A Realistic and Contextual Perspective on the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean_1
A Realistic and Contextual Perspective on the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean_1
Towards a realistic and contextual perspective on the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
INTRODUCTION
As we have seen, at the heart of the Rule of Law, as theorized by A.V. Dicey and later refined by figures
such as Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz, are principles of legality, separation of powers, the supremacy of law,
and the absence of arbitrary power.
In the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Rule of Law takes on a layered, often paradoxical character. It
stands as a beacon of fairness and stability inherited from British legal tradition, yet it remains
inextricably bound to the embers of empire.
Post-colonial realities mean that the principle of the Rule of Law must constantly negotiate between the
heavy imprints of colonial governance and the democratic aspirations of newly independent states.
In what follows, I offer a realistic and contextual perspective that weaves together historical legacies,
critical theoretical insights, and contemporary judicial developments, illuminating how the Rule of Law
in the Commonwealth Caribbean is both a promise of order and a contested terrain shaped by power,
identity, and social justice.
The concept of the Rule of Law has deep historical and philosophical roots, emerging from ancient
civilizations and evolving through various legal traditions. While the modern articulation of the Rule of
Law is often traced to the works of A.V. Dicey in the 19th century, its intellectual lineage can be found in
ancient, medieval, and early modern legal and political thought.
The Rule of Law has evolved from ancient moral and philosophical principles into a cornerstone of
modern constitutionalism. While its earliest origins lie in classical and medieval legal traditions, its
modern articulation owes much to the works of Locke, Montesquieu, Dicey, and later legal theorists.
Despite its varying interpretations—whether as a formal legal structure (Raz), a procedural ideal (Fuller),
or a constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness (Dicey)—the Rule of Law remains central to legal and
political thought worldwide.
The Rule of Law: A.V. Dicey, Lon Fuller, and Joseph Raz
The concept of the Rule of Law, foundational to modern legal and constitutional thought, has been
subject to extensive theorization and refinement over time.
It will be observed that A.V. Dicey’s classical formulation in the late 19th century provided the bedrock
of the idea, whereas later legal theorists such as Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz critically examined and
expanded upon its implications.
Each of these thinkers presents a different perspective on what the Rule of Law entails—whether as a
purely formal requirement of governance, a procedural ideal, or a substantive commitment to justice.
1
Albert Venn Dicey, in his seminal work: Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885),
articulated a threefold conception of the Rule of Law, which became a defining feature of English
constitutionalism. His theory was primarily concerned with the limitation of arbitrary power and the
supremacy of ordinary law.
While Dicey's model remains foundational, it has been criticized on several grounds:
His rejection of administrative law ignores the necessity of regulatory bodies in modern
governance.
His insistence on equality before the law ignored the structural inequalities that persist in legal
systems.
Lon L. Fuller, an American legal philosopher, advanced a more nuanced understanding of the Rule of
Law in The Morality of Law (1964). He rejected purely formalist accounts and instead argued that the
Rule of Law entails an inherent morality embedded in legal procedures.
Fuller proposed that for a legal system to comply with the Rule of Law, it must meet eight key criteria:
2
4. Clarity: Laws must be clear and comprehensible.
7. Stability: Laws must not change so frequently that people cannot adjust their behavior.
8. Congruence: There must be alignment between laws as written and laws as enforced.
He introduced a procedural and moral dimension to the concept, arguing that law's legitimacy
depends on its capacity to guide human conduct.
His framework emphasized that a system that disregards these principles is not merely
inefficient but ceases to be a legal system at all.
Unlike Dicey, Fuller was less concerned with judicial supremacy and more focused on the
internal integrity of legal systems.
Criticism of Fuller:
His notion of "internal morality" has been critiqued as being overly procedural and not
necessarily tied to substantive justice.
Legal positivists, including Raz, argue that legality and morality should be kept separate.
Joseph Raz, a prominent legal positivist, offered a more skeptical perspective on the Rule of Law, arguing
that it is best understood as a formal concept rather than a moral or substantive one.
3
He provided a more restrained, positivist account, insisting that the Rule of Law is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a just legal order.
His emphasis on formalism challenges the assumption that the Rule of Law inherently leads to
good governance.
He reorients the debate away from moral claims and toward the instrumental function of law in
structuring social interactions.
Criticism of Raz:
Critics argue that his approach is too detached from substantive concerns such as human rights
and justice.
His insistence on the separation of law and morality is seen as excessively rigid, especially in
societies where legal frameworks have been used as tools of oppression.
A.V. Classical Supremacy of law, equality before the Ignores administrative law, overly
Dicey Liberalism law, common law constitutionalism rigid formalism
Joseph Legal Formalist approach, legal certainty, Too detached from justice, neglects
Raz Positivism distinction between law and morality human rights
In contemporary legal discourse, the Rule of Law remains an evolving and contested concept.
While Dicey's classical formulation underpins much of modern constitutional thought, Fuller’s
proceduralist approach has influenced debates on good governance, and Raz’s formalism remains
central to legal positivism.
The challenge for modern jurists is to navigate these perspectives in ways that account for both the
stability and fairness of legal systems.
The Rule of Law, as conceptualized by A.V. Dicey and later refined by Lon Fuller and Joseph Raz,
embodies fundamental principles that ensure a legal system is structured, predictable, and resistant to
arbitrary governance. These principles—legality, separation of powers, the supremacy of law, and the
absence of arbitrary power—serve as the bedrock of constitutionalism and just governance.
Legality
Legality refers to the requirement that laws must be clear, publicly promulgated, and consistently
applied. Each theorist contributes to this understanding:
4
A.V. Dicey: Argued that no one should be punished except under the clear provisions of the law.
The government itself must operate within legal limits.
Lon Fuller: Expanded legality by introducing his eight principles of legality, which demand that
laws be general, public, non-retroactive, and internally coherent to guide human conduct
effectively.
Joseph Raz: Stressed that legality is a formal concept, meaning a legal system can comply with
the Rule of Law even if its content is unjust, as long as laws are clear, stable, and predictable.
Separation of Powers
This principle ensures that different branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—
remain distinct to prevent the concentration of power.
Dicey: Advocated for a strong role for the judiciary in upholding the Rule of Law, ensuring that
the executive remains subject to legal scrutiny.
Raz: While not explicitly a separation-of-powers theorist, he reinforced the idea that for the
Rule of Law to function, independent institutions must oversee legal compliance.
Supremacy of Law
The supremacy of law dictates that all persons, including government officials, are subject to the law.
Dicey: Strongly emphasized that no one is above the law, and legal authority should be derived
from judicially enforceable principles rather than arbitrary government discretion.
Fuller: Believed that adherence to legal procedures ensures that law remains a system of
governance rather than a tool of oppression, reinforcing the law’s supremacy.
Raz: Accepted the supremacy of law but distinguished it from moral legitimacy, arguing that
even authoritarian regimes can comply with the Rule of Law if they adhere to clear legal
processes.
A system governed by the Rule of Law must prevent unchecked discretion and ensure that state power
is exercised through legal mechanisms.
Dicey: Saw the Rule of Law as a safeguard against tyranny, ensuring that executive decisions are
legally constrained.
Fuller: Viewed arbitrary rule as an affront to procedural legality, emphasizing that when laws
are unpredictable, secret, or contradictory, they cease to function as laws.
Raz: Acknowledged the importance of predictability in law but warned that limiting
arbitrariness does not necessarily lead to justice, as unjust laws can still be predictably applied.
5
While Dicey laid the foundation for the Rule of Law, Fuller refined it by introducing a procedural
morality, and Raz provided a formalist critique that emphasized legality over morality. Together, their
perspectives reinforce the core principles of legality, separation of powers, the supremacy of law, and
the absence of arbitrary power, ensuring that governance is both structured and constrained within
legal frameworks.
The British colonial scheme in the Caribbean imposed a system of courts and statutes designed initially
to serve metropolitan economic interests—particularly in plantation societies. Statutes regulating
property, labor, and criminal behavior were imbued with assumptions of racial hierarchy and paternal
governance.
The ideal of the Rule of Law, though present in British jurisprudential philosophy, operated selectively—
upholding, for instance, the “lawful” subjugation of the enslaved and the systematic exclusion of large
segments of the local population from political representation.
When formal independence was obtained, many of the newly minted Caribbean constitutions enshrined
the Rule of Law as a core principle.
The Guyana Independence Constitution, which came into effect on May 26, 1966, drafted within the
framework of British constitutional traditions, included many of the structural hallmarks of
parliamentary democracy, fundamental rights, and judicial independence, which are all integral to the
Rule of Law.
Yet these constitutional frameworks retained much of the inherited legal architecture—judicial
hierarchies, common law doctrines, and institutional cultures.
6
Limitations and Tensions
However, while the form of the Rule of Law was embedded in the 1966 Constitution, its substantive
realization was constrained by several factors:
The paradox is stark: the very normative ideals meant to guarantee rights and fairness arose from legal
structures historically complicit in subjugation.
Thus, from the outset, Commonwealth Caribbean states have wrestled with the tension between
adopting the inherited forms of the Rule of Law and forging new paths to protect rights in line with post-
colonial self-determination.
The 1966 Constitution of Guyana embedded many of the formal characteristics of the Rule of Law—
constitutional supremacy, judicial review, fundamental rights, and legal certainty. However, the
existence of wide executive discretion, emergency powers, and limited separation of powers meant that
the Rule of Law was not fully entrenched as a core, inviolable principle.
Rather than a rigid constitutional commitment to the Rule of Law in the Diceyan or Razian sense, the
Constitution reflected the pragmatic political realities of the time—seeking to balance order,
governance, and legal principles within the constraints of an emerging post-colonial state.
While the constitutional framework provided the possibility of a robust Rule of Law system, the extent
of its realization would depend more on political culture, legal interpretation, and post-independence
governance rather than on constitutional text alone.
7
Post-Colonial Theories and the Recasting of the Rule of Law
Post-colonial theorists—ranging from Frantz Fanon’s searing analysis of colonial violence to more
regionally focused voices such as Walter Rodney and CLR James—challenge the notion that the Rule of
Law in previously colonized societies can be purely neutral. Instead, they argue that law is part of a
broader ideological framework, historically utilized to legitimize economic extraction and maintain social
stratification.
In the Caribbean, the Rule of Law must therefore be re-read through a lens that acknowledges these
biases, seeking to dismantle vestiges of inequality that remain embedded in seemingly “modern” legal
regimes.
Amid the complexities of the post-colonial transition, Caribbean governments and activists have
attempted to “indigenize” the Rule of Law. We see this in efforts to reflect local values, for instance,
when courts consider customary land rights or weigh moral arguments that resonate uniquely within
regional contexts.
Yet, such transformations are not uniform; while some states experiment with localized dispute-
resolution mechanisms, others retain a deep trust in their inherited legal traditions, citing them as
bastions of procedural fairness and global legitimacy.
The interplay of these attitudes reveals the ambivalence many Caribbean jurists and policy-makers feel:
they want to honor indigenous identities yet also safeguard the stability that centuries-old British legal
precepts can provide.
Constitutional governance in the Commonwealth Caribbean typically follows the Westminster model,
replete with a separation of powers, parliamentary supremacy (curbed by constitutional supremacy),
and strong executive leadership.
In principle, these institutional design features should bolster the Rule of Law by distributing authority
and preventing the overreach of any single branch. In practice, however, small-state challenges—tight-
knit communities, limited financial resources, political polarization—can strain the promise of impartial
governance.
Judicial independence, while jealously guarded in formal law, may be threatened by subtle pressures:
budgetary constraints, personal ties among the legal elite, and occasionally, executive heavy-
handedness.
The establishment of the CCJ to replace the Privy Council as a final appellate court (at least for some
jurisdictions) symbolizes a regional commitment to control their own judicial destinies. This
development also underscores a deep-seated desire to assert local jurisprudential voices.
8
Cases reaching the CCJ often address fundamental rights—privacy, capital punishment, discrimination—
creating an ever-evolving jurisprudence that tests how the Rule of Law can uphold universal principles
while reflecting Caribbean social values.
The court’s emphasis on the region’s distinct cultural and socio-economic environment suggests a move
toward a more context-sensitive application of legal norms.
Many Caribbean constitutions contain robust Bills of Rights, patterned after international human rights
instruments and Britain’s own traditions of civil liberties. These constitutional guarantees—to equality,
freedom of expression, and due process—are the bedrock of the formal Rule of Law.
Yet, the deeper question remains whether these constitutional pledges genuinely filter down to all
strata of society. Pockets of socio-economic inequality, stigma surrounding certain identities (e.g.,
LGBTQ+ populations), and remnants of racialized policing hamper the effective realization of rights.
Thus, while local courts have handed down progressive rulings, the shadow of colonial forms of
exclusion can persist, demonstrating how law operates within complex cultural and historical
undercurrents.
Progress on rights issues often emerges from grassroots activism—trade unions, women’s groups, youth
movements—invoking the constitution to demand equitable treatment. These movements approach the
Rule of Law not as a top-down dictate but as a principle to be harnessed for social transformation.
By forcing the judiciary and executive to confront structural inequalities, activists have propelled legal
reform, demonstrating that in the Caribbean, the “rule by law” can become the “rule for justice” when
propelled by popular engagement.
In a globalized era, the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean stands at a crossroads between
international legal standards—championed by bodies like the UN or the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights—and deeply rooted local mores.
On one hand, compliance with international norms is a source of foreign investment and diplomatic
goodwill. On the other, national sovereignty discourses can clash with the universalizing ambitions of
human rights frameworks.
Caribbean courts thus find themselves interpreting the law in ways that simultaneously uphold
recognized global standards and preserve local autonomy.
9
The region’s jurisprudence increasingly hints at a transformative vision of constitutional law, one that
acknowledges that historical injustices—racial, socio-economic, and gender-based—require robust
judicial intervention.
The Rule of Law, under this evolving lens, is not merely a protective shield for property and procedural
fairness but also an instrument for restructuring societal relations toward greater equity.
Whether in judgments about capital punishment, environmental justice, or equality for marginalized
groups, courts are forging a path that aligns textual guarantees with real-world outcomes.
Such an ethos is reminiscent of what some constitutional scholars label “substantive constitutionalism,”
where law aspires to rectify societal imbalances rather than merely codify the status quo.
The Rule of Law is a fundamental principle in the Commonwealth Caribbean legal system, ensuring that
laws are clear, fair, and equally applied to all individuals. Over the years, several landmark cases have
shaped the understanding and application of the Rule of Law in the region. Below are some of the most
significant cases:
The Privy Council ruled that prolonged delays in carrying out the death penalty (over five years)
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment under the Jamaican Constitution.
This case significantly influenced death penalty jurisprudence in the Caribbean, reinforcing the
principle that justice must be administered fairly and without undue delay.
This case challenged the Gun Court Act of Jamaica, which granted certain judicial powers to a
tribunal mainly composed of executive-appointed officials.
The Privy Council held that this violated separation of powers, reinforcing the principle that
judicial power must be exercised by independent courts in accordance with the Rule of Law.
Collymore & Abraham v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (1967) 12 WIR 5
The Trinidadian government attempted to restrict trade union activities through legislation.
The Privy Council ruled that restricting trade union freedom violated constitutional rights,
affirming the protection of civil liberties under the Rule of Law.
A death row inmate in Trinidad argued that his execution should be delayed until his petition to
an international human rights body was considered.
10
The Privy Council ruled that failing to allow this petition would violate due process, reinforcing
the importance of procedural fairness and international law compliance in the Caribbean legal
system.
The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) ruled that executing prisoners before the completion of
their legal appeals violated their constitutional rights to due process.
This case emphasized that Caribbean courts must uphold constitutional supremacy and
fundamental rights, even in death penalty cases.
The Jamaican government sought to create a local final court, bypassing the Privy Council,
without constitutional amendments.
The Privy Council ruled that altering the judicial structure required constitutional compliance,
reinforcing the importance of judicial independence within the Rule of Law.
Summary
These cases demonstrate how Caribbean courts have shaped the Rule of Law, reinforcing constitutional
supremacy, judicial independence, due process, and protection of fundamental rights. They continue to
serve as precedents in ensuring that governance, law enforcement, and individual freedoms operate
within legal and constitutional boundaries in the Commonwealth Caribbean.
Guyana’s landmark cases that have significantly contributed to the Rule of Law, abound by reinforcing
constitutional governance, fundamental rights, and legal principles:
Principle: Constitutionality, Human Rights, and Equal Protection Under the Law
This case challenged Section 153(1)(xlvii) of the Summary Jurisdiction (Offences) Act, which
criminalized cross-dressing for an “improper purpose.” The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)
ruled the law unconstitutional, declaring it vague and discriminatory, violating the right to
protection under the law. This case reinforced legal clarity and equal treatment under the Rule
of Law.
Yassin & Others v. The Attorney General of Guyana (Death Penalty Case)
In this case, death row prisoners challenged their execution warrants, arguing violations of their
constitutional rights. The ruling emphasized the necessity of due process, ensuring that death
11
sentences are reviewed under strict procedural safeguards. This case strengthened the Rule of
Law by confirming that executive action must comply with constitutional protections.
This was an international dispute over maritime boundaries between Guyana and Suriname. The
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of Guyana, clarifying the legal boundaries of
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This case upheld international law, reaffirming Guyana’s
territorial rights under the Rule of Law.
This case addressed the power of the executive to legislate through decree, questioning
whether emergency regulations could override constitutional rights. The court ruled that all
governmental actions must align with constitutional mandates, reinforcing judicial oversight in
preventing executive overreach.
The Case Between Guyana and Venezuela at the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Guyana filed a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to confirm the validity of the
1899 Arbitral Award, which had settled the Essequibo territorial dispute with Venezuela. The
case underscores Guyana’s reliance on international legal mechanisms to defend its sovereignty
under the Rule of Law.
Summary
These cases demonstrate how Guyana’s judiciary and legal institutions uphold the Rule of Law by
ensuring:
These rulings continue to shape Guyana’s legal and constitutional framework, reinforcing justice,
fairness, and equality under the Rule of Law.
12
The Rule of Law in the Post-Colonial Commonwealth Caribbean: A Promise of Order and a Contested
Terrain
This essay has examined how the Rule of Law functions as a mechanism of order while also being
shaped by power relations, identity politics, and the pursuit of social justice in the Caribbean.
It is posited here that the ‘Rule of Law’ in the post-colonial Commonwealth Caribbean serves as both a
promise of legal order and a site of contestation, shaped by power, identity, and social justice struggles.
On the one hand, the Rule of Law is heralded as a foundation for democratic governance, constitutional
supremacy, and legal certainty in the region. On the other, it remains deeply contested due to historical
inequalities, post-colonial legacies, and socio-political tensions.
The post-colonial Commonwealth Caribbean legal system is built upon the British common law tradition,
where the Rule of Law is meant to ensure predictability, fairness, and equality before the law. This legal
order manifests in several key ways:
Many Caribbean constitutions explicitly enshrine the Rule of Law, ensuring that government
actions must align with constitutional principles.
Landmark cases such as Hinds v The Queen (1977) reinforced separation of powers, preventing
executive overreach in Jamaica.
Courts, particularly the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) and the Privy Council, uphold judicial
independence and constitutional rights.
The Rule of Law establishes predictability in governance, ensuring that laws apply equally to all
citizens.
Elections and political transitions are governed by legal norms, reducing the risk of
authoritarianism or arbitrary rule.
Courts safeguard legal principles, as seen in Pratt & Morgan v The Attorney General of Jamaica
(1993), which curtailed excessive death row delays as violations of fundamental rights.
The legal system provides a framework for property rights, contract enforcement, and business
regulations, essential for economic stability.
Foreign investment in tourism, energy, and banking depends on the predictability of the legal
system, reinforcing the economic benefits of the Rule of Law.
While these aspects highlight the stabilizing function of the Rule of Law, its application and effectiveness
remain deeply contested due to structural inequalities, historical injustices, and social struggles.
13
Despite its idealized role as a neutral legal framework, the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean
is deeply shaped by power dynamics, identity struggles, and social justice movements.
The colonial legacy of the legal system means that it often reflects the interests of elites rather
than marginalized communities.
Laws are sometimes selectively enforced, particularly against the poor and vulnerable. For
instance, harsh anti-drug laws disproportionately affect the lower class, while white-collar crime
enforcement remains weak.
The death penalty remains a point of contention, with courts balancing public policy demands
for crime deterrence against international human rights obligations.
The legal system has historically marginalized Afro-Caribbean and Indo-Caribbean populations,
particularly in land disputes and economic access.
Indigenous and Maroon communities have had to litigate for land rights, as seen in Akawaio
People v The State of Guyana, where indigenous groups fought for territorial recognition.
The criminalization of LGBTQ+ communities, as seen in McEwan & Others v The Attorney
General of Guyana (2018), highlights how law has been used as a tool of exclusion and
oppression.
The Rule of Law has been a site of resistance, where activists, legal scholars, and social
movements challenge discriminatory laws and state oppression.
Legal battles over press freedom, police brutality, and workers’ rights highlight the ongoing
tension between legal authority and grassroots activism.
Cases like Thomas v Baptiste (1999) demonstrated the tension between domestic laws and
international human rights principles, reinforcing the contested nature of legal norms.
Given these tensions, the future of the Rule of Law in the Caribbean depends on resolving its
contradictions and ensuring its alignment with justice and equity. Some key areas of reform include:
Judicial training and legislative reviews to eliminate colonial-era laws that perpetuate
discrimination.
Greater representation of diverse identities within the judiciary and legal profession.
14
Courts must increasingly consider international human rights frameworks in decisions that
impact vulnerable populations.
Community engagement in legal reform should be prioritized to ensure laws reflect the realities
of post-colonial Caribbean societies.
Concluding Reflections
Viewed holistically, the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean is both an inheritance and an
aspiration—a testament to the region’s historical entanglements with empire and a tool for crafting a
more equitable social order.
Post-colonial critique serves as a valuable lens, unearthing the ways in which law can unwittingly
perpetuate power asymmetries while simultaneously offering avenues for redress.
Constitutional rights serve as both legal shield and moral compass, tested daily in the crucible of
economic pressures, shifting political alliances, and grassroots mobilizations.
Ultimately, to speak of the Rule of Law in the Commonwealth Caribbean is to speak of becoming—a
region in perpetual negotiation with its past, forging jurisprudence that is at once universal in its ideals
and distinctly Caribbean in its texture.
Through ongoing judicial innovation, citizen activism, and critical engagement with inherited legal
structures, the region continues to define and refine what it means for law to rule in a post-colonial era.
In this sense, the Rule of Law is not a static doctrine; it is the living architecture of justice, evolving amid
the voices, hopes, and struggles that breathe life into the Caribbean’s constitutional tapestry.
The Rule of Law in the post-colonial Commonwealth Caribbean is both a promise of order and a
contested space shaped by power, identity, and social justice struggles. While it provides a legal
foundation for governance and rights protection, it also perpetuates inequalities rooted in colonial
histories and socio-economic disparities. The challenge lies in ensuring that the Rule of Law serves not
only as a mechanism of order but as a tool for justice, empowerment, and true equality in Caribbean
societies. `
15
16