1.

1 Cases in General (Censorship and Prior Restraint)

In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. L-32717, Nov. 26, 1970),
The Supreme Court struck down COMELEC's prohibition on taped political jingles, ruling
that it violated freedom of speech. The Court found no statutory basis for the ban,
emphasizing that political speech is highly protected and that COMELEC’s interpretation
of campaign restrictions was unreasonable. The ruling reinforced that electoral
regulations must not impose prior restraints on free expression.
In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 90878, Jan. 29, 1990),
A journalist challenged a COMELEC resolution barring media practitioners from
campaigning for or against plebiscite issues. The Supreme Court ruled the restriction
unconstitutional, holding that it unlawfully curtailed freedom of speech and the press. The
decision clarified that COMELEC's authority to regulate media applies only to candidates
and does not extend to public discussions on political issues.
In Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez (G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015),
Government employees faced administrative sanctions for protesting workplace
grievances through printed shirts and posters. The Supreme Court ruled that wearing
grievance-labeled shirts was protected free expression but upheld penalties for violating
workplace rules on posting materials. The decision reaffirmed that government
employees retain constitutional rights but must comply with reasonable office regulations.
In Deduro v. Vinoya (G.R. No. 254753, July 4, 2023),
A human rights activist sought protection against military red-tagging, arguing it
endangered his life and security. The Supreme Court ruled that red-tagging poses a threat
to constitutional rights and emphasized the state’s duty to protect individuals from unjust
labeling. The case underscored the judiciary's role in safeguarding free expression and
dissent from government suppression.
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001),
Petitioners challenged the ban on publishing election surveys 15 days before national and
7 days before local elections. The Supreme Court struck down the restriction, ruling it was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech and the press. The decision emphasized
that voter influence concerns do not justify suppressing political information.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP (G.R. No. L-64261, Dec. 26, 1984),
Authorities seized a publication critical of the government, claiming national security
concerns. The Supreme Court ruled the seizure unconstitutional, holding that prior
restraint on press freedom is invalid absent a compelling justification. The case reinforced
press freedom protections against government suppression.
In National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992),
Media entities challenged COMELEC’s prohibition on selling or donating print space and
airtime for political advertisements, arguing it violated free speech and press freedom.
The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling it was a valid regulation ensuring fair elections
by preventing wealthier candidates from monopolizing media exposure. The Court
reasoned that the restriction applied only to paid political ads and did not hinder news
reporting or editorial opinions, striking a balance between constitutional rights and public
interest.
In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 205728, July 5, 2016),
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC’s order to remove a tarpaulin opposing the RH
Law violated freedom of expression. The Court held that the tarpaulin was not election
propaganda but a form of social advocacy, and COMELEC’s size restriction was an
unconstitutional content-based regulation. The ruling reinforced the protection of political
speech and emphasized that government restrictions must pass strict scrutiny.
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans Jr. (G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985),
A radio station was summarily shut down on national security grounds without due
process. The Supreme Court ruled the closure unconstitutional, emphasizing that freedom
of speech includes broadcast media, which cannot be arbitrarily silenced without clear
evidence of an imminent threat. The decision set guidelines for protecting media rights
while ensuring due process in administrative proceedings.
In Adiong v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992),
A senatorial candidate challenged COMELEC’s prohibition on election stickers on private
vehicles, claiming it restricted free speech. The Supreme Court ruled the prohibition
unconstitutional, holding that it was overly broad and violated both freedom of expression
and property rights. The Court emphasized that election regulations must not infringe
upon private individuals' ability to express political preferences.
In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998),
candidates argued that restricting political advertisements in mass media disadvantaged
poorer candidates. The Supreme Court upheld the restriction, reasoning that it ensured
equal media access and prevented undue influence by wealthier candidates, thus
regulating rather than suppressing political speech. The ruling affirmed that electoral
fairness justified limited restrictions on campaign expenditures.
In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 119694, May
22, 1995),
COMELEC required newspapers to provide free print space for election information. The
Supreme Court ruled this unconstitutional, holding that it violated press freedom and
property rights by mandating uncompensated use of private resources. The decision
reinforced the principle that government-imposed obligations on media must be justified
and fairly compensated.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998),
Broadcasters challenged COMELEC’s requirement for free airtime during elections,
arguing it was an uncompensated taking. The Supreme Court upheld the mandate, ruling
that broadcasting is a privilege regulated by the government, and requiring free airtime
served a compelling public interest in ensuring fair elections. The decision reinforced the
state’s regulatory authority over publicly licensed airwaves.
In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973),
Workers staged a mass protest despite company warnings, violating their collective
bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court upheld their dismissal, ruling that their appeal
was procedurally defective due to late filing and emphasizing the need for strict
compliance with legal remedies. The decision highlighted the importance of procedural
regularity in labor disputes.
In Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999),
Public school teachers were dismissed for participating in illegal strikes. The Supreme
Court upheld their suspension and denied back wages, ruling that their actions constituted
conduct prejudicial to public service. The decision emphasized that government
employees’ right to protest is subject to legal limitations, particularly when it disrupts
essential public functions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006),
President Arroyo declared a national emergency under Proclamation No. 1017, leading to
warrantless arrests and media takeovers. The Supreme Court upheld the declaration but
ruled that certain actions, such as prior restraint on speech and warrantless arrests, were
unconstitutional, reinforcing constitutional checks on executive power. The decision
affirmed that emergency measures must not infringe upon fundamental rights without
proper legal basis.
ART 353 of RPC & RA 10175
Libel - public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice, or defect that tends to cause
dishonor, discredit, or contempt for a person. When this offense is committed using a
computer or any digital means, it falls under cyber libel, which is a punishable act under
RA 10175.
ELEMENTS OF LIBEL
a) Defamatory Imputation – There must be a claim or accusation that is damaging to a
person's reputation.
b) Malice – The imputation must be done with malice, implying an intention to harm.
c) Publication – The defamatory statement must be communicated to a third party.
d) Identifiability of the Victim – The person defamed must be identifiable from the
statement.
DEFENSES AGAINST CYBER LIBEL
Several defenses may be raised in a cyber-libel case, including:
a) Truth – If the statement made is factual and can be proven as true, it is a valid
defense against libel.
b) Good Faith and Fair Comment – Comments made in good faith on matters of public
interest may not constitute libel. However, the comments must not be malicious or
unnecessary.
c) Lack of Identifiability – If the subject of the defamatory statement cannot be
identified, the case may not
1. Constitutional Foundation: Sec. 4 Art. III 1987 Constitution “No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.”
Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: "Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith."
Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 442, renumbered
as Art. 278 by R.A. 10151) provides: Art. 264 (Art. 278).
Prohibited Activities (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively, filed the required notice, or observed
the required cooling-off period or the seven-day strike ban after submission of the strike
vote report to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or
the Secretary of Labor or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the
strike or lockout.
(b) Any worker whose employment has been terminated due to unlawful lockout shall be
entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, and any worker who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike, may be declared to have lost his employment
status. However, mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination, even if the strike is subsequently declared illegal.
(c) No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with peaceful picketing by employees
during any labor controversy or strike.
(d) No employer shall use strike-breakers or engage in acts that interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
(e) The police force shall maintain peace and order but shall not interfere in any labor
dispute, except to preserve public peace and safety.
Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: "The State shall afford
full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights
of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be
entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall
also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including
conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial
peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns to investments, and to expansion and growth."
1.1 Cases in General (Censorship and Prior Restraint)
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. L-32717, Nov. 26, 1970),
The Supreme Court struck down COMELEC's prohibition on taped political jingles, ruling
that it violated freedom of speech. The Court found no statutory basis for the ban,
emphasizing that political speech is highly protected and that COMELEC’s interpretation
of campaign restrictions was unreasonable. The ruling reinforced that electoral
regulations must not impose prior restraints on free expression.
In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 90878, Jan. 29, 1990),
A journalist challenged a COMELEC resolution barring media practitioners from
campaigning for or against plebiscite issues. The Supreme Court ruled the restriction
unconstitutional, holding that it unlawfully curtailed freedom of speech and the press. The
decision clarified that COMELEC's authority to regulate media applies only to candidates
and does not extend to public discussions on political issues.
In Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez (G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015),
Government employees faced administrative sanctions for protesting workplace
grievances through printed shirts and posters. The Supreme Court ruled that wearing
grievance-labeled shirts was protected free expression but upheld penalties for violating
workplace rules on posting materials. The decision reaffirmed that government
employees retain constitutional rights but must comply with reasonable office regulations.
In Deduro v. Vinoya (G.R. No. 254753, July 4, 2023),
A human rights activist sought protection against military red-tagging, arguing it
endangered his life and security. The Supreme Court ruled that red-tagging poses a threat
to constitutional rights and emphasized the state’s duty to protect individuals from unjust
labeling. The case underscored the judiciary's role in safeguarding free expression and
dissent from government suppression.
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001),
Petitioners challenged the ban on publishing election surveys 15 days before national and
7 days before local elections. The Supreme Court struck down the restriction, ruling it was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech and the press. The decision emphasized
that voter influence concerns do not justify suppressing political information.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP (G.R. No. L-64261, Dec. 26, 1984),
Authorities seized a publication critical of the government, claiming national security
concerns. The Supreme Court ruled the seizure unconstitutional, holding that prior
restraint on press freedom is invalid absent a compelling justification. The case reinforced
press freedom protections against government suppression.
In National Press Club v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992),
Media entities challenged COMELEC’s prohibition on selling or donating print space and
airtime for political advertisements, arguing it violated free speech and press freedom.
The Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling it was a valid regulation ensuring fair elections
by preventing wealthier candidates from monopolizing media exposure. The Court
reasoned that the restriction applied only to paid political ads and did not hinder news
reporting or editorial opinions, striking a balance between constitutional rights and public
interest.
In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 205728, July 5, 2016),
The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC’s order to remove a tarpaulin opposing the RH
Law violated freedom of expression. The Court held that the tarpaulin was not election
propaganda but a form of social advocacy, and COMELEC’s size restriction was an
unconstitutional content-based regulation. The ruling reinforced the protection of political
speech and emphasized that government restrictions must pass strict scrutiny.
In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans Jr. (G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985),
A radio station was summarily shut down on national security grounds without due
process. The Supreme Court ruled the closure unconstitutional, emphasizing that freedom
of speech includes broadcast media, which cannot be arbitrarily silenced without clear
evidence of an imminent threat. The decision set guidelines for protecting media rights
while ensuring due process in administrative proceedings.
In Adiong v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992),
a senatorial candidate challenged COMELEC’s prohibition on election stickers on private
vehicles, claiming it restricted free speech. The Supreme Court ruled the prohibition
unconstitutional, holding that it was overly broad and violated both freedom of expression
and property rights. The Court emphasized that election regulations must not infringe
upon private individuals' ability to express political preferences.
In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998), candidates
argued that restricting political advertisements in mass media disadvantaged poorer
candidates. The Supreme Court upheld the restriction, reasoning that it ensured equal
media access and prevented undue influence by wealthier candidates, thus regulating
rather than suppressing political speech. The ruling affirmed that electoral fairness
justified limited restrictions on campaign expenditures.
In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 119694, May 22,
1995), COMELEC required newspapers to provide free print space for election
information. The Supreme Court ruled this unconstitutional, holding that it violated press
freedom and property rights by mandating uncompensated use of private resources. The
decision reinforced the principle that government-imposed obligations on media must be
justified and fairly compensated.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998), broadcasters challenged COMELEC’s
requirement for free airtime during elections, arguing it was an uncompensated taking.
The Supreme Court upheld the mandate, ruling that broadcasting is a privilege regulated
by the government, and requiring free airtime served a compelling public interest in
ensuring fair elections. The decision reinforced the state’s regulatory authority over
publicly licensed airwaves.
In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.
(G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973), workers staged a mass protest despite company
warnings, violating their collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court upheld their
dismissal, ruling that their appeal was procedurally defective due to late filing and
emphasizing the need for strict compliance with legal remedies. The decision highlighted
the importance of procedural regularity in labor disputes.
In Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999), public school teachers
were dismissed for participating in illegal strikes. The Supreme Court upheld their
suspension and denied back wages, ruling that their actions constituted conduct
prejudicial to public service. The decision emphasized that government employees’ right
to protest is subject to legal limitations, particularly when it disrupts essential public
functions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006), President Arroyo declared a
national emergency under Proclamation No. 1017, leading to warrantless arrests and
media takeovers. The Supreme Court upheld the declaration but ruled that certain actions,
such as prior restraint on speech and warrantless arrests, were unconstitutional,
reinforcing constitutional checks on executive power. The decision affirmed that
emergency measures must not infringe upon fundamental rights without proper legal
basis.
1.2 Doctrines and Related Principles and Cases: (Discussion lecture – Doctrines)
1.2.1 Clear and Present Danger test
In Chavez v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008), the Supreme Court examined
government warnings against broadcasting the Hello Garci tapes, which allegedly exposed
electoral fraud. The Court ruled that these warnings were an unconstitutional form of
prior restraint, as they suppressed speech without a clear and present danger, violating
the freedoms of speech and the press.
2. In contrast with: Gonzales v. Comelec 27 SCRA 835 In Schenck v. United States (249 U.S.
47, 1919), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Schenck’s conviction under the Espionage Act of
1917 for distributing anti-draft leaflets during World War I. The Court ruled that speech
can be restricted if it poses a clear and present danger of causing significant harm,
particularly in times of war. Justice Holmes famously likened Schenck’s advocacy to falsely
shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, emphasizing that free speech is not absolute. This
case established the clear and present danger test, distinguishing it from the dangerous
tendency rule, which punishes speech based on its potential effects rather than imminent
threats, shaping future interpretations of speech limitations.
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 79690, October 7, 1988), the Supreme Court ruled
on the balance between a public official’s right to due process and the state’s interest in
fighting corruption. It upheld the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, emphasizing that the
state’s compelling interest in maintaining integrity in public office outweighs procedural
objections, provided due process is observed.
In Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, Nov. 9, 1983), Jose B.L. Reyes sought a permit for
a peaceful rally near the U.S. Embassy, which Mayor Bagatsing denied, citing intelligence
reports of possible infiltration by subversive elements. The Supreme Court ruled in favor
of Reyes, holding that the denial violated the right to free speech and peaceful assembly, as
no clear and present danger was established. While the government must protect
diplomatic missions under international law, speculative threats cannot justify restricting
constitutional rights. The Court reaffirmed that public spaces must remain open for lawful
assemblies, with regulations limited to ensuring public order.
In Subayco v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 117267-117310, August 22, 1996), police and
paramilitary forces fired at unarmed protesters during the 1985 Escalante Massacre,
killing 20 and injuring 24. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of three officers,
ruling that their concerted actions demonstrated implied conspiracy. It rejected claims of
self-defense, emphasizing that peaceful assemblies cannot be suppressed with deadly
force. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional right to assembly, the clear and present
danger test, and the duty of authorities to protect, not harm, demonstrators. Justice
remained incomplete as many accused remained at large.
1.2.2 Compelling State Interest Test
In Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 223705, Aug. 14, 2019), the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a law prohibiting partisan political activities abroad during the
overseas voting period. The Court ruled that the restriction was overbroad and an
unjustified prior restraint on political expression, violating the freedoms of speech,
assembly, and suffrage. Applying strict scrutiny, it found no compelling state interest to
justify the absolute ban, making the temporary restraining order permanent and ensuring
that overseas Filipinos could freely engage in political discourse.
In Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City (G.R. No. 225442, Aug. 8, 2017),
youth activists challenged curfew ordinances for minors in Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas, arguing they violated the right to travel and parental authority. The Supreme
Court upheld Quezon City's ordinance but struck down those in Manila and Navotas for
being overly restrictive and lacking necessary exceptions. It ruled that curfews must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and cannot impose penalties on
minors, ensuring compliance with constitutional protections and juvenile welfare laws.
1.2.3 Benevolent Neutrality Doctrine
In Estrada v. Escritor (A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006), a court interpreter faced an
administrative complaint for cohabiting under a religious covenant recognized by her
Jehovah’s Witnesses faith. The Supreme Court ruled in her favor, holding that her religious
beliefs were constitutionally protected under the Free Exercise Clause. Applying the
compelling state interest test, it found no justification for penalizing her conduct,
reinforcing the protection of sincerely held religious practices unless they pose a
significant societal threat.
In Aglipay v. Ruiz (G.R. No. 45459, March 13, 1937), the Supreme Court upheld the
issuance of commemorative postage stamps for the International Eucharistic Congress,
ruling that it did not violate the Non-Establishment Clause of the 1935 Constitution.
Applying the Purpose-Effect Test, the Court found that the primary purpose was secular—
generating revenue and commemorating a historic event—while any benefit to the
Catholic Church was incidental. The ruling affirmed that government actions with a
legitimate secular purpose do not breach the separation of Church and State, even if they
indirectly benefit a religion.
In Peralta v. Philippine Postal Corporation (G.R. No. 223395, December 4, 2018), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of issuing commemorative stamps for the
Iglesia ni Cristo’s Centennial Celebration. The Court ruled that the stamps served a secular
purpose—recognizing a historic event—and did not violate the separation of Church and
State, as the INC funded the printing costs through an agreement with PhilPost. Applying
the doctrine of benevolent neutrality, the Court held that the government may
acknowledge religious milestones without endorsing any particular faith.
1.2.4 Least Restrictive Means Test
In Malaban v. Ramento (G.R. No. 62270, May 21, 1984), student leaders were suspended
for holding a rally beyond its permitted time and location. The Supreme Court ruled that
while the students violated the permit conditions, the one-year suspension was excessive
and disproportionate. The Court reduced the penalty to a one-week suspension,
emphasizing the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, which should
not be unduly curtailed without a clear and present danger to public order.
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines (G.R. No. 69198, April 17, 1985),
students were barred from re-enrollment after participating in a peaceful assembly. The
Supreme Court ruled that while academic freedom allows institutions to set enrollment
standards, it cannot be used to suppress student rights to speech and assembly. The Court
reinstated students with satisfactory academic records but upheld the school’s right to
deny enrollment to those with academic deficiencies, balancing constitutional rights with
institutional policies.
In Non v. Dames II (G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990), students were denied re-enrollment for
leading protests against their school. The Supreme Court ruled that the school violated the
students' rights to free speech, assembly, and due process, overturning a previous
doctrine that allowed schools to refuse re-admission without justification. The Court
mandated their readmission, affirming that student enrollment is not merely a semester-
based contract but a public interest issue requiring fair treatment.
In Alcuaz v. Philippine School of Business Administration (G.R. No. 76353, May 2, 1988),
students were denied re-enrollment after participating in campus protests. The Supreme
Court upheld the school’s authority to impose sanctions, ruling that students’ contracts
expired at the end of the semester and that academic freedom allows institutions to
discipline rule violators. While recognizing student rights to speech and assembly, the
Court ruled that these do not absolve them from accountability for actions that disrupt the
academic environment.
1.2.5 Balancing of Interests Test
In American Communications Association v. Douds (339 U.S. 382, 1950), the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which required labor union leaders to
affirm they were not Communist Party members. Applying a balancing test, the Court
ruled that the government's interest in preventing political strikes that could disrupt
commerce justified the indirect restriction on speech and association. It found that the law
targeted specific conduct rather than mere beliefs, making the restriction permissible.
In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong (G.R. No. 82380, April 29, 1988), an Australian
film company sought to depict Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in a docudrama about the EDSA
Revolution, which he opposed on privacy grounds. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
the filmmakers, holding that public figures involved in significant historical events have
limited claims to privacy concerning their public actions. The decision emphasized the
primacy of free expression and the public's right to an accurate portrayal of history.
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 79690, October 7, 1988), the Supreme Court
weighed a public official’s right to due process against the state’s anti-corruption efforts. It
upheld the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, ruling that the state’s compelling interest in
maintaining public trust and integrity outweighed procedural objections, provided that
due process standards were met.
1.2.6 Purpose-Effect Test
In Acharon v. People (G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021), the Supreme Court applied the
Purpose-Effect Test to assess Christian Acharon’s conviction under the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act (RA 9262) for denying financial support to his
wife. The Court ruled that Acharon’s non-support was due to financial difficulties rather
than a willful intent to cause emotional distress, and there was no sufficient evidence of
actual mental anguish. Since both malicious intent and harmful effect are essential for
conviction under this provision, Acharon was acquitted.
In Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 223705, August 14, 2019), the
Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of a law prohibiting partisan political
activities abroad during the overseas voting period. Applying the Purpose-Effect Test, the
Court ruled that while the law aimed to protect electoral integrity, its broad restrictions
on speech and assembly impermissibly infringed on fundamental rights. The provision
was declared unconstitutional for being overbroad and unjustifiably limiting free
expression.
1.2.7 Sub judice Rules In Re: Republic v. Sereno (A.M. No. 18-06-01-SC, July 17, 2018), the
Supreme Court found former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno guilty of violating the sub
judice rule due to her public statements and media appearances during the quo warranto
proceedings against her. The Court ruled that such actions could influence public opinion
and potentially affect judicial outcomes, undermining the judiciary’s integrity. However,
considering mitigating factors, the Court imposed only a stern reprimand instead of
harsher sanctions. In P/Supt. Marantan v. Diokno (G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014),
the Supreme Court reviewed whether public statements made by the respondents
criticizing the court's inaction in Marantan’s case violated the sub judice rule. The Court
ruled that their statements were mere reiterations of legal arguments and personal
opinions, lacking malice or a clear and present danger to justice administration.
Consequently, the petition for indirect contempt was dismissed.
1.2.8 Doctrine of Prior Restraint
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006), the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, which declared a
state of national emergency. The Court upheld the President's authority to declare a
national emergency but ruled that certain actions, such as warrantless arrests and media
takeovers, were unconstitutional as they constituted prior restraint on freedom of
expression without sufficient justification.
In Chavez v. Gonzales (G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008), the Supreme Court examined
government warnings against broadcasting the Hello Garci tapes, which allegedly exposed
electoral fraud. The Court ruled that these warnings were an unconstitutional form of
prior restraint, as they suppressed speech without a clear and present danger, violating
the freedoms of speech and the press.
1.2.8 Freedom from Subsequent Punishment:
In Baguio Midland Courier v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107566, November 25, 2004),
mayoral candidate Ramon Labo Jr. filed a libel suit against Baguio Midland Courier and its
editor over articles questioning his financial credibility. The Supreme Court ruled that the
articles constituted fair comment on a matter of public interest, affirming that discussions
about a candidate's qualifications are protected under freedom of expression. It
emphasized that while the Doctrine of Prior Restraint prohibits censorship before
publication, individuals may still face liability for defamatory content, though in this case,
the comments were privileged and not libelous.
In Alonzo v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 110088, February 1, 1995), Dr. Merle Alonzo
submitted an official report on clinic irregularities, leading to a libel suit by the clinic
owners. The Supreme Court held that the report was a qualified privileged communication
made in good faith during the performance of official duties and lacked malice. This case
reaffirmed that while the Doctrine of Prior Restraint prevents pre-publication censorship,
freedom from subsequent punishment applies when statements fall under privileged
circumstances.
In Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 79690, October 7, 1988), the Supreme Court ruled
on the balance between a public official’s right to due process and the state’s interest in
fighting corruption. It upheld the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, emphasizing that the
state’s compelling interest in maintaining integrity in public office outweighs procedural
objections, provided due process is observed.
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 124678, July 31, 1997), public school teachers
were dismissed for staging mass protests over low wages. The Supreme Court ruled that
while their right to assemble is protected, their failure to comply with legal requirements
for strikes rendered their actions illegal, justifying administrative sanctions. This case
highlights that freedom from subsequent punishment is not absolute when public
employees violate lawful regulations.
In GSIS v. KMG (G.R. No. 170132, December 6, 2006), GSIS employees staged a four-day
mass action against management policies, leading to administrative charges. The Supreme
Court ruled that while government employees have the right to self-organization, this
does not extend to strikes that disrupt public services. The mass action was deemed a
prohibited concerted activity, reaffirming that public sector employees cannot engage in
work stoppages under existing law
1.2.9 Dangerous Tendency Rule
In Cabansag v. Fernandez (G.R. No. L-8974, 1957), Apolonio Cabansag, frustrated by
delays in his ejectment case, sought PCAC intervention, criticizing procedural
inefficiencies. The trial court held him in contempt for undermining the judiciary, but the
Supreme Court reversed, ruling his letter was a valid exercise of the right to petition for
redress and posed no clear and present danger to judicial independence. His lawyers were
warned to exercise greater prudence.
In People v. Perez (83 Phil. 314, 1949), the Supreme Court rejected the dangerous
tendency rule in treason cases, ruling that Perez’s act of procuring women for Japanese
officers, while immoral, did not directly aid enemy military operations. The Court held
that treason requires clear and substantial assistance, not merely an indirect or
speculative benefit to the enemy. This limited the dangerous tendency rule, ensuring that
treason is only punishable when it poses an imminent and material threat to national
security.
2.2 Batas Pambansa 880 –
Public Assembly Act of 1985 Cases:
In Hector S. Ruiz vs. Richard Gordon (G.R. No. 65695, December 19, 1983), petitioner
sought a mandamus to compel the issuance of a permit for a prayer rally, unaware that
Mayor Gordon had already approved it with conditions. The Supreme Court dismissed the
petition as moot, emphasizing that applicants must verify their permit status before
resorting to legal action. Citing J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, the Court reiterated that permit
denials must be based on the "clear and present danger" test and recommended filing
such petitions in trial courts first for efficiency.
In BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KMP, GABRIELA, et al. v. Ermita (G.R. Nos. 169838, 169848,
169881, April 25, 2006), petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 880 and the
government's Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) policy, arguing they curtailed the
right to peaceful assembly. The Supreme Court upheld BP 880 as a content-neutral
regulation ensuring public order but struck down CPR as unconstitutional for violating the
"maximum tolerance" policy. The Court mandated the establishment of freedom parks and
ruled that all public parks and plazas would serve as such if local governments failed to
comply. The decision affirmed the right to assembly while balancing it with lawful
regulation.
In Primicias v. Fugoso (G.R. No. L-1800, November 15, 1947), Cipriano Primicias sought a
permit for a public assembly at Plaza Miranda, which Mayor Fugoso denied, citing
potential threats to public order. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Primicias, holding
that the Mayor’s discretion was limited to regulating time, place, and manner, not
prohibiting lawful assemblies. Fear of disturbances could not justify restricting the right to
peaceably assemble. The decision affirmed that public spaces are traditional forums for
free expression and that officials cannot arbitrarily suppress constitutional rights based
on subjective concerns.
In Reyes v. Bagatsing (G.R. No. L-65366, Nov. 9, 1983), Jose B.L. Reyes sought a permit for
a peaceful rally near the U.S. Embassy, which Mayor Bagatsing denied, citing intelligence
reports of possible infiltration by subversive elements. The Supreme Court ruled in favor
of Reyes, holding that the denial violated the right to free speech and peaceful assembly, as
no clear and present danger was established. While the government must protect
diplomatic missions under international law, speculative threats cannot justify restricting
constitutional rights. The Court reaffirmed that public spaces must remain open for lawful
assemblies, with regulations limited to ensuring public order.
In Subayco v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 117267-117310, August 22, 1996), police and
paramilitary forces fired at unarmed protesters during the 1985 Escalante Massacre,
killing 20 and injuring 24. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of three officers,
ruling that their concerted actions demonstrated implied conspiracy. It rejected claims of
self-defense, emphasizing that peaceful assemblies cannot be suppressed with deadly
force. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional right to assembly, the clear and present
danger test, and the duty of authorities to protect, not harm, demonstrators. Justice
remained incomplete as many accused remained at large.
Censorship and Prior Restraint: Censorship is the suppression of speech deemed
objectionable, while prior restraint prevents expression before it occurs, generally
prohibited unless justified by extreme circumstances.
Clear and Present Danger Test: A doctrine allowing speech restriction only if it poses an
immediate and substantial threat of significant harm. Compelling State Interest Test: A
strict scrutiny standard requiring the government to prove a law restricting fundamental
rights serves a compelling interest, is narrowly tailored, and is the least restrictive means.
Benevolent Neutrality Doctrine: A principle ensuring the government accommodates
religious freedom without favoring or inhibiting any particular religion. Purpose-Effect
Test: A legal standard assessing whether a law’s intent or effect suppresses a
constitutional right, rendering it invalid if it does.
Doctrine of Prior Restraint: A prohibition on restricting speech before it is expressed,
generally unconstitutional except in cases of national security or incitement to violence.
Freedom from Subsequent Punishment: Protection from being penalized for
constitutionally protected speech, though exceptions exist for libel, obscenity, and
defamation.
Dangerous Tendency Rule: A doctrine permitting speech restrictions if the expression has
a tendency to incite harm, even without an immediate threat.
Batas Pambansa 880 – Public Assembly Act of 1985: A law regulating public assemblies by
requiring permits while upholding the constitutional right to peaceful assembly.
Presidential Decree No. 1986 – Creating the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB): A law establishing the MTRCB to regulate and classify
media content in the Philippines based on moral, cultural, and national security concerns.
Philippines Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA 10175) – Cyber Libel Chapter II (4) Crimes:
A law criminalizing cyber libel and other internet-based offenses, imposing stricter
penalties for online defamation.
Public Figure Doctrine: A principle in defamation law stating that public figures, due to
their influence and role in society, must prove actual malice to succeed in a libel claim.
Onion Skin Doctrine: A rule in libel law that holds public officials and figures to a higher
standard of criticism, recognizing that they are subject to scrutiny and should be more
tolerant of public opinion.
Non-Establishment Clause: A constitutional principle prohibiting the government from
establishing, endorsing, or favoring any religion, ensuring the separation of church and
state.