(Schmidt 2008, p. 321). Rather than bridging gaps and aiming to build a more
holistic understanding of the term in order to connect different schools of thought in
new institutionalism, Schmidt believes in the distinctiveness of ideas (ibid., p. 304).
The understanding of ideas constructed by Schmidt in contrast to that of Campbell is
revolutionary on two accounts. First, Schmidt does not consider ideas and interests
to be two distinct concepts but rather holds that the former constitutes the later.
Public Policy and Ideation 71

Second, ideas for Schmidt are both constraining structures as well as enabling
constructs, and thereby she implies a much more dynamic understanding of the
term than Campbell does. However, Schmidt’s understanding of ideas as cognitive
[what is and what to do] and normative [what is good or bad in light of what one
ought to do] falls short of fully appreciating the subjective dimension constituting
interests [what is one’s gain or loss in view of what is], though she herself infers
“interests are subjective and norm-driven” (ibid., p. 306, 318). The notion of ideas as
frames is therefore a comparatively more comprehensive conception, which seems
full of potential with its ability to link cognition to norms and understanding to action
(Gooby-Taylor 2005, p. 4).
In a 1989 essay, Bruno Jobert (1989, p. 377) talks of ideas as a “frame of
reference” and links them to the cognitive, instrumental, and normative dimensions
of policy making. He explains cognitive dimension as a “common intellectual
interpretative framework” (ibid., pp. 377–378) through which policy makers evalu-
ate the probable effects of their actions. This instrumental dimension provides a set
of recipes or policy instruments available to carry out intended action, and he
describes the normative dimension as comprising political culture and values.
Together with Surel, Muller (1998, p. 11) further elaborate this understanding of
referential as “arrangements of intellectual, normative, or cognitive frames that
simultaneously determine the tools with which societies can work on themselves
and the arena of meaning within which social groups will interact.” Jobert and
Muller (1987) also use the term of mediator somewhat similar to the concept of
epistemic community as presented by Hass (1989) or the advocacy coalition frame-
work of Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (1993), but it is more broad-based in
its membership, which includes the referential and comprises “the actor, as a group
or an individual (. . .) considered as the truth at a specific moment.” This viewpoint
implies that cognitive frames are constructions from outside that are then used as
intellectual and normative references by the policy maker to determine tools for
problem-solving. For this, they need access to the political agenda and must be
diffused in policy circles to become a reference for actions. This comprehension
carries two limitations. First, it becomes overtly prescriptive, focusing less on the
creations and change of institutions and more on the instrumental dimension of
ideas. Second, it shuts itself off from the possibility of policy behaviors of an
individual or a group of individuals acting in pursuit of their own interests using
ideas to build incentive structures and to reduce uncertainties.
Nevertheless, understanding ideas as a frame of reference takes distinction over
other conceptions of the term in the three established new institutionalisms as, on the
one hand, it not only constrains actors’ decision-making but also becomes “a tool to
shape and modify reality” (Simoulin 2000, p. 334). It also differs in a sense that it
implies a reciprocal relationship between ideas and public influencing the construc-
tion of each other as opposed to the univocal relationship as described by rational
choice, historical, or sociological institutionalisms. Seeing ideas as a frame of
reference to a public policy outcome is particularly useful, considering that policy
makers usually operate at various levels, i.e., cognitive, normative, and subjective
interpretations of interests, for the evaluation of their decisions. It is in this context
72 A. I. Butt

the term ideas is conceived as the basis for policy decisions, central to how policy
makers conceive and evaluate their options and how and what they decide. Its
construction is the result of exogenous factors, i.e., culture, norms, or scripts, or
endogenous to organization, i.e., rule-like qualities, structure action, and regularized
practices, or internal to actors as in subjective calculations of interests, intellectual
determination of optimal course of action, or assumptions of public sentiments, or a
mix of thereof.

4 Institutions in Ideational Institutionalism

In ideational institutionalism literature, there have been only a handful of attempts to

define institutions and their relationship with ideas, and even that gives alternative
accounts of what institutions are and what they constitute. Schmidt (2008, p. 305),
who is among the pioneers of bringing an ideational dimension to new institution-
alism, defines institution as “meaning structures and constructs that are internal to
agents whose ‘background ideational abilities’ and ‘foreground discursive abilities’
make for a dynamic, agent-centered approach to institutional change.” In an idea-
tional context, as Schmidt (ibid., p. 304) elaborates, “institutions are therefore
internal to the actors, serving both as structures that constrain actors and as con-
structs created and changed by those actors.” Schmidt (ibid., p. 322) further explains
that in ideational institutionalism:
Agents’ background ideational abilities [what goes on in individuals’ minds as they come up
with new ideas] enable them to act in any given meaning context to create and maintain
institutions while their foreground discursive abilities [to reason, debate] enable them to
communicate critically about those institutions and so to change or maintain them.

This is why Schmidt prefers to label this as discursive institutionalism, instead of

ideational or constructivist, where ideas serve as substantive content of discourse and
discourse is needed for an interactive process to convey ideas. She (ibid., p. 314)
argues that in an ideational context, institutions are not only given but are also
contingent upon agents, and therefore they are “internal to the actors.” On the other
hand, Schmidt (ibid., p. 314) does not rule out the possibility of “agents to think,
speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, to deliberate
about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade one another to
change those institutions or to maintain them.” Schmidt (ibid., p. 316) continues to
make the case for the necessity of discourse for an ideational understanding to hold
that:
an interactive process is what enables agent to change institutions, because the deliberative
nature of discourse allows them to conceive of and talk about institutions as objects at a
distance, and to dissociate themselves from them even as they continue to use them.

Colin Hay prefers to call himself a constructivist institutionalist and argues along
somewhat similar lines to Schmidt but does not talk of institutions as internal and
rather considers them to be “codified systems of ideas and the practices they sustain”
Public Policy and Ideation 73

(Hay 2006, p. 65). In contrast to historical institutionalism, he talks of “ideational

path dependence,” whereby he argues “it is not just institutions, but the very ideas on
which they are predicated and which inform their design and development, that exert
constraints on political autonomy.” He continues that actors:
perception about what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable are shaped both by the
institutional environment in which they find themselves and by existing policy paradigms
and world-views. It is through such cognitive filters that strategic conduct is conceptualized
and ultimately assessed. (Hay 2006, p. 67)

Mark Blyth (2002), also among the ranks of the most influential ideational insti-
tutionalists, is mainly interested in the role of ideas in determining policy choice,
especially in crisis situation with a goal to decipher relationship between institutions,
interest, and ideas. For Blyth, ideas serve as blueprints for the design of new
institutions and “to reduce uncertainty, propose a particular solution to a moment
of crisis and empower agents to resolve that crisis by constructing new institutions in
line with these new ideas [emphasis added]” (Blyth 2002, pp. 10–11). While Blyth
does not subscribe to any particular adjective to distinguish himself, he is quite
critical of instrumental and functional treatment of ideas in the three established new
institutionalisms and contends “ideas have to be taken as more than an addendum to
institutions” (Blyth 1997, p. 246); he writes and continues, “they must be con-
ceptualized apart from pre-existing categories and epistemological commitments
and treated as an object of investigation in their own right.”
Although it is still in its nescient phase, ideational scholarship is not without
criticism, which is imposed from theorists inside as well as from outside institution-
alist scholarship. The most formidable of these criticisms comes from a fellow
neo-institutionalist Stephen Bell who sums up differences in ideational discourse
as varying “from postmodern accounts, where ideas, inter-subjective meanings and
discourse are primitive and wholly define or constitute social and institutional life, to
more ontological realist accounts, which admit that institutions and wider structures
can have real effects” (Bell 2011, p. 889). He argues that Schmidt in her thesis
“perceives only one dimension of the two-way dialectical interaction between agents
and institutions”, the latter he argues is “ontologically prior to the individuals who
populate them at any given time” (ibid., p. 891). Bell is right in pointing out the
weakness in Schmidt’s analysis but therein also highlights the key difference
between ideational institutionalism and the three established new institutionalisms.
In ideational institutionalism, it is neither the institution nor ideas that are conceived
ontologically prior to one or another. Rather, the design and development of
institutions are based on ideas, which once developed affect their subsequent
development as well as actors’ perceptions about what is feasible, legitimate,
possible, and desirable. In his defense of historical institutionalism, Bell (ibid.,
p. 899) conceives agents, institutions, structures, and ideas to be mutually con-
stitutive in a dialectical manner. In ideational institutionalism, however, ideas are
the blueprint of a dialectical relationship among agents, in effect becoming their
cognitive filters which they use to interpret environmental signals, with institutions
being built upon ideational foundations and structures serving as constraints shaping
74 A. I. Butt

options and strategies once formed but yet dependent on agent for its existence and
continuity. Bell’s third criticism is on the mechanism and origin of ideas in ideational
scholarship, as he writes, “ideas do not operate in a vacuum but are instead
‘embedded in a historical context and need institutional support to be effective'
(ibid., p. 891).” This criticism holds true in the sense that there is scant written
material either on the origin or the mechanism of ideas through which they operate, a
subject taken in more detail in subsequent section. Though limited in number,
substantial work does exist in discourse analysis on which the origin and mechanism
of ideas can be operationalized.
How are we then to define institutions in ideational institutionalism? The answer
may lie in looking for commonalities among ideational theorists. With slightly
differing accounts, the main commonalities among ideational institutionalists and
their major divergences from the three established new institutionalisms are primar-
ily three. Firstly, ideational institutionalists imply a dynamic understanding of the
relationship between institutions and agents in contrast to what Schmidt (2008,
p. 313) calls the “sticky” definition of the same by the three established new
institutionalisms, i.e., deterministic influence either through fixed rationalist prefer-
ences, self-reinforcing historical paths, or all-defining cultural norms. Secondly, and
related to the first difference, the three established new institutionalisms treat
institutions as given within which agents’ actions are dictated; therefore, they
serve mainly a constraining role conforming to a rule-following logic. This is one
of the main reasons that the three established schools of new institutionalism have
been better able to explain continuity but run into trouble when it comes to
explaining policy change and must resort to explanations of exogenous shocks,
dramatic events, or crisis situations. In ideational understanding, and as Schmidt
argues, institutions are not only constraining structures but also enabling constructs.
Furthermore, as Hay (2006, p. 65) elaborates, “institutions are built on ideational
foundations which exert an independent path dependent effect on their subsequent
development.” Finally, actors in ideational understanding are both strategic and
socialized, making their actions more flexible as their desires, preferences, and
motivations are not a contextually given fact but rather ideational toward the context
in which they are to be realized. In the words of Blyth (2002, p. 39), then it is ideas
that make interests actionable meaning interests start determining our behaviors
and/or decisions; or as Schmidt (2008, p. 303) argues that interests are neither
objective nor material as they are subjective ideas. Within this context, institutions
are thus defined as an interrelated collection of ideational constructs that is itself
affected by its institutional environment for its subsequent design and development.
Such constructs are internal to sentient agents that enable them to evolve, adopt, and
innovate, but together they constitute external structures serving primarily as con-
straints. For example, they may be thought to embed history and political thought
and to reflect, therefore, a set of traditions and practices, whether written or unwrit-
ten. Institutions thus can be interpreted as reflecting habits and norms, more likely to
evolve than to be created. However, institutions also may be seen as architecture and
as rules that determine opportunities and incentives for behavior, inclusion and
exclusion of potential players, and structuring the relative ease or difficulty of
Public Policy and Ideation 75

inducing change and the mechanisms through which change may be facilitated or
denied. In contrast with rational choice institutionalism where rational actors pursue
preferences following a “logic of calculation” or in historical institutionalism in
which regularized patterns and routines are the result of agents acting according to
“logic of path dependence” or in sociological institutionalism where actions are
response to socially constituted and culturally framed actions as outcomes of “logic
of appropriateness,”, agents in ideational institutionalism are salient and socialized
who devise, deliberate, and legitimize their actions according to the “logic of
discourse.”

5 Ideational Framework of Public Policy

John Campbell (1998, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010) has made important advancements
in studying the effects of ideas on policy making outcomes. In his first major
publication on the subject, Campbell (1998) sharpens the concept of ideas and
their effect on policy making, building upon the work of Peter Hall. He compares
existing insights on ideas in historical institutionalism and organizational institu-
tionalism to create a typology of ideas based on structural dimensions of normative
and cognitive levels, which he considers to operate both explicitly in the foreground
and as underlying assumptions in the background of policy debates (1998, p. 385).
Campbell’s (1998) typology consists of four distinct types of ideas, namely, pro-
grams operating at the foreground compared with paradigms functioning in the
background at the cognitive level and frames in the foreground as opposed to public
sentiments in the background at the normative level of public making. Campbell
(1998, p. 386) defines programmatic ideas, which are at the forefront of policy
debates, as concrete solutions “that specify cause-and-effect relationships and pre-
scribe course of policy action.” Ideas as paradigms, which also operate at the
cognitive level, reside in the background of policy debate and are the “underlying
theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works” (ibid., p. 389).
At the normative level of the policy debate, an idea as public sentiment “consists of
broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is desirable or not” that
work at the background (ibid., p. 392). Ideas as frames are symbols and concepts
also normative in their orientation but residing in the foreground of the policy debate
through which policy makers “appropriate and manipulate public sentiments for
their own purpose” (ibid., p. 394). Through empirical cases from the United States,
Campbell (1998) then makes a case that different types of ideas, as identified by their
structural features, have different effects on policy making.
Campbell’s (1998) work provides a passionate analysis of what we mean by ideas
and how they affect policy making outcomes. It also advances the argument that
ideas, as opposed to historical institutionalism, are not just constraints on actors,
limiting their possibilities for action, but are also enabling factors that generate
solutions for problems (ibid., p. 382). Campbell (ibid., p. 383) also advances
historical institutionalism in its approach of treating ideas through normative lenses
only and brings insights from organizational institutionalism to add a cognitive
76 A. I. Butt

dimension offering a more dynamic theory of action. Importantly, and in contrast to

Peter Hall and more generally to new institutionalism’s inability to appreciate
agency [who said what to whom] over structures [what is said or where and how],
Campbell (1998) has given considerable credence to actors, as is the case in
ideational institutionalism, and their ability to “self-consciously devise solutions to
their problems by deliberately manipulating explicit, culturally given concepts that
reside in the cognitive foreground.” However, Campbell (2004) sees ideas and
interests distinctively and is interested in the interaction of the two rather than seeing
one shaping the other. In a subsequent article in 2002, Campbell (pp. 21–38)
endorsed another type of idea to the existing typology of ideas, which he calls it
world culture. He (Campbell 2002, pp. 21–38) explains it as either a cognitive
paradigm or normative framework or a combination thereof with its ability to be
diffused around the world and homogenizing national political institutions and
policy making apparatuses. Campbell’s (1998) typology of ideas and theoretical
framework, which brings agent and agency back into institutional scholarship, are
important contributions in delineating mechanism through which ideas affect policy
making outcomes as well as in terms of bringing overall conceptual clarity. In his
more recent article on ideas and their influence on policy making, Campbell (2008)
agrees, “Interests are just another type of idea,” which are “rooted in people’s
perceptions of their material situations.” This is an important concession and one
that constructivists have been emphasizing in their ideational analysis. Hay (2006,
p. 64) writes, “[Actors] desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually
given fact—a reflection of material or even social circumstances—but are irredeem-
ably ideational, reflecting a normative orientation towards the context in which they
will have to be realised.” Interests, therefore, whether public or private, are social
constructions.
While constructing discursive institutionalism, Vivien Schmidt (2008, p. 303,
321) combines the work of Peter Hall and John Campbell and sees ideas to exist at
three levels—policies, programs, and philosophies—and categorizes them, at each
level, into two types of ideas, cognitive [constitutive of interests] and normative
[which appeal to values]. She does not ascribe to particular titles for the two types of
ideas at these three levels; rather, she provides their descriptive understanding.
Schmidt (2008, p. 306) talks of cognitive ideas at a policy level to offer solutions
to the problem at hand, at the programmatic level to define the problem to be solved
and identify the methods by which to solve them, and finally at the philosophical
level to mesh solution and definition of problems with deeper core of principles and
norms of relevant scientific disciplines or technical practice. Similarly, normative
ideas at the policy and program levels meet the aspirations and ideals of the general
public and at the philosophical level resonate with a deeper core of principles and
norms of public life (ibid., p. 307). Instead of seeing ideas in the background of
policy debates or located in the foreground as Campbell distinguishes them in his
typology, Schmidt (ibid., p. 314) instead talks of “background ideational abilities”
that are internal to agents for creating and maintaining institutions and “foreground
discursive abilities” for communicating to either continue or change within those
institutions. The synthesis provided by Schmidt (2008) on different types and levels
Public Policy and Ideation 77

of ideas combines distinctions that are rarely contested in the study of ideas and their
effect on public policy outcomes (see Allmendinger 2011, p. 46; Wentzel 2011,
p. 33). More so, Schmidt’s (2012, pp. 86–87) typology does not discount the role of
interests, as she sees agent’s ideas also as response to “material (and not so material)
realities, which affect them including material events and pressures.” Rather than
making a distinction between the two, Schmidt’s typology mixes the instrumental
and material dimensions of ideas and ascribes cognitive ideas to “provide the
recipes, guidelines, and maps for political action and serve to justify policies and
programs by speaking to their interest-based logic and necessity” (Schmidt 2008,
p. 306). This does little to bring clarity to different types of ideas when cognitive
ideas are seen to “provide robust solutions” as well as be “constitutive of interests.”
This essentially necessitates advancing the agenda beyond its typical distinction
between normative and cognitive ideas and clearly distinguishing the instrumental,
material, and value dimensions of ideas from one and other.
Referring back to Campbell’s (1998) typology while holding this belief that ideas
create interests, a material dimension could be added in addition to the two levels of
normative and cognitive ideas. Campbell’s (1998) first dimension consists of cog-
nitive ideas that specify causal relationships, and the second dimension is of
normative ideas, which specifies how things ought to be. The second dimension
comprises the locus of the current debate, whether it is at the foreground or in the
background of the policy debate. Campbell (ibid., p. 167) concedes that there is
slippage between cognitive and normative ideas and between foreground and back-
ground ideas and those in the background may shift into the foreground over time.
Campbell (ibid., p. 168) further argues, “The two dimensions from which the four
types are derived are probably more akin to continua than to rigid dichotomies.”
Building on these lines, another dimension—the material level—is added to
Campbell’s typology. The material level at the foreground of the policy debate
will be composed of “contested interests” as social and political constructions,
which give legitimacy to certain actions over others, and constituted of “private
interests” in the background, which are conceptions of self-interest when policies are
conceived and decided upon (see Table 1).

6 Policy as Discourse

The fundamental claim of ideational institutionalism and also its point of departure
from the three established schools of new institutionalism is that actors’ desires,
preferences, and motivations are not predetermined through rationalist preferences,
historical paths, or cultural norms but are irredeemably ideational reflecting subjec-
tive orientation toward the context in which they will have to be realized. This is also
the focus of the policy-as-discourse theorists whose starting place for policy analysis
is not the “problem” but problematization (Kritzman 1988, p. 257). In Goodwin’s
words, according to the policy-as-discourse approach, policies are not framed in
response to existing conditions and problems “but more as a discourse in which both
78 A. I. Butt

Table 1 Ideational framework of public policy: types of ideas and their effect on policy making
Types of ideas in the foreground of Types of ideas in the background of
policy formulation policy formulation
Cognitive Programmatic ideas: Paradigmatic ideas:
level Ideas as elite policy prescriptions that Ideas as elite assumptions that constrain
help policy makers to chart a clear and the cognitive range of useful solutions
specific course of policy action available to policy makers
Normative Public notions: Public sentiments:
level Ideas as public notions of ideal public Ideas as assumptions of public senti-
policy solutions that specify policy ments that constrain the normative
actions for policy makers or on the basis range of legitimate solutions available
of which they legitimize proposed policy to policy makers
action
Material Contest-interested ideas: Self-interested ideas:
level Ideas as outcomes of politics of interests Ideas as subjective interpretation of
between contending interest groups self-interest by which policy makers
evaluate the relative merits of
contending potential course of actions
Reformulation of Campbell’s typology of ideas (1998, p. 385)

problems and solutions are created” (Goodwin 1996, p. 67). This is also a key
objective of discourse theory to elucidate carefully problematized objects of study by
seeking their description, understanding, and interpretation. This implies that the
types of ideas, as described in the ideational framework, not only affect the course of
the policy process but also are the basis of proposed public policy solutions and their
eventual outcomes.
Institutions, in ideational institutionalism, are internal to sentient agents that serve
both as structures that constrain action as well as constructs created and changed by
those actors. These sentient agents are strategists who favor certain strategies over
others while seeking to realize their policy goals. Actors’ orientation toward their
environment, therefore, is based on their perception of the context in which they seek
to realize their policy goals. Change in ideational institutionalism, as argued by Hay
and Wincott (1998, p. 955), “is seen as the consequence (whether intended or
unintended) of strategic action (whether intuitive or instrumental), filtered through
perceptions (however informed or misinformed) of an institutional context that
favours certain strategies, actors perceptions over others.” These perceptions serve
as cognitive filters through which actors conceptualize and assess potential merits
and demerits of contending course of policy actions as to what is feasible, legitimize,
possible, and desirable (Hay and Wincott 1998, p. 956). Béland argues that such
cognitive filters concern “both self-perceptions and the framing processes that actors
use to convince others that it is in their interest to mobilise with them in order to
reach shared goals and have an impact on outcomes” (Béland 2010, p. 148). This is
one of the central contentions of ideational institutionalism that “ideas shape how we
understand political problems, give definition to our goals and strategies, and are the
currency we use to communicate about politics” (Béland and Cox 2011, p. 3). Both
argue that ideas “embrace thoughts, emotions, desires, as well as interests, all in
Public Policy and Ideation 79

delicate and fluid balance with one another” (ibid., p. 11). It is contended that it is not
just a rational pursuit of actors for maximizing their self-interest; dictation of their
actions through symbolic systems, cognitive scripts, or moral templates; or even
their dependency on enduring legacies but essentially an interplay of myriad ideas
that have cognitive, normative, and material characteristics. This distinction of ideas,
their interaction with one another, and the stable system they form together to serve
as criteria for evaluation for different courses of policy actions are aptly summed up
by Corina Barbaros (2012, p. 114) when she distinguishes between three types of
ideas as those that have:
(. . .) primarily, a cognitive character being descriptions of social political, economic situ-
ations and tools for understanding how things work (. . .) a normative nature which consists
in ideals, values and norms that define what is good or bad (. . .) [and] a third category of
ideas that regards the desires that form people’s preferences.

She further asserts that “it is important to distinguish between these three types of
ideas, but they are different just in analytical sense, in discursive and perceptual
reality they not only interact but form stable systems” (Barbaros 2012, p. 114).
These basic claims about the effect of ideas on the process and outcome of public
policy can be ascertained with the help of the methodological approach of policy as
discourse. Carol Bacchi (2000, p. 45), one of the frontrunners to have taken up this
approach to policy analysis, asserts that with such an understanding, the implication
is “that no one stands outside discourse.” This particular viewpoint is based on the
rejection of neopositivist and realist explanations that correspond to objective
realities “out there” in the world (Fischer 2003, p. 21). The roots of the approach
policy as discourse are connected with post-empiricism, the theoretical development
of which has been outside of policy studies, in particular social constructionism,
critical theory, and poststructuralism (ibid., p. 21). Its premise, as Bacchi (2000,
p. 48) explains, is based on the understanding that “problems are ‘created’ or ‘given
shape’ in the very policy proposal that are offered as ‘responses’.” The policy-as-
discourse approach starts with the assumption, writes Goodwin, that “all actions,
objects and practices are socially meaningful and that the interpretation of meaning
is shaped by the social and political struggle in specific socio-political context”
(Goodwin 2012, p. 29). Thus, both the policy process and its outcomes are cultural
products and context specific. Theorists who subscribe to the idea of analyzing
policy as discourse draw on the work of Michel Foucault on the conceptualization
of discourse and apply it to policy. In Foucault’s conception, discourse entails
“practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak; they do not
justify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of doing so conceal their own
invention” (Foucault’s 1972, p. 49).
In policy studies, the aim of discourse analysis is to show how actions and objects
come to be socially constructed and what they mean for social organization and
interaction. A policy-as-discourse approach can then be understood as an attempt to
understand the means by which social processes and interactions shape different
realities (Shaw 2010, p. 200). It enables researchers, practitioners, and implementers
of policy decisions to see how discourses in policy construction legitimize certain
80 A. I. Butt

possibilities for thinking and acting while tacitly excluding others. It is argued that
conceptualizing policy as discourse offers opportunities for those with a vested
interest in policy to reach the parts that other theories and methods can’t reach
(Daugherty and Ecclestone 2006, p. 153). The analytical focus on policy as dis-
course can “enable deconstruction of the apparent neutrality and objectivity of the
stories that sustain policies and the explicit or implicit rules that validate them
(Phoenix 2009, p. 65).” To view policy as discourse is essentially seeing policies
as product of ideas. If ideas are understood as the basis for policy decisions, they
themselves are the product of discourse, which also serves as the communicative and
coordinative vehicle for framing particular set of policy solutions above others. The
distinctive aspect of the policy-as-discourse approach is that it can be understood
both as a research method and a political activity.
The ideational framework of public policy presented in the previous sections
allows for the categorization of different types of ideas as per their influence on the
policy process and its outcomes. With the application of the policy-as-discourse
approach, the analysis of public policy process and its outcomes would focus on
three interrelated facets that constitute institutions and form the basis of ideas.
Namely, these three distinct facets are text, agency, and the structural context.
Analysis of the text [what is said] will provide an interpretation of ideas as defined
by social and intersubjective production of meaning, whereas agency [who said what
to whom] will inform us of interactively acquired or constituted identities of different
actors involved in the decision-making process. Inquiry into the structural context
[where, when, how, and why it was said] will explore processes by which meaning is
assigned and disseminated and the ability of the actors in constructing agenda,
conceptualizing problems, and rendering the uncertain certain. Structural context
will also look into the processes and their dispersion in construction of meaning and
identities and configuration of power. In the ideational framework of public policy,
analysis of text helps us in determining the value dimension of decision-making, and
analysis of relationships between language and power and of language, thought, and
knowledge within the structural context enables us to position public policy outcomes
on the material and instrumental dimensions, respectively. The analysis of structural
context informs us of the degree of politics of interests or contestation, whereas the
study of actors’ identities helps us to contrast public policy outcomes between
different dimensions of the ideational framework.

7 Concluding Thoughts

Policy as discourse, as with other forms of discourse analysis, involves exploring the
process of meaning creation. Shaw (2010, p. 202) writes, “A policy-as-discourse
analysis incorporates qualitative methods to illuminate the processes whereby reality
comes into being.” Russell et al. argue the same and assert, “Making visible the role
of language, argument and discourse in policy discussions has the potential to play
an emancipatory role in giving policy makers new insights into their work, and
Public Policy and Ideation 81

increasing awareness of the conditions that shape their actions and choices” (Russell
et al. 2008, p. 45). For the authors “policy-making in practice depends crucially on
what is said, by whom, and on whether others find their arguments persuasive” and,
therefore, “require a framework of ideas that addresses the role of language, argu-
ment and discourse” (Russell et al. 2008, p. 41). Their basic thesis calls for analyzing
policy problems qualitatively and in their social and political context. The main
purpose here is to advance the scholarship on policy studies with an interest in ideas
and discourse for overcoming theoretical shortcomings. While much of the scholar-
ship is in its nascent stage, essential features of ideational institutionalism are laid out
in this chapter by introducing an ideational framework of public policy, which
combines cognitive, normative, and material dimensions behind a policy decision.
In contrast to the dominant influence of economics and its positivist scientific
methodologies, the development of the field of policy studies, and its theorization,
requires a multidisciplinary methodological perspective. By considering interests as
just another type of ideas, the ideational framework of public policy is an effort to
specify the relationship between ideas and interests. Positivist methodologies are
inadequate in dealing with the complexity and subjectivity of policy making pro-
cesses. Their quest for a single objective reality is neglectful of politics, which is
primarily an interpretive and value-driven exercise. This chapter reiterates the post-
positivist agenda for future research to study into the role of ideas in shaping
expectations of policy actors and influencing policy process.
For empirical researchers, Peter John writes, “Theory in social sciences is usually
based on claims about the nature of human action and power relationship, and seeks
to provide a coherent and consistent account of reality” (John 2003, p. 482). At a
broader level, perhaps then a theory is essentially “a set of analytical principles
designed to structure our observations and explanation of the world” (Cairney
2012, p. 5). However, due to the complexity of the policy process that spans over
many disciplines and their subfields, there is an absence of a commonly accepted,
clearly articulated, and empirically verified theory of public policy (Sabatier 1991,
p. 153). The nature of explanation in the policy and planning sciences, writes Frank
Fischer (2003, p. 21), “is scarcely straightforward” to serve as basis for guiding social
action as it can take numerous forms where no one form is privileged over another. If
there is a way out of this for theorists and researchers to this seemingly endless variety
of processes to observe, argues John (2003, p. 487), it is in developing a framework
with the ability to conceptualize the relationship between core causal processes. The
account provided by the proposed ideational framework rests on discursive means
and practices that are originated and constituted by “text,” “agency,” and the “struc-
tural context” and result in the construction of ideas. As Schmidt (2008, p. 305)
writes, discourse is not just text but also context and not only refers to structure but
also to agency. These ideational constructs, in turn, become the basis for policy
decisions, central to how policy makers conceive and evaluate their options and how
and what they decide. Institutions, in ideational understanding, are then collection of
these interrelated ideational constructs that are themselves affected by its institutional
environment for their subsequent design and development. Ideational institutional-
ism, it is contended, has the capacity to inform an endogenous account of complex
82 A. I. Butt

institutional evolution, continuation, adaptation, and innovation. This basic claim is

tested later in the book by studying one of the social sector legislations—the Right to
Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012—enacted in Pakistan.

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Atif Ikram Butt has a doctorate degree in International Development Studies from Ruhr Univer-
sity Bochum, Germany. His doctoral research explores the concept of ideation and its influence on
policy making. He currently heads the Center for Communication Programs Pakistan as Executive
Director. He has nearly 20 years of leadership experience in social and behavior change with
renowned international aid and humanitarian organizations including the Department for Interna-
tional Development, the German Society for International Cooperation, the International Labor
Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the Johns Hopkins University and the
United Nations Children’s Fund. He is also a visiting faculty at the Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Institute of Science and Technology (SZABIST) and the Information Service Academy, Pakistan.
 Part II
Case Studies
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public
Policy Research in Colombia

Juan David Rivera Acevedo, Jorge Sellare, and Lina Martínez

1 Introduction

The history of public policy as an academic discipline is an issue not often debated in
the literature. However, as in any other discipline, it is important to trace back its
roots to understand how it has evolved throughout the years and how it has been
structured as a field of research. The history of public policy is of particular interest
because the field has, by definition, direct linkages to the “real world” and thus
focuses on how theoretical academic knowledge can be used to promote social
change.
Although mankind has been conducting policy analysis and giving policy rec-
ommendations in one form or another since ancient times, it was only in the late
1960s that the first schools of public policy started emerging. In the United States,
this was clearly a response to the growing demand for highly specialized and
meticulously trained analysts who could aid the government in improving its
performance. Therefore, although the field uses knowledge from other sciences as
an input, such as from economics and political science, the study of public policy
distinguishes itself from other disciplines because it is intrinsically problem-
oriented, multidisciplinary, and value-oriented (Goodin 2008).
It can be misleading to assume that the emergence of public policy as an academic
discipline followed a similar process to the one that occurred in the United States.

J. D. Rivera Acevedo (*)

DB CARGO AG, Mainz, Germany
J. Sellare
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Georg-August-University
Göttingen – GRK 1666 “GlobalFood”, Göttingen, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]
L. Martínez
POLIS (Observatory of Public Policies), Universidad Icesi, Cali, Colombia
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 87

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_6
88 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

Since the origin of academic thought on public policy seems to be related to political
processes and needs, its emergence is likely to be country-specific or, at least, region-
specific. For this reason, to find out how the discipline originated, a historical
analysis focusing on the most influential political actors is required.
In this chapter, we aim to analyze the rise of public policy as an academic
discipline in Colombia and how it is related to multilateral financial and develop-
ment organizations and to actors from the agricultural sector, traditionally the
biggest sector in the Colombian economy. Because of the history of the country
and its position in the world economy, we hypothesize that despite the importance of
the sector for the national economy, the policies that were implemented were a
by-product of outside influence for many decades. It was only when Colombia
acquired more autonomy in the international scene, especially in the capital markets,
that a need to develop a system for designing and understanding policy was
identified, which created the still incipient demand for public policy schools.
To undertake this analysis, we use a historical approach starting from the devel-
opment of policy-making from the beginning of the twentieth century and continu-
ing to the 2000s when public policy emerged as an academic field. We have
reviewed historical documents and analyses in order to reconstruct the decision-
making rationale and respond to the following questions: How has policy-making
evolved in the country? Who have been the main actors? When did public policy
emerge as an academic field?
In the following section, we will present the main ideas advocated by inter-
national organizations to promote financial stability and development in the devel-
oping world, especially in Latin America. Subsequently, in Sects. 3 and 4, we will
examine the history of agriculture in Colombia focusing on how its most important
institutions were developed and analyze how agricultural policy needs were thought
of in the Development Plans after 1970. Lastly, we will conclude by verifying what
role academia played in designing policies for the agricultural sector.

2 International Organizations and Ideas for Development

Under the mercantilist economic structure, Colombia and other colonies traded,
almost exclusively, with their mother country, providing food and raw materials.
Independence, however, brought a bigger trade network, new governments, and new
economic models. During the early postcolonial era, Colombia and other Latin-
American countries tried to specialize according to their comparative advantages,
but the opening to the international economy did not bring the expected growth
(Prados de la Escosura 2005). Additionally, the lack of infrastructure prevented any
industrial development during this period, which was the reason why raw materials
remained the “mainstay” of Latin-American trade (Albert and Society 1983).
Because World War I significantly reduced the supply of manufactured goods
from Europe and the United States, the Latin-American countries were forced to
produce some industrial goods to face the limitations of the recession. After the war
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 89

ended, these new, unprotected industries could not compete with the global supply
and went bankrupt. The 1930s Great Depression brought a second opportunity for
industrialization in Latin America, but narrow macroeconomic policies and the open
market hampered the success of this goal. Only a handful of industries in the biggest
Latin-American countries survived (Heenan and Lamontagne 2002).
It was only after World War II that Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI)
became a deliberated policy for economic development among Latin-American
countries. The theoretical foundation of ISI can be traced to the Argentine economist
Raúl Prebisch and to the creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA). ISI was advocated for as a policy that would lead Latin-American countries
to greater self-sufficiency and create independent economies capable of handling the
fluctuations of international trade (Prebisch 1959). Most of the countries of Latin
America, including Colombia, accepted the ECLA analysis and embraced the
proposed policy (Baer 1972).
The ISI policies were prejudiced against traditional sectors of the economy; the
investment of capital resources targeted mainly infant industries, which reduced the
capital available for agricultural innovation. Furthermore, overvalued exchange rates
favored the import of inputs for the industry, but severely harmed the agricultural
field’s competitiveness by increasing the opportunity cost of exports. At the same
time, higher industrial prices and price controls of agricultural goods turned the
internal trade against domestic agriculture (Baer 1972).
Paradoxically, while the intention of the policies was to strengthen the economies
to be independent and capable of handling the fluctuations of international trade, the
result was that Colombia and other Latin-American countries were in a new and
riskier dependency relationship with industrial countries. As Baer explained:
In former times, a decline in export receipts acted as a stimulus to ISI. Under the circum-
stances, a decline in export receipts not counterbalanced by capital inflows can result in
forced import curtailments which, in turn, could cause an industrial recession. Such results
have been experienced by Argentina and Colombia, and other countries face the same
danger. (1972, p. 106)

Latin-American countries remained dependent on the world economy and were

unable to escape the influence of foreign markets and finance (Heenan and
Lamontagne 2002). Furthermore, the ISI policy created a low labor absorption
rate. Cheap credit was channeled into favored industries. At the same time, though,
labor legislations were passed in several countries to guarantee high industrial
wages, which resulted in incentives to not adopt labor-intense techniques of pro-
duction. This fact neglected the expansion of certain sectors, such as low-income
housing, transportation, agriculture, and other infrastructure facilities, which led to
the countries facing severe bottlenecks (Baer 1972; Franko 2007).
While Latin-American countries were trying to implement ISI, the industrialized
nations were rebuilding the international monetary system by creating International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (IBRD), today’s World Bank Group. During its early years, the IMF showed
less interest in developing countries and focused primarily on developed states.
90 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

However, the IMF underwent a structural transformation over time. Babb and Buira
identified three phases of transformation and increased conditionality (2004). The
initial phase was the establishment of fiscal and monetary conditions toward the
balance of payments (see Babb and Buira 2004, p. 7; Mussa and Savastano 1999,
p. 82). The second phase introduced the right to pursue policy reforms in debtor
nations (Doyle 2012). Finally, the third phase led to the introduction of liberalizing
governance, the adoption of the Washington Consensus, and other reforms since the
1980s (Babb and Buira 2004).
The eruption of the Third World Debt Crisis in 1982 eradicated the ideals of
material abundance and social welfare in Colombia and other Latin-American
countries (Herrera and Acevedo 2004). The IMF played an instrumental role in
preventing a greater disaster by keeping the governments from defaulting. At the
same time, the Fund required banks to grant loans and restructure their existing debt
(Babb and Buira 2004).
From 1982 on, the IMF began to require structural reforms that aimed at the
fundamental transformation of the underlying institutions governing national econ-
omies (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2011; Doyle 2012).
The structural conditionality of the IMF was based on the premise that the best
recipe for growth lies in the market liberalization, privatization, monetary stability,
and reduction of the role of the state, regardless of the constitutional, structural, and
regulatory framework and capabilities of the countries (Stiglitz 2003).
The IMF and Colombia had a very close relationship from 1999 to 2006. The
Colombian government had regular meetings with the IMF staff to verify the progress
of the conditions imposed to access the loans. Particularly during the economic crisis
of 1999, the conditions included macroeconomic and financial policies, fiscal policy
adjustment, monetary and exchange rate policies, financial sector restructuration,
external sector policies, structural reforms, and social and anti-drug policies. The
nature of this condition can be verified in the Letters of Intention (LOI) from
Colombia to the IMF. The conditions changed over the years, but the targets remained
the same. Only after October 2006 was Colombia able to gain access to the sovereign
bonds market at payable interest rates and reduce the influence of the IMF on internal
policies.

3 The Agricultural Sector and Its Relevance

in the Colombian Policy-Making Process

3.1 The Rise of Agricultural Organizations and Financial

Institutions

At the turn of the twentieth century, Colombian politics were going against the
mainstream liberal economic approach that was being followed in Latin America.
While other countries in the region were enjoying the benefits of massive foreign
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 91

investment and increased exports, Colombia was going through a civil war that culmi-
nated in the Conservative Hegemony, the period between 1886 and 1930 in which a
conservative and interventionist state was in force (Bergquist 1981; Posada 2002). Its
strong opposition to liberal ideas alongside fluctuations in the international price of
coffee, destruction of the infrastructure needed for the transportation of commodities,
and the utilization of resources from the National Bank to finance the army left the
country in an impaired economic situation (Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).
With the closure of the Congress in the beginning of the 1900s, the liberal
opposition grew stronger. In this context, the SAC (Colombian Farmers Association)
was created as a guild that would advocate for the interests of the agricultural sector
and its supporting industries, promoting public debates and the integration between
producers (Bejarano 1985). Throughout its existence, the SAC has been an impor-
tant actor in the development of the agricultural sector, currently working as a
consultative body for the government on agricultural issues through its participation
in a number of commissions and technical councils. According to the organization, it
represents the interests of 31 of the main guilds of the agroindustry, which together
account for 80% of the GDP of the sector (SAC 2013).
The liberals progressively gained more political space throughout the first 30 years
of the twentieth century, but when they finally rose back to power in 1930, the world
was going through the Great Depression, and, in order to overcome the economic
crisis, they had to hold back their reformist drive and conform to some extent to the
idea of a centralist and interventionist state. However, if the liberal government had
some constraints at the macroeconomic level, it had the possibility to promote
significant reforms on internal issues, such as education. The new universal and
secular educational system proposed by the liberals gave farmers better conditions
to deal with new and more technical methods to grow crops according to their needs
(Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002). In addition, Bejarano points out that the promotion
of infrastructure development helped link farmers to markets, urbanization created a
demand for new agricultural products in the cities, and the protectionism boosted the
expansion of some crops (1985).
The growing importance of coffee in the Colombian economy and the coordinated
representation of farmers by the SAC and by the Federation of Coffee Growers gave
these actors more power to influence politics on the macro level. During the 1930s,
these actors successfully opposed the government at least three times. The Federation
of Coffee Growers made the government of Enrique Olaya devaluate the peso to
make coffee more competitive in the international market, as opposed the Brazilian
proposal to regulate the market, which showed that the Colombian coffee growers
wanted to establish their commercial policies by themselves and influenced the tax
reforms from López Pumarejo’s government to benefit the coffee regions
(Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).1

1
The available literature about the SAC and its effectiveness as a pressure group is scattered and
sometimes contradictory. While some scholars challenge the importance of gremios in influencing
policy-making, others stress the importance of the political elements of these agricultural groups,
92 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

Just like other sectors in the economy, agriculture depends heavily on well-
established financial institutions to support the investments in the sector and thus
its development. Colombia entered the twentieth century with hyperinflation,
reaching 398.9% in 1901, which greatly devalued the Colombian peso. This situa-
tion was mainly caused by an ineffective National Bank that was indiscriminately
issuing money to finance the government’s expenses during the Thousand Days War
since the government could not access international credit due to its failure to pay its
debts (Meisel 1990). In order to help Colombia overcome its financial crisis, the
government asked the State Department of the United States for financial advisory
help, which was provided in 1923 by the Kemmerer Mission, led by Professor
Edwin W. Kemmerer. The recommendations made by the Mission resulted in the
creation of the Bank of the Republic, the implementation of new budgetary laws and
controls, and the establishment of modern supervision and administration of banks,
customs, and duties (Seidel 1972).
The creation of a Central Bank was possible thanks to the Thomson-Urrutia
Treaty, which ensured that Colombia received 25 million dollars as compensation
for the loss of Panama. This compensation required, however, that Colombia create a
Central Bank that should collect the old paper currency that had previously been
issued and facilitate the country’s return to the gold standard, which Colombia had
abandoned during the 1880s. At that moment, a new financial system was
established with commercial banks that revolved around the Bank of the Republic
and provided differentiated discount rates to finance specific sectors of the economy
(Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002).
Due to the poor economic situation caused by the 1929 crisis and because of
pressure to create public banks to fund the debtors in the agricultural sector, the
government created the Colombian Credit Corporation and the Agrarian Fund. Also
during this time, the Bank of the Republic was reformed to include two new seats on
its Board of Directors that were given to representatives of the agricultural sector:
one to the SAC and the other to the Federation of Coffee Growers. This financial
structure would last in Colombia until the second half of the twentieth century
(Kalmanovitz and Avella 1998; Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2002). However, the
presence of these actors in the political arena and access to credit did not translate
into a competitive advantage for the largest commodity producers.
It was during the second and third decades of the twentieth century that Colombia
recovered access to international credit with the opening of branches of foreign
banks. At the same time, the government created various financial institutions in an
attempt to attract long-term foreign credit, which, given the gold standard, would
translate into lower interest rates (Mora Cuartas et al. 2011; Kalmanovitz and Enciso

especially in the first half of the twentieth century (e.g., Machado 2001). The most prominent study
on the history of the SAC is arguably the one conducted by Bejarano (1985) under a request from
the SAC itself. Regarding the agrarian reform, the information about the position of the SAC is not
completely uniform either. Although most scholars argue that the SAC opposed land reform
presents evidence of directors of the SAC arguing in favor of the agrarian reform, which at the
very least shows that there were divergent opinions within guilds.
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 93

2002). The Colombian Credit Corporation, the Agrarian Fund, and, more recently,
FINAGRO are among the public and private institutions that were established to
support the development of the agricultural sector.
Alongside the creation of financial institutions, this sector was the recipient of
subsidies that were overwhelmingly collected by those who are well-off. In most of
the cases, subsidies are planned to be temporary measures to provide producers
income support to overcome time-specific circumstances. Nevertheless, subsidies
tend to become institutionalized, in particular those beneficiating coffee growers
(World Bank 2003).

3.2 Coffee Grower’s Contributions to Social Policies

In Colombia, policy formulation for the agricultural sector is a central element in the
formulation of long-term government plans. It is highly important not just in
response to the protagonist role that key players have taken, but also because the
economic dynamic of this sector directly benefits the rural population (Moreno
et al.). The Coffee Growers Federation has greatly influenced policy-making in
Colombia and has been able to influence policies that directly benefit its sector.
However, the full picture would be incomplete if one does not take into account the
Federation’s important contribution to the social development of the coffee regions,
in particular in the design and implementation of educational policies.
For more than 40 years, the Coffee Growers Federation has been investing
heavily in improving the educational system for more than 500,000 families in the
coffee region. The rationale of this intervention is the increase in human capital and
educational levels to ensure that coffee growers are able to adopt technological
changes to make them more competitive and improve their quality of life. The
scope of this intervention includes partnerships with the government to improve
school infrastructure, the development of educational methodologies (escuela nueva
y posprimaria) to improve the educational outcomes of farmers, and the creation of
centers of higher education. All of these strategies, in particular those that have been
developed in elementary schools, significantly improved the educational outcomes
of coffee growers’ families (CRECE 1999).
Among the major contributions of the implementation of this strategy, there have
been an increase of educational access, expanding access to more than 12,000
students in rural areas; an increase in more than 5 years of average schooling for
the new coffee growers generation (CRECE 1999); and a significant increase in
educational quality as measured by scores on standardized tests (UNESCO 1998;
Bogoya Maldonado 2001). Evaluations of the educational system implemented in
partnership with the Coffee Growers Federation indicate that educational programs
using the methodology developed for coffee regions are more cost-effective in terms
of access, survival, and learning. This strategy has also been shown to have an
impact on productivity and in creating incentives for young coffee growers to stay in
the coffee industry instead of migrating to urban settings (Moore et al. 2010).
94 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

4 Actors and Ideologies Behind the Colombian

Development Plans

4.1 Early Socioeconomic Planning

The Colombian economy continued to grow, boosted by the high price of coffee in
the international market that persisted until the 1950s. While the prices for coffee
were high, the government was exercising rigid control on international trade by
increasing tariffs, a measure that was contrary to the general trend established by the
Bretton Woods Agreement. With the fall of coffee prices in 1955, Colombia
experienced a severe economic crisis, leading to an increase of the external debt, a
decrease in access to credit, and political instability. In order to overcome the
economic and political crisis, the liberal and the conservative parties made a
coalition called Frente Nacional that lasted from 1958 until 1974 and implemented
the mechanism of development planning, which included the commitment to insti-
tute a land reform process. During this period, the economic policies implemented
had a very interventionist character, granting subsidized credit to both the agricul-
tural and industrial sectors and aiming to meet the demands for public services
(Kalmanovitz and Enciso 2003).
Kalmanovitz and Enciso (2003) further argue that the debates about the agricul-
tural sector were based on the diagnosis made by a mission from the IBRD (Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development) led by Lauchlin Currie. The
mission identified a disproportionate relationship between the number of inhabitants
in rural areas and their productivity, mainly because of sub-utilization of the most
fertile land. One of the main recommendations given by Currie’s team was to tax the
ownership of the land progressively, in order to push tenants to either intensify their
productivity or to sell underutilized lands to reduce the taxes that had to be paid. In
addition, Currie proposed incentives to increase migration from the fields to the city,
because he believed that agricultural production could be increased and become more
competitive without any additional labor by using more modern techniques and
achieving economies of scale. However, the government declined Currie’s proposal
and opted for the Plan Decenal, which was based on the ECLA’s ideas.
Due to high unemployment, growing tensions in rural areas, and the appearance
of guerrilla groups, development was thought in terms of changing rural structures,
i.e., to reduce the income differences between rural and urban populations through
redistribution of social benefits and promotion of land reform, thus keeping the
population in the rural areas.
From 1970 on, each government had to present its own development plan for the
country. The first development plan, presented by Pastrana Borrero (DNP 1970),
was based on Currie’s idea that growth could be achieved by supporting the
construction sector and by aiming production at the international market, matching
it with a more egalitarian distribution of income. In contrast, the following devel-
opment plan, from López Michelsen (DNP 1975), had a critical view of the inter-
ventionist character that the state had been presenting since the Great Depression and
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 95

proposed fighting social inequality by implementing elements of a free market.

During his mandate, we can also see a change in the agro-industrial policy, which
was more concerned with increasing productivity and exportation than with land
tenancy and rural income.
We can identify different views of development planning throughout the 1980s.
Turbay’s administration focused on the infrastructure sector and on granting more
autonomy to the regions. It also benefited from changes in the international financial
situation and from the good moment of the coffee to finance its investment (DNP
1979). The momentum refers to high prices for coffee at the time, equal to more
disposable income for investments. Betancurt sought to boost the economy by
emphasizing social housing and specific sectorial policies aimed at improving
industry and agriculture. He wanted to have a large supply of agricultural products,
which would provide plenty of food at low cost, as well as increase exports and thus
increase the demand for industrialized goods (DNP 1983). The last government of
this decade pursued a combined social development and economic growth approach,
making use of programs created in previous administrations and stimulating private
investment by restructuring the system of prices (DNP 1987).
In the early 1990s, Gaviria affirmed that the government would depart from the
interventionist model of development from the ECLA and implement a more open
model, one that was subject to competitiveness and with more equality and oppor-
tunities for citizens (DNP 1990). The promulgation of the new Constitution in 1991
established a process of democratization and social participation that defined new
commitments for the government. In 1994, the development plan of the Samper
administration tried to honor its social duties by prioritizing social investments,
infrastructure, and modernization of the army (DNP 1994). Several national and
international thinkers such as Joaquin Bernal, Paul Krugman, and Marcelo Selowsky
influenced the direction of the Samper administration’s economic growth, social
equality, and fiscal policy strategies (ibid). However, the ambitious social programs
were truncated by political and institutional scandals, low economic growth, and the
rising power of insurgent groups that led to over one million displaced families (see
Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES)).
To fight the high levels of insecurity and to boost the Colombian economy,
Andrés Pastrana proposed a plan based on exports, decentralization, and a potential
peace treaty with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC in Spanish)
(DNP 1998). Nevertheless, during this period, Colombia experienced its first eco-
nomic recession in more than six decades, which was only exacerbated by the 1999
earthquake at the Colombian Coffee Growers Axis (Hudson 2010). Furthermore, the
peace talks did not succeed, in part because US influence transformed the Plan
Colombia to focus more on curtailing drug trafficking and strengthening the military,
rather than on social development (Livingstone and Pearce 2004).
96 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

4.2 Peace, Growth, and Social Justice in the Twenty-First

Century

The aforementioned situations help us understand how Alvaro Uribe, a low-profile

presidential candidate, positioned himself alongside US interests and won the 2002
election with the clear proposition of fighting the FARC in his so-called democratic
security. His development plan also included re-establishing the legitimacy of public
institutions, job creation, and promotion of sustainable economic growth (DNP
2002). Uribe’s administration restored investor confidence through security and
open-market policies. The expansion of the mining and hydrocarbon industries
helped the economy grow 4.6% on average from 2002 to 2006 (BanRep 2013).
Economic stability and his popularity helped influence Congress to amend the
Constitution and allowed Uribe to run for a second consecutive presidential term,
which was up until then unconstitutional in Colombia.
Thanks to his successful development plan and a continuation of the “democratic
security” policy, Uribe was easily elected for a second term (DNP 2006). Further-
more, the relative stability of the country allowed him to expand his conditional cash
transfer program Familias en Acción to reduce poverty, pursue free trade agreements
(e.g., the United States and South Korea), and establish an ambitious program based
on the trickle-down theory for the agricultural recovery program named AIS (Agro
Ingreso Seguro in Spanish).
After 8 years of growth and political stability, Colombia was facing the future with
optimism and hope for continued progress. In this context, Juan Manuel Santos, who
was endorsed by Uribe, won the presidential election. In contrast to Uribe’s vision,
Santos based his development plan on the Third Way ideology, and he also opened
the door for peace talks with the FARC. This way of thinking allows the markets to
work as far as possible to engender entrepreneurship and wealth creation while
involving the state to promote development based on social justice. Santo’s plan
focused on education, inequality reduction, regional convergence within Colombia,
and macroeconomic stability (DNP 2010). During Santos’s first term, the economy
had performed remarkably (the GDP grew 4.8% between 2010 and 2013) together
with a stable macroeconomic basis (BanRep 2013). Furthermore, the peace talks,
which officially started in September 2012, gained broad international support. With
these successes, Santos was reelected in 2014 for a second presidential term.
The current development plan for Colombia is based on three pillars: peace, social
equality, and education. This plan is also heavily influenced by the Third Way
ideology by striving for social mobility, governmental compliance, and large invest-
ments in infrastructure, innovation, and competitiveness (DNP 2014). The current
peace talks with the FARC also include new rural development plans, like the
“Comprehensive Agricultural Development Policy” (Política de desarrollo agrario
integral), which reflects the growing importance of agricultural policies in Colombia.
Furthermore, in the last few years, there has been a rise in influential think tanks and
institutions in the formulation of bottom-up agricultural policies, such as the
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 97

International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) (Jarvis and Carbonari 2014;
Parra-Peña et al. 2014).

5 The Introduction of New Public Management

in Colombia: New Approach to Policy-Making

The enactment of the new Constitution in 1991 changed the political landscape and
the formulation of public policy in many significant ways in the country. The process
of democratization and the permanent assistance of Multilateral Development Banks
(MDB) allowed profound changes in the government’s structure and the adoption of
tools and models to improve policy-making (Sagasti 2002). One of the major shifts
during this period was the introduction of New Public Management (NPM). This
model was aimed at maximizing public value and improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of the government using a more flexible approach of administrative
structures within the government (Echebarria 2006). One of the key components of
NPM was the availability of good quality data and information in order to better
identify social needs to improve the process of problem identification as well as the
formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of public policies. For the
first time, data and information were at the center of public policy formulation
(CLAD-BID 2007).
One reason for the implementation of NPM in the government was the need to
attach interventions to measurable results. During the 1980s there were important
investments in social policies; however their impact was negligible and sometimes
even negative on social and economic development. To tackle this problem, the
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and Los Andes University started a
program for the first time to train civil servants and professionals in monitoring
and evaluation, information gathering, and system production, as well as teaching
them about promoting effectiveness and efficiency in government spending (DNP
2010). It was only in the 1990s that a culture of evaluation started to permeate public
administration as consequence of the requirements made by international organiza-
tions to access foreign loans.
One of the conditions imposed by MDB was the incorporation of monitoring and
evaluation systems in all projects that were financed by multilateral organizations.
The final objective was to build the capacity within the government to be able to
attribute changes in social outcomes to program implementation. These require-
ments also came along with technical assistance provided by multilateral organiza-
tions to help governmental offices rigorously design and implement public policy
initiatives. This context was the platform for a sense of renewal in the government
toward “management for results,” which had two main purposes. On the one hand, it
was a process to encourage comprehensive management and institutional capacity
among civil servants. On the other hand, “management for results” seeks to establish
98 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

a new relationship between the state and citizens as mandated in the Constitution
through civil participation (DNP 1995).
The 1990s came with important developments in the evaluation of public poli-
cies. From the government, the creation of SINERGIA in 1994 as part of the
Department of National Planning (DNP in Spanish) was the stepping stone to the
creation of an evaluation branch to determine the effectiveness of public investments
and public policy implementation (DNP 2010). SINERGIA was created with the
main objective of providing data to policy-makers and improving decision-making
processes in the country. The data has been used to craft and define objectives
attached to quantified indicators of National Development Plans as well as invest-
ment projects.
Academia also contributed to this reform. The consolidation of Los Andes
University and Javeriana University, in particular the school of economics, provided
the technical knowledge needed to undertake the rigorous process of policy evalu-
ation. During this process, the consolidation of COLCIENCIAS and the access to
loans provided by the Inter-American Development Bank, aimed at improving the
qualification of higher education professors, allowed professionals to access Master
and PhD programs at universities outside the country (Salazar 2013). This process
was pivotal to the emerging of qualified professionals in academia and government.
It was only in 2001 that the first master program of government and public policy
was opened at Externado University. Afterward, other similar programs were cre-
ated, but only in major cities. The consolidation of public policy and economic
programs benefitted and strengthened policy formulation in the country, in particular
national policies, including early education (Bernal and Fernandez 2013; Bernal and
Camacho 2011), social mobility (Gaviria 2007), rural development, and conflict
(Ibañez Londoño et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, the nature of the research traditionally undertaken in academia, in
particular its theoretical focus and methods, is often irrelevant to real policy problems.
Time constraints, political ideologies, lack of resources, and works published in foreign
languages are some of the factors that inhibit policy-makers from effectively using
research developed in academia internationally. As professors and researchers become
more qualified, questions relevant for policy-makers are studied using elaborated
methodologies that add little to possible courses of action in the policy-making process
(Coleman 1991; Davies 1999). Government, on the other hand, relies too heavily on
paradigms and general rules of thumb to make decisions and implement public policies
(Van Bergeijk 1997). Much of the policy-making process is based on policy transfer or
political ideologies of the government in place. An example of this is the implemen-
tation of a major social policy in the country. “Familias en Acción,” a cash transfer
policy that benefits more than 2.5 million families, was based on a conditional cash
transfer policy from Mexico (BID-INDES 2011).
To bridge the gap between academics and government, the country has witnessed
the emergence of think tanks and research centers during the past few years. In
particular, Fedesarrollo has been an important influence in policy formulation on the
national level. These institutions have become pivotal in providing relevant infor-
mation to policy-makers and making research developed by academics accessible to
The Rise of Policy-Making and Public Policy Research in Colombia 99

the public. One fact that has become clear in the policy process is that policy-makers
do not face a lack of information. On the contrary, information is abundant and
comes from different sources: academia, advisors, civil society, and multilateral
organizations, among other groups. What think tanks and research centers do,
though, is focus and shed light on the policy side of the information produced
(Salazar 2009).
Another source of information that think tanks and academia have used to help
the policy-making process and demand transparency and results is public opinion
surveys (Manza and Cook 2002). During the last decade, Colombia witnessed the
consolidation of public opinion systems in which academia, the private sector, and
grass roots organizations have become important actors. For instance, the network of
cities Cómo Vamos (How are We Doing) is a citizens’ initiative that is responsible
for assessing and monitoring the changes in the levels of quality of life in cities
where it operates. Furthermore, it tracks the district administrations on their compli-
ance with the commitments made in the Development Plans, taking into account
both technical indicators and public perception. This initiative started in Bogotá and
was later implemented in large metropolitan areas in Colombia.

6 Conclusion

In this contribution, we reviewed the history of public policy in Colombia by looking

at some key national and international actors as a means to understand how the
academic discipline originated in the country. We started with the hypothesis that
specialized policy research was only needed, and thus only originated, after Colombia
obtained more political and economic autonomy in the world system. To verify our
original proposition, we analyzed the role that international organizations and
political-economic national actors—here represented by stakeholders from the agri-
cultural sector—had in the historic development of policy-making and policy
research since the beginning of the twentieth century. We have found that these
stakeholders influenced the policy-making process in the country, but other forces
and actors were far more influential.
Our study has shown that throughout most of its history, Colombia has been
influenced by international actors and has frequently adopted foreign ideas and
models of development to base its own policies on. In the beginning of the last
century, under the Conservative Hegemony and the influence of the SAC, the Coffee
Growers Federation and other agricultural actors, the country was indeed going
against the mainstream economic ideologies. However, from the 1920s on, Colombia
started feeling the influence of international actors more strongly (Thomson-Urrutia
Treaty and Kemmerer Mission) and began to import foreign models of development,
especially after the 1950s when it consciously adopted the ISI model. In the 1990s,
Colombia seemed more committed to complying with the demands of the IMF in
order to gain access to loans and access international markets. Because of the
country’s competitive advantage in agriculture, the apertura was actually supported
100 J. D. Rivera Acevedo et al.

by most of the guilds represented by the SAC, especially by those who were ready to
engage in an export-oriented business model.
After analyzing the history of the Colombian agricultural sector and the Devel-
opment Plans that reshaped the country’s approach to policy-making in the 1970s,
we identified several events where either national advocacy groups or international
actors exerted influence over the policy choices made. However, we did not find any
document pointing to the presence and relevance of academic institutions in
influencing or informing the policy-making process.
Although we were correct to affirm that public policy emerged in Colombia as an
academic discipline in the context of the gradual independence of the country from
international financial institutions, the assumption of causality does not hold.
Despite its comfortable economic situation, Colombia today still needs to borrow
from Multilateral Development Banks and other international donors to implement
its most ambitious sectorial policies and programs. To illustrate this situation, in
2014, the IDB alone approved US$2745.40 million to co-finance various projects
from the Colombian government (IDB 2015). However, because these loans require
monitoring and evaluation to hold their borrowers accountable and to identify best
practices for development programs, the demand for a specific kind of professional
was created. In this context, the first academic programs in public policy originated.
The academic field in Colombia is rather underdeveloped, but has potential for
growth. The DNP and other regional government actors have been increasingly working
together with think tanks and research centers, such as CIAT, FEDESARROLLO, and
POLIS, who depend on policy analysts and other practitioners to build their workforce.
This increases the demand for professionals trained in implementing and evaluating
public policies and in making sense of unstructured data to inform decision-makers.
Nevertheless, the relationship between academia and governmental institutions has
weak ties. The DNP is not in the hands of technocrats, but rather, it has become
politicized, and just like other regional political organizations, it fears the political cost
of studies that might show that the monetary investment made in some policies did not
result in a real impact for the population.

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Juan David Rivera Acevedo is an economist and received his doctorate in Behavioral Economics
from the University of Erfurt, Germany. He is specialized in nonprofit management, international
political economy, impact investing, and impact measurement. His main interests include outcome-
based policy-making, impact investing, impact bonds, and microfinance.

Jorge Sellare is a doctoral researcher at the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural
Development of the University of Goettingen, Germany. Previously, he worked at the International
Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT), Colombia, and at the Tropical Agriculture Research and
Higher Education Center (CATIE), Costa Rica. His main research interests include impact assess-
ment of development projects, food security, and climate change.

Lina Martínez is Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Director of POLIS (Observatory of
Public Policies) at the Universidad Icesi, Colombia. She holds a PhD in public policy. She is
experienced in public policy evaluation and designing and has a major interest in educational and
social policy. Her current research focuses on the informal economy, urban policies, and the
provision of public goods, social mobility, and life satisfaction.
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public
Policy as an Academic Discipline in Brazil:
Push or Pull?

Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti

1 Introduction

Brazil is still a relatively young democracy. The current constitution enacted in

1988, frequently referred to as Constituição Cidadã (Citizen’s Constitution), is a
cornerstone of the post-military period and a symbol of the re-democratization. For
the first time in the Brazilian republican history, the constitution would, at least
legally, recognize the existence of fundamental rights for groups who had their social
and political participation systematically hindered, not only during the dictatorship
itself, but also in previous so-called democratic governments.
The extension of political and social rights also provided an opportunity for the
ample discussion of other matters that were largely secluded from the public, largely
due to the strong political control of the public institutions and media during the
military dictatorship. Social issues were suddenly brought to the attention of the
public and consequently to the academic debate. The awareness of problems
afflicting the country increased: extreme poverty, poorly distributed healthcare,
unacceptable labor conditions, continuous human rights violations, and many
other issues started to emerge as problems to be tackled by the new democratic
state. In the wake of re-democratization, the population was called to vote, partici-
pate, and endorse the government that should take on the reins and provide an
answer to the new emerging demands. Effective solutions, information, and know-
how, however, were still lacking.
The end of the dictatorship also led to the necessity of deep state reformation, not
only to cope with the newly established democratic status and procedures to ensure
transparency and accountability, but also to address the poor economic performance
of the country. After years under a developmentalist economic policy with very high
levels of state participation and interventionism, Brazil had the challenge of

R. Z. Robiatti (*)
University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 105

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_7
106 R. Z. Robiatti

“downsizing government” while simultaneously improving its efficiency. How the

country would manage to achieve those goals within that very delicate moment of
transformation in the political, economic, and social fields was still unclear.
This chapter aims to analyze the process by which public policy emerged as an
academic discipline in Brazil. By dividing it into three different cycles, the study
seeks to provide a better understanding of the process’ timeline, mainly focusing on
two driving forces: the undertaken state reformation and the opening for democratic
participation. The effect of such factors on the emergence of the public policy field
will be assessed based on indicators such as the number and distribution of study
programs, availability and access to specific publications, funding structures, and the
production of research within the field.
The chapter is divided into six sections. Following this first and introductory part,
the second section offers a review of the military period, discussing some of its
characteristics in detail that help to understand why the development of public policy
studies was hindered and happened so late in comparison to the USA, for example.
The third section deals with the re-democratization process and outlines how a
convergence of diverse factors influenced and contributed to the inception of public
policy in the academic debate. The fourth section narrates the emergence of the three
tracks that constitute the area of public policy studies in Brazil, contextualizing the
creation of public administration, public policy, and public policy management
programs. The fifth section entails the detailed analysis of the current situation of
the public policy disciplines in Brazil by outlining and discussing its potential and
challenges for the future. Finally, the sixth and last section contains the conclusion of
the paper. It summarizes the main problems and arguments of the presented research
and provides a series of recommendations aimed at strengthening teaching and
studies in the area of public policy in Brazil.

2 The Military Period: 1964–1986

This section discusses some of the most important characteristics of the military
dictatorship period in Brazil with regard to its strong state control, the curtailment of
individual liberties, and the strict focus on economic development. The objective is
to analyze and demonstrate how the conjecture ultimately hindered the development
of public policy as an academic discipline.

2.1 The Minimization of the Public Sphere

The military dictatorship that seized power in Brazil during the early 1960s was
characterized, as many others of its kind, by the control over the media, limitations of
artistic productions, and the suppression of civil and political liberties. Over time, the
intensity of this political control varied, oscillating between moments of
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 107

permissiveness and moments of very tight control and persecution (Codato 2005).
Individuals could not manifest their political views or any criticism without being
labeled “revolutionary,” “state enemy,” and/or “communist,” among other designa-
tions. They could be arrested, incarcerated, tortured, and even killed in the name of
political stability and the establishment. Many people who were not involved in
political activism whatsoever were investigated by the intelligence police and many
times found guilty without a proper trial and with rights to a legal defense being
systematically curtailed. There was a general feeling, which is common to many
dictatorial and totalitarian regimes, of constant surveillance. Certain groups were de
facto under the military’s closest observation, for example, union leaders, journalists,
artists, and academics (Gaspari 2014a).
The interest of the military in academia had a particularly strong effect on the
academic output during that period. Many professors and students were arrested,
censored, and persecuted due to alleged “involvement with subversive activities.”
The regime also created investigatory units to operate undercover inside the uni-
versities in order to feed the secret service information about possible threats to
“national security” (Motta 2014). The dynamics described above generated a certain
degree of co-optation of the universities by and for the regime, restraining the extent
to which research, teaching, and discussion could freely flourish.
Freedom of information was nonexistent, since information was also completely
controlled by the state. Media were submitted for official governmental review
before publication, and often reporters’ original contents were substituted for
pro-government news and propaganda. The usage of disinformation via publication
of tampered pieces was intended to protect the government from critique from the
public. The same rationale was applied to the release of official data: economic,
social, and political indicators were also unreliable, making it very hard to have
access to real information. The political order obliterated social participation to
greatly reduced levels, either by persecution and fear or simply by shrinking the
public sphere (Gaspari 2014b).

2.2 The Focus on Economic Development

The military administrations in Brazil were notably engaged in development policies

aimed at “catching up” with developed countries. There was a very strong focus on
promoting development through state-led investments in infrastructure and industry,
which generated an economy-based approach to policy. The evaluation of the
implemented public policies was focused on the economic gains that would result
from them and also on their potential to project the country as an increasingly
important player internationally.
Some sectors regarded as key areas to promote development were highly
privileged during the years of military rule. The government gave away concessions
to companies from these sectors so that they could operate largely on a monopoly-
like basis (Cysne 1993). Civil construction and heavy industry, for example, had
108 R. Z. Robiatti

very close ties with the military government, which allowed them to exert particular
influence in policy design. They did this either by reporting their “concerns” and
providing “recommendations” or by giving in-depth assessments of specific legis-
lation relative to their activities. Many other actors representing other interest groups
would attempt to influence the policy design process, something that is widely
accepted and part of the political process, including democratic societies. The
difference in that case was the disproportionate amount of influence that was granted
to such special interests at the expense of participation of the general public, which
was, obviously, entirely excluded from the political process. The policy process was
not, of course, completely controlled by special interest. Governmental institutions
conducted viability studies for the design of policies and also evaluated the imple-
mentation and indicators of past efforts. The focus of such studies was, however,
very specific and their results were not transparent at all.
The common element in most parts of the state-led intellectual production was the
focus on very particular policy areas with specific interest on economic impact. This
resulted in a lack of more comprehensive studies that included other important
aspects that are also results of policy implementation and go beyond the economy.
While the government targeted economic problems such as foreign trade, industrial
production, and infrastructure development, the upsurge of social problems such as
extreme poverty and the growing gap between rich and poor was overlooked. The
military period represented one of the worst times in Brazilian modern history in
terms of income concentration and decay of other social development indicators
(Hoffman 1986). The steep social disparity contributed even more to the exclusion of
a big segment of the population from meaningful political representation.
The end of the military dictatorship period would bring new dynamics for the
Brazilian society and not only in terms of increased political participation and the
development of new institutions. The focus of policies also shifted from the pursuit
of strict economic objectives toward the improvement of social conditions. This
opened the country’s and policymakers’ eyes to the real situation of most part of its
population in terms of social development indicators, what partly explains the higher
demand for understanding the sources of these problems. The development of public
policy as an academic discipline would be instrumental in that matter.

3 The Democratic Re-establishment

A transition process to the liberal-democratic regime characterized the last years of

the military dictatorship period. In 1979, both political parties that took turns
governing during the military period were extinct. In 1980, workers went on strike
for the first time in many years. In 1982, direct elections for state governors were
held, opening up space to the first indirect elections for president with an actual
opposition party, in 1985. This process culminated in direct elections for president in
1989 (Codato 2005). The final phase of the military period, from the 1979 to 1986,
represented a gradual opening-up process in which political persecution and
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 109

censorship slowly declined. This process created the necessary conditions to restore
the public sphere in Brazil with the reactivation of media’s participation and the
contribution of multiple civil society groups that started to form.
The “liberation” of the public sphere ended up raising awareness about many
issues that have been mostly ignored during the military period. Social policies that
were largely “privatized” during the military regime started to be handed back to the
state as the political situation started to change (Martine 1989). The restoration of
direct elections also shifted the political approach to social problems such as poverty,
low education, and the restricted access to basic services. Given the fact that politi-
cians began to compete for popular votes, many populations, especially those that had
historically been excluded from the political process, started to receive more attention
from politicians. These politicians, and to some extend the government, began to
direct their campaigns at these previously marginalized populations. Social problems
became a matter that had to be tackled and targeted by the public sector (Nunes 1997).
As a consequence, academia developed a great interest in researching and comparing
the global approaches to solve such problems and how they could be applied in
Brazil.
The political transition also heavily impacted other governmental institutions in
Brazil. The democratic awakening demanded changes in the structures of executive
agencies, public companies, and bureaucratic services on many different levels. Driven
by forces of democratization, transparency, and accountability, the federal government
went through an intense transformation in line with the doctrine of the New Public
Management (NPM) (Hood 1991) which became increasingly influential since the
beginning of the 1980s. NPM substantially modified the way the public administration
was understood and also influenced academic research to a certain degree. Institution-
alism and public sector reforms progressively became prevailing topics.
The state reformation and reopening for social participation were the two main
driving forces behind the establishment of public policy as an independent academic
discipline in Brazil (Arretche 2003). On the one hand, the reform of the Brazilian
state demanded not only the necessary know-how but also professionals that could
work in the newly envisioned bureaucracy. On the other hand, the increasing social
participation revealed many problems that needed to be addressed by the new
democratic governments. Most of those issues were reminiscent of the military
regime, relating to the poor social and living conditions. From the confluence of
those factors emerges the necessity of understanding how the public sector could
target and solve these problems.

4 The Development of Public Policy as an Academic

Discipline

In Brazil, public policy studies are now generally divided into three different tracks,
each of them having a specific undergraduate program focusing on its area of
concentration: public administration, public policy, and public policy management.
110 R. Z. Robiatti

Those programs were initially very different from one another because they were
created in different periods of time and thus with specific objectives. However, over
time, they somehow developed toward a common path. The sections below will
discuss each of them individually, contextualizing their creation and considering
their objectives.

4.1 Demand for Bureaucrats: Public Administration

Programs

The first school of public administration in Brazil and in Latin America was created
by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV) under the name Escola Brasileira de
Administração Pública (EBAP) (Brazilian School of Public Administration), in
1952 (Pinto and Motter Junior 2012). Its main objective was to develop research
and disseminate the latest trends in the field of public administration through the
exchange of knowledge with schools in the USA, for example, with the University of
South California (Nicolini 2003). Eventually, in 1960, the first postgraduate program
in public administration started to be offered. The strongest force pushing for the
creation of a public administration program was the modernization process of the
Brazilian civil service that started in the late 1940s. This process created a demand
for specific technocratic managerial knowledge, which was largely unavailable in
the country. In those days, public sector employees were mostly economists and
lawyers. The situation only started to change in 1962 when the profession “public
administrator” and the specific requirements necessary to undertake civil service
contracts were finally established by law (de Coelho 2006).
The approval of the law pushed other important universities to start offering
public administration programs. This was the case for the University of São Paulo
(USP), the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), and the Federal
University of Bahia (UFBA). Public administration programs were at that point very
technical and emphasized the subjects that were seen as the most important for
training a typical public administrator: law, mathematics, statistics, accounting, and
management. In short, the public administration programs aimed at meeting the huge
demand for civil servants, which was the objective that dominated public policy
studies for a considerably long period of time.
The end of the military period brought, as previously mentioned, a new reality for
the political and social orders in Brazil. The newly established democratic regime
called for public participation and had the challenge of being more inclusive than the
military had been. The process of opening for social participation in conjunction
with the reformation the state was undergoing created an interesting scenario (Farah
2011). Political scientists increasingly began to research public policy and, in
particular, the social aspects of it. Political science programs in Brazil date back to
the 1970s (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014), but it was not until the end of the
military dictatorship that the output of research and teaching in the public policy field
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 111

started to rapidly increase. There was a notable difference in the new modality of
public policy research in comparison to that of the traditional public administration
programs that inaugurated the first cycle. By the end of the military period, the
interdisciplinary approach put forth by political science was gaining momentum.

4.2 Democracy and the New Order: Public Policy Programs

In 1983, the National Association of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Social

Sciences (ANPOCS) established a working group for public policy, opening up a
space for the discussion of topics related to the theme. In 1985, the first institution
within a university with a main focus on evaluation of public policy was set up in
Brazil-the Center for Public Policy Studies (NEPP)1 of the University of Campinas.
Afterward, other academic centers started to promote research and teaching of public
policy (Melo 1999). That was the beginning of the second cycle of the development
of public policy as a discipline in the country.
The output from this second cycle is very much characterized by the concerns that
afflicted the country during the immediate period after the end of the military regime.
The research production focused greatly on the effects of public policy on the
institutional aspects of the transition to democracy such as direct elections and the
reorganization of institutions, for example. What effects would be expected from
the decentralization process by which states and municipalities were empowered?
How would the emergence of new interest groups affect the policy agenda setting?
What approaches had to be used in order to fulfill social objectives and address the
“social debt”? Those, among others, were the problems and questions that the new
emerging public policy programs were set to dwell upon (Frey 2000). There was still
very little coordination between the many studies that were produced, and it cannot
be said that there was a deliberate and concise attempt to construct a new field of
study. Nonetheless, public policy was certainly institutionalized as an autonomous
field within the social sciences (Souza 2003a).
In contrast to the first cycle, when the focus of study was on the application of
management tools and strategies to the public sector without necessarily taking into
account the nuances of the sociopolitical system, a process-oriented approach, the
second cycle shed light on the outcomes of the public administration process.
Emphasis was put on the tasks and roles that public institutions have with regard
to the conception, implementation, and evaluation of public policies, in other words,
a result-oriented approach. Public policy was finally consolidated as a discipline
within the field of social sciences. However, despite the growing output of research
and teaching, it was still considered as a sub-area of political science.

1
http://www.nepp.unicamp.br/ (Access on March 20, 2018).
112 R. Z. Robiatti

4.3 Consolidation and Independence: Public Policy

Management Programs

The apex of detachment of public policy studies from under the social sciences is
rooted in the complex period that Brazil underwent during the 1990s. The interna-
tional liberalization regime influenced the Brazilian government to abandon the
interventionist approach that dominated Latin America since the 1950s. The “big
state” was seen, during that period, as harmful for development and economic
growth due to its over-bureaucratization, politically motivated interventionism, and
overall administrative ineffectiveness (Bresser Pereira 1997). The solution offered
by the neoliberal order set forth by the Washington Consensus led to a wave of
privatizations, deregulation, and state modernization efforts in order to cope with the
demands of a more interdependent and competitive economy. Throughout the years,
the country underwent institutional reforms, and government-created managerial
proxies to deal with this new reality. The trend of becoming a regulatory state was
confirmed, and the area of public policy started to shift focus to managerial aspects
of public policy that involved not only politics and institutions but also organi-
zational and performance concerns.
From 2000 onward, full-scale public policy programs were finally developed and
implemented. The University of São Paulo (USP) created a public policy manage-
ment program2 followed by a number of other universities, inaugurating the third
cycle in the development of public policy as an academic discipline. This cycle
represents, to a certain extent, the harmonization between the first and the second.
Public policy management programs put emphasis on the efficient functioning of the
state administration, while simultaneously aiming at the development of effective
public policies. Influenced by the so-called International Good Governance regime,
the third cycle is an attempt at addressing the lack of transparency and accountability
of the governmental institutions in order to prevent corruption and systematic
inefficiencies. The embedded concept there was that an efficient state administration
would be able to deliver policies with more value to the population and address the
social and economic problems that afflict a country by preventing the waste of
resources.

5 Future Perspectives and Challenges

The field of public policy experienced a steep growth in the past 15 years that can be
measured by using various indicators. This article developed three important ones
that reveal not only the upward trend but also some of the challenges in the context of
further developments.

2
http://www.each.usp.br/gpp/ (Accessed on March 20, 2018).
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 113

Fig. 1 Undergraduate study 60

52
programs in Brazil (2014).
50
Source: Brazilian Ministry
of Education (Accessed on 40
February 01, 2015)
30
16 Public University
20
9 Private University
10 3
0
Public Public Policy
Administration Management /
Public Policy

There are currently over 100 study programs that are directly related to the public
policy field (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014). According to the electronic
database of the Federal Ministry of Education, there are 80 active programs, either in
public administration, public policy, or public policy management.
As Fig. 1 indicates, the offer of public administration programs still greatly out-
numbers their newer public policy-oriented peers. It could be due to the traditionalism
of the first one in comparison to the relative novelty of the second. The first public
policy management program was set in 2005; currently, there are 19. This might be a
result of the changing perspective of the public and private sectors on the importance
of having employees with the ability of analyzing and understanding public policies.
Most public policy management programs are not academic in a narrow sense, but
rather, they aim to train students to work in the public, private, or third sector. On the
other hand, the public administration programs focused on preparing prospective
employees to work on a bureaucratic-oriented career, until the early 1980s. After the
new constitution in 1988 and the consequent modernization of the Brazilian state and
economy, the differences between public administration, public policy, and public
policy management programs became less apparent.
The educational system in Brazil is mixed, breaking the monopoly of public
universities and allowing private institutions to establish study programs as long as
they are in accordance with the rules and regulations after receiving the approval
from the Ministry of Education. The constitution of 1988 eased those rules and
propitiated a rapid increase in the offer of programs by private universities, due to a
suppressed demand that could barely be met by the public sector. In 2013, according
to the latest available census, 2000 private universities offered about 21,000 under-
graduate programs, while 301 public universities offer a little over than 10,000
undergraduate programs. Although the presence of private universities exceeds
public in general, this same tendency does not apply to public policy-related pro-
grams. According to the diagram above, public universities still offer the majority of
undergraduate programs in public administration (52:9), public policy, and public
policy management (16:3), indicating that private universities still have a very
limited interest in the area.
114 R. Z. Robiatti

Given the structure of the education market in Brazil, access to public universities
is still very exclusive. Students take entrance examinations (vestibular) that are very
competitive due to the limited number of vacancies. Those that had a much better
level of education, which is offered, in general, by private schools, end up topping
the exam and securing their study offers at public universities, while a bigger share
has no other option but to finance their education themselves or not pursue under-
graduate studies at all. That is one of the reasons why private universities have had
relatively high success in meeting the demand of the large part of the population that
simply does not have access to public education at the tertiary level. This can be
recognized by looking at the comparison between the number of students enrolled in
each of them. Private universities have over 5.3 million students matriculated, while
public universities have about 1.9 million (Brazilian Ministry of Education 2014). In
order to increase the number of professionals in the area of public policy, it is
important that private universities start to offer programs in that field as well, since
they are responsible for roughly five in every seven students at the undergraduate
level.
The distribution of study programs throughout the country is another point that is
worthy of attention. Brazil is divided into 26 states and 1 federal district. They are
ordered into five different administrative regions: Midwest, Northeast, North, South-
east, and South. The offer of undergraduate public administration, public policy, and
public policy management programs in each of the regions is represented in Fig. 2.
According to the information available in the Federal Ministry of Education’s
database, in 2014, there were public administration programs available in 24 out of
26 federal states, while public policy and public policy management programs were
offered in only 10. Again, public administration outnumbers public policy and
public policy management by far in almost all the regions with the Southeast region
showing the smallest difference (14:9). The problem here lies in the number of
programs in relation to the total population of each region. The most populous region
in Brazil is the Southeast (85 million inhabitants), followed by the Northeast
(56 million), South (29 million), North (17 million), and Midwest (15 million).

Fig. 2 Number of study 18 17

programs per region (2014). 16
Source: Brazilian Ministry 14
of Education (Accessed on 14
February 01, 2015) 12 11
10 Midwest
10 9 9
Northeast
8
6 North
4
4 3 Southeast
2
2 1 South
0
Public Administration Public Policy
Management / Public
Policy
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 115

Public administration programs are relatively well distributed among the population
on a quantity basis, with the Northeast having a small advantage in comparison to the
Southeast, which can easily be explained by the higher number of states in this
region in comparison to the other (9:4). On the other hand, the public policy and
public policy management programs are still poorly distributed using the same
population-per-region method. Only 10 states offer them, and the Southwest has,
by far, the most programs (9), with the Midwest in second place (4), the South in
third (3), Northwest in fourth (2), and the North in last (1). Using the standard above,
there is still an overall lack of programs in this particular area of the public policy
field, but also, the distribution of the existing ones does not satisfy the quantity per
population criteria. For those programs, the distribution more likely follows the
criteria of economic power and the socioeconomic importance of the regions. One of
the major challenges is to distribute the offer of programs fairly across the regions
and states in order to ensure access for the population and also to reflect each
region’s specificities in the creation of its public policies.
Another very important challenge for the growth of the public policy area in Brazil
is research production. According to many scholars, despite the growing output of
research, there is still a big disconnect between research production and the institu-
tionalization of the field. There are ample sectorial case studies that, in general, do not
contribute to the vertical construction of the discipline—there is insufficient focus
and interest in contributing to the theoretical embodiment but instead only to hori-
zontal growth (Melo 1999; de Faria 2003). Currently, the discipline lacks a more
harmonized methodology that permeates the production of knowledge and enhances
the output of the production with more detailed methods and cohesive agendas.
However, there are currently many initiatives that seek to overcome the problem of
agenda setting in the field that are also paving the way for a more concise elaboration
of knowledge. The Internet is helping students all over Brazil to have increased access
to national and international forums of public policy discussion (Souza 2003b). Many
national and international publications such as the Brazilian Magazine of Public
Administration (RAP) and the publications of the National School of Public Admin-
istration (ENAP) are accessible via online journal platforms such as SciELO and
CAPES. Those platforms also help to facilitate access to highly relevant national and
international publications, as well as to other journals that recently opened up space
for the debate of public policy-related themes more specifically, such as the National
Association of Post-graduate Studies and Research in Social Sciences (ANPOCS)
and the National Association of Research and Post-graduation in Administration
(ANPAD). Moreover, multiple organizations coordinate symposiums, conferences,
and workshops on public policy themes that contribute to the capacity of researchers
to network with each other.
Finally, it is also worth noting the situation of graduate and postgraduate pro-
grams in Brazil and the role that public finance plays in their creation. Despite the
fact that the private sector offers most of the programs and enrolls more students at
the undergraduate level, the same does not hold true for the graduate and postgrad-
uate levels. Public universities were responsible for 172,000 students enrolled in
2013, while their private peers had only about 31,000 students, about 15% of the
total number of enrolled students in the country. That means that the government is
116 R. Z. Robiatti

responsible for most of the financing of research and academic production in Brazil,
which can be slightly dangerous. Historically, Brazil has spent relatively few
resources on research in proportion to its GDP. Relying mostly on public finances
for cutting-edge research can be risky, especially during periods of financial hard-
ship, as was the case in recent years after the financial crisis. Until very recently,
many research programs had their funding drastically reduced or completely cut.
Government is always under a lot of pressure when it comes to reducing costs, and it
is always much easier to cut policies that are less popular, such as academic research.
Of course, relying completely on the private sector also does not solve the
problem. Having a mixed approach would be ideal since the risks would be
mitigated and the production of research would probably be more plural, reflecting
the demands of society more accurately. At least, for sure, more democratic public
policy needs to be seen not only as a provider of workforce and tools for government
but also as an enabler of better and more sustainable policies that would be beneficial
to the society and country in general, thus a strategic area to be funded and fostered.
The percentage of the total participation of public investment should not be as
substantial as it is today.

6 Conclusion

This chapter traced back the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in
Brazil by looking into the historical, social, and political factors that played a role in
influencing the studies in this area of knowledge. The period starting with the
creation of the first public policy-related program until today was divided arbitrarily
in three phases, each of them corresponding to a specific time period: from 1950s
until the last years of the military period, from 1986 with the re-democratization until
the end of the 1990s, and from 2000 on. Today, public administration, public policy,
and public policy management programs have many common goals and overlapping
research areas, but the objective of the paper was to point out the differences that
necessitated the emergence of each of them, given the sets of characteristics that
stimulated their creation during specific periods of time. It is important to see how
each of them developed and in order to understand the consequences for the
configuration of the field today.
The process of the emergence of public policy as an academic discipline in Brazil
has always been reactive, meaning that the majority of the curricular changes and
creation of new programs were a result of changes in the political, social, and/or
economic environment, having little to do with the actual research output or proactive
changes by the universities and scholars. One of the important results from this
conjecture is the lack of theoretical depth within the field due to the meager accumu-
lation of works focused on theoretical and methodological discussion in Brazil, with a
prevalence of case studies and analysis of phenomena related to the changes in the
governmental institutions and policies. This situation has been changing in the past
20 years with the creation of platforms through which scholars can better
Re-democratization and the Rise of Public Policy as an Academic. . . 117

communicate and exchange ideas and research results. The creation of area-specific
journals and online platforms has contributed meaningfully to this matter.
Another important conclusion from this research is that, contrary to what happens
with other areas of knowledge, the provision of tertiary education in relation to
public policy programs is still very much a prerogative of the public sector. Over
80% of all the available public administration, public policy, and public policy
management study programs are offered by public universities, as opposed to only
30% for all the other fields of study. This relationship is criticized by scholars
(de Faria 2003) who affirm that conflicts of interest can emerge when most part of
the research funding for public policy comes from public institutions which are also
potential study objects. Moreover, the provision of funding for postgraduate pro-
grams in public policy is almost solely public, which increases the risk of
underfinancing in periods of economic hardship or because of changes in the policy
agenda, not to mention that it can implicate a certain bias on the research output.
A final important concern that has been raised is the current uneven geographical
distribution of programs over the Brazilian territory and the ratio between population
and number of programs available. The older and more traditional program “public
administration” is relatively well distributed within the regions and has a high
number of offers as well. This research did not explore the microlevel in order to
affirm if there is an unmet demand across different regions, but the distribution
seems to make sense. The situation is not as good, though, for the public policy and
public policy management programs. These are very much concentrated in the South
and Southeast regions, while offers in the rest of the country are still very low. In this
case, the research attributes this situation to the relative novelty of such programs
and the fact that they developed mainly in the two richer regions of the country,
mainly due to the partnerships with international institutions and stronger links to a
number of powerful economic and political groups. These problems must be
addressed by offering more programs in the Midwest, North, and Northwest regions
in order to supply those markets with highly skilled professionals that have an
awareness of the latest developments in the area of policymaking.
From the Brazilian experience in providing public policy-related study programs,
it is possible to observe that strong and independent institutions are necessary for the
successful implementation of a new academic discipline on the national level (Souza
2006). Once those factors started to be present in the years following the military
period, the area began to develop at a very fast pace. This rapid development brought
along an underlying lack of cohesion, which has only started to be addressed in recent
years. This issue was only and finally corrected by the increasing networking between
different research centers and universities, which was made possible, most notably,
by the Internet. It is, then, important to keep moving forward in order to keep
promoting the studies in this area of knowledge all over Brazil, as well as to
coordinate efforts with neighboring countries. This approach might prove useful to
allow researchers to learn from each other’s successes and mistakes and build a
better and brighter future for an important academic field.
118 R. Z. Robiatti

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Raphael Zimmermann Robiatti is a doctoral fellow of the Faculty of Law, Social Sciences and
Economics at the University of Erfurt, Germany. His doctoral research focuses on the political
economy and governance of Development Financial Institutions in Latin America. He holds a
Master of Public Policy (MPP) degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the
University of Erfurt, Germany, and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the
Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Sao Paulo (PUC-SP), Brazil.
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key
Actors and Dynamics of Economic
Diversification in Kazakhstan Throughout
2011–2016

Mergen Dyussenov

1 Introduction

Economic diversification often becomes an agenda item across developing nations

(Konkakov and Kubayeva 2016; Davis 2012). This issue has also surfaced on
political (Strategy 2050.kz 2014) and policy (Toxanova 2008) agendas in Kazakh-
stan. Regarding its political importance, Kazakh President N. Nazarbayev adopted
the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy in 2012, which envisions economic and political
reforms, with a focus on the diversification of industries (by creating new cutting-
edge industries, e.g., electronics, laser and medical, and expanding existing trans-
portation links), diversifying export capacities away from oil and gas (Weitz 2014),
transforming Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based and diversified economy, and
shaping budgetary policy to divert financial resources to support long-term projects
to boost economic diversification and infrastructure development (Strategy 2050.kz
2014). The economic diversification theme came to agenda setting prominence in the
context of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan (Seisembayeva 2017). “The first
one was the creation of an entirely new state based on the principles of a market
economy. The second was the implementation of the Strategy 2030 and the creation
of our country’s capital, Astana,” according to President Nazarbayev (as in
Seisembayeva 2017). A key priority within the Third Modernization is technological
advancement based on digital technologies, as part of a broader goal to join the top
30 developed nations (ibid).
This contribution focuses on agenda setting processes. Defined as the first and
most critical stage of the policy process (Howlett et al. 2009) that determines its
subsequent stages (Peters 2015), agenda setting contributes to a more nuanced
understanding of media’s role in society (Carragee et al. 1987, as cited in Rogers

M. Dyussenov (*)
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore,
Singapore
https://sg.linkedin.com/in/mergen-dyussenov-055ba510

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 119

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_8
120 M. Dyussenov

et al. 1993). Among multiple actors involved in this stage of the policy process, e.g.,
the public, interest groups, NGOs, and scholarly and think tank communities, media
often plays a predominant role in setting policy agendas, as suggested by current
debates (e.g., McCombs and Shaw 1972; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Wood and Peake
1998), although the public’s role has become stronger since the emergence of the
Internet and their increasing use among scholars (see, e.g., Margetts et al. 2016;
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2016). Furthermore, as
the literature review on agenda setting in Kazakhstan suggests, the president and the
government appear to be key actors in defining a variety of policy issues both in the
country (e.g., Novikova (2015) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies,
Mukhtarova et al. (2013) on anticorruption issues, Koch (2013) on urban modern-
ization agenda, etc.) and the Central Asian region (e.g., Tucker (2015) on the role of
key political figures, along with media, in shaping public sentiments toward ISIS,
Schatz (2009) on political elites’ power in framing debates and defining policy
agendas, etc.). Thus, to define who actually sets the agenda, it needs to be tested
by contrasting and comparing the role of (online) media vis-à-vis the public, think
tanks, academia, and the government in agenda setting for economic diversification
in Kazakhstan in 2011–2016.

2 Literature Review of Agenda Setting Publications

in Kazakh Context

Despite the relatively short period since Kazakhstan gained its independence in late
1991, there is a fair amount of publications worth analyzing related to agenda setting
processes in Kazakhstan. The total number of related publications generated by
Scopus and Google Scholar [and further filtered for relevance] is 16. Although the
time span extends from 2003 to 2016, relevant scholarly attention to the Kazakh
context has largely begun to increase recently, i.e., around 2013–2016 (Fig. 1 below).
Thus, this research is reflective of the timely scholarly attention given to agenda
setting in Kazakhstan, besides the general importance of the agenda setting stage.
The agenda setting publications that are based on the Kazakh context can be
grouped not only according to the policy issues analyzed (e.g., CSR as in Novikova
(2015), corruption as in Mukhtarova et al. (2013), social conflicts as in Ibrayeva

Agenda-Setting Publications in Kazakhstan

6
4
2 Publications
0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fig. 1 Publications related to agenda setting in Kazakhstan, by year. Source: The author’s own
analytics
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 121

(2015), water reform in Central Asia as in Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev (2016) and
trans-boundary rivers as in Wegerich (2010), strengthening state capacity as in
Cummings and Nørgaard (2004), etc.) or by year of publication (as in Fig. 1) but,
more importantly, in terms of the key actors that play a strong role in setting the
policy agenda.
Eight of the 16 publications analyzed highlight the importance of the president
and his/her leadership in setting agendas in Kazakhstan (Koch 2013; Mukhtarova
et al. 2013; Schatz 2008, 2009), political elites and politicians (Tucker 2015;
Cummings and Nørgaard 2004), and government (Novikova 2015; Knox and
Yessimova 2015). The rest emphasizes the role of the following actors: intergov-
ernmental committees (as in Wegerich 2010) and international organizations
(Cleuziou and Direnberger 2016; Asanova 2006), foreign governments (i.e., the
government of Russia attempting to set energy policy agenda in the Caspian Basin,
as in), media (Akhmet et al. 2015), social media (Ibrayeva 2015), academia
(Abdullaev and Rakhmatullaev 2016), and networks (i.e., the currently weaker
role of human resource (HR) management associations in shaping economic devel-
opment agenda in Kazakhstan but which should eventually become more pro-
nounced, as in Davis 2012).
Among the sources analyzed in the literature review, the following three papers
merit closer scrutiny: Davis (2012), Akhmet et al. (2015), and Ibrayeva (2015). First,
Davis (2012) studies the role of HR managerial associations in driving the economic
policy agenda in Kazakhstan, specifically as a potential factor in leading nationwide
efforts in economic diversification. However, he asserts the potentially strong role
that HR associations should play in promoting economic diversification, instead of
carefully analyzing their capacity versus other players, e.g., the government
(as suggested by the literature review), academia, think tanks, media, and the public.
Second, both Ibrayeva (2015) and Akhmet et al. (2015) use content analysis as
applied to social conflicts and diplomatic bilateral relations with Malaysia, respec-
tively. Ibrayeva (2015) employs content analysis to analyze various issues on
Facebook—2015 money devaluation, sport achievements, the 2015 mudslide in
Almaty, corruption, and court processes—based on netizens’ positive, negative, or
neutral perceptions. Then she divides publications into Kazakh- versus Russian-
language media to trace variations in public perception (ibid.). In a different manner,
Akhmet et al. (2015) use the content analysis method to focus on a single issue—the
2012 state visit of Kazakh President Nazarbayev to Malaysia—by looking into the
prevalent news frames in covering the topic by Kazakh and Malaysian newspapers.
Last but not least, akin to Davis (2012), who simply asserts the potentially strong role
of HR network groups in economic policy, Akhmet et al. (2015), referring to
McCombs (2004), assert the robust role of media in “forming public opinions and
political attitudes” (p. 165) by framing certain issues.
The present contribution attempts to take a similar approach as in Akhmet et al.
(2015) by focusing on a single policy issue, economic diversification. It seeks to
assess online media by embracing all possible online newspapers and other Internet-
based media sources by using LexisNexis (see Sect. IV “Data and Methods”).
122 M. Dyussenov

3 Key Theories and Frameworks Applicable to Agenda

Setting

This research draws on a number of actor-centered theories and frameworks related

to agenda setting. These emphasize the predominant role of media (e.g., as in
McCombs and Shaw 1972), the public (as in Margetts et al. 2016), think tanks as
part of epistemic communities (Haas 1992), academia (e.g., Timmermans and
Scholten 2006), or the government (e.g., Koch 2013; Mukhtarova et al. 2013; Schatz
2009), as described in the literature review section.
First, some scholars indicate the media’s power to set the policy agenda (e.g.,
McCombs and Shaw 1972; Soroka et al. 2013, etc.). In their groundbreaking work,
McCombs and Shaw (1972) observe that media editors can shape public perceptions
toward a certain policy issue and the degree of perceived importance by choosing
what news to broadcast. Soroka et al. (2013) further emphasize the predominant role
of media in policymaking by framing policy issues, acting as a conduit between the
public and political groups.
Yet others argue in favor of the stronger role of the public in driving issues onto
agenda setting. Margetts et al. (2016) emphasize the ability of citizens, empowered
by social media, to drive their collective interest agenda by affectively capturing the
attention of politicians by threatening social protests. Further, as Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen (2010) note, once an issue reaches the macro-political agenda, two
factors—public opinion and party competition—then drive policy change. Wiezien
and Soroka (2016) specifically observe the stronger role of active voters in driving
the policy agenda. Finally, Stocking (2015) links the emergence of the Internet to the
growing role of the public versus media in setting agendas.
A third group of scholars define the predominant role of academia and think
tanks. Some scholars generally refer to so-called epistemic communities that com-
bine scholars and think tanks (e.g., Haas 1992). On the contrary, others specifically
emphasize either the role of think tanks or academia. For instance, Zimmerman
(2016) explores the agenda setting role of think tanks in security policies, while
Shaw et al. (2014) analyze the ability of think tanks to set the agenda on healthcare.
Regarding academia, Timmermans and Scholten (2006) find that scholars can set the
policy agenda for immigration and reproductive technology in the Netherlands.
Nisbet and Huge (2006) observed scholars’ successful promotion of biotechnology
issues into agenda setting in the USA.
Finally, as mentioned earlier in the literature review on the Kazakh context, there
are scholars who support the notion of government-dominated agenda setting theory.
These include inter alia Novikova (2015), Knox and Yessimova (2015), Koch
(2013), Mukhtarova et al. (2013), Schatz (2008), Schatz (2009), Tucker (2015),
and Cummings and Nørgaard (2004).
Thus, current agenda setting theories can be broadly divided in theories and
frameworks defined by media, the public, think tanks, academia, and the govern-
ment. Not all of these theories were initially developed for agenda setting, e.g., Haas
(1992) applied the notion of epistemic communities to policy coordination, enabling
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 123

policymakers to articulate cause-and-effect relationships, identify state-level inter-

ests, frame issues for debates, develop policies, etc., thus partially relating to agenda
setting (i.e., framing the issues). Thus, this research attempts to clearly define key
actor categories based on both explicit and implicit agenda setting theories.

4 Data and Methods

The major research question that the paper seeks to explore is the following: (1) Who
sets the agenda for economic diversification issues in Kazakhstan over the time span
of 2011–2016? This needs to be established by contrasting the agenda setting power
of the public and media (collectively referred to as “non-experts”), academia and
think tanks (collectively “experts”), and the government. This research takes advan-
tage of the inductive nature of the content analysis method (using NVivo), analyzing
the specific nodes that emerge in the analysis process, e.g., common and divergent
patterns.
The 6-year time span is defined by evolving Internet penetration rates in
Kazakhstan. As demonstrated in Sect. 5, the share of the Kazakh population with
access to the Internet jumped from a critically low 32% in 2010 to 50.6% by 2011and
then around 56% by 2016. For comparison, Özdemir (2012) applies social media to
online campaigns in Turkey, with the Internet penetration level being 45% in 2012 and
43% in 2011 (Internetlivestats.com 2016). Kazakhstan’s fixed Internet penetration rate
of 56% in 2016 is comparable to the rate of Turkey, at 58% (Internetlivestats.com
2016), which now witnesses further proliferation of online research applications (e.g.,
Chadwick and Sengül (2015) on unemployment, Ozan-Rafferty et al. (2014) on
medical tourism, Demirdogen et al. (2010) on Turkish online banking). Moreover,
reflective of evolving online research in Kazakhstan (e.g., Sultanov et al. 2016; Tyson
et al. 2015; Dyussenov 2016), the country is highly positioned in UN e-government
rankings, 28th in 2014 globally (Egov.kz 2014), and 33rd in 2016, while ranked 7th in
Asia (Inform.kz 2016). Finally, in terms of the ICT development index, Kazakhstan
was ranked 58th in 2015 (up from 62nd in 2010), compared to 61st for Brazil, 64th for
Malaysia, and 69th for Turkey (ITU 2015). Thus, when compared to other emerging
nations, Kazakhstan appears quite well suited for conducting online research.
The data analyzed will be collected using the following sources:
1. Google Search filtered for blogs, as well as www.blogsearch.com, between
January 1, 2011, and December 31, 2016. The goal of using this tool is to
generate data to trace attention dynamics of the public with the use of content
from e-blogs and readers’ comments posted on media. Furthermore, readers’
comments will also be generated by using Google Search filtered for news (see
below). The total number of mentions serves as the proxy for public attention. To
collect mentions, the following Google commands are used: Commands “экон*
әртараптандыру (economic diversification) AND Қазақстан”(Kazakhstan) in
Kazakh,“экон* диверсиф* AND Казахстан” in Russian, and “econ* diversif*
124 M. Dyussenov

Fig. 2 Scopus interface. Source: Scopus (2017)

AND Kazakhstan” in English will be used to capture mentions on economic

diversification in Kazakhstan among Kazakh and Russian speaking parts.
2. Google Search filtered for news is employed to trace relevant media articles. The
data collected, i.e., publications by both local and international media, serve as
the proxy for media attention. Similar Google Search commands, as outlined
above for Google Search filtered for blogs, will be employed. Those media
publications that include readers’ comments will be employed to trace public
attention.
3. Scopus database and Google Scholar are employed to generate academic publi-
cations. Furthermore, some publications may be generated by using Google
Search filtered for news. This data would serve as a proxy for scholarly attention
to the issue. To search for “economic diversification” in Kazakhstan, the follow-
ing command is employed, “econ* diversif* AND Kazakhstan” (Fig. 2), which
then produces eight academic publications by Scopus and nine by Google
Scholar. Furthermore, the search of think tank articles on KIMEP University’s
website resulted in two academic publications.
4. To collect data on think tanks, their respective websites are analyzed. Google
Search led to the selection of the following key Kazakhstan-based think tanks for
analysis: the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research (www.kisi.kz), Kazakhstan
Center of Humanitarian and Political Trends (sarap.), KIMEP University (kimep.
kz), Nazarbayev University (nu.edu.kz), the Eurasian Research Institute of A.
Yassawi University, the Institute of World Economic and Politics (iwep.kz), and
the Economic Research Institute (http://economy.kz/). Additional publications may
emerge by using Google Search filtered for news. Relevant documented mentions
are collected and analyzed. It is worth noting that almost all the above-listed think
tanks produced relevant publications, except KIMEP University, which only pro-
duced two academic publications dated 2013 and no articles from think tanks.
5. Adilet.kz parliamentary legal database (Adilet 2017), from January 1, 2011,
through December 31, 2016, is used to generate data on the number of laws
related to economic diversification adopted over the period. It captures all legal
and normative acts as well as presidential decrees. Furthermore, major govern-
ment programs and documents are captured by tracing media, think tank, and
academic publications in reference to economic diversification initiatives. The
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 125

data collected serve as a proxy for government’s attention to the issue, which is
aggregated to observe its relationship between the trends of public and media
attention and trends in academia and think tank attention.
This research proposes the following units of analysis: an online article, or a piece
of e-document (for media and the government) identified by using Google search; a
blog post, or comment (the public); and an academic and think tank publication
(or abstract/summary) related to economic diversification.
It should be noted that the use of these units of analysis is not novel. For instance,
Murray (1991) analyzed e-documents used for person-to-person (online network)
interactions and developed cognitive and context-specific strategies to write personal
computer documents in a study that involved an IBM manager and his staff (as cited
in December 1996). Lörcher and Neverla (2015) analyze climate change attention
dynamics of online German news media by using news samples derived from
“Spiegel.de” and “Welt.de,” as well as readers’ comments (both on news websites
and e-blogs) as units of analysis.

5 Analyses

This section presents analyses of documented publications and mentions on eco-

nomic diversification from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2016. Divided into two
parts—quantitative analysis and qualitative (content) analysis—it seeks to analyze
and contrast these publications and mentions by each of the key actors.

5.1 Quantitative Analysis

1. Experts. The search for academic and think tank publications reveals the follow-
ing. First, academia produced totally 20 publications over the period, including
3 in 2016, 2015, and 2014, followed by 7 in 2013 and 4 in 2012 (see Table 1).
Second, the think tank community generated 53 relevant publications with the
following breakdown by year: 16 in 2016, 14 in 2015, 6 in 2014, 5 in 2013, 8 in
2012, and 4 in 2011. Thus, the total number of expert publications was 73.
2. Non-experts. The use of search engines as described above leads to 83 media
articles selected for analysis. These include 35 articles in 2016, 24 in 2015, 9 in
2014, 8 in 2013, 3 in 2012, and 4 in 2011. The search for public sentiments did
not result in any e-blog content but included readers’ comments on media articles
(12) and think tank publications (2). Thus, the total number of non-expert
publications over the period was 85. The total number of publications and articles
with public comments is 14, including 12 “public/media” articles and 2 “public/
think tank” publications. The total number can be divided by year, i.e., five in
2016, four in 2015, two in 2014, and one for 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.
126 M. Dyussenov

Table 1 Total number of publications/articles and mentions on economic diversification in

Kazakhstan among key actors in 2011–2016
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Experts Think tanks 4 8 5 6 14 17 53
Academia – 4 7 3 3 3 20
Total 4 12 12 9 17 20 73
Non-experts Media 4 3 8 9 24 35 83
The public 1 1 1 2 4 5 14a
Total 4 3 8 10b 24 36b 85b
Government 5 6 8 12 6 6 43
Source: The author’s own analytics
a
This includes 12 publications generated by media and 2 by think tanks
b
These numbers include two publications generated by think tanks, one in 2014 and one in 2016

3. Kazakh Government. The analysis of the adliet.kz database reveals a total of

103 legislative documents (such as decrees, drafts, directives, etc.). Further
filtered for substance and relevance, the number can be trimmed down to 38.
Furthermore, another five government program documents are added based on
references by media, academic, and think tank publications and articles. Thus, the
total number of government documents selected for analyses is 43. This includes
6 in 2016, 6 in 2015, 12 in 2014, 8 in 2013, 6 in 2012, and 5 in 2011. In terms of
the key bodies, these documents are adopted either by the Kazakh government
(under prime minister) or by the president. Table 1 summarizes the number of
publications and mentions by each of the key actors by year.
Table 1 demonstrates interesting observations. Indeed, over the 6-year period, it is
largely the experts, i.e., both think tanks and academia, that actually precede the
attention of non-experts, i.e., media and the public, and the government: the experts
first paid increasing attention in 2012–2013, with the think tank community produc-
ing eight publications in 2012 (a twofold increase vis-à-vis 2011) and then academia
producing seven publications in 2013 (up from four in 2012). On the other hand, in
terms of the total number of publications, non-experts produced a larger number
(85), versus experts (73), and the government (43) in 2011–2016. In other words,
though the experts seem to set the agenda on economic diversification, non-experts
demonstrate a higher degree of overall activity related to the issue. The government
occupies the middle ground with 12 legal documents adopted in 2014, following the
experts but preceding non-experts. To better visualize the patterns in attention to the
issue, Fig. 3 is helpful.
As Fig. 3 reveals, not only do experts set the agenda for the issue but also two
other players—non-experts and government—though exhibiting different trajecto-
ries. The government, while showing a spike in the number of adopted legislative
documents in 2014, slowed its activity again by 2015–2016, as was the case in
2011–2012. Non-experts, on the other hand, while dormant in 2011–2014, dispro-
portionately react with their attention spikes of 24 and 36 pieces in 2015 and 2016,
respectively. Finally, as the experts continue to show growing attention trends in
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 127

40

30
Experts
20
Non-experts
10 Government

0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fig. 3 Attention dynamics of experts, non-experts, and government, 2011–2016. Source: The
author’s own analytics

40
35
30
Think tanks
25
Academia
20
Media
15
Public
10 Government
5
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Fig. 4 Attention dynamics among all actors, 2011–2016. Source: The author’s own analytics

2015–2016, provided that their agenda setting power remains valid in the years to
come, then non-experts are expected to continue demonstrating high attention trends
comparable with, if not higher than, their 2015–2016 levels, and the government
should resume its legislative activity related to economic diversification. To better
observe specific variations in attention trends among all actors, Fig. 4 is presented
below.
Overall, as Fig. 4 above shows, while experts, non-experts, and the government
exhibit some degree of change in attention, the public largely remains dormant over
the period, with a slight increase around 2015–2016. One possible explanation is that
economic diversification had not captured the interest of the public. For instance, the
search for public sentiments did not return any results on relevant e-blogs but only
readers’ comments posted on media and think tank publications. Another is the use
of online research methods, which are likely to exclude some part of Kazakh
population out of analyses due to still expanding Internet penetration. This tentative
finding is similar to the corruption agenda setting context in Thailand (Dyussenov
2017), where the public is also found to be rather dormant. Two things are worth
noting—first, the public includes both local and international netizens since it can be
128 M. Dyussenov

challenging to clearly differentiate between these subgroups using online research

methods and second, as Internet penetration rates in Thailand over the period was
lower than in Kazakhstan varying from 24% in 2011 to 43% in 2016
(Internetlivestats.com (2016), as in Dyussenov (2017)) versus 51% in 2011 and
56% in 2016 in Kazakhstan, the inability of online research methods to capture parts
of local population becomes less plausible (although not entirely improbable).
Another observation as Fig. 4 suggests is that among the experts it is think tanks
that seem to precede academia. Yet, possible time lags due to academic publica-
tions’ reviews should be taken into account. For example, as Björk and Solomon
(2013) suggest, the period between the date received by a publisher and the date of
publication is 14.1 months for social science papers. Thus, both think tanks and
academia may roughly coincide around 2012 (again, accounting for 1 to 1.5 year
publication lags for academia). However, at a later stage (2015–2016), think tanks
demonstrate a higher degree of attention to the issue than academia. However, to
observe whether think tank discourse on economic diversification actually influences
discourse in the spheres of academia, media, the public, and government over time,
or to observe some of the other actor’s influence on one another, it is necessary to
conduct qualitative content analysis of publications. To do this, we must analyze
specific codes used by the sectors and industries where diversification is defined as
necessary to pursue types of economic diversification and other codes.

5.2 Qualitative Content Analysis

Content analysis (using NVivo) of publications for each of the key actors leads to the
selection of the following nodes: causes and effects, types of diversification, key
industries defined, and key actors (Appendix 1). A cause should be understood, in
broad terms, as a factor that is believed to influence the development of economic
diversification, versus a more specific definition of establishing causality through
statistical regressions, while an effect is what economic diversification should lead
to. The types of diversification node as defined by actors is divided into product,
market, industry diversification, diversification of the energy sector, and single-
industry towns. The notion of key industries includes those industries where each
of the actors believes economic diversification is important. Finally, the key actor’s
node embraces a set of actors (not necessarily included for analysis, e.g., interna-
tional organizations) that each of the actors believes should drive the economic
diversification policy in Kazakhstan.
First, as Appendix 2 demonstrates, with regard to causes and effects, think tanks
(13 causes, 12 effects), media (13, 3), and academia (8, 8) produced more substan-
tive outputs than the public (4 causes) and the government (5 causes). Thus, it is the
think tank community that outperforms the other actors both in terms of causes and
effects of economic diversification. Table 2 summarizes these observations.
Second, with regard to the types of diversification node, the key actors produced
the following major types of economic diversification: product diversification, i.e.,
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 129

Table 2 The aggregate number of causes and effects of economic diversification

Academia Think tanks Media The public Government
The number of causes 8 13 13 4 5
The number of effects 8 12 3 – –
Note: Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the largest number of references
Source: The author’s own analytics

Table 3 Types of diversification as defined by actors

The number of references by each of the key actors
Types of Diversification Academia Think tanks Media The public Government
Product 13 8 11 – 12
Market 11 19 30 4 15
Industrial 8 6 17 3 15
Energy (green; within the 10 (5; 5) 10 (7; 3) 17 (10; 7) – 20 (9; 11)
energy sector)
Single-industry towns 1 2 1 – 2
Note: Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the larger numbers of references
Source: The author’s own analytics

pursuing economic diversification based on expansion of manufactured products

either within a single industry or across sectors; market diversification, i.e., the need
to expand the export geography for a single product or a set of products; industry
diversification, i.e., developing new industries especially in oil- and gas-rich nations;
and diversification of single-industry towns (also known as mono-towns) either by
expanding the range of products within a given industry or developing new indus-
tries in a town. Furthermore, due to dependence of the Kazakh economy on energy
resources to sustain growth, the energy diversification node is also included in the
analysis. This node is further divided into two sub-nodes—diversification within the
energy sector and transition to green energy including renewable energy.
As Table 3 suggests, regarding the product diversification node, academia pro-
duces the largest magnitude (13), closely followed by the Kazakh government
(12) and media (11). On the contrary, the public appears dormant in this regard,
while think tanks produce moderate impact. The market diversification node, unlike
the previous node, exhibits a less ambiguous picture—i.e., media outperforms the
rest with 30 references. Regarding industrial diversification, media again produces
the largest magnitude (17), closely followed by the government (15). As for the
energy diversification node, the government outperforms the rest, with 20 references
and a further 11 references to the within the energy sector sub-node. Although media
(10) slightly outperforms the government (9) in terms of the number of references to
the transition to green energy sub-node, the difference is negligible. Finally, regard-
ing the single-industry towns node, neither actor seems to outperform the rest, with
the government and think tanks producing a marginally larger degree of impact.
130 M. Dyussenov

To summarize this section, media largely remains the most dominant actor exhibiting
a larger magnitude with regard to market and industrial types and the transition to green
energy sub-node. This is followed by the government exhibiting the largest magnitude
related to the energy diversification, including the within the energy sector sub-node.
Finally, academia outperforms the rest with regard to the product diversification cate-
gory. None of the key actors seems to emphasize the importance of promoting diver-
sification policies related to single-industry towns. This is not to suggest diminished
importance of developing single-industry towns based on diversification policy, but
rather compared to the other types of economic diversification, single-industry town
diversification is a relatively lower item on the agenda among the key actors analyzed.
Third, regarding key industries as defined by each of the actors, Table 4 (below) is
helpful. Although the range of industries is quite wide (see Appendix 1), the analysis
here focuses on more substantive industries, i.e., those generating at least five
references by each actor. Furthermore, the industries selected for analysis must not
be unique, i.e., defined by a single actor only (e.g., services as defined by the
government, Appendix 1e), to ensure adequate comparability.
As Table 4 suggests, the government produced the largest magnitude in terms of
the number of references for the selected industries (seven industries), followed by
media (three industries). The public, on the contrary, did not produce any meaning-
ful impact in defining key industries. Both think tanks and academia, though
exhibiting certain influence, fall short of producing a magnitude sufficient to qualify
these two actors as agenda setters. It is thus the Kazakh government that seems to
lead the pack in this regard.
Lastly, with regard to key actors, i.e., those deemed to play a role in shaping the
agenda on economic diversification as identified by each of the actors (Appendix 1),
the public seems to emphasize the role of media (2 references), while media tends to
refer to the Kazakh government (20) and to a lesser degree international organiza-
tions (9), followed by academia (5 media references). Academia emphasizes the

Table 4 Key industries as defined by actors

The number of references by each of the key actors
Industry Academia Think tanks Media Government
Agriculture 7 10 15 24
Chemical – – 8 9
Construction 6 – 8 7
Food 5 – – 8
ICT and digital technologies – – 7 9
Engineering and machinery 5 – 13 9
Mining 11 9 13 15
Processing 6 6 10 18
Tourism 7 – – 11
Transport 9 15 26 15
Note: (a) Italicized and emboldened numbers denote the largest number of references. (b) The
public produced negligible numbers of references, i.e., fewer than five, and thus is omitted
Source: The author’s own analytics
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 131

predominant role of the Kazakh government (16), followed by their fellows, i.e.,
academia (9 references). The think tank community largely refers to the Kazakh
government (10 references), followed by international organizations (4) and foreign
think tanks (3). Finally, the government emphasizes the importance of supporting
small and medium business, i.e., the private sector (with eight documented refer-
ences), in setting the agenda for economic diversification policy, followed by
international organizations (four). It is thus the Kazakh government that outperforms
the other actors with regard to the key actors node.

5.3 An Analysis of the Public’s Comments

This sub-section analyzes the public sentiments in relation to think tanks, media, and
international organizations, as reflected in readers’ comments to some of the
documented publications. First, while think tanks generally refer to the following
negative causes that stifle economic diversification, a lack of political rivalry and
openness, independent media, and strong civil society, the public further emphasizes
the following key factors: pervasive corruption and lack of strong civil society, i.e.,
“people are silent” (Stronski 2016). Thus while think tanks identified three distinct
negative factors, the public did so with regard to two factors, including one in
common, i.e., a lack of strong civil society and public activism. With regard to
transition to a green economy, think tanks note Kazakhstan’s leadership position
among Central Asian states in promoting the transition to a green economy into the
political agenda through the adoption of the Green Economy Concept in 2013 with a
focus on diversification based on renewable energy sources and reforming agricul-
ture and industrial sectors to spur research activity and the use of advanced technol-
ogies (Ospanova 2014). The public suggests taking a step further by amending
legislation, e.g., the Ecological Code, to formally institutionalize emission trading
and introduce a price on carbon emissions (ibid). In other words, while think tanks
believe Kazakhstan has made certain progress in transitioning to green energy, the
public deems this is not enough and that further steps are needed to bolster confi-
dence in government measures as perceived by business and the wider public.
Second, in relation to media, the public expresses two opposing views. On one
hand, the public appears to agree with some of media’s arguments: in Tokabekova
(2016), Kazakh national news portal Bnews.kz, referring to the success of key
government policies such as the National Program on Investment Attractiveness
(stage 1 for 2010–2014, stage 2 for 2015–2019), describes Kazakhstan as the most
favorable and sustainable nation in Central Asia in terms of foreign investment
attractiveness, while the public comments seem to be in line with this assessment.
Furthermore, with regard to the opening of a new armored vehicle manufacturing
factory in Kazakhstan in 2015, the media cites Chairman of Paramount Group Ivor
Ichikowitz, who positively assesses this move reflecting on Kazakh government’s
vision of diversified high-tech economy, and the public appears to agree based on
readers’ comments (DefenceWeb 2015). On the other hand, the public may be found
132 M. Dyussenov

to be in disagreement with media’s portrayal of certain issues. A Forbes.com media

article cites a Lithuania-born adviser at Samruk-Kazyna, the Kazakh national wealth
fund, who referred to the Kazakhstan 2050 strategy as the one that reforms state
enterprises, diversifying the economy away from mining and building transportation
infrastructure, and praised the 2014 “Nurly Zhol” government program to develop
transportation infrastructure (Shepard 2016). The public’s reaction was rather neg-
ative, referring to the adviser’s narrative as the “Potemkin village for foreigners”
(ibid), pinpointing his apparent lack of wealth fund management experience, espe-
cially in Kazakhstan.
Third, regarding international organizations, the public expresses negative senti-
ments. In response to a media publication, which stated that according to Moody’s
analyses Kazakh economy still failed to diversify (as in Nur.kz 2015), readers
reacted negatively by invoking the memory of Moody’s failure to predict the
financial crises in the USA to begin with, not to mention its attempt to assess the
vibrancy of the Kazakh economy (ibid). Another media piece (Blua 2011) cites a
new OECD report that urged Central Asian states to diversify their economies to
attract foreign investments, while one of the readers reacted by pointing to OECD’s
limited knowledge of the region: “As usual with OECD, the report is relevant mainly
for energy-exporting states of Central Asia” (ibid.). The negative assessment of
international organizations is also developed by academia. For instance, Pomfret
(2014) in his assessment of Kazakhstan 2030 strategy notes that major policy
documents “have the personal imprint of the President Nazarbayev” (p. 10), while
the role of international organizations remains mixed. In particular, both “the World
Bank and IMF have become more cautious about being identified as apostles of
neo-liberalism, and the United Nations, Asian Development Bank and OECD all
have different agencies. . . offering conflicting advice” (ibid.).
To conclude, the public seems generally supportive of the narrative developed by
the think tank community, jointly building a constructive dialogue with regard to
possible factors that drive the development of economic diversification policies in
Kazakhstan. On the contrary, international organizations are generally perceived
rather in negative terms by the public, i.e., lack of competence (Nur.kz 2015) and
limited knowledge of the region (Blua 2011), with regard to economic diversifica-
tion policy. Media seems to occupy the middle ground, with the public being in line
with some media narratives (e.g., Tokabekova 2016; DefenceWeb 2015), while
being opposed to other media articles (Shepard 2016; Gorst 2012).

6 Key Findings and Discussion

This research reveals a number of interesting findings. First, quantitative analysis

suggests the presence of overall agenda setting power driven by experts, i.e., think
tank and academic communities. Indeed, their attention to the issue precedes the
attention of both non-experts—i.e., media and the public—and the government.
Furthermore, as the experts continue to exhibit growing attention dynamics to
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 133

economic diversification in 2015–2016 and assuming that their agenda setting power
remains valid in another few years, non-experts should be expected to further
increase their attention trends vis-à-vis their 2015–2016 levels. The government is
also expected to resume its activity by introducing more legislation and programs on
economic diversification and intensifying discussions on parliamentary sessions
within the next few years (as Fig. 3 suggests, there should be a 2-year gap between
a spike in experts’ attention and a correlated spike in government’s attention, though
this is a tentative finding). Among experts, think tanks are found to precede
academia in terms of attention to the issue.
Interestingly, the role of the (online) public is found to be dormant. Having
assessed two initially plausible explanations—lack of netizens’ interest to the issue
versus the inability of online research methods to capture parts of public senti-
ments—the former appears more plausible than the latter. If this tentative finding
is confirmed by further studies, it should have important methodological implica-
tions in support of the overall validity of online research methods even with lower
Internet penetration rates, i.e., around 25–40% (as in Dyussenov 2017). In other
words, as long as an issue is interesting to the online public enough to spur debates,
public sentiments might intensify even with lower Internet penetration.
Next, (NVivo-based) content analysis points to further findings. With regard to
causes and effects, think tanks appear to outperform the other actors by producing
the largest magnitude in terms of the number of identified causes and effects related
to economic diversification. On the other hand, media is found to lead the pack
related to the types of diversification node by showing the largest relative magnitude.
Regarding key industries, the Kazakh government produces the largest impact by
defining seven industries (out of 10 substantive industrial sectors) where diversifi-
cation policy should be pursued. Finally, with regard to the key actors node, each of
the analyzed actors emphasizes the predominant significance, i.e., agenda setting
magnitude, of the government.
To conclude, quantitative analyses suggest the dominant agenda setting role of
think tanks in driving economic diversification policy as contrasted with other
actors. Qualitative (content) analyses exhibit a more complex picture. Think tanks
again lead in relation to causes and effects, while the government is found to be the
key actor with regard to key industries and key actors nodes. Finally, media
demonstrates the largest magnitude with regard to types of diversification.

7 An Overview of Key Think Tanks

As the findings of this research suggest the dominance of think tanks in setting the
agenda for economic diversification in the Kazakh context, it is important to provide
a brief overview of key think tanks that produced the largest impact in terms of the
number of mentions related to the issue over the period.
To begin with, out of a total of 53 documented mentions produced by the think
tank community (including both Kazakh-based and international institutions) in
134 M. Dyussenov

2011–2016, the following think tanks appear more prominent: Kazakhstan Institute
of Strategic Research (with 20 mentions produced), Nazarbayev University-based
research units (9), and the Eurasian Research Institute of A.Yassawi University (8).
The remaining think tanks—the Kazakhstan Center of Humanitarian and Political
Trends (4), the Institute of World Economic and Politics (4), and the Economic
Research Institute (3), followed by international institutions (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (2), Russian Council on International Affairs (1), Duke Social
Science Research Institute (1), and the International Institute for Environment and
Development (1))—produced far more modest contributions.
According to its website, the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Research was
established in 1993 with the mission to offer analytical support to the Kazakh
president and government (KAZISS 2017). It positions itself as the most reputed
think tank in the country due to the high professionalism of its staff and is ranked
57th among government-affiliated think tanks worldwide based on University of
Pennsylvania’s 2015 Global Go To Think Tank Index (ibid). Apart from its own
self-assessment, it is worth noting that this think tank appears to be the largest
contributor to this research in terms of the number of documented mentions.
Next, Nazarbayev University established in 2010 (NU 2017) is a fairly new
academic and research institution. Its stated aim is to educate leaders in Kazakh
public administration and science, while its core features include academic freedom
and institutional autonomy (ibid). Furthermore, among its major goals is pursuing
research excellence by developing programs of world-class research based on
partnerships with the best research institutions across the globe (ibid).
Finally, the Eurasian Research Institute, based in the city of Almaty, is affiliated
with A.Yassawi Kazakh-Turkish University based in the city of Turkistan in the
South Kazakhstan region (ERI 2017). The Institute’s mission is to conduct academic
research and project planning across various areas including economics and finance,
new technologies, sociology, politics, etc. in Eurasia (ibid).
Thus, the three dominant Kazakh-based think tanks include a well-reputed gov-
ernment-affiliated institution (KISR) and two university-based think tanks (NU and
ERI). On the contrary, among the remaining Kazakh-based think tanks, the Institute of
World Economics and Politics describes itself as a government-affiliated institution
established in 2003 under the Foundation of the First President of Kazakhstan (IWEP
2017), and the Kazakhstan Center for Humanitarian and Political Trends is viewed as a
nonprofit organization (KCHPT 2017), thus representing civil society, while the
Economic Research Institute is affiliated with the Kazakh Ministry of National
Economy (ERI 2017), thus representing civil service.
Based on the above information, it appears that with regard to organizational forms
of think tanks, it is the government-affiliated and university-based institutions that play
a predominant role. However, there are two caveats. First, while KISR produced the
largest impact with 20 mentions, its other counterpart—IWEP—produced a more
negligible contribution (with 4 mentions). Second, while both Nazarbayev University
research units and the Eurasian Research Institute (representing academia-based
institutions), their other counterpart—KIMEP University—failed to produce any
documented mentions, instead producing two relevant academic publications over
the period.
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 135

8 Conclusion and Further Research

Apart from contributing to the emerging agenda setting scholarly literature in the
context of Kazakhstan, the paper concludes that (a) think tanks set government
agenda for economic diversification policy, which provides support to the validity of
think tank-dominated agenda setting theory, and (b) the government, while produc-
ing the largest agenda setting magnitude vis-à-vis the other actors, shapes the
subsequent debates as measured by the number of relevant references in media,
think tank, and academic publications. On the contrary, media only partially shapes
the agenda with regard to the types of economic diversification as identified by the
actors.
This research raises important policy and research implications. With regard to
key policy experts and government decision-makers, the findings suggest the impor-
tance of taking into account the messages developed by local think tank communities
in the context of economic diversification in Kazakhstan. By doing this, the gov-
ernment should be better equipped to make more efficient policy decisions. On the
contrary, the role of international organizations and advisors is often weaker, as
demonstrated in Sects. 5.1 and 5.2. Regarding research implications, these findings
prima facie support the validity of think tank-dominant agenda setting theory (e.g.,
Zimmerman 2016; Shaw et al. 2014), while disproving the validity of media-
dominated agenda setting theory (McCombs and Shaw 1972), at least as applied
to economic diversification policies in Kazakhstan. This research also partially
refutes the existing literature, which suggests the predominant role of the govern-
ment and the president’s office in setting the agenda for various policy issues in
Kazakhstan, by differentiating between actual agenda setting in terms of temporal
sequence of attention (with think tanks being the leading actor) and agenda-shaping
magnitude (with the government being the more predominant actor and think tanks
and media being other, possibly less important, players).
There are certain areas for further research. First, scholars should further establish
whether the “think tank-government” agenda setting tandem plays out across other
jurisdictions, primarily across former Soviet, as well as Eurasian and East European
nations across different policy issues. Alternatively, if other actors, e.g., media,
academia, or international organizations, should be found to set the agenda, it is
important to identify specific clusters of policy issues in the domain of a specific
actor. Another area for further research is methodological. In contrast with previous
research as applied to the corruption policy agenda setting context in Thailand
(Dyussenov 2017), this research tentatively finds the possible validity of using
online research methods even with lower Internet penetration levels (p. 26). Thus,
future studies should either support or disprove it. Finally, regarding the organiza-
tional forms and affiliations of think tanks, further research should analyze whether
university-based and/or government-affiliated think tanks produce a larger impact on
setting policy agendas across other jurisdictions vis-à-vis their civil service-affiliated
and civil society-based institutional counterparts.
136 M. Dyussenov

Appendices

Appendix 1 Nodes as Defined by NVivo Content Analysis

(a) The Public

Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 137

(b) Media
138 M. Dyussenov

(c) Academia
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 139

(d) Think Tanks

140 M. Dyussenov

(e) Government
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 141

Appendix 2 Causes and Effects as Defined by Key Actors

(a) The Public

Note: The public defined causes only. Dark green denotes negatively correlated
causes, i.e., mismanagement should lead to weaker economic diversification.
142 M. Dyussenov

(b) Media

Note: Media defined 13 distinct causes (including 6 negatively correlated, as denoted

by dark green) and 3 effects of economic diversification (all positive).
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 143

(c) Academia

Note: (a) Academia defined the total of eight distinct causes (two negative and six
positive) and eight distinct effects (three negative and five positive) of economic
diversification in the context of Kazakhstan. (b) Red denotes a hypothesized cause
(i.e., foreign direct investments) that was tested in a research publication and found
not to be an important factor explaining the development of economic
diversification.
144 M. Dyussenov

(d) Think Tanks

Notes: (a) The think tank community produced 13 distinct causes of economic
diversification. These include 11 positively correlated causes (light green) and
2 negatively correlated (dark green) causes. (b) Think tanks defined 12 distinct
effects of economic diversification, including 10 positive (blue) and 2 negative
(navy blue) effects.
Who Sets the Agenda? Analyzing Key Actors and Dynamics of Economic. . . 145

(e) Government

Note: Similar to the public (Appendix 3a), the government of Kazakhstan defined
causes only. Dark green denotes a negatively correlated cause of economic diversi-
fication, i.e., incomplete infrastructure.

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Mergen Dyussenov is a PhD student at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Singapore.
Originally from Kazakhstan, he has various working experience in public, nonprofit, and private
sector organizations. His current research interests include the analysis of issue attention dynamics, an
actor-centric approach to agenda setting processes, along with the use of Internet research and content
analysis (mixed) methods. The major policy issues analyzed include corruption and economic
diversification. His research has been published by the Journal of Asian Public Policy (2017, Taylor
& Francis) and the Public Policy and Administration Journal (2016).
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes
for Participatory Governance in Ghana

Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham

1 Introduction

The growing trend of information sharing and human capacity development that is
due, in part, to globalization reflects an upshot in the changing trend in how govern-
ments, especially, engage in the decision-making processes. Since 1957, when Ghana
gained independence, there have been changing trends in the administration and
governance systems that have and still continue to engage the masses in political
affairs and governance. Thus, since Ghana began to self-govern, there have been
numerous reforms at various governmental levels. To this end, there has been
increased citizen participation in governance and easy access to information from
government. As the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence, Ghana
became a political role model in the manner that she approached issues of gover-
nance. Thus, in sub-Saharan Africa, the changes in governance, in terms of citizen
participation, became very evident especially when dictatorial rule and military
regimes ceased to dominate political discourse in the early 1970s and 1980s. The
general picture now is steady progress toward open governance and increased
democratization through which citizens are seen to have a say in government policies.
One major changing force is also the activities of think tanks. In this work, I will
use think tanks, policy institutes, and policy centers interchangeably. Policy insti-
tutes, which are also known as think tanks, have played a sufficient role in the
changing trends of governance in sub-Saharan Africa. They are public policy
research and analysis institutions that advise policy makers and the public on how
to make informed decisions about public policy through their activities (Global Go
To Think Tank 2013). According to Ayee (2000), they act as linchpins in the policy
making process since they subject public policy to strict analysis and assessment. We
note that these institutes have become a beacon of knowledge and information

K. K. A. Abraham (*)
Department of Classics and Philosophy, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 151

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_9
152 K. K. A. Abraham

providers to the extent that they have emerged as strong policy actors especially in
Ghana (Kpessah 2011).
Since the early 1990s, there has been a tremendous shift from elite-centered
policy making to a participatory approach in government decision-making in
Ghana (Ohemeng 2005). The change is partly attributed to the emergence of strong
civil society groups that have turned themselves into think tanks. Even though the
process of participation in Africa is slow, the change has been steady, and it is
estimated to improve even further. Sub-Saharan Africa has, as at the year 2012, a
total of 610 think tanks out of a global number of 6826, thus representing 8.97% of
global distribution of policy think tanks (Global Go To Think Tanks 2013). This
number seems encouraging considering the fact that almost all the 44 countries in
sub-Saharan Africa have a political history characterized by a lack of participation in
government on the part of the citizenry. Again, there have been historical anteced-
ents when political participation by the citizens had been reserved for a select few in
the society, especially the educated elite. This has been attributed to the legacies of
colonialism and the military dictatorships that took control of affairs after indepen-
dence (Miller et al. 2009).
Thus, proceeding from the legacy of a politically stifled citizenry, where partic-
ipation in governance was low, it is encouraging to see the growth of organizations
such as policy think tanks that are influencing government decisions and educating
the public on the impact of certain governmental decisions on society. In July 2001,
the space for civil society activism had expanded further through the repeal of the
criminal libel and sedition laws, which in the past had been used to intimidate the
media (Crawford 2004; Jonah 2007).
It is, however, important to note that most of these policy institutes focus more on
domestic issues and internal affairs of the various countries of origin rather than
regional or even international issues. The new trend has been the development of
institutes with a regional and global focus. Generally, Johnson and Prakesh (2007)
trace the economic history of civil society organizations, of which policy think tanks
make up a major part. They observe that the state has been seen as the main actor
dealing with negative governance externalities and other issues such as market
failures. However, due to political and administrative constraints, states are often
not able to cover the full range of needs of the citizens. This is what accounts for the
creation of civil societies to fill in the gaps left by the state as a result of political and
administrative constraints. In performing their supporting functions, policy think
tanks perform various activities that influence the people to contribute to shaping
policy as a part of civil society.
It is important to note that the role of civil society in governance has been a vital
aspect of democratization. There is no doubt that civil society promotes grassroots
participation. In this vein, it is recommended that governments, especially in devel-
oping countries, work more closely with civil society to leverage additional knowl-
edge and capacity (Heimans 2002). This is because it is only through forming closer
relationships with civil society that governments can realize concrete benefits of
participative governance. Given the major role that these institutes play as an aspect
of civil society in promoting citizen participation in governance, it is imperative that
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 153

they are given the free environment to operate. In fact, “they must be treated well,
conceptually, and, above all, relationally” (Mitlin et al. 2007). We observe therefore
that policy think tanks are considered as part of the civil society. Civil society is seen
as an arena of organized citizens and a collection of organizations that acts to balance
the state and the market, as a place where civic democratic values can be upheld
(Lewis and Kanji 2009).
In this study, I look at the development of policy institutes in Ghana and how their
activities have influenced the role of citizens in policy making. We note that these
institutes have contributed to a shift from elite or bureaucratic systems of governance
to a more participatory style through their activities. Again, these activities have
further strengthened the civil society of the country. To better understand the
potential roles of these institutes in Ghana, it is imperative to look at the political
situation in the county.
The study thus focuses on participatory governance at the grassroots level and how
the activities of think tanks promote it. Here, participatory governance involves the
collaboration of the government, civil society, and the general citizenry. We conceive
in this study that the aspect of policy institutes performs various activities that
influence the citizens to participate in governance through sharing of opinions,
advocacy, etc. Songco (2001), however, notes that there is a risk of conflict among
different sectors of civil society, especially those concerned with poverty reduction,
when participatory programs are introduced at the formulation stage. Additionally,
participatory governance is a tool for preventing corruption and other shortcomings in
government. For instance, Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2014) assert that improving gov-
ernment effectiveness should be accompanied by strategies aimed at combating
corruption.

2 Ghana’s Political Landscape

Ghana became an independent country on March 6, 1957, after decades of British

rule, making Ghana the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence. As a
British colony, the country was governed through a system of indirect rule which
stipulated that power was to be given to local chiefs who were handpicked by the
British according to their loyalty to the colonial powers (Lugard 1992). These rulers
had limited powers to control political affairs although they were in charge of routine
governmental activities. The system was thus meant to avoid any confrontation
between the masses and the colonial masters; as a result, the system of control was
passed through the traditional rulers. Thus, one of the primary roles of the rulers was
to enforce orders given by the colonial officer.
We reckon that although this system seemed to have given traditional leaders a
say in the governing of the state, it was not necessarily so. This is because the British
handed down policies and the traditional leaders were obligated to simply implement
them. Those who were seen as dissident rulers were sent into exile; for instance,
Prempeh I was exiled in Seychelles for disobeying the colonial master.
154 K. K. A. Abraham

The rule under colonialism greatly affected the organic development of the
political landscape, which could have allowed the people to participate and have a
say on who governs, how they are governed, and what policies they felt best served
their needs. It can thus be seen that the political timidity of the masses and the
ensuing apathy that developed was as a result of events that took place during the
colonial rule. The important thing is that, with such a situation, protests and
demonstrations that are seen as civil rights were banned, so political participation
at the grassroots level was indeed nonexistent.
Since independence, various events have taken place in Ghana’s political arena.
For instance, there was the establishment of a one-party state in 1964 by the first
president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. This situation further stifled political partic-
ipation because all political parties as well as all political activities were banned. The
effect was that citizens were alienated from the political process and policy making
became the primary responsibility of the elites and those holding positions of
political power. With little or no political competition, the new nation descended
into military rule during that period.
There were intermittent coup d’états that aimed to remove legitimate govern-
ments up until the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1992. Between 1966 and
1992, there were a total of four coup d’états—1966, 1972, 1979, and 1981 (Abdulai
2009). However, there have been three democratically elected governments which
also represent the various republican eras: the First Republic from 1960 to 1966, the
Second Republic from 1969 to 1972, and the Third Republic from 1979 to 1981.
These situations led to a hostile political environment which instilled political fear in
the citizens since governance was in the hands of the strong. Again, military regimes
and political instability as a result of incessant coup d’états led to weak institutions
since most of these regimes did not include institutions in the political process.
However, since the Fourth Republic in 1992, which transferred governmental rule
from the military and authoritarianism to constitutional democracy, there has been
tremendous growth in civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, and
policy institutes (Abdulai 2009). Their emergence, in fact, contributed to the political
liberalization of the country. Their activities have also awakened citizen conscious-
ness which for some time had been dormant due to the pre-existing political system.
Thus think tanks continue to play a pivotal role in determining how the state operates
in the modern governance system (Ohemeng 2005; Kpessah 2011). The experience
of four uninterrupted elected regimes since 1992 has helped in re-engaging the
masses, a political system that seeks to ensure participation. The 1992 Constitution,
under which the state is run, sets out a clear framework (Gyimah-Boadi 2008) for the
governance processes.
With the stabilization of the political system, and the establishment of multiparty
democracy, citizen consciousness has been heightened. However, with the high
illiteracy rate, unemployment, and economic hardships, many people did not seem
to be interested in political issues, which most people considered “petty,” because
they were more concerned with how to put food on the table. Thus, many people
were much more engaged in their everyday lives than in designing and participating
in policy processes and activities. The role of policy institutes has been to research
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 155

and analyze government’s policies, put it in the public domain, and, through citizen
response, influence the policy process and policy making.

3 Policy Institutes in Ghana: Developments and Activities

Policy institutes or think tanks in this case are seen as part of the wider civil society,
but their activities are recognized as a significant tool in the creation of ideas for
emerging democracies, especially developing countries (Weaver and McGann
2000). In other words, their activities have become an alternative knowledge hub
through which governments, citizens, and other civil society organizations look to
for innovative ideas for the progress of good governance. Increased participation in
Ghana’s civil societies and consequently the growth and development of policy
institutes were quite evident after 1992. The stabilization of the political landscape,
the liberalization of the airwaves, the toleration of dissenting views, and the imple-
mentation of good governance indicators have led to such steady growth.
We note, at this point, that policy institutes have been important to the political
process in Ghana. This is because governments are mostly preoccupied with admin-
istrative duties that they consider more pertinent than analyzing and evaluating
policies. Thus, the mountain of problems they then face makes it necessary for
some sectors, especially the private sector where most policy institutes are, to take on
these roles to supplement the government’s efforts. Again, most countries in the
developing world lack the capacity, especially the human resources expertise, to
make critical analyses, data assessments, and in-depth research before policy deci-
sions are made or existing policies are evaluated. This makes the activities of think
tanks a necessary supplement for governments. Policy makers and implementers in
the developing world are most notably handicapped when it comes to knowledge
and expertise as most use guess work (Turner and Hulme 1997). This is even worse
when it comes to most African states where there is little information on policy
design, means of implementation, and data availability. This is why the presence of
policy centers is seen as an important phenomenon for the strengthening of good
governance.
According to the Global Go To Think Tank (2013) index report, Ghana, as at
2013, had a total of 38 think tanks. Hence, it is ranked as having the 4th highest
number of think tanks in sub-Saharan Africa, the first being South Africa (88),
followed by Kenya (57), and Nigeria (51). These think tanks in Ghana range from
privately owned, nonprofit non-governmental policy centers, profit-oriented private
institutes, and public academic centers. Table 1 indicates a list of selected think tanks
in Ghana in no particular order. We note that the selection of these think tanks is
informed by their keen involvement in activities that promote and influence citizen
participation in governance even at the grassroots. This does not necessarily mean
that the unlisted think tanks are not active, but rather that most of their activities have
been advisory, other than grassroots participation.
156 K. K. A. Abraham

Table 1 List of randomly selected think tanks in Ghana

Policy think tank Status Website
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) Non- www.ieagh.org
governmental
Center for Democratic Development (CDD) Non- www.cddgh.org
governmental
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA) Non- www.cepa.org.gh
governmental
IMANI Center for Policy and Education Non- www.imaniafrica.org
governmental
Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) Non- www.ideg.org
governmental
Institute for Health Policy Research Non- www.healthresearchweb.
governmental org
The Integrated Social Development Center Non- www.isodeg.org.gh
(ISODEC) governmental
Centre for Policy Research and Training Non- www.cepratgh.org
governmental
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Non- www.kaiptc.org
Training Center (KAIPTC) governmental
Danquah Institute Non- www.danquahinstitute.org
governmental
Africa Center for Energy Policy (ACEP) Non- www.acepghana.com
governmental
African Center for Economic Transformation Non- www.acetforafrica.org
(ACET) governmental
Institute for Policy Alternatives (IPA) Non- www.ipaghana.com
governmental
International Food Policy Research Institute Non- www.ifpri.org
governmental
Center for Freedom and Accuracy Non- ------------
governmental
Africa Youth Peace Call www.aypcghana.org
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding Non- www.wanep.org
governmental
African Security Dialogue and Research Non- www.myafrica.allafrica.
governmental com
Third World Network Non- www.twnafrica.org
governmental
Mutatio Institute Non- http://mutatio-institute.
governmental alumniportal.com/
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Governmental www.isser.edu.gh
Research (ISSER)
Center for Social Policy Studies Governmental http://csps.ug.edu.gh
Source: Author (2015), all websites accessed in March 2015
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 157

These think tanks have various motivations and objectives for their establish-
ment. However, their activities are driven by one common motive, offering policy
alternatives to government and giving citizens the opportunity to be part of the
decision-making process as far as influencing policy making is concerned.

4 Establishments and General Characteristics

The various think tanks in Ghana were established under different mandates, pur-
poses, and objectives. A Ghanaian economist, Dr. Charles Mensa, who returned to
Ghana in the late 1980s, established the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana’s first
public policy think tank. The founder started the think tank with the goal of
establishing an institution to strengthen democracy and promote economic analysis
and growth through policy recommendations while also promoting democratic
views among citizens. In the same vein, the Centre for Policy Research and Training
(CEPRAT) and Mutatio Institute were established by young individuals who
returned from Germany after being trained in public policy and governance under
the German Education Exchange Services’ (DAAD) Public Policy and Good Gov-
ernance Programme. These institutes have become a platform for young people with
policy analysis expertise to promote citizen participation in governance through their
activities.
It is important to note that the policy institutes in Ghana mimic the American
system of policy centers. The reason for this is because most of the founders are
individuals and groups of individuals who have studied and acquired knowledge of
democratic governance, policy assessment, and the roles organizations can play in
the policy making process. We observe that public policy as an academic discipline
and vibrant practice of public policy in the United States and the United Kingdom
has had a rippling effect on some of these individuals and their views on the
importance of policy institutes.
There are few centers that can be seen as public or government owned. These
centers are also mostly attached to public universities, so their employees are remu-
nerated by the government. For instance, the Institute of Statistical, Social and
Economic Research (ISSER), the Center for Social Policy Studies, and the Center
for Development Studies are all attached to public institutions like the University of
Ghana. Their activities are not greatly different from the privately owned institutes;
however, they seek to concentrate on training in policy, economics, and/or develop-
ment fields. These centers also liaise with foreign institutes to train their staff. For
instance, ISSER has a collaborative agreement with the Center for Development
Research (ZEF), Bonn (http://www.zef.de/). Through this program, Ghanaians are
trained in fields of development up to the PhD level.
The privately owned think tanks, which form more than 90% of the total 38 think
tanks in Ghana as at 2013, have a more praxis-oriented approach to policy analysis
and policy alternatives and sometimes critically assess and challenge governmental
decisions. Some of the most vibrant in this area are Imani, CDD, the IEA, ACEP, and
158 K. K. A. Abraham

the CEPRAT, among others. Their establishment was also influenced by the Western
education that the founders acquired and policy systems they studied. This is evident
in the founding information on their websites and the educational background of
their founders. Thus, the Western public policy influence took another dimension in
sub-Saharan Africa in general and Ghana in particular. Here we posit that the
influence translated into the establishment of think tanks rather than a continuation
of the academic stream where other countries have been influenced to establish
policy schools and colleges to actually train minds and continue the academic
debate.
The reason for this is that most sub-Saharan African states, Ghana included, are
bedeviled with a plethora of problems whereby governments seem to be
overwhelmed by the task of coming up with practical and sustainable solutions to
deal with most of these problems. As a result, we assert that individuals with
Western training, not necessarily in public policy but also in economics, public
administration, and other fields, found it imperative to establish institutes that make
governments accountable in terms of information sharing, policy design and imple-
mentation, as well as participatory decision-making in governance. We further
surmise again that the institutes also assess the impact of governmental policies as
well as bring the actual implications of governmental actions to the doorstep of the
people, thereby making them part of the decision-making process.

5 Policy Institutes as a Platform for Participatory

Governance

Participatory governance involves harnessing the population’s human resource

capacity in the decision-making process when it comes to policy making. In other
words, this is when the citizens are involved in the decision-making processes before
final decisions are made; participation is not just restricted to general elections but
rather policy makers seek the people’s views and policies are laid before the public
sphere for deliberations. The importance of making policy decisions participatory is
to engage citizens in the policy process either through consultations or direct
involvement (Peters and Pierre 2000). This becomes more of a co-governance
whereby the decision-making gap between government and the citizens is not
considered to be wide. This, according to Ackerman and Fishkin (2005), is when
social actors, in this case think tanks, are invited to participate in the core activities of
the state.
We note here that decisions by governments inadvertently have consequences for
the people either in the positive or negative sense. To this end, when governments
directly involve the people in decision-making, the final policy thereof and the effect
of the policy are seen as a collective decision of both the people and the government.
This incorporation not only builds the confidence of the people in such a democratic
system but also legitimizes the final policy outcomes (Cohen and Sabel 1997). This
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 159

makes the policy making approach bottom-up and also centers policy making
strategies on deliberation and compromise. Here, there is the commitment to varying
opinions, constructive criticisms, and maximum support for policy ideas.
Kpessah (2011) distinguishes between the conventional form of decision-making,
which is based on representative governance, a participatory form of decision-
making, and a participatory approach. The conventional form in this sense conceives
of the citizen as a voter, client, subject, or even customers, while the participatory
approach sees the citizen as an activist, co-producer of policy, negotiator, and a
social cooperation partner. In this view, participatory policy making is the result of a
paradigm shift from the traditional form which is mostly seen as elitist because the
ruling class makes decisions based on either guess work or how they believe things
should be. This posture according to Esau (2008) is more paternalistic in its
orientation.
Policy think tanks in Ghana are considered to have been part of the paradigmatic
shift from traditional representative decision-making to participatory governance.
Though the successes are not at peak height, they are visible and the progress is
evident. For instance, their activities have led to being empaneled in policy deliber-
ations such as the Economic Forum as Senchi in 2015, Social Security and National
Insurance Trust, tier-two pension investigations, etc.
The dynamism in administration especially after Ghana gained her independence
has aided the penetration of the policy centers into decision-making processes.
Through these advisory committees, focus groups, consensus conferences, and
further bodies have been established (Montpetit 2003) to deliberate on national
issues and policy drafts. These groups are made up of experts and policy analysts,
some of whom are founders of and researchers for policy think tanks. For instance, in
2013, the Government of Ghana, through the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Employment and Labour Relations, set up a focus group to discuss the ways of
dealing with the newly implemented pay structure called Single Spine Salary
Structure which was estimated to be taking about 60% of government annual
revenue. Among the participants of the focus group were different heads of think
tanks and technocrats who were involved in policy analysis at the various policy
institutes.
Policy institutes employ various approaches at raising citizens’ interest in partic-
ipatory decision-making. Thematically, the major approaches that these think tanks
employ are advocacy; policy analysis; public debates, conferences, workshops, and
colloquiums; and capacity building and training.

5.1 Advocacy

There are many different types of advocacy. It definitively involves action being
taken in the form of writing, acting, etc. by an individual or a group to promote,
protect, or defend the interest of a group or to affect decision-making through
education (Casey 2011). Many advocacy programs are employed by think tanks,
160 K. K. A. Abraham

and this accounts for citizen awareness in governance. For instance, ISODEC
conducts its activities through rights-based advocacy programs whereby they seek
to ensure transparency and accountability in governance, responsiveness and equity
in the management of natural resource revenues, and access of the poor to essential
services, etc. (www.isodec.org.gh, accessed in March, 2015). ACEP and CEPRAT,
on the other hand, employ training and advocacy as the core activities with specific
reference to Ghana’s energy resources and general policies on governance. The
CDD is predominantly seen as a research and advocacy institute. This is not limited
to one think tank. It is commonly accepted that almost all of these organizations have
advocacy strategies since this is the easiest means of getting information across to
either the policy makers or the citizens. For instance, the ACEP engages citizens on
regional bases in a symposium to explain the state of Ghana’s oil exploration and
how the government has managed the oil revenue so far. This advocacy activity has
sensitized many people to gain first-hand information on the extent to which the oil
revenue is either mismanaged or well-managed by government.
Again, the CEPRAT has established policy clubs in tertiary institutions where they
discuss, hold seminars, and assess pertinent issues concerning the country such as
corruption, peaceful elections, national health insurance, etc. Another example is the
Danquah Institute’s which major activity is advocacy. For instance, the Institute has
been a strong advocate for the use of biometric registration and verification for
elections in Ghana. This has been adopted and is being used to conduct elections.
Advocacy is the major activity of ISODEC as well. Through this, the ISODEC
defends and promotes the provision of public goods, accountability of public
resources, and community engagements. It is also dedicated to what it calls “peo-
ple-centered advocacy.” This creates awareness at the grassroots level on governance
and public resources issues. This initiative gives remote areas the opportunity to
participate in governance through the sharing of ideas to shape public policy. The
WANEP focuses on using dialogue as an approach to building peace. The organiza-
tion also uses training of community leaders and opinion leaders to help in peace-
building. Their activities, therefore, engage the grassroots level and expose them to
the various benefits in conflict prevention and peace-building. Furthermore, the IEA
makes its research known to stakeholders and the general public through advocacy
and advising. Here, they engage directly with stakeholders through various programs
to present their research and offer advice. In the same vein, the Third World Africa
Network engages in advocacy on policy issues such as political economy, gender,
environment, etc.

5.2 Policy Analysis

Citizen participation in governance includes creating the socioeconomic understand-

ing of government’s policies from a nonpartisan perspective. One of the duties of
governments is the redistribution of income to help bridge the inequality gap
between the rich and poor. In performing this duty, government engages in policy
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 161

design and implementation. It is imperative that citizens understand and appreciate

the various policies such as health insurance, social security, unemployment support,
etc. and know the extent of its effects. In this vein, think tanks engage in policy
analysis for the purposes of evaluating and creating citizen awareness of govern-
ment’s policies. Here, there are many analyses on fiscal policy and development
policy, as well as the general economic health of a country.
Within the policy analysis framework, there are various thematic areas for
analysis. Policy institutes produce analytical reports and put them in the public
domain to help the masses better understand the effects and impact of the policy
proposed by the government. For instance, there are analyses concerning the eco-
logical and agricultural sectors of the economy.
Again, there are analyses of foreign direct investments inflows, skills develop-
ment, education, policies on export promotion, etc. The Center for Social Policy
Studies, which is affiliated with the University of Ghana, aims at designing, devel-
oping, and improving the social welfare system through the development of a
comprehensive social welfare policy. Even broader is the approach of the ISSER,
which is also affiliated with the University of Ghana. They engage in research in the
areas of statistics and social and economic research to help policy makers decide on
the best policy for national development. Also, the ISODEC and IDEG engage in
assessing policies that are mostly community-based like rural electrification, educa-
tion, and health.
Additionally, CEPA engages in economic policy research and analysis. Here, the
Center takes a nonpartisan approach to analyzing fiscal policy issues, inflation,
exchange rate development, and the economic outlook in Ghana and the African
subregion. The CDD also undertakes policy research on various governance themes
which allows for citizen participation and various views on governmental issues
through its annual programs such as the Afro-Barometer, Transparency and Account-
ability Project, the African Power, and Politics Program among other things. Even
more, ACET is focused on economic policy analysis for transformational growth,
especially in Africa. Through this, the ACET also engages in policy advising and
advocacy. Here, they engage with stakeholders for the purposes of achieving trans-
formational and sustainable growth. This gives the opportunity to citizens and
individuals across the continent to know and understand the economic development
patterns in Africa. The IFPRI is dedicated to proposing policy solutions for poverty
reduction and hunger. These are mostly done through research and advocacy.
In the same vein, IPA mostly engages in policy research and advice. Through this
they use participatory tools such as citizen reports to inform citizens on important
policies, as well as solicit for views on design and implementation mechanisms.
Likewise, the IEA engages in rigorous policy analysis. Here, government policies on
employment, economic growth, governance, financial management, etc. are
subjected to scrutiny. We note that people who have strong academic backgrounds
also run most of these think tanks and this provides the opportunity to apply their
research experience in the academic field to their policy analyses. For instance, the
heads of IDEG, CDD, CEPRAT, IEA, and CEPA are all individuals who have
strong academic training in research and field advocacy. The import is that they
162 K. K. A. Abraham

create an avenue where their activities do not alloy supplement governance but also
contribute to the academic discourses on the various areas of research.

5.3 Public Debates, Conferences, Workshops, and Colloquia

In public debates, there are various conferences, seminars, and colloquiums orga-
nized to release information into the public domain. Here, policy institutes have
various policy review magazines, journals, and blogs where they publish their
findings, as well as written papers and memorandums. This provides the opportunity
for the wider population to have access to the information and activities of these
think tanks. Also, think tanks like the Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) organize
presidential debates for representatives of political parties during general elections.
This is a new phenomenon in our body politic where questions are requested from
the general public and sorted out for the candidates to answer. Additionally, there are
panel discussions on radios and television programs to discuss the government’s
policies, the general state of the nation, the annual budget, and other issues of public
interest.
The IEA, on the other hand, publishes the legislative alert, governance, economic
review (midyear), quarterly highlights, and more. The CDD and CEPA produce
publications that are all meant to disseminate information on policy issues to the
public. Specifically, the CDD organizes workshops and roundtable discussions with
the involvement of leading actors on pertinent issues such as electoral violence,
extractive sector governance, transparency, and others. Research is presented and
discussed in workshops and roundtable discussions: media, politicians, and policy
makers are invited on a regular basis, potentially influencing policy processes and
policy making.
For instance, the Danquah Institute engages in conferences and seminars to
publicize their views on government policies. Being a politically oriented (partisan)
think tank, it uses these conferences to push for a property-owning approach to
capitalism and a free market economy. Also, CEPA organizes seminars that are
mostly to unveil research findings and results to the general public. Thus, their
research activities are directly linked with their workshops and seminars. The IEA
and ACET are also noted for organizing conferences and seminars that are mostly
attended by presidents and other experts in Africa.

5.4 Capacity Building and Training

Capacity building also involves capacity development which is a vital role played by
policy institutes. Capacity development has gradually become the center of attention
in the development discourse over the past few years, and it constitutes an increas-
ingly important strategy in development today (Ulleberg 2009). Furthermore,
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 163

capacity building is sometimes conceptualized as capacity development,

expecially when describing their activities or mandate or using the equivalent
notions of “capacity building,” “providing an enabling environment,” or “develop-
ing abilities” (Eade 1997).
Capacity building and training involves the improvement of the human resource
capacity of individuals and groups who are interested in policy analysis. Through
this, policy institutes organize trainings for people, including politicians, and also
offer internships and volunteer opportunities for citizens who are interested in policy
analysis. Internships give opportunities to people who may not necessarily have any
policy background to get at least 3-month training and work experience with these
institutes. Some institutes also offer to host graduates who are doing their national
service. In regard to institutional capacity building, the IEA is dedicated to strength-
ening the institutional capacity of both the public and private sectors to enable them
to perform more efficiently.
Thus, governmental institutions such as parliament, district assemblies, etc. gain
from the institute. Again, the institute helps political parties during elections through
training programs and other logistical support. Volunteers are also sought mainly to
help in large research projects. These people are given in-service training that adds to
their knowledge base and can enable them to transfer and improve upon their
previous knowledge. Again, there are school and college programs such as those
run at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Institute of
Development Studies at the University of Cape Coast, and the University of Ghana
Business School to name a few, aimed at targeting students to better understand
governmental policies and to appraise the impact assessment of implemented
policies.
Other centers such as the IEA, CEPA, CDD, ACET, KAIPTC, etc. are dedicated
to training politicians and stakeholders on policy design and analysis. These train-
ings are done in the form of roundtable discussions, seminars, and other formats.
This approach is taken by almost all the major policy think tanks to help make them
reach their target groups. For instance, CDD has a range of programs for building the
human capacity of state agencies, constitutional bodies, and other interested agen-
cies. Programs such as the media literacy and anti-stigmatization programs are
prominent. Also, the CEPA engages in programs that aim at building the capacity
of state institutions such as parliament and the civil society. There are also school
and college programs that are organized periodically to enlighten the youth on
governmental policy trends. Again, through the African Trade Network (ATN),
TWN Africa provides training and information on trade to many civil society
organizations. This has an indirect link with educating the grassroots level on issues
that are mostly community-based.
164 K. K. A. Abraham

Table 2 Activities of randomly selected think tanks in Ghana (Author, 2015)

Public debates,
Policy conferences, Capacity
Policy think tanks Advocacy analysis workshops building
Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) x x x x
Center for Democratic Development x x x x
(CDD)
Center for Policy Analysis (CEPA) – x x x
IMANI Center for Policy and x x – –
Education
Institute of Statistical, Social and x x x –
Economic Research (ISSER)
Institute for Democratic Governance x x x –
(IDEG)
Institute for Health Policy Research x x – –
The Integrated Social Development x x x –
Center (ISODEC)
Africa Center for Development and x x – –
Integrity
Danquah Institute x x x –
Kofi Annan International Peacekeep- x x – x
ing and Training Center (KAIPTC)
Africa Center for Energy Policy x x – –
(ACEP)
African Center for Economic Trans- x x x –
formation (ACET)
Center for Social Policy Studies – x – x
Institute for Policy Alternatives (IPA) x x – –
International Food Policy Research x x – x
Institute
Center for Freedom and Accuracy x x – –
Africa Youth Peace Call x x – –
Center for Development Studies – x – x
West Africa Network for x x x x
Peacebuilding
African Security Dialogue and x x x –
Research
Centre for Policy Research and x x – x
Training
Source: Author (2015), all websites accessed in March 2015

5.5 Synthesis

The policy think tanks listed in Table 2 follow no preferential order. However, their
selection, which is based on the criteria of their activism in the various activities listed
over and above other think tanks that were not selected, satisfies a pattern that
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 165

effectively influences citizen participation in participatory governance. These think

tanks operate with systematically updated websites and/or communication methods
in order to get information about their activities with the people. The table below
indicates where their focus lies when it comes to specific activities. The main
activities that are aimed at improving citizen participation in governance are advo-
cacy, policy analysis, public debates, conferences, workshops, and capacity building.
For my assessment, I gathered information from the websites of the various think
tanks from the period between 2013 and 2015, as well as the media reportage of their
activities. My assessment shows that more than 90% of the think tanks engage in
advocacy and policy analysis. This has been the broad base activity through which
grassroots change is influenced. This is mainly because such activities require fewer
resources as compared to other activities. They educate the people sometimes
through the media and also engage in in-depth analyses on policy implementation
by the government and then publish it for interested readers.
My assessment in Table 2 also indicates that about 60% of the think tanks engage
in public debates, conferences, workshops, and seminars on a regular basis. The
table shows the strength of the think tanks when it comes to these activities. It is
important to note, however, that almost all of the think tanks offer seminars or
conferences at some point. The table looks at how deeply these think tanks engage in
these activities to promote citizen participation in governance. Few think tanks
prioritize a strategy to mobilize the people to understand and take part in public
decision-making. In terms of capacity building, there lacks a sense of variety and
vibrancy in the activities of the think tank. Think tanks that concentrate on purely
academic research are the most active ones. These think tanks train people in
master’s degrees and other professional courses. Table 2 gives an overview of the
think tank activities in Ghana related to the selected institutes.

6 Assessment of Activities on Citizen Participation

From the time that Ghana gained independence in 1957 until the beginning of the
Fourth Republic in 1992, bureaucrats and politicians were solely in charge of policy
making. According to Carroll et al. (2003), policy making has become the job
description of management teams, core civil servants, and politicians. Here,
decision-making enabled the ruling elite to develop their leadership style, which
was mainly authoritarian, through the policies they made for those actually affected
by those policies.
The grassroots involvement of citizens through the activities of policy think tanks
has led to the incorporation of the nonprofit sector into the policy making process.
This is an improvement in the political system that existed from the precolonial,
colonial, and early part of the postcolonial period. Apart from the colonial regime,
the various authoritarian regimes from 1957 on governed with the practice of
reducing and excluding the private sector, civil society, trade unions, etc. from the
policy making process (Tsikata 2001).
166 K. K. A. Abraham

Through their activities, citizens are now largely aware of governmental decisions.
There is a movement from passive citizenry to participative citizenry. For instance,
the citizen approach to issues such as electoral reforms before the 2012 general
elections in Ghana and the legal struggles after the elections evidently shows the
widespread interest in governance. Additionally, through the activities of policy think
tanks, public discussions on major issues such as erratic energy supply, water,
sanitation, and other themes have taken on a different dimension that has
overwhelmed governments. Suddenly, everyone seems ready and eager to contribute
to national debates on radio and television stations during phone-in programs.
According to Ohemeng (2005), these think tanks have become a catalyst for
complementing government’s policies by educating the populace on public policies
that are vital for the development and marketization of Ghana. Thus, through this,
the various policy institutes are dedicated to the promotion of rights, governance
based on the rule of law, strengthening the market economy, and promoting liber-
tarian society among other concerns. Some have also become what Ohemeng (2005)
refers to as policy mediators, whereby their assistance is sought to help in conflict
resolution.
Again, past and successive governments have been taught the importance of
involving these institutes in policy making. This has happened in situations whereby
these think tanks have formed coalitions with non-governmental organizations. For
instance, a coalition between the TWN, ISODEC, and NGOs led to the adoption of a
tripartite committee to review the Structural Adjustment Programme when that
policy started facing problems of implementation (Britwum et al. 2001).
It is important to note that apart from the Danquah Institute, which is affiliated
with a political party, these think tanks are purely nonpartisan. Since their basic aim
is to influence governmental policies through objective research and analysis, it is
imperative that they remain objective in performing their duties and this is consid-
ered to be an important feature of most think tanks. Because of this important feature,
they are able to better inform the people who are, for the most part, deeply divided by
political affiliation between two main political parties: the New Patriotic Party (NPP)
and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). We should not lose sight of the fact,
however, that occasionally politicians associate some of these think tanks with some
parties depending on how critical the institute is to the party in power.
The activities that the think tanks employ have had an enormous impact on citizen
participation in governance. Through advocacy, these institutes, rather than the
government, have made policy information that was previously shrouded in secrecy
available to the people. This effect is enhanced through the various advocacy
strategies that they employ. Some accomplish this through panel discussions in the
media. And since these policies are discussed in the local language by representa-
tives of the think tanks during panel discussions and phone-in periods, the populace
is able to listen to and understand even complex policy issues. Ultimately, they are
able to share their views which can possibly lead to mass demonstrations when a
policy is not received well by the people. We note here that some advocacy means
are very subtle, while others are very rigorous, such as lobbying. Rigorous advocacy
is not largely seen to be employed by these think tanks. This is because the aim has
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 167

not been to push a certain agenda, but rather to give the government policy
alternatives and educate them on the implications of the proposed policies. Thus,
through advocacy, there is a general understanding among the people of what
government needs to do and not to do. This is a very promising sign for a growing
democracy.
Like advocacy, all the think tanks are involved in policy analysis. Through this,
they become critical of the government and conduct impact assessments of govern-
mental policies. For instance, think tanks have for some time now placed the current
salary structure in Ghana under scrutiny, with some institutes putting forward the
view that public servants are overpaid, while others are of the view that it was rather
the implementation strategy of the salary structure that was problematic.
Again, the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana has for some time now
been under the policy analysis microscope (Agyepong and Adjei 2008). This has
been necessary because the current state of the scheme is seen as collapsing.
Through their analysis, policy alternatives have been proposed on how to revamp
the scheme. Policy analysis on Ghana’s oil revenue and use was and continues to be
even more pertinent, especially after the then government decided to collateralize the
oil revenue for 15 years to acquire a $3 billion Chinese loan in 2014. Under normal
circumstances this would only be a parliamentary and elitist discussion, but the role
that think tanks played in getting the information into the public domain empowered
every Ghanaian to have an opinion and to share it. The effect is that people are now
issue-centered and are open to decisions that governments propose and make. This
has also been reflected in the body politic when it comes to political campaigning.
Public debates such as the presidential debates have been a new phenomenon in
Ghanaian politics; in addition to these, conferences, roundtable discussions, focus
groups, workshops, and colloquiums have been an effective tool for mass enlight-
enment and citizen participation. Since the aim has been to influence policy making,
involving the public through these activities leads to a larger influence in govern-
mental policy making since the activities bring the grassroots base to the policy
domain. Through this, capacity building, education, and training have also devel-
oped young minds who are now very interested in policy and public administration.
The Center for Social Policy is now known to run a postgraduate program in social
policy. This has put an academic touch on policy knowledge. The program boasts of
a student body characterized by a broad range of backgrounds and fields from the
private to the public sector including politicians. This is a vital approach to bringing
policy making as an academic activity into the broader academic setting. Many
student alumni, trained individuals, interns, service personnel, and volunteers
acquire knowledge that is very important for grassroots participation and activism
in understanding governmental policies.
The activities of the policy think tanks have in no uncertain terms contributed to
the shift from the traditional bureaucratic and elitist decision-making to a more
participatory and deliberative form of policy making. This progress is not all perfect,
however, since there are still many aspects of governance systems that ought to be
put into the public sphere for more objective discussion. For instance, the politici-
zation of the educational system in Ghana is an important theme, as the duration of
168 K. K. A. Abraham

secondary education keeps switching between 3 and 4 years depending on which

party is in government.
Again, there are periods when the government fails to see recommendations by
these think tanks as relevant and this case is an example of such a situation. This is
because there seems to be unanimous agreement by policy experts and civil society
on the need to make secondary education a 4-year program, but the government has
ignored such recommendations presumably because it was a policy implemented by
the opposition when they were in power. Instances like this sometimes make the
work of these institutes just a formality and without any meaningful impact on
governance. However, when concerned citizens become engaged, they can have a
meaningful impact on public policy. This indirectly puts pressure on the government
since it then becomes a public issue rather than a recommendation from a policy
institute. In the end, citizens are empowered, enlightened, and informed about
government policies which help them to be part of policy making through partici-
patory democracy.

7 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the impact of policy institutes on citizen involvement in
governance and policy making. This feat has been achieved through the grassroots-
oriented activities that the think tanks employ to influence public policy. The various
strategies inherent in the major activities of the policy think tanks have all contributed
to increased citizen participation in governance. The progress of citizen participation
is very much seen as an improvement in the state of governance when we assess the
political history of Ghana. Having gone through the colonial stage to a one-party
system, and then to the various military and authoritarian regimes, it seemed natural
for citizens to be less politically concerned when it comes to governance. Addition-
ally, the state of the economic health and living conditions also made political issues
and policy making less of a priority for citizens to be concerned with since their major
focus was on how to earn a sustainable income necessary for survival. This accounts
for why policy making and decision-making at the government level were more elitist
than participatory in the period between 1957 and 1992. However, with the liberal-
ization and democratization of the state, citizens have been included in the decision-
making process and policy implications less by government and more by civil
society, of which think tanks are a part. Their activities have undoubtedly given
many average Ghanaians the opportunity to understand and assess the implications of
some governmental policies for themselves.
The Role and Activities of Policy Institutes for Participatory. . . 169

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Kow Kwegya Amissah Abraham holds a Master of Philosophy from the University of Cape
Coast, Ghana, and a Master of Public Policy degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy
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policy, ethics, political philosophy, and law.
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy
Making in Developing Countries: The Case
of a Donor-Funded Community-Driven
Development Program in The Gambia

Lamin O. Ceesay

1 Introduction

The following contribution begins with an introduction of the case, The Gambia, and
a discussion of its background and the set of events that culminated into a local
governance and decentralization reform in the country. This is followed by a
description of the contexts in which public policy making is pursued in developing
countries and the various policy transfer/lesson-drawing approaches that are being
used. This helps to lay a fitting foundation and thus puts the case discussion within
an analytical framework. The rest of the discussions focuses on drawing evidence
from secondary sources to demonstrate where The Gambia’s local government and
decentralization policy came from, who formulated/transferred these policies and
why supranational organizations engage in policy transfer, and what policy objects
are transferred.

2 Country Overview and Context of Decentralization

in The Gambia

After political independence, countries in sub-Saharan Africa went through waves of

decentralization reform processes. In the past decades, the desire to shift power to
sub-national governments in sub-Saharan Africa was motivated by the different
countries’ desire to ensure democratic governance, better managed intrastate
conflicts that characterized postindependent Africa, rapid urbanization, and to
accelerate development. Although the reform processes continue to be inhibited by
inadequacies regarding the availability of resources and ineffective collaboration

L. O. Ceesay (*)
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 171

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_10
172 L. O. Ceesay

between various stakeholders, decentralization policy formulation and implementa-

tion began in The Gambia in the late 1980s (Alam 2009, p. 28; Sowe 2017, p. 111).
The Gambia is a small subtropical country in West Africa occupying an area of
about 10,689 sq. km. She shares borders to the north, east, and south with Senegal,
with an 80 km coast on the Atlantic Ocean in the west. She has an island capital city,
Banjul. The River Gambia divides the country into north and south banks. The
country has a total area of approximately 11,300 km2 (4388 sq. miles) out of which
1300 km2 is comprised of bodies of water (Ministry of Finance and Economic
Affairs 2018, p. 1). English is the official language of communication in The Gambia
and other spoken local languages. As of 2018, The Gambia has seven administrative
regions: Banjul City Council, Kanifing Municipal Council, West Coast Region
(Brikama), Lower River Region (Mansa Konko), North Bank Region (Kerewan),
Central River Region (Janjanbureh), and Upper River Region (Basse). It also has
eight local government authorities—one city council, one municipality, and six area
councils. These councils are Banjul City Council, Kanifing Municipal Council,
Brikama Area Council, Mansa Konko Area Council, Kerewan Area Council,
Janjanbureh Area Council, Kuntaur Area Council, and Basse Area Council.
Since The Gambia was under the colonial administration and its indirect rule
system of government, local government administrations have been a critical com-
ponent of her overall governance and development structures. They are key players
not only in the areas of economic development but equally in the areas of mainte-
nance of law and order, environmental protection, growth, and employment. The
central government is able to inject valuable insight into its development policy
design and governance processes only through its frequent interactions with local
government authorities. The Government of The Gambia, as far back as the early
1980s, began rethinking its approaches to development and governance and how it
could ensure greater participation of its citizens in the activities of national socio-
economic and political development (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs
2011, p. 95).
To achieve its decentralized objectives, the Government of The Gambia pursued
some of the following actions: (1) assist local government authorities, technical line
departments, and community institutions to coordinate, inspect, implement, manage,
monitor, and evaluate decentralized development programs in a democratic and
transparent manner and (2) promote civil society (NGOs and CBOs) and people’s
participation in determining the country’s destiny through a participatory develop-
ment process (ibid., p. 96).
Decentralized administrative reforms in The Gambia, as of late, have been
accelerated through the enactment of the country’s 1997 Constitution and its relevant
provisions like sections 193–194 and 214 (3), all of which provided for decentral-
ization through the devolution of some central government functions to the local
governments. And in line with the decentralization strategy, several enabling policy
and legal frameworks have been formulated on local government reform. Notable
among these policy and legal frameworks are the Local Government Act of 2002,
Local Government Amendment Acts (2004, 2006, and 2007), Finance and Audit Act
2004, and the establishment of Local Government Service Commission. A National
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 173

Steering Committee was established to implement the reforms, whereas the response
from the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Religious Affairs was the
establishment of the Directorate of Local Governance for smooth formulation and
coordination of decentralization reforms (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009; Ministry
of Finance and Economic Affairs 2011, 2018).
The Local Government Act 2002; the subsequent amendments of 2004, 2006,
and 2007; and the Finance and Audit Act of 2004 outlined the framework for large-
scale fiscal and functional decentralization of the public sector. The legislations
restructured the public sector beginning with the demarcation of local government
areas, the new institutional arrangements or structures, and staffing. Equally pre-
scribed by the legal instruments are the obligations of the central government toward
the councils, what authorities and services the center must devolve to the councils
both functional and fiscal, and the terms and conditions for the provision of grants to
the local councils. Such basic services like education, health, agriculture, road
maintenance, sanitation, and animal husbandry are identified as the domains of the
councils; however, the devolution is incomplete without the concomitant transfer of
the needed resources from the central to the local government administrations to run
and maintain these services.
Decentralization serves as the foundation for The Gambia Government’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), its Strategy for Poverty Alleviation (1994
and 2003) and Vision 2020 (1996), Program for Accelerated Growth and Employ-
ment (PAGE 2012–2015), and the National Development Plan (NDP 2018–2021).
The cornerstone of all of these is a participatory approach to sustainable develop-
ment and poverty alleviation (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 8).
However, the Government of The Gambia’s actions to deepen decentralization
have been frustrated by certain challenges. Among which are inadequate Government
budget allocations to facilitate decentralized governance, participatory community
planning, and development interventions and weak capacity of local decentralized
structures to plan and implement their own development initiatives (Ministry of
Finance and Economic Affairs 2011, p. 96). Similar sentiments are shared in The
Gambia National Development Plan (NDP 2018–2021) (Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs 2018, p. 23) and the report on the Decentralisation in The Gambia
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 9).
As of 2018, in the areas of human and institutional capacity strengthening at all
levels of the decentralized structures, there is no comprehensive capacity building
plan to facilitate capacity building at all levels. Out of the eight local government
councils in The Gambia with regard to the evidence-based planning, monitoring, and
evaluation front, “only 37 percent (3) of councils have strategic plans” (Ministry of
Finance and Economic Affairs 2018, pp. 24–25). In the area of standardized financial
management and accounting systems, presently, only one out of eight councils has a
resource mobilization plan in place, while “only 37 per cent of councils have
computerized financial management packages” (ibid., p. 25). Table 1 summarizes
the decentralized structures of The Gambia.
174 L. O. Ceesay

Table 1 Summarized decentralized structure of The Gambia

Development mandate in LG Act
Level Structures 2002
Local Govern- Local Government Authority (Local Area – Coordinates development plans
ment Areas Council) and programs
(LGAs) – Elected councilor from each ward – Promotes economic, social,
– Finance, establishment, development spatial, and human settlement
committee policy
Local Government Services – Plan and implement any pro-
– Departments of finance, services, plan- gram or project for developing the
ning and development, and administration infrastructure, improve social ser-
vices, developing human and
financial resources
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) – Provides technical advice to area
– Central government’s technical depart- council, WDCs, and VDCs to
ment that have extension workers at ward ensure local projects conform to
and village levels (MDFTs) the national standards, policies,
– Representatives of locally involved and priorities
NGOs
Ward Ward Development Committees – Coordinate and prioritize all
– Ward councilor (chair) development planning at the ward
– Male and female elected representatives level
from each VDC – Prepare ward development plans
– Representatives of organizations – Coordinate development assis-
involved in ward level development tance at ward level
activities – Review village plans to identify
– Other co-opted members shared prioritizes and concerns
– May establish subcommittees – May operate bank accounts
Village Village Development Committees – Identifying and prioritizing local
– Male and female representatives from development needs, in consulta-
each Kabilo (clan) tion with the local community
– Male and female representative of each – Developing plans; raising,
community-based organization (CBO) coordinating and managing finan-
– Youth representative cial resources at village level
– Other co-opted members – Implementing and managing
– May establish subcommittees development plans and projects at
village level
– Carrying out other functions as
assigned by the area council or
WDC
– May operate bank account
Adapted from Project Appraisal Document on a proposed grant by the Government of The Gambia
for a community-driven development project, May 24, 2006

3 Public Policy-Making Process in Developing Countries

Many policy scientists have argued that public policy making involves a complex
interactive process, rather than a mere one-off technical function of governments.
The fact that the process is interactive has been influenced by a variety of sociopo-
litical, economic, and environmental factors. The environmental factors that
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 175

characterize the policy context are responsible for the policy variations not only in
the kinds of inputs that are supplied, or the demands made to the system, but also in
the results realized in the differences in public policy processes in dissimilar
contexts, thus influencing both the policy output and impact. As a result of the
differences in their policy contexts, significant variations are realized between public
policies processes of the developed countries and those of the developing countries
(Abdul Mu’eez et al. 2018; Aiafi 2017; Dery 2000; Osman 2002).
Public policies in developing countries are immensely influenced by volatile
sociopolitical environments and other challenges such as ill health, malnutrition,
poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, low living standards, and others. As a result,
Osman (2002) referred to public policies in developing countries as having special
peculiarities that are unlike those of the developed nations. According to him, policy
refers “to a broad statement that reflects future goals and aspirations and provides
guidelines for carrying out those goals.” He provided another definition where policy
means “the product of political influence, determining and setting limits to what the
state does” (p. 38).
Potoae Roberts Aiafi (2017) argued that public policy has been defined differently
by different scholars and according to her, the term refers to any of the following:
(. . .) ‘what governments do, why they do it and what difference it makes’, (. . .) or ‘the sum
of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents as it has influence on the
lives of citizens’ (. . .) or ‘an emergent, self- organizational, and dynamic complex system
(p. 452).

In short, policy is any course of action or decision taken by government to

provide a solution to a social issue and one, which has to have a deliberate strategy
for planning and implementation.
A consensus has been reached among policy scientists such as Osman (2002),
Aiafi (2017), and Abdul Mu’eez et al. (2018) that the best way to conceptualize
public policy is in terms of a process. The reason being that policy decision-making
is neither static nor confined to any one level of government and that the process is
best conveyed using the process analogy and not a one-off or a single act of a
government or any of its agencies (Dery 2000; Osman 2002, p. 38). Policy processes
involve a network of political activities and interactions such as bargaining, nego-
tiation, lobbying, and accommodation of a variety of interests within which not only
decisions flow but where programs are formulated and implemented. Thus, organi-
zations become dependent on each other within this network of political interaction
through frequent interactions and program implementation. Due to activities and
interactions involved in public policy processes, Osman referred to policy making as
both complex and dynamic with a “series of actions and inactions of varieties of
groups with varieties of interests at different stages,” rather than a simple process
(2002, p. 38).
Actors in the policy process that play active roles include officials of public
institutions, private sector organizations, civil society groups, and individuals. The
series of interactions between the officials of public and private sector organizations
176 L. O. Ceesay

in the policy-making process is what “constitutes the structure of the political system
within which policy actors influence the policy process,” and it is again due to these
differences existing between the structures of political systems of the developed and
developing countries that differentiate their policy-making processes (ibid., p. 39). In
the words of Osman (2002), “This makes the existing theories or models of public
policy-making derived from the developed countries inadequate to explain the
policy making process of developing countries” (p. 38).
According to him, an important distinction is that
Compared to the developed countries, policies of developing countries are less responsive to
the demands of the environment. On the other hand, support from the society as input for
decision-making is also less significant in the developing country context (p. 39).

Research findings of Aiafi (2017) and Osman (2002) show that developing
countries have certain common sociopolitical and economic characteristics that result
in them having some distinct policy contexts compared to developed countries.
Ferdous Arfina Osman’s (2002) article entitled Public policy making: theories
and their implications in developing countries, where she examined the health
policy-making process of Bangladesh as a developing country, has identified some
common features among developing countries’ policy-making environment. Firstly,
she observed that in developing countries in particular, those that have experienced
colonialization, the “state elites frequently find themselves facing weak and disor-
ganized societies. Their own autonomous preferences can thus play a large role-at
least initially” (p. 46).
In developing countries, interest groups are “less organized. . .thus cannot
become dominant over the state machinery and in the same way, professionals in
developing countries are less dominant than their counterparts in the developed
countries.” Secondly, the fact that in the developing countries, decision-making is
“highly centralised. . . the state assumes the key role in policy making.” With regard
to agenda setting, for instance, in developing nations, noted (Osman 2002, p. 46),
state actors are “frequently the most important actors in placing issues on an agenda
for government action, assessing alternatives and superintending implementation.”
Thirdly and the most important argument regarding the subject matter of this
chapter is that the “scarcity of financial resources in developing countries has made
donor agencies another dominant policy actor which is non-existent in developed
countries.” Thus, the heavy dependency on foreign aid for durable and effective
functioning by most political systems in developing countries such as health care,
agriculture, education, and so on causes donor agencies to influence “policy priority,
allocation of resources and creates scope to the donor agencies to emerge as
important policy actors.” Alongside the issues of unavailability and limited access
to vital public goods and poor, ineffective, and inefficient service delivery by the
governments functionaries in developing countries, the doors are opened for NGOs
(nongovernmental organizations) or “voluntary agencies emerge as another policy
actor in developing countries” (ibid., p. 47).
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 177

Similarly, in terms of policy initiation/adoption in three Pacific Island nations

(Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Samoa) and key regional intergovernmental organi-
zations, the results of Potoae Roberts Aiafi’s (2017) study on The Nature of Public
Policy Processes in the Pacific Islands: Public Policy in the Pacific Islands show that
(. . .) issues that enter the government agenda and then become public policies came largely
from the top (political actors. . .) and external (foreign actors. . .). This means that policy
adoption is highly political, influenced mainly by local politicians and donor countries.
[Secondly] (. . .) issues originating from society (. . .) were limited. This means that the
society on which public policy is meant to impact, and in which the state is a part, has been
the missing element in policy processes examined. Third, external influences came as policy
transfers mostly through the roles performed by donors (or international development
agencies) and consultants (p. 455).

With regard to policy formulation, Potoae Roberts Aiafi’s (2017) research find-
ings also indicate four commonalities and one key difference:
First, the formulation process is predominantly top-down. Second, most policies are
constructed without proper consultation or stakeholder participation. Although consultative
discourses have improved, civil society’s meaningful participation remains minimal. Third,
rational and evidence-based policy is limited (although much stronger at regional than
national level). Fourth, the ‘policies’ are largely policy transfers (lacking recognition of
local institutions), but the ‘practices’ are ad hoc driven mostly by ideological factors. Fifth,
stakeholders understanding of policies (and notions of public policy in terms of state–society
relationships) are limited. Lastly, the key difference across the four case studies is direct
involvement of the political level in policy formulation in the Solomon Islands (p. 459).

4 Policy Transfer or Lesson-Drawing

One key attribute of public policy is that it is enacted in response to some kind of issue
(s) that calls for attention (Birkland 2015). The waves of decentralization reforms or
the attempts that African countries have made to shift powers to sub-national gov-
ernment after independence are certainly “in response to some sort of problem that
requires attention” (Birkland 2015, p. 8). The aftermath of political independence on
the continent was characterized by authoritarian or dictatorial governments or simply
the absence of democratic governance; the problem of legitimacy especially at
sub-national level; and the plague of intrastate conflicts and excruciating underde-
velopment to name but a few. Although public policy making is the ultimate
responsibility of national governments, however, the ideas may emanate externally,
i.e., “from outside government or through the interaction of government and
nongovernment actors” (Birkland 2015, p. 8).
According to Rose (1991), it is not only normal to transfer policy or draw policy
lessons from one country, but it is common to do so.
Every country has problems, and each think that its problems are unique to its place and time
(. . .) However, problems that are unique to one country (. . .) are abnormal. The concerns for
which ordinary people turn to government–education, social security, health care, safety on
the streets, a clean environment, and a buoyant economy–are common on many continents.
Within a given policy area there is much in common across state and national boundaries
178 L. O. Ceesay

(. . .) Confronted with a common problem policy makers in cities, regional governments and
nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere responded (pp. 3–4).

In the opening statement of their review of policy transfer literature, David

Dolowitz and David Mars (1996) argued that policy transfer
has always existed [and] (. . .) that the rapid growth in communications of all types (. . .) has
accelerated the process. Not surprisingly, the increase in policy transfer has led to the
development of interest in the topic among students of comparative politics and public
policy (p. 343).

They went further to argue that whether it is called policy transfer, policy
emulation, or lesson-drawing, they all mean
(. . .) a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions
etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrange-
ments and institutions in another time and/or place (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p. 344).

Policy transfer, as it is argued by Rose (1991), can be either voluntary or coercive.

Many authors concur that the key reason for voluntary policy transfer is “some form
of dissatisfaction or problem with the status quo.” This argument points to the fact
that it is necessary for governments to search for policy lessons from elsewhere
voluntarily “Only when routines stop providing ‘solutions’(. . .)” (Dolowitz an
Marsh 1996, p. 346). The usual cause of dissatisfaction most authors argued results
from “a perception, either by the government or the public, of policy failure” (ibid,
p. 347).
Although “direct imposition of policy transfer on one country by another is rare”
(ibid., p. 348), however, the direct coercive policy transfer occurs when one gov-
ernment, in most cases a powerful one, forces another government, usually a less
powerful one, to adopt a policy. The notable and sometime notorious key players in
coercive policy transfers are the supranational institutions. For instance, suprana-
tional institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank (WB),
through their stipulating of certain economic policies for implementation as condi-
tions for granting loans to the developing countries, have performed a crucial part “in
the spread of Western monetary policies” to the developing countries over the years
(ibid., p. 348).
Other examples include the European Union (EU) and the European Court of
Justice which force policy transfer upon its member states and beyond. With their
power to bully developing country governments to conform to certain business
regulations or threaten to move their businesses to other countries, Transnational
Corporations (TNCs) are other supranational institutions that can engage in direct
coercive policy transfers. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) argued that alongside direct
coercive policy transfer is that of indirect coercive policy transfer which happens
through the potential role played by “externalities, or functional interdependence.”
They maintained that “There is little doubt that externalities, which result from
interdependence, push government to work together to solve common problems”
(ibid., p. 348). They cited the development of common environmental policies in the
Mediterranean and European chemical regulations as examples.
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 179

Due to the speed with which technology forces change, it is mentioned as another
indirect coercive transfer, for it pushes governments into policy transfer. Other
factors that indirectly push governments toward policy transfer include world econ-
omy constrains (e.g., financial crisis), global economic integration, perception
among political actors that their country is falling behind its neighbors or compet-
itors, and the emergence of an international consensus on a solution to a particular
problem could also pressure countries “to join the international ‘community’ by
implementing similar programmes or policies” (ibid., p. 349).
With regard to what is transferred or the objects of policy transfer, Dolowitz and
Marsh (1996) argued that it is not only “policy goals, content and instrument” that
are transferred as identified by Bennett, but rather all of the following seven objects
they have identified are transferred: “policy goals, structure and content; policy
instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; ideology; ideas, attitudes
and concepts; and negative lessons” (ibid., pp. 349–350). As they engage in policy
transfer processes, actors do have access to a range of options with regard to how
they could incorporate lessons from elsewhere into their political systems. Regard-
ing these, Rose (1993) identified five options which include copying, emulation,
hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration (pp. 132–134). However, Dolowitz and
Marsh (1996) combined hybridization and synthesis as one, due to their perception
that the two categories are related (p. 351).
Rose (1991) argued that lesson-drawing is “about whether programmes can
transfer from one place to another; it is not about what politicians think ought to
be done” (p. 5). Lesson-drawing noted Rose (1991) comprises the entire policy or
institutions transfer process, whereas, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) understood the
term lesson-drawing to imply that “political actors or decision makers in one country
draw lessons from one or more other countries, which they then apply to their own
political system”(p. 344).
Although it is likely that more than one category of actors is involved in a number
of specific policy cases, however, in providing an answer to the question on who
does the policy transfer, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) identifies six key categories of
actors that are involve in this process. Actors involved in the policy transfer process
include elected official, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups,
policy entrepreneurs/experts, and supranational institutions (p. 345). Rose (1991)
argued that “Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank regularly deal with the concerns of 150 nations around the globe, and this
experience is often cited as a justification for advice” (p. 5).
A similar view is shared in a book Something Borrowed, Something Blue? Part
One: A Study of the Thatcher Government’s Appropriation of American Education
and Training Policy by Finegold et al. (1993). In the introductory section, it has been
explained how the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) did learn some
policy lessons from each other. Rose (1991) also argued that “The Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is concerned with moving ideas
across national boundaries” (p. 18).
180 L. O. Ceesay

Intergovernmental and international organizations encourage exchanges of ideas between

countries (. . .) The European Community and OECD encourage exchanges among advanced
industrial nations (. . .) and the World Bank and the United Nations agencies focus on
programs of concern to developing countries (ibid., p. 105).

Similarly, Jacqueline Wilson, Director of the Governance and Institutional Devel-

opment Division of Commonwealth Secretariat in the preface to the book Decentral-
isation in The Gambia: Report of a High-level Workshop on ‘Managing Change in
Local Governance’ held in Banjul, The Gambia, 7–9 April 2008, has stated that
“Donors and international agencies such as the United Nations, International Monetary
Fund and World Bank are placing a higher priority on how they can assist local
governments in the medium and long term” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. V).
While the Commonwealth Secretariat, according to her,
(. . .) a sizeable proportion of Commonwealth resources are allocated to the Africa region and
to small states. The Secretariat, in furtherance of millennium development goal 8 on
developing a global partnership for development, continues to extend assistance in the
important area of local government and service delivery (ibid).

5 Local Governance and Decentralization Policy-Making

Process in The Gambia: Donor Agencies as Another
Dominant Policy Actor

5.1 Agenda Setting

As the initial stages of the policy-making processes, problem identification and

agenda setting are processes where certain policy problems or issues are identified
and brought to the attention of legislators. This process can be set in motion or
initiated by either the government, politician, individual citizens, interest groups,
pressure groups, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)/supra-institutions. To
bring policy issues to the attention of policy makers, issues are discussed and
debated through multiple processes such as negotiation, lobbying, and advocacy.
Power manifests in different forms during the policy-making process with the
“government, technical aspect such as expertise, evidence and technologies and also
funding resources” as the three main sources of power. Power is defined as “the
ability to influence, and in particular to control resources. Power is also described as
those who make and implement the policy” (Abdul Mu’eez et al. 2018, p. 4). As the
stage where power comes to play so as to influence the decision of an agenda, agenda
setting is an extremely important component of policy-making process.
In the late 1980s, when decentralization reform was being conceptualized in The
Gambia, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and
the World Bank are the international agencies that were the initial partners that
supported the process. As a result of domestic problems, however, the initial
momentum gathered by the reform process “waxed and waned” until 1986 when
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 181

the government together with UNECA organized a high-level workshop on the

matter (Alam 2009, p. 28).
Following this, in the early 1990s, a study was commissioned by the UNDP to
solicit recommendations on decentralization in The Gambia. With the submission of
the study report in 1993, a joint cabinet paper was prepared by the Ministry of Local
Government, Lands and Religious Affairs together with other relevant ministries in
1994, which got approved in April the same year by the cabinet (Alam 2009; Sowe
2017). After the July 1994 military coup, the new administration took up the
decentralization reform agenda. With the explicit provisions for decentralization
and devolution of government functions to local governments enshrined in the
1997 Constitution, decentralization regained momentum, thus laying the foundation
for the enactment of the Local Government Act of 2002, its subsequent amendments,
and the local Government Finance and Audit Act of 2004 (Alam 2009; Fye 2016,
2017; Sowe 2017).
The initial phase of the local government and decentralization reform in The
Gambia is similar to that of many other countries in the developing world. The
agenda setting for the reform processes was influenced by international development
organizations. For instance, as early as 1996 to early 2000 during The Gambia’s
political transition from military to civilian, the UNDP and the EU, as part of their
technical assistance, provided support to The Gambia’s decentralization program.
The goal of the UNDP and the EU’s technical assistance was to work with the
Government of The Gambia to strengthen its local democracy with a local govern-
ment reform agenda as the focus. Due to the unwillingness to open up the political
space for local government reform by Yaya Jammeh’s totalitarian and
neo-patrimonial regime, this initial attempt was very unsuccessful (Sanneh 2018).
According to the Commonwealth Secretariat, “The implementation of decentral-
ization started well, with an initial surge of donor support and government attention”
(Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. 9). The Commonwealth Secretariat also
acknowledged the support of international donor agencies in The Gambia’s decen-
tralization and local governance policy reform processes when they argued that
Donors and international agencies such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund
and World Bank are placing a higher priority on how they can assist local governments in the
medium and long term (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009, p. V).

Donors have financed efforts on both the demand and supply sides of The
Gambia’s decentralization reform processes to bolster both village and municipal
governments. On the demand side, the support of international partners included the
strengthening of citizen participation in local government. In particular, they have
supported regular local government elections, improved access to information, and
fostered deliberative decision-making mechanisms. However, on the supply front,
international development stakeholders through their support to the capacity
enhancement of local governments in the areas of coordination, development plan-
ning, and service provision have left an indelible make on The Gambia’s decentral-
ization policy. They have financially supported the capacity strengthening of local
officials and helped both the central and local governments to reorganize and
rationalize their administrative functions.
182 L. O. Ceesay

5.2 Policy Formulation

Policy formulation in the field of public policy

is part of the pre-decision phase of policy making including to craft the goals and priorities
and options, costs and benefits of each options, externalities of each option. It involves
identifying a set of policy alternatives and public policy tools to address a problem (Hai
2013, p. 1).

As a pre-decision phase of the policy-making process, the policy formulation

phase includes tasks such as identifying policy alternatives that would address the
socioeconomic, political, or environmental issues and narrowing the set of solutions
to prepare for final policy solutions and setting the stage for the next phase. Hai
(2013) defined policy formulation as a stage in the policy process/cycle that deals
with “the problem, goals and priorities, solution options for the achievement of
policy objectives, cost benefit analysis, negative and positive externalities are asso-
ciated with each alternative.” Policy formulation Hai (2013) argued, “is a function
rather than a stage where dominant actors and set ideas shaping significantly during
their course of actions”(p. 3). The stage could be referred to as a social and political
process through which policies are conceptualized, created, or changed, while
adoption refers to the policy enactment stage, or when the policy comes into force
through legislation, cabinet, or an individual minister’s decision.
International development agencies supported numerous other major milestone
programs in the context of The Gambia’s national development that incorporated
decentralization and local governance as a socioeconomic development priority. For
instance, although the 1985 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and the 1990
Programme for Sustainable Development (PSD), which got interrupted between
1994 and 1997 due to the military coup, did not make any specific reference with
regard decentralization, they “were supported by donors” (Alam 2009, p. 28). Alam,
however, stated that “starting with the 1994 Strategy for Poverty Alleviation, there
were references to decentralization” (Alam 2009, p. 29). All the major priority
national development blueprints that are necessary for the operationalization of
local government reform agenda, such as the 1998 Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF), the 2003–2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I/SPAII, 2007
PRSP II, the 2007–2011, 2012–2016, and 2017–2021 Medium-term plans, have
made reference to decentralization (Alam 2009, p. 28).
For instance, NPAP/Strategy for Poverty Alleviation I, which was in response to
the key poverty issues diagnosed under the 1989 ILO study on poverty in The
Gambia, has capacity building at the local level and access to resources as one of its
four priority areas or pillars (Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2000). SPA I was
presented at a round table conference in April 1994 organized by the donor com-
munity in Geneva. The findings of the 1998 participatory assessment of the NPAP/
SPA I recognized decentralization as a key area for poverty alleviation and the
empowerment of the poor.
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 183

As a follow-up to SPA I, capacity building at the local level was among the pillars
of Strategy for Poverty Alleviation II (Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2000).
The fact that PRSP II (2007–2011) “stressed the importance of continuity of
assistance from development partners” pointed to the fact that all these national
development blueprints got donor support throughout the policy cycle (Alam 2009,
p. 31; Republic of The Gambia 2008). Again, the fact that the “PRSP was oriented
towards the Paris Declaration” and the MDGs also points to how international
development institutions influence the public policy processes in developing coun-
tries such as The Gambia (Alam 2009, p. 31; Republic of The Gambia 2008).
In 2006, The Gambia adopted her national development blueprint called the
Vision 2020, and this also has enhanced local governance and decentralization as
an important pillar. As a signatory to the Brussels Programme of Action agreed at the
third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries convened in
Brussels in May 2001, and as part of her commitment to this Action, the Government
of The Gambia committed itself to local government reform and decentralization
(Alam 2009; Republic of The Gambia 2006).
The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) agreement,
signed in 2006 between the Government of The Gambia and the UNDP, incorpo-
rated the recommendations of the Common Country Assessment and furthered the
decentralization and deconcentration of central government functions. As part of the
UNDAF agreement, the Government of The Gambia has identified certain local
councils where she piloted reforms. These programs were to be scaled up later, so as
to meet the human resource and financial capacity requirements at both the central
and local government levels (Alam 2009; United System in The Gambia and The
Republic of The Gambia 2006).
The consultative processes of the legal instruments like the Local Government
Act of 2002; the subsequent amendments of 2004, 2006, and 2007; and the Finance
and Audit Act of 2004 were supported by international donors. These legal instru-
ments set out the restructuring agenda of the public sector and ignited the country’s
fiscal and functional decentralization in motion. Decentralization in The Gambia was
formulated in close partnership with support from international organizations like
the Economic Development Fund (EDF) of the European Commission, the World
Bank, and the UNDP. These institutions were not only part of the broad stakeholder
consultative processes that preceded the decentralization reform agenda but also the
commissioning of a number of consultancy studies in collaboration with the Direc-
torate of Local Governance that assessed the in-country capacity of both the central
government institutions and local councils for the smooth implementation of the
decentralization reform agenda (Commonwealth Secretariat 2009).
The support of the international development stakeholder in the development of
The Gambia’s national development blueprints, which are fundamental for the
successful political and institutional decentralization, is also marked. For instance,
the following national development blueprints, of which decentralization is a
cornerstone, were formulated in close partnership with international donors: The
Gambia Government’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP), its Strategy
for Poverty Alleviation (1994 and 2003) and Vision 2020 (1996), the Program for
184 L. O. Ceesay

Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE 2012–2015), and the National Devel-
opment Plan (NDP 2018–2021). The cornerstone of all of these is a participatory
approach to sustainable development and poverty alleviation (Commonwealth
Secretariat 2009, p. 8).
Under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation
(CFTC), the commonwealth secretariat, as part of its assistance in the area of local
government and service delivery, through its Governance and Institutional Devel-
opment Division (GIDD), organized a high-level workshop on decentralization and
local government reforms for the Department of State for Local Government,
Government of The Gambia in Banjul from 7–9 April 2008 on “Managing Change
in Local Governance.” The aim of this consultative workshop was
to facilitate the sharing of ideas and international good practice on the implementation of
effective decentralisation. It was intended to be a forum for discussion of current pertinent
issues relating to good local governance and development, and to project common concerns
that need to be resolved at all levels. Specifically, the programme provided an opportunity
for informing participants about the strengths and weaknesses of The Gambia in its appli-
cation of the principles, process and methodology of decentralisation (Commonwealth
Secretariat 2009, p. 9).

5.3 Policy Implementation

Policy implementation is the stage in the policy-making process where actions and
mechanisms that ensure policies are brought to practice are set to motion. In other
words, it is the practice of turning what is written in the law books, legislations, or
policy documents into reality. Policy implementation, Makinde (2005) argued, could
refer to any of the following:
the activities that are carried out in the light of established policies (. . .) the process of
converting financial, material, technical and human inputs into outputs-goods and services
(. . .) a stage of policy making between the establishment of a policy (such as the passage of a
legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule)
and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects (p. 63).

Policy implementation is characterized by a number of actions, some of which are

fund disbursement, making loans, issuing and enforcing policy directives, assigning
and hiring personnel, sanctioning defaulters, and so forth.
The most cited advantage of decentralization is that it moves the government
closer to its citizens and gives them the chance to participate in development
governance decision-making processes. Mansuri and Rao (2013) described decen-
tralization as
efforts to strengthen village and municipal governments on both the demand and supply
sides. On the demand side, it strengthens citizens’ participation in local government-by, for
example, instituting regular elections, improving access to information, and fostering mech-
anisms for deliberative decision making. On the supply side, it enhances the ability of local
governments to provide services by increasing their financial resources, strengthening the
capacity of local officials, and streamlining and rationalizing administrative functions (p. 16)
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 185

In many countries, “A great deal of empirical evidence reveals that decentraliza-

tion will not always achieve the goal of making local governments more responsive
and accountable” (Wong and Guggenheim 2005, p. 253). The cited reasons included
the fact that often decentralization and its benefits are “susceptible to elite capture”
(ibid., p. 253). In most decentralized situations often society’s well-to-do, well-off,
and well-connected groups disproportionately influence public decision-making or
hijack it.
In a number of developing countries, opportunities offered by decentralization are
often exploited by officials through the promotion of their own commercial activities
over the provision of public goods and services. Existing social problems can also be
made worse by decentralization when it results in the polarization of the different
social groups in communities. It does this through the exclusion of certain commu-
nity groups from government. When local governments fail to equitably redistribute
resources or to prioritize social programs that matter the most to the poor and
vulnerable groups, marginalized groups can be made worse off under decentraliza-
tion (ibid.).
To introduce mechanisms such as consultation, transparency, participation, and,
above all, accountability in local governance system for it to serve as a linkage
between its immediate communities and the public administrators and ultimately
ensure greater voice to the poor would need a greater deal of work (ibid.). In the
words of Wong and Guggenheim (2005), achieving this goal, however, hinges on a
variety of conditions such as “establishing mechanisms to promote broad civic
participation and more responsive and accountable local governments” (p. 253).
What this means is the operationalization of the policies as written in documents.
Community-driven development (CDD), as Wong and Guggenheim argued, is
one such mechanism that is designed to ensure community development planning
and management, as legislated, is not only more responsive but accountable
(Dongier et al. 2003; Mansuri and Rao 2013). There is no doubt that both decen-
tralization and CDD are inherently political reform processes; however, international
development interventions like the CDD programs make significant amount of
resources available to governance structures. The structural and administrative
choices of donors undoubtedly influence decentralization reform processes in the
developing world. To a larger extent, donor-funded programs stimulate healthier
relationships between governments and their citizens at the community level (Wong
and Guggenheim 2005).
As referenced above, the implementation of decentralization in The Gambia
began with an upsurge of support from the donor community; however, at some
point, the interests of the donors appeared to have diminished (Commonwealth
Secretariat 2009). As a fragile state, where both the central and local governments
have poor track records of service delivery, one of the challenges The Gambia
Government faced prior to the CDD program intervention was a mechanism to
operationalize/implement its decentralization reform processes and inject energy
that would promote more responsive and accountable local government. The
country’s decentralization reform processes continued to be very weak both on the
demand and supply sides.
186 L. O. Ceesay

Coupled with the lack of the much-anticipated support of decentralization and

local governance from the government resulted in the absence of adequate local and
national government capacities. This derailed the adequate articulation and dissem-
ination of the decentralization agenda not only for the creation of greater understand-
ing but also for the deeper engagement of the public on the subject matter. Added to a
weak capacity for both local planning and development, local communities continue
to wallow in ineffective public goods provisions and poor service delivery. The
central government failed to make available the required grants to the local govern-
ment as required by the Local Government Act of 2002 and its amendments and the
Financial and Audit Act of 2004 and to effectively devolve or transfer vital functions
to the councils.
Thus, between 2008 and 2010, a CDD program funded through the World Bank
and the Governments of Japan and The Gambia was implemented. The program did
not only simulate functional local governance systems but countered some of the
major challenges facing the decentralization efforts through programs that improved
local governance and promoted community participation in development (Fanneh
and Jallow 2013). The objective of the program was to “support the [Gambia’s] rural
communities in planning, implementation and maintaining their priority social and
economic investments in partnership with Local Government Authorities” (IDA
2007, p. 4). The CDD program designs in general often share at least two key sets
of goals: (1) improved service delivery/provision and socioeconomic well-being of
communities and (2) improved governance institutions and social cohesion at the
level of the community, of which the CDD program of The Gambia is not an
exception (Casey et al. 2011a, b; Fearon et al. 2009, 2011, 2013; King and Samii
2014; Wong 2012).
In recent decades, Pritchett and Woolcock (2004) stated that CDD programs have
become the conduit through which experiments in decentralization structures and
participatory development institutions can take place. To make development plan-
ning and management more accountable, there is no mechanism more appealing to
both developing country governments and the international donor community than
that of a CDD program today. The design is pleasing to governments because it places
less stress on their line agencies while at the same time reaching a large number of the
poor, vulnerable groups, and community actors. While for the international commu-
nity, due to its numerous advantages, a CDD constitutes an important approach in
their collection of development interventions in developing nations, be they fragile,
post-conflict, disaster stricken nations, or countries with poor records of public
service delivery (Adusei-Asante and Hancock 2012; Wong 2012; Wong and
Guggenheim 2005).
CDD is a bottom-up development approach that not only values but prioritizes the
contributions from its beneficiary communities. It is an approach to community
development in which community groups have the control over development deci-
sions and its resources. The approach fosters local participation and collective action
for development. According to Dongier et al. (2003), CDD is an approach to devel-
opment that “gives control of decisions and resources to community groups” (p. 303).
Often these community groups work in partnership with both the service providers and
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 187

demand-responsive support organizations such as the elected local councils, central

government agencies, the private sector, and NGOs (Dongier et al. 2003).
To Wong (2012), CDD is an approach to development that “emphasizes com-
munity control over planning decisions and investment resources” (p. iv). While for
Wong and Guggenheim (2005), it is “an approach that gives communities or locally
elected bodies control over the decision making, management, and use of develop-
ment funds” (p. 254). Community development project, argued Mansuri and Rao
(2013),
supports efforts to bring villages, urban neighbourhoods, and other household groupings into
the process of managing development resources, without relying on formally constituted
local governments (p. 16).

The significant difference between CDD and the earlier approaches of

community-based rural development programs is found in its emphasis on the active,
rather than a passive role performed by communities in leading development
processes.
Although they vary in their designs, community-driven development approaches
share the goal of poverty reduction through improved local governance and
empowered local people. Despite variations in terms of the exact role of each of
the players, Dongier et al. identified the following three broad sets of alternative
institutional arrangements: “partnerships between CBOs and elected local or munic-
ipal governments; partnerships between CBOs and private support organizations
(NGOs or private firms); and direct partnerships between CBOs and central govern-
ment or a central fund, including other, higher-level governments and funds, for
example, states or provinces in federal systems” (Dongier et al. 2003, p. 308).
The key components of a CDD program include planning, institutional building,
and the execution of projects. Its key inputs are to facilitate, recognize, promote, or
establish inclusive community institutions such as the ward development commit-
tees (WDCs) and village development committees (VDCs) that would continue to
decide their respective community’s development priorities and how to administer
the block grants that are used to finance identified community development projects.
The CDD program of The Gambia consisted of three core segments: community
development facility (including Good Governance grant), strengthening the capacity
for community development, and project coordination and monitoring. The overall
coordination was done at the Ministry of Local Governments and Lands and its
Department of Community Development. Its institutional and implementation
arrangement included the Program Steering Committee, Program Coordination
Team, Community Development Officers and Assistants (CDOs and CDAs), and
Multi-Disciplinary Facilitation Teams (MDFTs). MDFTs refer to the extension staff
of the different government departments in a particular region with the regional
governor as the coordinator (Arcand et al. 2010; Diop et al. 2013; Fanneh and Jallow
2013; IDA 2007; MASDAR UK Ltd. 2010).
188 L. O. Ceesay

6 The Case of Brikama Area Council and the Influence

of the Donor-Funded CDD Program

A typical case of a CDD program influence on the developmental approach, func-

tional, and institutional arrangement choices of local government administration in
The Gambia is the Brikama Area Council. Brikama Local Government is located in
the West Coast Region of The Gambia and is the second most populated region of
The Gambia comprising of nine administrative districts, each headed by a district
chief (a traditional ruler). The administrative districts are Foni Bintang-Karenai, Foni
Bondali, Foni Brefet, Foni Jarrol, Foni Kansala, Kombo Central, Kombo East,
Kombo North, and Kombo South. The region is an important link between The
Gambia and the Southern Senegalese Region of Casamance. Brikama, the regional
capital, is the largest provincial capital in The Gambia.

6.1 Development Approach

To tackle the several determinants of abject poverty in the West Coast Region, the
Brikama Local Government Council developed a Development Fund Implementa-
tion Manual (DeFIM). The inspiration and rationale for this manual according to the
council is the CDD program approach. The manual “intends to support the creation
of Development Fund based on the community-driven development approach” to
enhance transfer of skills and resources to decentralized administrative structures
(Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 3).
With regard to the council’s chosen development approach, it has been made
explicitly clear that the “Council’s approach will be anchored on promoting participa-
tory development methods with emphasis on people taking the lead in their own
development activities,” which is a typical CDD approach. It is also stated that to
design, implement, monitor, and evaluate community development programs in the
different sectors, the council would “focus on downstream, decentralized structures” as
the case was during donor-funded CDD program (Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 4).

6.2 Methods of Program Implementation Arrangements

6.2.1 Community Focus

The four major principles identified in the manual also adhere to the CDD program
design philosophy as well. The initial principle which is community focus ensures
about 60% of the council’s generated funds dedicated directly to community devel-
opment, the usage of which would be decided exclusively by members of the
communities as was the case of the block grant in the World Bank-funded CDD
program that the council implemented some years back.
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 189

6.2.2 Community Participation

Active community participation is ranked the second key priority of the council for a
purposed similar to that of the CDD program philosophy. The objective is the
promotion of community empowerment and a sense of project ownership for
enhanced sustainability of the Council’s physical investment.

6.2.3 Existing Local Capacity and Knowledge

The use of existing local capacity and/or knowledge is third in the rank of Manual’s
principles. Just as it was the case in the CDD program approach, the council intends
to build on existing VDC and WDC capacities and structures and to reinforce them
through periodic capacity enhancement activities. The services of Multi-Disciplinary
Facilitation Teams (MDFTs), Community Development Officer (CDO), the Plan-
ning and Development Directorate (Director of Planning and Development), and
Community Development Assistants (CDA) are being utilized for effective facilita-
tion just as was the case during the CDD program. The Manual equally reiterated the
Council’s resolve to not create any “new parallel structures” either at the ward or
village levels (Brikama Area Council 2015, p. 4).

6.2.4 Functional Fund Management Team (FMT)

The fourth development principle identified in the manual, i.e., the FMT also typifies
the pivotal role that the local government authorities performed during the CDD
program. This team is established and tasked with fund management, resource
allocation, monitoring, and evaluation of community projects.

6.3 Program Coordination and Institutional Arrangements

and Functions

The overall coordinating body of community development programs of the Brikama

Area Council is the Directorate of Planning and Development. This arrangement is
similar to the Program Steering Committee (PSC) of the CDD program arrangement.
In collaboration with various relevant community stakeholders, the Regional Com-
munity Development Office for the West Coast Region provides technical support
and supervision to field activities just as it was the case in the CDD program
implementation.
190 L. O. Ceesay

6.4 Development Fund Implementation and Management

Structures of Brikama Area Council

6.4.1 Fund Steering Committee

The responsibility of setting up the policy directive and the review of project
implementation in the various villages and wards is the task of the Fund Steering
Committee (FSC), functions that replicate the roles of the PSC during the CDD
program. The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Council or his/her representative
is the chair of this committee, and the Director of Planning and Development acts as
its secretary or any other senior staff designated by the CEO of the Council.
The representation of the committee, similarly to that of the CDD’s PSC, is drawn
from the following regional government institutions: the governor or his/her repre-
sentative, the Chairperson of the Council, the two Directors of the Council (Finance
and Planning and Development), Department of Community Development, CEO of
the Council, Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Social Welfare,
Department of Education, National Environment Agency, a representative of an
NGO institution, and the Chairpersons of the Development and Finance Subcom-
mittees of the Council Subcommittee.

6.4.2 Council

The overall oversight function of the development fund is provided by the Council
equivalent of the Program Coordination Team in the CDD program, a body which
also determines the total budgetary allocation for the fund.

6.4.3 Directorate of Finance (DF)

The Directorate of Finance (DF) ensures technical assistance is provided to the

villages, wards, and the council itself. This body is the equivalent of the appointed
financial controller in the CDD program who worked with the council CEOs in
managing finances at the council level. It ensures financial management compliance
as per the provisions in the Local Government Financial and Audit Act of 2004. The
head of the directorate is the Director of Finance who also answers to the CEO of the
council and to whom, in addition to other specific functions, he/she periodically
reports directly.

6.4.4 Technical Advisory Committees (TAC)

As an established body in the Local Government Act of 2002, the TAC performs
exactly the roles it has always played in the CDD program. It is responsible for
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 191

endorsing the Strategic Development Plans (SDP) of the villages and the wards
during which it ensures the conformity of the plans to standards, policies, and
priorities set by the government. A committee comprising some TAC members
and the Brikama Area Council subcommittee for development called a Plan
Endorsement Committee (PEC) is constituted to work together as well as review,
advise, and endorse technical components of community projects.
Composition of the TAC as per the provisions of Local Government Act of 2002
includes the Divisional Governor as Chairperson, the CEO as the Vice Chairperson,
the regional Heads of Government Departments, the Heads of Local Government
technical services, representatives of the NGOs operating in the Division, and other
persons such as the Chairperson in consultation with the Vice Chairperson shall
determine.

6.4.5 Multidisciplinary Facilitation Teams (MDFTs)

MDFTs are tasked to ensure guidance, and support is provided to the villages and
wards throughout the project cycles just as they did during the CDD program
implementation cycle. MDFTs are composed of extension workers from different
government line ministries or institutions or NGOs operating in the area and the
CDAs from the Department for community development. As far as community
development project activity implementations are concerned, the reporting line of
a MDFT task leader is to the Director of Planning and Development (DPD)
and CDOs.

6.4.6 Fund Management Team (FMT)

This team is found in the Council and has the overall task of managing the
development fund of the council. FMT’s other mandates are related to issues of
community development and decentralization reforms. This function of this team is
similar to those of financial controllers and CEOs of the councils from the period of
the CDD program. The team is comprised of the CEO of the Council, the Commu-
nity Development Officer, the Director of Planning and Development, Director of
Finance, the Procurement Specialist, the Chairpersons of the Development and
Finance subcommittees, and three other directors.

6.4.7 Ward Development Committees (WDCs)

WDCs are the second to last structure of local governance in The Gambia. As
enshrined in the Local Government Act 2002, the WDCs, in addition to other
functions with support from the MDFTs and the FMT, are mandated to take the
lead in the preparation of the ward SDPs.
192 L. O. Ceesay

6.4.8 Village Development Committees (VDCs)

With the support of the MDFTs, the mandate of the VDCs, among other functions, is
to take the lead in the identification and preparation of the village SDPs. While
developing their village plans, VDCs ensure active community participation and
regular endorsement of their decisions.

7 Conclusion

As demonstrated in this chapter, most developing countries over the years have
experienced various interventions in their policy-making processes from the inter-
national development organizations. From 1996 to date, donors have financed efforts
on both the demand and supply sides of The Gambia’s decentralization reform
processes with the aim of bolstering both village and municipal governments. One
notable intervention in this area is the community-driven development (CDD)
program, an intervention which could be defined as a bottom-up approach to
development that offers communities and their locally elected representatives the
control over the decision-making, use, and management of resources for
development.
Through the use of secondary sources, this chapter was able to illustrate how
international aid donors and their development programs influence policy-making
processes in a developing nation. This is demonstrated by a number of research
findings from the health system policy-making processes in Bangladesh and the case
of policy making in Pacific Island nations and to The Gambia’s decentralization
policy processes. As demonstrated, the structural and administrative choices of
donor agencies or supra-institutions such as WB, IMF, UN, EU, etc. and/or their
local partner NGOs have exerted enormous influence on the policy processes in The
Gambia through various programs.
Of particular significance to this chapter is the long-lasting influence that the
donor-funded, CDD intervention continues to have on the implementation of local
governance and decentralization reform processes in The Gambia. The success of
international development interventions like the CDD program in The Gambia is, to
a large extent, due to the fact that the intervention made a significant amount of
resources and institutional strengthening programs available to government and the
decentralized structures. The other success factors are the support it had rendered for
the functioning of local governance structures, the numerous capacity building
exercises it has for the communities and their elected representatives, and the
benefits they have accrued from the priority community projects it funded. The
findings of this research have demonstrated that The Gambia’s experience of donor-
funded CDD program has influenced her local government system in terms of
development approach, council structure, functions, and funding model.
The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 193

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The Influence of Supra-institutions in Policy Making in Developing. . . 195

Lamin O. Ceesay has an honors degree in Development Studies and a minor in Sociology from
the University of Gambia. He holds a master’s degree in Public Policy from the University of Erfurt,
Germany, and currently pursues a doctoral degree in institutional building and sustainability with
focus on donor-funded local institutions in fragile and post-conflict contexts using community-
driven development (CDD) programs as a case study. His research interests are social development,
private sector and development, public policy, social protection, institutional development, and
nonprofit management. He has held numerous leading positions in various organizations, among
them, as National Administrative and Human Resources Secretary for SOS Children’s Villages,
The Gambia, Programs Officer for West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), and Tech-
nical Specialist-Grants and Partnership for Child Fund International, The Gambia.
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither
“Asian Values” in the Emigration Policies
of the Philippines?

Exequiel Cabanda and Meng-Hsuan Chou

1 Introduction

The production of labor for export is an emergent development policy for developing
countries that have an abundant supply of labor (see Skeldon 2009). These countries
serve as the suppliers of labor to developed economies experiencing chronic short-
ages of labor due to, inter alia, structural changes in the labor market such as aging
demographics. While developing countries actively promote labor migration
because remittances generally boost economic growth, the question remains: How
do governments of the Global South address the need for economic growth and the
wider effects of emigration on the families left behind when designing labor
migration policies?
“Asian values” (without quotation hereafter), following their cultural roots in
Confucianism, conceive and promote the notion that society is hierarchal and
paternalistic, with family as the basic unit or model of governance (Barr 2000;
Yung 2012). Although the remnants of Western ideas from the long history of
colonization continue to influence the decision-making of some Southeast Asian
countries (e.g., the Philippines) (see Jetschke 1999), a closer examination of the
governance structure in the region illustrates how these countries interpret, integrate,
or discount Asian values in its most significant policy areas such as economic
development and labor migration. Although some scholars and policy-makers
have argued that there may not be any tension between the Western-led neoliberal
framework and Asian values (see Robison 1996), the way some emerging econo-
mies in Asia attempt to challenge this synchrony when examining the core value of
family and state-led labor export remains less investigated.

E. Cabanda · M.-H. Chou (*)

School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU) Singapore, Singapore,
Singapore
e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected];
http://www.menghsuanchou.com

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 197

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_11
198 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

Over the past few decades, Southeast Asia has dramatically witnessed an increas-
ing level of labor mobility within and outside of the region as countries function as
either producers or consumers of labor. In this chapter, we demonstrate how certain
existing governance structures and political institutions in Southeast Asia are more
likely to discount the tension embedded in Asian values, particularly the role of
women in the family, when seeking to implement neoliberal practices in the area of
labor migration. While some countries in the region have embraced neoliberal
migration policies that promote labor export as the primary lever for pumping
economic growth through remittances, we specifically ask: How does the policy
design of labor export policies address Asian values when female migrants aspire to
upward economic and social mobility for themselves and their family members?
Taking the case of the Philippines as the top producer of nurses (a female-
dominated labor profession) in the world, this chapter examines how the policy-
makers portray the Filipino nurses in the design of the Philippine Nursing Act of
2002 (from here onward, the Nursing Act), which was signed into law on October
21, 2002. In contrast to Singapore and Malaysia, which are strong advocates of
Asian values, the Philippines is not a major case study for Asian values considering
the country’s dominant Western-influenced governance. However, in debates
between human rights and economic development within the Asian values, the
country serves as a good case because of its portrayal of “Asian familism” or values
reflecting “family, rather than the individual, defines notion of public good” (Diokno
2003, p. 77).
Our starting point is Cabanda’s (2017) empirical study of the Nursing Act, which
underlines the government’s policy position to promote the emigration of nurses
through higher education policies and practices that prepare them for foreign
employment. While Cabanda (2017) focuses on the process of designing this law
by analyzing the different stages of the enactment process, this chapter examines the
different policy narratives the policy-makers advanced about Filipino nurses in the
legislative process. In doing so, our findings show how and why legislators were far
more interested in exporting nurses than retaining them in the country to address
domestic labor shortages. Specifically, these legislators were steered by the positive
contribution of remittances to economic growth and the international recognition of
producing “world class” nurses, a source of national pride for a country with strong
implications to its supposed heritage of Asian values.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we present Asian values
to illustrate the “Asian way” of politics and governance which situate the policy
narratives that evolved in designing the Nursing Act. Next, we present the case of the
Philippines and highlight the strong neoliberal position of the country in producing
labor for foreign employment in exchange for monetary remittances that are
assumed to boost economic growth. Drawing from Asian values, we delineate the
dominating policy narratives portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants with
the policy-makers evading the gender perspective during the enactment process. We
find that the discursive stronghold of the core Asian values of family in governance
structure is weakened when confronted with the neoliberal economic agenda in the
Philippines. This chapter concludes that, while the country belongs to the cultural
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 199

heritage of Asia that upholds strong family ties and the important role of women in
bringing up their children, the governance structure and regulatory practices have
reconfigured Asian values to prioritize economic growth over the core values of the
family. In so doing, we further engage in debates between economic and normative
considerations in a highly contested policy area of migration.

2 Asian Values

The Asian values debate emerged in the early 1990s when countries in Southeast and
East Asia gained economic and regional power in the Western-dominated global
economy. The Asian values are a “challenge to Western hegemonic thoughts and
civilizations,” deeply implanted in many Asian nations that “harbor deep resentment
against the West for its past colonialism and who have an inferiority complex in
regards to Western civilization” (Hoon 2004, p. 151). Specifically, it challenges
Western ideas on the universality of human rights (Barr 2000) and “Western style”
civil and political freedoms (Hoon 2004, p. 155). The Asian values approach pro-
motes three core ideas: (1) the non-universality of human rights, (2) family-centered
structures where interests of the family take precedence over individual interests, and
(3) emphasis on collective social and economic rights over individual political rights
(Hoon 2004, p. 155). Through these core principles, Asian countries make policy
decisions by seeing the state as the “guardian of the general interests of the society,
above and against the contest of vested interest” (Robison 1996, p. 311).
The high stake of family life, especially the role of women, is a significant
element of Asian values that governments in Southeast Asia like to invoke (Eng
and Blake 1998, p. 188). The responsibility evolves around caring for children, sick,
and the elderly and the decision to hire domestic helpers (Willis and Yeoh 2000,
p. 255) while their “qualification and employment” weakens the cohesion of the
family (Langguth 2003, pp. 32–33). To a greater extent, women have a more
significant role in the family amid the increasing openness of global markets.
Yeoh and Willis (1999, p. 359) write: “While men are associated with mobility
and agility to grapple with newly fluid and somewhat erratic forms of transnational
capital, women are often positioned in official state discourse as stabilizing forces of
the ‘home’—the cultural carriers of ‘Asian values’ [. . .].”
Although these scholars convey the state narratives about the role of women in
the family, how policy-makers incorporate these narratives in the design of policies
that support, undermine, or reconfigure Asian values in light of growing global
demand for labor is generally less examined in labor-producing countries of Asia.
Migration remains a key phenomenon in the contemporary period, especially for
economic purposes. It is therefore important to examine more closely how policy-
makers approach the unit of family, as generally understood within the Asian values
framework, when designing public policies to promote, limit, or altogether restrict
emigration.
200 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

3 The Policy Design Approach in Examining

the Nursing Act

Designing public policies requires specific goals that effectively address the policy
problem. The better the policy is crafted, the greater the possibility of success
of achieving the goals as originally set out (Turnbull 2017, p. 2). According to
Colebatch (2017, p. 2), policy design is part of the broad concept of “authoritative
instrumentalism” which explains that the state, composed of government actors
or leaders, exercise their authority with various agendas and preferences to
achieve their objectives. Simply put, the state is the fundamental actor in policy
design. With the growing interconnectedness of the world system, policy design
develops into a complex process that involves the network of government and
nongovernment actors as policy actors in the policy-making process as a result of
the “decentering of policy studies away from the centrality and authority of the state
centeredness” (Howlett and Lejano 2013, pp. 360–361). In this chapter, we define
policy design as a:
[. . .] dynamic and deliberative process between policy actors, during which they exchange
policy ideas (problems are coupled with solutions), provide and articulate justifications for
their positions, and agree on and experiment with the steps forward based on existing
knowledge (Chou and Ravinet 2019, p. 437).

Conversely, Howlett and Lejano (2013, p. 360) explain that policy design
contains two important components—substantive and procedural. The substantive
component is a set of different alternatives to address policy problems, while the
procedural component contains different activities (such as formulating and
decision-making) to achieve agreement among policy actors on policy alternatives.
Essentially, these two components are significant in any analysis of the design
process of public policies.
In designing policies, policy actors predominantly have differing views of the
policy problems and competing proposals to provide solutions to the problems
(Hoppe 2017, p. 6). The interactions of the policy actors in the design process
produce different policy narratives that reflect their position in shaping a particular
policy. Roe (1994, p. 3) broadly defines policy narratives as:
[. . .] stories—scenarios and arguments—that are taken by one or more parties in the
controversy as underwriting and stabilizing the assumptions for policymaking in the face
of the issue’s uncertainty, complexity or polarization.

For example, definitions of policy problems contain “narrative structure” where

there are “stories [. . .of] heroes or villain [. . .] and they pit forces of evil against forces
of good” (Stone 2001, p. 138). These policy narratives reflect different frames which
drive policy debates from problem identification to the details of implementation (see
Hoppe 2017). Consistently, the policy narratives lead to a more interpretative policy
analysis by contextualizing these stories (Jones and McBeth 2010, pp. 333–334). In
this chapter, the policy design approach helps unveil how the policy-makers in the
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 201

Philippines prioritize economic value over maintaining the coherence of family when
designing the Nursing Act.

4 The Case of the Philippines: Context, Legal Development,

and Policy

Nursing is considered a predominantly female profession. Basford and Slevin (2003,

p. 392) explain that nurses are “perceived socially and culturally to be a feminine one
[. . .] linked to the notion of human (feminine) caring values, and the domestic and
nurturing role of women.” By contrast, some scholars claim that as early as the
fourth and fifth century, there were male nurses out of well-established monastic
orders who cared for the injured and wounded military knights; indeed, it was only
when Florence Nightingale, the founder of modern-day nursing in 1863, declared
nursing as a female occupation that it became associated with women (Evans 2004).
In the contemporary world, wealthy and developed countries such as the USA,
Canada, and the UK and some major nurse-producing countries such as the Philip-
pines have welcomed male nurses into their nursing registry due to the growing
demand for care. For example, according to the results of the 2011 American
Community Survey (ACS) on the participation of men in nursing, from a roughly
3% share of male nurses to the total nursing workforce in the USA in 1970, the share
increased to 9% in 2011 (US Census Bureau 2013).
The Philippines is known for its neoliberal policies in the production and export
of labor (Rodriguez 2010). For instance, the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act governs migrant workers and various laws on the production of
Filipino seafarers, among others. Neoliberal policies assume that higher economic
growth can be best achieved when the market is not restrained by state protection
(Misra et al. 2006, p. 318) and could likewise necessitate an increase in state
intervention “to roll forward new forms of governance [. . .] that are purportedly
more suited to a market-driven [. . .] globalizing economy” (Jessop 2002, p. 454).
Consistently, the country is considered to be the top producer of foreign-trained
nurses in the world.
Since the 1970s, the Philippines has been actively sending nurses abroad, with the
USA as one of the major destinations for Filipino nurses (Choy 2003). To strengthen
their position within this global market, over the decades, the country ensured that
existing policies were well implemented, updated, and reflective of the most recent
development in the international practice of professional nursing. Put simply, the
country has contributed to establishing Philippine nurses as an international brand by
ensuring that this important export “commodity” is seen as having achieved world
standards.
Education, training, and licensing of Filipino nurses are key areas in producing
“globally” competitive nurses who are responsive to the needs of health systems at
home and around the world. To ensure oversight of these key areas, the Philippines
202 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

Table 1 Key legislations for nursing education and practice in the Philippines
Legislation numbers Description
Public Act 2808 of 1919 Creation of Board of Examiners for Nurses
Republic Act No. 877 of 1953 Philippine Nursing Law
Republic Act No. 4704 of 1966 Amendment to Republic Act No. 877-Creation of Board of
Nursing
Republic Act No. 7164 of 1991 Philippine Nursing Act of 1991
Republic Act No. 9173 Philippine Nursing Act of 2001
Source: Various policy documents

has adopted and implemented several important laws that govern nursing education
and practice in the country. Although since 1919 there have been different laws
explicitly guiding the nursing practice (Table 1), Republic Act No. 877 of 1953, also
known as the Philippine Nursing Law, served as the legal basis for all succeeding
nursing legislation. This law specified the provisions on the composition of the
nursing board that oversees education, licensing, and nursing practice and the estab-
lishment of nursing schools, curriculum, and compensation for nurses. Legislators
amended this law in 1966 through Republic Act No. 4704 until further amendments
in 1991 through Republic Act No. 7164 or the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991. The
Nursing Act of 1991 paved the way for modernizing the nursing practice following
the rapid changes in the global development of the nursing profession.
As a result of a decade of changes in nursing curriculum and new nursing practices
in countries such as the USA and Canada, the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991 was
repealed and replaced by the Republic Act No. 9173 or the Philippine Nursing Act of
2002. The Nursing Act serves as the principal policy regulating Philippine nursing
education and practice. According to Cabanda (2017), although the Nursing Act
governs the country’s higher education and nursing practice, examining the process
of designing the law revealed a strong emigration context. He explained that, in the
making of this law, the legislators intended to educate nurses for export relying on
nurses’ remittances as a key factor in boosting economic growth.
Taking Cabanda’s (2017) findings as our starting point, we ask: how then does
the Philippine government address the Asian values it purportedly promotes?
Indeed, the gender idioms with reference to men as haligi ng tahanan (pillar of the
home) and women as ilaw ng tahanan (light of the home) are significant concepts at
the core of the Philippine society and family (Parreñas 2008, p. 1062). What happens
to the home when the light is removed? These gendered roles raise crucial questions
about the role of public policy in achieving important economic objectives while
upholding norms and practices that have long been at the core of the society. We are
primarily concerned with how the policy narratives presented during the design of
the Nursing Act interpret Asian values and align them with the economic agenda that
diminishes the potent role of women in the family.
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 203

5 Data and Method

To address the question we raised in the previous sections, we used the legislative
documents from the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines
related to the enactment of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002. Specifically, we used
the minutes of public deliberations from the committee to plenary levels, proposed
bills, and committee reports; these documents are publicly accessible at the archives
of these two legislative bodies.
Methodologically, we traced the policy narratives of the policy-makers during the
enactment process of the Nursing Act, the prevailing policy governing higher edu-
cation, and the practice of nursing in the Philippines. The analysis of policy narratives
entails the use of “existing papers” such as “policy papers, bureaucratic forms,
speeches” (van Eeten 2006, p. 253), which are consistent with our existing data.
We manually coded the legislative documents and identified various narratives
portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants (see Annex for the codebook). Our
findings also point to the general silence about the gendering effects of promoting
Filipino nurses for export. This has strong implications in the broad spectrum of
state-led women migration and its centrality in the family which is deeply rooted in
Asian values—a theme to which we return in the concluding section. In the next
section, we will present our findings.

6 Exploring the Narratives in the Design Process

of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002: Economic Gain
Versus Normative Concerns

The Nursing Act of 2002 serves as a guiding policy in nursing education and
profession in the Philippines. This agenda is set out in Article 1, Section 2, which
describes the overall responsibility of the state to protect and improve the nursing
profession to guarantee the delivery of quality basic health services and ensure that
there are adequate nursing personnel in the country. The Act also highlights the
improvements in nursing education, good working conditions, career prospects, and
dignified existence of nurses as principal elements of the Nursing Act. Despite the
Act’s domestic context, the policy discussions behind the enactment of this law
converged around the debate on the international mobility of Filipino nurses. These
discussions portray Filipino nurses as economic migrants while remaining silent
about the effects of nurse emigration within the confines of the family and the role of
women within the context of Asian values.
This section traces the policy narratives and the factors that have led to the general
silence about the societal effects of emigration. This process tracing starts with the
discussions of the proposed bills at the committee level, and moves on to the plenary
level, which saw the adoption and the passage of the law.
204 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

6.1 Filipino Nurses as Economic Migrants

While there is a long history of nursing policy in the Philippines dating back as early
as 1919, the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 is the current policy that governs the
country’s nursing education and profession. The Nursing Act of 2002 repealed and
replaced the Philippine Nursing Act of 1991 due to the fast-changing health-care
environment, medical technology, and licensing practices, among others, especially
in the USA and Canada. It also addresses domestic health-care needs and employ-
ment concerns in the Philippines in view of the international mobility of nurses.
In October 2001, during the 11th Congress, Congressman Carlos Padilla and Rufus
Rodriguez, Jr., filed two separate bills in the House of Representatives—House Bills
No. 1084 and 676—which sought to repeal and replace the Philippine Nursing Act of
1991. The repeal of the 1991 Nursing Act aims to make the nursing profession more
responsive to the rapidly changing context of health care in the country and the world
amid demographic changes and the discovery of new technologies. The explanatory
notes of these proposed bills provide us with the initial idea the sponsors had
envisioned for the law through their portrayal of Filipino nurses.
In these house bills, the two legislators portrayed the image of Filipino nurses as
economic migrants by emphasizing the vulnerable employment status of nurses in
the country. Congressman Padilla and Rodriguez, Jr., cited two economic-related
factors—high employment rates and low remuneration of nurses in the Philip-
pines—as motivations for nurses to seek employment in wealthier countries. For
example, in the explanatory note of House Bill No. 1084, Congressman Carlos
Padilla stressed the significant issue of employment in the nursing sector of the
Philippines and the huge demand for foreign nurses in the USA and Europe:
The nursing profession in the country has faced many problems, foremost of which is the
very high unemployment and underemployment of nurses [. . .] the shortage of nurses back
in the United States of America and Europe has caused the intensive recruitment of Filipino
nurses for employment abroad. (Par. 2, House Bill No. 1084)

By articulating demand and supply in comparative terms, Congressman Padilla

presents the image of Filipino nurses as skilled economic migrants who are deskilled
in their home countries as a result of the high unemployment and underemployment
of nurses during the period when the Nursing Act was deliberated. Moreover, he
points to voracious international demands for Filipino nurses, which frames this
phenomenon as an area for potential government intervention. Indeed, these bills
also proposed to safeguard the local hospitals and health institutions as a safety
mechanism in case of a possible shortage of nurses that may occur in the future if
legislators do not properly give these issues the necessary policy attention. The
provisions of the house bills also aimed to strengthen regulation in education,
licensing, and professional practice of Filipino nurses. Although these bills sought
to address future domestic shortages and the growing market for Filipino nurses
abroad, this regulatory oversight presents the overall image of nurses as strategic
economic actors who are willing to emigrate and explore more rewarding
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 205

opportunities in other countries as a result of the then shrinking domestic demand for
their skills.
In the Senate of the Philippines, there are three prominent sponsors of the new
Nursing Act: Senators Juan Flavier, Loren Legarda-Leviste, and Manuel Villar.
Their sponsorship speeches promote their unwavering stance of Filipino nurses as
modern-day heroes. They articulate the narrative of Filipino nurses as economic
migrants through the framework of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), which
remains a key pillar to the Philippines’ economic growth (Rodriguez 2002, 2010).
Senator Loren Legarda presented this policy position in her sponsorship speech
during the opening of the plenary deliberation on August 14, 2002:
[. . .] our nurses deserve to be as equally competitive in a field that has gained for themselves
recognition and acceptance, especially in hospitals and health-care facilities in the United
States and Europe [. . .] They are among our overseas Filipino workers who have evolved
into our modem-day heroes for the Filipino nation (Senate 2002, p. 012).

Manuel Villar, in his sponsorship speech on August 14, 2002, concurred with this
recognition of Filipino nurses as migrant workers who contribute to the Philippine
economy through their remittances. He stressed that:
One of the reasons that the Philippine economy continues to thrive amidst to global recession
is the valuable contribution of our OFWs. Part of this sector, hailed as the country’s modern
heroes, are our nurses. However, despite being the lifeblood of our hospitals, nurses remain
as part of the most neglected workers [. . .] This unfortunate occurrence has a large number of
them to seek better opportunities overseas. Thus, we need policies to enhance their compet-
itiveness and professionalism of Filipino nurses [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 386)

These statements portrayed the mobility of nurses as one of the most significant
sources of remittances these lawmakers believe could contribute to the country’s
economic growth. These narratives also reinforced the bills introduced by Congress-
man Padilla and Rodriguez, Jr., in the House of Representatives, which acknowl-
edged the mobility of Filipino nurses as a favorable policy approach. Further,
Senator Edgardo Angara, Jr., one of the pioneers of all health bills in the Philippines
and the author of the previous Nursing Act of 1991, generally conveyed in all his
committee and plenary appearances that there was no domestic shortage of nurses
during the enactment of the law. For him, the concern was that a shortage may occur
in the future if policies on proper health resource manpower planning are not
introduced in the Nursing Act:
On a per capita basis, it is said that the Philippines has one of the more favorable nurse-to-
population ratio [. . .] Making us the number one exporter of nurses in the world [. . .] And so,
when we have a supply of over 300,000 and a demand of 178,000, naturally we have a
surplus of some 128,000 nurses [. . .] we ought not to be content with having surplus nurses
[. . .] because this soon can vanish without realizing it. (Senate 2002, p. 327)

These legislators further sharpened the image of Filipino nurses as economic

actors who are willing to migrate when they debated on how to improve domestic
education, training, and practice of the nursing profession to be more attractive to
foreign employers. Expanding on this aspect, some legislators suggested a form of
206 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

bilateral dialogues with key receiving countries such as the USA to eliminate the
identified structural barriers to the entry of Filipino nurses. Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., articulated this point as follows:
Why is it that nurses being employed in the United States are made to undergo additional
examinations? [...] our government should exert effort to remove this apparent unnecessary
examination as far as our nurses are concerned [. . .] I think we should aggressively ask our
CHED [Commission on Higher Education] [. . .] the Department of Foreign Affairs [. . .] I
cannot understand really why the United States should lump us together with other countries
as if there is no such special relationship between the United States and the Philippines.
(Senate 2002, p. 340)

On this specific matter, Senator Pimentel, Jr., explained his point about receiving
countries imposing qualification standards on sending countries like the Philippines
and implied that a dialogue on a possible cooperation agreement between them
would contribute to eliminating these structural barriers. Our results support
Cabanda’s (2017) findings about the overriding viewpoint of policy-makers during
the deliberation process of the Nursing Act, specifically how they utilize higher
education reforms in nursing as an export-promotion strategy to prepare Filipino
nurses for foreign employment.
This dominant narrative of portraying Filipino nurses as economic migrants is
an established story line in the migration literature. Historically, Filipino nurses
have always been considered to be one of the earliest economic migrants from
the country. Certainly, dating back to the US occupation of the Philippines
(1898–1946), the immigration of Filipino nurses to the USA was part of the broader
spectrum of the American colonial legacy that includes the introduction of the
nursing profession and the opening of education and travel opportunities to the
USA for Filipinos (Choy 2003). Consistently, scholars of health professional migra-
tion have viewed nurses as one of the most mobile professions (Dovlo 2007; Kingma
2007). These scholars have argued and demonstrated that the changing demo-
graphics and the unpopularity of the nursing profession in wealthy economies
such as the USA, Canada, and the UK have acted as key pull factors leading toward
the out-migration of nurses from less wealthy countries such as the Philippines (Ball
2004; Kline 2003).
What are generally missing from these narratives are the roles that governments
of sending countries play in facilitating out-migration, specifically, in the case of the
Philippines, a careful consideration of the negative trade-offs of nurse emigration
and the importance of Filipino families as a core reflection of certain aspects of Asian
values. In the congressional deliberations, policy-makers did not contextualize the
effects of nurse emigration on the possible disintegration of families, particularly on
the role of women in the upbringing of children. The next section reveals this general
absence by exploring the extant gender narratives presented in the policy-making
process and, in so doing, illustrates the overall inattentiveness of the policy-makers
to this very important societal concern.
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 207

6.2 The Gendered Versus Gender-Neutral Nature of Filipino

Nurses

In the previous section, we described the most dominant narrative behind the
enactment of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002: Filipino nurses are key economic
migrants. While policy-makers viewed them as modern-day heroes through their
remittance contributions to the economy, they were generally nonvocal about the
significant issues concerning the gender aspect of the nursing profession and the role
of women in the family, with particular attention to the effects on the family
members left behind.
Although there is a growing interest on nursing among men in the Philippines,
women constitute the majority of entrants into the nursing sector; women represent
an estimated 95% of the total registered Filipino nurses (see Institute of Health
Policy and Development Studies 2005). By promoting their role as economic
migrants through policy, these very policy-makers appear to pitch economic objec-
tives against core societal and familial values. Women in the nursing profession must
reconcile this tension between the fulfillment of economic goals through emigration
and the fulfillment of family expectations (as daughter, sister, wife, or mother).
Although there are certainly overlaps between these two sets of demands, in this
section we highlight the neglected dimension often linked to Asian values by
revealing the policy-makers’ implicit non-feminized depiction of Filipino nurses,
which ultimately conveyed a tension between the gendered and gender-neutral
dimensions of this profession during the policy discussions.
In the enactment of the Nursing Act, the gender dimension of Filipino nurses is
almost nonexistent in the policy discussions. When there were references to the
gender dimension of Filipino nurses, the lawmakers did not make this aspect a
centerfold of their policy narratives. Most of the narratives that did convey any
gender dimension were based on the policy-makers’ personal experiences rather than
more general concerns about the gendering nature of the profession, but these
references did not receive any policy attention when it came to designing emigration
policies.
For instance, the most important reference to nurses as a non-feminized profes-
sion came from Senator Edgardo Angara, Jr., the author of the previous Philippine
Nursing Act of 1991. In his committee hearing appearance on August 02, 2002,
Senator Angara introduced himself as someone who was born in a family of nurses
with personal reference to his parents as professional nurses. He utilized this
personal statement to justify his support for the passage of the law and to promote
the competitive edge of migrant Filipino nurses in terms of nursing care:
Ako po’y talagang galing sa mga nurses sapagkat ang tatay at nanay ko ay nurse [I came
from the family of nurses since my father and mother are nurses] (Senate 2002, p. 004).
Now, the trend as I understand globally, is more of these western countries but including
Japan, to look to us for nursing care. Because fortunately, our nurses are so well-known for
their TLC—tender loving care and this is a world reputation [. . .] of course, we cannot
prevent our bright young men and women from migrating [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 004)
208 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

In contrast, by analyzing further the broader context of his speech, particularly his
reference to Filipino nurses who extend the famous “TLC—tender loving care” as a
form of caring, we find a more feminized representation of the nursing profession.
The adjectives “tender” and “loving” prefacing “care” are defining characteristics of
nurses that are often associated with motherly care (Allan 2001; Baylis et al. 2011).
While conjuring up this motherly image, Senator Angara and other members of the
legislation did not elaborate on this gender dimension and certainly not on the
implications of nurse emigration on family members who are left behind.
Subsequently, during the policy discussions, the policy-makers referenced
“mothers” or “motherly care” to describe nurses as a woman’s occupation. For
example, in her proposal to strengthen the registry of Filipino nurses to know if
they are actively serving in the Philippines or abroad, Ms. Vilma V. Paner, a resource
person from the Department of Health (DOH), referred to nurses as housewives or
women engaged in entrepreneurial activities instead of practicing the nursing
profession:
[. . .] we would like other information in terms of tracking down the nurses where they are
now, if they are in active practice [. . .] Because others may have delegated themselves to
become full housewife or indulge in business. (Senate 2002, p. 23)

Like Senator Angara, Ms. Paner did not move forward to discuss the effects of
nurse emigration in the absence of “mothers” who decide to move abroad and work;
instead she concentrated on how the DOH can establish a good registry system on
the mobility of Filipino nurses. Consistently, Senator Loren Legarda also conveyed
her personal support to the Nursing Act with reference to nurses as a female
profession based on her experience with her aunt who personally cared for her
when she was growing up:
[. . .] nurses have played a special part or role in my life because my aunt whom I lived with
in the compound where I grew up, took special care of me since birth [. . .] She was in fact a
head nurse of Makati Medical [...] she is considered as one of the pillars of nursing
profession in the country [. . .]. (Senate 2002, p. 011)

The personal story of Senator Legarda underscores the importance of nurses as

mothers in the family, even in the structure of extended family, while balancing
career growth and responsibility to family members. That is, if further examined, this
motherly role has a greater implication to the broader context of nurse emigration
especially in the rearing of children. This reference to nurses as mothers could be
seen as an opportunity to open up discussions on the societal issues relating to the
emigration of nurses, but it was not taken. In broadly linking the family (as one of the
core Asian values) with migration, Asis (2000, pp. 262–263) identifies “breakup or
estrangement of families, the adverse consequences of children growing up in the
absence of fathers, mothers, or both” as the primary concerns of migration. But she
added that the changes in the family as an institution is crucial with female migration
because “women’s role are much more closely woven to family life” (Asis 2000,
p. 263).
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 209

While the weight of the policy discussions centered on economic gain, the
importance of family coherence and the role of women in the family pose serious
implications on the family left behind when nurses (mothers) work abroad.

7 Conclusion: Implications of the Policy Design

of the Nursing Act to Understanding Asian Values

In this chapter, we set out to address whether policy-makers in Asia took into
consideration the importance of Asian values in policy deliberation and practices
in designing policy interventions. Specifically, we focused on the notion of family as
the central pillar that distinguishes Asian values from the “West.” In the key aspect
of family life, especially the role of women, extant literature has shown that some
major sending countries in Southeast Asia have turned a deaf ear or sometimes even
operate against family cohesion. These countries ignore the social consequences
attached to the migration of women in favor of the economic value of remittances
despite an alarming trend in the negative effects on family coherence and the
childrearing process (Parreñas 2001, 2005). While international migration serves
as a critical issue within the region for the past several decades, predominantly,
“family issues continued to be viewed as if international migration were not taking
place” (Asis 2000, p. 256). Put simply, in Asia there is an overall absence of aligning
migration policies within the backdrop of the family and specifically on the role of
women (Asis 2000).
Taking the case of the 2002 Nursing Act of the Philippines, we showed that it was
an example where we can visibly observe the strong image of neoliberal policies,
reflecting a supposed “Western” economic order. While the Nursing Act was framed
as a reform of the higher education sector and the professional practices of Filipino
nurses, a closer look at the deliberation process revealed another policy approach:
the Nursing Act sought to prepare these nurses through higher education reform for
foreign employment so as to further promote remittance-led economic growth (see
also Cabanda 2017).
In the policy narratives we identified, we observed that any existing tensions
between the centrality of family (as part of Asian values) and labor market policies in
the Philippines were absent in the eyes of the policy-makers. Indeed, during the
policy discussions, the policy-makers strongly emphasized the economic gains for
the country by projecting Filipino nurses as primary sources of foreign remittance.
While Eng and Blake (1998) explained that policy sensitivity of the governments
in Southeast Asia is greater when the vulnerability of family life is at stake as a core
value of Asian values, this was not the case in the deliberation process we analyzed.
The Philippine lawmakers remained surprisingly silent throughout the enactment
process about the negative effects that emigration of nurses may have on general
family life. When references were made to nurses, nursing, and family life, they were
mainly positive and glowing. Consequently, we conclude that policy-makers in the
210 E. Cabanda and M.-H. Chou

Philippines generally do neither acknowledge nursing as a highly feminized profes-

sion nor the export of nurses as potentially disruptive to family life. This is surprising
given how frequently migration scholars have singled out nurse mobility as a
migration stream composed mainly of females (see Choy 2003; Yeates 2009).
This allowed us to conclude that there is a disconnection between Asian values
and the design of migration policy in the Philippines.
By aggressively advancing a generally neoliberal economic agenda through the
Nursing Act, policy-makers in the Philippines have ushered in the transformation of
female labor as a form of exportable commodity. Indeed, some Southeast Asian
countries like the Philippines capitalizes on the production of feminized labor for
foreign employment as a primary strategy to achieve economic development
(Parreñas 2001, 2005, 2007; Yeates 2009). While we focused on the nursing sector
in this chapter, this tendency is also observable in the well-established labor export
industry of domestic helpers from the Philippines. Indeed, this neoliberal agenda is
noticeable in several Southeast Asia countries—such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Myanmar—that have ventured into the female migrant worker industry. What is
remarkable is that this trend is taking place against the assumed centrality of the
family in the context of Asian governance, which remains far less visible in
comparison to the more economic-centric policy-making in the region. Our findings
invite debates on how to reconcile the tensions between material and normative
considerations in the migration-related policy-making process, which is especially
pertinent in an era of sustained emigration from the Global South.

Annex: Codebook in Analyzing Legislative Documents

Major codes Sub-codes Definition

Nurse as Motivations for nurses’ emigration—high Pertains to nurses who
economic unemployment, underemployment, low salary, work in foreign
migrants neglected workers, better opportunities overseas countries
Domestic demand and supply of nurses in the
Philippines—surplus, shortage of nurses in local
hospitals, exporter of nurses
International demand and supply of nurses—surplus,
shortage of nurses in foreign countries, nurses
employed in foreign countries, foreign recruitment of
Filipino nurses
Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)—modern heroes,
lifeblood of the economy
Gender Both male and female—parents, mother and father, men Pertains to the gender
dimension and women of professional nurses
of nurses Female—mother, aunt, housewife
Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 211

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Designing the Export of Nurses: Whither “Asian Values” in. . . 213

Exequiel Cabanda is a PhD candidate (thesis under examination) in the Public Policy and Global
Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, NTU Singapore. His research project examines the
migration-development dimension of the Filipino nurse migration using the public policy and
negotiation analysis frameworks. He has published peer-reviewed articles at Migration and
Development and Higher Education Policy.

Meng-Hsuan Chou is Nanyang Assistant Professor in Public Policy and Global Affairs, School of
Social Sciences, NTU Singapore. She received her PhD in Politics and International Studies from
the University of Cambridge. Her research focuses on the transformation of the state through
interstate and inter-regional policy cooperation in areas of contemporary salience such as migration,
academic mobility, and higher education. During 2018–2019, Hsuan is a Fung Global Fellow based
at the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies where she will compare the rise,
evolution, and the effects of higher education regionalism in Europe and Southeast Asia, as well as
between these two regions. She co-authored Designing for Policy Effectiveness (2018, Cambridge
University Press) and co-edited The Transnational Politics of Higher Education (2016, Routledge)
and Building the Knowledge Economy in Europe (2014, Edward Elgar). She acknowledges the
NTU Singapore’s NAP Grant for the support to undertake this research.
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy
Response: Dynamics of Continuity
and Change

Anwesha Ghosh

1 Introduction

Afghans started fleeing abroad in the aftermath of the Saur Revolution of April 1978
which resulted in People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) coming to
power, in April 1978. This event marked the beginning of an unprecedented flow of
refugees out of Afghanistan. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in December
1979, further accelerated the exodus substantially. A whole generation of Afghans
has witnessed this more than 30-year-old conflict watching it morph into various
forms of violence from actual war to the ferocity of minefields and the destruction of
livelihoods which pushed a third of its population into exile. According to many
estimates, up to five million Afghans sought refuge abroad from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s (Dupree 1983, 1984; Dunbar 1987, 1988; Cronin 1989; Eliot 1990; Tarzi
1992, 1993; Khalilzad 1995). Over the past four decades, millions of Afghans have
sought refuge in Pakistan due to various factors ranging from geographical proxim-
ity to ethnic ties, religious affiliations, and pre-established trans-regional networks.
Although figures have fluctuated over the years according to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), refugees from Afghanistan around the
world today number around 2.5 million, making Afghanistan the second largest
refugee-producing country worldwide (UNHCR 2016). According to United States
Institute of Peace (USIP), in early 2016, an estimated one million registered Afghan
refugees and a further 1.5 million unregistered Afghan refugees were living in
Pakistan making it one of the largest hosts to Afghan refugees in the world today
(Ahmadi and Lakhani 2017).
For obvious reasons, cross-border population movement has constituted one of
the most significant aspects of Afghanistan–Pakistan relations over the past few
decades. One of the primary aims of this paper is to provide insights into Afghan
migration to Pakistan and to understand the host country’s policy response to the

A. Ghosh (*)
Willy Brandt School of Public Policy, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 215

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_12
216 A. Ghosh

refugee population over the years. Acknowledging that cross-border movement

between Afghanistan and Pakistan has existed for generations, the discussion in
this paper will revolve around the four major waves of population movement
between the mentioned countries since the Soviet intervention, in 1979. However,
before dealing with that, this paper will deal with the political context that triggered
this large-scale population displacement both within and outside Afghanistan. As
one of the major hosts of Afghan refugees, an attempt will be made to look at the
continuities and changes in Pakistan’s policy response to the refugee population over
the years and to identify the major factors that might have influenced the policy shifts
of the host government. To conclude, this paper will assess if the Afghan refugees
have been an asset or a liability for Pakistan.

2 The Context of Afghan Migration to Pakistan

Regarded as the coveted prize of empires, Afghanistan has evolved through the
modern era from the status of a buffer state to a Cold War battlefield, to a mere
hideout of the so-called terrorist outfits, and finally to a derailing democracy in an
unstable political landscape. The country has found itself at the hinge of imperial
ambitions since the beginning of recorded history, from the world’s first transcon-
tinental superpower, the Persian Empire, to the largest, the United States. The Soviet
intervention in 1979 and the subsequent turn of events marked a period of endless
political turmoil and resulted in pervasive conflict across the country, which reached
its highest intensity when the country faced its virtual civil war in the 1990s.
However, a careful study of Afghanistan’s political history indicates that the advent
of conflict in Afghanistan cannot be merely attributed to the Soviet intervention or
the particular year of 1979 even though it did mark the beginning of a phase of very
intense political turmoil armed conflict. Decades of conflict in Afghanistan have
unleashed a never-ending wave of destruction that has swamped traditional protec-
tion for civilians and swept away long-accepted rules of wartime behaviour. The
social cost of decades of violence and destruction has been colossal. Millions have
been killed, and millions more have been forced to flee their homes fracturing the
social fabric of the country. The physical, emotional, and psychological develop-
ment of generations of Afghans has been severely affected by conflict and wars.
Afghanistan’s population has historically been moulded by a high degree of
spatial mobility. The country was crisscrossed by important caravan routes on the
Silk Road until the early nineteenth century, and it has always been dominated by
nomadism and other forms of movement from place to place (including peripatetic
groups). Large caravan cities such as Kandahar, Herat, and Kabul also had Greek,
Armenian, and Jewish communities, which served as bases in transcontinental
ethno-religious trade networks until well into the twentieth century (Hutter 2009).
Historically, migration has been integral to Afghan livelihood and survival strategies
with nomads travelling from one valley to another in search of pastures, peasant
families sending their young men to work in the region’s trading centres, and
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 217

localized disputes, internal strife, and foreign invasions leading to displacement and
new alliances with neighbouring tribes, quam,1 or ethnic groups. Even today,
hundreds of thousands of nomadic people travel across the country and migrate
seasonally. In the course of the twentieth century, this high degree of mobility had
adapted to modern innovations. This is exemplified by the fact that many nomads
have moved into the transport sector and become truck or bus drivers. All over
Afghanistan, the basis of nomadism lies in the differences in altitude from one part of
the country to another as well as seasonal changes in the weather. Many of the
eastern Pashtun nomads from Afghanistan have traditionally utilized low-level
grazing lands in Pakistan, situated on the other side of the border.
While the mapping of Afghanistan’s borders by the late nineteenth century
constrained many traditional migratory routes, it did not end population movements.
Shared ethnic, religious, and cultural identities enabled people to move to and from
Afghanistan as economic or political incentives arose. No Afghan government ever
accepted the Durand Line2 as an international border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan, which separated the Pashtun population. This refusal has continued for
more than a century under regimes of all political stripes, some of which called for
the reincorporation of the territory into Afghanistan or the creation of a new state of
Pashtunistan. Pakistan, by contrast, has always insisted that the Durand Line con-
stitutes its recognized international border with Afghanistan since its creation in
1947. Pashtun tribes still believe that their homeland encompasses both sides of the
Durand Line. Other ethnic Afghans, such as central highland Hazaras, were also
regular migrants, first to British India and then to Pakistan, including the trading
centre of Peshawar, the mines of Balochistan, and the agricultural land of the Indus
Valley. Scholars observe that even in the present time, practically the entire transport
sector in Afghanistan and Pakistan is in the hands of former nomads (Titus 1995).
The conflict that has significantly affected the country since the late 1970s has not
changed these patterns so much as it has altered the scale of this regional migration,
which has transformed into one of the world’s largest population displacements.
The issue of Afghan refugee has been a protracted one, spread over almost four
decades. Decades of war and instability have forced one in three Afghans to flee their
home. On the eve of the Taleban’s ouster in 2001, an estimated one million Afghans
were internally displaced; almost six million had sought refuge in Pakistan and Iran,
the main refugee-hosting countries (UNHCR 2002). However, in the case of
Afghanistan, the refugee figures need to be treated with a degree of scepticism.

1
‘The term qawm can refer to an ethnic group, a clan or a tribe (defined by a common patrilineal
descent), a professional group (artisans, Mullahs), a caste (Syyad) or a religious minority (Ismaili),
or even people from the same village, neighbourhood, or valley’. Oliver Roy, ‘Ethnies et appurte-
nances politiques en Afghanistan’, in J.P Digard (ed.), Colloques Internationaux: le fait ethnique en
Itan et en Afghanistan (Paris 1988, p. 202). In general, however, the qawm is composed of family
members, friends, and neighbours who share an attachment to a common watan (a geographical
location that they recognize as their place of origin), whose families have known each other for
generations and are bound by relations of mutual trust and obligations.
2
The Durand Line demarcated Afghanistan and British India, in 1893, dividing the Pashtun tribes.
218 A. Ghosh

Nonetheless, even approximate numbers may give some idea about the importance
of the refugee trend. However, before getting into that, it would be relevant to
understand the political context that paved way for a large-scale population dis-
placement both within and outside Afghanistan.
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was marked by a series of
interesting developments all over the country. It transformed—virtually over-
night—the strategic significance of Afghanistan to its regional neighbours and to
the Western powers. First, it provided an opportunity for exiled Afghan Islamist
parties to strengthen their position by claiming leadership of the resistance to the
invasion of Afghanistan by a non-Islamic power.3 These parties which were known
as Mujahideen or ‘fighters in Jihad’ brought Islamic character to the resistance.
Consequently, the fighters of the Jihad or holy war sought to build international
support for their cause. From late 1979 until February 1989, the Soviet military
forces remained in Afghanistan, a period that was also marked by fierce resistance
from the Mujahideen, who were mainly financed and equipped by the United States,
the various Gulf States, and the Pakistani Intelligence Agency, the ISI, as well as
China and Iran (Basu Roy 2010, pp. 30–32). The Soviets sent around 530,000 troops
to Afghanistan, although there were never more than 120,000 in Afghanistan at any
one time. Altogether, Soviet losses numbered around as many as 85,000 (Ewans
2002, p. 148). Second, support was readily forthcoming from the then president of
Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq, who had come to power in a military coup in 1977 and
who had clear ambitions to build an Islamic bloc incorporating Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, and the Central Asian Republics as a counterweight to India (Turton and
Marsden 2002). Thousands of tons of arms crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
The revelation of Pakistan’s Brigadier Yousuf indicates that these arms were bought
with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Saudi Arabian funds from the United
States, Britain, China, Egypt, and Turkey, among others. The Pakistani army teams
inside Afghanistan also provided training to the Mujahideen in secret camps and
covert assistance to guerrillas (Yousuf and Adkin 1992, p. 138). Third, General Zia’s
ambition was consistent with the foreign policy objectives of the United States.
Taking over the historic role of Britain in the region, the United States saw the
Mujahideen as a mechanism for weakening the Soviet Union by engaging it in
protracted guerilla warfare. Because it did not want to be seen, at least initially, as
providing support to the Mujahideen, it used the government of Pakistan as a conduit
for arms supplies and other, supposedly humanitarian, resources.4 Suddenly General

3
Many of the high-profile leaders of these parties (Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani,
and Ahmed Shah Masoud) had fled to Peshawar, in Pakistan, in 1975, when the then president of
Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammed Daoud, moved against the Islamic radicals, whom he saw as a
direct threat to his power.
4
In an interview published in Le Nouvel Observateur (January 15–21, 1998), Zbigniew Brzezinski,
who was US President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Chief at the time of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, said that the United States began giving secret aid to the Mujahideen in July 1978 and
that this was expected to increase the likelihood of a Soviet invasion. ‘The day that the Soviets
officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving the
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 219

Zia, who had shocked the world with his execution of Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto, in April 1979, and his ruthless suppression of democracy in Pakistan,
became a darling for the West, a bastion of support for the free world in its ‘war’
against communism (Turton and Marsden 2002). The Mujahideen at that time were
fed, cared for, and supplied with every necessity and were recruited from among the
thousands of refugees. The refugee camps were huge reservoirs of potential recruits
for Jihad (Dixit 2002, p. 144).

3 Waves of Afghan Migration Post-Soviet Intervention

In the late 1970s, when the Afghans started fleeing to Pakistan and Iran in large
numbers, the world became aware of a new refugee problem. Initially the Kabul
regime had tried to forward its own explanation of the phenomenon: the refugees
were merely kuchis (nomads) who were used to crossing the border into
neighbouring countries. The fact that some of them then decided to stay there for
more than just a winter season on foreign soil was explained as being merely
traditional fluctuations within nomadic societies (Pedersen 1990, p. 154). As the
number of refugees grew following increasing persecution of the Afghan population,
it became evident to all that the refugees were not merely nomads adjusting to
various changes in conditions but that the region faced a serious refugee problem,
which by the early 1980s had grown to be the largest in the world. The patterns of
migration in and out of Afghanistan can be broadly divided into four distinct phases.
These phases, discussed below, deal with the population waves that had left and
returned back since Soviet intervention in 1979.

3.1 The First Wave (1979–1988)

On December 25, 1979, the 40th Army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) arrived at Afghanistan’s Kabul airport, an action that to most of the other
world powers was equivalent to an invasion. This event accelerated the exodus.
Within days, thousands upon thousands of people started to flee Afghanistan, and
most of them took refuge in the two Muslim neighbouring countries sharing a border
with Afghanistan, namely, Pakistan and Iran, although the regime consistently

USSR its Vietnam. Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war insupportable by the
government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the break-up of the Soviet
empire’. When asked by the interviewer whether he regretted having given arms to future terrorists,
Brzezinski replied: ‘What is more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse
of the Soviet empire? A few crazed Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the
Cold War?’ (Quoted in T. Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity.
Verso, London and New York: 2002, pp. 207–8).
220 A. Ghosh

denied the presence of refugees in neighbouring countries. Out of an estimated

population of 18 million, 1.2 million Afghans became refugees in Pakistan in
1980; by the end of 1981, there were an estimated three million refugees in Iran
and Pakistan combined (Wafadar 1981, 1982). During 1980–1981, the flood of
refugees peaked at 80,000 to 90,000 a month, which meant an average of about
3000 people per day in Pakistan. There were 3.5 million refugees in 1982—three
million refugees in Pakistan (Dupree 1983). Afghans continued to flee in 1983, but
in smaller numbers. At the end of 1983, Afghan refugees in Pakistan ranged from 1.5
to 3.2 million according to different estimates, but the official total was set at 2.8
million (Dupree 1984). The difference in numbers can be attributed to practical
reasons, such as the unrestricted mobility of Afghan refugees in Pakistan, which
makes any evaluation difficult. However, Louis Dupree also speaks of a ‘number
game’, which he sees as ‘a favorite pastime between the government of Pakistan,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, bilateral
donors, and the approximately 18 voluntary agencies involved in refugee programs’
(Dupree 1984, p. 232; see also Crisp 1999). One has to bear in mind that official
estimates of the number of Afghan refugees and returnees have always been more or
less inaccurate and subject to discrepancies whereby any similar research needs to
treat all such figures with caution.
Conflict between Afghan soldiers, Soviet troops, and Mujahideen groups created
an unstable environment for carrying on a normal life in Afghanistan. Others left in
response to a call for Hijra.5 A spiritual call for Hijra required an Afghan to leave his
or her country because it had been taken over by people who are not followers of
Islam. Thousands of Afghans moved to different parts of the country to escape
conscriptions, which were being forced to enlist in the military. To avoid the same
fate, many young men from the rural areas left for bigger cities. During this first wave
of migration following the Soviet intervention, the population of Kabul, Afghanistan’s
capital, increased from about 600,000 to more than two million (National Geographic
Report). At the peak of the first wave, approximately six million Afghans were forced
to migrate. About 3.5 million went to Pakistan, two million to Iran, and the rest to other
regional countries or the West (UNHCR 2000). However, the Soviets were never able
to consolidate their control over the country, and for 10 years they fought an insur-
gency—a loosely organized alliance of Mujahideen, or holy warriors, who were
supplied with arms and cash by the West. Over the course of this bloody decade,
hundreds of thousands more fled Afghanistan.

3.2 The Second Wave (1989–1992)

After the Soviet-backed government collapsed and the Islamic fundamentalists

seized power in April 1992, the relative peace and fragile stability evaporated as

5
Hijra is an Arabic word meaning ‘flight’ or ‘migration’.
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 221

Islamic warriors were again engaged in a brutal battle for control of the country. This
marked Islamization of an already Muslim society based on a rather narrow under-
standing of Islam (Emadi 2013). As a scourge of ethnic cleansing raged throughout
the country, the religious minorities such as Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan,
among others, were systematically targeted and were forced to flee. The develop-
ments in this phase caused a second and new wave of population movement, both
inside (the return of those who fled the Soviets) and out (flight of many Soviet
sympathizers).
After the overthrow of President Najibullahin 1992, Afghanistan finally saw the
first large-scale return of refugees since the Soviet invasion. No sooner had they
returned, however, was the country—and Kabul in particular—plunged into war
between its erstwhile Mujahideen liberators. Five different groups vied for suprem-
acy in the embattled Kabul (i.e. Hizb-Islami, Jamiat Islami, Ittehad Islami, Hizb
Wahdat, and Junbish Milli). One-third of Kabul city was laid to waste, and the
remaining portions of the city were seriously damaged. For many Afghans, this
period is remembered as even bloodier than the Soviet war, and it launched a new
exodus of refugees and, especially, internally displaced persons (IDPs). As reflected
in the following figures issued by UNHCR (Table 1), between 1989 and 1992, there
was a significant increase in the number of refugees in the neighbouring countries of
Afghanistan.

3.3 The Third Wave (1992–1996–2001)

In 1992, the UN-negotiated plan for President Najibullah to step down and a
transitional authority to take over were jeopardized. President Najibullah’s over-
throw in 1992 left the victorious Mujahideen the task of forming a government of
national reconciliation. Over two million refugees from Iran and Pakistan returned
home (International Crisis Group Report 2009). Peace was, however, short lived.
The struggle against the occupying Soviet forces mutated into an internal power
struggle as the different factions within the Mujahideen regime fought each other.
Those institutions that were untouched during the intervention rapidly disintegrated,
and an institutional vacuum became apparent. Apart from such state disintegration,
ethnic divisions came to fore, and Kabul was carved up along ethnic, linguistic, and
religious lines. With the fragmentation of political power and territory under the
control of different militias, the country plunged into lawlessness. Alliances and
hostilities between the warring factions were often based on personal loyalties, some
of which were tactical and short lived. As territories changed hands after long battles,
local populations were subjected to violent retaliatory punishments by various
forces. Children were subjected to abduction and sexual abuse by armed political
groups. Young girls in particular were abducted and detained for sexual purposes or
sold into prostitution. The rape of women and young girls by armed guards appeared
to have been condoned by leaders as a method of intimidating vanquished
populations and rewarding soldiers. Amnesty International referred to the situation
222 A. Ghosh

Table 1 Afghan refugee population by country of Asylum, 1979–1999

Year Pakistana Irana Indiaa Russian Fed.a Othersb Total
1979 402,000 100,000 – – – 502,000
1980 1,428,000 300,000 – – – 1,728,000
1981 2,375,000 1,500,000 2700 – – 3,877,700
1982 2,877,000 1,500,000 3400 – – 4,380,400
1983 2,873,000 1,700,000 5300 – – 4,578, 300
1984 2,500,000 1,800,000 5900 – – 4,305,900
1985 2,730,000 1,880,000 5700 – – 4,615,700
1986 2,878,000 2,190,000 5500 – – 5,073,500
1987 3,156,000 2,350,000 5200 – – 5,511,200
1988 3,255,000 2,350,000 4900 – – 5,609,900
1989 3,272,000 2,350,000 8500 5,630,500
1990 3,253,000 3,061,000 11,900 6,325,900
1991 3,098,000 3,187,000 9800 6,294,800
1992 1,627,000 2,901,000 11,000 8800 3000 4,550,800
1993 1,477,000 1,850,000 24,400 24,900 11,900 3,388,200
1994 1,053,000 1,623,000 22,400 28,300 12,300 2,739,000
1995 1,200,000 1,429,000 19,900 18,300 9700 2,676,900
1996 1,200,000 1,415,000 18,600 20,400 10,700 2,664,700
1997 1,200,000 1,412,000 17,500 21,700 12,500 2,663,700
1998 1,200,000 1,401,000 16,100 8700 8400 2,634,200
1999 1,200,000 1,325,000 14,500 12,600 10,000 2,562,800
Source: Five Proxy Wars in Africa, Asia and Central America, United Nations High Commissioner
For Refugees Report (UNHCR) (2000, p. 117)
Notes: As of December 31 of the given year
Asylum seekers registered with UNHCR only. By the end of 1999, an additional 100,000 Afghans
were in need of protection according to UNHCR
a
Countries of Asylum
b
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan

as ‘human rights catastrophe’ of ‘appalling proportions’ (Basu Roy 2010). During

the lengthy phase of conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs)
escaped battle zones. City dwellers, mainly Kabulis, were forced into exile in the
neighbouring countries.
The Taleban, which emerged in the Afghan political scene in November 1994,
marked a new phase in Afghan politics. Over this period, there had been changes in
the nature of the conflict, and human rights abuses had taken on a new dimension. In
contrast to the Mujahideen groups of the past, the Taleban appeared as a more
cohesive force in 1994 and 1995, bringing a degree of order in the areas of the
country that they brought under their control. Their policy of disarming opposition
groups resulted in a reduction in acts of banditry and extortion, winning them
popular support from traditional Afghan families. They attracted media attention
not because of their remarkable success in capturing a large area in a very short time,
but because of their strict enforcement of dress codes and treatment of women
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 223

(Marsden 2002). Since the capture of Kabul on September 26, 1996, the Taleban
government issued a series of edicts based on their interpretation of Sharia. The
edict’s ban on women’s employment and education and restricting women’s move-
ment had undermined, especially in urban areas, women’s ability to contribute to the
financial well-being of the family. Many young male children were forced to work,
at times, with the livelihood of the entire family depending solely upon them.
Thousands fled from Afghanistan during that time, especially women, the educated
population, religious minorities, and political moderates. Drought and the lack of
economic opportunities in the war-torn country led to further displacement. By this
time, both Iran and Pakistan had started suffering from acute ‘asylum fatigue’
(Turton and Marsden 2002).

3.4 The Fourth Wave (Since 2001)

The US-led intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 forced thousands to become inter-

nally displaced and even cross borders, at least temporarily. The subsequent fall of
the Taleban government and the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration
after the Bonn Agreement in December 2001 led, in turn, to the largest and most
rapid return movement of Afghan refugees ever and the largest UNHCR-assisted
repatriation programme in almost 30 years (UNHCR 2008, 2009). With the inter-
national community’s commitment to reconstruction and peace building, Afghans
grew more optimistic about their country’s future. By returning to their homeland
after years or even decades in exile, Afghans expressed their confidence in the post-
Taleban political order. In 2002, UNHCR assisted the voluntary repatriation of
almost two million refugees from Iran and Pakistan (Turton and Marsden 2002).
The initial enthusiasm resulted in the return of almost five million Afghan refugees
to Afghanistan in the first few years, although, according to UNHCR figures, around
three million continued to remain abroad (Schmeidl 2009). However, these refugees
returned to a politically unstable environment, and the motives behind the push for
repatriation were not necessarily in the best interests of the refugees or Afghanistan.
In the post-9/11 world, Afghan repatriation was needed to legitimize the US-led
intervention, the subsequent peace process, and the fledgling government. These
factors seemed to outweigh more careful considerations of the feasibility of return
and the impact that such large numbers of returnees would have on a poor and
war-stricken country which was already struggling to accommodate those who had
remained.
There were innumerable blockages from the very beginning, and the repatriation
was never meant to be an easy task. Afghan case painfully demonstrated the
problems with resolving protracted displacement where considerations other than
refugee protection were at the heart of the activities of international actors and where
the human security of refugees was in competition with national, regional, and
international security agendas. Even UNHCR later acknowledged that ‘the Afghan-
istan experience has highlighted the complexity of the repatriation and reintegration
224 A. Ghosh

process, which has proven to be a much more sustained and complex challenge than
initially anticipated’ (UNHCR 2008). With the escalation of insurgency since 2005,
a reverse flow has been noticed. The withdrawal of the Western troops and further
deterioration of the security situation, drying of opportunities, and the unwillingness
of the neighbouring countries to accommodate Afghans any further forced thousands
of Afghans to migrate to Europe. Along with Syrians, the Afghans constitute one of
the largest refugee groups during the European Refugee Crisis that unfolded in 2015.
Post-2001, Pakistan’s position and policies on Afghan refugees changed drastically.
The welcoming attitude by then had transformed into an expelling one. The follow-
ing section attempts to locate the continuities and changes in Pakistan’s response to
Afghan migration by focusing at the policy shifts adapted by the Pakistani
government.

4 Pakistan’s Policy Response to Afghan Refugees:

Dynamics of Continuity and Change

During the early days of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policies
towards Afghan refugees were notably liberal. Afghanistan provided the military
dictator of Pakistan, General Zia, with the opportunity to connect with the world,
establish his credentials, and obtain assistance for hosting Afghan refugees. Policies
were designed in which the United States, joined by Western and other extra-
regional powers, could inflict crippling financial losses on the Soviet Union at
minimal risk to themselves. The West found a willing partner in Pakistan where
the unlawful regime of a military dictator sought international legitimacy and
material support. Therefore, there was no dearth of international support to assist
Pakistan in dealing with the Afghan refugees.
In Pakistan, the refugees were primarily ethnic Pashtuns, and the sought refuge
mainly in Pashtun-dominated parts of the country, mostly in North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) and a few in Balochistan. More than 300 ‘refugee villages’ were
established by UNHCR and majority of the refugees lived there (UNHCR 2000).
Although, Pakistan has largely been a generous host to Afghan refugees, its policy
has been ambivalent. Except at the very beginning, from 1978 to October 1979,
when Pakistan had to support the refugees with its own resources (in the absence of
an UNHCR office in the country), Pakistan has been generously supported by
various international organizations in its refugee assistance programmes. At the
outset, the refugees turned to the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) for help. UNDP, in turn, asked UNHCR for funds to provide temporary
assistance to the needy cases. In April 1979, the government of Pakistan formally
requested UNHCR’s assistance. UNHCR along with other UN agencies, individual
government and dozens of international NGOs, provided the refugees with food,
water, health care, sanitation, and education. By the 1980s, there were over 100 inter-
national NGOs involved in aid operation in Pakistan (Lamb 1987). From 1984,
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 225

UNHCR along with the World Bank and the Pakistani government initiated income-
generation projects for refugee areas for which US$85 million was invested in the
next 12 years in sectors such as reafforestation, watershed management, irrigation,
road repair, and construction (UNHCR 1996). Over the years UNHCR has continued
to play a significant collaborative role along with the host government in the
management of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
In addition to the government of Pakistan and UNHCR’s assistance, several
voluntary organizations (VOLAGS) from many countries, including Pakistan and
Afghans in exile, had established refugee assistance programmes in Pakistan. Sev-
eral organizations carried out special programmes under contracts with UNHCR.
Additionally special agencies within the United Nations System such as World Food
Programme (WFP), World Health Organization (WHO), Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), etc. had facilitated the initiation of Afghan refugees’ assistance
programmes in Pakistan since 1979 (Dupree 1988). International Rescue Committee
(IRC), Save the Children Fund US (SCF), Church World Services, Project Director
Health of the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, and Frontier Primary Health
Care were some of the organizations that provided both primary health and repro-
ductive health care to the refugees. Afghan refugees in Pakistan did not suffer from
any large-scale epidemics or malnutrition, which is often seen during large-scale
mass displacement.
Like most South Asian countries, Pakistan is also not a signatory of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and has no legislation that recognizes
refugees. However, it is bound by the provisions of the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which allows expulsions only by law and requires the
government to allow those it wishes to expel to defend themselves. Furthermore, it
requires that competent authorities review their case. It is also a signatory of the 1984
Convention against torture and other ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which prohibits refoulement of anyone in instances where there is a
substantial risk that the individual will be tortured (World Refugee Survey)’. The
1973 Pakistani Constitution granted the same protection against detention to all
persons in Pakistan. Pakistan is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides for basic health services, general rights of freedom
of movement, and choice of residence. Islamabad did not impose restrictions on the
movement or residence of registered Afghans nor on assistance to those living
outside camps, although the government did not issue international travel documents
to refugees. In 2008, Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which recognizes a general right to work. Although,
Pakistan’s Foreigner Act of 1946 prohibits the hiring of illegal residents, the
authorities have always tolerated refugees working in the informal sector. In the
formal sector, refugees officially need Pakistani partners and cannot hold immovable
property or the requisite documents to own a business (Grare and Maley 2011).
However, the law has been bypassed regularly with the support of authorities. In the
NWFP, for example, refugees cannot officially own trucks, but in reality they
dominate the entire transport sector.
226 A. Ghosh

Despite having several rights granted, it is nevertheless true that Afghan refugees
have been facing increasing constraints. The US State Department noted, in partic-
ular, that refugees do not always have access to courts, are harassed by the intelli-
gence agencies, or are asked by police to pay bribes (Grare and Maley 2011). With
the degradation of Pakistan’s economic, political, and security situation, the toler-
ance of the authorities tends to decrease, and the new generation of refugees does not
enjoy the same degree of protection. For example, the National Database and
Registration Authority stopped providing Proof of Registration (PoR) cards in
2007. This card allowed registered refugees to stay in Pakistan, until 2009, if they
did not wish to return immediately under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation
programme. That was extended to 2012 under an agreement between Pakistan and
UNHCR in March 2009 to allow some 1.7 Afghans to continue living in Pakistan.
The Pakistani and Afghani authorities, along with UNHCR, agreed that those with
PoR cards would be entitled to the UN assistance/incentive package including
transportation and reintegration assistance.
A case study conducted by Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU)
on Afghans in Karachi indicated that in August 2001 the government of Pakistan
established the National Aliens’ Registration Agency (NARA) under the Ministry of
Interior. NARA was a sister organization of the National Database Registration
Authority (NADRA), which was mandated to issue new computerized national
identity cards (CNICs) to Pakistani citizens. NARA, in turn, was charged with
registering non-citizen residents with the purpose of regulating those considered to
be irregular or illegal migrants (AREU 2005). Before the US-led military offensive
and the fall of the Taleban government in Afghanistan, the Pakistani government’s
policy was moving in the direction of ‘regularization’. NARA was supposed to
register Afghan migrants in order to provide them with some legal cover. This was
partly in light of the fact that the earlier ‘refugee’ status granted to migrants who had
arrived during the period of the Soviet military intervention was no longer viable
politically, legally, or economically. In principle, registration with NARA would
have afforded some legal protection to people of Afghan origin to live and work in
Pakistan. After the fall of the Taleban government, the policy changed dramatically
from ‘regularization’ to ‘regulation’. All people of Afghan origin were to be
registered now, with the purpose of eventually repatriating them back to Afghani-
stan. Repatriation was to be voluntary, of course, but it was also clear that the option
of ‘regularization’ was closed at least for the time being (AREU 2005). Evidently,
such an ad hoc approach to the issues of refugees has been possible because the host
country did not ratify the international laws on refugees. In 2013, Islamabad came up
with a new National Policy on Afghan Refugees, drafted in synergy with the multi-
year Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), which focuses on voluntary
repatriation, sustainable reintegration inside Afghanistan, and assistance to refugee
host communities. Considering that Afghanistan continues to be one of the most
unstable and fragile states, with rapidly evaporating aid and opportunities, a rapidly
deteriorating security situation that includes insurgencies, diminishing government
control over its territory, and a news cycle that is consistently punctuated by news of
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 227

suicide bombing, deaths, and destruction—it is not very difficult to gauge how far
these refugee repatriations are ‘voluntary’.

5 Afghan Refugees: Liability or Asset for Pakistan?

It is evident from the above discussion that Pakistan’s policies over the years have
undergone remarkable shifts. Thus, it becomes necessary to understand the host
government’s concerns and interests that may have triggered those shifts. Today, the
government of Pakistan largely believes that Afghans are a net drain on the econ-
omy. The refugee presence may have resulted in some clearly defined changes in
income distribution, leading to occasional friction with local Pakistanis, even if it did
not necessarily affect the overall economy. Moreover, incoming refugees created a
larger demand for goods and generated inflation in some parts of the country as a
consequence. At the same time, some local economies did grow because of the sheer
number of refugees, which enriched local markets. The international aid that
Pakistan received because of Afghan refugees stimulated consumption and contrib-
uted to the regional infrastructure. It is indeed difficult to make a balanced cost/
benefit analysis since a major part of Pakistan’s economy belongs to the informal
sector. The environmental price that Pakistan paid by hosting Afghan refugees has
also been raised along with the question of the security impact. With Afghanistan
producing about 92% of the world’s opium, part of it has to be smuggled out through
Pakistan where informal tax collection systems by militant groups of various
affiliations have transformed narcotics trafficking into an additional source of inse-
curity (Peters 2009).
Over the years, Islamabad has pursued several parallel objectives in Afghanistan.
Firstly, it has tried to persuade Afghan refugees against the idea of Pashtunistan, as it
would deprive Pakistan of a chuck of its territory. Secondly, Pakistan has always
tried to limit its foremost enemy India’s influence in Afghanistan in order to avoid
the risk of two-front war if a conflict were to erupt with India. Therefore, a political
dispensation in Kabul that does not have a favourable relationship with New Delhi
and shares the opposite with Islamabad is seen to be the best-case scenario from the
Pakistani perspective. The Taleban period provided Pakistan with a favourable
situation, but it did come with a cost in the form of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,
which according to observers has turned out to be ‘Frankenstein’s monster’
(Waldman 2010). Thirdly, like the Soviet intervention, the ‘War on Terror’ also
provided Pakistan with yet another lucrative opportunity to amass funds from the
international community. At another level, Pakistan’s desire to keep the United
States tied down in Afghanistan has two clear advantages: one, the continuation of
the supply of international assistance and two, it provides a guarantee against a
predominant Indian influence if Taleban fail to return to power. Seen from
Islamabad’s perspective, it makes sense for Pakistan to maintain a low-intensity
conflict in Afghanistan, in which case the Afghan refugees in Pakistan constitute to
be the ideal cannon fodder. It is clear that the continuation of the war in Afghanistan,
228 A. Ghosh

thanks to Pakistan’s continued support of the Taleban, is also an important factor in

convincing the refugees directly (because of the consequences of the conflict) and
indirectly (because of the inhibition of Afghanistan’s reconstruction) to stay in
Pakistan (Grare and Maley 2011). The mentioned objectives do not necessarily
oppose each other, but they do influence the position on the refugees, who are no
longer exclusively a potential strategic liability but also a strategic asset.

6 Conclusion

From a position of relative openness to and facilitation of refugee migration from

Afghanistan (from the late 1970s to 1988), official policy went through a period of
openness without facilitation (from around 1988 to 2001) to a posture of regulation
and repatriation; from 2001 onwards, Pakistan’s policy towards Afghan refugees has
undergone drastic shifts. Evidently, the fact that Pakistan is not a signatory to the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol allowed it to implement drastic policies. The
absence of legal obligations made the refugees a potential source of leverage
whenever Islamabad considered the problems intractable and a bargaining tool
with the international community when the situation demanded. This article high-
lights that Pakistan’s management of the refugee issue has been fraught with
contradictions, and not necessarily linked to logical cost-benefit assessments. The
context of population displacement from Afghanistan aptly indicates the crucial role
played by Pakistan in influencing the course of Afghan history. Although other
international and regional players pursued their selfish interests in Afghanistan, the
impact of Pakistan’s policies has been most significant. Unlike the 1980s, when
Pakistan was suffering from the consequences of the Soviet occupation and strate-
gies, today it suffers because of its own policies in Afghanistan, which is one of the
reasons why it still has to cope with a refugee problem of a significant magnitude.
Today, Afghan refugees in Pakistan constitute both a liability and an asset. It would
not be surprizing if the international community continued to be held hostage by
Pakistan’s policies conducted on its neighbour’s territory in the years to come.
The future of the Afghan refugees will largely depend on the political stability
and economic viability of Afghanistan, which certainly appears to be a distant dream
at the moment. The increased attacks by the Taleban and other militant groups
including Islamic State and the Haqqani network have jeopardized the security
situation in Afghanistan considerably. Tackling of the security situation will require
appropriate resourcing and preparation from the Afghan National Security Force,
which is currently overstretched and seemingly fatigued—as evidenced by the
expansion of the Taliban footprint. All these factors are not only disheartening but
also discouraging for Afghan refugees in Pakistan or elsewhere to contemplate
returning to Afghanistan. The long-standing strenuous relation between Pakistan
and Afghanistan has had direct effect on Afghan migration particularly in regard to
repatriation and the extension of Proof of Registration process. Evidently, the
Afghan refugees have constituted some kind of asset for the political dispensation
in Pakistan, but time has come for the policymakers in Islamabad and Rawalpindi to
Afghan Migration and Pakistan’s Policy Response: Dynamics of. . . 229

re-evaluate the socio-political and most importantly economic impact of the pres-
ence of Afghan refugees for their country and stop using these refugees as mere
pawns for their own advantage. Pakistan has the most significant role to play in
bringing stability in Afghanistan, but it is important for the political dispensation to
see merit in that prospect and reformulate policies accordingly. Not only Pakistan
and Afghanistan but the world at large has suffered because they tried to follow their
narrow and selfish interests in Afghanistan. The problems that grip Afghanistan and
the region at large have a history behind them and were not created in a short span of
time; therefore, a shortcut solution will not be effective. It is crucial that the regional
powers and the international community stay committed to Afghanistan as the
failure to do so will speak much more about them as opposed to the Afghans.

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org/3edf4fc02.html
UNHCR. (2008, December). Protracted refugee situations: A discussion paper prepared for the
High Commissioner’s dialogue on protection challenges. Accessed January 27, 2018, from
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/492fb92d2.html
UNHCR. (2009). Global appeal Afghanistan-2008–2009. Accessed January 27, 2018, from http://
www.unhcr.org/474ac8e00.html
UNHCR. (2016). Global trends: Forced displacement in 2016. UNHCR. Accessed January
26, 2018, from http://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/
UNHCR Report. (2000). Five proxy wars in Africa, Asia and Central America. Accessed January
29, 2018, from http://www.unhcr.org/3ebf9baf0.pdf
Wafadar, K. (1981). Afghanistan in 1980: The struggle continues. Asian Survey, 21(2), 172–180.
Wafadar, K. (1982). Afghanistan in 1981: The struggle intensifies. Asian Survey, 22(2), 147–154.
Waldman, M. (2010). The sun in the sky: The relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan
insurgents (Discussion papers, 18). London: Crisis States Research Unit, London School of
Economics and Political Science.
Yousuf, M., & Adkin, M. (1992). The bear trap: Afghanistan’s untold story. Barnsley: Pen &
Sword Books.

Anwesha Ghosh received her doctoral degree from the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at
the University of Erfurt, Germany, supported by the DAAD Conflict Studies and Management
Programme. She has published in the field of aid diplomacy, India’s foreign policy, regional
cooperation, gender, migration and refugees focusing on Afghanistan. Her publications include A
Leap Forward: Education, Capacity Building and Indo-Afghanistan Co-operation (2014) and
Afghan Women in Transition: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow (2017). Her recent book Identity
and Marginality in India: Settlement Experience of Afghan Migrants has been published by
Routledge, United Kingdom in 2018.
Agenda Setting in India: Examining
the Ganges Pollution Control Program
Through the Lens of Multiple Streams
Framework

Maitreyee Mukherjee

1 Introduction: Do Systemic Patterns of Agenda Building

Exist in Governmental Policy Dynamics?

Agenda setting is the first and a crucial step of the policy cycle, whereby important
issues are highlighted and begin to receive attention from the government. This has a
critical influence on the entire trajectory of a government’s policy process. Activities
in this initial phase, for example, may determine whether an issue would be
addressed by the government or abandoned at later stage (Howlett et al. 2009).
Therefore, it is important to study the mechanisms and patterns of agenda setting in
different countries or regions to gain insight into the means by which social,
economic, and environmental issues are highlighted in government action plans.
Pressure to act on certain agenda items often comes from domestic or interna-
tional actors, and this is usually cited as the reason for why government takes an
issue up for further consideration (Princen 2007; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2005).
The key question is, nonetheless, what is the exact pattern and sequence of the
interactions that lead governments to choose one or a few policy issues for agenda
setting out of a probably large cluster of topics? Who are the key players influencing
agenda setting and how do they co-ordinate this dynamic? What circumstances
facilitate such co-ordination? This is indeed a fascinating area of inquiry. The
identification of a chain or pattern of events that lead to successful issue attention
may be useful for understanding and managing future agendas. It can also help
academics or policy practitioners better formulate policy tools in bringing important
issues to the government’s attention.
Various theoretical explications of the agenda setting process have been
suggested by different proponents (Lasswell 1956; Downs 1972; Cobb Ross and

M. Mukherjee (*)
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore,
Singapore
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 231

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_13
232 M. Mukherjee

Ross 1976; Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Empirical studies to
support heuristic models have been mostly conducted in the United States,
Canada, and some European countries, as evidenced by the works of McFarland
(1991), Baumgartner and Jones (1991), Sabatier (1993), Howlett (1997, 1998),
Birkland (2004), Guldbrandsson and Fossum (2009), Vliegenthart et al. (2016),
and others. While these studies deal with various procedural parameters of agenda
setting dynamics mostly in Western countries, there is a dearth of similar research in
Asian countries. To bridge this gap, my article investigates the dynamics of agenda
setting in India, specifically the roles played by different actors in the policy arena.
Using a single case study of the pollution control program in the Ganges river basin,
I try to identify key motivations behind these actors and their respective behaviours.
This chapter intends to add to the existing knowledge regarding the nature of
agenda setting dynamics in the Global South, by investigating issue-attention pat-
terns addressing Ganges river pollution in India over the span of three decades
(1985–2016). The rationale behind choosing this case study is that issues such as
pollution abatement, river restoration, and basin management in the Ganges river
system have been matters of issue attention since the mid-1980s. The enormous
scope of the Ganges restoration project and a rather incompetent planning process
and numerous government projects launched since 1985 resulted in limited success,
while fast and unplanned urbanization, economic development, and excessive water
withdrawals have deteriorated the river’s overall condition, resulting in the worst
quality levels since ever. As a result, in recent times, the Ganges river basin has
captured significant national as well as global attention due to its deplorable condi-
tion and repeated demands for restoration.
The fundamental research questions investigated in this study are as follows:
• What were the key drivers involved in setting up the agenda for pollution
abatement in the Ganges river and its rejuvenation?
• Who were the prominent policy entrepreneurs in this process?
• What was the motivation behind their actions?
To address the above queries, I have used the discourse analysis to study agenda
dynamics in the Ganges river basin through the lens of the multiple streams
framework (MSF) model (Brunner 2008; Lorenzoni and Benson 2014). I have
focussed on the history, repeated governance attempts, and subsequent failures to
control pollution in the Ganges and documented how these have been influencing
related policy-making (or lack of policies) in the region. Tracing the evolution of the
Ganges clean-up program since the mid-1980s, I have attempted to categorize the
simultaneous development of Kingdon’s three streams over years and how they were
finally converged into a favourable policy window driven by policy entrepreneurs to
initiate enough governmental commitment. By examining the country’s political
situation during these periods of enhanced issue attention, it was found that gaining
electoral advantage served as the key driver in the whole process. I further applied
the theory of collective action (Ostrom 2007) to analyse the motivation behind the
cooperative behaviour of political leaders prior to parliamentary elections to push
their preferred policies to the limelight. They had exploited the existing situation to
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 233

their favour by igniting massive public sentiments and facilitated the formation of a
‘national mood’ which demanded immediate action and visible outcomes from the
government.

2 Multiple Streams Framework

At any given time, there exists an almost infinite set of societal problems or public
issues that could require government attention; however, only a few make it into a
government’s agenda. What classifies these issues as special events seeking imme-
diate attention and how? John Kingdon, in his 1984 seminal work, attempted to
integrate the physical, social, and state components influencing the problem universe
by taking a broad system approach. By observing policy proceedings in the US
Congress, he proposed that, generally, the policy agenda expands through the
parallel processing of three distinct subsystems, that is, the problem stream (inherent
properties of the problem issue), the policy stream (development of feasible solu-
tions by different interest groups), and the politics stream (creation of receptive
policy institutions or right political motivations). The right opportunity is created
when these streams function simultaneously with each other towards the realization
of similar interests, opening a narrow fertile window for prospective policy consid-
erations. However, this does not occur spontaneously. Each stream in the system
generally develops individually, with serial processing of events that accumulate
over time to create enough weightage. Simultaneous parallel processing of the three
distinct streams then converges together to give rise to an impending situation that
policy-makers cannot ignore anymore (Zahariadis 2014).
How, then, do these three separate streams converge towards one another?
Kingdon (1984) had noted that several trigger factors might predictably or
unpredictably activate the creation of a window. Among those, sudden external
shocks or ‘focussing events’ (unpredicted events such as a plane crash or natural
calamity) have been cited as an important agent in drawing attention from the public
as well as from the government. When such a situation occurs, the presence of
cognitive, opportunity seeking interest groups, government or community leaders,
policy entrepreneurs, or social media members may play a central role in expanding
those interests or agendas to facilitate the path for policy consolidation. This also
increases the likelihood that influential policy actors with similar interests will come
together and collectively create pressure on dominant policy communities, thus
initiating the breakdown of the status quo (Birkland 1998). They further realize
their agenda through group mobilization, a change in public image, and capturing of
public venues, thus bringing it to the forefront of an agenda.
Apart from the role of influential policy actors, certain crucial events might be
directly highlighted through the media. The strength and sensitizing capacity of the
focussing event play an important role in determining how much media attention it
would attract (Birkland 2004). Alternately, political institutions themselves might
234 M. Mukherjee

play an instrumental role in initiating the expansion and entry of an agenda to the
governmental list of topics under consideration.
“Basically a window opens because of change in the political stream (for example, a change
of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of seats (. . .) or a shift in
national mood); or it opens because a new problem captures the governmental officials and
those close to them.” (Kingdon 1984, p. 176).

Thus, institutionalized events like impending elections or budgetary sessions are

often key factors that motivate governments to focus on impending problems
(Howlett 1998). Successful politicians are often seen to exploit such events to
combine them with the existing national mood to generate an emotional attachment
of public towards certain policies (Neuman et al. 2007; Zahariadis 2016).
Kingdon’s three-stream model of policy window creation has been further
expanded by the works of Zahariadis, which he restructured in the form of the
multiple streams framework (MSF). According to Zahariadis (2014), the utility of
MSF over other propositions is that it considers the ambiguity, temporal aspect, and
multiple levels of analyses involved in the study of agenda dynamics. The develop-
ment of streams and their subsequent convergence in the framework allows
researchers to study the process at multiple levels as well as from the angles of
single units of analysis. Zahariadis’s research (1992, 1995a, b, 2007, 2014) further
highlighted how policy entrepreneurs (or influential policy actors) used their access
to key policy venues and resources (in form of time, energy, reputation, and money)
to facilitate the convergence of three streams. He also proposed that policy entre-
preneurs utilize a variety of strategies to form the agenda, which are issue framing,
utilization of symbols, salami tactic (piecemeal or step-by-step approach), and affect
priming (emotional endowment of the issue). Of these, the last two are of interest to
scholars of agenda setting. Salami tactics are the way in which complex or wicked
problems are addressed through temporal structuring, that is, by breaking the process
through subsequent stages, taking one step at a time, and facilitating holistic
agreements sequentially. On the other hand, affect priming handles the ambiguity
aspect of policy problems by strategically manipulating public emotions and creating
favourable images on certain agenda items (Zohlnhöfer and Rüb 2016).
The key contributions of Kingdon’s model (or MSF) have been that it has
inspired a large volume of empirical literature enabling researchers to apply the
concept beyond the Anglo-American paradigm. Owing to its simple, broad
approach, flexibility to adapt to different contexts, and low barriers to entry, MSF
has been effective in explaining issue complexities and drivers of change in the
policy process. Furthermore, it has also facilitated the development of evolutionary
policy theories like that of punctuated equilibrium (Cairney and Jones 2016). To list
a few examples, MSF has been widely used as a theoretical base in explaining the
dynamics of US foreign policy-making (Wood and Peake 1998); the policy process
of the European Union (Ackrill et al. 2013); politics of privatization in Britain,
France, and Germany (Zahariadis 1995a, b; Zahariadis and Allen 1995); character-
istics of US antidrug policy (Sharp 1994); agenda dynamics in Canada (Howlett
1998); alliances between industry and environmental groups in pushing certain
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 235

antipollution policies in the United States and Europe (Lober 1997); and many more.
Such extensive empirical studies have shed light on different aspects of the agenda
setting process leading to the refinement of Kingdon’s original propositions.
In this line, research by Thomas Birkland emphasized the importance of ‘focus-
sing events’, triggering media coverage, public attention, group coalescence, and
mobilization, finally leading to the convergence of opinions regarding the nature of
the problem as well as commitment to address it (Birkland 2004, 2006; Birkland and
DeYoung 2012). Simultaneously, studies by Vliegenthart et al. (2016) reconfirmed
that political motivation and multiparty competition play a pivotal role in the final
promotion of an agenda to the government’s discussion table. In fact, Guldbrandsson
and Fossum (2009) identify politicians as the key policy entrepreneurs in
augmenting the opening of a policy window in the Swedish healthcare sector.
From yet another perspective, Soroka (2003) and Soroka et al. (2012) discussed
the role of media in issue attentiveness and policy framing. They pointed out that
media does not necessarily play a constructive role in agenda framing due to regular
shifts in its attention from one topic to another along with the possibility that
potential false news feeds lead to an untruthful hype. Furthermore, the interaction
of political motives and media attention often results in the shifting of foci away
from the real policy issues. According to them, this is the reason why long-term
environmental issues may not be adequately addressed by media due to the lack of
sustained interest in a complex issue along with the presence of other easily available
and at first sight more attractive events for coverage.
Despite its wide applicability, MSF has been simultaneously criticized for several
limitations. Sabatier (1999) argue that although MSF has a broad flexible structure,
providing it a wide base for empirical applications, the framework suffers from a
lack of testable hypotheses. Thus, falsification of the empirical findings based on
MSF is very difficult. Kuhlmann (2016) argues that the MSF theory has a limited
scope for quantitative assessment and lacks a micro foundation. Brunner (2008)
further observed that MSF lacks the explanatory power to explain modern-day
features like multilevel governance structures, policy changes due to the effects of
learning processes, and social network linkages. Therefore, he suggested that MSF
needs to be complemented with other illustrative theories to increase its explanatory
capacity. In line with this argument, Lorenzoni and Benson (2014) showed that
combining Kingdon’s model with discursive institutionalism provides a better
understanding of the evaluation of institutional innovations in the case of the UK’s
environmental governance.
As specified earlier, the following sections will contribute to this vast, already
available literature on agenda dynamics by applying a policy discourse and by
reviewing the chain of events regarding the Ganges river clean-up program in
India over three decades. Additionally, I will identify crucial factors that played a
vital role in pushing the agenda from the local to the national level and subsequently
to the limelight of international significance.
236 M. Mukherjee

3 Ganges River Basin: A Short History of Issue Agenda

Dynamics

The Ganges river basin covers 1.09 mio. km2 spread over India, Nepal, and
Bangladesh. It is one of the largest and most complicated river basin systems with
transboundary issues both interstate and across countries. The basin accounts for
over a quarter of India’s land and water resources, 37% of human resources (more
than 500 million people); nearly half of it is irrigated area (The NGRBA1 program,
online documents from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, MoEF) The main
stem of the river is about 2500 km length and passes through five different states of
India before entering Bangladesh. The river has enormous cultural and religious
significance for Hindus and is the source of great ecological wealth in the region
(Singh and Singh 2007).
The water quality of the Ganges has deteriorated radically over the past decade
due to the uncontrolled discharge of untreated sewage, solid waste, industrial
effluent, and reduced stream flow caused by the diversion and control of the water
for human use (CSE 2013; MoEF documents). The Ganges ranks among the five
most polluted rivers in the world. Restoration efforts over the last three decades have
failed to achieve any notable results. The situation deteriorated constantly. There-
fore, the ruling political leadership has vowed to implement short-term and long-
term interventions with the goal of significantly improving the river’s conditions, at
least in visible parameters by the year 2019. Against this background, the handling
of the Ganges river pollution is of high interest in context of agenda setting dynamics
in the Indian context. Figure 1 displays the evolutionary path of the government
initiatives taken regarding the ‘Ganga rejuvenation’ project since 1985.
The Indian government had initiated efforts to clean up the river back in 1985
with the Ganga Action Plan I. However, this and subsequent action plans2 had little
impact on water quality and other ecological parameters in the basin. The sheer
enormity of the project, inadequate planning, communication gaps between central
and state agencies, inappropriate technologies, delays in investment, low utilization
of treatment facilities, lack of appropriate monitoring mechanisms, ambiguous legal
and institutional structures, limited involvement of stakeholders, and numerous other
factors have hindered the process from the beginning (CSE 2013; Das and
Tamminga 2012; GRBMP 2010; The NGRBA program). At the same time, over
the last three decades, the Ganges river basin has undergone extensive development
in terms of urbanization, economic growth, population explosion, and amplified
waste generation. There have been substantial changes in geographic, environmen-
tal, ecological, and socio-economic parameters as well. Unpredictable meteorolog-
ical conditions regularly wreak havoc in the basin in the form of severe water
shortages in summer months due to devastating floods, cloudbursts, or flash floods

1
National Ganga River Basin Authority.
2
Ganga Action Plan I (GAP I) ran between 1985 and 2000; Ganga Action Plan II (GAP II) ran
between 1991 and 2001.
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 237

Fig. 1 Schematic flow chart showing the major milestones of the Ganges clean-up program.
Source: Compiled by Author. Abbrviations used: Ministry of Environment and Forestry
(MoEF); Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR)

during monsoon season that often claim many lives and destroy livelihoods. Thus,
each year a major share of resources, time, and efforts are utilized for ad hoc disaster
management, shifting the pollution abatement effort to the background.
In addition, rapid economic development in the region has raised several types of
water use demand leading to indiscriminate water extraction from the river. Irriga-
tion is the largest form of water consumption in the basin. Currently, there are nearly
480 (major and medium) functional irrigation projects in the Ganges basin (India-
WRIS website, b). To ensure water (as well as energy) security in the area, the Indian
government has sanctioned numerous dams and hydroelectric projects. According to
official sources, 38 hydroelectric projects are operational over the Ganges and its
tributaries (India-WRIS website, a). These projects have caused considerable eco-
logical disruption and reduced water flow in many regions of the basin. Furthermore,
different large-, medium-, and small-scale manufacturing industries such as tanner-
ies, sugar mills, paper, jute, textiles, cement, fertilizers, machinery, coal mining, and
many more have thrived in the region. There are 764 grossly polluting industries
dumping waste into the river. The Central Pollution Control Board report states that
existing wastewater treatment capacity in the region can address only 45% of the
total generation.3 However, even if every drop of polluted water is treated, Ganges
cannot be revived to bathing type water quality unless its natural flow can be restored
(CPCB 2013).

3
36 Class I cities and 14 Class II towns discharge approximately 2723 MLD of urban sewage, of
which only 1208 MLD is the capacity of installed STPs (sewage treatment plant). Additionally,
6087 MLD of open drain water from different run-offs flow into the river.
238 M. Mukherjee

Right after the GAP I and II ceased to function post 2000, issues related to the
Ganges slowly faded out of the public as well as the governmental agenda. As a
result, exploitation of the river basin resources (pollution, water withdrawal, sand
mining, extinction of species) continued indiscriminately. This stimulated internal
interest groups like NGOs, autonomous academic institutes, and various local
community groups to start campaigning against government inaction and the
alarming deterioration of the riverine system. Eventually, widespread media atten-
tion, along with collective pressures from environmentalists, religious leaders,
international agencies, and policy entrepreneurs, forced the Indian government to
revive the Ganges clean-up project under fresh leadership and organizational capac-
ities (Zawahri and Hensengerth 2012).
In the year 2008,4 the Ganges river received ‘National River’ status. Since then, a
series of activities followed in order to revive the Ganges clean-up project. Unsure
about the multi-tiered nature of the problem, the government was still making ad hoc
decisions by ‘muddling through’ different policy solutions. The National Ganga
River Basin Authority (NGRBA), an advisory organization responsible for super-
vising overall planning and progress, was formed under the MoEF. GAP was
relaunched as the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG) in 2011 and placed
under NGRBA. A comprehensive Ganga River Basin Environmental Management
Plan (GRBEMP) was sanctioned to be prepared by a panel of experts in order to
establish an extensive management plan for integrated basin level management.
Following the 2014 parliamentary elections, a change in the ruling government
brought political focus back to the Ganges clean-up agenda. The Ganges rejuvena-
tion program was shifted from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry to the
Ministry of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation. The
‘Namami Gange Program’ (2014) was launched with an integrated goal of develop-
ing sewage treatment infrastructure, riverfront development, river surface cleaning,
biodiversity protection, afforestation, public awareness, industrial effluent monitor-
ing, and Ganga Gram development (open defecation free villages). The memoran-
dum of understanding (MoU) has been signed with different ministries to cooperate
in integrating government schemes for the Ganges program into their planning as
well (NMCG website5).
To date, the NMCG retains its role as the implementation arm of the government
to take measures on pollution abatement, conservation, and the rejuvenation of the
Ganges river. However, the NGRBA has been dissolved since October 2016, and a
new organization the ‘National Ganga Council’ (NGC) under the chairmanship of
the Prime Minister of India has been established. A five-tier institutional structure
(from national to state to district level) has been formed to ensure the smooth
functioning of the Ganges rejuvenation program. The five levels are as follows6:

4
Incidentally these activities coincided with the upcoming May 2009 general elections.
5
http://nmcg.nic.in/NamamiGanga.aspx (accessed 08/09/17).
6
http://nmcg.nic.in/about_nmcg.aspx (accessed 08/09/2017).
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 239

1. National Ganga Council under the chairmanship of Honourable Prime Minister of

India (federal authority)
2. Empowered Task Force (ETF) on Ganges river under the chairmanship of
Honourable Union Minister of Water Resources, River Development and
Ganga Rejuvenation (ground force appointed by the central ministry)
3. National Mission for Clean Ganga—NMCG (implementation arm of the federal
system)
4. State Ganga Committees (state agency)
5. District Ganga Committees (district level agency)

4 Discussion and Analysis

From the above description, it is evident that the Ganges river pollution and its
abatement programs have continuously faced entry and exit on the public as well as
state agenda for nearly three decades, thus generating a long pattern of issue-
attention behaviour. This provides an excellent opportunity to inspect the case for
the existence of Kingdon’s three streams, their interaction, and how they subse-
quently merged together. Figure 2 shows schematically the major events occurring
under each stream, their time sequence, and their eventual convergence. Starting

Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the sequence of stream development and stream convergence.
(Note: 2009 and 2014 were election years. Mr. Narendra Modi is the current Prime Minister of
India.). Source: Compiled by Author. The Multiple Streams Framework has been adapted from
Zahariadis 2003. [Abbreviations used: GAP Ganga Action Plan, CPCB Central pollution Control
Board, NGRBA National Ganges River Basin Environmental Plan, IIT Indian Institute of Technol-
ogy, MoEF Ministry of Environment and Forestry, MOWR Ministry of Water Resources, River
Development and Ganga Rejuvenation, JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency]
240 M. Mukherjee

from the problem stream, resentment and frustration about the plight of the Ganges
river had been building up for a long time. With the failure of GAP, the government
had been unsuccessful in initiating an efficient river restoration program that could
match the enormous scale of the problem at neither the river basin level nor the
regional levels. In addition, whatever infrastructure was developed under GAP was
either under-performing or closed down due to lack of operation and maintenance
funds at the state government level. Dams and hydropower projects, along with
diversion canals on the river course, had substantially restricted its water flow.
Additionally, severe pollution from industries as well as residential/municipal sew-
age choked the river at various stretches. In fact, during the summer and winter
months when river flow is limited, many stretches of the river become ecologically
dead due to high biological oxygen demand (BOD) and a deadly concoction of
organic and inorganic wastes. Apart from this, cultural activities like religious events
on the river banks, immersion of idols, the throwing of dead bodies into the river,
and similar activities add to the magnitude of the problem, rendering the river
unusable at many points.
Concerned about the fast deterioration of the river resources, many (government,
independent, and academic) reports investigating the scale of the damage were
published. Of these reports, the most eye-opening ones were the government’s
own reports such as the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report, 2000
(Business Line 2000), and reports from Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB).
The CAG report, 2000 had criticized GAP by noting that between 1993 and 2000,
only 39% of the stipulated target for building sewage treatment plants could be
achieved. The CAG report further pointed out that GAP had laid out a static plan
without considering the extensive trend of population increases or economic devel-
opment that would have taken place. The report also highlighted that GAP was a
centralized program, which failed to be efficiently executed at the state levels.
Although central government had borne the capital cost of STP construction, state
governments were responsible for setup, operation, and maintenance. In many
instances, it was found that state governments lacked the necessary expertise or
funds to operate those STPs. Simultaneously, the CPCB reports on water quality
status revealed that between 2009 and 2015, the number polluted river stretches in
the country had doubled (CPCB 2009, 2013, 2015). The Ganges river basin is also
no exception.7
The policy stream was initiated by giving the Ganges river a special ‘National
River’ status, in 2008. The government also started revamping the river restoration
program with the formation of new organizations dedicated to river basin manage-
ment activities on a national scale. The National Ganges River Basin Authority
(NGRBA) was formed in 2009, which sanctioned the development of a working
environmental management plan, GBREMP, by a consortium of Indian experts. The

7
Nearly 16% of the country’s total sewage generated is discharged in Ganges only (Ganga River
Basin Management Plan Interim Report 2013, Avaialbe at: https://nmcg.nic.in/writereaddata/
fileupload/25_GRBMPInterim_Rep.pdf (accessed 17/12/2018); CPCB Report 2013).
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 241

National Mission for Clean Ganga was launched as the central implementation arm
for coordination with state and district level agencies. Several programs were lined
up for rigorous water quality monitoring, industrial effluent checks, and the instal-
lation of wastewater treatment facilities in settlements along the bank. Simulta-
neously, independent academic and NGO groups8 continued their campaign by
writing blogs, posts, newspaper articles, publishing reports, religious messages,
drawing media attention, joining various government committees, and negotiating
with them on future strategies. International aid organizations such as World Bank
and JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) extended financial aids worth
more than US$1 billion, for various projects under the Ganges rejuvenation project
(around 2011–2012).
Meanwhile, with the development of problem and policy streams, political
incentives to sensitize the issue to draw public support were growing too. In the
2014 parliamentary elections, the opposition party leader Narendra Modi first
brought up and highlighted the Ganges issue in his election campaign. In fact,
Ganga rejuvenation was declared as one of his priority promises to be delivered
once he came to power. As an iconic gesture, he decided to contest the election from
a prime constituency on the Ganges river bank, Varanasi. Varanasi occupies a sacred
position in the Hindu religion, and has significant cultural implications, too. All
these ignited pro-religious sentiments among the majority of voters in the region and
led to the creation of a poignant ‘national mood’.
Narendra Modi and his party, namely, The Bhartiya Janata Party, translated as
Indian People’s Party, won the 2014 federal elections with an overwhelming major-
ity. In his first speech as Prime Minister elect, which he delivered at the river bank of
Varanasi, he underlined the ‘need of the hour (is) to restore the glory of the Ganga.
Today Maa (mother) Ganga is calling us, her children to make the river clean once
again’.9 He announced two important projects that day, which were the Ganga river
clean-up and ‘Clean India Mission’. In doing so, a politically charged policy window
was forced to open, triggering lot of interest, discussions regarding the problem, and
future planning. As promised, Modi mobilized a series of policy directives after
taking office. The Ganga program was transferred to the Ministry of Water
Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation (MOWR). The NGRBA
was dissolved to form a new supervisory board called the National Ganga Council
directly under the leadership of the Prime Minister. A five-tier institutional structure,
including national, state, and district organizations, was formed for more efficient
management. The Namami Gange Program was launched with integrated river
development targets.

8
Autonomous research institute like Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) and NGOs like Eco
Friends, Kanpur; Sankat Mochan Foundation, Varanasi; and more.
9
Zee News; http://zeenews.india.com/news/general-elections-2014/narendra-modi-attends-ganga-
aarti-in-varanasi-thanks-people-for-support_932777.html (accessed 08/07/17).
242 M. Mukherjee

5 Conclusion: What Induced the Convergence of Streams?

This contribution traces historical discourse of the Ganges river basin rejuvenation
program and analyses its development to evaluate the nature of agenda setting
dynamics in India. The occurrence of multiple streams convergence and the opening
of an institutionalized policy window were identified in two instances, which also
coincided with election years. Strictly speaking, the process was initiated before the
2009 parliamentary elections with designation of River Ganges as India’s national
river, however the ripening of streams occurred in the successive 2014 election with
a change in ruling party and political ideology. Although political motives to gain
electoral advantage appeared to be the single major stimulus in facilitating stream
convergence, window opening was possible due to the simultaneous development in
the problem as well as the policy sectors, along with constant pushes from relevant
policy entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, if we study the development of events over past three decades,
adequate political interest was already present from the beginning, much before
2009 or 2014. One could ask, what was special during this time that triggered such
massive sensitization of public sentiments, creating distinct public images and
attracting so much interest from politicians, communities, and media? I suggest
that the final convergence of streams or the opening of a window was possible due to
the carefully planned collective action of a handful of political actors that shared
similar political ideologies. These political leaders managed to arouse necessary
passion and public sentiments regarding the issue using stories, images, and symbols
of cultural significance to build support for their electoral candidature (Neuman et al.
2007; Zahariadis 2016). As a result, it led to the creation of a national mood
(Kingdon 1984) charged with religious sentiments and an urgent need to address
the impending situation.
The Ganges river, being an important common pool resource and a significant
national asset, must be well managed and sustained for the nation’s future well-
being. Therefore, policy initiatives to act on the issue had already started, with the
declaration of the Ganges as the national river of India in 2008. This was followed by
the formation of planning committees, expert group consultations, budgets set aside
for numerous projects, and the acceptance of extensive international funds. Once
those funds were released, the initiated projects had to be rolled over, the money
spent, and promised output achieved (irrespective of change in political ideology).
However, sensitizing the sentiments of millions had the potential to generate sub-
stantive electoral leverage in any political party, an opportunity readily grasped by
the then opposition party (before 2014). The concerned leaders, mobilized by
common political interests, then worked collectively to promote their dedication
for rejuvenation of the Ganges river. Mutual trust, creation of good will, high levels
of co-operation (due to sharing of similar ideologies), and well-coordinated actions
enabled the creation of a national mood that demanded better environmental policies
(Ostrom 2007). Nonetheless, the pivotal role in agenda setting was played by the
then Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, who took up the issue again and
Agenda Setting in India: Examining the Ganges Pollution Control Program. . . 243

again in his election campaigns. Simultaneously, media also played a supporting role
in inspiring public sentiments by covering the governmental proceedings, reports,
and party agendas regularly. Eventually, all these activities converged together when
finally the opposition party won the election, in 2014, which then realized its
promises through respective actions.
However, the opening of a policy window does not ensure any significant out-
comes (Howlett et al. 2009). Continuous discussion and constant trials keep the
process rolling and cause the subsequent attention to persist. The agenda focussing
of the Ganges river has triggered a series of policies targeting river clean-up,
stringent pollution rules, and long-term strategic planning. The MOWR has finally
announced that no more new dams on the main river course would be permitted.
Several new STPs have been sanctioned along with funds for the construction of
toilet facilities in villages. Continuous monitoring of water quality has been initiated
to detect industrial effluent discharge (113 stations with real-time monitoring sys-
tems). A Ganga Task Force (Empowered Task Force) has been deployed along the
banks to check any illicit waste disposal as well as to spread public awareness.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has declared the rivers Ganga and Yamuna (trib-
utary) as living entities, implying that these rivers also have the right to good health
and well-being. Anybody infringing upon these rights can be prosecuted. Neverthe-
less, in spite of so much enthusiasm and good will, the latest official reports admit
that most projects under the Ganges clean-up program are way behind their sched-
uled targets, with the allocated development funds severely underutilized in most
cases (compiled from several newspaper reports).
Despite an elaborate discussion on agenda setting behaviour in the Indian context,
findings from this chapter should be interpreted very carefully. Since the chapter
deals with a single case study, it is insufficient to suggest any normative pattern of
agenda setting for developing nations or countries in the Global South. However,
certain patterns have been identified in this chapter and these form its key contribu-
tions. For example, evidence for the presence of three distinct streams and political
motivation to push relevant agenda items before elections reinforce the application
of MSF in the context of the Global South as well. The findings also resemble
agenda dynamics patterns found in the United States or the EU as documented by
relevant literature. However, more empirical research in future is needed on agenda
dynamics for other sensitive issues as well, such as air pollution, nuclear power, and
alternative energy sources to be able to draw more convincing conclusion.

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Maitreyee Mukherjee is currently pursuing her PhD at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public
Policy (LKYSPP), National University of Singapore (NUS). She has a background in biosciences
and environmental management. Her academic interest lies in water related policy research. Previ-
ously, as research associate of the Institute of Water Policy of the LKYSPP, Singapore, she focused
on research related to urban water management, water pricing and river basin management.
Entrepreneurship Education
and the Promotion of Startup Development:
The Case of Pilar, Paraguay

Fernando Luis Ramirez Gonzalez

1 Introduction

In both developed and developing countries, entrepreneurs have been viewed as

important actors in the promotion of innovation, job creation, and employment
(Hynes 1996; Piperopoulos 2012; Wong et al. 2005; Kuratko 2005), while small
businesses have been argued to be the main economic units where these actors can
contribute to the socioeconomic development and prosperity of their communities
(Ghina 2014; Matlay 2006; Baldwin et al. 2001). Particularly in small business-
dependent developing countries, these economic units have been regarded as cata-
lysts of income growth, unemployment reduction, and poverty alleviation (Grimm
et al. 2012; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Ahmad 2013). Congruently, policy makers
have increasingly been focusing their attention and resources on promoting the
development of startups through, for instance, Entrepreneurship Education Programs
(EEPs), as a way to teach them lifelong entrepreneurial soft skills and competences
and, at the same time, increase their entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward
business development, based on the conviction that EEPs are also valid channels to
make a society more entrepreneurial and competitive in this globalized world (Hynes
1996; Samwel Mwasalwiba 2010; Franco et al. 2010).1
However, in the academic world, there is an ongoing debate regarding the
effectiveness of those EEPs in promoting the development of startups. Assessment
of the effectiveness of EEPs is commonly measured by increases in EEP

1
It should be clarified that the promotion of startup development refers to the increase of students’
entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the development of startups. Likewise, the terms
“startups,” “small business,” and “small firms” are implicitly used interchangeably by the study’s
author, unless otherwise stated.

F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez (*)

President’s Delivery Unit of the Republic of Paraguay, Asunción, Paraguay
e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 247

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_14
248 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (personal attitude toward the

behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control), as defined by Ajzen’s
(1991) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) (Fayolle and Linan 2014). Through meta-
analysis studies, some scholars argue that a majority of studies suggest that EEP
participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes are overall increased after
having completed an EEP (Pittaway and Cope 2007; Liñan and Fayolle 2015);
however, results remain contradictory (Lorz et al. 2013; Fayolle and Linan 2014;
Rideout and Gray 2013). Having noted these controversial results, Alberti et al.
(2004) stressed the need for further research on the assessment of the effectiveness of
EEPs. Liñan and Fayolle (2015) argued that further studies and a strengthening of
evidence in the subfield of “EEP evaluation” are compulsory, and Valerio et al.
(2014) claimed that there is a need to study the impact of particular types and
characteristics of EEP on participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes. In
the same line, research linking entrepreneurship education with entrepreneurial
intentions and the promotion of startup development is also argued to be limited
(Pittaway and Cope 2007; Sanchez 2013). Moreover, although Karimi et al. (2016)
provided some empirical evidence from a developing country context, Khalid (2016)
and Byabashaija and Katono (2011) reported that empirical studies related to the
assessment of the effectiveness of those EEPs carried out in the context of develop-
ing countries remain underdeveloped. Finally, there is an increasing call for the
implementation and assessment of EEPs that should take into consideration the local
context and economic ecosystem where it is implemented (Giacomin et al. 2011; Lee
et al. 2011; Bruyat and Julien 2001).
As a way to fill in the above exposé gaps in academia, this study aims at assessing
the effectiveness of a particular type of EEP, an “Education through Entrepreneur-
ship” type of EEP, as measured by significant increases in EEP participants’
entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward startup development, after having
completed the referred type of EEP.2 The EEP type to be tested has been chosen due
to the fact that it has been regarded as the most relevant type of EEP (Liñan 2006;
Liñan 2004), because of its emphasis on practical, real-life, and learning-by-doing
exercises, as well as its focus on developing lifelong entrepreneurial soft skills and
mindsets (Lackeus 2015).

2 About Entrepreneurs, Entrepreneurship, and Startups

The positive role of entrepreneurs, entrepreneurship, and startups in a society has

been noted by several studies, often with overlapping perspectives. At the individual
level, entrepreneurs have been described as individuals who are able to innovate and
create something that has not been done before, regardless of the risk or uncertainty

2
This paper is based on the thesis titled “Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Small
Business Development: The Case of Pilar, Paraguay,” which was submitted by the author for the
degree of Master of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt, Germany, on 7 July 2017.
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 249

that such actions might imply (Schumpeter 1934; Drucker 1985). Van Gelderen et al.
(2008) point out that entrepreneurs have been described as creative, self-reliant, risk-
takers, and action oriented. Baldwin et al. (2001) notes that entrepreneurs are those
who are able to create new firms by taking advantage of the opportunities available
in their surroundings and continuously innovating. Shane and Venkataraman (2000)
claim that entrepreneurs are able to recognize opportunities and introduce disruptive
new products and services in the market. In this study, an entrepreneur may be
broadly described as the individual “who creates and innovates something recog-
nized around perceived opportunities by accepting risks and failures” (Eroglu and
Piçak 2011, p. 150). Seen from a macro context, entrepreneurship is thus believed to
be an important factor for socioeconomic development, growth (Keat et al. 2011),
and sustainability (Porter 1990). In fact, it has been argued that the global economy
has been greatly shaped by the phenomena of entrepreneurship (Lee and Peterson
2000) due to the increased internationalization of markets and changes in people’s
attitudes toward entrepreneurship (Luthje and Franke 2003). Zahra (1999) claims
that entrepreneurship increases economies’ overall competitiveness and productiv-
ity, while Wong et al. (2005) and Piperopoulos (2012) point out that entrepreneur-
ship serves as a source of employment, income generation, and innovation.
Entrepreneurship may also be understood as a process or mindset toward value
creation, particularly during times of economic stagnation (Klein and Bullock 2006).
Similarly to the role of entrepreneurship in a nation, in both developed and
developing countries, small businesses have been viewed as economic units that
are crucial “engines” or sources for economic prosperity, growth and diversification,
competition, innovation, and job generation (Baldwin et al. 2001; Hynes 1996;
Piperopoulos 2012; Birch 1979, as cited in Valerio et al. 2014). Although startups
are susceptible to high failure rates (World Bank 2012), and small businesses have
shown to be unable to grow in size and number of employees in the long run (Nichter
and Goldmark 2009), they are the chief economic units for poverty reduction,
income growth, and employment in many developing countries (Grimm et al.
2012; Karlan and Valdivia 2011; Ahmad 2013).
For instance, the importance of small businesses in terms of their socioeconomic
impact and job generation is clearly evidenced in Paraguay, where its economic
structure is mainly composed of these economic units, which account for 90.9%
(203,936) of all registered economic units (224,242) and employ 49.4% (394,707) of
all registered workers (799,153) (General Directorate of Statistics, Surveys and
Censuses of Paraguay 2013a). At the city level, in Pilar, small businesses are almost
universal, accounting for 98% (1817) of all formally registered economic units
(1854), employing 68% (3807) of all registered workers (5614) (General Directorate
of Statistics, Surveys and Censuses of Paraguay 2013b).3 Having noted these

3
In a population of around 40,000 inhabitants in Pilar, Paraguay, according to official data, there are
only 5614 “registered workers.” As such, “registered workers” may only refer to those who are
officially employed and included in the Paraguayan social security system and exclude those
employed in the informal sector.
250 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

characteristics of the Paraguayan economic structure, the prevalence of small busi-

nesses, and the role that entrepreneurs play in their communities, not surprisingly,
the Paraguayan government has recently focused its attention and resources on EEPs
(National Service for Professional Development of Paraguay 2015a, b) in order to
make the Paraguayan society, particularly the young segment of the population,
more entrepreneurial.

3 Defining Entrepreneurship Education Programs

EEPs vary greatly across regions and are imparted differently based on several factors
such as teaching methods, content, objectives, and differences in understanding on
what an EEP is about (Fayolle et al. 2006). For instance, according to Gottleib and
Ross’s 1997 study (as cited in Chen et al. 2015), EEPs should be imparted in the
business field and should include features of innovation and creative thinking. Chen
et al. (2015) reported that EEPs should pedagogically raise entrepreneurial awareness
and develop innovative skills and practical competences. Similarly, Raposo and do
Paco (2011) pointed out that EEPs should include creativity nurturing, as well as
innovative and critical thinking as key components, so that students should be able to
identify opportunities to develop businesses. Mcmullan and Long’s 1987 study
(as cited in Mayhew et al. 2012), nevertheless, suggested that, besides those compe-
tences related to innovation and business and product development, EEPs should also
teach soft competences such as negotiation and leadership, as well as include
technology-related skills. Gibb’s 1999 study (as cited in Packham et al. 2010)
proposed that an effective EEP should make students first understand what entrepre-
neurship is about, develop their entrepreneurial mindsets, and provide insights on
how to start and subsequently maintain a business, while Fayolle et al. (2006)
maintained that EEPs are about promoting positive attitudes toward entrepreneurship.
Having noted the abovementioned divergences, Pittaway and Cope (2007)
claimed that, among scholars, there is no consensus on what entrepreneurship
education actually is and on what and how skills and competences should be
nurtured. For the purpose of this study, in general terms, EEPs may be described
as “any [short or long term] pedagogical program or process of education for
entrepreneurial attitudes and skills, which involves developing certain personal
qualities” (Fayolle et al. 2006, p. 702).

4 Types of Entrepreneurship Education Programs

In an attempt to categorize EEPs, Caird (1990) divided them into three types,
Education for, about, and through Enterprise, terms which were later referred by
Lackeus (2015) as Education for, about, and through Entrepreneurship:
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 251

“Education for Entrepreneurship” is aimed at providing skills to start and manage

a startup and includes guidance in terms of legal and financial procedures for the
registration of a startup (Caird 1990). This may be regarded as equivalent to Liñan’s
(2004) Education for startup type of EEP.
(a) “Education about Entrepreneurship” is imparted in the traditional, theoretical
way to conceptually transfer knowledge to students and raise awareness about
entrepreneurship in general as well as the business and industry environment
(Caird 1990). Samwel Mwasalwiba (2010) reports that this type of EEP is the
dominant one in universities. This may be regarded as equivalent to Linan’s
(2004) “Entrepreneurial awareness education” type of EEP.
(b) “Education through Entrepreneurship” may be considered equivalent to Linan’s
(2004) “Education for entrepreneurial dynamism,” as it refers to those programs
devoted to instruct “life skills” through “enterprise activities” (Caird 1990,
p. 139), as well as develop entrepreneurial values, attitudes, and soft skills such
as team management, negotiation, decision-making, problem-solving, commu-
nication, and leadership skills through real-practice and real-life experiences
(Caird 1990; Kent 1990; Lackeus 2015). Not surprisingly, this type of EEP has
also been referred to as action-based EEP (Ansteensen 2015).
Finally, in a comparison of EEP types, the latest “Education through Entrepre-
neurship” has been considered the most important type of EEP (Liñan 2006; Liñan
2004; Garavan and O’Cinneide 1994) due to its focus on learning-by-doing and real-
life exercises (Ansteensen 2015; Politis 2005; Mayhew et al. 2012) and its emphasis
on the promotion of several lifelong skills that are thought to be essential in the
entrepreneurial process of starting a small business and maintaining it in the long run
(Vesper and McMullan 1987; Liñan 2007).

5 The Theory of Planned Behavior

The Theory of Planned Behavior stipulates that prior to conducting a behavior, there
needs to be an intention to carry out that behavior (Ajzen 1991). In Ajzen’s (1991)
words, “intentions are indicators of how hard people are willing to try, of how much
of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (p. 181).
Accordingly, when the intention to conduct a particular behavior is higher, the
conduction of that behavior is more likely to be carried out (ibid.). Not in vain,
Kim and Hunter (1993) pointed out that intention is an immediate predictor of
behavior, while Krueger (1993), in the entrepreneurship field, further stressed that
entrepreneurs need, first, an intention to start a behavior. For the purpose of this
study, entrepreneurial intentions may be defined as:
a conscious state of mind that directs attention (and therefore experience and action) toward
a specific object (goal) or pathway to achieve it (means). Entrepreneurial intentions aim
toward the creation of new venture or new values in existing ventures. (Bird 1989, p. 8)
252 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

Attitude toward the

behavior

Intention Behavior
Subjective Norm

Perceived behavioral
control

Fig. 1 Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of planned behavior. Source: Ajzen (1991, p. 182)

Additionally, as displayed in Fig. 1, Ajzen (1991) notes that intentions to carry

out a behavior can be “predicted with high accuracy” (p. 179) through three
“antecedents of intention” (p. 188), which are personal attitude toward the behavior,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. According to Ajzen (1991),
these antecedents, also termed altogether as “attitudes” (Souitaris et al. 2007),
predict intention, which, at the same time, predict the proposed behavior. These
attitudes are described as follows:
1. Personal attitude toward the behavior: refers to the “degree to which a person has
a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in question”
(Ajzen 1991, p. 188). According to Kolvereid (1996), in the field of entrepre-
neurship, a higher attitude toward that behavior implies a higher desire to be self-
employed, instead of being employed by an organization. In other words, it
captures how attractive the behavior in question is.
2. Subjective norms: serve as a “social factor” and “refers to the perceived social
pressure to perform or not to perform the behavior” (ibid., p. 188). It refers to the
individual’s perception about what other people, particularly relatives and closer
ones, might think about his proposed behavior.
3. Perceived behavioral control: is about “the perceived ease or difficulty of
performing the behavior and it is assumed to reflect past experience as well as
anticipated impediments and obstacles” (ibid. 1991, p. 188). In other words, it
captures an individual’s confidence and his/her own perception of being able to
control the proposed behavior (Ajzen 2002).
Krueger and Carsrud (1993) who were some of the first scholars to apply Ajzen’s
(1991) theory in the entrepreneurship field claimed that his Theory of Planned
Behavior is a “well-grounded” theoretical framework, which “robustly predicts a
wide variety of planned behaviors” (Krueger and Carsrud 1993, p. 315), and
proposed that “researchers might use [Ajzen’s model] to analyze how the process
of doing a business plan or entrepreneurial education affects intentions” (ibid.,
p. 327). Not surprisingly, the use of Ajzen’s model in entrepreneurship intentions
research has increased considerably in the last decades (Entrialgo and Iglesias
2016; Liñan and Fayolle 2015).
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 253

6 Assessment of the Effectiveness of Entrepreneurship

Education Programs

In the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs, Ajzen’s (1991) model has been
extensively used in order to capture significant alterations in EEP participants’
entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (Fayolle and Linan 2014). Although most
scholars believe that entrepreneurship, or at least certain aspects of entrepreneurship,
can be effectively taught (Kuratko 2005), results have been controversial. This is the
case for studies that measured EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and
attitudes in ex ante and ex post occasions, that is, prior to and after their participation
in EEPs.
On the one hand, a number of studies have found that after the culmination of an
EEP, participants have higher entrepreneurial intentions than at the beginning of the
program (Souitaris et al. 2007; Fayolle et al. 2006; Jones et al. 2008; Sanchez 2011,
2013). In the same way, other studies found that only certain entrepreneurial
attitudes of EEP participants were higher after the program (Souitaris et al. 2007;
Fayolle et al. 2006; Harris et al. 2008). In the case of “Education through Entrepre-
neurship” EEPs, Ansteensen (2015), Politis (2005), and Mayhew et al. (2012) claim
that the positive impact that these EEPs have on participants is due to the practical
and real-life exercises used in those programs.
On the other hand, there are other studies that have produced quite different
results. For instance, Chen et al. (2015) and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) found
no significant changes in EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and/or atti-
tudes, whereas von Graevenitz et al. (2010) found that EEP participants’ entrepre-
neurial intentions decreased somewhat after the program. Finally, Oosterbeek et al.
(2010) found that EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions were even signifi-
cantly lower after the program. These scholars have frequently pointed out that these
results might be due to students’ cumulative understanding during the EEP about the
financial difficulties and other challenges that entrepreneurs face when intending to
develop and effectively manage a business (ibid; Gouveia Rodrigues et al. 2012).
As these previous experiences suggest the appropriateness of Ajzen’s (1991)
model to assess the effectiveness of EEPs on participants’ entrepreneurial intentions
and attitudes (personal attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived
behavioral control), as measured in ex ante and ex post occasions, and taking note of
the research gaps that need to be addressed in the field, namely, the call for further
studies focused on a particular type of EEP, conducted in developing countries, and
in accordance with the local context and economic ecosystem, this chapter, further
considering the predominance of small businesses in the context of Pilar, Paraguay,
aims at answering the following research questions.
Research Question 1 Do EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions to develop
startups increase significantly after having completed an “Education through Entre-
preneurship” type of EEP?
254 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

Research Question 2 Do EEP participants’ entrepreneurial attitudes (personal

attitude toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control)
toward the development of startups increase significantly after having completed an
“Education through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP?
Congruently, the null and alternative hypotheses are suggested as follows:
H0 EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the develop-
ment of startups do not increase significantly after having completed an “Education
through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP.
H1 EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes toward the develop-
ment of startups increase significantly after having completed an “Education through
Entrepreneurship” type of EEP; α ¼ 0.05.

7 Methodology

In the research design process, a key challenge in the assessment of the effectiveness
of EEPs and the subsequently comparison of results is the inexistence of a generally
accepted methodological framework, as noted by Armitage and Conner (2001).
Considering that longitudinal methods using pretest and posttest research designs
have been suggested and considered superior as compared to cross-sectional
methods (Martin et al. 2013; Fayolle and Linan 2014), this study adopts Ajzen’s
(1991) TPB-based Fayolle et al.’s (2006) study as a source of support, taking into
account that other recent studies have also followed the same methodology (Hamzah
et al. 2016) and that its suitability has been suggested for the assessment of the
effectiveness of small-size, short-term EEPs (Fayolle et al. 2006), key characteristics
of the experiment carried out as part of this study.
In Fayolle et al.’s (2006) methodological framework, independent variables may
be constituted by one or a combination of the characteristics of the EEP that one
wishes to assess (as shown in Fig. 2). Those characteristics include “institutional
setting, audience, types of EEP, objectives, content, and teaching approaches and
methods” (ibid., p. 710). Taking into consideration that “Education through Entre-
preneurship” types of EEPs have been considered the most relevant category of
EEPs (Garavan and O’Cinneide 1994) and that EEP should be elaborated in close
relation to the local context and economic ecosystem (Giacomin et al. 2011; Lee
et al. 2011; Bruyat and Julien 2001), this study determined “Education through
Entrepreneurship” EEP types, with a focus on the promotion of startup development,
as the independent variable. Successively, in accordance with Fayolle et al.’s (2006)
methodological framework, the dependent variables, which are the EEP participants’
entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes (attitude toward the behavior, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control), should be measured prior to and after
the culmination of the EEP.
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 255

EEP

- Institutional
Setting
- Audience Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior

Attitude toward the

- Type of EEP
behavior
- Objectives

- Contents Intention Behavior

Subjective Norm
- Teaching and
Training
methods Perceived behavioral
- Teaching and control
Training
Approaches

Fig. 2 Fayolle et al.’s (2006) methodological framework. Source: Fayolle et al. (2006, p. 710)

As such, this is a longitudinal study with a pretest and posttest experimental

research design on a single group of participants who took a 3-day-long workshop
named “Entrepreneurship Education and Creation of Small Businesses” in Pilar,
Paraguay, which, taking into account its content, objectives, and teaching approach,
should be considered as an “Education through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP. In
terms of the selection of the location where the experiment was carried out, from a
theoretical perspective, it should be interpreted as a response to recent calls for more
EEP evaluation-related research in developing countries (Byabashaija and Katono
2011). In relation to the target population, the workshop was designed for the
“youth,” that is, individuals between the ages of 15 and 29, as determined by the
National Youth Secretariat of Paraguay (2014).
With respect to data collection, participants’ basic demographic and background
information was first requested using an adapted version of Aragon-Sanchez and
Baixauli-Soler’s (2014) questionnaire, instrument that allowed to gather participants’
gender, age, place of residence, socioeconomic background, education level, subject
of study, and own and families’ experience in employment and entrepreneurship.4
Then EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes were collected
through Liñan and Chen’s (2009) Entrepreneurial Intentions Questionnaire (EIQ), a
TPB-based structured questionnaire survey, with Likert-type scales, ranging from
1 to 7, which is composed of four constructs: personal attitude toward the behavior,
subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and entrepreneurial intentions. The
EIQ was administered two times: prior to and after the culmination of the EEP. Both
questionnaires were administered in the local language (Spanish). Upon completion
of Cronbach’s reliability tests at both times, a paired t-test for means was carried out

4
The results of participants’ basic demographic and background information are available upon
request.
256 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

to determine whether EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes

increased significantly upon completion of the EEP.

7.1 Methodological Limitations

The study has certain limitations. As noted by Fayolle et al. (2006), in this method-
ological framework, the impact of EEPs is not intended to measure “in terms of
specific entrepreneurial behavior [of creating a startup] (. . .) instead, it is measured
in terms of [significant] changes in attitudes and intentions” (p. 712). Therefore, the
present does not directly assess the effectiveness of EEP in terms of how many
startups were immediately created upon completion of the program. Instead, it
assesses its effectiveness in promoting the development of startups, as measured
by significant increases in EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes.
In this aspect, although in the assessment of the effectiveness of EEPs, attitudes, and
intentions have been desired as parameters due to its more volatile nature, as
compared to personality, which is more static (Harris et al. 2008; Hatten and
Ruhland 1995; Robinson et al. 1991), this approach may also imply, by the same
token, that it might not be possible to determine whether the effect of an EEPs on
participants’ entrepreneurial attitudes and intentions will be constant and will not
corrode over time, as contended by Fayolle et al. (2006). Not surprisingly, Pittaway
and Cope (2007) reported that a weakness of entrepreneurship-related studies based
on intention-based methods is that they may not explicitly tell us that those increases
in entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes will in fact be reflected in actual behavior
or “activity,” and long-term “success,” in case students end up creating their own
businesses (p. 493).
Moreover, due to time constraints, this study only studied whether significant
increases existed in participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes after the
culmination of a 3-day-long “Education through Entrepreneurship” EEP type. As
such, it is unable to determine that this particular type of EEP is superior to other
types, an inference which may only be made through cross-sectional studies. More-
over, since ex ante and ex post measurements were only carried out on the same
treatment group (EEP participants), this study lacks the strengths of other studies that
also measured the entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes on another (control) group
of nonparticipants. Additionally, although the population size (N ¼ 22) is superior to
other studies such as that of Fayolle et al. (2006), it is rather small, and thus, the
relevance of the results may be subject to challenges, as a bigger population size
would have been desired in order to increase its statistical robustness. Moreover,
although this study focused on the youth, that is, participants aged 15–29, who
belonged to either secondary or higher education institutions, a more representative
participation of high school students (36%), as compared to university students
(64%), would have been desired.
Finally, taking into account that the arranged workshop was promoted through
conferences at a local high school, social media, and local mass media (radio
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 257

Table 1 Cronbach’s alpha reliability test

Construct Cronbach alpha (t1) Cronbach alpha (t2)
Personal attitude toward the behavior 0.65 0.69
Subjective norms 0.72 0.76
Perceived behavioral control 0.88 0.83
Entrepreneurial intentions 0.62 0.64

stations), it is possible that the study may be susceptible to self-selection biases, as

noted by Liñan (2004), Fayolle and Gailly (2015), and McMulland and Long’s 1987
study (as cited in Mayhew et al. 2012), considering that the workshop might have
attracted participants with an already high interest in entrepreneurship and positive
attitudes toward business development.

7.2 Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Test

As it can be seen in Table 1, the first construct (personal attitude toward the
behavior) received “moderately reliable” scores at both times, 0.65 at t1 and
0.69 at t2; the second construct (subjective norms) obtained “highly reliable” scores
at both times, 0.72 at t1 and 0.76 at t2; the third construct (perceived behavioral
control) got “highly reliable” scores at both times, 0.88 at t1 and 0.83 at t2, whereas
the fourth construct (entrepreneurial intentions) obtained “moderately reliable”
scores at both times, 0.62 at t1 and 0.64 at t2. Taking into account that these
coefficients show “moderate” to “high” internal consistency (reliability), as mea-
sured in Hinton et al.’s study (2014), the author of this chapter thus considered
satisfying the adoption of the adapted EIQ as the key instrument to measure EEP
participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes.

7.3 Paired t-Test for Means

First of all, it should be stressed that a t-test (paired two samples for means) has been
chosen as it is commonly used when the independent variable (in this study, the
workshop) has two sets of observations (pretest and posttest values) from the same
population (EEP participants). Taking into account that the hypothesis posited in this
study aims at determining whether EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and
attitudes increased significantly after the completion of an EEP, and considering that,
as contended by Siegel and Castellan (1988), one-tailed tests should be carried out
when the tested hypothesis already indicates one direction or side (in this case,
positive/higher entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes), as opposed to a two-tailed
p value (which are aimed at determining whether significant differences, either
positively or negatively, exist between the two sets of observations). For this
258 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

study, a one-tailed p value has been selected to determine statistical significance,

which, as briefly presented in the introductory chapter, is set at a α ¼ 0.05 level.
Microsoft Excel was chosen as the software to do all the statistical calculations.
As it can be seen from column 1 through 4 in Table 2, the mean values and
standard deviations of each of the items for each participant were first calculated for
both times, t1 and t2. Then, the mean difference and its standard deviation of the
items for each participant in all four constructs were calculated, as it can be seen in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 2. Finally, prior to conducting the paired t-test for means,
the sum of the scores of each participant in all items composing each of the
constructs was calculated for both times, t1 and t2. Then, a paired t-test for means
(values) was conducted for each of the four constructs and each of the items
composing those constructs. Results of the t-values are observed in column
7, whereas its significance (one-tailed p value) is highlighted in column 8.

8 Discussion of Results

First, as shown in Table 2, at a α ¼ 0.05 significance level, the construct related to

“personal attitude toward the behavior,” which measured the “degree to which a
person has a favorable or unfavorable evaluation or appraisal of the behavior in
question” (Ajzen 1991, p. 188), had on average, a positive, yet not significant,
increase (mean difference ¼ 0.3; p value ¼ 0.077), noting that the mean value at
t1 was 6.109, while at t2 was 6.409. This result is in line with the findings made by
previous studies such as that of Souitaris et al. (2007), von Graevenitz et al. (2010),
and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012) who also found no statistically significant
differences between pretest and posttest mean values. As it has been already
recognized that the experiment might be subject to self-selection bias issues, taking
into account that people who voluntarily participated in the workshop might have
already had a positive attitude toward entrepreneurship, as well as certain familiarity
with business-related studies (in fact, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler’s
(2014) adapted questionnaire, it was found that 55% of all participants indicated to
be business-related studies). The reason why there was not a statistically significant
increase in the mean value at t2 might be due to the fact that, although quite disperse
(standard deviation ¼ 1.184), participants, from the very beginning, prior to the
beginning of the EEP, already scored relatively high in their personal attitudes
toward the behavior (mean value ¼ 6.109 at t1). This paradox has already been
noted by Diaz-Garcia et al. (2015) who stated that students voluntarily taking part in
EEPs, as was the case for this experiment, might already have positive attitudes
toward entrepreneurship even before the beginning of the program, and as such,
room for statistically significant increases would be reduced. In addition, results
within this construct indicate, nevertheless, that the experiment caused some con-
tradictory effects on participants’ personal attitudes toward the behavior. For
instance, participants had statistically significant increases in PA1 (“being an entre-
preneur implies more advantages than disadvantages to me”) (mean
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 259

Table 2 Paired t-test results

Mean
Mean Mean diff. (t2
value value minus p value
Measure (t1) SD (t2) SD t1) SD t stat (one-tail)
Personal attitude 6.109 1.184 6.409 1.258 0.3 1.338 1.475 0.077
toward the behav-
ior (5 items)
PA1. Being an 5.773 1.445 6.136 1.490 0.364 0.727 2.347 0.0144*
entrepreneur
implies more
advantages than
disadvantages to me
PA2. A career as 5.955 1.046 6.545 1.143 0.591 1.403 1.976 0.0307*
entrepreneur is
attractive for me
PA3. If I had the 6.636 0.727 6.591 1.333 –0.045 1.463 –0.146 0.4427
opportunity and
resources, I’d like
to start a small firm
PA4. Being an 6.545 0.858 6.318 1.323 –0.227 1.232 –0.866 0.1983
entrepreneur
would entail great
satisfactions for me
PA5. Among vari- 5.636 1.399 6.455 1.011 0.818 1.532 2.505 0.0103*
ous options, I
would rather be an
entrepreneur
Subjective Norms 6.091 1.092 6.197 1.011 0.106 1.010 0.594 0.2796
(3 items) (if you
decided to create a
small firm, would
people in your
close environment
approve of that
decision?)
SN1. Your close 6.636 0.727 6.636 0.848 0.000 0.690 0 0.5
family
SN2. Your friends 5.955 1.253 6.182 0.958 0.227 1.307 0.815 0.2119
SN3. Your 5.682 1.041 5.773 1.066 0.091 0.971 0.439 0.3326
colleagues
Perceived behav- 4.561 1.361 5.674 1.066 1.144 1.255 5.387 <0.001*
ioral control
(6 items)
PBC1. To start a 4.227 1.110 5.136 0.889 0.909 1.065 4.004 <0.001*
small firm and keep
it working would be
easy for me
PBC2. I am pre- 4.591 1.221 5.818 1.053 1.227 1.152 4.997 <0.001*
pared to start a
viable small firm
(continued)
260 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

Table 2 (continued)
Mean
Mean Mean diff. (t2
value value minus p value
Measure (t1) SD (t2) SD t1) SD t stat (one-tail)
PBC3. I can con- 4.818 1.500 5.727 1.032 0.909 1.411 3.022 0.0033*
trol the creation
process of a new
small firm
PBC4. I know the 4.364 1.465 5.773 1.066 1.409 1.297 5.096 <0.001*
necessary practical
details to start a
small firm
PBC5. I know how 4.318 1.524 5.727 1.162 1.591 1.403 4.958 <0.001*
to develop an
entrepreneurial
project
PBC6. If I tried to 5.045 1.253 5.864 1.125 0.818 1.097 3.498 0.0011*
start a small firm, I
would have a high
probability of
succeeding
Entrepreneurial 5.947 0.731 6.417 0.601 0.470 0.646 3.412 0.0013*
Intentions (6 items)
EI1. I am ready to 5.227 1.478 5.591 1.652 0.364 1.136 1.502 0.0740
do anything to be
an entrepreneur
EI2. My profes- 5.818 1.651 6.409 0.908 0.591 1.563 1.773 0.0454*
sional goal is to
become an
entrepreneur
EI3. I will make 6.227 0.973 6.364 1.002 0.136 0.640 1.000 0.1644
every effort to start
and run my own
small firm
EI4. I am deter- 6.182 0.958 6.818 0.395 0.636 0.953 3.131 0.0025*
mined to create a
small firm in the
future
EI5. I have very 6.136 1.207 6.636 0.581 0.500 0.964 2.434 0.0119*
seriously thought of
starting a small
firm
EI6. I have the firm 6.091 1.377 6.682 0.646 0.591 1.333 2.079 0.0250*
intention to start a
small firm some
day
Note: (*) statistically significant at α ¼ 0.05 level. N ¼ 22 (matched questionnaires; responses in
both t1 and t2). Degrees of Freedom (Df) ¼ 21
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 261

difference ¼ 0.364; p value ¼ 0.0144), PA2 (“a career as entrepreneur is attractive to

me”) (mean difference ¼ 0.591; p value ¼ 0.0307), and PA5 (“among various
options, I would rather be an entrepreneur”) (mean difference ¼ 0.818;
p value ¼ 0.0103); however, they scored lower, yet not significantly, in PA3 (“if I
had the opportunity and resources, I’d like to start a small firm”) (mean differ-
ence ¼ –0.045; p value ¼ 0.4427) and PA4 (“being an entrepreneur would entail
great satisfactions for me”) (mean difference ¼ –0.227; p value ¼ 0.1983). These
effects, on the one hand, might be understood as the increased interest and under-
standing of participants about the advantages of being an entrepreneur, be it the
independence, freedom, and economic return enjoyed by the entrepreneur, upon the
completion of the EEP, measured through PA1, PA2, and PA5. On the other hand,
the workshop might also have negatively contributed to participants’ in-depth
understanding of the initial and imperative struggle and need for financial resources
suffered by entrepreneurs in the early stage of small firm creation, as measured
through PA3 and PA4.5 Piperopoulos (2012) argues that “entrepreneurship is inher-
ently more risky and more demanding compared with working in an established
business” (p. 463); thus, for certain participants, the workshop might have caused
them to shift their attraction from entrepreneurship away to other employment
options, for instance, working for someone else in an already established firm. It
should be noted that, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-Soler’s (2014) adapted
questionnaire, it was found that the majority of participants have/had experience
working for someone else.
The second construct, related to subjective norms, which measured participants’
perception about what “reference people,” that is, close relatives, friends, and
colleagues, might think about their behavior also brought nonsignificant increases
taking into account that the mean value captured at t2 was slightly higher (mean
value ¼ 6.197) than the one at t1 (mean value ¼ 6.091), but it was not statistically
significant (mean difference ¼ 0.106; p value ¼ 0.2796). This result is in line with
the studies of von Graevenitz et al. (2010) and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012),
which also found no statistically significant differences in terms of mean values after
the completion of their studied EEP. However, it contradicts the findings made by
Souitaris et al. (2007) who did find a statistically significant increase in participants’
subjective norms after their participation in an EPP. Similar to the first construct, the
non-statistically significant increase in participants’ subjective norms or perception
about what other people might think about their behavior might be due to the fact
that they already scored relatively high at t1, an indication that suggests that they
may already enjoy an entrepreneurship-friendly environment (Liñan and Chen
2009). This finding clearly reflects the context where the experiment was carried
out, as they all indicated that they live in Pilar, Paraguay, where, as noted previously,
the economy largely depends on small businesses (98%), with a huge number of
entrepreneurs, be it in the formal or informal sector. Moreover, the existence of some

5
Contradictory results within a construct were also reported in the study made by Fayolle et al.
(2006) and Krueger and Carsrud (1993).
262 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

entrepreneurs in participants’ families (for instance, 60% indicated that their fathers
have experience in entrepreneurship) might also be attributed to why they scored
relatively high at t1, a situation also noted in the study of Fayolle and Gailly (2015).
However, after a closer look at the results, interestingly, it was participants’ percep-
tion about what their friends and colleagues would think about their behavior that,
although not significantly, increased the most (mean differences of 0.227 and 0.091,
respectively), while their close family did not increase at all (mean difference ¼ 0.0).
This might be due to the quite supportive and entrepreneurship-friendly environment
created among them throughout the workshop, as they constantly motivated each
other, shared their experience, and provided constructive feedback to improve their
recently created startups. Finally, as noted by Iglesias-Sanchez et al. (2016), the
non-statistically significant increase in the item related to participants’ close family
might be due to the fact that this item refers to the participants’ perception about their
relatives’ opinions, although they were not direct beneficiaries of the EEP. Taking
into account the short duration and intensity of the workshop and the limited
communication the participants might have had with their relatives related to the
workshop and their entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes, it is understandable why
participants’ perception on what those “reference people” might think would not
even show a marginal increase. It is also, not surprisingly, due to the argued
irrelevance of this construct in short-term studies that some scholars completely
omitted it from their studies (Fayolle et al. 2006).
With regard to PBC, which asked participants their level of agreement to six
statements related to their “perceived ease or difficulty of performing the behavior”
(Ajzen 1991, p. 188), Table 2 indicates that, on average, participants showed statis-
tically higher levels of perceived behavioral control at t2 (mean value ¼ 5.674) than at
t1 (mean value ¼ 4.561) (mean difference ¼ 1.144; p value ¼ <0.001). When
compared with previous studies, this result is similar to that of Harris et al. (2008),
who found statistically significant differences in participants’ “perceived personal
control of business outcomes” upon completion of an EEP. However, this result
contradicts the findings of Souitaris et al. (2007), Fayolle et al. (2006), and Gouveia
Rodrigues et al. (2012) who did not find any statistically significant difference
between participants’ mean values measured prior to and after completion of an
EEP. These contradicting differences might be due to the type of EEP implemented
for this study. For instance, the description of the experiment given by Souitaris et al.
(2007) and Fayolle et al. (2006) suggested that the EEP that they studied was an
“Education about Entrepreneurship” type of EEP, whereas the experiment carried out
for this study was an “Education through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP, which,
taking into account that it challenged participants to actually—in real life—create a
startup, as well as to dedicate a particular amount of time to nurturing entrepreneurial
soft skills, might have directly affected participants’ perceived ability to not only start
a small business but also to maintain it.
Finally, in relation to the Entrepreneurial Intentions construct, which through
“pure-intentions” items (Liñan and Chen 2009, p. 600) interrogated participants
about their intentionality toward the development of small firms, as shown in
Table 2, there was also a statistically significant increase (mean value
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 263

difference ¼ 0.470; p value ¼ 0.0013) from a mean value of 5.947 at t1 to a mean

value of 6.417 at t2. This result, on the one hand, is similar to those of Souitaris et al.
(2007), Fayolle et al. (2006), Jones et al. (2008), and Sanchez (2011, 2013), who also
found statistically significant differences between EEP participants’ entrepreneurial
intentions measured prior to and after the completion of an EEP; however, on the
other hand, it refutes the findings made by Chen et al. (2015) and Gouveia Rodrigues
et al. (2012) who did not find any statistically significant difference between the
mean values of EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions collected before and
after their studied EEP, as well as the findings made by Oosterbeek et al. (2010) who
found a statistically significant decrease in EEP students’ entrepreneurial intentions
upon the completion of an EEP, and those of von Graevenitz et al. (2010) who
concluded that the entrepreneurial intentions of EEP students “somewhat” decreased
after their participation in an EEP. This latest group of scholars who found signif-
icant decreases or non-statistically significant differences in participants’ entrepre-
neurial intentions has attributed their results to the learning process experienced by
the students who, according to them, have a more realistic understanding of the
challenges and difficulties faced by entrepreneurs when trying to start their own
business (Oosterbeek et al. 2010; Gouveia Rodrigues et al. 2012) or that, throughout
the EEP, they simply “understand they are not suitable to pursue an entrepreneurial
career” (Chen et al. 2015, p. 558). Taking into account that, in the context of the
experiment conducted for this study, students were challenged to create a startup and
commercialize a product or service without formally doing a structured business
plan or emphasizing legal procedure to formally register their business, as an
“Education about Entrepreneurship” or “Education for Entrepreneurship” type of
EEP would do, the conclusions made by these authors may not apply to the findings
of this study due to the fact that, in this study, students have already experienced the
creation of a startup, a process which at the same time could have positively affected
their intention and motivation to follow an entrepreneurial path in the future. As
previously noted, the emphasis on soft skills, such as negotiation, communication,
teamwork, and opportunity recognition, among others, and the quite supporting and
motivating environment created among EEP participants, which was incited through
exercises that promoted even joint ventures and business opportunities outside of the
classroom and upon completion of the EEP, are also claimed to have impact on
participants’ entrepreneurial intentions. Not surprisingly, within this construct, state-
ment items such as “my professional goal is to become an entrepreneur” (EI2) (mean
difference ¼ 0.591; p value ¼ 0.0454), “I am determined to create a small firm in the
future” (EI4) (mean difference ¼ 0.636; p value ¼ 0.0025), “I have very seriously
thought of starting a small firm” (EI5) (mean difference ¼ 0.500; p value ¼ 0.0119),
and “I have the firm intention to start a small firm someday” (EI6) (mean differ-
ence ¼ 0.591; p value ¼ 0.0250) increased significantly upon the completion of the
EEP. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although in this study, the entrepreneurial
intentions of participants, on average, were statistically higher after the EEP, when
taking a closer look at the remaining statement items composing this construct, some
of them, although positive, did not increase significantly (“I am ready to do anything
to be an entrepreneur” (EI1) (mean difference ¼ 0.364; p value ¼ 0.0740) and “I will
264 F. L. Ramirez Gonzalez

make every effort to start and run my own small firm” (EI3) (mean differ-
ence ¼ 0.136; p value ¼ 0.1644)), probably due to the fact that their intentions
toward the creation of a startup are planned in the long run, and not immediately
upon completion of the EEP, noting that, through Aragon-Sanchez and Baixauli-
Soler’s (2014) adapted questionnaire, it was found that they all were either high
school or university students, who, besides having entrepreneurial plans in the long
run, may also have, in parallel, other short-term aspirations that were most likely
related to their specific fields of study.
In summary, the results of this study confirm that participants, after having com-
pleted an “Education through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP, which focused on small
firms’ creation, showed an increase, yet not significantly, in their personal attitude
toward the entrepreneurial behavior and subjective norms, whereas they did show a
statistically significant increase in their perceived behavioral control and entrepreneur-
ial intentions toward the development of small businesses. As such, the alternative
hypothesis, which is EEP participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes
toward the development of startups increase significantly after having completed an
“Education through Entrepreneurship” type of EEP, is partially accepted.
The results of this study lend credibility to the works of Souitaris et al. (2007),
Fayolle et al. (2006), Harris et al. (2008), Jones et al. (2008), and Sanchez (2011,
2013), whereas it contradicts the findings of Oosterbeek et al. (2010), von
Graevenitz et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2015), and Gouveia Rodrigues et al. (2012).
It belongs to the interesting “EEP evaluation” subfield of entrepreneurship
education-related studies, as classified by Liñan and Fayolle (2015), which is still
restricted in terms of numbers of empirically tested studies (Sanchez 2013;
Byabashaija and Katono 2011; Pittaway and Cope 2007). Moreover, by testing a
particular type of EEP, this study fills in the gap noted by Valerio et al. (2014) and
Pittaway and Cope (2007) who contended that further research is needed based on
particular types and characteristics of EEPs in order to observe which types of EEP
effectively increase participants’ entrepreneurial intentions and attitudes and by
Byabashaija and Katono (2011), who claimed that further empirical evidence from
developing countries is still needed. In fact, this study brings evidence from a
developing country, in a rural context, a contextual setting that as of now has yet
to be covered by sufficient empirically tested studies (Byabashaija and Katono
2011). Additionally, it supports Fayolle et al.’s (2006) methodological framework,
which was developed in response to the methodological weakness in the EEP
evaluation subfield noted by Lorz et al. (2013), Glaub and Frese (2011), and Rideout
and Gray (2013), while testing a newly developed instrument in the field, that is,
Liñan and Chen’s (2009) Entrepreneurial Intentions Questionnaire (EIQ). In that
same vein, it is related to the study of Fayolle et al. (2006) who have indicated that
Ajzen’s (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior can be used to measure the impact of
EEPs, “even in small-scale experiments” (p. 715).
Entrepreneurship Education and the Promotion of Startup Development:. . . 265

9 Policy Recommendations

The results obtained from the experiment carried out as part of this study have
several implications. In fact, besides the formal procedures often needed to start a
firm, as an “Education for Entrepreneurship” type of EEP would do, or regular
business plan writing exercises, as most “Education about Entrepreneurship” types
of EEPs generally adopt as key components, these results should be interpreted as a
call for the implementation of “Education through Entrepreneurship” types of EEPs.
In other words, program designers and administrators at governmental agencies,
high school, and higher education institutions are called to implement EEPs with
objectives, content, and teaching methods that should focus on learning-by-doing,
practical, and factual experiences, for instance, by challenging students to not only
write a business plan but also to create real-life startups and commercialize products
and services. As observed in the experiment, these factors, besides participants’ real-
life interaction with actors outside of the classroom, were fundamental in nurturing
not only participants’ perceived behavioral control and entrepreneurial intentions but
also certain soft skills and mindsets, regardless of whether they follow an entrepre-
neurial career or enter the labor market by working for someone else.
Moreover, taking into account the significant increase in participants’ entrepre-
neurial intentions, and slight increase in participants’ perception about what their
friends and colleagues would think about their entrepreneurial projects, program
designers should regard EEPs as avenues for mutually supportive and motivating
environments for participants. In the same line, EEPs may be projected as network-
ing spaces that should be strengthened in the long run, for instance, through follow-
up group activities, which should be aimed at providing constant feedback and
facilitating business and funding opportunities among former participants in an
entrepreneurship-friendly circle.
Finally, joint programs between EEP-sponsoring governmental agencies and
other stakeholders such in academia, businessmen, and investors are also encour-
aged, as they may provide constant and crucial updates on the market, link partic-
ipants’ entrepreneurial projects with the needs of the market, and serve as potential
incubators for innovation and funding sources.

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Fernando Ramirez originally from Pilar, Paraguay, is a Policy Analyst for the President’s
Delivery Unit of the Republic of Paraguay. Previously, as Chief of Staff and Director of Planning
and Research of the Ministry of Youth of Paraguay, he co-wrote and edited several youth public
policy-related documents for the Paraguayan government. He is a former trainee for the Embassy of
Paraguay in the Republic of China (Taiwan), the European Union Center in Taiwan, and the United
Nations Secretariat in New York, USA. Fernando Ramirez holds a Master’s degree in Public Policy
from the University of Erfurt, Germany, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Interna-
tional Relations from National Taiwan University. His research interests include entrepreneurship
education, youth policies, and sustainable development.
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The
Right to Free and Compulsory Education
in Pakistan

Atif Ikram Butt

1 Introduction

In 2012, the Parliament of Pakistan passed the Right to Free and Compulsory
Education Act guaranteeing the right to free and compulsory education. The Act
applies to all schools run by the Federal Government or those situated in the capital
territory of Islamabad. The Act provides for free and compulsory education to all
children from ages 5 to 16 years and defines “free education” as free of any
education-related costs including expenditures on stationary, school bags, and trans-
portation. The Act affirms the fundamental right of every child to free and compul-
sory education and further provides that “No child shall be liable to pay any kind of
fees, charges, expenses, etc., which may prevent him or her from pursuing and
completing the education”. The Act includes, among others, provisions for disad-
vantaged children, special education, and monitoring of standards and even makes
private schools responsible for providing free education to disadvantaged children
from their neighbourhood up to 10% of the strength of a class. It has been more than
5 years since the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act was passed, and it
still awaits implementation (Wazir 2017).
Even at the time it was passed, the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act
received, at best, cautious and passive optimism among policy analysts. It was termed
as a “little more than a metaphorical pat on the back for its catalysts”, referring to
parliamentarians and donor agencies that supported the Bill (Iqbal 2012). Nasir
(2012) makes a similar assertion that a “cost-benefit analysis, which is now at the
core of public policy formulation in developed countries, is seldom conducted with
the result that even well-intentioned public policies finally do not produce the
intended results”, and he continues that “In their present condition, the penal pro-
visions of the ‘Right to Free and Compulsory Education Bill 2012’ unanimously
passed by the National Assembly to ensure free and compulsory education to all

A. I. Butt (*)
Center for Communication Programs Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 271

H. M. Grimm (ed.), Public Policy Research in the Global South,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-06061-9_15
272 A. I. Butt

children within the age bracket of 5–16 years are also likely to flounder badly at the
end of the day”. The international development organisations, on the other hand,
generally welcomed the passage of the Bill. United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) hailed the passage of the Bill (Memon 2012).
Similarly, the Child Rights Movement, a network of more than 100 organisations
working for the rights of children, also welcomed the enactment of the Act (Abbasi
2012). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its 2012 report on the country’s
performance on fundamental rights and freedoms considered the legislation as a
“positive development” (HRCP 2013, p. 179). The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), another specialised agency of the United Nations, writes in its 2012
annual report that it was due to its “policy dialogue for education reform, particularly
via provincial parliamentary caucuses [that were] pivotal for the passage of the ‘Right
to Free and Compulsory Education’ Bill” (UNICEF 2013a, p. 4). For the critics of the
Bill, the question whether it will be implemented or implemented with any effective-
ness becomes less important. Perhaps, the more meaningful quest is to understand
why lawmakers enacted such a policy despite its obvious flaws. For the proponents
too, there is solace in this quest to comprehend why a policy as fundamental as the one
that ensures the basic right of education of every child took this long to be passed.
This chapter employs ideational institutionalism, which gives supremacy to the role
of ideas and draws attention to discursive practices and meaning creation in
policymaking, to examine the passage of the 2012 Right to Free and Compulsory
Education Act. Central to ideational institutionalism is the understanding that ideas
are the blueprint of a dialectical relationship among policy agents in that they become
their cognitive filters to interpret environmental signals and shape political problems,
giving definition to political goals and strategies that are used as a currency to
communicate about politics. Using the Ideational Framework of Public Policy
presented in the introductory chapter, the policy decision to enact the 2012 Right to
Free and Compulsory Education Act is studied to understand the interplay of a myriad
of ideas that have cognitive, normative, and material characteristics and how the
policy actors have used these to interpret and construct their situation in shaping their
interests, preferences, and identities, either in the background or in the foreground of
the policy debate.

2 The State of Education in Pakistan

In Pakistan, according to estimates from UNICEF and UNESCO, one-third of

primary-school-age children (34.4%) from age 5 to 9 or around 6.5 million
children are out of school. Another 2.7 million children from ages 10 to
12, which equates to 30.1% of all children in this age group, are also out of
school (UNICEF 2013b, p. ix). This together equates to nearly 10 million children
in the age group of 5- to 12-year-olds who are not attending any form of
schooling. According to official statistics, only half (51%) of Pakistan’s population
has completed primary schooling (FBS 2013). Net enrolment rate, which is
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 273

children ages 5–9 years enrolled in primary schools divided by the number of
children in the same age group, is only 57% (FBS 2013). Similarly, the net
enrolment rate at the middle level among children aged 10–12 years is 22%
(FBS 2013). In terms of educational facilities, government statistics show that
only 40% of schools have electricity, less than 60% have drinking water and
latrine facilities, and a little more than 60% have boundary walls (NEMIS 2013,
pp. 45–47). According to a 2010 report by Transparency International, Pakistanis
consider education the fourth most corrupt sector (Gilani 2013, p. 40). The report
also highlights thousands of so-called ghost-schools and ghost-teachers that exist
on the government’s roster but “provide no services to students, although the
teachers or administrators assigned to these schools continue to receive a salary”
(Gilani 2013, p. 40). The National Education Policy of 2009, introduced before the
subject of education was delegated to provincial governments of the federation
under the 18th amendment of the Constitution, recognises that “education in
Pakistan suffers from two key deficiencies: at all levels of education, access to
educational opportunities remains low and the quality of education is weak” (MOE
2009, p. 13). Under overarching priorities for widening access and raising quality,
the policy asks provinces and area governments to “affirm the goal of achieving
universal and free primary education by 2015 and up to class 10 by 2025” (MOE
2009, p. 19). The policy, however, did not delve into an affirmative legislative
measure whereby education is made “free and compulsory”. Subsequent to the
18th constitutional amendment, the subject of education has been devolved to the
provinces. On September 16, 2011, a National Education Conference was held in
Islamabad and presided over by the then-Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani
where a Joint Declaration on Education was issued stating “National Education
Policy 2009, subject to such adaptations as are necessitated in view of the 18th
Constitutional Amendment, shall continue to be a jointly owned national docu-
ment” (Mujahid-Mukhtar 2011, p. 25). The 18th constitutional amendment also
added Article 25A that states, “The State shall provide free and compulsory
education to all children of the age of 5–16 years in such manner as may be
determined by law”, that eventually paved the way for federal legislation on “free
and compulsory education” in 2012. The 18th amendment and ensuing Article
25A to the Constitution of Pakistan is discussed in more detail in the next section.
However, it is important to note that even before Article 25A, the right to free and
compulsory education was obligatory for the State of Pakistan as the country is
signatory to various international covenants, declarations, and frameworks of
action. At the time that the bill was signed into parliamentary law, the then-
President Asif Ali Zardari also referred to such normative contents and said that
it is a “historic day for the people of the country as the government has fulfilled
the promise of protecting all fundamental rights after declaring education as the
basic right of the citizens” (Khan 2012). He further said:
Law would ensure that no child remains out of school hence realising the country’s
international commitments. . .(and) we will honour our international commitments and will
achieve the targets set in Education for All and Millennium Development Goals. (Khan
2012)
274 A. I. Butt

Other government parliamentarians had expressed similar sentiments when the

National Assembly had passed the bill. Shahnaz Wazir Ali, who was the Advisor to
the Prime Minister, had said “the entire National Assembly should take pride in it
because the law would ensure a bright future for children” (Ghumman 2012).
Yasmeen Rehman, the government parliamentarian who had tabled the bill in the
National Assembly as a private member bill while speaking to the House on the day
that the bill was passed, said, “provision of a compulsory education was a funda-
mental right of every child and the bill would ensure better education for the
children” (APP 2012). In its statement of objects and reasons, the bill refers to
Article 25A of the 1973 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which
provides for free education to all children of ages 5–16 as a fundamental right and
designates its provision as a responsibility of the state. The ideational forces that
shaped the process and eventual policy outcomes at the global level and within
Pakistan have been at play for a long time.

3 The Ideational Forces Behind the Right to Free

and Compulsory Education

The right to free and compulsory education first came onto the world stage out of the
democratic movement of the early twentieth century and general cause of “right of
the people” (Warde 1960). John Dewey, in particular, is credited with providing the
theoretical basis for “education for all”, and seeing all people as engaged in the
educative process and in seeing children as individuals with rights and claims of their
own (Dumbleton 1990, p. 17). In the context of Pakistan, however, its roots are
connected to the country’s colonial past. In Britain, the Compulsory Education Act
was first passed in 1870, and by 1881 it had been established all over the country
with enrolment having increased from less than half to nearly 100% (Besant 1917).
In 1882, the British Raj established the first commission on education called Hunter
Commission with an objective to assess the state of elementary education in the
Indian empire. The Commission, in its recommendations, placed special emphasis
on the need to make primary education universal, and for extending it to backward
districts (Aggarwal 2002, p. 56). In 1883, the princely ruler of Baroda introduced
compulsory education for boys in one of the districts and in 1906 extended to the rest
of the state. Gopal Krishna Gokhale, who was President at the time of the Indian
National Congress, presented a private bill on compulsory education to the Imperial
Legislative Council, but it was rejected. The first law on compulsory education in
British India, popularly known as the Patel Act, was eventually passed in 1917, and
by 1921 every province had enacted similar legislation (Panagariya et al. 2014,
p. 261). Soon after the independence, when the first National Education Conference
was held in Karachi in 1947 to recognise the colonial education system, it upheld the
principle of compulsory education and recommended that primary education be
made free and compulsory till Class-VIII (Durrani 2013, p. 224). The notion of
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 275

free and compulsory education was retained in the constitutions of both India and
Pakistan and was reflected in subsequent policies as a desirable goal.
At the global level, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights laid out the
principle of free and compulsory education for the first time and demanded a policy
response from member states. Pakistan was among the 48 countries that signed on to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the United Nations General
Assembly’s session held on December 10, 1948. Article 26 of the Declaration states,
“Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elemen-
tary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory”. The dec-
laration essentially became the bedrock for all subsequent policy and legislative
measures for the provision of and in efforts for ensuring “free and compulsory
education” across the world. Chapman (2007, p. 122) writes, “The right to education
is one of the most affirmed economic, social and cultural rights”. In addition to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, there are a number of other international
instruments listed in Table 1 that recognise the right to education. It is important to
note that Pakistan did not assent to most of the human rights treaties emanating from
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights until the turn of the twenty-first century.
Each of these has their own ideational trajectories, an analysis of which is beyond the
scope of this chapter. Pakistan was, however, among the pioneering countries that
signed onto and ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1990, which
demanded State Parties to make primary education compulsory and available free to
all in its very first Article.
In addition to its colonial heritage, these various international instruments on free
and compulsory education became ideational forces of their own and started
impacting how country-level policies and legislation on education were formed.
Periodic reporting from member states plays an instrumental role in advancing
particular legislative and policy agendas. Periodic reporting is an established mech-
anism through which the United Nations exercises its supervision of the implemen-
tation of international human rights treaties (Connor 2008, p. 513; Olowu 2010,
p. 180). Drinan (2001) views periodic reporting mechanism of the United Nations as
one of the strongest weapons in its human rights arsenal through which it names and
shames those who refuse to adhere to international human rights standards. Drinan
(2001, p. 94) argues that ultimately “this is the moral power which, more than laws
or economic sanctions, will induce nations to follow the less travelled road that leads
to democracy and equality”. Periodic reporting procedure as a form of monitoring of
the State’s fulfilment of its international obligations has been questioned on its
effectiveness and receives its fair share of criticism. However, at minimum it has
the advantage of reminding public authorities of the deadlines and obligations that
must be met (Chazournes 2007, p. 60). Humphrey (1976, p. 530) agrees and argues,
“Periodic reporting is the implementation system with which the international
community has had the longest, and probably the best, experience [among other
tools]”. Beitz (2009, p. 35) also argues in defence of the periodic reporting that such
“treaty monitoring systems seek to influence the behaviour of states by requiring
them to give public accounts of their conduct”. In the case of Pakistan, the Human
Rights Committee, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee
276 A. I. Butt

Table 1 International instruments on free and compulsory education and status of Pakistan
Instrument Reference Status
Universal Declaration of Human Article 26: Everyone has the right to Voted in
Rights, 1948 education. Education shall be free, at favour in
least in the elementary and fundamental 1948
stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory
UNESCO Convention against Dis- Article 4: The States Parties to this Not ratified
crimination in Education, 1960 Convention undertake furthermore to
formulate, develop and apply a national
policy which, by methods appropriate to
the circumstances and to national usage,
will tend to promote equality of oppor-
tunity and of treatment in the matter of
education and in particular: (a) To make
primary education free and compulsory
International Convention on the Article 5: States Parties undertake to Signed and
Elimination of All Forms of Racial prohibit and to eliminate racial discrim- ratified in
Discrimination, 1965 ination in all its forms and to guarantee 1966
the right of everyone, without distinction
as to race, colour, or national or ethnic
origin, to equality before the law, nota-
bly in the enjoyment of the following
rights: (v) The right to education and
training
International Covenant on Economic, Article 13: The States Parties to the Signed in
Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 present Covenant recognise that, with a 2004 and rat-
view to achieving the full realisation of ified in 2008
this right: (a) Primary education shall be
compulsory and available free to all
Convention on the Elimination of All Article 10: States Parties shall take all Ratified in
Forms of Discrimination against appropriate measures to eliminate dis- 1996
Women, 1979 crimination against women in order to
ensure to them equal rights with men in
the field of education and in particular to
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women
Convention on the Rights of the Article 1: States Parties recognise the Signed and
Child, 1989 right of the child to education and with a ratified in
view to achieving this right progres- 1990
sively and on the basis of equal oppor-
tunity, they shall, in particular: (a) Make
primary education compulsory and
available free to all
ILO Convention 182 on Worst Article 7: (c) Ensure access to free basic Ratified in
Forms of Child Labour, 1999 education, and, wherever possible and 2011
appropriate, vocational training, for all
children removed from the worst forms
of child labour
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 277

on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of Discrim-

ination Against Women, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child all have
conventional mechanisms and require periodic reporting on the implementation of
provisions of these treaties.
In the build-up to the legislation on the Right to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, a number of international treaties’ instruments and national policies and plans of
action highlighted the need for such legislative and policy actions. For instance,
Pakistan submitted its third and fourth periodic report to the Committee on the
Rights of the Child in 2009 wherein it stated that one of the measures needed to
improve the quality of education was to make “primary education free and compul-
sory”. Late in 2009, in its Concluding Observations, on the reports submitted by
Pakistan, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended setting up “clear
implementation plans for achieving universal free primary education by 2015 by
raising the age of compulsory education to the minimum age for admission to
employment”. The Concluding Observations also showed concern that not all
provinces have a compulsory education law and where they exist they are often
not properly enforced. Similarly, in its fourth periodic report to the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2009, Pakistan boasts of Article
37 of the Constitution which calls for removing illiteracy and providing free and
compulsory secondary education and a Compulsory School Attendance Bill intro-
duced as a private member bill in 2008. The 20th periodic report to the Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also identifies Article 37 of the Constitu-
tion as well as to the National Education Plan as some of the steps taken by the
Government towards improving the quality of education in the country. One of the
three goals set under the National Plan of Action on Education for All was to ensure
that “by 2015 all children with special emphasis on girls and children in difficult
circumstances have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education
of good quality”. Under the National Plan of Action, the measures to be taken to
achieve universal primary education for boys and girls were to be reinforced by
legislation for compulsory primary education (MOE 2002, p. 94). The National Plan
of Action is the outcome of the Dakar Framework for Action adopted by the World
Education Forum in April 2000 in Senegal. One of the six goals set out under the
framework is to ensure that “by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in
difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and
complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality”. Under the
Regional Framework for Action, the E-9 countries representing nine high-
population countries, including Pakistan, set one of its goals to make “changes in
legislation to extend basic education and include education for all in policy state-
ments” (UNESCO 2000, p. 71). The National Education Policy for the years 1998 to
2010 also envisaged promulgation and enforcement of free and compulsory primary
education act in a phased manner (MOE 2008, p. 54). At around the same time,
another trigger came from the neighbouring India. In 2009, India enacted the Right
to Free and Compulsory Education as an act of the Parliament making education
compulsory for children between 6 and 14 years of age.
278 A. I. Butt

In 2002, as per the directives of the Supreme Court of India, the Indian Govern-
ment made an 86th amendment to the constitution and inserted a new Article 21A.
Article 21A provides for the right to education to every child in India between 6 and
14 years of age. Before 2002, the right to education in the Indian Constitution, much
along the same lines as in Pakistan, was incorporated as one of the Directive
Principles of State Policy, subject to economic resources, and unenforceable by
courts (Ullah 2013, p. 332). The constitution making process and framing of the
fundamental rights and freedoms both in India and Pakistan reflect their British
heritage and are a mirror of the 1945 United Nations Charter and the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Ullah 2013, p. 332). The first constitution of Pakistan,
promulgated in 1956, stated in Article 28, Clause-B, as the Directive Principles of
State Policy, not enforceable by law, “remove illiteracy, and provide free and
compulsory primary education within the minimum possible period”. In the 1962
Constitution of Pakistan, the same was retained in Article 7 under the Principles of
Policy as “illiteracy should be eliminated, and free and compulsory primary educa-
tion should be provided for all, as soon as is practicable”. In the 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan, which stands to date, the same principle was reflected in Article 37(b) as
“the State shall remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary
education within a minimum possible period”. So when in 2009, the Indian Gov-
ernment enacted the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, it had already
made education a fundamental right in 2002, and with the comprehensive law, it
provided statutory guidelines for its enforcement. For Pakistan, the opportunity came
in 2008 when the coalition government at the time took on the task of reversing
amendments made to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan under the military rules of
General Zia-ul-Haq and General Pervez Musharraf through which the office of the
president had amassed considerable powers. The 18th Amendment was enacted in
2010 and made more than 100 changes to the Constitution of Pakistan. In addition to
limiting presidential powers, giving greater role to the parliament and the prime
minister and clarifying composition, and appointments of senior judiciary, it also
entailed devolution of power and greater autonomy to provinces. The 18th Amend-
ment added the Article 25A in the chapter on the Fundamental Rights stipulating the
responsibility of the State to “provide free and compulsory education to all children
of the age of 5 to 16 years in such manner as may be determined by law”. As a result
of the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, several issues once
dealt with at the federal level, including education, are now the prerogatives of the
provinces. The reference to “may be determined by law” in Article 25A required
provincial governments to formulate corresponding laws on the provision of free and
compulsory education.
The Federal Government first took the initiative and enacted The Right to Free and
Compulsory Education Act in 2012, which was only applicable to the Islamabad
Capital Territory and educational institutions that fall under its purview. The most
recent report submitted by Pakistan to the Committee on the Rights of the Child refers
to both Article 25A and the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act as being
among the measures taken to ensure the rights of the children in Pakistan. In
particular, the enactment of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act in
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 279

2012 coincided with the visit of the former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in
the capacity of the United Nations Special Envoy on Education to Pakistan in
November to commemorate Malala Day. On November 10, he met the then-President
Asif Ali Zardari and presented him a petition signed by over one million people in
support of the cause of “education for all” and conveyed the United Nations Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon’s aspirations to continue building “on the momentum of UN’s
Education First initiative and show that education is a right of everyone, and not a
privilege for a few” (Web Desk 2012). The Center for Education and Consciousness
(2013), a nongovernmental organisation working in Pakistan, which had spearheaded
the One Million Signature campaign, gives credence to Gordon Brown’s visit
because the ratification of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act 2012
by the National Assembly for Islamabad Capital territory could become possible. It is
important to underscore that as a British Prime Minister until 2010, Gordon Brown
had made two visits to Pakistan in December 2008 and April 2009, respectively, and
hosted his Pakistani counterparts at the 10 Downing Street in the months of May,
August, and December in 2009. In April 2009, Gordon Brown gave a speech to the
House of Commons in which he outlines his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy whereby
Britain’s development assistance to Pakistan became their second largest worldwide,
providing £665 million in assistance over the next 4 years with refocus on education
spending (Shackle 2010). This assistance, among other initiatives, also launched two
of the biggest ever advocacy campaigns [both in terms of duration and volume],
namely, Zara Sochiye and Alif Ailaan, in the history of Pakistan aimed at bringing
reforms in the education sector. By late 2012, enough momentum had been built
through these various ideational forces, which eventually culminated with the passing
of the legislation on the Right to Free and Compulsory Education (Table 2).
In the context of Pakistan, the ideational traces for the Right to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, thus, goes further back than her existence and are
found in the colonial past and British constitutional heritage. All three constitutions
of 1956, 1962, and 1973 made the right to education as one of the Directive
Principles of State Policy, while almost all education policies aspired to reach this
goal in the foreseeable future. The forces, however, that continued demanding a
legislative response came from the international human rights treaties under the
United Nations and its various specialised agencies. The momentum started building
up during the last decade of the twentieth century with Pakistan having signed and
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The first Periodic Report by
Pakistan in 1993 to the Committee on the Rights of the Child refers to a resolution
passed by the Senate in its efforts to universalise children’s education urging
Government to “ensure compulsory and free education to all its citizens at the
primary level” and that “The education departments of four provinces have been
requested to initiate necessary steps/action for the implementation of the resolution”.
The third and fourth Periodic Reports, submitted together in 2009, stated as one of
the achievements that although “national compulsory primary education law cannot
be devised as this action is done at the provincial level,” however, “three of the four
provinces, Federally Administered Areas and the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)
[all] have compulsory primary education laws”. So much so, the 2008 Mid-Decade
280 A. I. Butt

Table 2 Timeline to the right to free and compulsory education act in Pakistan, in 2012
1947 Soon after independence, All-Pakistan Education Conference was held that made
three basic recommendations including making elementary education free and
compulsory (Khan 1997, p. 648)
1948 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was passed with Article 26 explicitly
declaring education as the right of everyone
1956 The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan made free and compulsory primary education as
one of the Directive Principles of State Policy
1959 A National Commission on Education was established that aimed at making
education compulsory for age group 6–11 within 10 years time (Khan 1997, p. 649)
1970 The first education policy was announced reaffirming the commitment “to the
objective of universal elementary education” accepting it as a “basic principle of
State Policy in the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962”, and proposed ... compulsory,
universal and free primary education as a target for 1980” (Bengali 1999, p. 6)
1972 Education Policy 1972–1980 was announced declaring “education will be made
free and universal up to Class X for all children throughout the country” (Bengali
1999, p. 6)
1973 The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan retained free and compulsory primary education
of the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions as one of the Directive Principles of State Policy
1979 Education Policy 1979 was announced that set out the goal “to provide minimum
acceptable level of functional literacy and fundamental education to all citizens of
the country” (MOE 1992, p. 4)”
1985 The Literacy Ordinance was promulgated that for the first time made provision of
passport, driving and arm licences and employment with the local body or in an
establishment or institution under the control of Federal Government only to a
literate person
1990 Signed and ratified Convention on the Rights of the Child, which categorically asks
State to make primary education compulsory and available free to all. It is pertinent
to note that at the time Pakistan had not signed other human rights treaties, namely
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1990 The World Conference on Education For All was held in Thailand, attended by
Pakistani delegation, which issued a World Declaration on Education for All
reaffirming the notion of education as a fundamental human right
1992 As per the goals set in the World Conference on Education for All, National
Education Policy was introduced that set the objective of making the primary
education compulsory and free to achieve universal enrolment in 10 years time
1994–2002 During this period, laws on compulsory education were passed in Punjab, NWFP
[now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa], Sindh and for the Islamabad Capital Territory,
namely The Punjab Compulsory Primary Education Act, 1994; The NWFP Com-
pulsory Primary Education Act, 1996; The Sindh Compulsory Primary Education
Ordinance, 2001; The ICT Compulsory Primary Education Ordinance, 2002
1998 The National Education Policy 1998–2010 was launched which stated that primary
education will be made compulsory through legislation and will effectively be
implemented and recalled provisions made under the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child that it is State’s
duty ensure that primary education is free and compulsory (Bengali 1999, p. 24)
(continued)
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 281

Table 2 (continued)
2000 Ten year later as targets set in the World Conference on Education for All remained
unachieved, World Education Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal and Pakistan
signed to its goal for achieving Education for All by year 2015
2001 Education Sector Reforms program was initiated and National Plan of Action for
Education for All was developed to realise Education for All goals by the year 2015
2009 In 2002, India had made education a fundamental right from a directive principle of
state policy and in 2009 enacted The Right to Free and Compulsory Education as an
act of the Parliament making education compulsory for children between 6 and
14 years
2010 The 18th Amendment was made to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which
included Article 25A that made responsibility of the State to provide free and
compulsory education to all children of the age of 5–16 years
2012 On October 9, 2012 Malala Yousafzai was shot in an assassination attempt that
sparked international outrage and brought the issue of education in general and
specifically of girls education in Pakistan on the top of the policy agenda
2012 The Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act was passed and received assent of
the President and made into a law

Country Assessment Report on Education by Ministry of Education stated that there

“are no legislative hindrances [left now] for children in access to education [as] all
federating units have made primary education free and compulsory” (MOE 2008,
p. 112). This report was published only 2 years before the 18th Amendment to the
Constitution was made which provided that free and compulsory education as a
fundamental right of citizens of Pakistan and one of the duties of the state.
Greenberg et al. introduce the concept of points of “last significant controversy”
and “first significant controversy” to identify beginning and ending points in the
policy process (Greenberg et al. 1973). The point of “last significant controversy” in
the policy process is a stage after which substantial changes in the outcome are no
longer realistic alternatives, at least for a time being, such as voting on a proposed
legislative bill. The point of “first significant controversy,” however, is more elusive,
and its identification is relative on actors’ perception of the instance that triggered the
policy process in the first place. The first significant controversy could also be
considered when the need for legislation is publically expressed for the first time,
either in form of a legislative proposal, press statement, or similar instrument by a
policymaker. The Article 25A thus marks the “first significant controversy” for the
Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012 recreating the need for such
legislative interventions when previously they were reported to have sufficed. Inter-
estingly, while the ideational roots for the Right to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2012 are the deepest, the time between the “first significant controversy” and the
“last significant controversy” is of only 2 years. During these 2 years, the bilateral role
of the British government is significant in the education sector with triggers coming in
various forms and formats, both from inside Pakistan with the assassination attempt
on Malala Yousafzai and from the outside with the Indian government having passed
the national Right to Free and Compulsory Education Act. The main ideational force
thus constituted of the international community, with the human rights treaties
282 A. I. Butt

serving as the bedrock, engaging though multilateral and bilateral means and shaping
education sector policies and legislation in Pakistan.
At the time the bill was passed and made into law, the normative roots had
become so strong that there was virtually no disagreement with the notion that
education is a fundamental right and responsibility of the state to every child. It
took Pakistan 65 years to cede to normative forces due to the near absence of the
feasibility of such a decision. At the foreground of the policy debate, the momentum
building through the normative forces culminated only when the material interests of
passing the legislation outweighed the opposing forces.

4 The Underlying Ideational Dimensions

The underlying ideational dimensions of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2012 have been studied by means of taking stock of the opinions and experiences of
key policy actors involved in the legislative process. There is a general agreement among
them that the insertion of Article 25A on the right to education, as a result of the 18th
Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, is a cornerstone of the legislation on free and
compulsory education. Ms. Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication, February
22, 2014), who was the member of the parliament from the ruling Pakistan Peoples
Party and had tabled the bill, elucidates the same: “I believe the 25A was the main
trigger”. Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014), who was
the Senior National Specialist with UNESCO and spearheaded technical backstopping
during the legislative process, agrees: “This bill had two stages; the first was to have the
Article 25A added into the Constitution”. Ahmad Ali (personal communication,
February 24, 2014), who is working as Research Fellow at the Institute of Social and
Policy Studies, which was one of the think-tanks behind the legislation, also support this
assertion: “The day the article [25A] got inserted into the Constitution, the debate also
started. . .and. . .people started discussing education as their right”.
However, the insertion of Article 25A into the Constitution was unexpected.
There was no movement, visible or otherwise, or specific demand from any sections
of society for such a commitment. Ahmed Ali (personal communication, February
24, 2014) calls it a “mystery” and explains:
we have gone through the minutes of the meetings of the Constitutional Commission, we
have looked at the applications filed to the Commission and its responses and when the
Commission solicited inputs from the citizens and you will be surprised there was no such
demand [for Article 25A]. . .if you compare this with the Right to Education Bill passed in
India there was a huge crowd outside the legislature standing and demanding the right to
education but in this particular case you will be surprised that not even a single vocal or a
written demand was there.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) agrees: “The
surprise for me [during legislative process] was to have the 25A inserted into the
Constitution”. Faisal Bari (personal communication, February 18, 2014), who is
the Senior Advisor at the Open Society Foundation that promotes education, is of
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 283

the opinion that “25A is the least discussed provision of the 18th Amendment.
Most of the discussion revolved around other bigger political issues, such as
presidential power”.
Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes that
perhaps parliamentarians were not cognizant of the implications of Article 25A:
“People perhaps let it made part of the Constitution thinking that it does not mean a
lot and carry not much weight”. The insertion of Article 25A into the Constitution
through the 18th Amendment was mainly the result of efforts of one person—Senator
SM Zafar. Ahmad Ali (personal communication, February 24, 2014) recalls, “Article
25A is the result of one person only—SM Zafar. The person who in fact introduced
this in the 18th Constitutional Amendment and also the bill that eventually became a
law at the Federal level was SM Zafar”. Senator SM Zafar (personal communication,
March 4, 2014) himself spoke of his involvement in Article 25A:
From my party side, I moved an amendment on education. I was also at the time Chairman of
the Standing Committee on Education, there was some debate that whether it can become a
fundamental right, and I said that education is now the most basic thing one needs in life. So
when I moved this amendment fortunately most of the members accepted it and the language
was very clear.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes, “If
people like SM Zafar were not there it would have become very difficult”. The
choice of Senator SM Zafar to champion the cause of education for civil society
organisations in the policymaking corridors seems an obvious one. He has been
Chairman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, as well as the Chancellor of
Hamdard University, and was at that time the Chairman of the Senate’s Standing
Committee on Education. More so, as Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communica-
tion, February 24, 2014) captures, SM Zafar’s involvement made sense:
Senators are easier to get hold of, they don’t have their constituency to worry about. We
involved Senator SM Zafar, a highly respected figure, and invited him to our discussions and
he was the Chairman of the Senate’s Standing Committee on Education at the time.

Senator SM Zafar (personal communication, March 4, 2014) himself agrees that

his background in education made him interested in the legislation: “I otherwise was
very interested; I have been the Chancellor of Hamdard University. So it is in my
background and so we moved this bill”. Senator SM Zafar (personal communication,
March 4, 2014) recalls the time when he presented the bill in the Senate, and he could
not pursue it further as his term ended:
The bill was presented by me as a private member, from there it was referred to the Standing
Committee on Education, and it brought it to the Senate and it took a long time. And by the
time I was able to bring it back to the Senate my third term had ended. We had to find another
private member to continue with it. So it took a long time there and so when it went to the
National Assembly, somebody had to be selected there.

From the time that Article 25A was inserted into the Constitution to when the
legislation was passed hardly took two years. Khalida Ahmad (personal communi-
cation, February 17, 2014), who was working as Education Officer at UNICEF and
pressed for the legislation, believes, “The bill was passed hurriedly. . .international
284 A. I. Butt

community was looking at them and asking why aren’t you [Government of
Pakistan] doing your job”. Even Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication,
February 22, 2014), who is a former member of the National Assembly, member
of the Pakistan Peoples Party, and had tabled the bill in Parliament, spoke of her
surprise that in no time the bill was passed: “The surprise for me was that this bill
was instantly passed and became legislation”. She and others interviewed believe
that the visit of Gordon Brown played a critical role in its passing. Ms. Khalida
Ahmad (personal communication, February 17, 2014) opines:
Gordon Brown visited in last November in 2012, and he met with ministers and the Prime
Minister and asked that something needs to be done [for education] urgently, and one thing
that could have been done immediately was passing the legislation.

Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014), who was the Education
Advisor at the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development in
Pakistan, agrees that “There was high-level strategic dialogue with the UK in the
last few months of the Gordon Brown and it would have been a nice thing to present
internationally”. Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014)
also supports this assertion:
What had happened, the bill was sitting in the National Assembly and we feared that it would
lapse. Gordon Brown was visiting Pakistan during that time and the Malala incident had also
happened. These two incidents also provided impetus to passing of the legislation.

Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014), who is the Addi-
tional Secretary at the Federal Ministry of Education and Trainings, recalls, “This
bill was enacted right before the second visit of Gordon Brown and during that time
President [Asif Ali Zardari] was also scheduled to visit UNESCO’s headquarter”.
Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) also believes that
“Once the bill had reached the assembly. . . the bill was passed due to the visit of
Gordon Brown”.
However, the normative base that had been established over the past decades
should not be discounted. Dr. Faisal Bari (personal communication, February
18, 2014) argues:
Historically, there has been a conversation in Pakistan that primary education should be free
and before the amendment it was part of our principles but stated not as a basic right. In
provinces, however, there were laws on primary education but they were not implemented.

Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) believes:

the impetus was also provided by the 1973 Constitution, its article 37b under Principles of
Policy that contained that State remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary
education within minimum possible period.

The timing of the legislation was, nevertheless, primarily defined by a strategy of

appeasement. Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees that
the legislation was the “result of influential politicians who wanted to signal to the
international world that the federal government is serious about education”. For Atif
Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) such gestures encourage inter-
national donors, i.e. Department for International Development, as it shows political
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 285

will “to justify a huge investment needed in Pakistan for the next 5 years”. Mehnaz
Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014), who is the Chief Executive
Officer at the Children’s Global Network, is of the opinion that similar activism in
the region must have also had an impact on the legislation in Pakistan: “There is
pressure on our governments to adhere to what is happening in the region and as per
the global reality, and a similar act is also passed in India. We took the influence
from our region”. Arshad Saeed Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014)
further substantiates:
The biggest example I had was from India in form of their Eighty-sixth Amendment passed
in 2003, I used to show that to everyone on PowerPoint that this is the law passed in 2003
and their indicators have since improved so why cannot we do the same.

This was coupled with international instruments, i.e. conventions and treaties that
also had a role to play in bringing this issue to the forefront of policymakers’
agendas. Khalida Ahmad (personal communication, February 17, 2014) highlights
the same: “It’s very embarrassing for the Country and the parliamentarians too when
reports come out . . . in respect to the status of education in Pakistan”.
Insertion of Article 25A and the subsequent legislation is highly similar to the
case of India. Yasmeen Rehman (personal communication, February 22, 2014)
pointed to the same: “When ever we pass some legislation, some how or the other
we always look towards our neighbours, especially India and Bangladesh, and we do
keep an eye on their legislative businesses”. Arshad Saeed Khan (personal commu-
nication, February 24, 2014) recalled how the Indian legislation was used to draft the
bill in Pakistan: “We advertised it twice [for drafting the legislation], the first time we
did not receive any quote and even the second time no one applied. We then took a
lot of help from a similar act in India”. Dr. Faisal Bari (personal communication,
February 18, 2014) was also of the same opinion: “It is almost exactly the same that
the Indian Constitution has, the only difference is that the change the age from
14 years to 16 years”. The drafting of the legislation, thus, took a lot of references
from similar legislative work in India and other countries of the region. Interestingly,
the Ministry of Education was completely detached from both the insertion of Article
25A and subsequent legislation on free and compulsory education. Mehnaz Aziz
(personal communication, February 24, 2014) claims, “even parliamentarians had
not been involved. . .and the technical assistance came from UNESCO mainly”.
Sheikh Waqas Akram (personal communication, April 1, 2014), who was the
Federal Minister of Education and Member of Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid at
the time, confessed, “I came to know about this bill in 2012 when Yasmeen Rehman,
who represented PPP, presented this bill as a Private Member. . .this should have
been tabled by the government in the first place”.
The Federal Minister and the Bureaucracy, in their statements, seemed unhappy
with the legislation. Sheikh Waqas Akram (personal communication, April 1, 2014)
believes, “It should have been the responsibility of the Ministry to do that. But it
came through a private member”. Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February
20, 2014) is of the opinion that “There was no thought behind how this bill is going
to be implemented”. Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014)
286 A. I. Butt

believes that it was merely a “tick mark that you have this legislation but its technical
dimensions were not looked into”. Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February
20, 2014) speaks of the legislation along similar lines:
It is a dilemma of our country, we get very beautifully drafted rules and regulation but they
are not implemented. They passed the legislation in a single day under pressure and did not
pay much attention how it is going to be implemented.

With the legislation being applicable only in the Capital Territory, which has the
best infrastructure, implementation of the law had been a difficult undertaking. Atif
Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees:
Compared to the big provinces obviously ICT is very small so they don’t have that much to
lose from a legislation. They have a semblance of an infrastructure and they are deputed in
each area that are not difficult to reach and they can make a good start towards implementing
it and probably they can also find the money.

Mehnaz Aziz (personal communication, February 24, 2014) thinks that if:
Gordon Brown had come to Punjab and asked for such a law, they would have not done this.
They know that their voter is very smart and if they pass such a law then the people will
demand for services that they cannot provide. It could be the reason that they wanted to
showcase this bill for his [Gordon Brown] visit.

Atif Rafiq (personal communication, February 20, 2014) believes that it is

“absolutely essential that some signal [of government’s commitment] is given
[to the international community] because of the scale of the problem”. In Faisal
Bari’s (personal communication, February 18, 2014) opinion, at least activists like
him “can go to the Supreme Court and claim that provision of education is the
responsibility of the State and not being provided”. Mehnaz Aziz (personal commu-
nication, February 24, 2014) thinks that now the bill has put the government
“between the rock and the hard place because . . .now things have to be improved”.
If the bill faced any opposition, it mainly came from the bureaucracy. Arshad Saeed
Khan (personal communication, February 24, 2014) elucidates the same: “Bureau-
cracy has such a mind-set that after looking at every proposed bill their first question
is from where will the money come”. SM Zafar (personal communication, March
4, 2014) agrees, “In case of education, the bureaucracy showed reluctance, they had
put hurdles”.
The Article 25A of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, inserted through the 18th
Amendment in 2010, can be considered the main reference point for the 2012 Right
to Free and Compulsory Education Act. The Review Committee tasked with drafting
the 18th Amendment did not delve much into discussion on the then-proposed
Article 25A, and it was added to the package mainly because of the initiative of
Senator SM Zafar. Perhaps most significant is the last section of Article 25A, which
left the determination of free and compulsory education to all children “as may be
determined by law”, comforted members of the Review Committee to not contest or
debate otherwise. The main reason the 18th Amendment was enacted was to reverse
amendments made to the Constitution under the military rules of General Zia-ul-Haq
and General Pervez Musharraf, through which the office of the president had
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 287

amassed considerable powers. While subjects such as devolution of power and

greater autonomy to provinces were hotly debated and contested, declaration of
education as a fundamental right did not gain any limelight. Once Article 25A was
made part of the Constitution, the civil society saw this as an opportunity to further
the agenda of provision of free and compulsory education. Arshad Khan (personal
communication, February 24, 2014) recalls being invited to the meeting of the
Standing Committee by Senator SM Zafar, in which he briefed the members on
the status of education and offered UNESCO’s technical assistance through provi-
sion of legal experts for drafting law. In drafting and during the process of legisla-
tion, Khalid Hanif (personal communication, February 20, 2014) agrees, “UNESCO
and UNICEF played a very crucial role and they were at the forefront”. The
legislation was mainly the result of international pressure and the expectations
placed upon the government of Pakistan because of its international commitments.
The role of Gordon Brown is crucial, whose visit to Pakistan as a UN special envoy
for global education in the backdrop of the assassination attempt on Malala
Yousafzai was the main catalyst which caused the legislation to be passed. In July
2012, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appointed Mr. Brown as UN Special Envoy
for Global Education. In October 2012, a month before his scheduled visit to
Pakistan, Mr. Brown had said, “I have asked Pakistan’s President [Asif Ali] Zardari
to pledge that Malala’s suffering will not be in vain. In response, he has invited me to
lead a delegation of education leaders to visit him in Pakistan in November to talk
about how he can improve opportunities for children”. His spokesperson further
added that the aim of Mr. Brown’s visit to Pakistan was to “to get governments,
international non-governmental organisations and businesses to agree practical pro-
posals to turn the promise of universal education into reality” and that “in recent
talks, President Zardari has agreed that there should be a plan to get the five million
Pakistani girls and boys presently not schooled into education” (BBC News 2012).
The legislation was passed a month later in December 2012, and 2 months later
President Zardari went on an official visit to the United Kingdom. The process had
negligible involvement from the public, in the form of mediation of any interest
groups in formulation of the policy agenda.

5 Concluding Thoughts

The preceding discussion shows that actors’ orientation to policy issues, i.e. the right
of children to free and compulsory education, is not a contextually given fact but
constructed over many years and undeniably ideational. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and subsequent international conventions, treaties, and covenants
have played a pivotal role. In the case of free and compulsory education, the
ideational roots can be traced back to the country’s colonial past and its constitu-
tional history. This is in support of the assertion of “policy-as-discourse” theorists
who see policies not being framed in response to existing conditions and problems,
“but more as a discourse in which both problems and solutions are created”
288 A. I. Butt

(Goodwin 1996, p. 67). The discussion also shows that both the actors outside the
formal legislative process and those tasked with legislation are strategic and rely
upon multiple levels of criteria for making strategic policies. In the case of the Right
to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012, in the lead-up to the legislation, the
reporting requirements of a number of international treaties, instruments, national
policies, and plans of actions highlighting the need for policy action had begun
exerting considerable pressure on the government. This coincided with the visit of
the former British Prime Minister in his capacity as a United Nations Special Envoy
on Education, who was asked to specifically press upon the need for visible actions
on part of Pakistan to show that education is a right of everyone and not a privilege
for a few. The insertion of Article 25A further provided impetus to the international
community, especially UNICEF and UNESCO, to demand that the state of Pakistan
translate their constitutional obligations into actionable polices.
This analysis shows that the dominant ideational construct in public domain is
based on the normative dimension but that the timing, which is defined the “last
significant controversy”, is based on the material dimension. The visit of Prime
Minister Gordon Brown to Pakistan and the subsequent visits of President Asif Ali
Zardari to the United Kingdom, together with the demand for visible action on the
part of the government of Pakistan on universalisation of education and for release of
funds, played a pivotal role. Also, this case highlights that both the problematisation
of the policy and its prescription originated from and was defined by forces acting
outside the legislature. UNESCO provided the technical assistance in drafting the
legislation, and it was presented as a private member bill to the Senate. Importantly,
the normative roots of these ideational constructs originated from outside Pakistan.
In the case of the Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2012, both the instrument,
the piece of legislation, and the idea originated from outside the locale of actors
engaged in this legislation. Not only was this legislation not widely discussed, but its
implications were not fully considered either. As a result, the legislation still remains
a law on paper without any implementation. The legislative process lacked both
public participation and contestation in the phases of development and the formula-
tion of the public policy agenda and was primarily the result of ideas in the
background of the policy formulation.
One of the intentions of this contribution is to advance the scholarship in policy
studies with an interest in ideas and discourse. The analysis presented herein
advances the basic claim of ideational institutionalism, that it has the capacity to
inform an endogenous account of complex institutional evolution, continuation,
adaptation, and innovation.
In the case of the legislation to make education free and compulsory, not only the
ideational process informs how institutions evolve and continue over time and how,
in the context of Pakistan, adapted and innovated, if at all. Unlike the other three
established schools of new institutionalism, this analysis confirms that actors
involved in the policy process are oriented subjectively, through the ideation process
to which they are exposed to and later expand it further, rather their desires,
preferences, and motivations being contextually given facts. This analysis further
confirms that actors in the policy process are strategic and that they rely on multiple
Ideational Leadership and Legislation: The Right to Free and Compulsory. . . 289

criteria for favouring certain strategies over others. The criteria, as per the proposed
ideational framework, can be categorised into three levels, namely, material, nor-
mative, and cognitive. This analysis shows that ideas at the normative level are used
in the foreground of policy formulation for justification of proposed policy pre-
scriptions. Also, ideas at the cognitive level are used in the foreground of policy
formulation and are essentially policy prescriptions from subject experts outside the
policymaking realm to help policymakers in taking specific courses of policy
actions. The material dimension, interestingly, appears more forcefully at the
moment of “last significant controversy”, essentially meaning when a particular
piece of legislation has to be passed and, as expected, is in the background of policy
formulation in the form of self-interested ideas. In contrast to the three established
new institutionalisms, agents in ideational understanding are sentient beings who do
not just operate or adapt to existing institutions, but who can also create and maintain
new institutions through their ideational abilities. While this goes beyond the scope
of the existing writings, it is contended that if an ideational institution is such where,
for instance, free and compulsory education is seen as a right of every child, it could
only be changed if a new set of ideational constructs were created not only refuting
this existing premise but also establishing new ones, i.e. education is essentially a
service that needs to be procured like any other service available on the market.

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Atif Ikram Butt has a doctorate degree in International Development Studies from Ruhr Univer-
sity Bochum, Germany. His doctoral research explores the concept of ideation and its influence on
policy making. He currently heads the Center for Communication Programs Pakistan as Executive
Director. He has nearly 20 years of leadership experience in social and behavior change with
renowned international aid and humanitarian organizations including the Department for Interna-
tional Development, the German Society for International Cooperation, the International Labor
Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, the Johns Hopkins University and the
United Nations Children’s Fund. He is also a visiting faculty at the Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Institute of Science and Technology (SZABIST) and the Information Service Academy, Pakistan.