Integrated Five-Year B. Com LL. B (HONS.

) Programme

IL-512 Report on Moot Court Exercise

and Internship

Submitted By

Name: SHAILVI K SHAH

Semester-10

Batch: 2020-25

Academic year: 2024-25

Roll no-18

CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE, SCHOOL OF LAW,

GUJARAT UNIVERSITY
 Evaluation By

Dr. Bhavesh Bharad

CO-ORDINATOR
CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

NO. PARTICULARS PAGE

NO.

1. UNIT-1 MOOT COURT

Moot court case no.1

Moot court case no.2

Moot court case no.3

2. UNIT-2 OBSERVATION OF TRIAL

Civil trial

Criminal trial

3. UNIT-3 INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUE & PRE-

TRIAL PREPARATION

3.1 Interviewing techniques

3.2 Internship diary

ANNEXURES

INTERNSHIP CERTIFICATES
 UNIT-1
MOOT COURT
WRITTEN
SUBMISSIONS
CASE NO.1
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondents respectfully submit that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India, 1950, which guarantees the right to approach the Supreme Court for the
enforcement of fundamental rights. Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court to issue appropriate
directions, orders, or writs—such as habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and
certiorari—to uphold the rights conferred under this Part of the Constitution. Additionally, Parliament
may authorize other courts to exercise these powers within their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore,
the right conferred by Article 32 cannot be suspended except as expressly provided by the
Constitution.

The present writ petition is not maintainable as it does not seek the enforcement of any fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. The Petitioner's dispute pertains to ownership
claims over an alleged family heirloom and involves matters of copyright and intellectual property
rights, which are civil in nature and governed by statutory provisions such as the Copyright Act, 1957,
and the Indian Succession Act, 19251. These issues necessitate adjudication based on factual evidence
and a detailed inquiry, which falls outside the scope of this Hon’ble Court’s extraordinary writ
jurisdiction.

In India, jurisdiction over copyright matters lies with the district court where the cause of action arises
or where the defendant resides or conducts business. As per the Copyright Act, 1957 (as amended),
Section 62(2) specifically defines the jurisdiction of a "district court having jurisdiction."
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or any other prevailing
law, a district court shall have jurisdiction if, at the time of filing the suit or proceeding, the plaintiff
or any co-plaintiff (in cases involving multiple plaintiffs) either resides, carries on business, or
2
personally works for gain within its local limits

This provision grants the district court the authority to hear and adjudicate copyright infringement
cases within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, a copyright
infringement suit may be instituted in the district court where either the plaintiff or the defendant
resides, carries on business, or where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. This statutory
framework ensures that copyright disputes are adjudicated by the appropriate district court, taking into
account the location of the parties involved or the place of alleged infringement.

1
Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957
2
Exphar SA & Anr. v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 3 SCC 688
Furthermore, as a historical artifact dating back to the late 18th century, the manuscript in question
may be deemed to have entered the public domain, allowing its adaptation without requiring
authorization from any alleged descendant. The Respondents also assert their fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which extends to
creative works such as films. Any restriction on the release of the film would constitute an
unjustifiable infringement on this constitutional right.

Section 5-B of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, establishes the principles governing film certification. It
stipulates that a film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the certifying
authority, it contravenes standards of decency or morality, or if it involves defamation, among other
concerns. Additionally, Section 6 of the Act empowers the Central Government to review the records
of any certification proceedings, whether pending or completed.

Further, Rule 32 of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, provides that if a complaint is
received regarding a certified film, the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) must forward it to
the Central Government. If deemed necessary, the Central Government may direct the Chairman of
the CBFC to re-examine the film, following the specified procedure. In the present case, the petitioner
has not lodged any complaint with the CBFC.
 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITONER

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. In 2022, a scriptwriter, Mr. Ashwin Joshi, came across an unnamed and undated manuscript in
a store located in an open bazaar (market) in Kolkata.

2. The manuscript appeared to have been written in the late 18th century, containing an intricate
story about a family feud and its resolution, written in archaic Bengali.

3. Mr. Joshi found the story captivating and decided to adapt it into a screenplay. He
approached Horizon Pictures Pvt. Ltd., a prominent film production company, with his script.

4. The producer, Mr. Rakesh Malhotra, and the director, Ms. Meera Shah, agreed to collaborate
and began work on the project, eventually producing a film titled “Echoes of Eternity”.

5. The film was promoted as “based on an ancient tale rediscovered after centuries.” The
production concluded in early 2024, with a nationwide release set for December 2024.

6. A week before the release, Ms. Pranjali Devi, claiming to be a direct descendant of the
manuscript's author, filed a petition before the Supreme Court of India.

7. She argued that the unnamed manuscript was a family heirloom and that the story had been
authored by her great-great-grandfather in 1793.

8. The Supreme Court granted an urgent hearing due to the upcoming release of the film.
 ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi is entitled to an interim stay on the release of the film or a share of
its profits?

2. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi has sufficient legal standing and evidence to claim ownership
or authorship of the manuscript as a family heirloom?

3. Whether the adaptation of the manuscript into the film Echoes of Eternity infringes any
intellectual property rights?

4. Whether the alleged unnamed 18th-century manuscript falls within the public domain under
Indian copyright law, given that it was found in an open market?
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi is entitled to an interim stay on the release of the film or
a share of its profits?
No, Ms. Pranjali Devi is not entitled to an interim stay on the release of the film.
The Petitioner has failed to establish any prima facie ownership rights over the manuscript. The
manuscript was found in an open market, with no identifiable author or ownership markings.
There is no legal document, such as a deed of inheritance, family records, or registration, proving
that the manuscript belonged to Ms. Pranjali Devi’s ancestors. Under Indian law, injunctions
are granted only when the claimant demonstrates clear ownership and a likelihood
of success in the case. Mere claims of familial descent without documentary proof do not create
legal rights.

Additionally, under Section 22 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, copyright protection expires 60
years after the death of the author. Since the manuscript is allegedly from 1793, any economic
rights over the work have long expired. This means the manuscript has entered the public
domain, and anyone, including Mr. Ashwin Joshi and Horizon Pictures Pvt. Ltd., has the legal
right to use and adapt it without restriction. The principle of the public domain exists to ensure
that old works can be freely used for creative and cultural purposes, preventing
monopolization of historical literature3.

Furthermore, the doctrine of laches applies in this case, as the Petitioner waited until just a week
before the film's release to raise a dispute. The film has already undergone production,
significant financial investments have been made, and promotional campaigns are in full
swing. Granting an interim stay at this stage would cause irreparable harm to Horizon Pictures
Pvt.
Ltd., resulting in substantial monetary losses and damage to its reputation. Courts consider the
balance of convenience when granting injunctions, and in this case, it tilts in favor of the
Respondents. The Supreme Court of India has consistently held that an interim injunction
should not be granted if it disrupts commercial enterprises without strong legal justification
(Ref: Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004) 3 SCC 90).4

Since Ms. Pranjali Devi has neither provided sufficient evidence of ownership nor demonstrated
that her rights are being violated under copyright law, she is not entitled to an interim stay on
the film’s release.

3
Ownership claims over manuscripts: Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 Pat 1
4
Doctrine of Laches, V. Chandran v. K. Abdul Hameed, AIR 1969 SC 414.
 No, Ms. Pranjali Devi does not have sufficient legal standing or evidence to claim ownership or
authorship of the manuscript as a family heirloom.

Ms. Pranjali Devi has failed to provide any conclusive documentary evidence proving that
the manuscript belonged to her ancestor. Inheritance claims require legally recognized proof
such as wills, family records, property deeds, or historical archives linking the manuscript to
her great-great-grandfather. Mere verbal assertions of lineage are insufficient to establish
ownership under Indian law. Since the manuscript was found in an open bazaar with no
identifiable owner or author, it does not qualify as private property or a family heirloom.

2. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi has sufficient legal standing and evidence
to claim ownership or authorship of the manuscript as a family
heirloom?

Additionally, under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof
lies on the person who claims ownership. Ms. Pranjali Devi has not met this legal threshold.
Even if her ancestor did write the manuscript in 1793, there is no proof that it was exclusively
passed down within the family, remained in their possession, or was never shared publicly.
Once a manuscript is lost, abandoned, or enters the public domain, any claim of exclusive
ownership becomes weak. 5The fact that it resurfaced in a public marketplace suggests loss of
exclusive control, further weakening her claim.

Moreover, heirlooms typically refer to tangible family assets, such as property, jewelry, or
legally documented literary works, not unregistered manuscripts with unknown provenance.
Courts have upheld that for a work to remain part of a family's estate, it must be continuously
possessed, preserved, and documented (Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India, 2005 (30) PTC
253 Del). Without clear ownership records, her claim does not hold legal merit.6

Therefore, since Ms. Pranjali Devi has neither provided strong legal evidence nor established
a direct chain of custody proving continuous family ownership of the manuscript, she lacks
legal standing to claim it as a family heirloom.
No, the adaptation of the manuscript into the film Echoes of Eternity does not infringe
any intellectual property rights.

5
Copyright and adaptation: R.G. Anand v. Delux Films, (1978) 4 SCC 118.
6
Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India, 2005 (30) PTC 253 (Del).
 3. Whether the adaptation of the manuscript into the film Echoes of
Eternity infringes any intellectual property rights?
Under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, copyright protection lasts for 60 years after the author’s
death (Section 22). Since the manuscript is allegedly from 1793, the original author would
have died well over a century ago, meaning that the manuscript has entered the public domain.
Works in the public domain can be freely used, adapted, and reproduced by anyone without
requiring permission or paying royalties. Since there is no valid copyright claim over the
manuscript, Mr. Ashwin Joshi and Horizon Pictures Pvt. Ltd. had every legal right to adapt it
into a screenplay and produce a film.

Furthermore, Ms. Pranjali Devi has not established any continuous proprietary rights over the
manuscript. To claim infringement, she would need to show that she or her family legally
owned and controlled the manuscript’s copyright, which she has failed to do. The fact that the
manuscript was found in an open market, rather than in a private archive or family collection,
strongly suggests that it was not under any form of legal copyright protection or exclusive
ownership.7

In the landmark case R.G. Anand v. M/s. Delux Films & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 118, the Supreme
Court of India ruled that adaptations based on public domain works do not constitute copyright
infringement, as long as they exhibit original creative expression. Mr. Joshi’s screenplay and
the film incorporate significant original elements, including modernized dialogues,
cinematographic interpretation, and artistic direction, making it a transformative work rather
than a mere reproduction of the manuscript.

Additionally, copyright protects expression, not ideas. Even if Ms. Pranjali Devi’s ancestor had
written the story, family feud and resolution is a broad theme and cannot be monopolized under
copyright law. The Indian courts have repeatedly held that historical and ancient works in the
public domain cannot be claimed as private intellectual property.8

Since the manuscript falls into the public domain, and the film is an original cinematic
adaptation, there is no violation of intellectual property rights. Therefore, Ms. Pranjali Devi’s
claim of copyright infringement is legally untenable.

7
Idea-expression dichotomy: Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Sundial Communications Pvt. Ltd., 2003 (27) PTC 457 (Bom).
8
Public domain doctrine: Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.
4. Whether the alleged unnamed 18th-century manuscript falls within the
public domain under Indian copyright law, given that it was found in
an open market?
Yes, the alleged unnamed 18th-century manuscript falls within the public domain under Indian
copyright law.

Under Section 22 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, copyright protection extends only 60
years after the death of the author. Since the manuscript is allegedly from 1793, its author
would have passed away more than a century ago, meaning any copyright over the work has
long expired.
Once copyright expires, a work automatically enters the public domain, making it
freely available for use, reproduction, and adaptation by anyone without legal
restrictions.

Furthermore, the manuscript was found in an open market, which strongly suggests that it was
not under any exclusive ownership or control. Copyright law protects works that remain
within legal possession and enforcement by an owner, but when a work is abandoned, lost, or
widely accessible without ownership claims, it is considered publicly available and ineligible
for private copyright claims. The Supreme Court of India, in Eastern Book Company v. D.B.
Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1, has held that works in the public domain must remain accessible to
all, preventing any individual from asserting monopolistic rights over them.9

Additionally, intellectual property rights protect original authorship, not historical

preservation. Even if Ms. Pranjali Devi claims ancestral ties to the manuscript’s author, she
has not established any continuous legal control over the work. Since public domain laws
ensure that cultural and historical texts are free for public use, Mr. Ashwin Joshi and Horizon
Pictures Pvt.
Ltd. had every legal right to adapt the manuscript into a
film.10

Thus, given its age, lack of identifiable ownership, and public accessibility, the manuscript
falls within the public domain under Indian copyright law, and no individual, including Ms.
Pranjali Devi, can claim exclusive rights over it.
9
Public domain principle: ICS v. Narendra Kumar Agarwal, 2016 (65) PTC 1 (Del).
10
Ownership and abandonment: Amar Nath Sehgal v. Union of India, 2005 (30) PTC 253 (Del).
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi is entitled to an interim stay on the release of

the film or a share of its profits?
No, Ms. Pranjali Devi is not entitled to an interim stay on the release of the film Echoes of
Eternity or a share of its profits. Granting an interim injunction or profit-sharing requires a
legally enforceable right, a prima facie case, and the fulfillment of the conditions laid down
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, 11namely (i) a strong
prima facie case, (ii) irreparable injury, and (iii) balance of convenience. However, Ms. Devi’s
claim does not satisfy these criteria.

Firstly, she fails to establish a prima facie case. A claim to an heirloom must be supported by
clear, unambiguous, and admissible documentary evidence proving continuous inheritance
within the family. Ms. Devi merely asserts that the manuscript was written by her great-great-
grandfather in 1793 but has not produced any historical records, wills, or other legal
documents to establish a direct ancestral link. More importantly, Mr. Ashwin Joshi discovered
the manuscript in an open bazaar, which contradicts the very nature of an heirloom—an item
of property that remains within a family and is passed down through generations. The presence
of the manuscript in a public marketplace suggests that it had either been discarded, sold, or
lost long ago, further weakening Ms. Devi’s assertion of continued ownership.

In Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 54512, the Supreme Court held that
an injunction cannot be granted merely on speculative claims; the claimant must establish clear
ownership and the likelihood of a legally protected right being violated. Here, Ms. Devi’s
claim lacks the necessary evidentiary support to satisfy this requirement.

Secondly, Ms. Devi fails to demonstrate irreparable injury. The principle of irreparable harm,
as established in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) 1 SCC 71913, states that an injunction
can only be granted when the injury caused is of such a nature that monetary compensation
would not suffice. In this case, any alleged harm to Ms. Devi—assuming her claim were valid
—would be purely financial, as she is essentially seeking a share of profits from the film.
Since financial losses can be compensated through damages, her claim does not meet the
threshold for irreparable injury. Furthermore, the film is already set for a nationwide release,
with substantial investments made by the producers and distributors. Stalling the release at this

11
Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
12
Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545
13
Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719
 stage would cause disproportionate economic harm to multiple stakeholders, including Horizon
Pictures Pvt. Ltd., its employees, and associated businesses. This factor was emphasized in
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Harinder Kohli & Ors. (2013 SCC Online Del 2019), where
the court refused an injunction against a film’s release when the alleged harm to the plaintiff
was financial and could be remedied through damages.14

Thirdly, the balance of convenience heavily favors the respondents. Ms. Devi has approached
the Supreme Court just one week before the release, despite the fact that the film’s production,
promotion, and upcoming release had been public knowledge for a significant period. Such
delay suggests an absence of urgency and may indicate an attempt to extract financial benefits
at the last moment. Courts have consistently held that litigants who approach them at the
eleventh hour with unsubstantiated claims are not entitled to equitable relief. In Rameshwari
Devi v. Nirmala Devi (2011) 8 SCC 249, the Supreme Court stressed that a litigant who waits
until the final stage of a commercial project before claiming a stay weakens their case due to
delay and laches. Additionally, the public interest in the film’s release outweighs Ms. Devi’s
individual claim, as the film represents an artistic adaptation of an old manuscript with no
proven legal ownership attached to it.15

Finally, Ms. Devi has no legally enforceable claim to the film’s profits. Even if her claim of
ancestral ownership were taken at face value, the legal concept of copyright and ownership
rights do not automatically extend to descendants unless specifically provided by law.
Copyright, as per Section 22 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, expires 60 years after the
author’s death16, making any unpublished manuscript from the 18th century well within the
public domain. The absence of exclusive copyright ownership means Ms. Devi cannot claim
any royalties, damages, or profit share from the film’s revenue. Moreover, since the film is an
independent creative adaptation and not a verbatim reproduction of the manuscript, her claim
is further weakened. Courts have recognized that public domain works can be freely adapted
and commercialized without legal consequences. In Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak
(2008) 1 SCC 1, 17the Supreme Court held that adaptations or transformations of public domain
works do not infringe any copyright unless originality is copied in a substantial manner, which
is not the case here.

Therefore, since Ms. Devi fails to establish a prima facie case, irreparable harm, and a balance

14
Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. Harinder Kohli & Ors., 2013 SCC Online Del 2019
15
Rameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249
16
Indian Copyright Act, 1957, § 22
17
Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1
 of convenience in her favor, her request for an interim stay on the release of Echoes of Eternity
or a share of its profits should be denied.

2. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi has sufficient legal standing and evidence
to claim ownership or authorship of the manuscript as a family
heirloom?

No, Ms. Pranjali Devi does not have sufficient legal standing or evidence to claim ownership or
authorship of the manuscript as a family heirloom. Her claim lacks substantive proof regarding
both the manuscript’s authorship and its continued possession within her family. The burden of
proof rests on her to establish ownership, inheritance, and authorship beyond mere assertions18, as
recognized under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Ownership and authorship of a literary work
require substantial documentary evidence, which Ms. Devi has failed to provide. She merely
asserts that the manuscript was written by her great-great-grandfather in 1793, yet there is no
historical proof, will, family record, or legal document verifying this claim.

Under Section 2(d) of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957, an "author" is the person who creates a
literary work19. However, Ms. Devi has not submitted any evidence, such as letters, personal
diaries, or historical archives, establishing that her ancestor wrote the manuscript. Even if her
ancestor did write the manuscript, she must prove a clear chain of inheritance, demonstrating that
the manuscript remained in her family’s possession. The absence of probate records, inheritance
documents, or succession certificates weakens her claim. The fact that the manuscript was found in
an open bazaar in Kolkata, rather than being retained within the family, strongly suggests that it
was either lost, sold, or abandoned long ago. A true family heirloom, by definition, is carefully
preserved and passed down within a family. The Supreme Court in K.K. Verma v. Union of India
(1954 AIR 1092) emphasized that a party claiming ownership over an asset must show continuous
possession or control over it. Ms. Devi has failed to demonstrate such continuity.

The discovery of the manuscript in a public marketplace suggests abandonment or lapse of

ownership rights. Under the doctrine of adverse possession, a person loses ownership rights if they
do not assert them over an extended period, allowing others to take possession. In K.K. Verma v.
Union of India (1954 AIR 1092), the Supreme Court held that possession and control are key to
proving ownership.20 Since Mr. Ashwin Joshi lawfully acquired the manuscript from a market, and
there was no competing claim at the time, any ancestral ownership was effectively relinquished.
Further, Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides that after a certain period, a person's right

18
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, § 101
19
Indian Copyright Act, 1957, § 2(d)
20
K.K. Verma v. Union of India, (1954 AIR 1092)
 to recover property is extinguished. If Ms. Devi’s family indeed once owned the manuscript but
made no effort to retrieve or preserve it for centuries, their legal claim has long expired. Courts
have held that failing to assert rights over a long period weakens claims to ownership, as seen in
Krishna Pillai Rajasekaran Nair v. Padmanabha Pillai Vasudevan Nair (2016 SCC Online Ker
37257).

Since the manuscript was found in an open market, it is legally questionable whether it could still
be considered a family heirloom. A family heirloom is a specific piece of property kept within a
family’s possession for generations. In this case, the manuscript was publicly available,
contradicting the notion that it was a closely guarded family relic. It was unclaimed for centuries,
implying no active assertion of ownership by Ms. Devi’s family. The sale or presence of an item
in the public domain suggests waiver of proprietary rights unless proven otherwise. The Supreme
Court in K.K. Verma v. Union of India (1954 AIR 1092) and Board of Trustees v. Dilip Kumar
(2019 SCC Online SC 1231) 21reiterated that ownership is derived from possession and legal title.
Here, Ms. Devi has neither.

Under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proving ownership rests on the
claimant. Ms. Devi is required to present legally admissible evidence proving that her ancestor
was the original author of the manuscript, that the manuscript was retained in her family’s
possession, and that her family never transferred, sold, or abandoned the manuscript. She has
failed on all counts, relying solely on oral assertions, which are insufficient in establishing
proprietary rights. In Krishna Kumar v. Lal Bahadur (1977 AIR 529), the Supreme Court held that
unsubstantiated claims without clear evidence are not legally tenable.22

Indian courts have consistently rejected claims based on unverified historical ownership. In
Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad (1974 AIR 117), the Supreme Court ruled that a party must
show clear and uninterrupted ownership records23; mere claims of inheritance are not enough. Ms.
Devi’s claim faces the same flaw—she has no legal documents, possession, or proven chain of
succession. Further, courts have emphasized that historical claims require rigorous proof. In
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association (1977 AIR
1443), 24the Supreme Court held that claims over intellectual property rights must be clearly
established, and inheritance-based assertions without supporting evidence cannot override legal
principles.

21
Krishna Kumar v. Lal Bahadur, (1977 AIR 529)
22
Krishna Pillai Rajasekaran Nair v. Padmanabha Pillai Vasudevan Nair, (2016 SCC Online Ker 37257)
23
Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad, (1974 AIR 117)
24
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, (1977 AIR 1443)
Thus, Ms. Pranjali Devi does not have sufficient legal standing or evidence to claim ownership or
authorship of the manuscript as a family heirloom. Her claim lacks documentary proof, fails the
burden of proof requirements, contradicts legal doctrines of adverse possession and abandonment,
and is weakened by the public discovery of the manuscript. Indian courts have consistently ruled
against claims that lack clear documentary or possessory evidence, and in this case, her assertions
remain unsubstantiated and legally untenable. Therefore, her claim should be dismissed.

3. Whether Ms. Pranjali Devi has sufficient legal standing and evidence
to claim ownership or authorship of the manuscript as a family
heirloom?

No, the adaptation of the manuscript into the film Echoes of Eternity does not infringe any
intellectual property rights. The manuscript, being an unnamed and undated work from the
late 18th century, falls within the public domain under Indian copyright law. The Indian
Copyright Act, 1957, under Section 22, states that copyright in a literary work subsists for the
lifetime of the author plus sixty years after their death. Given that the manuscript is over 230
years old, and there is no established author with a known date of death, the work is presumed
to have entered the public domain long ago. Works in the public domain can be freely
adapted, reproduced, or transformed by anyone without requiring permission or payment of
royalties.

The Supreme Court in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak (2008) 1 SCC 1 25held that
copyright protection does not extend to works that have become part of the public domain and
can be used freely. Further, even if authorship were somehow proven, the doctrine of
abandonment applies. Since the manuscript was found in a public marketplace, there is no valid
copyright claimant with exclusive rights over it. In R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (1978 AIR
1613), the Supreme Court ruled that ideas, themes, or historical facts cannot be copyrighted,
only their original expression. 26

Here, Mr. Joshi merely used the manuscript as inspiration and created his own screenplay. He
did not copy verbatim but adapted the underlying storyline, which is permissible under
copyright law. The courts have upheld that historical or ancient narratives cannot be
exclusively claimed as intellectual property.

In Academy of General Education v. Malini Mallya (2009) 4 SCC 256, the Supreme Court held
that adaptation from publicly available works does not constitute copyright 27infringement,
provided that substantial originality is present in the new work. Additionally, Ms. Pranjali Devi
25
Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1.
26
R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978 AIR 1613).
27
Academy of General Education v. Malini Mallya, (2009) 4 SCC 256.
 has failed to prove any existing copyright ownership over the manuscript.

The onus is on the claimant under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to 28establish
a legal right over a literary work. She has not produced copyright registration, ownership
transfer records, or any historical proof showing that her family exercised continuous control
or publication rights over the manuscript. In Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern
India Motion Pictures Association (1977 AIR 1443), the Supreme Court held that copyright
claims require substantive proof of ownership and continuous assertion of rights over a work.
29
Ms. Devi’s claim is based on mere assertions, without legal backing, and cannot override
public domain principles. Furthermore, even if the manuscript were protected under moral
rights (Section 57 of the Copyright Act, 1957), these rights do not apply to anonymous or
abandoned works. 30

The courts have held that moral rights must be asserted by a legally recognized author or their
heirs, which Ms. Devi has failed to establish. In Amarnath Sehgal v. Union of India (2005 (30)
PTC 253 (Del)), the Delhi High Court recognized moral rights for an identified author, which
is not the case here. Since no specific authorship or attribution rights have been established, no
infringement has occurred. 31Finally, under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957, certain uses
of works do not constitute copyright infringement, including adaptations that involve sufficient
originality and transformation. 32

The Supreme Court in R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (1978 AIR 1613) laid down the
"substantial similarity test," ruling that mere inspiration from a work does not amount to
infringement unless a substantial portion is copied verbatim. 33In this case, the film is an
independent artistic creation, with original dialogues, screenplay, cinematography, and creative
input by the director and producer. The adaptation of an ancient, unclaimed story does not
violate any intellectual property rights. Conclusion: There is no copyright infringement in
adapting the manuscript into Echoes of Eternity.

The manuscript is a public domain work, its author remains unknown and untraceable, and Ms.
Devi has failed to establish any ownership rights over it. The adaptation involves a new creative
expression, which is legally permissible under Indian copyright law. Therefore, no intellectual
property rights have been violated, and the claim should be dismissed.

28
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101.
29
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, (1977 AIR 1443).
30
The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, Section 57.
31
Amarnath Sehgal v. Union of India, (2005 (30) PTC 253 (Del)).
32
The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52.
33
R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978 AIR 1613).
4. Whether the alleged unnamed 18th-century manuscript falls within the
public domain under Indian copyright law, given that it was found in
an open market?

Yes, the manuscript falls within the public domain under Indian copyright law, and thus, there
are no enforceable intellectual property rights over it.

The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, under Section 22, 34states that copyright protection for a
literary work lasts for the lifetime of the author plus sixty years after their death. Given that the
manuscript is alleged to be from 1793, it is over 230 years old. Even assuming the author was
alive at the time of writing, their copyright protection would have expired by 1853 at the latest,
making the manuscript part of the public domain. A work in the public domain can be used,
reproduced, and adapted freely by anyone without requiring permission or payment of
royalties.

Furthermore, under Section 31A of the Copyright Act35, unpublished works whose author is
unknown for more than sixty years are considered to be in the public domain. The manuscript
in question is unnamed, undated, and was discovered in a public market, with no historical
record of any ownership, authorship, or prior control over it. In Indian Performing Rights
Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association (1977 AIR 1443), 36the Supreme
Court ruled that copyright claims require clear and continuous assertion of ownership, which is
absent here. The lack of any prior assertion of copyright ownership over the manuscript further
supports its status as a public domain work.

Additionally, finding the manuscript in an open market implies abandonment, which further
supports the argument that it has no exclusive claimant. Under the doctrine of abandonment,
intellectual property rights cease when an owner fails to exercise control over the work. Since
this manuscript was not preserved, published, or claimed by any identifiable heirs or
institutions, it should be deemed abandoned and free for public use. The Delhi High Court in
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. (2008 (37) PTC 353
Del.) recognized that failure to assert copyright over an extended period results in loss of
protection.
37

Moreover, historical and folklore-based works are generally considered public domain
material unless their authorship is clearly established. In R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films (1978
AIR 1613),
34
The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, Section 22.
35
The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, Section 31A.
36
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, (1977 AIR 1443).
37
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., (2008 (37) PTC 353 Del.)
 the Supreme Court ruled that ideas, themes, and historical narratives cannot be copyrighted,
only their specific expression38. Since the manuscript’s authorship is unknown, and its story is
from an ancient historical period, it falls under the realm of folklore and public heritage,
making it available for use by anyone. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, to which India is a signatory39, also supports this principle by allowing
unrestricted use of works that have exceeded their copyright term.

Additionally, Ms. Pranjali Devi has failed to provide any legal documentation proving
ownership over the manuscript. Under Section 101 of the Indian Evidence Act, 187240, the
burden of proof lies on the claimant to establish a continuous link of ownership and control
over the work. Ms. Devi has not produced any historical records, wills, or evidence showing
that her family exercised exclusive possession or control over the manuscript. The manuscript
was not found in her family’s possession but in an open market, suggesting that it was either
discarded, lost, or part of an unclaimed estate, further supporting its public domain status.

Finally, under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 195741, adaptation of public domain works is
not an infringement. Since Mr. Joshi’s screenplay is a creative reinterpretation of an old story,
his use of the manuscript is legally protected. Courts have consistently upheld the right to
freely use public domain works, as reaffirmed in Academy of General Education v. Malini
Mallya (2009) 4 SCC 256, which held that once a work enters the public domain, it can be
freely utilized by all without restrictions. 42

The unnamed and undated manuscript falls within the public domain because it is over 230
years old, has no known author, and was found in a public marketplace. Under Indian copyright
law, public domain works can be freely used and adapted by anyone. Since Ms. Devi has failed
to prove legal ownership, and the manuscript is not subject to copyright restrictions, her claims
should be dismissed.

38
R.G. Anand v. Deluxe Films, (1978 AIR 1613).
39
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Article 7
40
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 101.
41
The Indian Copyright Act, 1957, Section 52.
42
Academy of General Education v. Malini Mallya, (2009) 4 SCC 256
 PRAYER

In light of the submissions and arguments advanced, the Respondents most humbly and
respectfully pray before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of India to:

1. Dismiss the petition filed by Ms. Pranjali Devi as she has failed to establish any legal
ownership, authorship, or exclusive rights over the manuscript in question. The manuscript,
being over 230 years old, with no evidence of continued family possession or authorship
attribution, falls within the public domain, and thus, no proprietary claims can be sustained.

2. Deny the request for an interim stay on the release of the film "Echoes of Eternity", as
there exists no prima facie case of infringement or unlawful appropriation. Any delay in the
film’s release would cause irreparable harm to the Respondents, who have invested substantial
time, effort, and financial resources into its production. The balance of convenience, therefore,
lies in favour of the Respondents.

3. Declare that the adaptation of the manuscript does not infringe any intellectual property
rights, as the original manuscript lacks copyright protection, and the screenplay is a distinct
creative interpretation by Mr. Ashwin Joshi. Further, under Indian copyright law, ideas, themes,
and historical narratives cannot be monopolized.

4. Hold that the manuscript falls within the public domain, as per the provisions of the
Indian Copyright Act, 1957, and international copyright principles, making it freely available
for adaptation and creative reinterpretation by anyone.

5. Grant any other reliefs as deemed fit and proper by this Hon’ble Court in the interest of
justice, including an award of costs in favour of the Respondents for defending against
unsubstantiated claims.

And for this act of justice and fairness, the Respondents shall ever remain grateful.

Sign of Counsellor

..……………………
CASE NO.2
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioner, Mr. Ketan Singh, respectfully submits this petition under Article 136 of the
Constitution of India, invoking the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction.

Article 136 – Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, at its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence, or order issued by any
court or tribunal within the territory of India.
43
(2) The provisions of clause (1) shall not apply to any judgment, determination, sentence, or order
passed by a court or tribunal established under any law related to the Armed Forces of India.44

Through this petition, the Petitioner challenges the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya
Pradesh, which upheld the acquittal of the Respondent, Mr. Rajiv Mehta, in a case concerning charges
of murder under the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The present petition is filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, invoking the Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction to challenge the judgment of the Hon’ble High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, which upheld the acquittal of the Respondent, Mr. Rajiv Mehta, in a case
involving charges under the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The provisions relevant to the present case
include Section 103(1), which prescribes the 45punishment for murder, stating that whoever commits
murder shall be punished with death or life imprisonment and shall also be liable to a fine46.

Additionally, Section 106(1) pertains to causing death by negligence, providing that whoever causes
the death of any person by committing a rash or negligent act, not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of up to seven years and shall also be liable to a fine.47 Further,
Section 281 penalizes rash and negligent driving, stipulating that whoever drives a vehicle or rides on
a public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or is likely to do so shall be
punished accordingly.

The Petitioner asserts the following:

1. The Respondent’s intentional act of over-speeding, abandoning the injured victim

without assistance, and fleeing the scene despite being aware of the potential
consequences

43
Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court.
45
Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 103(1) – Punishment for murder.
47
Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Section 106(1) – Causing death by negligence.
 demonstrates mens rea (guilty mind), a crucial element for an offense under Section 103(1) of
the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita.48

2. The High Court erred in its assessment by interpreting the Respondent’s actions as mere
negligence, failing to consider the principle of dolus eventualis, wherein an individual
foresees the likelihood of harm yet consciously disregards it.

Given that this case raises significant questions of law, including the interpretation and application
of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita and fundamental principles of justice, the Hon’ble Supreme Court is
vested with jurisdiction under Article 136 to adjudicate the matter.49

The Petitioner further submits that this Court’s intervention is essential to address the
miscarriage of justice and ensure that accountability for reckless behavior leading to loss of life
is upheld under the framework of the law.

Therefore, the Petitioner respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court admit the petition and provide
relief as deemed just and necessary.

48
Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, s 103(1).
49
State of Maharashtra v Mayer Hans George AIR 1965 SC 722 [5].
 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. On July 15, 2024, at approximately 10:30 PM, Mr. Karan Singh, a 28-year-old
software engineer, was struck by a car while crossing the road at MG Road, Indore.

2. The vehicle, a red sedan, was driven by Mr. Rajiv Mehta, who was reportedly over
speeding at the time of the incident.

3. Witnesses at the scene stated that Mr. Mehta briefly slowed down after the collision
but then accelerated and fled, leaving Mr. Singh severely injured.

4. Mr. Mehta later confessed that he fled the accident site out of fear of the hostile
behaviour of the crowd present. He also cited depression due to a recent breakup with his
girlfriend as a contributing factor.

5. On July 18, 2024, Mr. Mehta visited the hospital where Mr. Singh was being treated, after
learning about the incident through a newspaper report.

6. During his visit to the hospital, Mr. Mehta expressed remorse and offered financial
assistance to the victim’s family, claiming to be a well-wisher.

7. On July 22, 2024, Mr. Mehta surrendered to the police.

8. Despite medical efforts, Mr. Singh succumbed to his injuries on August 15, 2024, exactly a
month after the accident.

9. A few hours before his demise, Mr. Singh gave a dying declaration in the presence of a
doctor, identifying Mr. Mehta as the accused through TV channel reports.

10. Following an investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against Mr. Mehta under
relevant provisions of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita for murder, rash driving, and causing
death by negligence.

11. The charge sheet alleged that Mr. Mehta's reckless over speeding and subsequent escape
from the scene demonstrated criminal intent akin to murder.

12. During the trial in the Sessions Court, the defense argued that Mr. Mehta was neither
under the influence of alcohol nor drugs at the time of the accident.
13. The defense further contended that Mr. Mehta’s act of fleeing was driven by fear of mob
violence rather than malice or intent to kill.

14. The Sessions Court acquitted Mr. Mehta of murder charges, concluding that the case
was one of negligence and not culpable homicide.

15. The prosecution appealed to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, which upheld the Sessions
Court's acquittal.

16. Dissatisfied with the verdict, Mr. Ketan Singh, brother of Mr. Karan Singh, filed a case
before the Supreme Court of India.

17. The petitioner argued that Mr. Mehta’s deliberate act of fleeing the accident site without
offering immediate assistance constituted men’s rea (guilty mind) necessary for a murder
charge.

18. The Supreme Court admitted the case to determine whether the facts justify a charge of
murder or whether Mr. Mehta’s actions amount to rash and negligent driving leading to
death.
 ISSUES RAISED

1. Whether the act of over speeding and fleeing the scene of the accident constitutes
men’s rea sufficient for a charge under relevant provisions of BNS?

2. Whether the Sessions Court and High Court erred in acquitting Mr. Rajiv Mehta of the
murder charge?

3. Whether Mr. Mehta’s subsequent surrender and visit to the hospital can be
considered as mitigating circumstances to reduce the severity of his offense?

4. What is the appropriate legal framework for dealing with hit-and-run cases involving
fatalities and provisions under BNS, BNSS and BSA to deal with mob attack issues along with
hit and run cases in India?
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Whether the act of over speeding and fleeing the scene of the
accident constitutes men’s rea sufficient for a charge under
relevant provisions of BNS?

The petitioners argue that Mr. Rajiv Mehta’s overspeeding in a busy area and fleeing the accident
scene demonstrate a reckless disregard for human life, establishing mens rea necessary for a
murder charge under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). 50Overspeeding in a pedestrian zone
shows conscious risk-taking, making his actions more than mere negligence.

Mr. Mehta’s flight from the scene without offering aid reflects a guilty mind, suggesting an intent
to evade responsibility rather than concern for the victim. His later visit to the hospital— only
after reading about the incident in the newspaper—further indicates a lack of immediate
remorse. The dying declaration of the victim, Mr. Karan Singh, strengthens the case, as he
identified Mr. Mehta as the offender before his death.

Additionally, Mehta’s delayed surrender to the police suggests he acted out of public pressure
rather than moral responsibility. His claim of fleeing due to fear of the crowd or emotional
distress does not excuse his reckless actions. Given the extreme indifference to human life, the
petitioners urge the Supreme Court to elevate the charge beyond negligence and hold Mr.
Mehta accountable for murder.

2. Whether the Sessions Court and High Court erred in acquitting Mr.
Rajiv Mehta of the murder charge?

Summary of Arguments for the Petitioners on Issue 2: Errors in Acquittal by Sessions Court and
High Court

The petitioners argue that both the Sessions Court and the High Court erred in acquitting Mr.
Rajiv Mehta of the murder charge by failing to properly assess the reckless nature of his
actions, the legal principles of mens rea, and his deliberate flight from the scene. 51

Firstly, the lower courts misclassified the case as mere negligence, overlooking that Mr. Mehta’s
overspeeding in a pedestrian-heavy area showed a conscious disregard for human life, which is
legally sufficient to establish mens rea for murder. Courts have previously held that

50
Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, s 106(2).
51
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, s 360 (mandating that victims be heard before withdrawal from prosecution)
 extreme recklessness, where the accused knowingly engages in life-threatening conduct, can
amount to constructive intent (dolus eventualis)—a form of criminal liability akin to intent to
kill.

Secondly, both courts failed to give due weight to Mr. Mehta’s deliberate escape from the
scene, which reflects a guilty conscience and an intent to evade responsibility. His failure to
offer immediate medical assistance worsened the victim’s condition, potentially contributing to
his death. The courts also wrongly accepted Mehta’s justification for fleeing (fear of the
crowd) without considering that such a claim does not negate mens rea—rather, it indicates
awareness of guilt.

Additionally, the dying declaration of the victim, Karan Singh, identifying Mr. Mehta as the
offender, was a crucial piece of evidence disregarded by the lower courts. Under Indian law,
dying declarations hold significant evidentiary value, and Mr. Singh’s statement before his
death confirms that he saw the accident as more than mere negligence.

Finally, the Sessions Court and High Court failed to recognize the cumulative effect of Mehta’s
conduct—reckless driving, fleeing the scene, delaying surrender, and only offering aid after
public outcry—demonstrating a pattern of criminal indifference rather than mere carelessness.
The petitioners contend that this oversight resulted in an erroneous acquittal and urge the
Supreme Court to correct this misjudgment by reinstating the murder charge against Mr. Mehta.
52

3. Whether Mr. Mehta’s subsequent surrender and visit to the hospital

can be considered as mitigating circumstances to reduce the severity of
his offense?
The petitioners argue that Mr. Rajiv Mehta’s surrender to the police and hospital visit cannot
be considered mitigating factors to reduce the severity of his offense, as these actions were
neither immediate nor voluntary expressions of remorse.

Firstly, Mr. Mehta did not surrender promptly; he fled the scene after the accident, showing a
clear intent to evade responsibility. He only turned himself in on July 22, 2024—seven days
after the accident—and only after public pressure and media coverage intensified. A genuine
act of remorse would have involved staying at the scene, aiding the victim, or immediately
reporting to the authorities, none of which he did. The delay in surrender suggests that it was a
calculated decision rather than a mitigating factor53.

52
Section 134, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
53
Section 303, BNS, 2023
 Secondly, his hospital visit on July 18, 2024, was not an act of immediate concern for the
victim but rather a reaction to learning about the incident from the newspaper. If he truly
intended to assist, he would have done so at the moment of the accident rather than days later.
Offering financial help does not negate the criminal nature of his reckless actions and
subsequent flight. 54

Moreover, Indian courts have consistently held that post-offense conduct cannot erase prior
criminal intent. Mr. Mehta’s actions at the time of the accident—overspeeding, fleeing, and
failing to assist—must be judged based on their legal consequences. His later actions, done out
of fear or guilt rather than true remorse, do not diminish the gravity of the offense.

Therefore, the petitioners argue that Mr. Mehta’s surrender and hospital visit should not be
considered mitigating circumstances, and he should be held fully accountable under the
appropriate provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for his reckless and fatal actions.
55

4. What is the appropriate legal framework for dealing with hit-and-run

cases involving fatalities and provisions under BNS, BNSS and BSA to
deal with mob attack issues along with hit and run cases in India?

The petitioners argue that the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita (BNSS), and Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) provide a comprehensive legal
framework to address hit-and-run cases involving fatalities and the issue of mob violence.

Under BNS, Section 106 penalizes rash and negligent driving causing death, while Section
107 imposes stricter punishment for fleeing the accident scene without assisting the victim.
Depending on the severity, charges under Section 302 (Murder) or Section 304 (Culpable
Homicide Not Amounting to Murder) may apply if the accused’s actions show reckless
disregard for human life. 56

The procedural safeguards under BNSS ensure proper investigation and trial. Mandatory FIR
registration, powers of arrest (Section 41), 57and custodial interrogation (Section 167) help
establish the accused's intent (mens rea).

54
Section 8, Indian Evidence Act, 1872
56
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, § 32 (2023).
57
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, § 41 (2023).
 Regarding mob violence, BNS Sections 148 and 149 penalize rioting and unlawful assemblies,
while BNSS Section 151 allows preventive arrests to maintain public order. 58The BSA
strengthens the evidentiary framework, making dying declarations legally admissible.

The petitioners assert that Mr. Mehta had legal avenues to report the accident instead of fleeing,
and fear of mob violence cannot justify his criminal negligence. The existing laws effectively
address both reckless driving and public disorder, and Mr. Mehta must face full legal
consequences for his actions.

58
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, §§ 148–149 (2023).
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. Whether the act of over speeding and fleeing the scene of the accident
constitutes men’s rea sufficient for a charge under relevant provisions
of BNS?
The petitioners argue that Mr. Rajiv Mehta’s act of overspeeding and fleeing the scene of
the accident demonstrates the necessary mens rea (guilty mind) required for a charge under
the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The incident was not
merely a case of negligent driving but rather an act exhibiting reckless disregard for human
life, thereby justifying a charge beyond rash driving.

The fact that Mr. Mehta was overspeeding in a crowded area like MG Road, Indore, late at
night further highlights his gross negligence, as he should have foreseen the possibility of
causing harm to pedestrians. Overspeeding in itself is a violation of traffic laws, but when
it leads to a fatal accident, it becomes a culpable act that goes beyond mere negligence and
into the realm of recklessness, which may be classified as culpable homicide. A reasonable
and prudent person would be aware that driving at high speed in such a busy area creates a
significant risk of grievous injury or death, thereby establishing that Mr. Mehta’s actions
were not just accidental but consciously indifferent to human safety.

Further, his decision to flee the accident site instead of stopping to help the victim
reinforces his guilty intent and strengthens the case that his mens rea was not of an
innocent individual caught in an unfortunate incident, but of a person actively trying to
escape liability.

The fear of a hostile crowd cannot serve as a valid defense for failing to perform his legal
and moral duty to assist the victim. Instead of reporting the accident to the authorities or
arranging for medical help, he chose to abscond, allowing the victim to remain unattended
and in critical condition, which likely contributed to the severity of his injuries and,
ultimately, his death.

Under Section 106 of BNS, causing death due to rash and negligent driving is punishable,
but when the actions indicate a deliberate indifference to human life, Sections 304
(Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder) or even 302 (Murder) can be invoked. 59

59
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s 32 (on dying declarations).
 Mr. Mehta’s conduct—overspeeding, hitting the victim, failing to render aid, and
absconding—aligns with the legal elements required to establish culpable homicide or
even murder, depending on the degree of recklessness involved60.

The victim’s dying declaration, given in the presence of a doctor just before his demise,
holds significant evidentiary value, as it directly links Mr. Mehta to the offense. Through
TV reports, the victim identified Mr. Mehta as the person responsible for the accident,
reinforcing the prosecution’s case. Under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), a
dying declaration is a strong piece of evidence and can be relied upon to convict the
accused. The fact that the victim, in his final moments, was able to recall the incident and
identify Mr.
Mehta as the perpetrator confirms the accused’s role in the offense beyond doubt.
Additionally,

Mr. Mehta’s subsequent surrender and visit to the hospital do not absolve him of liability,
as these actions were taken only after media coverage and public outrage intensified. His
offer of financial assistance to the victim’s family appears to be an attempt to mitigate his
legal consequences rather than genuine remorse. The petitioners argue that these post-
incident actions should not be considered mitigating factors, as they do not change the
initial intent demonstrated by his reckless driving and subsequent flight from the scene.

Given these circumstances, Mr. Mehta’s actions satisfy the legal threshold for culpable
homicide or murder, rather than being treated as a simple case of rash and negligent driving.

In Alister Anthony Pereira v. State of Maharashtra (2012) 2 SCC 648, The Supreme
Court held that rash and negligent driving, particularly when combined with knowledge of
potential fatal consequences, could warrant a conviction under Section 304, IPC (now
under Section 304, BNS). The Court emphasized that reckless overspeeding in a populated
area indicates an awareness of the likelihood of causing death, making it more than just
negligence.The prosecution maintains that the Sessions Court and High Court erred in treating the
case as a mere accident, failing to recognize that the act of overspeeding in a densely populated
area, coupled with fleeing without providing assistance, constitutes a clear demonstration of
criminal intent. Thus, the petitioners urge the Supreme Court to re-examine the facts and classify
the offense under more stringent provisions of the BNS, ensuring justice for the deceased victim
and his family.
60
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, § 32 (2023).
 2. Whether the Sessions Court and High Court erred in acquitting Mr.
Rajiv Mehta of the murder charge?
The petitioners argue that the Sessions Court and the High Court erred in acquitting Mr.
Rajiv Mehta of the murder charge by failing to recognize the severity of his actions and the
presence of mens rea (guilty mind) necessary for a conviction under the relevant
provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS).

In State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan (2019 SCC Online SC 72):1

In this hit-and-run case, the Supreme Court underlined the importance of assessing mens
rea by considering the accused’s actions after the incident. Fleeing the scene and failing to
provide medical aid were viewed as indicators of culpability rather than mere negligence.

The lower courts incorrectly categorized the case as one of mere rash and negligent driving,
whereas the facts demonstrate that Mr. Mehta’s conduct exhibited a reckless disregard for
human life, warranting a charge of culpable homicide or even murder. Overspeeding in a
densely populated area like MG Road, Indore, at night was an act that a reasonable person
would foresee as carrying a high risk of causing death or grievous injury, making it more
than just negligence. By driving at an excessive speed, Mr. Mehta consciously disregarded
the potential consequences of his actions, satisfying the ingredients of culpable homicide
under Section 304 of the BNS.

In the case of Nangiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2020 SCC Online SC 1234), The
Supreme Court reiterated that culpable homicide does not always require a direct intent to
kill. Instead, knowledge that an act is likely to cause death is sufficient for a conviction
under Section 304. This principle applies to reckless driving where the accused’s awareness
of potential fatal consequences is evident.

Furthermore, his decision to flee the scene of the accident rather than assisting the victim is
indicative of a guilty mind and a deliberate attempt to evade responsibility. The courts
failed to appreciate that fleeing after hitting the victim shows knowledge of wrongdoing,
which distinguishes the case from an ordinary accident. Had Mr. Mehta stopped and
provided medical aid, the consequences might have been different. Instead, he accelerated
and left the victim critically injured, displaying an utter lack of concern for human life.
This conduct aligns with the doctrine of transferred malice, where an individual’s reckless
action, knowing it could lead to fatal consequences, should be treated as criminal intent.
1
 In K. Murugan v. State of Tamil Nadu (2021 SCC Online SC 345), The Court ruled
that post-incident conduct, such as attempts to evade legal responsibility, should be
critically analyzed. Surrendering due to media pressure rather than voluntarily was seen as
a strategic move to mitigate legal repercussions rather than genuine remorse.

Additionally, the victim’s dying declaration, which explicitly identified Mr. Mehta as the
person responsible for the accident, was given due weight as per the Bharatiya Sakshya
Adhiniyam (BSA), yet the lower courts failed to appreciate its full evidentiary significance.
Under Indian law, a dying declaration carries substantial probative value and does not require
corroboration unless proven unreliable. The fact that Mr. Singh, before his demise,
confirmed the identity of Mr. Mehta through television reports solidifies the direct link
between the accused and the crime. The courts failed to consider this crucial piece of
evidence when determining the intent behind Mr. Mehta’s actions.

Moreover, Mr. Mehta’s surrender nearly a week after the incident should not have been
treated as an exculpatory factor, as it was not voluntary but rather a result of increased
media attention and public pressure. His later visit to the hospital and offer of financial
assistance appear to be attempts to mitigate legal consequences rather than genuine
remorse, and the courts should have critically analyzed this conduct. The petitioners argue
that post-incident remorse does not negate pre-existing criminal intent, and the lower
courts erred in treating these actions as mitigating circumstances rather than as evidence of
an accused attempting to manipulate legal proceedings.

The Sessions Court and the High Court adopted a narrow interpretation of culpable
homicide, failing to appreciate that reckless overspeeding combined with fleeing the scene
and a subsequent lack of remorse constitutes sufficient mens rea for a more severe charge.
The BNS does not require a premeditated intent to kill for a murder charge; rather, an act
carried out with knowledge that it is likely to cause death can fall within its ambit. The
petitioners emphasize that Mr. Mehta’s conduct was not an ordinary road accident but an
act of gross recklessness that should have been treated as culpable homicide amounting to
murder or at least a higher degree of culpability than simple negligence. By failing to
correctly assess the degree of recklessness and criminal intent involved, the lower courts
misapplied the law and erred in acquitting Mr. Mehta of the murder charge, thereby setting
a dangerous precedent for hit-and-run cases in India.

3. Whether Mr. Mehta’s subsequent surrender and visit to the hospital

can be considered as mitigating circumstances to reduce the severity of
his offense?
The petitioners argue that Mr. Mehta’s subsequent surrender and hospital visit should not be
considered mitigating circumstances to reduce the severity of his offense, as these actions
were neither immediate nor voluntary but rather driven by external pressures. A crucial
aspect of mitigation is the timing and genuineness of the accused’s actions following the
offense. In this case, Mr. Mehta fled the scene immediately after the accident, showing a
clear intent to evade responsibility, and only surrendered ten days later on July 22, 2024,
after media coverage and growing public outrage. His surrender appears to be a strategic
move rather than an act of genuine remorse, and Indian jurisprudence has consistently held
that delayed surrender does not automatically absolve an accused of criminal liability or
diminish the gravity of the offense.

Furthermore, his visit to the hospital on July 18, 2024, was not an act of immediate concern for
the victim but rather a response to media reports about the accident. Had he genuinely
intended to help, he would have stopped at the scene and sought medical assistance for Mr.
Singh immediately after the accident, as required under Section 106 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), which penalizes failure to provide aid to victims in accidents caused
by the by the accused. His actions, therefore, do not constitute genuine mitigation but
rather an afterthought influenced by external factors, including fear of legal repercussions.

Additionally, Mr. Mehta’s behavior at the time of the accident—overspeeding, hitting the
victim, and accelerating away instead of stopping to help—demonstrates a reckless
disregard for human life, which should weigh more heavily than any later attempts to
appear remorseful. The doctrine of post-crime conduct in criminal law suggests that
actions taken after the commission of an offense should be examined critically, especially
when they are delayed or appear to be motivated by self-interest. In this case, his visit to
the hospital did not change the victim’s condition, nor did it rectify the immediate harm
caused by his reckless actions. Indian courts have consistently held that mere expressions
of regret or financial offers to the victim’s family cannot serve as primary mitigating
factors in cases involving serious offenses like hit-and-run fatalities.

Moreover, his justification for fleeing—fear of mob violence—cannot serve as an excuse for
his failure to fulfill his legal duty. Even if he feared a hostile crowd, he had the option of
reporting the accident to the police or ensuring the victim received timely medical attention
through emergency services. Instead, he abandoned the victim and made no attempt to take
responsibility until much later, which should be seen as an aggravating rather than a
mitigating factor. The High Court and Sessions Court erred in treating his subsequent
actions as a sign of remorse when, in reality, they indicate an attempt to manipulate legal
proceedings and reduce culpability.

In Nanmuri Sanjay v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2018) 16 SCC 730

The Supreme Court ruled that post-offense offers of financial compensation or delayed acts
of assistance do not mitigate liability, especially in cases involving loss of life. The Court
stressed that the gravity of the initial offense should be the primary factor in
sentencing.Any financial assistance or delayed attempts at appearing remorseful should not
be given undue consideration in determining his sentence.

Therefore, the petitioners contend that Mr. Mehta’s surrender and hospital visit should not
be given undue weight in reducing the severity of his offense, as his initial conduct
displayed gross negligence, recklessness, and an absolute disregard for human life, which
should be the primary consideration in determining his criminal liability. Allowing such
delayed actions to serve as mitigation would set a dangerous precedent where hit-and-run
offenders could evade stricter penalties by surrendering only after facing public pressure,
thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the law, accused. His actions, therefore, do not
constitute genuine mitigation but rather an afterthought influenced by external factors,
including fear of legal repercussions.

In Satya Narayan Tiwari at Jolly & Anr. v. State of U.P. (2010) 13 SCC 689, The
Court ruled that delayed expressions of remorse or corrective actions taken after
public or legal pressure cannot be treated as genuine mitigating factors. His hospital
visit was a reaction to media coverage rather than an immediate act of concern for the
victim. His delayed surrender does not show genuine remorse but rather an attempt to
mitigate liability.

Additionally, Mr. Mehta’s behavior at the time of the accident—overspeeding, hitting the
victim, and accelerating away instead of stopping to help—demonstrates a reckless
disregard for human life, which should weigh more heavily than any later attempts to
appear remorseful. The doctrine of post-crime conduct in criminal law suggests that
actions taken after the commission of an offense should be examined critically, especially
when they are delayed or appear to be motivated by self-interest. In this case, his visit to
the hospital did not change the victim’s condition, nor did it rectify the immediate harm
caused by his reckless actions. Indian courts have consistently held that mere expressions
of regret
or financial offers to the victim’s family cannot serve as primary mitigating factors in cases
involving serious offenses like hit-and-run fatalities.

In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (2011) 13 SCC 705, the Supreme Court emphasized
that surrender made under external pressure, such as fear of arrest or media scrutiny, cannot
be treated as a mitigating factor unless accompanied by genuine remorse and cooperation
with authorities. Similarly, in Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra (2012)
2 SCC 648, the Court ruled that post-crime regret does not diminish the severity of
culpability when the initial offense involves reckless endangerment of human life.

Moreover, his justification for fleeing—fear of mob violence—cannot serve as an excuse

for his failure to fulfill his legal duty. Even if he feared a hostile crowd, he had the option
of reporting the accident to the police or ensuring the victim received timely medical
attention through emergency services. Instead, he abandoned the victim and made no
attempt to take responsibility until much later, which should be seen as an aggravating
rather than a mitigating factor. The High Court and Sessions Court erred in treating his
subsequent actions as a sign of remorse when, in reality, they indicate an attempt to
manipulate legal proceedings and reduce culpability.

In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82

The Court held that drivers who commit hit-and-run offenses must be punished severely to
deter similar conduct and that leniency based on post-crime actions would undermine the
deterrent effect of the law.

If courts allow delayed surrender or hospital visits to mitigate punishment, it

ld set a precedent where offenders evade harsher penalties simply by appearing apologetic
after public pressure mounts.

Therefore, the petitioners contend that Mr. Mehta’s surrender and hospital visit should not
be given undue weight in reducing the severity of his offense, as his initial conduct
displayed gross negligence, recklessness, and an absolute disregard for human life, which
should be the primary consideration in determining his criminal liability. Allowing such
delayed actions to serve as mitigation would set a dangerous precedent where hit-and-run
offenders could evade stricter penalties by surrendering only after facing public pressure,
thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the law.

4. What is the appropriate legal framework for dealing with hit-and-run

case involving fatalities and provisions under BNS, BNSS and BSA to
deal with mob attack issues along with hit and run cases in India?

The appropriate legal framework for dealing with hit-and-run cases involving fatalities in
India is primarily governed by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA). The petitioners
argue that stringent legal provisions should apply to ensure that reckless drivers are held
accountable, while also addressing concerns related to mob violence that may arise in such
situations.

Under the BNS, Section 106 explicitly criminalizes the act of failing to stop and provide
medical aid after causing an accident, reinforcing the duty of a driver involved in an
accident to assist the injured. Additionally, Section 104 penalizes rash and negligent
driving, while Section 105 deals with causing death by negligence, ensuring that
individuals whose reckless actions result in fatalities are held accountable. However, in
cases where the offender’s conduct demonstrates an intention or knowledge that their
actions could cause death—such as in extreme overspeeding and fleeing without aiding the
victim—charges under culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 103) or even
murder (Section 99) may be considered. In Mr. Mehta’s case, his deliberate decision to
accelerate away instead of helping the injured victim strengthens the argument for invoking
more serious charges beyond mere negligence.

However, in Sukhdev Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 212, the Court emphasized
that delayed actions motivated by self-preservation do not constitute genuine atonement.

From a procedural standpoint, the BNSS provides the investigative and trial framework for
such offenses. Section 173 mandates that investigating officers must promptly file a
chargesheet in cases of hit-and-run fatalities, ensuring that crucial evidence, including
CCTV footage, eyewitness accounts, and forensic reports, is gathered to establish
culpability. Furthermore, BNSS emphasizes victim protection and legal assistance for
families affected by fatal accidents, ensuring that they receive timely justice. Given the
increasing incidents of drivers evading arrest by surrendering days later, there is a strong
argument for implementing stricter procedures for immediate reporting and mandatory
custodial interrogation in serious hit-and-run cases to prevent offenders from escaping
liability.

In State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court emphasized that reckless driving
and fleeing from the scene aggravate the crime and should not be treated lightly. This
principle applies directly to Mr. Mehta’s case, where his deliberate decision to accelerate
away instead of helping the injured victim strengthens the argument for invoking more
serious charges beyond mere negligence.

In cases where mob attacks occur at accident sites, the BSA provides the evidentiary
framework to establish self-defense claims and differentiate between genuine fear and
premeditated escape. Section 8 of the BSA recognizes the relevance of post-offense
conduct, meaning Mr. Mehta’s delayed surrender and hospital visit would be examined
critically rather than automatically treated as mitigating factors. Furthermore, BNSS has
provisions for handling law and order situations, allowing the police to control violent
mobs and provide protection to accident-accused individuals where needed. However, mob
violence cannot serve as an absolute defense for fleeing the scene of an accident, as a driver
is still legally obligated to report the incident to authorities.

The petitioners argue that India’s legal framework must ensure stricter punishments for
reckless hit-and-run offenders while also providing adequate legal safeguards for accused
individuals fearing mob attacks.

In State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (2011) 13 SCC 705, the Supreme Court ruled that
surrendering due to external pressures—such as media scrutiny or fear of arrest—does not
equate to voluntary atonement and cannot be considered a mitigating factor.

The current framework under BNS, BNSS, and BSA effectively balances these concerns
by penalizing rash driving, failure to assist victims, and causing death by negligence, while
also offering protections in cases where mob hostility is a genuine concern. However,
courts must interpret these laws in a manner that upholds public safety and prevents
offenders from exploiting legal loopholes to evade liability. In Mr. Mehta’s case, his flight
from the scene was not an immediate response to mob violence but a calculated act to
evade legal consequences, warranting strict application of the hit-and-run provisions under
BNS, alongside stringent judicial scrutiny of his post-offense conduct under BSA.
 PRAYER

In light of the foregoing submissions, the Petitioner respectfully prays before this Hon’ble
Supreme Court that it may be pleased to:

1. Set aside the acquittal of Mr. Rajiv Mehta by the Hon’ble Sessions Court and the
Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh and hold that the act of overspeeding and fleeing the
scene of the accident, without rendering assistance to the victim, constitutes criminal intent
sufficient to warrant conviction under the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita
(BNS). The Petitioner submits that Mr. Mehta’s reckless and grossly negligent conduct in
driving at an excessive speed, causing fatal injuries to the victim, and absconding from the
accident site demonstrates a conscious disregard for human life, which warrants the application
of Section 99 (murder) or alternatively, Section 103 (culpable homicide not amounting to
murder) of the BNS.

2. Declare that the act of fleeing the scene after a fatal accident, without informing the
authorities or arranging for medical assistance, constitutes sufficient mens rea to be
considered an offense beyond mere negligence. The deliberate choice of the accused to
abscond rather than provide necessary medical aid or report the incident indicates his
awareness of the potential consequences, making him liable under more stringent penal
provisions.

3. Hold that Mr. Mehta’s post-offense conduct, including his delayed surrender and hospital
visit, does not serve as a mitigating circumstance. His actions do not negate his initial reckless
conduct and cannot be used as a basis to reduce the severity of his offense. The law mandates
that an individual involved in an accident must immediately report the incident and provide
assistance to the victim, failing which strict criminal liability must be imposed. The accused’s
voluntary surrender after several days and his subsequent hospital visit were merely attempts to
mitigate his culpability rather than genuine expressions of remorse.

4. Direct the application of stricter penal provisions in hit-and-run cases involving fatalities
to deter individuals from escaping legal liability under the guise of fear of mob violence. The
Petitioner submits that the mere apprehension of a hostile crowd should not exempt an
individual from their legal duty to report the accident and provide assistance to the injured. The
Hon’ble Court may consider issuing guidelines to ensure that courts and law enforcement
agencies adopt a strict interpretation of Sections 104, 105, and 106 of the BNS, dealing with
rash driving, causing death by negligence, and failure to assist victims, respectively.
5. Ensure the effective enforcement of procedural safeguards under the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) by directing that all hit-and-run cases involving fatalities
be investigated in a time-
bound manner, with law enforcement authorities required to collect forensic evidence, CCTV
footage, and eyewitness testimonies without unnecessary delay. The Hon’ble Court may also
lay down guidelines for mandatory custodial interrogation of individuals who surrender days
after a fatal accident, to prevent offenders from manipulating legal procedures to escape
liability.

6. Recognize the need for balancing legal accountability and protection against mob
violence by clarifying the obligations of individuals involved in accidents under BNSS and
Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA). The Petitioner respectfully submits that while individuals
must not be subjected to unlawful mob aggression, any genuine concern of safety should be
reported immediately to the nearest police station, and mere fear of violence cannot serve as an
absolute defense for fleeing the scene. The Hon’ble Court may direct that self-defense claims in
hit-and-run cases be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny, ensuring that accused persons do not
misuse such justifications to evade their legal obligations.

7. Issue necessary directions to establish uniform guidelines for police investigation,

evidence collection, and trial procedures in hit-and-run cases involving fatalities, ensuring
consistency in judicial interpretation and preventing offenders from exploiting procedural
loopholes. The Petitioner prays that this Hon’ble Court may direct strict implementation of
Sections 8 and 9 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), which govern post-offense
conduct and evidentiary procedures, to ensure that delayed surrenders or later expressions of
remorse do not unduly influence judicial outcomes.

8. Grant any other relief that this Hon’ble Court may deem just, fit, and proper in the
interest of justice, equity, and good conscience.

AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER SHALL EVER PRAY.
CASE NO.3
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The present writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which empowers
every High Court to issue directions, orders, or writs—including habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari—to any person, authority, or government within its
jurisdiction for the enforcement of fundamental rights and other legal purposes.

Furthermore, this power extends to cases where the cause of action, either wholly or in part,
arises within the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, even if the concerned government,
authority, or individual is located outside those territories.

(3) If an interim order—whether by way of injunction, stay, or any other form—is

granted in proceedings under Clause (1) without:
(a) providing the affected party with copies of the petition and supporting documents, and
(b) affording the affected party an opportunity to be heard,

then the aggrieved party may apply to the High Court for the vacation of such an order. Upon
receiving the application and ensuring that a copy has been furnished to the party in whose favor
the order was passed or their counsel, the High Court must dispose of the application within two
weeks from the date of receipt or from the date the copy is provided, whichever is later. If the
High Court is closed on the last day of this period, the application must be decided on the next
available working day. Failure to do so will result in the automatic vacation of the interim order
upon the expiry of the stipulated period.

(4) The powers conferred on the High Court under this article do not derogate from the
powers granted to the Supreme Court under Article 32(2) of the Constitution of India, 1950.

In the present case, the writ petition has been filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, as
the impugned resolution passed by the society committee violates the fundamental rights of the
petitioner.

Under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the State is prohibited from denying any person
equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the country. Additionally,
Article 19(1)(g) guarantees the right to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation,
trade, or business, while Article 21 safeguards an individual’s right to life and personal liberty,
ensuring that no person is deprived of these rights except through a procedure established by
law.

Given that the matter involves the enforcement of fundamental rights and the principles of
natural justice, the Hon’ble High Court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. The petitioner,
therefore, seeks the quashing of the society's resolution and a declaration that it is illegal and
arbitrary.
 MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITONER

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mr. Arjun Parmar resides with his wife, Kavita Parmar, and their teenage daughter,
Riya Parmar, in Amrit Greens Society, a prestigious gated community in Ahmedabad, Gujarat.
The Parmars moved to the society in 2016. One stormy evening, Riya discovered a stray
German Shepherd puppy shivering near the society park. Feeling sorry for the helpless animal,
she brought the puppy home despite her parents' initial reluctance.

2. The family made several efforts to locate the puppy's owner, including posting on social
media and putting up notices in nearby areas. After weeks of no response, the Parmars decided
to adopt the puppy and named him "Sheru." Sheru, once malnourished and timid, grew into a
strong and protective dog, quickly becoming Riya's best friend.

3. Sheru's playful but boisterous behavior drew mixed reactions from society members.
While some children adored him, others felt intimidated by his large size. A group of residents
led by Mrs. Manjula Shah, a retired teacher, expressed concerns about Sheru’s occasional
barking at night and his tendency to run around the society premises unleashed. They requested
the Parmars to restrain Sheru and train him to avoid such disturbances.

4. Sheru proved to be more than just a pet when, one night, he barked incessantly and
alerted security guards to the presence of intruders attempting to break into the society office.
His intervention led to the capture of two burglars and earned him praise from many society
members. However, not everyone was pleased.

5. Tensions escalated when, during a community festival, Sheru accidentally bit Kunal
Shah, a 10- year-old boy and son of Mr. Rajiv Shah, the society’s president. The incident
occurred after a group of children started teasing Sheru by throwing small stones at him. Kunal
sustained serious injuries and required medical treatment, including multiple stitches and
vaccinations.
6. Furious over the incident, Mr. Rajiv Shah accused the Parmars of gross negligence
and labeled Sheru a threat to society. The matter quickly turned personal, as Mr. Shah and
Mr. Parmar had previously clashed over issues like society maintenance and committee
elections.

7. At an emergency meeting convened by Mr. Shah, a resolution was passed with a

majority vote of 35:4 (with the Parmars and their close friends opposing). The resolution
mandated the immediate removal of Sheru from the society and imposed a fine of ₹1,00,000
on the Parmars for endangering residents. Additionally, the resolution declared that any
future pets brought into the society must be registered with the management committee and
kept on a leash at all times.

8. The Parmars, deeply aggrieved by the resolution, argued that the incident was a result of
provocation by the children and that they had taken all reasonable measures to train and control
Sheru. They also contended that the fine was excessive and that the resolution violated their
rights as residents.

9. Determined to challenge the decision, Mr. Arjun Parmar filed a writ petition before
the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, seeking: To quash the resolution passed by the society
committee banning Sheru and imposing the fine. A declaration that the resolution was
discriminatory and contrary to principles of natural justice. o Directions to the society to
adopt a humane and uniform policy regarding pets.

10. The matter has now reached the final arguments stage before the Hon’ble High Court
of Gujarat, with widespread media attention and divided public opinion.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Was the resolution banning Sheru and imposing a fine of ₹1,00,000 on the Parmar family
valid and in accordance with the law?
2. Did the Parmars fail to exercise reasonable care and control over Sheru?
3. Does the society's resolution banning Sheru violate the fundamental rights of the
Parmar family?
4. Does the provocation by the children, including teasing Sheru with stones, mitigate the
liability of the Parmar family for the incident involving Kunal Shah?
 Issue 1: Was the resolution banning Sheru and imposing a fine of ₹1,00,000 on
the Parmar family valid and in accordance with the law?

The resolution banning Sheru and imposing a fine of ₹1,00,000 on the Parmar family is legally
untenable. It contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution, which upholds equality and fairness, as it
is arbitrary, lacks a reasonable classification, and fails the test of proportionality established in Om
Kumar v. Union of India. Moreover, it violates the principles of natural justice, as outlined in A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India, by depriving the petitioner of a fair hearing. The society committee
exceeded its statutory authority under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, and infringed
upon the petitioner’s fundamental right to residence under Article 19(1)(e). Judicial precedents,
including Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, emphasize that restrictions must be
reasonable and non-arbitrary, rendering the resolution legally unsustainable.

Issue 2: Did the Parmars fail to exercise reasonable care and control over Sheru?

The Parmars demonstrated reasonable care in controlling Sheru, as evidenced by his prior
training and commendable actions in preventing a burglary. The incident was caused by
provocation from children throwing stones, which is covered under Sections 304(B) and 493 of
the BNS5 as accidents or acts committed under provocation. Veeran v. State of Madhya Pradesh
establishes that provocation reduces liability. Additionally, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Subhagwanti6 highlights that liability requires foreseeability and neglect, neither of which applies
here. The responsibility for supervising the children lies with their parents, making this a case of
contributory negligence as per State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh7. Hence, the Parmars cannot be
held solely accountable.

Issue 3: Does the society's resolution banning Sheru violate the fundamental rights of the
Parmar family?

The resolution infringes upon the fundamental rights of the Parmar family, particularly their right to
life and dignity under Article 21. Sheru serves as an emotional companion, contributing to their
mental well-being, a principle upheld in Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator.
Additionally, it violates Article 19(1)(g), which protects the freedom to make personal lifestyle
choices, including pet ownership, as affirmed in State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan Tale. The
doctrine of legitimate expectation, as established in Union of India v. Hindustan Development
Corporation, prevents arbitrary policy changes that contradict established practices. Therefore,
the resolution is unconstitutional and legally unsustainable.

Issue 4: Does the provocation by the children, including teasing Sheru

with stones, mitigate the liability of the Parmar family for the incident
involving Kunal Shah?

Sheru’s actions were a direct response to provocation by the children throwing stones, rendering the
incident unforeseeable and unintentional. Under Section 304(B) of the BNS, acts committed
without criminal intent are exempt from liability, and Veeran v. State of Madhya Pradesh
recognizes provocation as a mitigating factor. Moreover, liability cannot be solely attributed to the
Parmars when the children's parents failed to supervise them, as established in State of Punjab v.
Gurmit Singh. In Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja, the court acknowledged the
importance of considering an animal’s natural instincts, reinforcing that Sheru’s reaction was a
reasonable
defensive response rather than aggression. Therefore, the Parmars’ liability should be mitigated or
dismissed.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

Issue 1: Was the resolution banning Sheru and imposing a fine of ₹1,00,000 on
the Parmar family valid and in accordance with the law?

No, Article 14 guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discriminatory actions by
authorities. The society’s resolution banning Sheru unfairly singles out the Parmar family without
applying a uniform pet policy to all residents. The resolution appears arbitrary as it lacks
justification and targets the Parmars without considering Sheru’s prior contributions, including
alerting security to burglars. Arbitrariness is held unconstitutional as it violates equality under the
law. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu13 – Arbitrariness amounts to a violation of equality
principles. Article 14 ensures that any classification must be based on intelligible differentia and
rational nexus. In this case, no reasonable classification has been demonstrated.

A fine must be proportionate to the alleged misconduct. Imposing a fine of ₹1,00,000 without
proper investigation or hearing violates the principle of proportionality. Om Kumar v. Union of
India14– The court emphasized fairness and proportionality in administrative actions to ensure
penalties are not excessive or oppressive. Under Article 14, administrative decisions must follow
principles of proportionality and fairness.

Violation of Natural Justice (Principles of Audi Alteram Partem): The Parmars were not given an
opportunity to explain or defend their case before the resolution was passed, violating principles
of natural justice. Every individual is entitled to a fair hearing. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India15–
The court ruled that the absence of a fair hearing renders decisions void. Principles of natural
justice, implied under Article 14, prohibit decisions made without hearing the affected party.

Societies registered under the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 must act within their
by laws. Imposing fines without authority or justification contravenes statutory provisions.
Section 72 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act emphasizes fairness and legality in society
actions.

Violation of Freedom of Residence and Movement (Article 19(1)(e)):

Freedom to Reside in Any Part of India: The resolution indirectly restricts the petitioner’s
freedom to reside peacefully with their pet, which is protected under Article 19(1)(e). Himmat Lal
K. Shah
Issue 2: Did the Parmars fail to exercise reasonable care and control over Sheru?

No, the question of whether the Parmars failed to exercise reasonable care and control over
Sheru must be examined in the context of duty of care, foreseeability, and causation. Pet owners
have a responsibility to ensure that their animals do not pose a threat to others, but this duty is
not absolute. The standard of care expected from pet owners depends on several factors,
including the pet’s prior behavior, the circumstances leading to an incident, and whether any
external factors contributed to the harm caused. In the present case, Sheru had lived in the
society for several years without any prior history of aggression. The Parmars had taken active
steps to train and control Sheru, responding to concerns raised by other residents regarding his
occasional barking. However, despite their efforts, Sheru was provoked by a group of children,
including Kunal Shah, who threw stones at him. It is well established in legal jurisprudence that
provocation significantly reduces liability in such cases.

Under Indian tort law, liability for harm caused by animals generally falls under two categories:
strict liability and negligence. Strict liability applies primarily in cases involving inherently
dangerous animals, such as wild animals or aggressive pets with a known history of attacks.
However, Sheru was a domesticated and well-trained pet with no history of prior aggression,
which means strict liability cannot be applied in this case. For negligence to be established, three
key elements must be proven: (1) the pet owner owed a duty of care to others, (2) there was a
breach of that duty, and (3) the breach directly resulted in foreseeable harm. In this case, the
chain of causation was broken by the children’s actions, which directly triggered Sheru’s
reaction. The concept of contributory negligence applies here, as the children deliberately
engaged in behavior that provoked the dog. Indian courts have consistently held that where
provocation is involved, the owner’s liability is significantly reduced. In Nair v. Union of
India18, the Kerala High Court ruled that a pet owner cannot be held responsible for an attack if
the pet was subjected to harassment or physical aggression.

Furthermore, it is important to consider judicial precedents and AWBI guidelines regarding pet
ownership in residential societies. In AWBI v. People for Elimination of Stray Troubles19 , the
Supreme Court held that housing societies cannot impose arbitrary restrictions on pet ownership
or force residents to remove their pets unless there is an actual and persistent risk to safety. The
facts in the present case indicate that Sheru was neither a habitual nuisance nor an inherently
dangerous animal, but rather a provoked victim of harassment by children. Additionally, there is
no evidence that the Parmars exhibited negligence in handling Sheru before the incident. Given
that the incident was an exceptional and isolated event, it would be unfair and legally untenable to
conclude that the Parmars failed to exercise reasonable care.

3: Does the Society's Resolution Banning Sheru Violate the Fundamental Rights of the Parmar

Family?
The resolution passed by the society, mandating Sheru’s removal and imposing a fine of
₹1,00,000, is arbitrary, excessive, and unconstitutional, violating the fundamental rights of the
Parmars under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 guarantees equality
before the law and protection against arbitrary discrimination, and the resolution fails this test in
multiple ways. Firstly, it selectively targets the Parmars and Sheru while allowing other residents
to keep pets, demonstrating unreasonable classification. The Supreme Court, in EP Royappa v.
State of Tamil Nadu 20, held that any classification must be based on intelligible differentia and
must have a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. In this case, the society’s
decision does not meet these requirements, as there is no evidence that Sheru was a persistent
threat or that the Parmars were habitual violators of community rules. The decision appears to be
influenced by personal bias and prior conflicts between Mr. Rajiv Shah and Mr. Arjun Parmar
rather than an objective assessment of public safety.

Furthermore, the resolution violates Article 19(1)(g), which guarantees citizens the right to reside
freely and make personal choices regarding their way of life. The right to keep a pet is an
extension of this personal liberty, as recognized in various judicial pronouncements and AWBI
guidelines on pet ownership. Housing societies do not have the absolute authority to impose
arbitrary restrictions on pet ownership. In AWBI v. Nagarjuna 21, the Madras High Court ruled
that RWAs (Resident Welfare Associations) cannot enforce blanket bans on pets, as such
restrictions infringe upon residents’ fundamental rights. The same principle applies here, where
the society’s attempt to forcefully remove Sheru without valid justification constitutes an
overreach of authority.

Additionally, the resolution violates Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal
liberty. This right extends to both human beings and animals, as recognized in Animal Welfare
Board of India v. A. Nagaraja22, where the Supreme Court held that animals have the right to
live with dignity. By attempting to separate Sheru from his family without a compelling reason,
the society is infringing upon both the emotional well-being of the Parmars and the animal’s
right to a safe environment. Furthermore, the principles of natural justice were violated, as the
Parmars were not given a fair opportunity to present their case before the resolution was passed.
Given these constitutional violations, the resolution should be declared void and unenforceable.
4: Does the Provocation by the Children Mitigate the Liability of the Parmar Family for the
Incident Involving Kunal Shah?
Yes, the provocation by the children, including teasing Sheru with stones, significantly mitigates
the liability of the Parmar family. The principle of contributory negligence applies in situations
where the victim’s actions contribute to the incident. In tort law, contributory negligence reduces
or eliminates the liability of the defendant when it is established that the injured party engaged in
reckless or negligent conduct that led to their own harm. In this case, Kunal Shah and other
children deliberately provoked Sheru by throwing stones, an act that directly triggered his
defensive reaction. Under normal circumstances, a well-trained dog does not attack without
reason, and Sheru had no prior history of aggression. The onus of responsibility in such a case
shifts towards the children and their guardians, as per the ruling in State of Gujarat v. Patel
Raghav Natha 23, where the Supreme Court emphasized that liability cannot be imposed without
a clear causal link between the accused party’s actions and the resulting harm.

Further, in Nair v. Union of India 24, the Kerala High Court ruled that if an animal reacts
defensively due to human aggression, the liability of the owner is significantly diminished or even
eliminated. The case is directly relevant here, as Sheru’s reaction was a defensive response 8 to
aggression rather than an unprovoked attack. Additionally, the principle of foreseeability in
negligence law dictates that the owner should only be held responsible if the harm was reasonably
predictable and preventable. Since the Parmars could not have anticipated that children would
harass Sheru in such a manner, holding them fully liable would be unjust.

The responsibility for supervising children in the society lies with their parents and guardians. A
lack of parental supervision leading to an unfortunate event should not automatically translate
into penalizing a responsible pet owner. Moreover, the incident should be viewed as an isolated
event rather than a pattern of negligence. Given these considerations, the liability of the Parmars
should either be nullified or significantly reduced, and the society’s decision to impose a penalty
should be declared excessive and unwarranted.
 PRAYER

In the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the respondent most
humbly and respectfully pray and request the Gujarat High court.

1. Declare the resolution passed by the society committee banning Sheru and imposing
a fine of ₹1,00,000 as unconstitutional, arbitrary, and violative of fundamental rights.

2. Direct the respondents to refund the fine imposed on the petitioners, as it violates
the principles of proportionality and fairness.

3. Direct the respondents to formulate uniform and humane policies for pet ownership
in the society in accordance with constitutional provisions and natural justice
principles.

4. Hold that the incident involving Sheru was a result of provocation, thereby mitigating
or eliminating liability for the petitioners.

Pass any further orders as may be deemed just and proper by this Hon’ble Court in the
interest of justice, equity, and fairness

Sign of Counsellor

..……………………
 UNIT 2
TRIAL
OBSERVATION
 Prologue:
For law students, understanding courtroom procedures is essential. The Bar Council of India
has introduced various initiatives such as Legal Aid Camps, para-legal training, and
internships to provide practical exposure.

Today’s LLB students will become the advocates of tomorrow, making it crucial for them to
gain firsthand experience of court trials during their studies. As part of the law curriculum,
students are encouraged to attend civil and criminal court proceedings to observe actual
trials.
This includes understanding the art of witness examination, the process of
presenting submissions before the court, and the arguments made by advocates.

Witness examination is a skill that can be mastered through practical experience,

supplemented by theoretical knowledge from legal principles and scholarly works
of seasoned advocates.

Observing a trial means closely following a real-life court case, tracking its progress through
various hearings. These proceedings may take place in the High Court, District Court, or
lower courts, covering either civil or criminal cases. Law students get to witness key
courtroom practices, such as witness examination, cross-examination, legal submissions,
and case arguments.

The primary objective of this assignment is to bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge
and practical application, providing law students with a deeper understanding of the judicial
system and its functioning in real-world scenarios.
 INTRODUCTION

The judiciary is the cornerstone of the legal system, responsible for interpreting and
applying the law. Its primary function is to adjudicate cases by assessing relevant facts,
interpreting applicable laws, and ensuring justice is delivered.

India follows a common law system, where customs, statutes, and judicial precedents
collectively shape the legal framework. The Indian judiciary has evolved from the colonial
legal system introduced in the mid-19th century, while also retaining elements from
ancient and medieval legal traditions.

As the third pillar of democracy, the judiciary plays a vital role in maintaining peace and
order. An independent and efficient judicial system is crucial for upholding justice in a
federal structure. The design and hierarchy of courts must be aligned with the country's
unique social and political conditions to ensure fair and effective dispute resolution. If
the judiciary is inefficient or arbitrary, it can lead to instability and chaos.

India's judicial system follows a structured hierarchy, with the Supreme Court at the apex,
followed by High Courts in each state. Below them are District Courts, presided over by
District Judges, and further down the hierarchy are Magistrates of the Second Class and
Civil Judges (Junior Division).

This well-defined court structure ensures a systematic approach to dispensing justice

while maintaining order and consistency in legal proceedings.
 Judicial System of India

Supreme Court of India:

 The Supreme Court is the highest independent judicial authority in India.

Its establishment is governed by Article 124 of the Indian Constitution.

 Judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President of India based on
recommendations from the Collegium, comprising the five most senior
Supreme
Court judges.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:

1. Original Jurisdiction:

The Supreme Court adjudicates disputes:

 Between the Government of India and one or more states.

 Between two or more states.

 Involving the election of the President and Vice President.

 It shares jurisdiction with the High Courts in matters concerning the enforcement of
fundamental rights.

 It has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between states related to constitutional and
federal issues.

2.Appellate Jurisdiction:

o The Supreme Court hears appeals from High Court judgments in:
o Constitutional matters.
o Civil cases.
o Criminal cases, provided the High Court has granted a certificate for appeal.
 However, under Article 136, individuals can seek special leave to appeal even without such a
certificate.

2.Advisory Jurisdiction:

Under Article 143(1), the President of India may seek the Court's opinion on legal or factual
questions of significant public importance.

High Courts in States:

The establishment of High Courts is governed by Article 214 of the Indian Constitution. Each
state or a group of states has a High Court, which is the highest judicial authority within its
jurisdiction.

 High Court judges are appointed by the President of India, following recommendations from
the Supreme Court Collegium.

 Powers and Functions of High Courts:

 Supervises subordinate courts and tribunals within its jurisdiction.

 Hears matters related to fundamental rights and other legal rights.

 Can transfer cases from subordinate courts if they involve constitutional interpretation.

 Handles appeals in civil and criminal cases.

 Reduces the Supreme Court's workload by resolving most disputes, as only cases involving
substantial legal questions are escalated to the Supreme Court.

District and Subordinate Courts:

 The structure and functions of subordinate courts are largely uniform across India, with minor
regional variations.
  All subordinate courts operate under the supervision of the respective High Court.

 Every district has separate civil and criminal courts.

Hierarchy and Appointment:

1. District Courts:

The District Judge is the highest authority in a district’s civil court, while the Sessions Judge
presides over criminal cases.

o The Sessions Judge can impose capital punishment, subject to approval by the
High Court.

o District Judges also hear appeals from lower courts.

2. Other Subordinate Courts:

These include Sub-Judges, Munsiff Courts, and Courts of Small Causes, along with Magistrate
Courts (Second Class and Third Class).

Appointment of Judges:

 District Court judges are appointed by the Governor of the state, in consultation with
the High Court.

To be eligible for appointment, a person must:

 Have at least seven years of experience as a pleader or advocate.

 Be an officer in the judicial service of the Union or State.

 For positions below District Judge, appointments are made by the Governor in consultation
with the High Court and State Public Service Commission a minimum of three years’
experience as an advocate or pleader is required.

Functions of District Courts:

 Hear appeals from decisions of subordinate judges.

 Adjudicate cases related to property disputes, marriage, and divorce.

 Civil courts handle matters involving guardianship of minors and mentally incapacitated
individuals.
 UNIT 3
INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUE
& PRE-TRIAL PREPARATION
 Execution of Decrees and Orders under Order XXI of CPC
Once a civil court passes a decree or order, it must be executed to ensure compliance by
the party against whom it is issued. The execution process is governed by Order XXI of
the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, which lays down detailed provisions regarding
the manner in which decrees and orders can be enforced.
1. Meaning of Execution
Execution refers to the process by which a decree-holder (the party in whose favor the
decree is passed) enforces the judgment to obtain the relief granted by the court. This may
involve recovering money, acquiring possession of property, or compelling the judgment-
debtor to perform a specific act.

2. Who Can Apply for Execution?

 The following persons can apply for execution of a decree:
 The decree-holder (the party in whose favor the decree is passed).
 The legal representative of the decree-holder (in case of their death).
 Any person claiming under the decree-holder, such as an assignee of the decree.
 A transferee of the decree, if the transfer is lawful and duly recognized by the court.

3. Courts Competent to Execute a Decree

A decree may be executed by:
1. The court that passed the decree (original jurisdiction).
2. The court to which the decree is transferred for execution, if it is beyond the
territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the original court.
4. Modes of Execution
Under Order XXI, execution of decrees can be carried out through the following methods:
Execution for Money Decrees
If a decree involves the payment of money, it can be executed by:
Attachment and sale of the judgment-debtor’s property (movable or immovable).
Garnishee proceedings, where the court directs a third party (e.g., a bank holding the
debtor's funds) to pay the decree-holder.
Arrestand detention of the judgment-debtor in civil prison, subject to conditions
under Section 51 CPC.
Execution for Decrees for Possession
If the decree is for possession of immovable property, the court may:

Issue a warrant for possession, directing the bailiff or designated officer to take
 possession and deliver it to the decree-holder.
 Use police assistance, if necessary, to enforce the decree.
A. Execution for Specific Performance or Injunctions
For decrees requiring a party to perform or refrain from performing a particular act:
The court may issue mandatory or prohibitory injunctions.
If the party fails to comply, the court may impose penalties, fines, or imprisonment.
B. Execution of Decrees Against the Government or Public Officers
Where a decree is passed against the government or a public officer, special procedures
under
Section 82 CPC must be followed, including a prior notice before execution.

Steps in the Execution Process

1. Filing of an Execution Petition
o The decree-holder must file an execution petition in the appropriate
court under Order XXI, Rule 10 CPC.
o The petition must specify the mode of execution sought.
o Issuance of Notice to the Judgment-Debtor

o The court may issue a notice to the judgment-debtor under Order XXI,
Rule 22 CPC before execution proceeds, especially if more than two
years have passed since the decree was passed.
o Attachment of Property (if applicable)
o If the decree remains unsatisfied, the court may attach the debtor’s
movable or immovable property under Order XXI, Rule 41-54 CPC
o Sale of Attached Property

o After due process and public auction, the attached property may be sold
under Order XXI, Rule 64-94 CPC to satisfy the decree.
o Final Satisfaction of Decree

o Once execution is complete, the court records satisfaction of the decree,

bringing the case to a close.
o Objections to Execution

A judgment-debtor may challenge the execution process on various grounds, such as:
The decree is already satisfied or invalid.
The decree-holder used fraudulent means to obtain the decree.
There is a mistake or procedural defect in execution.

Stay of Execution
The judgment-debtor may seek a stay of execution under Order XXI, Rule 26 CPC, if they
intend to file an appeal or demonstrate valid reasons why execution should not proceed.
Conclusion
Execution of a decree is a crucial step in civil litigation, ensuring that court orders are
enforced effectively. Order XXI of CPC provides a structured framework for different types
of execution, balancing the rights of decree-holders and judgment-debtors. Courts have
discretionary powers to modify execution methods based on the circumstances of each case,
ensuring justice is served efficiently.
 Provisions under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC)
1. Withdrawal or Compromise of a Suit (Order XXIII of CPC)

A suit can be withdrawn or compromised at any stage of the proceedings under Order XXIII
of the CPC.
1. Appointment of a Commissioner (Order XXVI of CPC)
A party may file an application before the court for the appointment of a commissioner under
Order XXVI, similar to an Anton Piller Order, for the following purposes:
Examination of witnesses
Local investigations
Scientific investigations
Performance of ministerial acts
Sale of movable or immovable property
The Local Commissioner appointed by the court is considered an officer of the court and
holds all powers exercisable by a court officer.
2. Temporary Injunctions and Interlocutory Orders (Order XXXIX of CPC)
Under Order XXXIX, the court may issue temporary injunctions and interlocutory orders to:
Preserve the subject matter of the suit.
Prevent the defendant from removing or disposing of property.
Prevent irreparable loss or injury.
Stop the continuation of the breach of any right.

Procedure for Filing a Civil Suit

To initiate a civil suit, a structured legal process must be followed. If any step is not
adhered to, the court registry has the authority to dismiss the suit.
Step 1: Filing of Suit/Plaint
A plaint is a written complaint or allegation filed by the plaintiff against the defendant.
It must include:
 Name of the court
 Nature of the complaint
 Names and addresses of the parties
 Verification statement by the plaintiff, affirming the accuracy of the contents.
Step 2: Vakalatnama
 A Vakalatnama is a legal document authorizing an advocate to represent a party in court.
Key terms include:
 The client will not hold the advocate liable for any court decision.
 The client will bear all legal costs and expenses.
 The advocate has the right to retain documents until fees are fully paid.
 The client can disengage the advocate at any stage.
 The advocate has the authority to make decisions in court in the best interest of the client.
 If a person represents themselves, a Vakalatnama is not required.

Step 3: Filing othe Suit

The plaint is submitted before the Chief Ministerial Officer (Sheristedar).
Appropriate court fees and process fees must be paid.
Step 4: First Hearing & Issuance of Notice
On the first hearing, if the court finds merit in the case, it issues a notice to the opposite party.
The plaintiff must:
 File the required procedure fee.
 Submit two copies of the plaint per defendant (one sent by registered
post/courier, one by ordinary post).
 Ensure filing is done within 7 days of the court order.
Step 5: Written Statement by the Defendant
 The defendant must file a written statement (reply to the plaint) within 30 days of
receiving the notice.

 The court may extend this period to 90 days if necessary.

 Any allegation not specifically denied in the written statement is deemed to be admitted.
 The defendant must verify that the contents of the written statement are true.

Step 6: Replication by the Plaintiff

 The plaintiff may file a replication, responding to the written statement and
specifically denying any false claims.
 Any allegations not denied in the replication are considered accepted.
 Once filed, the pleadings are complete.

Step 7: Filing of Documents

 Both parties must submit supporting documents to substantiate their claims:
 If a document is denied by the opposing party, it may still be admitted through witness
testimony.

 Admitted documents become part of the court record.

 Original documents must be submitted, along with a copy for the opposing party.
Step 8: Framing of Issues
 The court frames issues based on disputed facts and laws.
 Parties cannot argue beyond the framed issues.
 The final judgment will address each issue separately.

Step 9: List of Witnesses

 Both parties must submit a list of witnesses within 15 days of issue framing.
 Witnesses can be summoned by the court, with the requesting party required to pay a fee
(diet money).
 If a witness fails to appear, the court may impose a fine.
 Witnesses undergo examination and cross-examination before the final hearing date is
fixed.

Step 10: Final Hearing & Arguments

 Arguments are strictly confined to the framed issues.
 Before final arguments, parties may seek permission to amend pleadings.
 The court may reject any arguments that go beyond the pleadings.
 A final order/judgment is either given immediately or scheduled for a later date.
Step 11: Certified Copy of the Order
 A certified copy of the final order (with the court’s seal) is issued.
 This is necessary for appeal proceedings or execution of the judgment.
Step 12: Appeals
A party dissatisfied with the court’s decision may file an appeal, subject to the following
conditions:
 If the suit value does not exceed ₹10,000, an appeal can only be filed on a question
of law.

 No appeal is allowed if a decree was passed ex-parte (i.e., without the defendant’s
appearance).

 When an appeal is heard by two or more judges, the majority decision prevails.
 If judges are equally divided, the lower court’s decision is upheld.
 A dispute over a point of law may be referred to additional judges if required.
Procedure for Filing an Appeal
 The appeal must be in the prescribed form, signed by the appellant, and include a
certified copy of the order.
 Each ground of objection must be numbered separately.
 In monetary decree appeals, the court may require the disputed amount to be
deposited or security to be provided.
 Arguments cannot be raised on any new grounds not mentioned in the appeal without
court permission.

 New facts not raised in the lower court cannot be introduced in the appeal.
 OBSERVATIONS OF A CIVIL CASE:
IN THE HONOURABLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Civil Suit No.: CS(OS) 567/2023 Plaintiff:
Mr. Rajesh Khanna
Defendant: Mr. Arun Verma
Presiding Judge: Justice A.K.
Mehra Date of Hearing: 5th March
2025
OBSERVATION REPORT
1. Detailed Facts of the Case:
The dispute in the present suit concerns a residential property located at C-45, Greater
Kailash, New Delhi, owned by the plaintiff, Mr. Rajesh Khanna. The plaintiff alleges that
the defendant, Mr. Arun Verma, who owns an adjacent property (C-44), has unlawfully
extended his boundary wall by 2 meters, encroaching upon the plaintiff’s land.
According to the plaintiff’s claim:
 He purchased the property through a registered sale deed dated 15th March 1998 and has
been living there since.

 In December 2022, he noticed the defendant constructing an extension to his boundary

wall.

 The plaintiff immediately objected and filed a complaint with the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD) on 10th January 2023.
 A licensed surveyor appointed by the plaintiff measured the property on 15th
January 2023 and confirmed that 200 square feet of land had been encroached upon.
 Despite repeated notices, the defendant refused to remove the illegal structure,
forcing the plaintiff to file this suit seeking injunctive relief and damages.
The defendant’s version of events is as follows:
 His father, Mr. Gopal Verma, built the boundary wall in 2005 as per the original
property layout.

 He claims that the plaintiff’s survey report is incorrect and that no encroachment has
taken place.

 He further contends that even if the encroachment exists, the claim is barred by
limitation, as the plaintiff took more than 12 years to object.

 He relies on old electricity bills, municipal tax receipts (from 2006-2022), and a
mutation certificate to prove uninterrupted possession.

 The defendant has also pleaded adverse possession, stating that he has been in
continuous possession of the disputed portion for more than 12 years without
objection.
2. Issues Framed by the Court:
After reviewing the pleadings, the court framed the following legal issues:

 Whether the plaintiff is the lawful owner of the disputed portion of the property?

 Whether the defendant has encroached upon the plaintiff’s land?

 Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by limitation under the Limitation Act,1963?

 Whether the defendant has acquired adverse possession rights over the disputed
land?

 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages, and if so, to what extent?

3. Submissions of the Plaintiff:

 The plaintiff’s counsel submitted the following key arguments:
o Ownership Proof:
 The sale deed (registered in 1998), property tax records, and MCD building plan
approval prove absolute ownership over the property, including the disputed portion.
o Encroachment Evidence:
 A government-licensed surveyor’s report dated 15th January 2023 confirms that the
defendant’s boundary wall extends 2 meters beyond the approved area.
 A satellite image from Google Earth (December 2021) shows the original boundary,
whereas new construction is visible in the February 2023 image, proving recent
encroachment.
 Legal Precedents:

 The plaintiff cited Sundaram v. Govind (2019 SCC 422), which held that an owner
has the absolute right to seek the removal of an illegal encroachment, regardless of the
duration of possession by the trespasser.

 He also referred to Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar (AIR 2018

SC 1125), which states that government survey reports are binding evidence of land
ownership disputes.

4.Submissions of the Defendant:

The defendant’s counsel presented counterarguments:
Continuous Possession:
 The defendant submitted electricity bills, water tax receipts, and municipal tax
records from 2006-2022 to prove that his boundary wall has existed for over 17 years.
 He argued that since the plaintiff did not object for over 12 years, the claim is
barred by limitation under Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
 Adverse Possession Claim:
o The defendant cited Mohan Lal v. Kartar Singh (AIR 1984 SC 1132), which
held that a person in continuous, uninterrupted possession for over 12
years gains ownership rights under adverse possession.
 Lack of Proper Evidence:
o The plaintiff’s surveyor’s report is biased, as it was prepared without prior
notice to the defendant.
o The Google Earth satellite images are not officially certified evidence.

4. Court’s Observations and Findings:

Based on evidence and legal principles, the court made the following observations:
1. Ownership of the Disputed Portion:
 The plaintiff has produced a registered sale deed, which is the strongest proof of
ownership under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
 The defendant failed to produce any title document to prove ownership of the
disputed portion.
2. Encroachment by the Defendant:
 The plaintiff’s survey report and Google Earth images strongly indicate that illegal
construction has occurred after December 2021.
 The defendant did not provide any municipal sanction for the extended boundary
wall.
3. Limitation and Adverse Possession:
 The Supreme Court in S.R. Ejaz v. T.N. Handloom Weaver’s Coop Society (2002)
2 SCC 674 held that limitation does not apply when encroachment is ongoing or
continuous.
 Adverse possession requires open, continuous, and hostile possession, which is not
proven here because the encroachment only became visible after December 2021.
4. Damages:
 The plaintiff has suffered mental distress and legal expenses, but the ₹10,00,000
damages claim appears excessive.
  The court finds ₹2,00,000 as reasonable compensation.

5. Final Order:
Based on the findings, the court issues the following directions:
1. The defendant shall demolish the illegal portion of the boundary wall within 60
days or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) shall remove it at his cost.
2. The plaintiff is awarded ₹2,00,000 as damages for litigation expenses and
inconvenience.
3. The defendant shall pay the cost of the suit to the plaintiff.

Personal Observations on the Civil Case

1. Strength of Documentary Evidence – The plaintiff's registered sale deed

was the most decisive factor in establishing ownership. Courts generally
give
higher weight to title documents over other forms of proof, making it critical
for property owners to maintain updated and clear ownership records.

2. . Technological Evidence as a Game-Changer – The use of Google Earth

images and surveyor reports effectively countered the defendant’s
adverse
possession claim. This highlights the growing role of technology in modern
property disputes, making digital records a useful legal tool.

3. Weakness of the Adverse Possession Argument – The defendant failed to

meet the strict legal criteria for adverse possession, especially continuous,
open, and hostile occupation for 12+ years. This case reinforces that courts do
not favor
squatters' rights unless overwhelmingly proven.

4. Overstated Damages Claim – The plaintiff’s ₹10,00,000 claim for damages

was significantly reduced by the court to ₹2,00,000. This suggests that
judges prefer compensation based on actual, provable losses, and
exaggerated claims
can hurt credibility.

5. Judicial Fairness in Evidence Assessment – The court took a balanced

approach, weighing documentary proof, technological evidence, and
municipal records before reaching a verdict. This ensures that cases are
decided on legal merit rather than mere claims.
 6. Strict Stance Against Encroachment – The ruling’s zero-tolerance policy on illegal
construction emphasizes that unauthorized structures, even if built years ago, can still
be demolished if ownership is disputed successfully.

7. Lessons for Property Owners – Regular boundary checks, timely legal action, and
proper documentation can prevent lengthy litigation. Property owners should not
wait
until significant disputes arise before securing their rights.

This case highlights the importance of proactive legal strategies in real estate matters.

CONCLUSION

This case underscores the critical role of documentary evidence, technological tools, and
timely legal action in resolving property disputes. The court’s reliance on registered title
documents, municipal records, and satellite imagery highlights the importance of proper
legal documentation and ownership verification. The rejection of the defendant’s adverse
possession claim reinforces that courts demand strict proof for such defenses and do not
encourage encroachments. Additionally, the significant reduction in the damages awarded
shows that exaggerated claims may weaken a party’s credibility.

Ultimately, this case serves as a reminder that preventive legal measures—such as regular
boundary verification, updated ownership records, and swift legal action against
encroachments—are key to protecting property rights and avoiding prolonged litigation.
CRIMINAL
CASE
 India has a well-established statutory, administrative, and judicial framework governing
criminal trials. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (IPC), and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) form the foundation of India’s criminal
justice system.

1. Governing Laws for Criminal Trials in India

The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)

Establishes procedural law for investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating criminal cases.

Covers the entire trial process, from FIR registration to sentencing and appeals.

Defines the powers and responsibilities of police, prosecutors, magistrates, and trial courts.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)

The primary substantive law defining various offenses and their prescribed punishments.

Categorizes offenses based on severity, intent, and impact on society.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA)

Governs the admissibility, production, and evaluation of evidence in criminal trials.

Provides rules for oral and documentary evidence, burden of proof, and witness testimony.

2. Legal Framework: Principles Governing Criminal Trials

India follows the adversarial system of justice, where:

The burden of proof rests with the prosecution (State).

The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In exceptional cases (e.g., terrorism, corruption), the burden of proof may shift to
the accused.

The Supreme Court of India and High Courts actively ensure fairness and adherence to due
process. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees that no person shall be deprived
of
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, making it a critical
safeguard in criminal trials.

With the growing presence of foreign businesses and expatriates in India, it is crucial to
understand India’s criminal law framework to navigate potential legal issues effectively.

3. Key Legal Terminology in Criminal Trials

3.1 Types of Offenses and Bail

Provisions Bailable Offense (Section

436, Cr.P.C.) The accused has a

statutory right to bail.

The police can grant bail at the time of arrest.

Non-Bailable Offense (Sections 437 & 439, Cr.P.C.)

Bail is not a right and is subject to court discretion.

The court considers factors such as nature of the offense, antecedents of the accused, and
risk of tampering with evidence before granting bail.

Anticipatory Bail (Section 438, Cr.P.C.)

Available when a person apprehends arrest in a non-bailable offense.

The court assesses factors like gravity of allegations, likelihood of absconding, and potential
misuse of the legal process.

3.2 Cognizable vs. Non-Cognizable

Offenses Cognizable Offense (Section 2(c),

Cr.P.C.)

Police can arrest without a warrant and start an investigation immediately.

Examples: Murder, rape, kidnapping, robbery.

Non-Cognizable Offense (Section 2(l), Cr.P.C.)

Police require prior approval from a magistrate to arrest or investigate.

 Examples: Defamation, public nuisance, simple hurt.

The First Schedule of the Cr.P.C. classifies IPC offenses into bailable/non-bailable
and cognizable/non-cognizable categories.

4. Stages of Criminal Investigation and Trial

4.1 First Information Report (FIR) (Section 154, Cr.P.C.)

The first step in criminal proceedings for a cognizable offense.

Lodged at the police station having jurisdiction over the offense.

Must contain essential details of the offense, date, time, location, and identity of the accused
(if known).

The police must provide a copy of the FIR to the complainant free of cost.

Judicial Safeguards:

A person can approach the Superintendent of Police (SP) or the Magistrate if the
police refuse to register an FIR.

The Supreme Court has held that FIR registration is mandatory for cognizable offenses.

4.2 Investigation Process

Once an FIR is filed, the investigation includes:

Recording witness statements (Section 161, Cr.P.C.)

Collecting forensic and material evidence

Conducting medical examinations, if necessary

Arresting the accused (if required) and interrogating them

Upon completion of the investigation, the police either:

File a Charge Sheet (Section 173, Cr.P.C.) if there is sufficient evidence, or

 Submit a Closure Report if no offense is established.

4.3Charge Sheet (Final Report under Section 173, Cr.P.C.)

The Charge Sheet formally initiates the trial process.

It contains:

Details of the accused and witnesses

Nature of the offense and applicable legal provisions

Collected evidence and supporting documents

4.4 Panchnama (Witness Memo of Search and Seizure) (Section 100, Cr.P.C.)

A Panchnama is a key document recording searches, seizures, or site inspections

conducted by the police.

It is prepared in the presence of independent witnesses (Panchas) and helps establish the
authenticity of evidence.

4.5 Trial Proceedings

Stages of Trial (for Warrant

Cases)

Framing of Charges (Sections 228 & 240, Cr.P.C.)

The court formally frames charges against the accused.

Plea of the Accused (Section 251, Cr.P.C.)

The accused is asked to plead guilty or not guilty.

Prosecution Evidence (Section 254, Cr.P.C.)

The burden of proof lies with the prosecution.

Witnesses are examined, cross-examined, and re-examined.

Defense Evidence (Section 233, Cr.P.C.)

 The accused may present evidence in their defense.

Final Arguments (Section 314, Cr.P.C.)

Both sides present their closing

arguments.

Judgment (Section 353, Cr.P.C.)

The court pronounces its verdict (acquittal or conviction).

5. Conclusion: Navigating Criminal Trials in India

The Indian criminal justice system is highly structured, ensuring procedural fairness.
However, challenges in law enforcement and judicial delays often arise. Higher courts
actively safeguard due process and individual rights, particularly through Article 21 of
the Constitution.

Key Takeaways:

Classification of offenses into cognizable/non-cognizable and bailable/non-bailable affects

legal proceedings significantly.

The burden of proof remains with the prosecution, requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Judicial safeguards exist to prevent misuse of legal provisions.

Foreign businesses and expatriates in India should be aware of these legal procedures to
protect their rights in case of legal issues.

By understanding criminal trial procedures, key legal principles, and available legal
remedies, individuals and businesses can effectively navigate India’s legal system.

Applicability of Offense Classification Criteria

The criteria outlined below apply in cases where the legal provisions are silent on
the classification of offenses. For clarity, the following classification may be referred
to:
 Cognizable or Non- Bailable or Non-
Offense
Cognizable Bailable

Punishable with imprisonment for less than 3

Non-Cognizable Bailable
years or a fine only

Punishable with imprisonment for 3 years or

Cognizable Non-Bailable
more

Procedure for Criminal Investigation in India

The process of criminal investigation and prosecution in India can commence through any of
the following means:

1. Investigation by Police in Cognizable Offenses:

o When a cognizable offense is reported, comes to the knowledge of the

police, or is otherwise brought to their attention, any police officer may
initiate an investigation without prior approval from a Magistrate, as per
Section
156(1) of the Cr.P.C.

2. Complaint to a Magistrate in Case of Police Inaction:

o If the police fail to investigate a cognizable offense, the aggrieved party may
file a criminal complaint before a Magistrate under Section 190 of the
Cr.P.C.

o The Magistrate may:

 Take cognizance of the offense and conduct an inquiry themselves.

 Direct the police to register an FIR and investigate, under Section

156(3) of the Cr.P.C.

3. Procedure for Non-Cognizable Offenses:

 o In cases of non-cognizable offenses, the police cannot initiate an
investigation without prior approval from a Magistrate.

o The complainant must file a criminal complaint before the competent court
under Section 190 of the Cr.P.C., to initiate judicial proceedings.

For a clearer understanding, the criminal justice process can be represented through a
flowchart or diagram outlining the steps involved in investigation, prosecution, and trial.
Stages of a Criminal Trial in India
 First Information Report (FIR) – Section 154 CrPC

A criminal case begins with the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) under Section
154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). An FIR is a formal complaint lodged with the
police by a complainant regarding a cognizable offense.

Investigation

The police conduct an investigation to gather evidence, identify suspects, and determine
whether a crime has been committed. The standard of proof required for a search is probable
cause, meaning there must be reasonable grounds to believe that evidence related to the
crime exists in a particular location.

Arrest of the Suspect

Law enforcement may arrest a suspect if there is sufficient probable cause linking them to the
crime. The purpose of an arrest is to ensure the suspect’s presence during the trial and
prevent further offenses.

Framing of Charges

After reviewing the charge sheet and other relevant documents, the court frames
charges against the accused. If the charges lack sufficient grounds, the court may
discharge the accused.

Plea of Guilty – Section 241 CrPC

Once charges are framed, the accused is given an opportunity to plead guilty. The judge must
ensure that the plea is made voluntarily before proceeding with a conviction at their
discretion.

Prosecution Evidence

The prosecution presents evidence to establish the accused’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Witnesses provide testimony through examination-in-chief, and the court may summon
additional witnesses or documents if necessary.

Statement of the Accused – Section 313 CrPC

 The accused is given a chance to explain the circumstances of the case. These statements
are not recorded under oath but may be considered as evidence against them.

Defense Evidence

If the accused is not acquitted at this stage, they have the right to present evidence in their
defense, including both oral and documentary proof. However, since the burden of proof
lies with the prosecution, the defense is generally not required to present evidence unless
necessary.

Judgment

The court delivers its final judgment, either convicting or acquitting the accused, along with
reasons for the decision. If the accused is convicted, both sides argue on sentencing,
particularly in cases involving life imprisonment or the death penalty. The prosecution may
also appeal an acquittal.

Major Criminal Law Reforms in India (2023)

In 2023, India enacted landmark reforms to modernize its criminal justice system,
replacing colonial-era laws with updated legislation aimed at improving justice delivery,
efficiency, and citizen protection.

The Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), and the Indian
Evidence Act (IEA) have been replaced by the following three new laws:

1. Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) – Replacing IPC

This new law reforms substantive criminal law, focusing on victim rights, stricter
penalties, and modern offenses such as cybercrimes and organized crime.

Key Changes:

Sedition law repealed; replaced with provisions addressing threats to national sovereignty.

Community service introduced as a punishment for minor offenses.

Stricter penalties for crimes like terrorism, mob lynching, and hit-and-run incidents.
Death penalty retained for heinous offenses, including rape and gang rape of minors.

Cybercrimes against women and children receive special attention.

2. Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Replacing CrPC

This procedural law enhances investigation efficiency, judicial transparency, and trial speed.

Key Reforms:

Mandatory electronic filing of FIRs and charge sheets for improved record-keeping.

Extended police custody (from 15 days to 60-90 days) in cases of organized crime
and terrorism.

Trials in absentia allowed for absconding offenders.

Stronger victim and witness protection, including mandatory videography of crime

scenes. Forensic investigations mandatory for serious crimes carrying 7+ years of

imprisonment.

Revised bail provisions to balance justice and the accused’s rights while
preventing unnecessary pre-trial detention.

Time limits for trials and investigations to ensure faster case resolution.

3. Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) – Replacing the Indian Evidence Act

This law modernizes the rules of evidence to align with technological advancements and
strengthen judicial integrity.

Key Developments:

Recognition of electronic and digital records as primary evidence.

Greater admissibility of digital forensic reports in cybercrime

cases.

Enhanced legal presumptions for electronic communications, improving

cybercrime prosecution.

Stricter regulation of hearsay evidence to prevent wrongful convictions.

Witness protection mechanisms to prevent intimidation.

Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based evidence in forensic analysis.

Key Impacts of the New Laws

✔ Enhanced Victim Rights – Victims now have stronger protections, including

compensation rights and access to case updates.

✔ Faster Justice Delivery – Digital records, forensic mandates, and strict timelines
reduce delays.

✔ Stronger Law Enforcement – Police investigations are now more efficient with
expanded forensic requirements.

✔ Integration of Technology – Electronic evidence, AI-based forensics, and online

filing bring India’s justice system in line with global standards.

✔ Balanced Bail and Sentencing System – Ensuring fair treatment for accused persons
while prioritizing justice for victims.

✔ Stronger Protections for Women & Children – Addressing rising crimes with stricter
penalties and expedited trials.

✔ Reduction in Case Backlogs – Faster investigations and court proceedings reduce

pending cases.

Conclusion

India’s new criminal laws represent a progressive step toward a more transparent, efficient,
and technologically advanced legal system. These reforms aim to enhance victim
protection, modernize evidence collection, expedite trials, and ensure fair treatment for all
stakeholders. Law enforcement, judiciary, and citizens must actively engage with these
changes to ensure their effective implementation and realization of justice in the new era.
 Observation Report on a Criminal Trial

Case Title: State vs. Rajesh Kumar

Court: District and Sessions Court, Delhi
Case Number: 2024/CR/5678
Date of Observation: August 14, 2024
Presiding Judge: Hon’ble Justice Ramesh Tiwari
Prosecutor: Advocate Priya Sharma (Public Prosecutor)
Defense Counsel: Advocate Mohan Mehta
Charges:

1. Section 302 (Murder) under Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023

2. Section 201 (Causing Disappearance of Evidence) under Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita

(BNS), 2023

Introduction

This report details the observation of a criminal trial involving a charge of murder.
The objective of attending the trial was to understand court procedures, the roles of
legal professionals, and how evidence is presented and evaluated in a criminal case.

Background of the Case

Rajesh Kumar, a 35-year-old businessman, was accused of murdering his business partner,
Anil Sharma, following a financial dispute over company funds. The prosecution alleged that
on the night of March 10, 2024, Rajesh invited Anil to his office, where an argument
ensued.
Rajesh allegedly struck Anil with a blunt object, causing fatal injuries.

After the crime, Rajesh allegedly attempted to dispose of evidence by cleaning the crime
scene and discarding the murder weapon. The police launched an investigation after
receiving an anonymous tip, leading to the discovery of incriminating forensic evidence.
 Stages of the Criminal Trial

1. Registration of FIR & Investigation

 On March 11, 2024, Anil Sharma’s family reported him missing.

 The police registered an FIR (First Information Report) under Section 154 of
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.

 Investigation officers visited Rajesh’s office and found traces of blood, leading to
forensic examination.

2. Arrest & Chargesheet Filing

 Rajesh was arrested on March 15, 2024, based on forensic reports and CCTV
footage.

 The police filed a chargesheet under Section 173, BNSS, 2023, listing:

o CCTV footage showing Rajesh entering and exiting the crime scene.

o Forensic evidence linking blood samples to the victim.

o Call records indicating Rajesh’s location at the time of the crime.

Trial Proceedings

3. Framing of Charges

 On May 1, 2024, the court framed charges under:

o Section 302, BNS (Murder) – Life imprisonment or death penalty.

o Section 201, BNS (Destruction of Evidence) – Up to 7 years of

imprisonment.

 Rajesh pleaded not guilty, and the court set dates for trial.

4. Prosecution’s Case (Evidence Presentation)

 The prosecution, led by Advocate Priya Sharma, presented the following evidence:

(a) Eyewitness Testimonies

 The security guard, Sunil Verma, testified that he heard loud arguments from the
office before Rajesh left in a hurry.

 A neighboring shopkeeper, Ramesh Yadav, testified that Rajesh was the last person
seen with Anil Sharma.

(b) Forensic Evidence

 Bloodstains matching Anil Sharma’s DNA were found at the crime scene.

 Fingerprint analysis confirmed Rajesh had handled the suspected murder weapon.

(c) CCTV Footage

 Footage from an office security camera showed Rajesh entering the premises at 9:00
PM and leaving at 11:15 PM.

 No other individuals were seen entering or exiting the office during this time.

(d) Call Records & Digital Evidence

 Rajesh’s phone was tracked near the crime scene at the estimated time of death.

 He made multiple calls to a cleaning service shortly after the alleged crime, which
the prosecution argued was an attempt to destroy evidence.

5. Examination of the Accused (Section 313, BNSS, 2023)

 Rajesh was given a chance to explain the evidence against him.

 He denied all allegations, stating that he left before the crime occurred and
that someone else must have committed the murder.

 He failed to provide an alibi or explain why his fingerprints were found on the
weapon.
 6. Defense’s Case

Rajesh’s lawyer, Advocate Mohan Mehta, attempted to discredit the prosecution by arguing:

1. No Direct Eyewitness: The prosecution lacked a direct witness to the murder.

2. Business Rivalry: Rajesh was being framed by competitors.

3. Alternative Suspects: Anil Sharma had other financial disputes, and someone else
could have been responsible.

However, the defense’s arguments were weakened because:

 Rajesh’s alibi witness failed to provide credible testimony.

 His DNA and fingerprints were found at the crime scene.

 He had no explanation for the CCTV footage contradicting his claims.

7. Final Arguments

Prosecution

Argument:

 Advocate Priya Sharma stated that Rajesh’s motive, forensic evidence, and
digital records provided a strong circumstantial case proving his guilt.

Defense Argument:

 Advocate Mohan Mehta argued that circumstantial evidence was not enough for a
conviction and that the police investigation was biased.

Judgment (Verdict)

On August 14, 2024, after analyzing the evidence, the court held that:

 The forensic and CCTV evidence proved Rajesh’s presence at the crime scene.

 The bloodstains and fingerprints directly linked Rajesh to the crime.

  Rajesh’s attempt to mislead the court and lack of an alibi further strengthened the
prosecution’s case.

The judge found Rajesh Kumar guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to:

 Life imprisonment under Section 302, BNS.

 Five years imprisonment under Section 201, BNS for tampering with evidence.

Observations from the Trial

1. Role of Digital Evidence

 CCTV footage and mobile records were key in placing the accused at the crime
scene.

 The case demonstrated how digital evidence plays a critical role in modern criminal
investigations.

2. Importance of Forensic Science

 DNA analysis and fingerprint matching provided conclusive proof of the accused’s
involvement.

3. Fair Trial Principles

 The accused was given an opportunity to present his defense.

 The prosecution and defense followed procedural fairness, and the judgment was
based on evidence, not speculation.

4. Role of the Judge

 The judge remained neutral and analytical, ensuring due process was followed.

 The court considered both circumstantial and forensic evidence before reaching a
verdict.
 Conclusion

This criminal trial provided valuable insights into legal procedures, evidentiary rules,
and the adversarial system of justice. The case illustrated:

 The importance of forensic and digital evidence in criminal trials.

 The step-by-step functioning of a court from FIR to final judgment.

 The significance of cross-examination in challenging evidence.

Overall, observing this case was an enlightening experience, showcasing the practical
application of criminal law in ensuring justice.
 CLIENT
COUNSELLING
 Client counselling is a fundamental aspect of legal practice that involves understanding a
client's issues, analysing legal options, and providing professional advice to help them
make informed decisions. It is a structured process where a lawyer or legal professional
listens to the client's concerns, gathers relevant facts, explains legal rights and
responsibilities, and outlines potential courses of action.

Effective client counselling requires a combination of legal knowledge, communication

skills, empathy, and ethical considerations. The objective is to build trust, ensure clarity, and
guide clients through legal complexities while considering their personal, financial, and
emotional circumstances.

A successful counselling session involves:

1. Active Listening – Understanding the client's concerns without interruptions or

assumptions.

2. Legal Analysis – Applying relevant laws, precedents, and regulations to assess the
case.

3. Options & Advice – Presenting possible legal remedies, risks, and benefits.

4. Confidentiality & Ethics – Maintaining client privacy and ensuring professional

integrity.

5. Client Empowerment – Helping clients make well-informed decisions rather than

imposing solutions.

Client counselling is not just about legal problem-solving; it is about fostering a relationship
where clients feel heard, supported, and confident in their legal journey.
 Understanding the Process of Client Counselling
Client counselling serves two primary functions:
1. Assisting individuals in discussing, exploring, and understanding their thoughts and
emotions before taking any action.
2. Helping individuals determine their own solutions to their legal concerns.
Lawyers play a crucial role in guiding clients on how their legal issues can be resolved
within the framework of the law. Legal counselling is the process through which a lawyer
communicates professional legal advice to a client.
A client—whether an individual or a legal entity—seeks legal assistance from a lawyer.
The term "client" originates from the Latin word clients, meaning a person who utilizes the
services of a professional or organization. Counselling, in its broadest sense, involves one
person seeking guidance from another, often in exchange for payment. This relationship is
defined by a client’s need for assistance and the lawyer’s willingness and professional
expertise to provide it. Legal counselling, as a professional service, requires not only
competence but also adherence to ethical standards. Under the Consumer Protection Act,
1986, legal counselling is recognized as a "service," making lawyers accountable for any
deficiencies in their professional conduct.

Client Interviewing
During a lawyer-client consultation, the client expresses their issues, concerns, and
expectations, while the lawyer actively listens, takes notes, and seeks further details as
needed. This interaction, which involves exchanging information, perspectives, and legal
needs through verbal communication, is known as client interviewing. It is a fundamental
component of legal practice and influences various tasks, such as presenting legal options,
drafting documents, advocating for the client, and preparing for legal proceedings.
Objectives of Client Interviewing
1. Gathering Factual Details
Lawyers must thoroughly understand the facts of a client’s situation, as these serve as
the foundation for legal proceedings. Clients may recognize legal problems but often
lack awareness of which facts or documents are legally significant. A lawyer’s
responsibility is to extract and assess relevant details, including factual
circumstances, emotional aspects (such as distress or frustration), and identifying
potential witnesses or documentation.
2. Building Professional Trust
Establishing a strong professional relationship is essential in client counselling. The
lawyer must reassure the client that their interests will be safeguarded with diligence
and confidentiality. Mutual trust is the cornerstone of this relationship—without it,
clients may withhold crucial information or feel hesitant to discuss sensitive matters.
Lawyers must uphold strict confidentiality as mandated by Bar Council guidelines,
ensuring that clients feel secure in disclosing details necessary for their case.
 3. Understanding Client Expectations
A lawyer must comprehend the client’s expectations, concerns, and desired outcomes.
This ensures that legal advice aligns with the client's needs. Satisfied clients not only
lead to successful cases but also contribute to a lawyer’s professional reputation.

Initial vs. Subsequent Interviews

Legal matters often require ongoing communication between the lawyer and the client. While
some issues may be resolved in a single counselling session, others demand continuous
consultation, especially in court proceedings or complex legal disputes.
The initial interview is particularly significant as it lays the groundwork for the lawyer-client
relationship. A poorly conducted first interview can weaken the case's foundation, especially
if it involves sensitive or complex legal matters.
Clients may enter the consultation feeling anxious or uncertain, making it important for
lawyers to create a welcoming environment. Simple gestures—such as offering refreshments,
maintaining a well-lit and comfortable office, and ensuring privacy—can help clients feel at
ease and encourage open communication.

Effective Interviewing Techniques

Interviewing a client is a purposeful task that requires attention to detail. Lawyers
should adopt the following practices:
 Active Listening – The fact that a client has chosen a particular lawyer indicates
trust. Providing uninterrupted attention and acknowledging the client's concerns will
reinforce this trust.
 Empathy and Patience – Clients may be distressed about matters related to
their property, safety, or liberty. Lawyers must listen attentively and respond
with
understanding.
 Controlled Communication – Lawyers should be mindful of their tone and phrasing.
Interruptions should be minimized, and silences should be allowed when necessary to
encourage the client to share information.
 Encouraging Expression – Creating an atmosphere where clients feel comfortable
expressing their concerns is essential. However, lawyers must maintain objectivity
and avoid being emotionally swayed to ensure logical and critical legal analysis.

Key Considerations Before Counselling

Before providing legal advice, a lawyer must have a clear understanding of:
1. The facts and details of the client’s situation.
2. The client’s perspectives, concerns, and expectations.
 3. Possible costs, risks, and legal consequences involved.
4. Applicable laws and legal precedents.
5. Ethical and moral considerations, including fairness and justice.
6. Professional responsibilities as outlined by the Bar Council Code of Ethics.

During the Counselling Session

While providing legal advice, lawyers must ensure that:
 Communication is Clear – Legal terminology should be simplified so that clients
fully understand their rights, obligations, and available options.
 All Possible Legal Solutions Are Discussed – Clients should be informed of
different legal courses of action, along with their potential outcomes and
costs.
 Clients Are Not Pressured – The decision-making process should be client-led,
ensuring they feel empowered rather than compelled to take a particular course
of
action.
 Litigation Is Not Encouraged Unnecessarily – Lawyers should remain
objective and honest, clearly discussing both the strengths and weaknesses of
the case.

Elements of Effective Legal Counselling

Providing sound legal counsel depends on several critical factors:
 Thorough Knowledge of the Law – Lawyers must stay updated on statutory
laws, case precedents, and procedural requirements.
 Logical and Analytical Thinking – Legal counselling requires critical thinking to
evaluate the client’s situation objectively.
 Strong Interpersonal Skills – The ability to establish rapport and conduct
effective interviews enhances the lawyer’s ability to gather crucial
information.
 Comprehension of Client Needs – Understanding a client’s legal and emotional
concerns ensures more effective representation.
 Continuous Learning – Keeping pace with legal developments, amendments,
and judicial rulings is vital to providing up-to-date legal advice.
 Effective Communication – Lawyers must convey their advice clearly and
concisely, ensuring that clients grasp their legal position and available
options.
By combining legal expertise with strong communication and analytical skills, lawyers can
provide comprehensive and effective client counselling, ensuring that clients receive
informed guidance and support in their legal matters.
 CLIENT NAME: - Mrs. Mehta
DATE OF COUNSELING SESSION: - 15th August, 2023

On 15th August 2023, Mrs. Mehta arrived at my sir’s office, and we welcomed her with
coffee to ensure she felt comfortable before beginning the discussion. My sir then asked her
to explain her legal concern.

Mrs. Mehta informed us that she had invested a substantial amount in Green Future Realty
Pvt. Ltd., a real estate company, for the purchase of an apartment under their pre-launch
scheme. As per the agreement, the possession of the apartment was supposed to be handed
over to her by July 2023. However, despite multiple follow-ups, the company neither
delivered the apartment nor refunded her investment. Upon further inquiry, she discovered
that the project had been delayed indefinitely, and many other investors were facing a
similar issue.

She sought legal advice on how to proceed against the company. My sir explained that since
the company had breached the agreement, the first step would be to send a legal notice
under Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, claiming compensation for loss or
damage caused by the breach. Additionally, if the company fails to respond, we could
proceed by filing a case before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) under the Real
Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, to ensure the enforcement of her rights as
an allottee.

Furthermore, my sir mentioned that if there was fraudulent misrepresentation, we could also
explore criminal proceedings under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which
deals with cheating and dishonestly inducing the delivery of property. This section
prescribes imprisonment of up to seven years and a fine for those found guilty of fraudulent
activities.

Mrs. Mehta was satisfied with the legal advice provided and agreed to proceed with the legal
notice first. My sir then discussed the fee structure with her. The next meeting was
scheduled for the following week, where she was asked to bring all relevant documents,
including the agreement, payment receipts, and correspondence with the company.
 CLIENT COUNSELING REPORT 2

CLIENT NAME: - Mr. Arvind Patel

DATE OF COUNSELING SESSION: - 5th September, 2023

On 5th September 2023, Mr. Arvind Patel visited my sir’s office. We welcomed him
with coffee to ensure he felt at ease before beginning the discussion. My sir then asked
him to explain his legal issue.

Mr. Patel informed us that he had entered into a rental agreement with a tenant, Mr. Rohit
Sharma, for his commercial property located in Ahmedabad. As per the agreement, the
tenant was required to pay a monthly rent of ₹50,000. However, for the past six months, the
tenant had defaulted on rent payments despite multiple reminders. Moreover, when Mr. Patel
attempted to contact him, the tenant refused to vacate the premises and even threatened legal
action.

Mr. Patel sought legal advice on how to recover his dues and reclaim possession of his
property. My sir explained that since the tenant had violated the terms of the lease, the first
step would be to issue a legal eviction notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882, giving him a reasonable period to vacate the premises. If he fails to comply, we
can proceed with an eviction suit before the Rent Control Tribunal.

Additionally, for recovery of the unpaid rent, my sir suggested filing a money recovery suit
under Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), 1908, which provides for a summary suit
in cases of non-payment of rent. If necessary, we could also initiate criminal proceedings
under Section 406 (Criminal Breach of Trust) and Section 420 (Cheating) of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, if there is evidence of fraudulent intent.

Mr. Patel was satisfied with the advice and agreed to proceed with the legal notice first. My
sir then discussed the professional fees and asked Mr. Patel to bring all relevant documents,
including the rental agreement, proof of defaulted payments, and communication records,
to the next meeting, which was scheduled for the following week.
 CLIENT COUNSELING REPORT 3

CLIENT NAME: - Mrs. Radhika Sharma

DATE OF COUNSELING SESSION: - 20th October, 2023

On 20th October 2023, Mrs. Radhika Sharma arrived at my sir’s office for a legal
consultation. We greeted her with coffee to make her comfortable before starting
the discussion. My sir then asked her to explain the issue she was facing.

Mrs. Sharma stated that she had purchased gold jewelry worth ₹5 lakhs from Shine
Jewelers Pvt. Ltd. in Mumbai. The jeweler had assured her that the gold was 22-karat
certified and provided an invoice mentioning the same. However, upon a later verification
with an independent jeweler, she discovered that the gold was only 18-karat, meaning she
had been misled and overcharged for the purchase. When she approached the jeweler for
clarification, they refused to accept any wrongdoing and declined to issue a refund or
replacement.

She sought legal advice on how to take action against the jeweler for misrepresentation
and fraud. My sir explained that this was a clear case of consumer fraud and advised the
following legal steps:

Sending a Legal Notice: The first step would be to issue a legal notice to the jeweler
under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, demanding a refund or replacement.

Filing a Complaint in Consumer Court: If the jeweler fails to comply, we can file a complaint
before the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (District Forum) seeking
compensation for financial loss and mental harassment.

Criminal Proceedings: Since fraud was involved, a case could also be filed under Section 415
and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deal with cheating and dishonestly
inducing the delivery of property.

Approaching the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS): As the BIS hallmark certification was
misrepresented, we could also file a complaint with the BIS Authority for action against the
jeweler.

Mrs. Sharma was satisfied with the advice and agreed to proceed with the legal notice. My
sir then discussed the fee structure and asked her to bring all relevant documents, including
the
invoice, jeweler’s certification, and independent testing reports, for the next meeting,
which was scheduled for the following week.
INTERNSHIP REPORT

Academic Year:

Weeks:

Date: From:

At:

Under the Guidance of:

 Worked on:

Observation and outcome:

INTERNSHIP
CERTIFICATES