People v. Ting, et al., G.R. No.

225105, December 5, 2018

Doctrine: “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Facts: Mayor Ting and Treasurer Garcia, both of Tuguegarao, were charged with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC) for issuing treasury warrant during the 45-day election ban as payment for 2 parcels of land to be used as
a public cemetery for the city.

Upon arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty. At pre-trial, it was stipulated and admitted that Ting, as
representative of the city government, entered into a contract of sale with Dr. Almazan et al., for the purchase of 2
parcels of land in Tuguegarao. As payment, Garcia issued and released a treasury warrant for 8.4m. On May 5, 2004,
the city government caused the registration of the sale and the issuance of the TCTs in its name.

Consequently, a complaint was filed against respondents for violation of the OEC, but was eventually dismissed by
COMELEC finding that since the issuance of the treasury warrant was not for public works, no liability could arise
therefrom. In the case of Guzman v. COMELEC, however, the Court set aside the COMELEC’s resolution and ordered
the filing of the appropriate criminal information against respondents. It found that while said issuance may not be
considered as public works under the OEC, there was still probable cause to believe that the OEC was violated since
the provision does not require that the undertaking be for public works.

After pre-trial, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence. Instead of presenting their evidence, respondents filed a
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. RTC granted the same and acquitted the respondents.

According to RTC, while it is uncontested that the treasury warrant or the Landbank check bears the date “April 30,
2004,” which is well within the prohibited period, the date of the instrument is not necessarily the date of issue. The
Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) provides that an instrument is issued by “the first delivery of the instrument, complete
in form, to a person who takes it as a holder.” The prosecution failed to prove that the subject check was delivered to
the vendors of the lots within the prohibited period. In fact, the dorsal side of the instrument bears “May 18, 2004” as
the date of payment as annotated by the drawee bank, which is beyond the said period. The RTC added that just
because the title was issued in favor of the city on May 5, 2004, it does not follow that payment was in fact made on the
same day. The Law on Sales provides that payment of the purchase price is not a condition for the transfer of title, in
the absence of stipulation to the contrary.

CA affirmed, adding that the fact that the undated deed was notarized on May 5, 2004 is of no moment because
notarization only serves to convert a private document to a public one, making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity.

Issue: W/N the OSG was able to establish the guilt of respondents beyond reasonable doubt, hence, the RTC and CA
erred in dismissing the case by granting the demurrer?

Ruling: Yes. RTC should not have granted the demurrer to evidence.

OEC Sec. 261 provides:

Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of materials for public works and issuance of treasury
warrants and similar devices. During the period of 45 days preceding a regular election and 30 days before a
special election, any person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works, except for projects or
works exempted; or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device undertaking future delivery of
money, goods or other things of value chargeable against public funds.

The law is violated when:

1. Any person issues, uses, or avails of treasury warrants or any device 45 days preceding a regular election or 35
days before a special election;
2. The warrant or device undertakes the future deliver of money, goods, or other things of value; and
3. The undertaking is chargeable against public funds.

In this case, there is a violation of the cited provision.

First, the subject treasury warrant was dated April 30, 2004, which date falls within the election ban period beginning
on March 26, 2004 and ending on the election day or May 10, 2004. As such, it is deemed prima facie to have been
drawn, made, accepted, and indorsed on said date. On the basis of said presumption, it follows that the treasury
warrant was delivered to the Almazans, for delivery naturally precedes acceptance. Moreover, while this presumption is
disputable, respondents merely filed their demurrer to evidence and presented to evidence to challenge the same.

Second, even assuming that the treasury warrant was issued on another date, said date could not have been later than
May 5, 2004, which is the date when the deed of sale was notarized.

According to the CA, the fact that the undated deed was notarized on said date is of no moment because notarization
only serves to convert a private document to a public one, making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity.

However, the respondents cannot rely on the lack of date on the deed of sale. In fact, when said document was
notarized on May 5, 2004, the same was evidence that the deed was formally executed on or before, but no after, such
date. This is pursuant to the Rules on Notarial Practice which provides that when a document is notarized, the notary
public subscribes that a person appeared before him, presented a document, and affirmed the contents thereof, which
in this case included the issuance of the treasury warrant as payment for the lots. Thus, by virtue of the deed of sale
notarized on May 5, 2004, the parties thereto, Almazans as seller and the city represented by Mayor Ting, as buyer,
appeared before the notary public and affirmed on said date the contents of the deed of sale stating that the sellers
unconditionally sold, transferred, and conveyed the lots, for 8.6m to them.

This acknowledgement of payment in the deed of sale, coupled with the admission of respondents that the subject
check was used as payment for the lots, is evidence of its receipt by the Almazan on a day no later than May 5, 2004,
for public documents, such as the notarized deed of sale, are evidence of the facts giving rise to their execution, as well
as the date of their execution.

Third, that May 5, 2004 was also the date when the city caused the registration of the sale and the issuance of new
TCTs in its name. But the RTC ruled that it does not follow that payment was made on the same day. It must be
emphasized that actual payment of the purchase price is not an element of the offense charged herein. A person shall
be guilty if he or she issues, uses, or avails of treasury warrants or other devices undertaking the future delivery of
money, goods, or other things of value chargeable against public funds. The offense is committed even if the payment
or delivery of money was made after the prohibited period. Hence, that the check was encashed on May 18, 2004, or
after the prohibited election ban period, does not render respondents innocent of the charges.

While the NIL defines “issue” as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a
holder. The issue in this case neither concerns the negotiability or commerciability of the treasury warrant nor the
parties’ rights thereon. The OEC does not merely penalize a person who “issues” treasury warrants or devices, but a
person who “issues, uses, or avails” of treasury warrants or devices. As such, the term “issues” under the said provision
of the OEC should not be construed in its restricted sense within the meaning of the NIL, but rather in its general
meaning to give, to send, or such other words importing delivery to the proper person. Thus, for as long as the device is
issued, used, or availed of within the prohibited period to undertake the future delivery of money chargeable against
public funds, an election offense is committed.

HOWEVER, WE RESOLVE TO DENY THE PETITION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

The Dec. 16, 2013 Order of the RTC, on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, is a judgment of acquittal. The OSG is,
thus, barred from appealing said order because to allow the same would violate the right of respondents against double
jeopardy. The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than the Bill of RIghts which provides
that “no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present:

1. Valid complaint or information;
2. A court of competent jurisdiction;
3. Defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
4. The defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

Jurisprudence, however, allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was
made on the motion of the accused:
1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal; and
2. Where the dismissal is made also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial
which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate
whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such
dismissal is one on the merits, which is equivalent to an acquittal. The Court cannot review an order granting demurrer
to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the
accused in double jeopardy.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. The only instance when an accused can be barred
from invoking this right is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its
case against the accused or when the trial was a sham. For instance: (1) trial court prematurely terminated the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2)
where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial or adjudication.

In this case, the elements of double jeopardy are present. A valid information was filed. Respondents pleaded not guilty
and were acquitted; the dismissal of the case on a demurrer to evidence filed after the prosecution rested its case.