PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  

Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Foreword  
Food   defense   is   a   collective   term   used   to   describe   efforts   to   prevent   intentional  
contamination   of   food   products   by   biological,   chemical,   physical   or   radiological   agents   that  
are  not  reasonably  likely  to  occur  in  the  food  supply.  It  is  different  from  the  concept  of  food  
safety,   which   involves   efforts   to   protect   food   products   from   unintentional   and   naturally  
occurring   contamination   by   agents   reasonably   likely   to   occur   in   the   food   supply.   More  
often,  food  defense  is  confused  with  food  safety.    

This   Food   Defense   Guidance   for   Industry   was   developed   in   order   to   provide   a   general  
overview   of   the   food   defense   concepts,   principles,   elements   and   procedures.   This  
document   will   eventually   assist   the   food   industry   in   complying   with   future   regulatory  
requirements   of   importing   countries   such   as   the   United   States   and   national   regulatory  
requirements   such   as   that   of   the   National   Meat   Inspection   Service.   In   2013,   Republic   Act  
(RA)  10536  ammended  the  Meat  Inspection  Code  of  the  Philippines  (RA  9296),  to  include  a  
division   at   the   National   Meat   Inspection   Service   (NMIS)   on   “Enforcement   and   Food  
Defense.”  This  division  shall  be  responsible  for  the  enforcement  of  policies  against  hot  meat  
and   adulterated   or   misbranded   meat  products,  and  the  protection  of  meat  products   from  
hazardous  contaminants.  

A   Technical   Working   Group   (TWG)   was   created   through   Special   Order   Nos.   106   and   201  
Series   of   2013   to   develop   the   draft   Food   Defense   Guidance   for   Industry.   The   TWG  
represented   the   relevant   agencies   of   the   Department   of   Agriculture   (DA),   Department   of  
Health   (DOH),   University   of   the   Philippines   (UP),   and   the   private   sector.   Public  
consultations   were   conducted   in   Davao,   Cebu,   and   the   National   Capital   Region   (NCR),  
which   represented   the   major   exporting   regions   in   the   Philippines.   Comments   and  
recommendations   were   solicited   from   the   relevant   government   agencies,   academe,   private  
sector  and  non-­‐government  organizations.    Therefore,  this  Guidance  Document  is  the  final  
output   of   the   public-­‐private   sector   collaboration   between   and   among   the   TWG   and   the  
relevant  stakeholders  who  participated  in  the  public  consultations.          

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
1. Introduction  
Food   defense   is   a   collective   term   used   to   describe   efforts   to   prevent   intentional  
contamination   of   food   products   by   biological,   chemical,   physical   or   radiological   agents   that  
are  not  reasonably  likely  to  occur  in  the  food  supply.  It  is  different  from  the  concept  of  food  
safety,   which   involves   efforts   to   protect   food   products   from   unintentional   and   naturally  
occurring  contamination  by  agents  reasonably  likely  to  occur  in  the  food  supply.  

After   the   September   11   attack   in   2001,   the   United   States   (US)   signed   into   law   the  
Bioterrorism   Act   of   2002   which   aimed   to   improve   the   capacity   of   the   United   States   to  
prevent,  detect  and  respond  to  terrorist  acts.  Concern  for  the  food  safety  of  the  food  supply,  
which   can   be   a   target   of   terrorist   attacks,   also   came   into   the   fore.   With   it   came   a   basic  
understanding   to   better   secure   the   food   supply.   In   2002,   the   Homeland   Security   Act  
provided   the   basis   for   the   Department   of   Homeland   Security   to   be   responsible   for  
protecting   critical   infrastructure,   including   food   and   agriculture.   In   2003,   Homeland  
Security   Presidential   Directive   9   established   the   policy   of   improving   intelligence,  
emergency   response,   mitigation   strategies   and   vulnerability   assessments   to   defend   food  
and  agriculture  against  terrorism,  major  disasters  and  other  emergencies.  Food  terrorism,  
as   defined   by   the   World   Health   Organization   (WHO),   is   an   act   or   threat   of   deliberate  
contamination   of   food   for   human   consumption   with   chemical,   biological,   radionuclear  
agents  for  the  purpose  of  causing  injury  or  death  to  civilian  populations  and/or  disrupting  
social,   economic   and   political   instability.   Physical   hazards   may   similarly   be   intentionally  
introduced   to   a   food   system   by   a   perpetrator.   Since   then,   the   term   food   terrorism   has  
evolved  and  was  replaced  by  food  defense.  Food  defense  has  now  become  a  part  of  an  even  
larger   concept   of   food   protection,   which   also   encompasses   food   safety   and   food   quality.  
Currently,    the  US  Food  Safety  Modernization  Act  (FSMA)  requires  the  US  Food  and  Drug  
Administration  (USFDA)  to  issue  regulations  to  protect  against  the  intentional  adulteration  
of  food.  The  following  sections  of  FSMA  relate  to  intentional  adulteration  or  food  defense:  

• Section   103:   Hazard   Analysis   and   Risk-­‐Based   Preventive   Controls   –“identify   and  
evaluate   hazards   that   may   be   intentionally   introduced,   including   by   acts   of  
terrorism”  
• Section  105:  Standards  for  Produce  Safety  –  “consider  hazards  that  occur  naturally,  
may  be  unintentionally  introduced,  or  may  be  intentionally  introduced,  including  by  
acts  of  terrorism”  
• Section   106:   Protection   Against   Intentional   Adulteration   –   “issue   regulations   and  
guidance  to  protect  against  intentional  adulteration  of  food”  
• Section  108:  National  Agriculture  and  Food  Defense  Strategy  –  “a  strategic  planning  
document  that  is  in  the  process  of  development”  

The  Asia-­‐Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC)  likewise  identified  food  defense  as  having  
potential   impact   on   trade   and   measures   were   recognized   as   integral   to   protecting   the   food  
supply.   APEC   endorsed   a   set   of   nine   (9)   Food   Defense   Principles   in   2007   and   created   an  
APEC  Food  Defense  Pilot  Program  in  2008  in  an  effort  to  put  the  principles  into  practice.  
The   Philippines   was   one   of   the   four   (4)   pilot   economies   of   the   APEC   Food   Defense   Pilot  
Program  conducted  in  2011.    

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
In   2012,   the   Department   of   Agriculture,   with   the   Bureau   of   Agriculture   and   Fisheries  
Product   Standards   (BAFPS)   as   Technical   Secretariat,   created   a   private-­‐public   sector   Food  
Defense   Technical   Working   Group   (TWG)   and   conducted   a   food   defense   awareness  
seminar-­‐workshop  series  to  continue  the  information  dissemination  initiatives  started  by  
APEC.  The  Food  Defense  TWG  will  also  provide  recommendations  on  sustainable  national  
initiatives  related  to  food  defense.  
In  2013,  Republic  Act  (RA)  10536  amended  the  Meat  Inspection  Code  of  the  Philippines  (RA  
9296),   to   include   a   division   at   the   National   Meat   Inspection   Service   (NMIS)   on  
“Enforcement   and   Food   Defense.”   This   division   shall   be   responsible   for   the   enforcement   of  
policies  against  hot  meat  and  adulterated  or  misbranded  meat  products,  and  the  protection  
of  meat  products  from  hazardous  contaminants.    
In  view  of  the  national  and  international  concerns  on  food  defense,  this  guidance  document  
and   its   annex   was   drafted   for   the   Philippine   food   industry,   with   the   purpose   of   providing   a  
general  overview  of  the  food  defense  concepts,  principles,  elements  and  procedures.  This  
document   will   eventually   assist   the   food   industry   in   complying   with   future   regulatory  
requirements   of   importing   countries   such   as   the   United   States   and   national   regulatory  
requirements  such  as  that  of  NMIS.  
 

2. Objective  and  Scope  

This   guidance   document   is   designed   to   aid   farmers/producers   and   processors   of   food   to  
understand  the  basic  concepts  and  principles  of  food  defense  and  develop  a  food  defense  
plan  within  their  establishment.    Specifically,  it  aims  to:  
a. Provide  a  general  overview  of  food  defense;  
b. Introduce  the  concept  and  process  of  conducting  a  vulnerability  assessment;  and    
c. Assist  in  developing  a  basic  food  defense  plan  or  improving  an  existing  food  defense  
plan.  

This  guidance  document  can  be  used  by  all  sectors  in  the  food  supply  chain,  including  farms  
particularly  those  engaged  in  retailing  of  fresh  produce  or  minimally  processed  products,  
aquaculture   facilities,   fishing   and   holding   vessels,   meat   establishments,   transportation  
operations/facilities,   processing,   packing   and   warehousing   facilities.   It   is   not   intended   as  
guidance  for  retail  food  stores  and  food  service  establishments.  
 

 
 

 
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
3. Definition  of  Terms  

For  the  purpose  of  this  document,  the  following  terms  are  operationally  defined:  

Adulteration  –  refers  to  an  act  which  leads  to  the  production  of  food  which:  
(a) bears   or   contains   any   poisonous   or   deleterious   substance   that   may   render   it  
injurious  to  the  health  of  the  public;  
(b) bears   or   contains   any   added   poisonous   or   deleterious   substance   in   amounts  
exceeding   established   maximum   limits   or   standards   for   good   manufacturing  
practice;  
(c) contains  in  whole  or  in  part  filthy,  putrid  or  decomposed  substance  that  is  unfit  for  
human  consumption;  
(d) has  been  prepared,  packed  or  held  under  unsanitary  conditions;  
(e) in  whole  or  in  part,  is  the  product  of  a  diseased  animal  which  has  died  through  ways  
other  than  slaughter;  
(f) is  in  a  container  having  in  whole  or  in  part  poisonous  or  deleterious  substance;  
(g) has   been   intentionally   subjected   to   radiation   unless   the   use   of   radiation   is   in  
conformity  with  an  existing  regulation  or  exemption;  
(h) becomes   injurious   to   health   because   of   the   omission   or   abstraction   of   a   valuable  
constituent;   or   if   any   substance   has   been   substituted   wholly   or   in   part,   or   if  
damaged   or   made   inferior   which   has   been   concealed   in   any   manner;   or   if   any  
substance  has  been  added  thereto  or  mixed  or  packed  therewith  so  as  to  increase  its  
bulk  or  weight  or  reduce  its  strength  or  to  make  it  appear  better  or  greater  than  it  
is;  
(i) has   not   been   prepared   in   accordance   with   current   acceptable   manufacturing  
practice  as  promulgated  by  way  of  regulation;  and  
(j) uses  expired  ingredients.  
 
Agent   –   a   biological,   chemical,   physical   or   radiological   poison,   which   may   be   used   for  
intentional  or  terrorist  acts.  

CARVER  +  Shock  -­‐  a  vulnerability  assessment  tool  that  can  be  used  to  assess  and  prioritize  
the  vulnerabilities  within  a  system  or  infrastructure  in  the  food  industry.  CARVER  +  Shock  
is   an   acronym   for   six   attributes   used   to   evaluate   the   attractiveness   of   a   target   for   attack,  
namely   criticality,   accessibility,   recognizability,   vulnerability,   effect,   recuperability   and  
shock.  
Critical  Node  –  specific  point  in  the  food  supply  chain  where  intentional  contamination  has  
the  greatest  potential  to  cause  economic  and  public  health  harm.  
Counterfeit  -­‐  to  make  imitation  of  something  else  with  the  intent  to  defraud  or  deceive.  

Diversion  -­‐  the  act  of  turning  something  aside  from  its  intended  course  or  purpose.  

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Economically  Motivated  Adulteration  -­‐  an  economic  gain  or  increase  in  profit  resulting  
from  malicious/  fraudulent,  intentional  addition/substitution  of  a  substance  in  a  product  to  
increase  the  value  of  the  product  or  reduce  the  cost  of  production.  
Food   –   refers   to   any   substance   or   product   whether   processed,   partially   processed   or  
unprocessed   that   is   intended   for   human   consumption.   It   includes   drinks,   chewing   gum,  
water   and   other   substances   which   are   intentionally   incorporated   into   the   food   during   its  
manufacture,  preparation  and  treatment.  
Food  Defense  -­‐  effort  to  prevent  intentional  contamination  of  food  products  by  biological,  
chemical,   physical,   or   radiological   agents   that   are   not   reasonably   likely   to   occur   in   the   food  
supply.    
Food   Defense   Plan   -­‐   a   written   plan   used   to   record   practices   implemented   to  
control/reduce  the  potential  for  an  intentional  contamination  event  and  thereby  reduce  the  
overall  vulnerability  of  the  assessed  food  operation.  
Food   Safety   –   refers   to   the   assurance   that   food   will   not   cause   harm   to   the   consumer   when  
it   is   prepared   or   eaten   according   to   its   intended   use.   It   also   refers   to   efforts   to   protect   food  
products   from   unintentional   and   naturally   occurring   contamination   by   agents   reasonably  
likely  to  occur  in  the  food  supply.    

Food   Supply   Chain   –   refers   to   all   stages   in   the   production   of   food   from   primary  
production,   post   harvest   handling,   distribution,   processing   and   preparation   for   human  
consumption.   Preparation   is   the   cooking   or   other   treatments   to   which   food   is   subjected  
prior  to  its  consumption.  

Food   Terrorism   -­‐   an   act   or   threat   of   deliberate   contamination   of   food   for   human  
consumption   with   chemical,   biological,   radionuclear   agents   for   the   purpose   of   causing  
injury   or   death   to   civilian   populations   and/or   disrupting   social,   economic   and   political  
instability.  
Hazard  -­‐  a  biological,  chemical,  radiological,  or  physical  agent,  in  or  condition  of,  food  with  
the  potential  to  cause  an  adverse  health  effect.  

Hot  Meat  –  the  carcass  or  parts  of  a  carcass  or  food  animals  which  were  slaughtered  from  
unregistered/unaccredited   meat   establishments   and   have   not   undergone   the   required  
inspection.  It  also  includes  undocumented,  illegally  shipped  and  unregistered  carcass  and  
meat   products   coming   from   other   countries   and   those   that   are   classified   as   hot   meat   by  
NMIS.    

Meat   Establishment   –   premises   such   as   slaughterhouse,   poultry   dressing   plant,   meat  

processing   plant,   cold   storage,   warehouse   and   other   meat   outlets   that   are   approved   and  
registered   by   NMIS   in   which   food   animals   or   meat   products   are   slaughtered,   prepared,  
processed,  handled,  packed  or  stored.  

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Mitigation   Strategy   -­‐   science-­‐based   procedures,   practices,   or   processes   that   would   be  
employed   to   significantly   minimize   or   prevent   the   vulnerabilities   identified   in   a  
vulnerability  assessment.  
Prevention   -­‐   actions   taken   to   avoid   an   incident   or   to   intervene   to   stop   an   incident   from  
occurring.  
Prioritize  -­‐  process  of  using  the  results  of  the  vulnerability  assessment  to  identify  where  
the  reduction  of  risk  is  needed  and  has  to  be  reinforced.  
Radiological  –  involving  radioactive  materials.  
Radionuclear/radionuclide  -­‐  a  chemical  substance  that  exhibits  radioactivity.    

Recovery   -­‐   return-­‐to-­‐service   activities   that   industry   and   government   must   undertake   to  
assure   consumers   the   products   will   be   safe   and   secure   following   an   event.   The  
development,  coordination  and  execution  of  service  and  site-­‐restoration  plans  for  impacted  
communities   and   the   reconstitution   of   government   operations   and   services   through  
individual,  private  sector,  non-­‐government  and  public  assistance  programs.  
Response  -­‐  activities  that  address  the  short-­‐term,  direct  effects  of  an  incident  (e.g.  save  and  
limit   loss   of   life   and   property,   meet   basic   human   needs,   execution   of   emergency   plans,  
apply  intelligence  to  lessen  consequences,  immunizations,  law  enforcement  operations).  
Risk  -­‐  a  function  of  the  probability  of  an  adverse  health  effect  and  the  severity  of  that  effect,  
consequential  to  a  hazard(s)  in  food.  
Risk   Assessment   –   a   scientifically   based   process   consisting   of   the   following   steps:   (i)  
hazard   identification,   (ii)   hazard   characterization,   (iii)   exposure   assessment,   and   (iv)   risk    
characterization.  
Sabotage   -­‐   destruction   of   the   employers   property   or   the   hindering   of   manufacturing   by  
discontented  workers/perpetrators.  
Tainted  -­‐    to  affect  with  decay  or  putrefaction;  spoiled;  contaminated.    

Tampering  -­‐  to  interfere  with  the  food  in  a  harmful  way  by  adding  or  influencing  it  with  
something  else.  
Vulnerability   -­‐   a   weakness   in   the   design,   implementation   or   operation   of   an   asset   or  
system  that  can  be  exploited  by  an  adversary.  
Vulnerability   Assessment-­‐   process   of   identifying   and   prioritizing   the   weaknesses  
(vulnerabilities)  in  a  food  operation.  The  process  is  used  to  identify  specific  points  in  the  
food   supply   chain   where   intentional   contamination   has   the   greatest   potential   to   cause  
economic  and  public  health  harm.  
 
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
4. Food  Defense  Principles  and  Concepts  
There  are  generally  two  (2)  types  of  food  contamination:  (1)  unintentional/accidental  and  
(2)  intentional  as  shown  in   Figure  1.  Food  defense  is  the  protection  of  food  products  from  
intentional  contamination  by  biological,  chemical,  physical,  or  radiological  agents  that  are  
not   reasonably   likely   to   occur   in   the   food   supply.   Human   intervention   is   the   source   of  
intentional  contamination.  Food  defense  encompasses  intentional  contamination,  economic  
adulteration,  disgruntled  employees/sabotage,  and  counterfeiting/diversion/tampering.  
On   the   other   hand,   food   safety   is   the   protection   of   food   products   from   unintentional  
contamination   by   agents   reasonably   likely   to   occur   in   the   food   supply.   Nature   and  
environment  are  the  main  sources  of  unintentional  contamination.  
 
 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 
 

*Denotes  mode  of  human  interference  with  wrongful  intent  

Figure  1.  Spectrum  of  Food  Contamination  (USFDA,  2011)  

 
Table   1   summarizes   the   major   differences   between   food   safety   and   food   defense.  
Differences   depend   upon   the   outcome,   contaminants/agents   used,   methods   of   analysis,  
prevention   and   control   strategies,   decontamination   and   disposal   and   communication  
considerations.  
 
 

 
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Table1.   Differences   Between   Food   Safety   and   Food   Defense   (adopted   from   Maczka,  
2008)  

Parameters   Food  Safety                         Food  Defense  

(Unintentional/Naturally  
Occuring  Contamination)   (Intentional  Contamination)  

Outcomes   May  involve  many  illnesses  but   Has  potential  to  result  in  many  
few  deaths   deaths  

Contaminants/Agents      

a. Biological   E.  coli  O157:H7  in  hamburger  ,   Heat  Resistant:  Bacillus  

Salmonella  in  peanut  butter,   anthracis  (anthrax),  
Listeria  monocytogenes  in  berries   Clostridium  botulinum  

Heat  Sensitive:  Yersinia  pestis  

(plague),  Vibrio  cholerae  

b. Chemical   Pesticide  residues   Heat  Resistant:  arsenic,  rat  

poison  
Cyanide  
 
Veterinary  drug  residues  
Heat  Sensitive:  ricin  

c. Physical     Metal,  bone,  rodent  droppings   Nails  

d. Radiological       Plutonium-­‐238,  Cesium-­‐137  

Method  of  Analysis   Risk  assessment   Vulnerability  assessment  

Prevention  and  Control   Good  Agricultural  Practices   Measures  or  actions  taken  to  
Strategies     (GAP),  Good  Animal  Husbandry   reduce  the  impact  of  
Practices  (GAHP),  Good   intentional  food  contamination  
Aquaculture  Practices  (GaqP),   at  vulnerable  points  in  a  facility  
Good  Hygienic  Practices  (GHP),   (e.g.  personnel  and  physical  
Good  Manufacturing  Practice   security)  as  well  as  
(GMP),  Sanitation  Standard   government  or  industry-­‐wide  
Operating  Procedures  (SSOP),   measures  (e.g.  surveillance,  
Hazard  Analysis  and  Critical   outreach  training)  
Control  Points  (HACCP)  

Decontamination  and   Can  be  cooked  or  sent  to  landfill.   Contaminated  food  may  be  
Disposal   Sanitation  procedures  should  be   hazardous  waste.  Need  to  
sufficient  for  cleaning  the  facility   identify  decontamination  
before  resuming  food  production.   techniques  and  confirm  facility  
is  free  of  residual  contaminant  
before  resuming  food  
production.  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Communication   Food  safety  education  needed  for   Much  public  concern,  therefore  
general  public  and  good  risk   extra  consideration  is  needed  
communication  strategies  needed   when  developing  risk  
by  industry  and  government.   communication  and  public  
education  messages  

In   recent   years,   the   more   prominent   type   of   intentional   contamination   is   Economically  

Motivated  Adulteration  (EMA).  EMA  is  the  malicious/fraudulent,  intentional  substitution  or  
addition  of  a  substance  in  a  product  to  increase  the  value  of  a  product  or  reduce  the  cost  of  
production.   EMA   can   take   many   forms   such   as   concealment,   counterfeiting,   unapproved  
enhancements,   mislabelling   or   substitution.   Cases   of   EMA   have   been   documented  
worldwide   (i.e.   melamine   in   milk,   unapproved   dyes   in   spices)   which   cost   the   global   food  
and  consumer  products  industry  billions  of  dollars  each  year.  Contributing  factors  that  lead  
to   EMA   are   the   expanding   global   marketplace   with   companies   having   less   control   over  
processes.  Tighter  economic  conditions  and  global  food  shortages,  which    create  imbalance,  
can  also  drive  fraudulent  activities.  
The   food   supply   is   a   soft   target,   thus   it   is   difficult   to   protect.   Deliberate   contamination  
could  occur  at  any  point  in  the  food  supply  chain  where  a  variety  of  people  can  have  access  
to.   These   people   can   include,   but   not   limited   to,   disgruntled   employees,   cleaning   crew,  
temporary  employees,  members  of  extremist  group  posing  as  employees,  suppliers,  truck  
drivers,  visitors,  organized  extremist  or  activist  group  contractors.  
Intentional   contamination   can   cause   significant   public   health   consequences   and  
widespread   public   fear.   It   can   have   devastating   economic   impacts   and   loss   of   public  
confidence   in   the   safety   of   food   and   in   the   effectiveness   of   government   to   protect  
consumers.  It  also  generally  disrupts  trade  and  can  increase  food  insecurity.  
Food   defense   supports   safety   and   quality   initiatives.   It   can   also   reduce   cost   of   security  
lapses  such  as  theft,  vandalism  and  unethical  business  practices.  Likewise,  more  buyers  are  
now  requiring  a  Food  Defense  Plan  from  their  suppliers.  A  Food  Defense  Plan  also  prepares  
the   industry   for   potential   regulatory   requirements   of   both   importing   and   exporting  
countries.  
A   Food   Defense   Program   is   built   upon   four   (4)   major   activities   -­‐   prevention,   preparedness,  
mitigation   response   and   recovery.   It   requires   cross-­‐sectoral   collaboration   among  
government,   food   industry,   public   health   systems,   academe   and   the   international  
community.   Government   can   develop   guidance,   resources/tools,   training   programs,  
research  and  emergency  preparedness.  The  academe  can  train  new  and  existing  workforce  
and  conduct  research.  Private  industries  can  share  best  practices  and  sample  food  defense  
plans.   Government   and   industry   can   collaborate   to   develop   policies   to   protect   the   food  
supply.  

 
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
5. Developing  a  Food  Defense  Plan  
A  Food  Defense  Plan  is  a  written  plan  to  reduce  the  risk  of  intentional  contamination  with  
low-­‐cost   or   no-­‐cost   mitigation   measures.   It   assesses   the   risk   of   an   attack   and   identify  
control  measures  to  minimize  the  risk.  A  Food  Defense  Plan  achieves  the  following:  

• Helps  protect  product  and  customers  

• Maintains  a  safe  working  environment  for  employees  
• Increases   establishment   preparedness   and   facilitates   appropriate   response   to   an  
emergency  
• Enhances  establishment  security  
• Helps  protect  a  company’s  bottomline  
An   effective   Food   Defense   Plan   starts   with   well-­‐implemented   prerequisite   programs   (ex.  
GMP   and   SSOP   programs).   Some   information   that   will   be   used   to   create   a   Food   Defense  
Plan  may  already  exist  in  a  company’s  SSOP,  Food  Recall  and  HACCP  Plans.  A  Food  Defense  
Plan   does   not   require   the   development   of   another   HACCP-­‐type   document.   However,   a  
HACCP  plan  should  not  be  used  as  a  substitute  for  a  Food  Defense  Plan  because  not  all  of  
the  critical  control  points  will  be  the  same,  considering  the  differences  between  food  safety  
and  food  defense.  

A  functional  Food  Defense  Plan  may  be  developed  following  these  steps:    
1. Development  of  a  Food  Defense  Plan  by  conducting  vulnerability  assessment;  
2. Implementation   of   the   Food   Defense   Plan   by   using   the   defense   measures  
identified;  
3. Testing  the  Food  Defense  Plan  by  periodic  monitoring  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  
defense  measures;  
4. Periodic   assessment   of   the   Food   Defense   Plan   by   reviewing   the   plan   and  
revising  as  necessary  especially  if  new  risks  are  discovered;  and  
5. Maintaining   and   sustaining   the   implementation   of   the   Food   Defense   Plan   to  
ensure  that  defense  measures  are  being  implemented  and  are  effective.  
Prior   to   developing   a   Food   Defense   Plan,   a   self   assessment   may   be   conducted   using   the  
sample   templates   provided   by   the   US   Department   of   Agriculture   Food   Safety   and  
Inspection   Service   (USDA-­‐   FSIS)   for   food   processing   plants    
(http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/63fb5993-­‐97ac-­‐4414-­‐b5d6-­‐
f9c329d13c74/Food_Defense_Plant_Brochure_Slaughter.pdf?MOD=AJPERES)    and  for  meat  
and   poultry   slaughtering   and   processing   plants  
(http://www.fsis.usda.gov/shared/PDF/Food_Defense_Plan.pdf).  
 
 

 
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
5.1            The  Basic  Food  Defense  Plan  
The  Basic  Food  Defense  Plan  has  four  (4)  base  components.  Each  base  component  has  sub-­‐
components  as  may  be  applicable  to  your  company.  They  are  as  follows:  
1.   Outside  Security    
                       1.1   property  perimeter  
         1.2   building  perimeter  
                       1.3       vehicles  
 
2.                  General  Inside  Security  
                         2.1   facility/plant  
                         2.2   utilities  
                         2.3   laboratory  
                         2.4               process  computer  systems  
 
3.                    Logistics,  Production  and  Storage  Security  
                           3.1             suppliers  and  vendors  
                           3.2             shipping  and  receiving  
                           3.3             incoming  shipments  
                           3.4             processing  and  production  
                           3.5             live  animals  
                           3.6             outgoing  shipments  
                           3.7   returned  products/goods  
                           3.8   ice/water/processing  aids  
                           3.9   storage  and  warehouse  
                           3.10   hazardous  materials/chemicals  
 
4.                      Management    
                             4.1          personnel  security  
                             4.2          food  defense  plan  
 
A  gap  assessment  should  be  done  to  evaluate  the  facility’s    existing  food  defense  measures  
in   the   components/areas   listed   above.   Designated   personnel   who   are   competent,  
understand   the   principles   of   food   defense   and   have   considerable   knowledge   about   the  
company  should  conduct  the  gap  assessment.  Weaknesses  in  processes,  infrastructures  and  
security   measures   which   provide   risks   for   intentional   food   contamination   are   identified.  
These  gaps  may  allow  possible  access  of  persons  with  ill  motives  and  introduce  agents  that  
are  hazards  to  food  safety.    
The   Food   Defense   Plan   Builder   is   a   user-­‐friendly   software   program   developed   by   the  
USFDA   designed   to   assist   food   facilities   in   the   development   of   their   individual   Food  
Defense  Plans.    The  tool  utilizes  the  existing  USFDA  tools,  guidance,  and  resources  on  food  
defense.     The   Food   Defense   Plan   Builder   can   be   downloaded   using   this   link:  
(http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/ToolsEducationalMaterials/ucm349888.htm).  
 

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
A  Basic  Food  Defense  Plan  should  detail  the  basic  information  about  the  company  and  the  
basic   food   defense   mitigation   measures.   Records   of   implementation   of   these   controls  
should   be   generated.   Monitoring   and   verification   of   implementation   should   likewise   be  
done   through   reviews,   assessments   and   audits.   Food   Defense   Plans   should   be   tested   for  
effectiveness.   Where   plans   are   weak   in   preventing   intentional   food   contamination,  
improvements   should   be   carried   out.   A   General   Food   Defense   Plan   developed   by   the   USDA  
–FSIS   can   be   accessed   at:   http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/99f95182-­‐0c9e-­‐
4214-­‐9762-­‐e98197f54ebf/General-­‐Food-­‐Defense-­‐Plan-­‐9-­‐3-­‐09+_2_.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.    
 
 
5.2            Vulnerability  Assessment  
 
Vulnerability   assessment   is   the   process   of   identifying   and   prioritizing   the   weaknesses  
(vulnerabilities)   in   a   food   operation.   It   allows   evaluation   of   individual   unit   operations   in  
the   process   to   identify   those   that   might   be   at   greatest   risk.   The   specific   point   in   the   food  
supply  chain  where  intentional  contamination  has  the  greatest  potential  to  cause  economic  
and  public  health  harm  is  called  a  critical  node.  
 
In  conducting  a  vulnerability  assessment,  the  following  general  steps  are  followed:  
1. Sketch  a  detailed  flowchart  of  the  operation,  validate  for  correctness  by  conducting  
a  walk-­‐through  in  the  facility;  
2. Identify  major  process,  storage  and  distribution  steps;  
3. Identify   vulnerabilities   based   on   a   number   of   criteria,   or   depending   on   the  
vulnerability  assessment  tool  applicable;  
4. Rank  the  unit  operation/s  based  on  vulnerability  scores  or  risks;  and  
5. Establish  mitigation  measures  for  the  unit  operation/s  most  vulnerable  to  attack.  
 
Vulnerability   assessment   requires   the   active   participation   of   all   members   of   the   Food  
Defense   Team,   with   everyone   contributing   to   a   democratic   decision-­‐making.   A   Food  
Defense   Team   should   represent   all   the   departments   in   the   facility   and   should   be   multi-­‐
functional.   The   size   of   the   Food   Defense   Team   depends   on   the   size   of   the   facility   and  
availability   of   resources.   While   assessment   of   the   contributions   of   people   and   physical  
structure   on   vulnerability   of   a   commodity   to   intentional   contaminations   may   be   easily  
done   and   addressed   using   the   earlier   discussed   Food   Defense   Plan   Builder   tool   for   gaps  
assessment,   vulnerability   assessment   of   the   food   processing   operation   entails   a   more  
rigorous   process,   tracing   each   step   of   the   process   flow,   and   including   all   sub-­‐processing  
facilities  found  within  the  same  area.  
 
For  example,  if  a  particular  ingredient  is  manufactured  in  the  same  facility  where  a  product  
is  processed,  the  process  flow  for  that  particular  ingredient  should  similarly  be  subjected  to  
vulnerability   assessment.   While   a   technology-­‐intensive   and   fully-­‐automated   process   may  
have   few   or   no   vulnerability,   a   labor-­‐intensive   and   highly   manual   process   exposed   to  
human   contact   may   have   too   many.   Aside   from   identifying   the   vulnerabilities   of   the  
process,   there   is   therefore   a   need   to   determine   the   relative   importance   of   the   identified  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
weaknesses,   so   the   Food   Defense   Team   can   prioritize   the   more   significant   (or   more  
vulnerable)  steps  that  need  immediate  mitigation.  
 
Vulnerability   in   a   process   flow   is   a   weakness   in   any   of   the   unit   operations   where  
intentional  contamination  can  take  place.  These  operations  include  handling  and  storage  of  
raw   materials,   ingredient   mixing,   finished   product   packaging,   and   dispatch   and  
distribution.  
 
5.2.1.  Facilitators  of  Intentional  Contamination  
 
Intentional  contamination  may  be  facilitated  by  agents  such  as  (1)  people,  (2)  process  and  
procedure,  and  (3)  physical  structure  of  the  facility.  People  include  in-­‐house  personnel  who  
have  constant  direct  access  to  the  process  flow,  delivery  personnel  who  can  intentionally  
introduce  hazards  to  raw  materials  or  finished  products  during  transport,  contract  cleaners  
and  pest  control  service  providers  who  have  access  to  the  processing  facility  before,  during  
and/or   after   food   processing;   and   visitors   who   may   have   limited   time   to   introduce  
contaminants   but   may   successfully   do   the   job   if   there   are  weaknesses   in   the   security   in   the  
processing  area.  
 
The   nature   of   a   process   step   or   procedure   can   also   affect   the   ease   of   introducing  
contaminations   to   the   food   product.   A   highly   manual   unit   operation   that   requires   long  
contact   time   with   a   food   handler   is   significantly   more   vulnerable   to   intentional  
contamination,   compared   to   a   unit   operation   that   is   fully   automated   and   with   minimal  
human  intervention.  Furthermore,  a  unit  operation  that  is  thoroughly  and  uniformly  mixed,  
and   involves   large   volumes   of   food   materials,   is   an   ideal   target   for   intentional  
contamination,   as   successful   hazard   introduction   may   not   be   easily   detected,   and   may  
result  to  more  consumer  exposure,  respectively.  
 
Finally,  the  physical  structure  of  the  food  processing  area  may  contribute  to  vulnerability  of  
the   product   towards   intentional   contamination.   Physical   barriers   preventing   entry   to   the  
processing  area  include  doors  and  windows,  vents,  fences  and  gates.  Even  light  and  CCTV  
installations  within  and  outside  the  processing  area  can  influence  product  vulnerability  to  
attacks.  
 
5.2.2.  Factors  Contributing  to  Unit  Operation  Vulnerability  
 
In  general,  factors  that  contribute  to  high  vulnerability  and  accessibility  are  the  following:  
 
1. Large  batch  size.  Successful  contamination  of  large  batch  size  may  similarly  result  in  
a  large  number  of  population  that  will  consume  the  tainted  product.  
 
2. Uniform   mixing.   A   unit   operation   that   involves   constant,   uniform   mixing   is   an  
attractive  point  of  attack  since  the  contaminant  shall  be  homogenously  distributed  
within  the  food  system,  ensuring  large  number  of  tainted  products.  
 

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
3. Serving   size.   A   product   with   a   serving   size   small   enough   to   be   consumed   in   one  
sitting,  containing  harmful  dose  of  an  agent,  is  ideal  for  an  attack  since  it  will  ensure  
maximum  harm  to  consumers.  
 
4. Short   shelf-­‐life.   A   product   with   short   shelf-­‐life   is   preferred   since   these   are  
immediately  consumed  in  large  numbers  that  could  similarly  result  in  large  number  
of  affected  consumers.  
 
5. Ability  to  disguise  the  contaminant.  A  contaminant  not  easily  detectable  in  the  food  
system  is  ideal  for  an  attacker.  
 
6. High   impact   consumer   such   as   children   and   elderly.   Successful   attack   of   products  
consumed  by  children  and  elderly  shall  result  in  greater  damage  to  public  morale.  
 
7. Lack   of   processing/preparation   steps   to   inactivate   or   reduce   the   harmful   agent.  
Some   biological   and   chemical   agents   may   easily   be   inactivated   by   heating   and   other  
processing  steps.  
 
USFDA   conducted   vulnerability   assessments   for   selected   food   products/categories.  
Vulnerability   assessment   results   showed   that   common   vulnerabilities   exist   regardless   of  
particular   food   product.   Common   vulnerabilities   can   be   organized   into   several   broad  
activity  types:  
 
1. Activity  Type  I  (coating,  mixing,  grinding  and  rework)    -­‐  effect  of  these  steps  would  
be  the  even  distribution  of  a  contaminant  
2. Activity   Type   II   (ingredient   staging,   ingredient   preparation   and   ingredient   addition)  
–  open  process  steps  with  access  to  product  stream  
3. Activity   Type   III   (bulk   liquid   receiving   and   bulk   liquid   loading)   –   high   probability   of  
uniform  mixing  
4. Activity   Type   IV   (bulk   liquid   holding   and   non-­‐liquid   holding   and   surge   tanks)   –  
tanks  are  often  agitated  to  prevent  separation;  often  in  isolated  areas  of  facility  
 
 
5.2.3.  The  CARVER  +  Shock  Tool  for  Vulnerability  Assessment  
 
One   of   several   tools   that   can   be   used   in   the   identification   and   prioritization   of   process-­‐
related  vulnerabilities  is  the  CARVER  +  Shock  program.  In  this  document,  this  tool  shall  be  
used  as  a  model  due  to  its  systematic  evaluation  of  potentially  vulnerable  unit  operations.  
Poore   (2010)   described   that   the   CARVER   +   Shock   has   been   adapted   from   the   military-­‐
based   CARVER   program,   which   was   originally   developed   as   a   targeting   tool   for   the   US  
Special  Operations  Forces  to  thoroughly  analyze  enemy  infrastructure  and  identify  critical  
nodes.   In   military   term,   a   critical   node   or   target   critical   damage   point   is   an   element,  
position  or  command  and  control  entity,  which  when  disrupted  immediately  degrades  the  
ability   of   the   enemy   to   conduct   combat   operations.   Hence   in   the   food   processing  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
environment,   a   critical   node   is   that   particular   unit   operation   that   when   successfully  
attacked,  could  result  in  significant  public  health  and  economic  impact.  

CARVER   is   an   acronym   for   the   six   attributes   namely,   “criticality”,   “accessibility”,  

“recognizability”,  “vulnerability”,  “effect”,  and  “recuperability”.  Each  of  these  attributes  can  
be  objectively  scored    on  a  scale  of  1  (least  risk)  to  10  (greatest  risk).  Refer  to  Annex  1  for  
the   matrices   for   the   systematic   evaluation   of   these   attributes.   Comparisons   of   combined  
scores   from   all   seven   (7)   attributes   of   a   unit   operation   in   a   process   flow   allows   the   Food  
Defense  Team  to  identify  critical  nodes  that  need  immediate  mitigation.  
1. Criticality  measures  the  economic  and  public  impact  of  an  attack  to  the  food  system.  
2. Accessibility   refers   to   the   ease   of   physical   access   and   egress   from   the   target   food  
system  or  unit  operation.    
3. Recognizability  refers  to  the  ease  of  recognizing  the  target  unit  operation.  
4. Vulnerability  measures  the  ease  of  accomplishing  the  intentional  contamination  of  a  
food  system.  
5. Effect  measures  the  economic  impact  of  an  attack  from  loss  in  production.  
6. Recuperability   assesses   how   a   particular   manufacturing   system   recovers   from   an  
attack,  should  it  survive.  
7. Shock  assesses  the  health,  economic  and  psychological  impacts  of  the  attack.    
 
5.3              Mitigation  Strategies/Measures  
 
Mitigation  strategies  are  preventive  measures  the  companies  may  choose  to  implement  in  
an   effort   to   better   protect   the   facility,   personnel   and   operations   from   identified  
vulnerabilities.   Mitigation   strategies   could   reduce   product   exposure,   unseen   personnel  
movement,  accessibility  for  direct  or  indirect  contamination  of  food  and  ease  of  addition  of  
contaminants/agents.   The   USFDA   mitigation   strategies   database   can   be   accessed   in:    
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fooddefensemitigationstrategies/.  USDA  FSIS  has  a  
similar   database   for   the   meat,   poultry,   and   processed   eggs   industries:  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-­‐defense-­‐defense-­‐and-­‐emergency-­‐
response/preparation-­‐and-­‐prevention/guidance-­‐documents/risk-­‐mitigation-­‐tool/ct_index  
 
6.                Resource  Requirements  
 
The   basic   requirements   may   already   be   in   place   but   are   not   intentionally   used   for   food  
defense  issues.  These  are  relatively  low-­‐cost  investment  and  readily  available  such  as:  
 
• signages  
• padlocks  
• identification  cards  
• logbooks/forms/time  logs  
• color-­‐coded  working  outfits  
• additional  lighting  
• roving  guards  

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• alarm  system  
• CCTV  
• perimeter  fence  
 
 
7.              Training  Tools  and  Resources  
 
Training   program   should   be   defined   to   ensure   that   personnel   are   aware   of   the   Food  
Defense   System   and   understand   their   responsibilities   in   its   effective   implementation.  
Several   training   tools   were   developed   by   the   USFDA   that   may   be   used   as   reference.  
Employees   FIRST   is   a   USFDA   training   program   designed   to   educate   frontline   workers   on  
the  first  line  of  defense  in  preventing  intentional  contamination  of  the  food  supply.  FIRST  is  
the  acronym  for  five  (5)  rules  on  food  defense:  
 
• Follow  company  food  defense  plans  
• Inspect  your  work  area  and  surrounding  areas  
• Recognize  anything  out  of  the  ordinary  
• Secure  all  ingredients,  supplies  and  finished  product  
• Tell  management  if  you  notice  anything  unusual  or  suspicious  
 
ALERT   initiative   is   a   training   program   intended   to   raise   awareness   of   state   and   local  
government   agencies   and   industry   representatives   on   food   defense   issues   and  
preparedness.  It  applies  to  all  aspects  of  the  farm-­‐to-­‐table  continuum.  It  identifies  five  (5)  
key  food  defense  points:  
 
• A-­‐  How  do  you  ASSURE  that  the  supplies  and  ingredients  you  use  are  from  safe  
and  secure  sources?  
• L-­‐  How  do  you  LOOK  after  the  security  of  the  products  and  ingredients  in  your  
facility?  
• E-­‐  What  do  you  know  about  your  EMPLOYEES  and  people  coming  in  and  out  of  
your  facility?  
• R-­‐  Could  you  provide  REPORTS  about  the  security  of  your  products  while  under  
your  control?  
• T-­‐   What   do   you   and   who   do   you   notify   if   you   have   a   THREAT   on   issue   at   a  
facility,  including  suspicious  behavior?  
 
USFDA   developed   Food   Defense   101   training,   a   vulnerability   assessment   software   tool  
(CARVER+Shock),   a   mitigation   strategies   database,   the   Food   Related   Emergency   Exercise  
Bundle  (FREE-­‐B)  kit,    and  a  food  defense  plan  builder,  all  are  available  online,  and  can  be  
downloaded   for   free.   The   following   Food   Defense   Industry   Guidance   documents   have  
likewise  been  developed  by  USFDA  for   the  following  stakeholders  which  is  available  in  the  
USFDA  website  (http://www.fda.gov/fooddefense):  
 
• Food  Producers,  Processors  and  Transporters  
• Importers  and  Filers  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
• Retail  Food  Stores  and  Food  Service  Establishments  
• Dairy  Farms,  Bulk  Milk  Transporters,  Bulk  Milk  Transfer  Stations  and  Fluid  Milk  
Processors  
 
Similarly,   FSIS   of   the   USDA,   developed   Food   Defense   Guidance   for   food   processors,  
importers,   transporters,   and   distributors   that   can   be   accessed   at  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-­‐defense-­‐defense-­‐and-­‐emergency-­‐
response  
• Food   Defense   Guidelines   for   Slaughtering   and   Processing   Establishments,  
Warehouse  and  Distribution  Centers  
• FSIS   Safety   and   Security   Guidelines   for   the   Transportation   and   Distribution   of  
Meat,  Poultry  and  Egg  Products  
• Guidelines   for   the   Disposal   of   Intentionally   Contaminated   Food   Products   and  
the  Decontamination  of  Food  Processing  Facilities  
   
 
8.   Assessment  of  Effectiveness,  Audits  and  Corrective  Actions  
 
The   facility   should   establish   internal   quality   audit   to   verify   the   effectiveness   of   the   Food  
Defense  Plan.  Internal  audit  will  help  give  objective  evidence/proof  that  the  Food  Defense  
Plan   is   carried   out   effectively   in   the   facility.   Records   of   internal   audit   and   noted   non-­‐
conformities   shall   be   given   attention   by   the   management   for   continuous   improvement,  
assess   capability   of   facility   processes,   etc.   Audit   findings   will   serve   as   evidence   or  
benchmark  data  for  the  effectiveness  of  the  policy,  procedure  or  requirement.  Verification  
of  the  corrective  actions  should  be  made  to  ensure  conformity  to  the  requirements.  
 
9.              Food  Defense  Documents  and  Records  
 
Some   recommended   documents   and   records   to   effectively   carry   out   the   Food   Defense   Plan  
include  the  following:  
 
Documents  

• Vicinity  Map  
• Floor  Plan  
• Emergency  Evacuation  Plan  
• Crisis  Management/Contingency  Plan  
• Human  Resource  (HR)  Training  Program  
• Traceability  and  Recall  Program  
• Personnel  Security  Measures  
Records  

• Hourly  Security  Roving  Report  

• Training  Attendance  Record  
• Daily  Attendance  Record  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
• Visitor/Suppliers  Entry  Slips  
• Loading/Unloading  Inspection  Report  
• Product  Recall  Exercise  Form  
• Chemical/Hazardous  Material  Control  Log  
• Food  Defense  Plan  Review  Form  
• Record  of  Food  Defense  Plan  Testing  
• CCTV  Recordings  
 

10.              Annex  
Annex  1  –Sample  Vulnerability  Assessment  Exercise  
 

11.              References    
http://medical-­‐dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/radionuclide  
 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/fooddefensemitigationstrategies/  
http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodDefense/ToolsEducationalMaterials/ucm349888.htm  

http://www.foodsafety.gov/  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/shared/PDF/Food_Defense_Plan.pdf  
 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-­‐defense-­‐defense-­‐and-­‐emergency-­‐
response  
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-­‐defense-­‐defense-­‐and-­‐emergency-­‐
response/preparation-­‐and-­‐prevention/guidance-­‐documents/risk-­‐mitigation-­‐tool/ct_index  
 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/63fb5993-­‐97ac-­‐4414-­‐b5d6-­‐
f9c329d13c74/Food_Defense_Plant_Brochure_Slaughter.pdf?MOD=AJPERES  
 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/wcm/connect/99f95182-­‐0c9e-­‐4214-­‐9762-­‐
e98197f54ebf/General-­‐Food-­‐Defense-­‐Plan-­‐9-­‐3-­‐09+_2_.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.  
 
http://www.meathaccp.wisc.edu/additional_info/assets/Guide%20Food%20Processing.p
df  
 
http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com  
 
http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/dictionary/diversion  
 

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/radiological  
 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/tainted  
 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/general/en/terrorist.pdf  
 
www.fda.gov/fooddefense  
 
Mackza,  Carol  PhD.  2008.  Food  Safety  vs.  Food  Defense:  Differences  and  Similarities:  
Protecting  the  Middle  East  Supply  from  Intentional  Contamination.  Presented  in  Cairo,  
Egypt  last  29-­‐31  January  2008.  

Poore,  D.  (2010).  Protecting  Your  Food  Supply:  A  Practical  Approach.  Food  Safety  
Magazine,  February-­‐March  2010.  
(http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=3536&sub=sub1  )  

Republic  Act  10536  -­‐  An  Act  Amending  Republic  Act  9296,  Otherwise  Known  as  the  Meat  
Inspection  Code  of  the  Philippines.  15  May  2013.  

Republic   Act   10611   –   An   Act   to   Strengthen   the   Food   Safety   Regulatory   System   in   the  
Country  to  Protect  Consumer  Health  and  Facilitate  Market  Access  of  Local  Foods  and  Food  
Products,  and  for  Other  Purposes.  28  August  2013.  
Republic   Act   9296   -­‐   Meat   Inspection   Code   of   the   Philippines   and   Its   Implementing   Rules  
and  Regulations.  October  2005.  
 

 
 

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Annex  1:  Sample  Vulnerability  Exercise  
Milk  in  Gable-­‐Top  Cartons:  A  Sample  Vulnerability  Assessment  Exercise  

(Adapted  from  Poore,  20101)  

The   following   is   an   example   of   a   vulnerability   assessment   (VA)   exercise   that   uses   the   CARVER   +  
Shock   as   a   VA   tool.   As   previously   discussed   in   the   Food   Defense   Guidance   for   the   Industry   of   the  
Bureau  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  Product  Standards,  VA  is  an  important  part  of  coming  up  with  a  
Food  Defense  Plan  since  it  allows  the  processor  to  determine  which  particular  unit  operation/s  or  
step/s   (or   node/s)   in   the   process   is/are   most   vulnerable   to   attack.   This   example   borrowed   from  
Poore  (2010)  uses  one  of  the  many  VA  tools  available.  The  choice  for  CARVER  +  Shock  is  due  to  its  
simplicity  and  the  systematic  method  with  which  each  of  the  unit  operations  in  a  particular  process  
may  be  evaluated.  

The  following  is  a  step-­‐by-­‐step  example  that  can  be  used  to  guide  the  readers  to  conduct  their  
own  VA,  in  the  development  of  their  own  Food  Defense  Plans.  

1. Assembling  the  Food  Defense  Team  

Before   conducting   the   VA,   it   is   essential   that   a   Food   Defense   Team   be   constituted.   A   company  
may  already  have  a  Food  Safety  Team  with  members  that  can  also  be  recruited  in  the  Food  Defense  
group.   The   team   should   include   skilled   and   educated   personnel   with   working   knowledge   on  
microbiology,   chemistry,   food   science,   engineering,   etc.   Since   personnel   are   significant   agents   of  
intentional   attack,   which   is   the   concern   of   Food   Defense,   the   Human   Resource   manager   should   also  
be   included   in   the   team.   Apart   from   these   professionals,   it   will   be   best   to   include   trusted   hourly  
personnel  who  are  most  familiar  with  the  unit  operations  in  the  processing  line.  

2. Conducting  the  Analysis  

2.1. Determine  the  Parameters  
In   conducting   the   VA,   the   following   questions   should   first   be   addressed,   as   the   answers   to   the  
following  shall  drive  entire  analysis:  

1. Determine  what  are  you  trying  to  protect,  and  from  what  or  whom.  
2. What  is  the  food  you  are  trying  to  protect?  
3. What  is  the  concern  –  foodborne  illness,  death,  or  economics?  
4. Who   or   what   does   the   attacker   look   like?   A   politically   motivated   outside   person,   a  
disgruntled  employee,  or  a  disgruntled  employee  with  ties  to  outside  person(s).  
5. What  agent  will  be  used  in  the  scenario/attack?  This  is  perhaps  the  most  difficult  aspect  of  
the   analysis.   Careful   consideration   should   be   given   to   the   whole   process   in   choosing   the  
appropriate  agent.  Choose  the  worst  case;  assume  that  successful  attack  is  highly  possible.  
                                                                                                                       
1
Poore, D. (2010). Protecting Your Food Supply: A Practical Approach. Food Safety Magazine, February-March
2010. http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=3536&sub=sub1

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Once  these  questions  have  been  answered,  do  not  be  tempted  to  change  them  in  the  middle  of  
the  VA.  If  the  team  decides  to  do  so,  they  should  start  from  the  beginning  of  the  analysis.  

2.2. Develop  a  Flowchart  

In   conducting   a   VA,   development   of   a   well-­‐documented   diagram   or   flowchart   of   the   various   unit  
operations   in   a   particular   process   is   prerequisite.   The   flowchart   should   include   all   subsystems,   and  
complex  pats  of  the  system.  There  may  be  sub-­‐processing  in  the  facility  that  produces  ingredients  
or   parts   of   the   finished   food   product.   It   is   important   to   include   even   the   smallest   detail   in   the  
flowchart   e.g.,   holding   time   and   temperature,   and   elements   such   as   kettles,   hoppers,   small   vats,  
liquefiers,   fillers,   ingredient   injectors,   small   bins,   etc.   The   following   is   an   example   of   a   detailed  
process   flowchart   for   pasteurized   milk   (Kennedy,   2011).   The   final   flow   chart   should   be   checked   for  
consistency  and  accuracy  by  conducting  a  walk-­‐through  in  the  processing  facility.  

Aside   from   the   details   found   in   the   flowchart,   the   Food   Defense   Team   should   have   access   to  
other   information   such   as   those   related   to   product   distribution   and   sales,   consumers,   market   share  
in   the   areas   where   the   product   is   distributed,   even   Good   Manufacturing   Practices   (GMP)  
implemented  in  the  processing  facility.  

Figure  1.  An  example  of  a  detailed  flowchart/process  diagram  for  pasteurized  milk  (Kennedy,  2011)  

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2.3. Scoring  and  Evaluation  

After   each   of   the   unit   operations   in   the   process   flow   diagram   has   been   checked   and   validated,  
the   VA   can   proceed   by   evaluating   each   unit   operation   using   the   CARVER   +   Shock   tool.   In   the  
CARVER  +  Shock  method  for  VA,  each  unit  operation  or  node  is  systematically  evaluated  and  scored  
(using   a   scale   of   1-­‐10)   for   criticality,   accessibility,   recognizability,   vulnerability,   effect,  
recuperability,  and  shock.  The  rating  given  to  each  of  the  nodes  should  be  based  on  team  decision.  
The  following  is  an  example  of  a  step-­‐by-­‐step  CARVER  +  Shock  evaluation  of  a  node  in  a  pasteurized  
milk  processing  facility.  

i. Criticality.  A  unit  operation  or  node  is  critical  when  an  agent  can  be  introduced  and  cause  
significant   health   or   economic   impact.   In   evaluating   Criticality,   always   consider   successful  
introduction   of   the   agent.   The   Criticality   may   be   evaluated   by   first   filling   up   the   following  
worksheet.  

Worksheet  1.  Worksheet  for  the  determination  of  Criticality  value  of  a  particular  unit  
operation/node  

As   an   example,   consider   a   fluid   milk   processing   facility   in   Figure   1,   making   8-­‐ounce,  

gable-­‐top   cartons,   utilizing   a   pasteurized   silo   with   constant   agitation,   holding   10,000  
gallons   of   milk.   Conducting   a   VA   for   this   plant   will   involve   subjecting   all   unit   operations  
or  nodes  in  the  process  flowchart  (Figure  1)  to  CARVER  +  Shock  evaluation.  

For  this  particular  example,  consider  the  following.  These  information  shall  be  used  in  
the  entire  CARVER  +  Shock  analysis.  

i. Pasteurized  silo  as  the  successfully  attacked  unit  operation/node  

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Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
ii. Ricin  as  the  agent  of  attack,  with  a  harmful  level  of  2.0  mg  per  serving  
iii. 87%   of   all   the   units   (8   oz.   milk   in   carton)   were   sold   before   the   attack   was  
discovered,  and  the  warning  came  out  
iv. 50%  of  the  sold  units  were  consumed,  one  unit  was  consumed  by  one  person  
v. The  mortality  rate  is  50%  
vi. Product  distribution  is  through  retail  outlets  in  areas  near  colleges  or  universities  
vii. The  market  share  for  this  company’s  milk  is  75%  in  the  area  
viii. The   plant   that   was   attacked   is   one   of   five   in   the   corporation.   There   are   three   fluid  
milk  plants,  one  ice  cream  plant,  and  one  cultured  products  plant  
 

Using   these   information,   a   filled   worksheet   for   Criticality   will   be   as   shown   in  

Worksheet   2.   Based   on   the   analysis   in   Worksheet   2,   refer   to   Table   1   for   Criticality  
scoring.  

Worksheet  2.  Filled  worksheet  for  the  determination  of  Criticality  value  of  a  particular  unit  
operation/node  

23  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Table  1.  Criticality  score  scale  

Criticality  Criteria   Score  

Loss  of  more  than  10,000  lives  OR  loss  of  more  than  $100  B.   9-­‐10  

(*Note:  If  looking  on    a  company  level,  loss  of  >  90%  of  the  total  economic  value  for  
which  you  are  concerned.)  

   

Loss  of  life  is  between  1,000  and  10,000  OR  loss  of  $10B  to  $100B.   7-­‐8  

(Note:  If  looking  on  a  company  level,  loss  of  between  61%  and  90%  of  the  total  
economic  value  for  which  you  are  concerned.)  

   

Loss  of  life  is  between  100  and  1,000  OR  loss  of  $1B  to  $10B.   5-­‐6  

(Note:  If  looking  on  a  company  level,  loss  of  between  31%  and  61%  of  the  total  
economic  value  for  which  you  are  concerned.)  

   

Loss  of  fewer  than  100  lives  OR  loss  of  $100M  to  $1B.   3-­‐4  

(Note:  If  looking  on  a  company  level,  loss  of  between  10%  and  30%  of  the  total  
economic  value  for  which  you  are  concerned.)  

   

No  loss  of  life  OR  loss  of  less  than  $100M.   1-­‐2  

(Note:  If  looking  on  a  company  level,  loss  of  <10%  of  the  total  economic  value  for  
which  you  are  concerned.)  

   

*Note:  The  economic  loss  could  depend  upon  different  factors.  If  your  facility  is  part  of  a  large  multinational  
organization,  the  financial  impact  may  not  be  as  severe  when  compared  to  a  regional  organization  that  has  a  
couple  of  local  plants.  

Note  that  the  Criticality  scale  should  not  imply  that  a  certain  loss  of  life  is  ‘acceptable,’  
but   should   be   used   to   determine   the   impact   of   an   attack   on   certain   nodes   within   the  
process.   Therefore,   based   on   the   Criticality   worksheet   analysis   in   Worksheet   2,   the  
attack   will   be   very   successful,   and   based   on   the   score   scale   in  Table   1,   the   Team   should  
give  this  unit  operation/node  (pasteurized  silo)  a  score  of  10.  

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
ii. Accessibility.   To   evaluate   and   give   Accessibility   score   to   the   unit   operation/node   in  
question,   the   Food   Defense   Team   should   have   information   on   the   location   of   that   particular  
unit  operation,  as  well  as  the  environmental  conditions  to  which  the  operation  is  exposed.  
For  example,  in  the  unit  operation  earlier  evaluated  for  Criticality,  the  following  information  
is  needed  to  continue  with  the  VA.  
i. The   pasteurized   silos   are   in   the   upper   level   of   the   plant   without   much   traffic,   but  
workers  pass  through  this  area  to  access  the  pasteurizer.  
ii. The  lighting  is  kept  dim  to  save  energy,  and  there  are  no  cameras  in  the  area.  
iii. The  silos  are  filled  from  the  top  and  have  vents  to  the  side  of  the  fill  tubes  that  are  
accessible.  
iv. There  is  an  attached  ladder  on  the  front  of  the  tank,  which  allows  access  to  the  fill  
tubes  and  vents.  
v. The  tanks  are  only  required  to  be  washed  every  24  h  and  can  be  filled  multiple  times  
between  washings.  
Based  on  these  information,  assess  the  Accessibility  of  the  unit  operation/node;  and  give  
a   score   based   on   the   scale   presented   in   Table   2.   Based   on   the   description,   the   tanks  
would   be   fairly   accessible.   Proper   exclusion   practice   is   not   practiced,   hence   everyone   in  
the  plant  could  have  access  to  it.  However,  attacking  the  silo  may  not  very  easy  since  the  
tanks   are   elevated   and   an   attacker   climbing   the   ladder   on   the   silo   will   certainly   be  
noticeable.  Based  on  the  scale  in  Table  2,  the  team  can  give  it  an  Accessibility  score  of  7.  

iii. Recognizability.   The   following   additional   information   shall   help   the   team   assess   the  
Recognizability  of  the  unit  operation/node  in  question.  
i. The  tanks  are  made  of  stainless  steel,  located  close  to  the  pasteurization  system,  and  
are  very  large.  
ii. Even  untrained  person  shall  easily  identify  the  tanks.  
iii. A  photograph  would  be  adequate  to  show  what  a  target  should  look  like.  
Based  on  these  information,  assess  the  Recognizability  of  the  unit  operation/node;  and  
give   a   score   based   on   the   scale   presented   in   Table   3.   The   Team   can   give   this   unit  
operation  a  Recognizability  score  of  8.  

iv. Vulnerability.   The   following   additional   information   shall   help   the   Team   assess   the  
Vulnerability  of  the  unit  operation/node  in  question.  
i. Each  of  the  tanks  has  a  ladder  in  front  of  it,  and  a  person  has  to  climb  the  ladder  to  
introduce  the  agent.  
ii. At  the  top  of  the  tank,  6  feet  from  the  floor  of  the  platform  is  a  2.5-­‐inch  filling  port.  
iii. The   tanks   are   not   labeled   to   indicate   that   they   contain   pasteurized   product,   but  
‘everyone’  knows  the  tanks  are  for  pasteurized  milk.  
Table  2.  Accessibility  score  scale  

25  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Accessibility  Criteria   Score  

Easily  Accessible  (e.g.  target  is  outside  building  and  there  is  no  perimeter  fence).   9-­‐10  
Limited  physical  or  human  barriers  or  observation.  Attacker  has  nearly  unlimited  
access  to  the  target.  Attack  can  be  carried  out  using  moderate  to  large  volumes  of  
contaminant  without  undue  concern  over  detection.  Multiple  sources  of  information  
about  the  facility  and  the  target  are  readily  available.  

   

Accessible  (e.g.  target  is  inside  building  but  in  an  unsecured  part  of  the  facility).   7-­‐8  
Human  observation  and  physical  barriers  limited.    Attacker  has  access  to  the  target  for  
an  hour  or  less.  Attack  can  be  carried  out  with  moderate  to  large  volumes  of  
contaminant,  but  requires  the  use  of  stealth.  Only  limited  specific  information  is  
available  on  the  facility  and  the  target.  

   

Partially  Accessible  (e.g.  inside  building  in  a  relatively  unsecured  but  busy  part  of  the   5-­‐6  
facility).  Under  constant  possible  human  observation.  Some  physical  barriers  may  be  
present.  Contaminant  must  be  disguised,  and  time  limitations  are  significant.  Only  
general,  non-­‐specific  information  is  available  on  the  facility  and  the  target.  

     

Hardly  Accessible  (e.g.  inside  building  in  a  secured  part  of  the  facility).  Human   3-­‐4  
observation  and  physical  barriers  with  an  established  means  of  detection.  Access  
generally  restricted  to  operators  or  authorized  persons.  Contaminant  must  be  
disguised  and  time  limitations  are  extreme.  Limited  general  information  available  on  
the  facility  and  the  target.  

   

Not  Accessible.  Physical  barriers,  alarms,  and  human  observation.  Defined  means  of   1-­‐2  
intervention  in  place.  Attacker  can  access  target  for  less  than  5  minutes  with  all  
equipment  carried  in  pockets.  No  useful  publicly  available  information  concerning  the  
target.  

     

Table  3.  Recognizability  score  scale  

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Recognizability  Criteria   Score  

The  target  is  clearly  recognizable  and  requires  little  or  no  training  for  recognition   9-­‐10  

     

The  target  is  easily  recognizable  and  requires  only  a  small  of  training  for  recognition   7-­‐8  

     

The  target  is  difficult  to  recognize  or  might  be  confused  with  other  targets  or  target   5-­‐6  
components  and  requires  some  training  for  recognition  

       

The  target  is  difficult  to  recognize.  It  is  easily  confused  with  other  targets  or   3-­‐4  
components  and  requires  extensive  training  for  recognition  

       

Notice  that  it  may  not  be  easy  to  add  approximately  320  g  ricin  (Worksheet   1)  through  
a   2.5-­‐inch   port,   especially   considering   that   the   port   is   an   access   point   to   the   pasteurizer  
for  other  employees  as  well.  If  an  attacker  is  detected,  an  employee  might  ask  why  the  
individual   is   adding   something   to   the   port.   To   assess   the   Vulnerability   of   the   unit  
operation/node  in  question,  refer  to  Table  4  for  score  scale.  The  Team  could  give  this  
unit  operation  an  Vulnerability  score  of  6.  

Table  4.  Vulnerability  score  scale  

Vulnerability  Criteria   Score  

Target  characteristics  allow  for  easy  introduction  of  sufficient  agents  to  achieve  aim.   9-­‐10  

   

Target  characteristics  almost  always  allow  for  introduction  of  sufficient  agents  to   7-­‐8  
achieve  aim.  

     

Target  characteristics  allow  30%  to  60%  probability  that  sufficient  agents  can  be   5-­‐6  
added  to  achieve  aim.  

       

Target  characteristics  allow  moderate  probability  (10%  to  30%)  that  sufficient   3-­‐4  
agents  can  be  added  to  achieve  aim.  

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 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
     

Target  characteristics  allow  low  probability  (<10%  )  that  sufficient  agents  can  be   1-­‐2  
added  to  achieve  aim.  

       

v. Effect.   The   following   additional   information   shall   help   the   Team   assess   the   Effect   to   the  
company  of  the  successful  attack  of  the  unit  operation/node  in  question.  
i. The   plant   is   a   well-­‐known   entity   in   the   area,   producing   a   regional,   name-­‐brand  
product.  It  has  75%  market  share  for  the  product  that  it  sells  within  the  region.  
ii. The  plant  would  be  shut  down,  and  the  milk  sales  would  drop  to  zero.  
iii. Other  product  sales  will  also  suffer  greatly.  
Assess   the   Effect   and   give   an   appropriate   score   by   referring   to   Table   5.   Based   on   these  
information,  the  Team  could  easily  give  a  score  of  10.    

Table  5.  Effect  score  scale  

Effect  Criteria   Score  

Greater  than  50%  of  the  system’s  production  impacted   9-­‐10  

   

25-­‐50%  of  the  system’s  production  impacted   7-­‐8  

       

25-­‐50%  of  the  system’s  production  impacted   5-­‐6  

         

1-­‐10%  of  the  system’s  production  impacted   3-­‐4  

       

Less  than  1%  of  the  system’s  production  impacted   1-­‐2  

       

 
 
vi. Recuperability.  As  described,  this  scenario  is  going  to  be  a  major  disaster  to  the  plant.  The  
concern  is  to  estimate  how  long  it  will  take  for  the  plant  to  recover  the  publicity  associated  

28  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
with   the   contamination.   Also,   consider   how   long   it   will   take   to   clean   the   facility   (should   it  
survive),  and  how  challenging  it  may  be  to  regain  consumer  confidence  and  market  share.  
Based  on  the  fact  that  there  were  so  many  deaths,  it  is  highly  unlikely  that  the  plant  or  even  
the   entire   organization   will   ever   recover.   Referring   to  Table   6   for   score   scale,   the   Team   can  
give  this  unit  operation  a  score  of  10.  

vii. Shock.  This  attribute  is  a  combined  evaluation  of  individual  emotions.  Shock  is  considered  
on  a  national  level.  It  is  especially  dramatic  if  the  event  occurs  on  or  close  to  a  holiday,  or  
affects   children,   and   the   elderly.   Consider   all   of   the   emotional   factors   when   evaluating  
Shock.  In  evaluating  Shock,  ask,  “How  would  I  feel  if  this  were  to  happen?”  
The   number   of   deaths   in   this   particular   unit   operation/node   being   evaluated   is   high,   and  
could   easily   be   given   a   score   of   10   (Table   7).   Consider   that   it   would   affect   young   adults  
going   to   a   college   or   a   university.   Furthermore,   because   the   product   is   sold   at   the   retail  
level,  the  incident  would  affect  individuals  of  all  ages.  A  serving  size  of  8  oz.  could  also  be  
targeted  because  smaller  children  also  consume  this  product,  as  well  as  elderly  who  do  not  
drink  a  lot  of  milk.  

Table  6.  Recuperability  score  scale  

Recuperability  Criteria   Score  

>  1year   9-­‐10  

6  months  to  1  year   7-­‐8  

3-­‐6  months   5-­‐6  

         

1-­‐3  months   3-­‐4  

<  1  month   1-­‐2  

       

3. Consolidate  Scores  and  Identify  Critical  Nodes  

29  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
After   evaluating   all   seven   (7)   CARVER   +   Shock   parameters,   consolidate   all   the   scores   for   each   of  
the  unit  operations/node  evaluated  (Worksheet  3).  One  can  expect  several  nodes  for  a  complex  
processing   operation   with   multiple   sub-­‐processes;   and   fewer   nodes   for   a   straightforward  
process.   Compare   the   summed   scores   of   all   nodes   to   identify   the   critical   node/s,   which   can   be  
prioritized  in  the  establishment  of  mitigation  measures.  

CARVER   +   Shock   is   a   valuable   tool   that   may   be   used   to   help   protect   the   food   chain   ‘from   farm   to  
fork.’   When   completing   the   analysis   process,   do   not   forget   to   consider   people,   visitors,  
contractors,  vendors,  haulers,  records,  equipment  and  supplies,  interior  and  exterior  factors,  and  
all   processes   from   incoming   and   outgoing   products.   It   has   been   observed   –   wisely   –   that   ‘food   at  
rest  is  food  as  risk.’  

Table  7.  Shock  score  scale  

Shock  Criteria   Score  

Target  has  major  historical,  cultural,  religious,  or  other  symbolic  importance.  Loss  of   9-­‐10  
more  than  10,000  lives.  Major  impact  on  sensitive  subpopulations,  such  as  children  
or  the  elderly.  National  economic  impact  more  than  $100  billion.  

   

Target  has  high  historical,  cultural,  religious,  or  other  symbolic  importance.  Loss  of   7-­‐8  
between  1,000  and  10,000  lives.  Significant  impact  on  sensitive  subpopulations,  
such  as  children  or  the  elderly.  National  economic  impact  between  $10  billion  and  
$100  billion.  

   

Target  has  moderate  historical,  cultural,  religious,  or  other  symbolic  importance.  Loss   5-­‐6  
of  between  100  and  1,000  lives.  Moderate  impact  on  sensitive  subpopulations,  such  as  
children  or  the  elderly.  National  economic  impact  between  $1  billion  and  $10  billion.  

     

Target  has  little  historical,  cultural,  religious,  or  other  symbolic  importance.  Loss  of   3-­‐4  
fewer  than  100  lives.  Small  impact  on  sensitive  subpopulations,  such  as  children  or  
the  elderly.  National  economic  impact  between  $100  million  and  $1  billion.  

   

Target  has  little  historical,  cultural,  religious,  or  other  symbolic  importance.  Loss  of   1-­‐2  
fewer  than  100  lives.  Small  impact  on  sensitive  subpopulations,  such  as  children  or  
the  elderly.  National  economic  impact  between  $100  million  and  $1  billion.  

     

30  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
 

Worksheet  3.  Summary  sheet  for  scoring  unit  operations/nodes  across  CARVER  +  Shock  
attributes  

 
 

31  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
Department  of  Agriculture  (DA)  

Bureau  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  Product  Standards  (BAFPS)  

Core  Technical  Working  Group  

 
Sonny  Angelo  A.  Argao    
M  Lhuillier  Food  Products,  Inc.  
 
Josephine  A.  del  Mundo  
Universal  Robina  Corporation  
 
Alonzo  A.  Gabriel  PhD  
University  of  the  Philippines  Diliman  
 
Dulce  M.  Flores,  PhD  
University  of  the  Philippines  Mindanao  
 
Emeliza  C.  Lozada    
University  of  the  Philippines  Mindanao  
 
Claire  T.  Dinio,  Marielle  A.  Aimee  Malinao  and  Karen  Joan  A.  Figuracion  
Royal  Breadhouse  
 
Members  -­‐  Department  of  Agriculture  (DA)  

1. Rubina  O.  Cresencio,  DVM  -­‐  Bureau  of  Animal  Industry  (BAI)  
2. Orlando  C.  Ongsotto,  DVM  -­‐  National  Meat  Inspection  Service    (NMIS)    
3. Clarita  M.  Sangcal,  DVM  -­‐  NMIS  
4. Marvin  B.  Vicente,  DVM  –  NMIS    
5. Consuelo  C.  Baltazar/Timothy  Joseph  S.  Lazaro  -­‐  Bureau  of  Fisheries  and  Aquatic  Resources  
(BFAR)        
6. Simeona  E.  Regidor  –BFAR  
7. Dennis  E.  Tiotangco  -­‐  BFAR  
8. Sonia  T.  Hernandez  -­‐  Bureau  of  Plant  Industry  (BPI)  
9. Lucita  M.  Falcatan/Josephine  T.  Nieva  -­‐  Philippine  Coconut  Authority  (PCA)    
10. Dina  B.  Masa  –  PCA  
11. Marcelino  M.  Guevarra  -­‐  Sugar  Regulatory  Administration  (SRA)  
12. Magdalena  D.  Palanca  –  SRA  
13. Jean  Nanette  C.  Sumagaysay  -­‐SRA  
14. Alberto  R.  Cariso  Jr./Carmelita  V.  Alkuino  -­‐  Food  Development  Center  (FDC)    
15. Judith  A.  Platero  –  National  Dairy  Authority  
 
Members  -­‐  Department  of  Health  (DOH)  

16. Ma.  Theresa  C.  Cerbolles  -­‐  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)    
17. Jesusa  Joyce  N.  Cirunay-­‐  FDA  
18. Minda  G.  Villa,  M.D./Josefina  P.  Giliberte  -­‐  Bureau  of  Quarantine  (BOQ)  
19. Richard  B.  Laroya  -­‐  BOQ  
20. Shirley  F.  Rillo/Jelene  N.  Jose  –  BOQ  

32  
 
  
 PHILIPPINE  NATIONAL  STANDARD   PNS/BAFPS  134:2013  
Food  Defense  Guidance  for  Industry    

 
 

Secretariat    
 
Chairperson  
 
Karen  Kristine  A.  Roscom  
Chief  Science  Research  Specialist  
Standards  Development  Division  
BAFPS-­‐  DA  
 
Member  
 
Charlie  T.  Palilio    
Research  Assistant  I  
Standards  Development  Division  
BAFPS-­‐DA  
 
 
 
 

33