OTTAWA POLICE SERVICE DISCIPLINE HEARING

IN THE MATTER OF ONTARIO REGULATION 268/10

MADE UNDER THE POLICE SERVICES ACT, RSO 1990,

AND AMENDMENTS THERETO;

IN THE MATTER OF

OTTAWA POLICE SERVICE

AND

DETECTIVE HELEN GRUS, #1631

CHARGE:

1. DISCREDITABLE CONDUCT
__________________________________________________

DECISION WITH REASONS

__________________________________________________

Before: Superintendent (Retired) Chris Renwick

Counsel for the Prosecution: Ms. Angela Stewart

Ms. Vanessa Stewart
Ms. Bonnie Cho
Ms. Lynda Bordeleau
Ms. Jessica Barrow

Counsel for the Defence: Ms. Pam Twining

Ms. Bath-Shéba van den Berg
Mr. Brendan Miller
Mr. Blair Ector
Disposition Hearing Dates: August 8, 2022
September 15, 2022
October 11, 2022
December 6, 2022
April 28, 2023
July 28, 2023
August 14-18, 2023
October 30-31 and November 1-3, 2023
January 8-11, 2024
March 25, 2024
May 27-31, 2024
January 6 and January 8-9, 2025
January 14, 2025

Det. Helen Grus is before this Tribunal accused of the following Police Service Act (PSA)
charge:

Count One: Discreditable Conduct

Cst. Grus is alleged to have committed Discreditable Conduct in that between June 2020
and January 2022, she did, without lawful excuse, act in a disorderly manner prejudicial
to discipline or likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the Ottawa Police Service,
in that she self-initiated an unauthorized project, wherein she accessed nine child and/or
infant death cases in which she had no investigative role/responsibility, and failed to then
record her involvement or finding in the files. Further, on or about January 30, 2022, she
interfered in an investigation of an infant death, without the lead detective’s knowledge or
authorization, by contacting the father of the deceased baby to inquire about the COVID
vaccination status of the mother. The foregoing conduct constitutes an offence against
discipline as prescribed in section 2(1)(a)(xi) of Schedule 1 of the Code of Conduct,
Ontario Regulation 268/10, as amended, and therefore contrary to section 80(1) of the
Police Services Act.

Representation

The first appearance videoconference occurred on August 8, 2022, with Ms. Angela
Stewart representing the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) and Ms. Pam Twining representing
Det. Grus as an Ottawa Police Association (OPA) non-legal representative. The Tribunal
was advised at the second videoconference hearing date on September 15, 2022, that
Ms. Twining was off the record and Ms. Bath-Shéba van den Berg appeared as counsel
for the Defence. Mr. Brendan Miller was subsequently added to the record as co-defence
for Det. Grus on October 11, 2022, followed by Mr. Blair Ector at the July 28, 2023 in-
person sitting.

DET. GRUS DECISION 2

For the Prosecution, Ms. Vanessa Stewart and Ms. Bonnie Cho were designated
prosecutors representing the OPS on November 22, 2022, replacing Ms. Angela Stewart.
Further, Ms. Lynda Bordeleau and Ms. Jessica Barrow were designated as prosecutors
on March 18, 2024.

Overview

Publication Ban

In the early stages of the hearing, all parties agreed that a publication ban was required
to protect the identities of the nine deceased infants and their families and, at the request
of Prosecution, a second publication ban was brought forward to protect the identity of a
police witness due to some concerns unrelated to this hearing. There was no opposition
to the motion by Defence.

The Tribunal put into effect a publication ban prohibiting the dissemination of any
information identifying the nine deceased infants or any family members, and directed
that all submitted documents be redacted to remove all identifying features. Further, the
Tribunal ruled that an identified police witness would be referred to as Det. KC and that
all documentary evidence would be redacted to replace the detective’s name with the
initials KC.

Appearances

The proceeding commenced on August 8, 2022 with a first appearance teleconference

and did not conclude until the closing submissions on January 14, 2025, a full 29 months
in duration. There were five videoconference sessions and one full day of in-person
submissions to hear various applications and motions.

In total, there were 13 motions and applications that required written and oral submissions
and 14 witnesses ultimately gave evidence. (Two witnesses for the Prosecution, seven
witnesses not called by the Prosecution for examination-in-chief but were subjected to
cross-examination by the Defence, two witnesses called by the Tribunal after a ruling,
and three witnesses were summoned by the Defence.)

Motions

Of the 13 motions and applications, six were written decisions, five were oral (refer to
transcripts), one was withdrawn by the Defence, and the Tribunal refused to hear one
(Defence’s Motion to Stay).

1. Ruling on Motion for Disclosure. (Written decision, January 21, 2023, Exhibit
11.)
2. Ruling on Consolidated Motion. (Written decision, April 28, 2023, Exhibit 17.)
Three-part motion consisting of:

DET. GRUS DECISION 3

 a. Motion for third party records.
b. Motion for the Discreditable Conduct charge to the amended, sufficiently
particularized, or dropped.
c. Motion for an identified Defence witness to be subpoenaed.
3. Decision (Revised) on Notice of Filing Evidence and Applicant by Cross-
Application. (Written decision, August 9, 2023, Exhibit 20.)
4. Motion for Additional Disclosure. (Oral decision, October 30, 2023.)
5. Abuse of Process Motion II. Motion to Stay. (Hearing Officer refused to hear
motion, October 30, 2023.) (Exhibit 48.)
6. Decision on Witnesses S/Sgt. Rossetti and Sgt. Berube. (Oral decision,
November 1, 2023.)
7. Ruling on Proposed Expert Witnesses for Defence. (Written ruling, November
26, 2023, Exhibit 63.)
8. Ruling on Motion for Third Party Records. (Written ruling, January 8, 2024.)
9. Adopted Rules on Motions. (Written ruling, January 11, 2024, Exhibit 82.)
10. Direction on Adopted Rules on Motions. (Written ruling, January 26, 2024,
Exhibit 83.)
11. Motion to Remove Prosecutor Ms. Vanessa Stewart. (Written direction,
January 26, 2024, Exhibit 83.) Note: Defence’s Motion to Remove Prosecutor
Ms. Vanessa Stewart was withdrawn before being entered into evidence and
there were no submissions on this motion.
12. Decision to allow Defence to withdraw their Motion to Remove Prosecutor Ms.
Vanessa Stewart without prejudice and not entering it into evidence. (Oral
decision, March 25, 2024.)
13. Ruling on Application for Non-suit. (Oral decision, January 6, 2025.)

Hearing Decorum

The in-person hearing proper commenced on August 14, 2023, at the OPS Community
Board Room, 211 Huntmar Dr., Ottawa, and the Tribunal heard 23 and a half days of
submissions and witness testimony.

Throughout, the setting and tone of the hearing was divisive and emotionally charged
and, from the perspective of the Hearing Officer, was extremely difficult to manage and
navigate to its conclusion. From the outset, there were disagreements on disclosure and
witness lists that ultimately came to the Hearing Officer for rulings as they could not be
resolved between the parties, some remaining unresolved well into the hearing proper. In
total, there were 13 written motions which led to the necessity of the Tribunal adopting a
set of rules on filing motions. (Exhibit 82.)

The decorum by counsel during sessions deteriorated to the extent that name calling and
accusations were exchanged. I found it necessary to stop the proceedings on several
occasions to lower the temperature, and to provide rulings to enable the hearing to
proceed. There was little to no cooperation between the counsel as parties to the hearing.
The frequency and level of objections while witnesses were testifying was, in my

DET. GRUS DECISION 4

experience, unprecedented, and added several unnecessary days to the 23 and a half
days of hearings. The Tribunal was put on notice by counsel on several occasions for
breaches of natural justice, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)
violations, appealable rulings, and judicial reviews. Procedural rulings were frequently
revisited and challenged. At one heated point, two counsel stood in protest of a ruling and
refused to continue until after a recess to regain composure.

Another challenge that had to be managed were disruptions by members of the public
present and the hearing had to be stopped on two occasions to remove disruptive
persons. On several occasions, I had to stop the proceeding to address the conduct of
members of the public present. The OPS were compelled to initiate a security protocol
which significantly added to the tension within the hearing room.

This is a PSA hearing into an allegation of one count of Discreditable Conduct against the
Responding Officer, Det. Helen Grus. It is my task as the Hearing Officer is to assess the
evidence, both documentary and oral, assess credibility, to find fact, and then apply the
relevant legal principles contained in statute and case law for analysis and a decision. It
is also my task to determine what facts and submissions by counsel fall outside of the
narrow parameters of the misconduct allegation contained in the Notice of Hearing.

I find that a large portion of the documentary evidence and oral testimony presented fell
outside of the scope of the facts in issue required to arrive at a decision on the allegation
of Discreditable Conduct. There were several days spent hearing irrelevant evidence and
submissions on points that were clearly outside the scope of this misconduct hearing.
The challenge was to try and determine relevancy when it remained unclear of the
direction of the case being laid out by counsel for Defence. With an abundance of caution,
I was lenient in my repeated directions to provide relevancy and the several oral rulings
on relevancy.

As the trier of fact, it is incumbent upon me to remain impartial and to refrain from
analysing what is irrelevant to the assessment of the nature of the conduct in question.
It would be an error on my part to attempt to list and address all the submissions and
evidence that I find to be outside the scope of this hearing and, instead, will confine my
analysis to what is contained in the Notice of Hearing. This may sound somewhat
avoiding or simplistic, but I find myself compelled not to cloud my analysis and decision
with overarching themes that have been woven into this hearing, and are, frankly, not
relevant to the essence of the alleged misconduct.

Plea

On August 15, 2023, Det. Grus was arraigned on one count of Discreditable Conduct and
the Notice of Hearing was read into the record. Det. Grus entered a plea of not guilty.

DET. GRUS DECISION 5

Finding

To the allegations of misconduct before me, I make the following finding, based on the
standard of clear and convincing evidence:

Count One: Guilty of Discreditable Conduct.

The Hearing

Witnesses

Summoned by Prosecution
Sgt. Jason Arbuthnot
Sgt. Marc-Andre Guy

Cross-Examined by Defence (no examination-in-chief)

Det. Renee Stewart
Det. Christopher Botchar
Det. KC
Sgt. Julie Dobler
Det. Erin McMullen
Det. Tara Anderson
Det. Tara McDougall

Summoned by Tribunal at the request of Defence

Sgt. Serge Bérubé
S/Sgt. Shelley Rossetti

Summoned by Defence
Mr. Timothy Ruggles
S/Sgt. Peter Danyluk
Det. Helen Grus

Submissions and Analysis

The facts presented in this hearing, both documentary and oral evidence, are rather
straightforward and non-contradictory, once the non-relevant and out of scope material
has been separated. The submissions on the correct application of statue and case law
are much more complex and will require some detailed, careful analysis to ensure that I
apply them in their intended context.

Direct evidence from Det. Grus was received by the Tribunal from three sources: Her
May 12, 2022 Compelled Interview (Exhibit 25, tab A-5); her January 9, 2024 Affidavit
(Exhibit 84); and the four and a half days of in-person sworn testimony in May 2024 and
January 2025. Although repetitive, it was certainly wholesome, exculpatory, and for the

DET. GRUS DECISION 6

most part, candid on what actions she took and why she did so. I find that there are no
major inconsistencies on what exactly occurred, what was said, and what transpired.

i) Regulatory Offence vs. Labour Relations Hearing

The main thrust of the legal arguments and submissions put forward by the Defence is
that a Discreditable Conduct charge under the PSA is in fact a regulatory proceeding as
set out in the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision of R. vs. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII
(SCC), thus is a strict liability offence. This is important for two reasons: It requires the
Prosecution to establish exactly what the standard of care or practice that has been
breached and, as a strict liability offence, it allows for the respondent officer to put forward
a due diligence defence.

Submissions

Ms. van den Berg submitted that regulatory cases are strict liability, as set out in the
Supreme Court of Canada case decision of R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, 1978 CanLII (SCC).
The burden of proof requires proving that Det. Grus did the acts and there is a requirement
to identify what the prohibited acts are. Ms. van den Berg submitted that other than note
taking, the prohibited acts are not defined in policy and there is no reference to “willingly”
or “knowingly” under Discreditable Conduct in the Code of Conduct. The Code of
Conduct does not include the term “without lawful excuse” under Discreditable Conduct
as it does in Insubordination, Neglect of Duty, and Deceit. For this, Ms. van den Berg
submitted that the Hearing Officer must strike “without lawful excuse” from the charge.

Ms. van den Burg submitted that the defence of reasonable care is also found in the R.
v. Sault Ste. Marie decision. This does not imply moral blameworthiness and a conviction
on a Discreditable Charge is nothing less than a failure to meet a prescribed standard of
care. The Defence’s position is that this is regulatory, thus strict liability, and requires
the standard of care be identified to understand whether Det. Grus is in breach of the
standard. Ms. van den Berg submitted that the prosecutor has not offered any evidence
of the standard of care that has fallen short. The concept of fault is based on the
reasonable care standard. A finding of guilt can only be found on the grounds of falling
short. Ms. van den Berg cited Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.(Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC)
which ruled that words in a statute are to be read in their grammatical format. Ms. van
den Berg submitted that the Prosecution has called no evidence or expert witnesses to
lay out the standard of care. It remains unknown thus it cannot be used to measure Det.
Grus’s actions.

Ms. van den Berg submitted that following on the R. v. Sault Ste. Marie decision, it is
open for the Respondent Officer to put forward a defence of due diligence or mistaken
belief of facts. There is a requirement to take all reasonable care to control the harm of
the act and it was submitted that Det. Grus did in fact take all reasonable steps in her
duties. Ms. van den Berg submitted that Det. Grus was stopped by the Hearing Officer
from giving evidence on reasonable steps taken. If she believed she had the consent of

DET. GRUS DECISION 7

her chain of command, even if mistaken, then she is innocent as it is a mistaken belief of
facts.

To reinforce Defence’s position that Discreditable Conduct is a strict liability regulatory

offence, Ms. van den Berg refers the Tribunal to the Girard v. Delany, 2 PLR. 337 (Ont.
Bd. Inq.) decision in the Prosecution’s Book of Authorities (Exhibit 94) and the five
principles used to measure the conduct by the reasonable expectations of the community.
Ms. van den Berg argued that the very wording of the test actually reinforces Defence’s
position that this is a regulatory offence and it is in the public’s interest. If it was simply
an internal labour relations matter, then the test would not include the reasonable person
test.

Ms. van den Berg cited the authorities of Carson and Pembroke Police Service, 2006
ONCP 2 (CanLII) aff’d 2007 CarswellOnt 3518(Div.Ct.), Godfrey v. Ontario (Police
Commission), 1991 CanLII 7115 (ON SC), and Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police
Chief, 1987 CanLII 42 (SCC). Ms. van den Berg submitted that the Carson and Pembroke
Police Service decision did not say the hearing was not regulatory, only that it was not
criminal. Further, nowhere in the Godfrey v. Ontario (Police Commission) decision does
it state police proceedings are not regulatory proceedings. In fact, none of the decisions
explicitly state or suggest that police proceedings are not regulatory proceedings.

Ms. van den Berg submitted that police hearings are in fact regulatory proceedings, they
do not have a mens rea component and Det. Grus can use a reasonable fact defence,
hence is entitled to a due diligence defence. Ms. van den Berg submitted that, in
accordance with R. vs. Sault Ste. Marie, it is open to Det. Grus to prove, on a balance of
probabilities, that she exercised all reasonable care to prevent the offences.

Ms. van den Berg cited R. v. Heap, 2023 ABCJ 177 which reinforces the R. v. Mooney,
2023 ABCA 144 ruling that “all regulatory offences are strict liability offences unless
clearly indicated otherwise.” R. v. Heap also builds on R. v. Sault Ste. Marie in stating
there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove the existence of mens rea, but leaves
the door open for the accused to avoid liability by proving that he/she took all reasonable
care. When establishing due diligence or reasonable care, the accused’s conduct is
assessed using the reasonable person standard. Further, the standard of proof of
reasonable care or due diligence is that of a balance of probabilities.

As to legal principles, Ms. Barrow submitted that it is necessary to clarify that case law is
abundantly clear that this PSA proceeding is an internal administrative process-- a labour
relations matter between an employer and an employee. Ms. Barrow cited five applicable
case laws: Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police Chief, 1987 CanLII 42 (SCC);
Godfrey v. Ontario (Police Commission), 1991 CanLII 7115 (ON SC); Armstrong v. Peel
(Regional Municipality Police Services, 2003 CanLII 37924 (ON SCDC); Carson and
Pembroke Police Service, 2006 ONCPC 2 (CanLII) aff’d 2007 CarswellOnt 3518 (Div.
Ct.); and Williams and Ontario Provincial Police, December 4, 1995 (OCCPS). Ms.
Barrow submitted the five decisions all speak to PSA hearings as clear administrative law
proceedings of a labour relations nature and the takeaway, all the way up to the Supreme

DET. GRUS DECISION 8

Court, is that this is not a quasi-criminal proceeding but rather about effective police
oversight on disciplinary steps by an employer on their employees. Just because the
hearing is public it does not change the notion of an employer/employee relationship.

Ms. Barrow further submitted that Det. Grus has raised a due diligence defence that it is
not applicable as it is wrong to introduce strict liability to a police disciplinary hearing. Ms.
Barrow cited Ms. N.J. Strantz’s article Beyond R. v. Sault Ste. Marie: The Creation and
expansion of strict Liability and the “Due Diligence Defence”, 1992, 30 Alta L Rev 1233
and submitted that strict liability only exists in professional regulatory offences which is
different from a police disciplinary dispute. To participate in a profession, members are
bound to professional regulations and subjected to discipline by a regulatory body. Police
discipline hearings are more akin to employer-employee relations with the Service as the
employer.

Ms. Barrow cited Stuart v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2005 BCSC 645
decision in which affirms that labour arbitration law is of limited assistance to labour
relations as it is regulatory and is about licencing. Police hearings are just a more formal
labour dispute and strict liability is simply not applicable. Ms. Barrow submitted that the
task of this Tribunal is whether the facts occurred, and if so, then misconduct occurred.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the Defence’s position on police hearings as strict liability
offences, the due diligence defence, and to ignore mens rea is asking the Tribunal to
adopt a new regime for hearings and to ignore the established tests. It is incumbent for
Defence to provide case law and they have not, as there is no case law. If accepted, this
would move an employer/employee matter into a regulatory regime and the two cannot
co-exist as there are two different purposes. Ms. Barrow submitted that this would mean
that the employee would have regulatory powers which they do not. If this was intended
by the statute then there would be case law and we do not have any. The Hearing Officer
is being asked to ignore decades of Ontario Civilian Police Commission (OCPC) law
which is extremely clear and has a well-established test for Discreditable Conduct.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the test for Discreditable Conduct does not require an expert
witness as it is an objective test of a community member and there is no basis to require
an expert to set the standard of conduct. It would be impossible for all conceivable
situations to be written in policy. Ms. Barrow submitted that the Hearing Officer is being
asked by Defence to ignore his own experience should he be required to rely on an expert
witness to tell him how an investigation in undertaken.

Analysis

I have spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the case law cited by both Defence
and Prosecution to be absolutely certain that I have a full grasp of the concept of strict
liability, the accompanying avenue of a due diligence defence, and whether or not it is
applicable to this specific case before this Tribunal. Foremost, I must determine where
the relevant case law falls on the question of PSA Discreditable Conduct hearings being

DET. GRUS DECISION 9

classified as regulatory hearings versus an internal administrative hearing, essentially a
labour relations matter between an employer and an employee.

A review of the five cited cases (Carson and Pembroke Police Service, Godfrey v. Ontario
(Police Commission), Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police Chief), Armstrong v. Peel
Regional Municipality Police Services, and Williams and Ontario Provincial Police)
demonstrate a consistency of describing PSA hearings as labour relations matters
between an employer and employee and administrative in nature. To follow the Defence’s
argument, I would have to accept the inference that since none of the often-cited cases
explicitly state that PSA hearings are not regulatory proceedings, then it is open for me
to conclude that they are indeed regulatory in nature.

With the abundance of relevant, strong case law, I cannot come to this conclusion. As
submitted by the Prosecution, it would be asking this Tribunal to essentially ignore
decades of OCPC case law and to embark on a new regime for PSA hearings. I also
agree that if it was the intent of statute that PSA hearings were to be classified as
regulatory proceedings, then there would be strong case law over the years to that effect.
During the hearing I invited Defence to assist the Tribunal in providing case law to support
their position. None was provided, leaving me no other conclusion than there is no
compelling case law to guide me in that direction. For these reasons, I find that strict
liability is non-applicable to this PSA Discreditable Conduct hearing, thus removes the
ability of Det. Grus to pursue a defence of due diligence and a mistaken belief in facts.

The non-applicability of strict liability carries over to the Defence’s submissions on the
failure of the Prosecution to define what exactly the prohibited acts were, or at the very
least, to have required an expert witness called to lay out the standard of care that Det.
Grus is accused of breaching. I accept that the applicable test for Discreditable Conduct,
as established in Girard v. Delaney, 2 PLR.337 (CanLII), is the objective test which
measures the conduct of the officer by the reasonable expectations of the community,
taking into consideration any appropriate rules and regulations in force at the time, along
with the immediate facts surrounding the case. The application of this established test
for Discreditable Conduct will be spoken to below in section vi) Test for Discreditable
Conduct.

ii) Validity of the Discreditable Conduct Charge/Notice of Hearing

Submissions

Ms. van den Berg submitted that Det. Grus is not guilty of Discreditable Conduct and did
not do any prohibited acts as they are not prohibited acts. She took reasonable steps
and had a firm belief. Det. Grus noticed a doubling or tripling of infant deaths and saw it
as her duty to investigative criminal negligence on the part of the government. Ms. van
den Berg submitted that Det. Grus was shut down by a lie concocted by members of the
OPS Sexual Assault and Child Abuse (SACA) Unit that led to a never seen before
Discreditable Charge which was influenced by political control of the police.

DET. GRUS DECISION 10

Ms. van den Berg submitted that the Discreditable Conduct charge is unlawful, vague,
and included multiple actions. She submitted that Sgt. Arbuthnot, in his Professional
Standards Unit (PSU) investigation, had found the insubordination allegations of the OPS
Records Management System (RMS) searches to be unsubstantiated and should not
have been mentioned again in this Discreditable Conduct charge.

Ms. van den Berg broke the Notice of Hearing into three categories or prohibited acts to
proffer a defence: An unauthorized investigation, not taking notes, and interference. Ms.
van den Berg submitted that there is no such thing as an unauthorized investigation and
no such thing as unlawful interference by making a phone call for policing purposes. The
entire case centres on policing discretion in performing policing duties.

Ms. van den Berg submitted the use of the wording “foregoing conduct” in the Notice of
Hearing means that all elements must be proven and if one is not proven, the whole
charge fails. The wording does not state “any of all the forgoing conduct”. (This is
contrary to the Prosecution’s position that if just one element is proven the Hearing Officer
can find misconduct.) Ms. van den Berg and Mr. Ector submitted that this conjunctive
connects the acts into one single act or conduct. If one of the three actions fails, the
whole prosecution fails.

Ms. van den Berg submitted that knowing the particulars of the charge is required for
natural justice and procedural fairness and to prevent a breach of Section 7 of the Charter.
Ms. van den Berg later raised concerns of Section 7 breaches on the issue of missing
and denied disclosure, the denial of a full defence of expert witnesses, a full defence of
mistaken belief, and of Det. Grus being “gagged” by the Tribunal.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the allegations in the Notice of Hearing are clear, the facts are
very clear, and for the most part are admitted by Det. Grus. Det. Grus commenced an
investigation not authorized by her chain of command, had no proper investigative role or
involvement in the investigations, interfered in a case by calling the father of a deceased
infant, and that she did not take notes of her actions. Ms. Barrow submitted that while
Det. Grus disputes it was a project, she agrees that it was an investigation and that she
did not communicate her undertaking of an investigation with her immediate chain of
command. She further admits that she did not advise that she had been using RMS to
make the connection between deaths and vaccines and admits that she contacted the
father in an investigation that she was not responsible for.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the purpose of the Notice of Hearing is to set out the details of
the charge as an outline of the alleged misconduct so as to permit the Respondent Officer
to understand the case to be met. A perfect wording is not legally required and the intent
of the Notice of Hearing is not to set out every single relevant fact. Ms. Barrow cited
Canada (Attorney General) v. Gill, 2007 FCA 305 (CanLII), Jutasi v. Kingston Police
Force, January 1992 (OCCPS), and Crozier v. Waterloo Regional Police Service, June
29, 1993 (OCCPS), as the authorities for her submissions.

DET. GRUS DECISION 11

Ms. Barrow submitted that the Canada (Attorney General) v. Gill decision establishes that
the goal of the Notice of Hearing is to set the boundaries of the allegation and it is the role
of the Hearing Officer to decide if the words used set the boundaries, particularly the word
‘project’. The Jutasi v. Kingston Police Force decision speaks to the ability during a
hearing to amend any deficiencies in a Notice of Hearing and does not necessarily nullify
the charges, as long as the constable was not being misled. In the Crozier v. Waterloo
Regional Police decision the Commission ruled that the officer must only know the case
that he/she needs to meet. Ms. Barrow submitted that the principles are all the same and
it is really about setting the boundaries for the charge. As long as Det. Grus knew what
she was being charged with there can be no error.

Ms. Barrow submitted that it is not necessary to establish each fact within the Notice of
Hearing to reach a finding of guilt. If one or more aspects are found to have occurred,
the Hearing Officer can find misconduct occurred. Ms. Barrow provided the Ontario
Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) decisions of Millar and Ontario
Provincial Police, December 15, 1995 (OCCPS) and Sterling and Hamilton-Wentworth
Regional Police Service, August 10, 1999 (OCCPS) as authorities of this clear legal
principle that finding even one breach occurred in a list of allegations is sufficient to
determine misconduct.

Analysis

As stated above, it is my intent to focus on the evidence, testimony, and submissions that
speak directly to the matter before me—the actions and alleged misconduct of Det. Grus,
as defined within the Notice of Hearing. It is outside my scope to address the accusations
by the Defence on their perceived political motivation of the PSA charge, nor the
Defence’s allegations of police misconduct and/or criminal accusations against various
members of the OPS, including SACA colleagues, supervisors, PSU investigators, senior
officers, and prosecutors. In doing so, I would be far exceeding my authority as a Hearing
Officer into this specific instance of one count of Discreditable Conduct. This extends to
the Defence raised issue of alleged internal OPS media leaks and whether they were
adequately investigated or addressed.

Nor is it the role of this Tribunal to assess or speak to any aspects of the actions of
Canadian public heath leadership on the approvals and implementation of vaccinations,
nor weigh into any analysis or position on the science pertaining to vaccinations. They
are out of the scope of relevance to the PSA charge before me.

On no account does this prevent me from weighing the credibility of witnesses that gave
oral evidence or documentary evidence received. It simply means that I am not going to
permit nonrelevant evidence--and there was a significant amount presented-- or
submissions to distract from adjudicating the specific charge against Det. Grus.

I have reviewed the case law submitted by Ms. Barrow (Canada (Attorney General) v.
Gill, 2007 FCA 305 (CanLII), Jutasi v. Kingston Police Force, January 1992 (OCCPS),
Crozier v. Waterloo Regional Police Service, June 29, 1993 (OCCPS), along with the

DET. GRUS DECISION 12

Notice of Hearing (Exhibit 5). I find that the Notice of Hearing is sufficient in is composition
and wording in setting out the details of the charge so as to permit Det. Grus to clearly
understand the case to be met and to enable her to mount a defence.

One slight amendment was made to the Notice of Hearing by the Hearing Officer, on the
consent of both parties, when it was noticed that there was an error in the section number
for Discreditable Conduct under the Code of Conduct, reading section 2(1)(a)(ix) instead
of (xi). This appeared to be a typing error.

I do not accept Ms. van den Berg’s position that the wording is vague. Yes, it contains
multiple actions in the single count, however each is sufficiently particularized as to
describe a series of actions that alleges misconduct. It is clear to me that my task as the
Hearing Officer is to determine if a self-initiated unauthorized project was undertaken by
Det. Grus and whether interference into an investigation occurred. I also see no issue
with the inclusion of the action of accessing nine child and/or infant deaths cases, despite
the conclusion of Sgt. Arbuthnot’s PSU insubordination investigation as being
unsubstantiated. The allegation of the RMS searches remain relevant to this charge, as
does the inclusion of wording of “failed to record your involvement of findings in the files”.
The Notice of Hearing sufficiently lays out the particulars that constitute the Discreditable
Conduct charge. It is fair to Det. Grus in her ability to fully understand the allegation and
to prepare a fulsome defence.

I must also reject the submission by Mr. Ector and Ms. van den Berg that the use of the
wording “foregoing conduct” in the Notice of Hearing should be interpreted as meaning
that all the elements in the Notice of Hearing must be proven as the conjunctive connects
each act into a single act or conduct. In other words, if one fails then the whole charge
fails. Well established case law, provided by the Prosecution, clearly states that
misconduct can be found if one of more elements is proven. (Millar and Ontario Provincial
Police, December 15, 1995 (OCCPS) and Sterling and Hamilton-Wentworth Regional
Police Service, August 10, 1999 (OCCPS)). There was no compelling case law submitted
by Defence to cause me to consider any alternative interpretation. Should one element
contained in the Notice of Hearing be found to be misconduct, I find it illogical to arrive at
the conclusion that there is no misconduct overall, as one or more of the other elements
were not proven. To do so would be asking the Hearing Officer to overlook or negate a
specific instance of proven misconduct.

The Evidence

Prosecution Submissions

Ms. Barrow submitted that in policing, law and policy exist with checks and balances and
for good reason as police officers are invested with highly intrusive investigative powers.
If these powers are misused, even for a noble cause, then misconduct occurs. Det. Grus
disagreed with vaccine mandates, and motivated by these concerns, she initiated her
own research and began reviewing infant death investigations, and put a case forward on
why vaccines were unsafe. Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus abused her powers as

DET. GRUS DECISION 13

a police officer to access RMS reports in which she had no investigative involvement and
did so without the knowledge or approval of her chain of command.

In her submissions on the evidence, Ms. Barrow submitted that three things were
occurring in the timeframe of June 2020 to January 2022: Det. Grus’s research into
vaccines; Det. Grus’s RMS searches; and OPS vaccination mandates, and that she was
applying all three things to her self-initiated, unauthorized project.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the Tribunal is being asked by Defence to find that there are
no parameters on individual police officers initiating criminal investigations at their own
discretion, as long as it is legitimate and not for personal reasons. Ms. Barrow submitted
that there is a chain of command for a reason: oversight; to ensure right skills for the right
investigation; and to ensure confidentiality. Police discretion does not mean no
authorization is required and no chain of command is required. Det. Grus, as an
experienced criminal investigator, understands how the chain of command and service
oversight works.

Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus conducted 22 RMS queries during this unauthorized
project to support her arguments to her employer, to support her conclusion that the
government was wrong, and that the vaccine mandate was unfair and unethical. Ms.
Barrow submitted that the modification dates on the research data contained on Det.
Grus’s USB drive (Exhibit 84, tab C) show that the research was ramping up to coincide
with the timelines of the RMS searches.

As to the absence of notes, Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus cannot state that she
was engaged in a criminal investigation but justified in not taking notes. The only notes
taken were to support her arguments to her employer on vaccine mandates in preparation
for the December 16, 2021 and January 13, 2022 town hall meetings with the Executive,
and notes on the vaccine issues in the SACA office. Ms. Barrow submitted that there are
no notes of the searches she conducted into what she describes as a criminal
investigation. Ms. Barrow submitted that detailed notes are crucial to a criminal
investigation and cited five authorities that speak to the principles of note taking. (Lloyd
and London Police Service, 1999 CanLII 31609 (ON CPC), Grieve v. Ontario Provincial
Police, 2013 ONCPC 7 (CanLII), Bender and Windsor Police Service, 2000 Can LII 45057
(ON CPC), Andrews v. Midland Police Service, 2003 CanLII 87663 (ON CPC), and Fright
v. Hamilton Police Service, 2002 CanLII 76734 (ON CPC).

Ms. Barrow submitted that the evidence is clear that Det. Grus admits that she did not
advise anyone (neither her chain of command nor her fellow investigators) of her
investigation as she knew that she would not receive authorization. She acted discreetly
and it was wrong to justify that overarching public safety warranted a criminal
investigation. Ms. Barrow asked the Hearing Officer to conclude that Det. Grus did not
generally believe she was conducting a criminal investigation as this was all about the
looming leave without pay vaccine mandate. To support this submission, Ms. Barrow
submitted to confusing and inconsistent statements contained in Det. Grus’s affidavit
(Exhibit 84) on speculation, hunches, suspicion, and reasonable and probable grounds.

DET. GRUS DECISION 14

Ms. Barrow submitted that an experienced investigator is very aware of grounds and their
definitions and it cannot logically follow that Det. Grus had formed reasonable and
probable grounds on the date of her affidavit. She knew she was not conducting a criminal
investigation nor ever believed that she was.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the Hearing Officer needs to apply a creditability assessment
to Det. Grus’s testimony and her affidavit and to conclude that the evidence is
inconsistent, diminished her colleagues, and that it undermines her provided view of her
actions and events. As case law, Ms. Barrow provide the decision of I.A.B.S.O.I, Local
834 v. Harris Rebar, 2007 CarswellOnt 8859 (Ontario) and Edmonton (City) v. A.T.U.
Local 569, 2006 CarswellAlta 1870 (Alberta).

Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus never believed she was conducting a criminal
investigation as, if she was, she would have used her notebooks. Nor was Det. Grus
assisting colleagues. There are no notes because she was not doing either.

Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus’s evidence was that she did not require approval to
call the father as she was being diligent in seeking missing information as the
investigation was negligent and “someone had to do it”. Ms. Barrow submitted that the
public would not appreciate that her actions were driven by personal beliefs and Det. Grus
knew that her actions would never have been approved.

Ms. Barrow submitted that the tasks of the Hearing Officer is to pull the facts together to
reach a conclusion of Discreditable Conduct. Det. Grus decided to take on a project
supported by her personal beliefs, to use police databases, without the authority and
knowledge of her chain of command, in which she had no investigative role or
authorization. Ms. Barrow submitted that Det. Grus interfered with an investigator’s file
by accessing RMS and contacting a family member of a deceased infant. Ms. Barrow
conceded that Det. Grus firmly believed there was an issue with the vaccine and she
believed there was a link to the infant deaths, but the public would not appreciate the
disregard of the chain of command and the invasion of privacy of the families, just as Det.
Grus was concerned with her own privacy on vaccination status. Ms. Barrow submitted
that this is not just a question of Det. Grus “stepping on toes”. It is about the seriousness
in contacting a grieving parent and that would concern the public.

Defence Submissions

Ms. van den Berg submitted that the allegation of not taking notes does not fit into the
Discreditable Charge and that there is no obligation to take notes when accessing RMS
reports. In fact, Sgt. Arbuthnot testified that he was satisfied that Det. Grus took notes
but it was later found that Sgt. Arbuthnot had not reviewed all the duty books and
discovered further entries on February 1, 2024, after his testimony. Ms. van den Berg
submitted that there have been errors detrimental to the defence of Det. Grus as all the
duty book entries should have been reviewed during the investigation into misconduct,
the notes were not properly disclosed, and the Hearing Officer ruled against Defence

DET. GRUS DECISION 15

reviewing an unredacted copy of the January 30, 2022 duty book which led to a request
for a Judicial Review.

Ms. van den Berg submitted that this is a case of police discretion and not one of police
powers. Det. Grus has not been charged with wrongful execution of her police powers.
She was using her police discretion to prepare a package for her chain of command.
Discretion is necessary to do the job, as outlined in the OPS ethics book. (Exhibit 68.)
The OPS mission statement contained within reads…”Protect safety and security of our
communities. Role is to protect life, property, and peace.” Det. Grus’s oath (Exhibit 72)
also reflexes her duty to “…preserve the peace, prevent offences, and discharge my
duties…”.

The position of Defence is that there was a need to look into the infant deaths and to
prepare an information package to the SACA chain of command. Ms. van den Burg
submitted that Det. Grus believed that she could not approach her immediate chain of
command (Sgt. Guy and S/Sgt. Rossetti) due to a directive not to discuss vaccines within
the SACA offices. Det. Grus considered her “ad-hoc” chain of command to be the
Executive (Chief Sloly, Deputy Chief (D/Chief) Ferguson, and Service Sergeant Major,
S/Sgt. Danyluk). Ms. van den Berg submitted that Det. Grus had in her mind to notify her
chain of command, took reasonable steps, and honestly believed that she was preparing
a package for her chain of command. Overall, Det. Grus carried out her work in
accordance with OPS policies, the PSA, and its regulations. She took regular care and
honestly believed she was doing the right things.

Ms. van den Berg submitted that the evidence shows that Det. Grus took all reasonable
steps to inform her chain of command and understood that she had to go through her
chain of command at the conclusion of her probe stage. However, there was no time as
she was put on leave without pay and subsequently suspended two weeks after her
January 13, 2022 probing. She had hoped for another meeting with the Executive, but
her suspension and the Chief’s departure prevented this from occurring. Ms. van den
Berg submitted that the testimony of S/Sgt. Danyluk established that there is no clear
definition of chain of command in policing and described it as hierarchical, overlapping,
and spoke to the “next opportunity” or “ad-hoc” chain of command.

Ms. van den Berg objected to a chart submitted to the Tribunal during Ms. Barrow’s
closing submissions (Exhibit 99), stating that the chart should not be entered as evidence
as it contains items that were not put to a witness and contained information that the
Prosecution did not disclose, although it was contained in the affidavit of Det. Grus.
(Exhibit 84, tab C). Ms. van den Berg cited Browne v. Dunn, 1894 Decision of the House
of Lords Privy Council, which states it is improper to put conclusions in closing
submissions when counsel has not put it to a witness during cross-examination. Ms. van
den Berg also submitted the chart was not helpful due to the level of errors and
conclusions not based on the evidence. Ms. van den Berg later submitted a revised,
Defence updated copy of the chart to the Tribunal with a “Defence Response” column
added, in the event the Tribunal accepted the chart into evidence. (Exhibit 100.)

DET. GRUS DECISION 16

Ms. van den Berg submitted that the RMS databank is an investigative tool and
highlighted testimony from witnesses Sgt. Arbuthnot, S/Sgt. Danyluk, Det. Botchar, Det.
K.C., and Det. Grus, all agreeing that it is common practice for police officers, particularly
criminal investigators, to access and review RMS records for a variety of police related
reasons. Ms. van den Berg submitted that should the Hearing Officer find this not to be
a prohibited act, then it would follow that Det. Grus has a reasonable defence.

Ms. van den Berg questioned what the standard of practice is for an unauthorized project
as there is no statutory definition within the PSA or OPS policy. Ms. van den Berg
submitted that Det. Grus’s evidence in her compelled statement, her testimony, and in
her affidavit is consistent--she had heard there was a doubling or tripling of infant deaths
and she wanted to know why. She saw it as her duty, as an obligation, and went to the
RMS system to get information for the only chain of command that would listen to her,
that of the Executive. The totality of Det. Grus’s evidence is that she was acting within
her police powers to “help save babies lives”.

In her submission on Det. Grus’s call to the father, Ms. van den Berg describes it as a
short, amicable phone call which was well received, not upsetting, and was indicative that
the police cared. Det. Grus testified that she believed that she had the authority to make
the call and she did not consult or advise the lead investigator (Det. Botchar) as it was a
Sunday, the day prior to the commencement of her leave without pay. Ms. van den Berg
submitted that the real damage to the reputation of the police service was the cold calls
to the nine parents by PSU investigators. The calls were unnecessary as there was in
fact no privacy breach on the part of Det. Grus and she was acting within her functions of
police work.

Summary of Relevant Evidence by Det. Grus

Witness testimony leaves no doubt that Det. Grus was a capable, diligent, and well-
respected criminal investigator. She had the respect of her peers and the confidence of
her immediate chain of command as demonstrated by her 2018-20 annual performance
reviews and more current 2023 annual performance review.

Evidence from Det. Grus was introduced into this Tribunal in three forms: Her compelled
interview with Sgt. Arbuthnot on May 12, 2022 (Exhibit 22, tab A-6); her January 9, 2024
affidavit (Exhibit 84); and her six days of witness testimony (May 27-31 2024 and January
6, 2025). Overall, I found her evidence to be detailed, candid, and exculpatory in nature.

Det. Grus’s evidence is that she first suspected a potential link between Covid-19
vaccinations and a perceived increase in the deaths of infants on December 14, 2021,
when she accessed the RMS records of an investigation into an infant death for a second
time. Her evidence was that she first queried the RMS report on December 8, 2021, the
day following the death, when it was being discussed in the SACA office. Her rationale
for the RMS search was to compare the circumstances of the death to a document titled
Sick Kids Interim Guidance (Exhibit 46).

DET. GRUS DECISION 17

In her affidavit (Exhibit 84, paragraph 88) Det Grus stated “I had never witnessed such a
horrific event leading to an innocent baby’s death. I believed further investigation was
necessary to rule out any adverse events of the COVID-19 vaccines on the mother’s [sic]
and their newborns. I did not make any conclusions that the COVID-19 vaccines were
the cause of death in these cases.” This entry is undated, however immediately follows
paragraph 87, dated January 25, 2022.

Paragraph 91 follows with “Based on available information at the time, I suspected

potential criminal negligence as pregnant and breastfeeding mothers were being assured
of the safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccines by Government of Canada, federal,
provincial and municipal health officials, when in fact there was no data available to assert
such claims.”

Det. Grus’s evidence is that on January 11, 2022, she first learned of an internal OPS
statistic suggesting a doubling, if not tripling of infant deaths investigated by the SACA
Unit. On December 16, 2021, she participated in the first videoconference town hall
meeting with Chief Sloly and D/Chief Ferguson to address concerns on the internal OPS
mandatory vaccine policy and the approaching leave without pay deadline for
unvaccinated OPS personnel. Det. Grus’s evidence is that there was no discussion of
infant deaths during the first town hall. Det. Grus testified that at the time of this meeting,
she felt the OPS had mismanaged the COVID-19 situation and she was subjected to
name calling and ostracization due to her opposition to the vaccination mandate.

Det. Grus testified that there was a second town hall videoconference meeting with Chief
Sloly, D/Chief Ferguson, OPS Legal, and the Heath Safety and Lifestyles (HSL) manager
on January 13, 2022. In preparation that same day, Det. Grus’s evidence is that she
telephoned and spoke to Dr. Byram Bridle, a Viral Immunologist who authorized an expert
report identifying several risks concerning COVID-19 vaccinations. The purpose of her
call was to obtain consent to share his report with the OPS Executive.

She testified that also on January 13, 2022, in preparation for the second town hall
meeting later that day, she queried seven infant death RMS investigations, viewed
documents contained within five investigations, and was denied access to two
investigations due to privatized settings.

Det. Grus’s address at the January 12, 2022 second town hall meeting was recorded and
there exists transcripts (Exhibit 25, tab 4). Det. Grus asks the Executive how her collective
group can assist the OPS ahead of the looming leave without pay deadline, inquired about
the continuation of the OPS rapid test policy, introduced Dr. Byram Bridle’s affidavit,
spoke to Dr. Peter Juni’s and Dr. Moore’s podcasts, and expressed her concern for police
and community members that have had adverse effects from vaccinations. Towards the
end of her presentation, Det. Grus states to the Executive that there were six baby deaths
in 2021 when in previous years there were two or three, she is not a doctor and cannot
link it directly to the vaccine, however it is concerning. She stated she is advising people
to research and become informed to stay safe, and to report adverse effects. Det. Grus

DET. GRUS DECISION 18

moves on to address literature on the effectiveness of vaccinations and returns to the
personal impact of the pending leave without pay.

Det. Grus’s evidence is that she conducted further RMS queries into one of the infant
death investigations from January 17-20, 2022, and on January 21, 2022, she called
Forensic Identification Unit Sgt. Julie Dobler to inquire whether the preliminary autopsy
report was completed as it was not attached to the RMS file. Det. Grus again accessed
the infant death file on January 25, 2021. Two additional RMS queries were made on
January 28, and January 30, 2022.

Det. Grus’s evidence is that the World Health Organization (WHO) characterized the
COVID-19 as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Det. Grus began to seek information from
peer-reviewed medical studies, Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Health
Ontario, municipal public health agencies, WHO, medical professionals, and international
news agencies, among other sources. The collection of approximately 80 documents
and clinical studies on her USB stick (Exhibit 84, tab C) have a “date modified’ column,
with the earliest document being dated July 8, 2020.

Analysis

By Det. Grus’s own evidence, in December 2021 she formed the opinion that the OPS
had mismanaged the COVID-19 situation, was unfairly treating their employees with
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policies, and that the workplace had become broken.
She was the subject of name calling and was ostracized by work colleagues and
experienced a breakdown in the relationship with her SACA peers and her immediate
chain of command, Sgt. Guy and S/Sgt. Rossetti.

The evidence reveals that there were significant concurrent, intertwined events unfolding
with and around Det. Grus in the spring of 2020 until the commencement of leave without
pay imposed by the OPS mandatory vaccine policy on February 1, 2022. As early as July
2020, Det. Grus began to actively research COVID-19 material, having amassed a library
of approximately 80 documents, clinical studies, affidavits, and reports. She became an
active, vocal supporter of colleagues who had experienced adverse vaccination reactions
and colleagues who opposed mandatory vaccinations. She sent unsolicited COVID-19
emails and research material to HSL, the Pandemic Team, the Professional Development
Centre (PDC), the OPA, the Executive, and ultimately posted to all OPS members.

Also in December 2021, Det. Grus first suspected a potential link of an infant death to
COVID-19 vaccination and in January 2022, she learnt of a potential increase in the
number of sudden, unexplained baby deaths investigated by the OPS. Det. Grus took
the opportunity to apply her amassed collection of COVID-19 research to the investigation
without the knowledge or consent of Det. Botchar, the assigned lead investigator.

Sometime between July 2020 and January 2022, Det. Grus took an informed stance in
opposition to OPS imposed COVID-19 test policy and the pending mandatory vaccination
policy. She took on a self-initiated leadership role in challenging the polices, sent several

DET. GRUS DECISION 19

unsolicited messages containing self-researched medical data and studies to OPS
personnel leading and managing pandemic responses and protocols. In doing so, Det.
Grus eroded the support of her SACA colleagues and professional relationships became
fractured to such an extent that her sergeant and staff sergeant gave her specific direction
not to debate COVID-19 policy within the SACA offices.

Events were ramping up in December of 2021 and the first town hall meeting with the
Executive where it was becoming clear to Det. Grus that there was a real risk that she
would be put on leave without pay at the end of January 2022. Coincidently, this is the
same time frame that discussions were being had about the potential increase of infant
deaths in 2021 and when Det. Grus began to suspect a potential link to COVID-19
vaccinations.

iii) Personal Interest

Det. Grus’s opposition to COVID-19 testing and mandatory vaccination polices were
personal views that were developed and fortified by her extensive personal research,
collected on her USB stick (Exhibit 84, tab c). They were not a requirement for her SACA
duties or caseload.

The beliefs and conclusions that Det. Grus formulated were based on self-researched,
personal convictions that are unrelated to her investigative responsibilities as a SACA
investigator. She was not assigned as the lead investigator on any of the investigations
and was not tasked with any responsibility to review any of the investigations for any such
linkages.

What I find is of relevance to Det. Grus’s mindset during this time is an October 28, 2021
email she sent to Chief Sloly, D/Chief Ferguson, and the OPA titled Thank you. (Exhibit
84, tab O.) In the email Det. Grus raises concerns about pending changes to the COVID-
19 vaccination policy and the city manager’s position that city employees who do not
comply with the policy may not be permitted into the workplace, and may face leave
without pay or discipline, up to and including dismissal. Det. Grus writes “as police officers
well versed on the Criminal Code we are very aware that such a statement by Mr.
Kanellakos could be argued in the courts as meeting the definition of assault under s.265
of the Criminal Code.”

The relevance of this email is that it demonstrates that Det. Grus is suggesting a criminal
element to the actions of the City Manager as her concern mounts that she is likely facing
leave without pay if such a policy is adopted. Six weeks later, when the leave without pay
is more certain and in fact looming, Det. Grus is once again formulating a criminal linkage
to the actions of government officials, this time towards public health officials and the
federal government.

On the eve of her February 1, 2022 leave without pay, Det. Grus is actively accessing
and reviewing infant death reports, had made an inquiry for a preliminary autopsy report
through the Forensic Unit, and had, in her words, “I suspected potential criminal

DET. GRUS DECISION 20

negligence…by Government of Canada, federal, provincial and municipal health
officials”. (Exhibit 84, paragraph 93.)

iv) Police Discretion

In his testimony, S/Sgt. Danyluk stated that there is no limit to police discretion. If a police
officer determines that something is within their discretion and it is in relation to
community safety, then it is “pretty powerful”, however leadership and the chain of
command should be aware of what their people are doing and their limitations.

I agree that there needs to be a substantial amount of investigative autonomy and

discretionary powers provided to criminal investigators, but not without checks and
balances and certainly not without limits. In R. v. Beaudry, 2007 SCC5 (CanLII), the
Supreme Court reaffirms that discretion is an essential feature of the criminal justice
system, however, follows with the statement that discretion is not absolute. Police officers
must justify their use of discretion subjectively and exercise it honestly and transparently.
A sincere belief of properly exercised discretion is not sufficient to justify a decision.

As the employer, the Chief of Police has a duty ensure that members of the service carry
out their duties in accordance with the PSA and its regulations, in a manner that reflects
the needs of the community, and that discipline is maintained. (PSA, section 41(1)(b)).

The evidence of Det. Grus was that she self-initiated a criminal negligence investigation
into the actions of public health officials without the knowledge of her SACA colleagues
(the lead investigators of the six active investigations) and without the knowledge and
consent of her immediate chain of command, her supervising sergeant and unit staff
sergeant. Rather, her evidence was that she justified her actions by believing she had the
implied consent of the Executive command, based on her statements and comments
during the January 13, 2022 second town hall meeting.

I find that this exceeds the rather large parameters of exercising police discretion,
particularly when motivated by strong personal convictions on the negative
consequences of public vaccine policies. Det. Grus intentionally kept her active criminal
inquiries to herself and as she knew that her chain of command would put a stop to her
activities, circumventing a rather rigid system of investigative assignments, case
management, and sergeant oversight, particularly with complex, specialized
investigations such as infant death investigations.

v) Chain of Command

Det. Grus’s evidence is that she made a conscious decision not to immediately go to Sgt.
Guy or her SACA chain of command as she felt she was not supported and interpreted
the direction by S/Sgt. Rossetti not to discuss mandates in the office to include her self-
initiated investigation linking vaccinations to infant deaths. So, in her evidence, her next
best option was to go to the Chief and Deputy Chief as she felt she had their ear and a

DET. GRUS DECISION 21

degree of support in her self-described role as an informal leader against mandatory
testing and police vaccine mandates.

The January 13, 2022 town hall videoconference meeting with employees adversely
affected by mandated vaccines was not the time nor the venue to provide a briefing to
the Executive command on a perceived increase in infant deaths and suspected criminal
negligence and investigative actions towards public officials. If the scope and
consequences of the criminal negligence investigation was properly relayed and truly
understood, the reaction of the Executive would have been one of alarm, further probing,
and demand for clarification on what was Det. Grus was undertaking.

The transcripts of the town hall meeting do not record the Executive giving any such
approvals and it is willfully blind for Det. Grus, the experienced investigator that she is, to
conclude from her presentation that she had implied consent from the Executive.

I cannot accept the evidence of S/Sgt. Danyluk that the Executive can be considered as
an “ad hoc” or “next opportunity” chain of command to Det. Grus. The only exigent
circumstance here was Det. Grus’s looming unpaid leave set for February 1, 2022. I can
only conclude that Det. Grus chose not to notify her SACA chain of command as she
knew she was going to be ordered to cease her line of inquiries and was willfully vague
with the Executive to justify to herself that she had fulfilled a form of required approval
and was able to proceed.

vi) RMS Searches

There was much discussion and submissions on the number of times and instances that
Det. Grus queried the RMS system to review the investigative reports of infant deaths
and what exact documents within the reports were accessed. Det. Grus, in her affidavit
(Exhibit 84) accurately lists the reports she accessed and provided rational for each
search. As tallied by Ms. Barrow, there were 22 RMS queries of reports during the
duration of the unauthorized project. Some of the RMS queries were conducted following
informal case review discussions in the SACA office, and several were in preparation for
the two town hall meetings with the Executive in an effort to support arguments of adverse
effects of vaccinations, and to illustrate a potential link between vaccinations and recent
infant deaths.

The evidence of Sgt. Guy and several of her fellow SACA investigators was that it was
common investigative practice for investigators to routinely access RMS files to conduct
informal peer case reviews, provide investigative experiences, and to mentor less
experienced investigators. It is encouraged by the sergeants, and, for the most part,
welcomed by the assigned investigators.

I also heard and read evidence that PSU investigator Sgt. Arbuthnot investigated an
allegation that Det. Grus was insubordinate in querying nine infant death investigations
for personal reasons, concluding that the allegation was unfounded.

DET. GRUS DECISION 22

A charge of Insubordination is not before this Tribunal and it outside of my authority to
form any conclusions on any misconduct investigations that have not resulted in charges.
The Notice of Hearing, as a descriptive to the allegation, reads “self-initiated and
unauthorized project, wherein you accessed nine child and/or infant death cases in which
you had no investigative role/responsibility…”. I find it a fair assessment of the evidence,
particularly that of Det. Grus, that she did access 22 RMS investigations in which she had
no investigative role or responsibility.

vii) Failure to Record Involvement or Findings

There was much focus on the quantity and detail of the notebook entries made or not
made by Det. Grus. I agree with Defence that failure to take notes could have been a
straightforward insubordination charge and that it is not noteworthy for an investigator to
write every RMS query in their duty book.

I find that the focus on the arguments by both Prosecution and Defence have somewhat
skirted around the true essence of the issue. The point here is not the names or case
numbers written in Det. Grus’s duty books but rather the total absence of submitted
investigative actions reports, written investigative plans, basic chronology of events, or
any supporting documents. Even criminal probes are subjected to disclosure and it is
fundamental investigative practice to start documenting relevant processes and events
from the outset as a requirement and function of criminal investigators. At the very least,
there is a requirement for a written investigative narrative or log. This would certainly
form the basis to write to an Information to Obtain a search warrant, should it become
relevant as an investigation progresses.

The Prosecution asked the Tribunal to conclude that Det. Grus did not take the required
notes as she never believed that she was conducting a criminal investigation at the time
and her motivation was really about her opposition to the OPS mandatory vaccination
mandate and the looming leave without pay. Although I have found that Det. Grus had
previously leveraged the notion of criminal conduct on public officials whose position on
vaccination she opposed, I do not see compelling evidence that would lead me to clearly
conclude that Det. Grus had never believed she was engaged in a criminal investigation.

What is clear is that Det. Grus’s notebook entries are inadequate for the investigative
actions that she undertook. Further, the complete absence of any submitted reports or
documentary evidence, especially to document her call to a parent and to record the
response to her specific question, is compelling evidence of her failure to record
involvement or findings.

viii) Self-initiated Unauthorized Project

The evidence of Sgt. Guy was that Det. Grus was his direct report and that files are
assigned by the SACA Unit case manager. In some circumstances, especially afterhours
or weekends, investigators on duty may self-assign developing investigations, especially
when immediate investigative action is required. Sgt. Guy testified that he did not

DET. GRUS DECISION 23

authorize Det. Grus to conduct any investigation into the adverse impacts of vaccines,
nor any form of quality review, and that he was in fact unaware of any investigative
actions undertaken into infant deaths related to vaccines by Det. Grus. S/Sgt. Rossetti,
the staff sergeant of the SACA Unit, testified that she was unaware of a criminal
negligence investigation by Det. Grus.

Defence had raised an issue with the wording “unauthorized project” in the Notice of
Hearing, submitting that there is no such thing, referring to the actions of Det. Grus as a
“probe stage”. Whether it is called a quality control project, project, probe, or an
investigation, it is still a form of a police inquiry of a criminal nature. In this case, it was
an unauthorized, self-initiated police inquiry into the actions of government and public
health officials who were engaged in the approvals and implementation of a vaccine
mandate during a pandemic.

This Tribunal has heard evidence on the protocol of how an infant death is investigated
in Ottawa, with a tripartite of three partners: A coroner; a pathologist; and police
investigator from both SACA and the Homicide Unit. Each has a specific role and
investigative responsibility. Evidence was also heard that Det. Grus did not consult the
Regional Coroner’s Office nor the Forensic Pathology Unit before suspecting potential
criminal negligence and proceeding on her own course of investigation.

I find it grossly naive on the part of Det. Grus to not comprehend the severity of her
independent actions. There is no evidence that she considered the implications of harm
to the Service’s reputation and perceived impartiality on delivering unbiased policing. It
can certainly be viewed as an attempted weaponization/politicalization of police powers
to exert pressure on municipal, provincial, and federal health officials. What Det. Grus
describes demonstrates, at best, a poorly thought-out criminal negligence investigation,
kept from her chain of command, and with national implications far beyond her individual
capabilities and resources.

I find that self-initiated an unauthorized project is a fair assessment of the actions of Det.
Grus. She was not assigned any of the infant death investigations and had absolutely no
investigative role in any of them other than receiving a call from Mr. Ruggles on two
occasions, due to his previous professional relationship with Det. Grus on a Loss-
Prevention Committee.

ix) Interfering in an Investigation

Det. Grus testified that on January 30, 2022, she called and spoke with the father of a
deceased infant and asked one follow-up question—“I asked if his wife had received a
COVID-19 vaccine because medical professionals were looking into possible adverse
events.” Det. Grus commenced leave without pay on February 1, 2022.

At paragraph 98 of her affidavit, Det. Grus rationalizes the phone call by stating Det.
Botcher was dismissive of her concerns and that he had not followed up with the family,
so “in good faith, I did so myself. This action does not breach OPS policy, at most I

DET. GRUS DECISION 24

stepped on Det. Botchar’s toes. I did not interfere with the case, and I did not update my
conversation with the father in RMS.”

Sgt. Arbuthnot’s conclusion of his Investigative Report (Exhibit 22, tab A-1) reads:

“However, a police detective rather than a doctor posing the question to a

grieving parent opened the possibility of subjecting the family to even greater
harm. Implicit in the question was the suggestion that prevailing medical
advice which had been provided to the public to this point had changed.
Absent any contextual information and/or rapport a lead investigator or the
coroner would have built with the family, a “cold call” from a detective with no
role in the case and asking a potentially guilt-induced question of a parent
about a medical choice they made possibly contributing to the death of their
infant was inappropriate.”

Det. Anderson’s Compelled Response (Exhibit 22, D-2) reads:

(The mother) “had already begun to lose faith in the integrity and ability of the
professionals conducting the investigation into the death of their baby through
their negative interactions at the outset…”. “If this relationship is severed, the
parents may become uncooperative.”

On January 30, 2022, when Det. Grus made the call to the father, she did much more
that “stepped on the toes” of the lead investigator, Det. Botchar. She deliberately, without
consulting Det. Botchar, inserted herself into the investigation. The evidence of both Sgt.
Arbuthnot and Det. Anderson speaks to the inherent repercussions of the unnecessary
interjection and the damage that could result. As an experienced SACA investigator, Det.
Grus was well aware of the fragile relationships with parents , the risks, and, once again,
allowed her personal convictions to cloud her better judgement as a seasoned
investigator.

The failure of Det. Grus to document her call to the father in the investigation serves only
to compound the potential damage to the lead investigator’s relationship and trust with
the family. She did not enter a RMS investigative action nor notify Det. Botchar in any
way of the call and the provided response on the vaccine status of the mother. It also
brings to question assertions by Det. Grus that there remain avenues of criminal
investigation that should be undertaken by the OPS yet she herself failed to record or
document what she considered to be relevant, important information.

x) Standard of Proof

Ms. Barrow submitted that the applicable standard of proof is that of clear and convincing
evidence, as established in Jacobs v. Ottawa Police Service, 2016 ONCA 345 (CanLII)
and more recently reinforced by Johnson v. Durham Regional Police Service, 2020
ONCPC3 (CanLII), at paragraph 31.

DET. GRUS DECISION 25

Ms. van den Berg submitted that Det. Grus was unfairly and unlawfully charged for
upholding her oath. The standard of proof is found in Jacobs v. Ottawa Police Service,
2016 ONCA 345 (CanLII) which is one of clear and convincing evidence. This standard
is higher than the balance of probabilities and lower that beyond a reasonable doubt.

Both Prosecution and Defence have submitted that the proper and applicable standard
of proof is the Jacobs v. Ottawa Police Service decision which establishes that it is on
clear and convincing evidence. This is indeed the correct standard of proof that will be
applied by this Tribunal.

xi) Test of Discreditable Conduct

Ms. Barrow submitted that the charge is from the Code of Conduct, section 2(1)(a)(xi)
which reads “…Discreditable Conduct, in that he or she, acts in a disorderly manner or in
a manner prejudicial to discipline or likely to bring discredit upon the reputation of the
police force of which the officer is a member”. Ms. Barrow submitted that there is
extensive and consistent applicable case law on the objective test for Discreditable
Conduct, starting with the early and key case of Girard v. Delany, 2 PLR. 337 (Ont. Bd.
Inq.) and the five principles at paragraph 51: The test is primarily objective; measure the
conduct to reasonable expectations of the community; may use own judgement and must
place themselves in the position of a reasonable person in the community, dispassionate
and fully apprised of the circumstances; considerate of the appropriate rules and
regulations in force; and the appropriate consideration of the subjective element of good
faith when the officer is required to exercise discretion.

Ms. Barrow cited subsequent case law that builds on Girard v. Delany, starting with
Mancini and Courage (Niagara Regional Police Service), 2004 CanLII 76810 (ONCPC),
paragraphs 92 and 93, where the “conduct in question must be measured against the
reasonable expectation of the community” and “the potential damage” rather than
establishing actual discredit as found in Silverman and Ontario Provincial Police, 1997 3
O.P.R. 1181 (OCCPS). The correct approach, as stated in paragraph 108, is whether or
not a reasonable person would find the conduct of the officer, if it were to me made public,
would likely discredit the reputation of the service.

Ms. Barrow further cited Stevenson v. Bryson, Green and Durham Regional Police
Service, 2020 ONCPC 8 (CanLII), paragraph 30, Toy v. Edmonton (City) Police Service,
2014 ABCA 353, Mulligan v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2017 ONCPC 19, and Campoli v.
Toronto Police Service, 2020, ONCPC 11 (CanLII).

Ms. Barrow submitted that, although there are several definitions in case law, the test is
clear. On the issue of good faith and discretion, Ms. Barrow submitted that it is only
relevant when required to show split second judgement calls, without delay, and will not
vindicate an officer, but can be a factor. In instances where there is no immediacy, the
issue of good faith and discretion does not apply.

DET. GRUS DECISION 26

Analysis

The applicable test for Discreditable Conduct is well established in case law for PSA
hearings, as submitted by Ms. Barrow, starting with the Girard v. Delaney’s five principles
constituting Discreditable Conduct and the subsequent decisions fortifying the key
concepts. (Mancini and Courage (Niagara Regional Police Service), 2004 CanLII 76810
(ONCPC), Silverman and Ontario Provincial Police, 1997 3 O.P.R. 1181 (OCCPS),
Stevenson v. Bryson, Green and Durham Regional Police Service, 2020 ONCPC 8
(CanLII), paragraph 30, Toy v. Edmonton (City) Police Service, 2014 ABCA 353, Mulligan
v. Ontario Provincial Police, 2017 ONCPC 19, and Campoli v. Toronto Police Service,
2020, ONCPC 11 (CanLII).

The 2017 OCPC decision Mulligan v. Ontario Provincial Police, paragraph 35, reads:

“We agree that the test for discreditable conduct is an objective one. The objective
test would require that the Hearing Officer place a dispassionate reasonable person
fully appraised of the same facts and circumstances, aware of the applicable rules
and regulations, in the same situation to assess whether the conduct in question
was discreditable.”

The 2004 Mancini and Courage (Niagara Regional Police Service) decision is clear
that the applicable measure to be applied to determine whether or not conduct is
discreditable is the extent of the potential damage to the reputation of the service
should the action become public knowledge, and not the actual damage. This is again
reestablished more recently (2020) in the OCPC decision of Campoli v. Toronto Police
Service on whether the misconduct would likely bring discredit on the police force.

The Notice of Hearing, as pointed out by the Defence, contains more than one alleged
actions: Self-initiated an unauthorized project (accessed nine child and/or infant death
cases with no investigative role/responsibility and failed to record your involvement or
findings); and interfered in an investigation of an infant death (without the lead
detective’s knowledge or authorization, contacted the father of a deceased baby to
inquire about the COVID vaccination status of the mother), thus constituting
Discreditable Conduct.

The applicable, objective test to be applied, as set out by clear case law, is for this
Tribunal to place all relevant facts and circumstances and applicable rules and
regulations before a dispassionate, reasonable person to assess whether the actions
of Det. Grus had the potential, if it became public, to damage the reputation of the
OPS, thus constituting Discreditable Conduct.

The evidence established that Det. Grus was not assigned any of the nine infant death
investigations by her sergeant or case manager, nor were they formally self-assigned
by herself which sometimes occurs on weekends or afterhours. Det. Grus was not
formally assigned the investigative task of conducting a criminal negligence

DET. GRUS DECISION 27

investigation into the actions of public health officials in their managing and application
of vaccine policy.

The evidence further established that her immediate chain of command (SACA
sergeant and staff sergeant) was uninformed and unaware of her investigative
inquires, as well as her SACA colleagues who were assigned as leads to the nine
death investigations. There was evidence that Det. Grus did raise the issue of the
possible linkage of infant deaths to vaccines to the Chief and Deputy Chief on January
13, 2022, the second videoconference town hall to hear concerns on the pending
vaccination policy for OPS employees and that Det. Grus considered this as implied
consent from her “next opportunity” or “ad hoc” chain of command.

The evidence also established that Det. Grus, other than a few handwritten notations
of case numbers, and preparatory notes on infant deaths for the town hall meetings on
mandatory vaccine policies and adverse effects, failed to record her involvement or
findings. No investigative action reports, investigative chronologies, or supporting
documents were submitted, nor was a case number generated on her investigative
inquiries into criminal negligence. The conclusion drawn by this evidence is that Det.
Grus made a deliberate effort to conceal her activities as she was aware that approval
would be required, and it would be denied.

I accept that an underlying motivation was a perceived increase of infant deaths since
COVID-19 and the implementation of vaccinations, but I find that the evidence supports
that she applied her own personal views on the risks and dangers of vaccination policy,
formed by her self-initiated research and her strong opposition to her employer’s
decision to implement a mandatory vaccination policy. Det. Grus allowed her personal
beliefs and opinions to seep into her professional responsibilities and cloud her
judgment and, ultimately, her professional conduct.

As to interfering with an investigation, the evidence is clear that Det. Grus had no clear
authorization or the consent of the lead investigator to contact the father of a deceased
infant to inquire about the COVID-19 vaccination status of the mother. It was the
conclusion of this Tribunal that there were very real consequences of such a call being
made. Det. Grus ought to have known the risks and addressed her concerns in another
format. The call was made on her last shift prior to being placed on unpaid leave and
there was no documentation of the call nor the information received from the father.

It is fair to conclude that a dispassionate, reasonable person would have concerns to

learn that a SACA detective discreetly, without authorization, undertook investigative
inquiries of criminal negligence into the actions of public health officials, clouded by
her personal belief of a potential linkage between infant deaths and COVID-19
vaccinations.

If in fact ultimately deemed warranted, investigative inquiries of such magnitude, even

preliminary, would have to be carefully considered by the Service, in consultation with
legal, medical, and prosecution experts, due to the political and societal ramifications

DET. GRUS DECISION 28

entailed. The police chain of command, up to and including the Executive, would have
to have full knowledge of the intended criminal investigation and give clear and specific
authorization before any such inquiries were undertaken.

A reasonable person would conclude that Det. Grus misused the authority of her
position and work related access to the personal medical information stored within a
police RMS databank system to advance a position on a topic that was known to be
divisive and controversial, despite a strongly held personal conviction that it was in the
public’s interests as public COVID policy was putting infants at risk.

I also find that a dispassionate, reasonable person would conclude that Det. Grus’s
telephone call to the parent had the real potential of bringing discredit to the reputation
of the OPS, if it became known, as it undermined the confidence of the family in the
ability of the health and medical community to protect their child and to determine a
cause of death. Sensitivity and privacy factors also come into play, as well as the
potential of the introduction of guilt by parents for their vaccination decisions.

In their totality, the actions of Det. Grus set out in the Notice of Hearing, would be
concerning to the community as it introduced an element of a personally held bias into
serious investigations involving the death of infants. There were no checks and
balances, no consultation with the coroner or medical community, and the criminal
inquiries were undertaken without the knowledge or authorization of the Service.

A reasonable person would understand the community’s collective response of

concern should they have learnt that such unauthorized criminal negligence inquiries
on public officials were being undertaken by a criminal investigator within SACA. The
public would expect their police service to exercise proper and effective oversight and
authority over their employees to ensure a bias free approach when conducting
criminal investigations.

Decision

Det. Grus is before this Tribunal on one count of Discreditable Conduct. In considering
the exhibits entered, the testimony and documentary of all witnesses, and the review of
case law provided in the Book of Authorities, I make the following finding on the standard
of clear and convincing evidence:

Count One: Guilty of Discreditable Conduct.

(Original signed)

Chris Renwick
Superintendent (Retired).

Dated March 25, 2025.

DET. GRUS DECISION 29

Electronically delivered: March 25, 2025.

DET. GRUS DECISION 30

Appendix A

Exhibits

Exhibit 1: Hearing Officer Designation, Supt. (retired) Chris Renwick.

Exhibit 2: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Angela Stewart.
Exhibit 3: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Christiane Huneault.
Exhibit 4: Prosecutor Designation, Mr. Shawn Cleroulx.
Exhibit 5: Notice of Disciplinary Hearing.
Exhibit 6: Notice of Increased Penalty.
Exhibit 7: Non-legal Representative Waiver, Ms. Pam Twining.
Exhibit 8: Motion Regarding Disclosure (December 29, 2022).
Exhibit 9: Respondents Factum—Response to Applicant’s Motion for Disclosure.
Exhibit 10: Respondent’s Book of Authorities-- Response to Applicant’s Motion for
Disclosure.
Exhibit 11: Ruling on Motion for Disclosure. (January 21, 2023).
Exhibit 12: Prosecution’s Book of Authorities.
Exhibit 13: Consolidated Motion.
Exhibit 14: Response (Prosecution) to Applicant’s Consolidated Motion.
Exhibit 15: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Vanessa Stewart.
Exhibit 16: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Bonnie Cho.
Exhibit 17: Ruling on Consolidated Motion.
Exhibit 18: Notice of Filing Evidence (Prosecution).
Exhibit 19: Respondent’s Response to Notice of Filing Evidence.
Exhibit 20: Decision (Revised) on Notice of Filing Evidence and Applicant by Cross-
Application.
Exhibit 21: Affidavit of Ms. Sarah Hanks (Defence). August 11, 2023.
Exhibit 22: Exhibit Book (Prosecution.)
Exhibit 23: External USB Drive. Compelled interview of Det. Grus. May 12, 2022.
Exhibit 24: Defence Letter on Prosecution Witnesses Summaries. August 4, 2023.
Exhibit 25: Notice of Filing Evidence (Prosecution). August 3, 2024.
Exhibit 26(a): Defence Book of Authorities, Volume I.
Exhibit 26(b): Defence Book of Authorities, Volume II.
Exhibit 27: Ottawa Citizen article. ‘PSW ‘monster’ jailed for another child-sex crime.’
June 6, 2019.
Exhibit 28: Det. Grus’s 2018 Annual Performance Review.
Exhibit 29: Det. Grus’s 2019 Annual Performance Review.
Exhibit 30: Det. Grus’s 2020 Annual Performance Review.
Exhibit 31: Excerpt for the Ontario Code of Conduct.
Exhibit 32: Ontario Court of Appeal Decision: R. v. H. (J). 2013.
Exhibit 33: Ontario Court of Appeal Decision: R v. Saunderson. 2017.
Exhibit 34: Decision. Ottawa Police Service and Cst. Kevin Benloss. 2022.
Exhibit 35: OCPC Decision. Bennett v. Ottawa Police Service. 2012.

DET. GRUS DECISION 31

Exhibit 36: OCPC Decision. Bargh v. Ottawa Police Service. 2011.
Exhibit 37: Decision. R. v Samaneigo, SCC. 2022.
Exhibit. 38: Ontario Reg. 645-21, Appendix A: Requirement for Patrons in Indoor
Sport and Recreation Fitness Facilities.
Exhibit 39: CBC article. ‘Detective tried to uncover vaccine status of dead children’s
parents, sources say.’ March 28, 2022.
Exhibit 40: OPS letter. Discipline Hearing involving Cst. Grus. September 26, 2022.
Exhibit 41: CBC article. ‘Grieving mother not told nature of misconduct in probe of
baby’s death: lawyer.’ March 31, 2022.
Exhibit 42: Redacted copy of January 30, 2022 notes of Det. Grus.
Exhibit 43: Excerpt of section 40, Police Services Act, Regulation 268/10.
Exhibit 44: Police Services Act, Regulation 368/10, Code of Conduct.
Exhibit 45: Emails between Sgt. Arbuthnot and Coroner Dr. Cowan, titled Re: Ottawa
Police Service internal investigation “**Confidential**. April, 2022.
Exhibit 46: Covid-19 Vaccine Clinical Studies. (12 bound documents.)
Exhibit 47: Applicant Motion for Additional Disclosure (Defence).
Exhibit 48: Applicant Abuse of Process Motion II—Motion to Stay (Defence).
Exhibit 49: International Guidelines for Certification and Classification (Coding) of
Covid-19 Cause of Death.
Exhibit 50: Covid-19 Vaccines: Safety Surveillance Manual.
Exhibit 51: Ramsay v. Brantford, Ontario Human Right Tribunal decision. 2021.
Exhibit 52: Richard Sahadeo and Pafco Insurance Company. Ontario Licence Appeal
Tribunal decision. 2022.
Exhibit 53: Sgt. Berube’s notes of compelled interview of Det. Grus. February 4 and
12 May, 2022.
Exhibit 54: Sgt. Berube’s notes of compelled statement of Det. R. Stewart. April 6,
2022.
Exhibit 55: Email titled ‘RE: With all due respect, Helen Grus #1631. September 9,
2021’.
Exhibit 56a: Notice of Internal Complaint.
Exhibit 56b: Application for Third Party Records (Defence).
Exhibit 57: R.J.S. v. R. SCC decision. 1995.
Exhibit 58: R. v. Rybak. Ontario Court of Appeal decision. 2008.
Exhibit 59: R. v. Jolivet. SCC decision. 2000.
Exhibit 60: Defence Book of Authorities for Expert Witness Submission.
Exhibit 61: Defence Expert Witness Documents. (Dr. McCullough, Dr. Payne, Dr.
Thorp, Dr. Chan, and S/Sgt. (retired) Danyluk.
Exhibit 62: USB stick. Expert witness documents. (Dr. Payne, Dr. Chan, Mr.
Buckley.)
Exhibit 63: Ruling on Proposed Expert Witnesses for Defence.
Exhibit 64: Application Motion of Non-Suit.
Exhibit 65: Hearing Transcripts. Binder 1 of 2.
Exhibit 65b: Hearing Transcripts. Binder 2 of 2.

DET. GRUS DECISION 32

Exhibit 66: Authorization for Release of Medical Information form.
Exhibit 67: S/Sgt. (retired) Danyluk resume.
Exhibit 68: OPS Honour, Courage, Service ethics booklet.
Exhibit 69: OPS Service Sergeant Major job description. **Sealed exhibit**.
Exhibit 70: OPS Sergeant Major School PowerPoint. **Sealed exhibit**.
Exhibit 71: Police Service Act, Ontario Regulation 268/10.
Exhibit 72: Excerpt of Police Service Act, Police Officers (sec. 42-45).
Exhibit 73: R. v. Lyttle, 2004 SCC.
Exhibit 74: Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC.
Exhibit 75: BORN Ontario document titled Data Privacy and Security.
Exhibit 76: IC/ES document titled Working With ICES Data.
Exhibit 77: ICMJE disclosure Form template.
Exhibit 78: Coroners Act Ontario Regulation 523/18.
Exhibit 79: Ontario Civilian Police Commission’s Rules of Practice.
Exhibit 80: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Lynda Bordeleau.
Exhibit 81: Prosecutor Designation, Ms. Jessica Barrow.
Exhibit 82: Adopted Rules on Motions.
Exhibit 83: Ruling on Adopted Rules on Motions and Motion to Remove Prosecutor
Ms. Vanessa Stewart.
Exhibit 84: Affidavit of Helen Grus.
Exhibit 85: Transcripts. January 8-11, 2024.
Exhibit 86: Det. Grus’s 2023 Annual Performance Review.
Exhibit 87: Peel’s Nine Policing Principles.
Exhibit 88: Det. Grus’s notes (redacted). January 5 to April 15, 2021.
Exhibit 89: Email titled ‘Re: Additional duty notes of Det. Grus’, February 27, 2023,
and Det. Grus’s notes (redacted) from September 15 to 18 January, 2022.
Exhibit 90: Nanobots excerpt from Smithsonian Science booklet.
Exhibit 91(a): Article titled ‘How nanotechnology helps mRNA Covid-19 vaccines work.’
Exhibit 91(b): Majecenic v. Natale, 1967 Ontario Court of Appeal.
Exhibit 92: R. v. Van Wissen, 2018 Court of Appeal of Manitoba.
Exhibit 93: Det. Grus’s notes from 30 January, 2022.
Exhibit 94: Prosecution’s Book of Authorities. (Two volumes.)
Exhibit 95: Abbott v. Chief of Police, 2005 ABKB 2 decision.
Exhibit 96: R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57 decision.
Exhibit 97: Browne v. Dunn, 1894 House of Lords privy Council, Probate, Divorce,
and Admiralty Division decision.
Exhibit 98: R. v. M. (J.), 2021, ONCA 150 decision.
Exhibit 99: Prosecution’s June 8, 2020 to January 30, 2022 RMS query timeline chart,
used for closing submissions.
Exhibit 100: Defence’s revision (addition of a ‘Defense Response’ column) of the
Prosecution’s June 8, 2020 to January 30, 2022 RMS query timeline chart,
used for closing submissions.

DET. GRUS DECISION 33

Exhibit 101: Notebook of Det. Helen Grus, dated January 30, 2022. (Single day entry
consisting of two pages of notes.)

DET. GRUS DECISION 34