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The 8085 Microprocessor Architecture Programming and
Interfacing 1e Kumar Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Kumar, K. Udaya; Umashankar, B. S
ISBN(s): 9788257452247, 8257452246
Edition: Online-Ausg
File Details: PDF, 7.68 MB
Year: 2008
Language: english
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/21/2008 2:31 PM Page i

THE 8085
MICROPROCESSOR
Architecture, Programming
and Interfacing

K. UDAYA KUMAR,
Principal,
B.N.M. Institute of Technology,
Bangalore, India.

B. S. UMASHANKAR,
Professor,
Department of Computer Science,
B.N.M. Institute of Technology,
Bangalore, India.
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page ii

Copyright © 2008 Dorling Kindersley (India) Pvt. Ltd.

Licensees of Pearson Education in South Asia

No part of this eBook may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without the publisher’s prior
written consent.

This eBook may or may not include all assets that were part of the print version. The publisher reserves the
right to remove any material present in this eBook at any time.

ISBN 9788177584554
eISBN 9788131799772

Head Office: A-8(A), Sector 62, Knowledge Boulevard, 7th Floor, NOIDA 201 309, India
Registered Office: 11 Local Shopping Centre, Panchsheel Park, New Delhi 110 017, India
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page iii

Dedicated to
the Goddess of Learning
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page iv

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udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page v

Contents

Preface xi 5. First Assembly Language Program 38

5.1 Problem Statement 38
Part I 5.2 About the Microprocessor Kit 41
5.3 Using the Microprocessor Kit in
FUNDAMENTALS OF A Serial Mode 51
MICROPROCESSOR 1 Questions 51

1. Evolution of Microprocessors 3 6. Data Transfer Group of

1.1 Early Integrated Circuits 3 Instructions 52
1.2 4-Bit Microprocessors 4 6.1 Classification of 8085 Instructions 53
1.3 8-Bit Microprocessors 4 6.2 Instruction Type MVI r, d8 54
1.4 16-Bit Microprocessors 4 6.3 Instruction Type MOV r1, r2 54
1.5 32-Bit Microprocessors 5 6.4 Instruction Type MOV r, M 55
1.6 Recent Microprocessors 5 6.5 Instruction Type MOV M, r 56
1.7 Microcontrollers and Digital Signal 6.6 Instruction Type LXI rp, d16 56
Processors 5 6.7 Instruction Type MVI m, d8 57
6.8 Instruction Type LDA a16 57
2. Fundamentals of a Computer 7 6.9 Instruction Type STA a16 58
2.1 Calculator 7 6.10 Instruction Type XCHG 58
2.2 Computer 8 6.11 Addressing Modes of 8085 59
2.3 Microcomputer 12 6.12 Instruction Type LDAX rp 62
2.4 Computer Languages 13 6.13 Instruction Type STAX rp 62
Questions 16 6.14 Instruction Type LHLD a16 63
6.15 Instruction Type SHLD a16 63
3. Number Representation 17 Questions 63
3.1 Unsigned Binary Integers 17
3.2 Signed Binary Integers 18
7. Arithmetic Group of Instructions 65
3.3 Representation of Fractions 23 7.1 Instructions to Perform Addition 66
3.4 Signed Floating Point 7.2 Instructions to Perform Subtraction 70
Numbers 25 7.3 Instruction Type INX rp 73
Questions 25 7.4 Instruction Type DCX rp 74
7.5 Instruction Type DAD rp 74
4. Fundamentals of Microprocessor 27 7.6 Decimal Addition in 8085 75
4.1 History of Microprocessors 27 Questions 76
4.2 Description of 8085 Pins 29
4.3 Programmer’s View of 8085: Need for
8. Logical Group of Instructions 77
Registers 34 8.1 Instructions to Perform ‘AND’
4.4 Accumulator or Register A 35 Operation 78
4.5 Registers B, C, D, E, H, And L 36 8.2 Instructions to Perform ‘OR’
Questions 36 Operation 79
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vi
8.3 Instructions to Perform 12. Addressing of I/O Ports 125
‘EXCLUSIVE OR’ Operation 80
8.4 Instruction to Complement 12.1 Need for I/O Ports 125
Accumulator 82 12.2 IN and OUT Instructions 127
8.5 Instructions to Complement/Set ‘Cy’ 12.3 Memory-Mapped I/O 128
Flag 82 12.4 I/O-Mapped I/O 129
Contents

8.6 Instructions to Perform Compare 12.5 Comparison of Memory-Mapped

Operation 83 I/O and I/O-Mapped I/O 129
8.7 Instructions to Rotate Questions 132
Accumulator 85
Questions 88
13. Architecture of 8085 133
13.1 Details of 8085 Architecture 134
9. NOP and Stack Group of 13.2 Instruction Cycle 140
Instructions 90 13.3 Comparison of Different Machine
Cycles 152
9.1 Stack and The Stack Pointer 90 13.4 Memory Speed Requirement 153
9.2 Instruction Type POP rp 92 13.5 Wait State Generation 160
9.3 Instruction Type PUSH rp 93 Questions 161
9.4 Instruction Type LXI SP, d16 94
9.5 Instruction Type SPHL 95
9.6 Instruction Type XTHL 95 Part II
9.7 Instruction Type INX SP 95
9.8 Instruction Type DCX SP 96 ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE
9.9 Instruction Type DAD SP 96 PROGRAMS 163
9.10 Instruction Type NOP 96
Questions 98 14. Simple Assembly Language
Programs 165
10. Branch Group of Instructions 99
14.1 Exchange 10 Bytes 165
10.1 More Details about Program 14.2 Add two Multi-Byte Numbers 169
Execution 100 14.3 Add two Multi-Byte BCD
10.2 Unconditional Jump Instructions 102 Numbers 171
10.3 Conditional Jump Instructions 104 14.4 Block Movement without
10.4 Unconditional Call and Return Overlap 174
Instructions 107 14.5 Block Movement with Overlap 175
10.5 Conditional Call Instructions 109 14.6 Add N Numbers of Size 8 Bits 178
10.6 Conditional Return Instructions 111 14.7 Check the Fourth Bit of a Byte 181
10.7 RSTN – Restart Instructions 113 14.8 Subtract two Multi-Byte
Questions 115 Numbers 182
14.9 Multiply two numbers of Size
11. Chip Select Logic 117 8 Bits 184
11.1 Concept of Chip Selection 117 14.10 Divide a 16-Bit Number
11.2 RAM Chip–Pin Details And by an 8-Bit Number 187
Address Range 118 Questions 189
11.3 Multiple Memory Address
Range 119 15. Use of PC in Writing and
11.4 Working of 74138 Decoder IC 120
11.5 Use of 74138 to Generate Chip Executing 8085 Programs 190
Select Logic 121 15.1 Steps Needed to Run an Assembly
11.6 Use of 74138 in ALS-SDA-85M Language Program 191
Kit 122 15.2 Creation of .ASM File using a
Questions 123 Text Editor 195
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vii
15.3 Generation of .OBJ File using a 17.5 Bubble Sort in Ascending/Descending
Cross-Assembler 195 Order as per Choice 259
15.4 Generation of .HEX File using a 17.6 Selection Sort in Ascending/Descending
Linker 197 Order as per Choice 263
15.5 Downloading the Machine Code to 17.7 Add Contents of N Word
the Kit 199 Locations 266

Contents
15.6 Running the Downloaded Program 17.8 Multiply Two 8-Bit Numbers (Shift
on the Kit 201 and Add Method) 268
15.7 Running the Program using the PC 17.9 Multiply two 2-Digit BCD
as a Terminal 201 Numbers 270
Questions 204 17.10 Multiply two 16-Bit Binary
Numbers 272
Questions 276
16. Additional Assembly Language
Programs 205
16.1 Search for a Number using Linear Part III
Search 206
16.2 Find the Smallest Number 208 PROGRAMMABLE AND NON-
16.3 Compute the HCF of Two 8-Bit PROGRAMMABLE I/O PORTS 275
Numbers 210
16.4 Check for ‘2 out of 5’ Code 212 18. Interrupts In 8085 277
16.5 Convert ASCII to Binary 214 18.1 Data Transfer Schemes 278
16.6 Convert Binary to ASCII 216 18.2 General Discussion about 8085
16.7 Convert BCD to Binary 218 Interrupts 283
16.8 Convert Binary to BCD 221 18.3 EI and DI Instructions 285
16.9 Check for Palindrome 228 18.4 INTR and INTA* Pins 288
16.10 Compute the LCM of Two 8-Bit 18.5 RST5.5 and RST6.5 Pins 291
Numbers 230 18.6 RST7.5 Pin 292
16.11 Sort Numbers using Bubble 18.7 Trap Interrupt Pin 293
Sort 233 18.8 Execution of ‘DAD rp’
16.12 Sort Numbers using Selection Instruction 296
Sort 235 18.9 SIM and RIM Instructions 297
16.13 Simulate Decimal up Counter 237 18.10 HLT Instruction 302
16.14 Simulate Decimal down 18.11 Programs using Interrupts 302
Counter 240 Questions 310
16.15 Display Alternately 00 and FF in
the Data Field 241 19. 8212 Non-Programmable 8-Bit
16.16 Simulate a Real-Time Clock 243 I/O Port 311
Questions 246 19.1 Working of 8212 311
19.2 Applications of 8212 315
17. More Complex Assembly Questions 322
Language Programs 247
20. 8255 Programmable Peripheral
17.1 Subtract Multi-Byte BCD
Numbers 248
Interface Chip 323
17.2 Convert 16-Bit Binary to BCD 250 20.1 Description of 8255 PPI 323
17.3 Do an operation on Two Numbers 20.2 Operational Modes of 8255 327
Based on the Value of X 252 20.3 Control Port of 8255 328
17.4 Do an Operation on Two BCD 20.4 Mode 1–Strobed I/O 331
Numbers Based on the Value 20.5 Mode 2–Bi-Directional I/O 340
of X 255 Questions 342
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viii

21. Programs using Interface 24.3 Description of 8257 DMA

Modules 344 Controller Chip 444
24.4 Programming the 8257 446
21.1 Description of Logic Controller 24.5 Description of the Pins Of
Interface 344 8257 452
21.2 Successive Approximation 24.6 Working of the 8257 DMA
Contents

ADC Interface 353 Controller 456

21.3 Dual Slope ADC Interface 356 24.7 State Diagram of 8085 457
21.4 Digital to Analog Converter Questions 460
Interface 359
21.5 Stepper Motor Interface 363
Questions 366
25. Intel 8253—Programmable
Interval Timer 461
25.1 Need for Programmable Interval
Part IV Timer 461
SUPPORT CHIPS 367 25.2 Description of 8253 Timer 462
25.3 Programming the 8253 463
22. Interfacing of I/O Devices 369 25.4 Mode 0–Interrupt On Terminal
Count 467
22.1 Interfacing 7-Segment Display 370 25.5 Mode 1–Re-Triggerable Mono-
22.2 Display Interface using Serial Stable Multi 468
Transfer 374 25.6 Mode 2–Rate Generator 469
22.3 Interfacing a Simple Keyboard 377 25.7 Mode 3–Square Wave Generator 471
22.4 Interfacing a Matrix Keyboard 380 25.8 Mode 4–Software-Triggered
22.5 Description of Matrix Keyboard Strobe 472
Interface 381 28.9 Mode 5–Hardware-Triggered
22.6 Intel 8279 Keyboard And Display Strobe 473
Controller 384 28.10 Use of 8253 in ALS-SDA-85
22.7 Programs using 8279 402 Kit 475
Questions 414 Questions 475
23. Intel 8259A—Programmable 26. Intel 8251A—Universal
Interrupt Controller 416 Synchronous Asynchronous
23.1 Need for an Interrupt Controller 417 Receiver Transmitter
23.2 Overview of the Working
of 8259 419
(USART) 477
23.3 Pins of 8259 421 26.1 Need for USART 477
23.4 Registers used in 8259 422 26.2 Asynchronous Transmission 478
23.5 Programming the 8259 with 26.3 Asynchronous Reception 481
no Slaves 424 26.4 Synchronous Transmission 483
23.6 Programming the 8259 with 26.5 Synchronous Reception 484
Slaves 436 26.6 Pin Description of 8251 USART 484
23.7 Use of 8259 in an 8086-Based 26.7 Programming the 8251 488
System 439 26.8 Use of SOD Pin of 8085 for
23.8 Architecture of 8259 439 Serial Transfer 492
Questions 440 Questions 493

24. Intel 8257—Programmable 27. Zilog Z-80 Microprocessor 495

DMA Controller 442 27.1 Comparison of Intel 8080 with
24.1 Concept of Direct Memory Intel 8085 496
Access (DMA) 442 27.2 Programmer’s View of Z-80 497
24.2 Need for DMA Data Transfer 443 27.3 Special Features of Z-80 498
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ix
27.4 Addressing Modes of Z-80 499 29.4 Data Memory Structure 551
27.5 Special Instruction Types 506 29.5 Programmer’s View of 8051 556
27.6 Pins of Z-80 517 29.6 Addressing Modes of 8051 557
27.7 Interrupt Structure in Z-80 519 29.7 Instruction Set of 8051 560
27.8 Programming Examples 524 29.8 Programming Examples 568
27.9 Instruction Set Summary 527 Questions 573

Contents
Questions 528
30. Advanced Topics
28. Motorola M6800
in 8051 574
Microprocessor 529
30.1 Interrupt Structure of 8051 575
28.1 Pin Description of 6800 530 30.2 Timers of 8051 579
28.2 Programmer’s View of 6800 531 30.3 Serial Interface 584
28.3 Addressing Modes of 6800 533 30.4 Structure and Operation of
28.4 Instruction Set of 6800 536 Ports 591
28.5 Interrupts of 6800 540 30.5 Power Saving Modes of 8051 595
28.6 Programming Examples 542 30.6 Programming of EPROM in
Questions 545 8751BH 597
Questions 600
29. 8051 Microcontroller 546
29.1 Main Features of Intel 8051 547 Bibliography 601
29.2 Functional Blocks of Intel 8051 548
29.3 Program Memory Structure 550 Index 603
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page x

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udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page xi

Preface

Microprocessors, microcontrollers, and digital signal processor chips are used in business machines,
automotive electronics, home appliances, electronic toys, and a variety of industrial applications. In
this book, we confine ourselves to the study of 8-bit microprocessors Intel 8085, Zilog Z-80 and
Motorola 6800, as well as the popular 8-bit microcontroller—the Intel 8051.
This book has been written after teaching the subject of microprocessors for more than two
decades, keeping in mind the difficulties faced by students in grasping the subject. We have pre-
sented the material in a lucid language, using short, simple sentences to facilitate easy reading and
understanding. Each concept has been articulated with a number of examples with emphasis on clar-
ity, in a logical sequence. To this end, the book is divided into four parts. The first part consists of
Chapters 1 to 13, and deals with the fundamentals of a microprocessor. Chapters 14 to17 make up
the second part, and focuses on assembly language programs. The programmable and non-program-
mable ports are examined in part three from Chapters 18 to 21, while the concluding portion of the
book, consisting of Chapters 22 to 30 deals with support chips.
Chapter 1 introduces the developments in electronics starting with the transistor and the early inte-
grated circuits and provides an insight into the evolution of microprocessors, microcontrollers and
digital signal processors.
Chapter 2 familiarizes students with the various parts of a computer, their main functions and the
evolution of computer languages.
Chapter 3 explains clearly the unsigned and the various signed number representations for integers
and provides an overview of signed floating-point numbers.
Chapter 4 touches upon the history of the microprocessor and deals with the fundamentals of the
8085 microprocessor, which is the main focus of this book. The various registers and the program-
mer’s view of 8085 are also introduced here.
Chapter 5 describes a typical 8085-microprocessor kit and its usage by indicating the steps needed
to write and execute a simple assembly language program.
Chapter 6 gives the classification of 8085 instructions and elaborates on the data transfer group of
instructions with meaningful examples. The various addressing modes of 8085 are also explained.
Chapter 7 deals with the arithmetic group of instructions and explains the various flags used in the
8085 microprocessor.
Chapters 8 to 10 focus on the logical, stack, and branch group of instructions respectively, explain-
ing them with suitable examples.
Chapter 11 dwells on the concept of chip selection and the use of 74138 to generate chip select
logic.
Chapter 12 discusses the need for I/O ports, their addressing and compares I/O mapped I/O with
memory mapped I/O.
Chapter 13 furnishes a detailed architecture of 8085, and explains the various machine cycles
needed for executing a variety of instructions.
Chapter 14 explains simple assembly language programs that are executed on a microprocessor kit
and also illustrates some of the commonly used monitor routines.
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page xii

xii
Chapter 15 brings out the use of a personal computer in writing an assembly language program,
translating it to machine language using an assembler, and then downloading it to the microprocessor
kit for execution.
Chapter 16 deals with complex assembly language programs. For these programs students have to
use the PC to enter the program, do the translation using the assembler, download the machine code
Preface

to the microprocessor kit, and run the program using the commands issued by the PC in serial mode.
Chapter 17 is about more complex assembly language problems. For each of these problems, the
flowchart and the program are provided along with trace for test data. This simplifies the understand-
ing of the given solution.
Chapter 18 expounds on data transfer schemes and discusses in detail about the use of interrupts in
the 8085 microprocessor. The interrupt related instructions are explained here, and we look at a num-
ber of assembly language programs that make use of interrupts.
Chapter 19 presents a detailed explanation of the working and application of the Intel 8212—a non-
programmable I/O port.
Chapter 20 is about the popular Intel 8255—a programmable peripheral interface chip. The
description, operational modes and the control words are delineated.
Chapter 21 describes some of the commonly used interface modules like logic controller, analog-
to-digital converter, digital-to-analog converter and stepper motor. A number of interesting programs
using these interface modules are illustrated.
Chapter 22 first deals with interfacing 7-segment display and matrix keyboard using latches and
tri-state gates. Then the Intel 8279—the programmable keyboard and display controller chip is
described at length. A number of useful routines using the 8279 chip are also explained.
Chapter 23 is about the Intel 8259—the programmable interrupt controller. It gives an overview of
the working of 8259, and explains the function of its pins and the programming of 8259 with and with-
out slave 8259s.
Chapter 24 covers the programmable DMA Controller—the Intel 8257. In this chapter the concept
of Direct Memory Access (DMA), the DMA controller chip and its programming are examined in
depth.
Chapter 25 describes the Intel 8253—a programmable interval timer. It explains the need for a pro-
grammable timer and succinctly spells out the various modes of operation of 8253.
Chapter 26 examines the Intel 8251—the Universal Synchronous Asynchronous Receiver Trans-
mitter (USART). It explains the asynchronous and synchronous modes of transmission and reception,
and describes the programming of the 8251.
Chapter 27 reviews the Zilog Z-80 microprocessor. With an in-depth knowledge of the 8085
microprocessor acquired from the first 26 chapters, students would be in a position to understand the
programmer’s view, new addressing modes, and the new instruction types available in Z-80. The
chapter ends with a few programming examples that provide a critical comparison of the Z-80 and
the Intel 8085.
Chapter 28 talks about the M6800 microprocessor from Motorola, which has a very simple archi-
tecture compared to 8085 or the Z-80. It describes the pins, the programmer’s view, addressing modes,
and the instruction set of M6800 and ends with a few programming examples that demonstrate its
power in spite of its simplicity.
Chapter 29 is devoted to the popular Intel 8051 microcontroller. It discusses the basics of the 8051
providing details about its functional blocks, the programmer’s view, addressing modes, and the
instruction set. A number of assembly language programming examples are provided to make students
comfortable with the instruction set of 8051.
Chapter 30, the concluding chapter, reviews the advanced topics in 8051. It deals with the interrupt
structure, timers, serial interface, structure and operation of ports, and power saving modes of 8051.
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page xiii

xiii
The chapter ends with the programming of EPROM in 8751, which is the EPROM version of the 8051
microcontroller.
Comments and feedback on the various topics discussed in this book are welcome.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Preface
The authors are grateful for the timely help, encouragement and support extended by Narayan Rao R.
Maanay, Secretary, B.N.M. Institute of Technology, as well as Prof. T.J. Rama Murthy, Director, and
Dr. K. Ranga, Dean of the institution. They are thankful to the reviewers for their constructive sug-
gestions, which helped in enhancing the contents of this book. Finally, the authors are indebted to their
family members for their encouragement and forbearance.
K. Udaya Kumar
B. S. Umashankar
udayakumar_fm.qxp 4/16/2008 4:21 PM Page xiv

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Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
search of the army, advanced as far as Medina Sidonia, and skirmished there with
Victor’s flank guard, two battalions under General Cassagne, which were always
kept watching the mountains (March 25). Beaten off, Beguines retired to his usual
haunts, and waited for signs of the expedition. His premature attack—premature
through no fault of his own—called Victor’s attention to his rear, and caused him
to fortify Medina Sidonia, and to reinforce Cassagne with three battalions and a
cavalry regiment.

[140] These battalions were, I believe, Ciudad Real and 4th Walloon Guards.

[141] As the names of the Spanish battalions engaged in this expedition have
never before been collected, it may be worth while to mention here that they
were—Lardizabal’s division: Campomayor, Carmona, Murcia (2 batts.), Canarias;
Anglona’s division: Africa (2 batts.), Sigüenza, Cantabria (2 batts.), Voluntaries de
Valencia.

[142] I do not know these roads, nor the field of Barrosa, but Colonel Churcher,
of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who is well acquainted with them, tells me that the
track (five miles inland from the coast) marked on the British staff map of 1810,
from Bolonia to Vejer, is no proper road at all, and unfit for wheeled traffic to this
day; while the Tarifa-Medina Sidonia road is bad, but can carry vehicles. He tells
me that he has actually crossed the Laguna de la Janda at its centre in dry
weather, so shallow does it become.

[143] There is a good note on the pros and cons of the two routes in Schepeler,
i. 161.

[144] According to Schepeler La Peña had sent an officer out from Tarifa in a
fishing-boat on the 1st March, to let the garrison of Cadiz know that he might not
keep his time accurately; this messenger was stopped at sea by an English brig,
and since he was disguised and had no English pass, he was detained some time
as a suspicious character, and only reached Cadiz on the 4th.

[145] It chanced that the battalions in Leval’s division were individually stronger
than those in the others—averaging 640 men each, against little over 500 in
Villatte’s and Ruffin’s divisions—officers not counted. The brigading was—Ruffin,
1/9th Léger, 1/96th Ligne, 1 and 2/24th Ligne, 2 Provisional battalions of
grenadiers, Leval 1 and 2/8th Ligne, 1 and 2/54th Ligne, 1/45th, 1 Provisional
battalion of grenadiers. See Appendix at end of volume giving exact strength.

[146] See Graham’s diary, p. 465.

[147] The pinewood is now much shrunken, and covers only the northern part
of its original breadth. See an article on the topography of Barrosa by Colonel
Verner in the Saturday Review for March 9, 1911.

[148] Cruz Murgeon was commanding the two battalions attached to the British
division, Ciudad Real and 4th Walloon Guards.

[149] The rest of the Spanish cavalry being now with La Peña by the Almanza
creek.

[150] There is a lively account of the altercation in the memoirs of Browne’s

ardent admirer Blakeney (A Boy in the Peninsular War, p. 187).

[151] All this from the graphic description in the autobiography of Blakeney,
Browne’s adjutant, p. 188.

[152] The biography of General Dilkes seems to explain this matter. Duncan, the
artillery commander, thought that he would be going into action without any
infantry supports, and rode to the nearest brigadier—this was Dilkes—to ask him
to lend a few companies to cover the guns. Dilkes assented, and told the
Coldstream companies in the middle of his column to fall out and follow the guns.
But Graham had already set aside the two companies of the 47th, from Barnard’s
battalion, for the same purpose. When Duncan found them waiting for him in the
edge of the wood, he told the officer commanding the Coldstreamers that he was
not wanted, and these two companies marched off and fell into line in a gap in
the front of Wheatley’s brigade.

[153] Blakeney, p. 195.

[154] For further details see the letters of General Dilkes, Colonels Norcott,
Stanhope, and Onslow, and Major Acheson, in Wellington’s Supplementary
Dispatches, vii. pp. 127-31.

[155] Vigo-Roussillon says that he personally captured Colonel Bushe, who was
riding away slowly from the front, disabled by a wound. This seems contradicted
by the very circumstantial evidence of Bunbury, adjutant of the 20th Portuguese,
who says that Bushe had his horse shot under him, and was mortally wounded,
that he declined being sent to the rear, and was propped up and left behind by
his own orders. French soldiers were seen rifling him as he lay.

[156] Surtees, Twenty Years in the Rifle Brigade, p. 119.

[157] See letter in Rait’s Life of Lord Gough, vol. i. p. 53.

[158] A hereditary name of glory in the 87th. The present representative of the
family won his Victoria Cross at Ladysmith in 1900.
[159] These two companies, whose losses, as it is seen here, were heavy, must
have been engaged with part of the left battalion of the French 54th.

[160] Wellington to Graham, from Santa Marinha, March 25th. (Dispatches, vii,
396.)

[161] See the figures of losses in Appendix No. V.

[162] Lapéne, Campagnes de 1810-11, p. 121.

[163] See, for a curious note concerning this incident, Lapéne, Appendix, p. 256.

[164] It is sometimes asserted that La Peña proposed to continue the campaign,

and was foiled by Graham’s departure into the Isla. But we have Graham’s own
statement, in his dispatch to Henry Wellesley of March 24, that no such proposal
was made. ‘The only regret expressed to me at Head Quarters on the morning of
the 6th, on knowing of my intention to send the British troops across the Santi
Petri, was that the opportunity of withdrawing the Spanish troops during the night
was lost, and on my observing that after such a defeat there was no risk of attack
from the enemy, a very contrary opinion was expressed.’

[165] See p. 62 above.

[166] The forces of the French corps five days later (but the numbers were
much the same still) were, to be exact [Return of March 15 in French Archives
Nationales]—

Reynier’s 2nd Corps 10,251 men

Junot’s 8th Corps 9,794 ”
Loison’s Division 4,734 ”
Ney’s other Divisions, horse and foot 11,066 ”
Montbrun’s Reserve Cavalry 2,435 ”
Conroux’s Division of the 9th Corps 5,000 ”
Artillery Reserves, Train, Sappers, Marine Battalion, &c. 5,855 ”
Total 49,135 men

all exclusive of sick and wounded.

[167] Wellington to Baccelar, March 8: ‘I conclude that Colonel Trant will have
retired from Coimbra upon the bridge of the Vouga, which he should destroy, and
from thence on Oporto. The enemy have no boats, and I hope to be able to press
them so hard that they can get none on the Mondego.... If the enemy should turn
toward Vizeu, you will of course do all that you can to annoy them in their march,
but send all your baggage, &c., across the Douro.’ (Dispatches, vii. p. 347.)

[168] Viz.:
1st Division 8,100 of all ranks, all British
3rd Division 4,500 ” and 1,550 Portuguese
4th Division 4,800 ” and 2,100 ”
5th Division 3,800 ” and 1,800 ”
6th Division 3,850 ” and 2,300 ”
Light Division 3,400 ” and 900 ”
Pack’s Portuguese Brigade 2,100
Ashworth’s Portuguese Brigade 2,500
Cavalry, British 2,430
Cavalry, Portuguese 500
Artillery, British 1,000
Artillery, Portuguese 500
Engineers, Waggon Train, &c. 200
Total British 32,080 and 14,250 Portuguese

The 2nd Division, left behind near Abrantes, had about 6,100 of all ranks.
Hamilton’s Portuguese Division about 4,200, Fane’s British (13th Lt. Dragoons)
and Portuguese cavalry was about 1,000 sabres, artillery of both nations for the
Army of Estremadura about 500. The 7th Division, now being formed at Lisbon,
was composed of 2,800 British and 2,300 Portuguese. There were two battalions
not belonging to the 7th Division marching up with it, with 1,300 bayonets
(2/52nd, 2/88th).

[169] Picton to Col. Pleydell, a letter printed in Robinson’s Life of Picton, i. 385.

[170] Narrative of Delagrave: ‘La cavalerie anglaise se déployait avec une

certaine audace, et semblait vouloir provoquer un combat. Le Général Montbrun
s’avança fièrement pour l’accepter. Les Anglais avaient des chevaux plus frais que
les nôtres, et ils semblaient s’en prévaloir. Mais nos gens avaient pour eux le vrai
courage et le sang-froid. Quelques escadrons de dragons, les plus avancés, en
voyant qu’on les chargeait au grand galop, s’arrêtèrent et poussèrent le sabre en
avant, et dans cette position reçurent de pied ferme l’ennemi. Cette manœuvre
eut un plein succès. L’ennemi fut rompu, désuni, il eut beaucoup d’hommes et de
chevaux tant tués que blessés. Ensuite les nôtres, dont pas un n’avait été touché,
tirant un prompt parti de leur bon ordre, et du désordre des Anglais, chargèrent à
leur tour, et eurent en quelques minutes bon marché de cette troupe, qui avait
d’abord montré tant d’audace.’ (Campagne de Portugal, pp. 191-2.)
 Narrative of Tomkinson, 16th Light Dragoons: ‘We followed the enemy up to
the Pombal plain, where they showed eight squadrons formed on the heath in
front. The Hussars advanced with one squadron in front and three in support, on
which the enemy’s skirmishers retired, and the whole eight squadrons began to
withdraw. We passed the defile in our front, and came up in time to join the
Hussars in their charge. We charged and broke one squadron of the enemy, drove
that on to the second, and so on, till the whole eight were altogether in the
greatest confusion, when we drove them on to their main support. We wounded
several and took a few prisoners, and should have made more, but that they
were so thick that we could not get into them. The French officers called on the
men supporting to advance: but not a man moved.’ (Diary, p. 79.)
The returns show that the total loss of the British cavalry was nine men on this
day. Six belonged to the Hussars. The report states that one officer and eleven
men of the French were taken prisoners (see Beamish, History of the K.G.L., i. p.
820). Wellington’s dispatch merely says, ‘The Hussars distinguished themselves in
a charge, made under the command of Colonel Arentschildt.’

[171] No. 3 of that arm.

[172] Some French authorities, favourable to Masséna, assert that he was not
responsible for the failure to occupy Coimbra, that Ney, on the 10th, had been
told to send Marcognet’s brigade to support Montbrun, who said that he could not
succeed without infantry help (Pelet, Notes sur la campagne de Portugal, p. 334).
But Ney, it is said would not detach the brigade. This seems most improbable, for
(1) Junot’s corps, which was in Ney’s rear and five miles nearer to Coimbra, would
have been the natural source from which to seek for infantry supports for
Montbrun, and (2) Masséna does not accuse Ney of this particular piece of
disobedience in his report to Berthier of March 19, nor in the later one of March
22, when he is giving his reasons for superseding his colleague and sending him
home to France. He simply says, in recounting his reasons for not seizing
Coimbra, that Montbrun and the engineers reported ‘that the river was in flood,
that the bridge had two arches broken, that the left bank was occupied by the
forces of Trant and Silveira, and defended by cannon. It would have required
several days to repair the bridge and to drive the Portuguese out of Coimbra;
there was no pontoon train with the army, and not a single boat on the Mondego.
In face of the danger of being attacked by Wellington’s whole force while the
passage was in progress, he resolved to renounce it.’ The one battalion of infantry
which was sent to Montbrun’s aid on the 12th came from Solignac’s division in
Junot’s corps—as might have been expected.

[173] I spent two interesting hours at Redinha on September 29, 1910, going
round the battle-ground, guided by Mr. Reynolds of Barreiro. The village is most
irregularly built, and the way to the bridge not obvious, the streets being tortuous
and narrow. The place is easy to defend, but not easy to get out of. A courteous
denizen of Redinha, Mr. J. J. Leitão, presented me with an unexploded British
shrapnel shell, which he had got out of the sand of the river-bed just above the
bridge. Several more had been found on this spot; they must have been thrown
by the pursuing British artillery at the French column hurrying over the bridge,
and had fallen short, into the water. Each contained thirty-two balls, but the
powder had decayed into an impalpable red dust. The shell that we got is now in
the United Service Museum.

[174] See table of losses in Appendix III. Of the regiments the chief losers were
the 95th (13 men), and 52nd (18 men).

[175] Of the fourteen French officers killed and wounded no less than thirteen
were from the 25th Léger, and 27th and 50th Ligne of Mermet’s division.

[176] e. g. in Delagrave, p. 201: ‘Deux colonnes des siens remontaient le

Mondégo, le long des rives: celle qui avait débarqué à Figuieras avait pour but
principal de couvrir Coïmbre.... L’autre, qui remontait la rive gauche, avait été
détachée de l’armée ennemie avec ordre de déborder et d’attaquer la droite des
Français.’ Belmas also speaks of this imaginary force.

[177] Marbot says that the officer arrived four hours after the evacuation of
Condeixa, though that place is only five miles from Fonte Cuberta (Mémoires, ii.
443). Fririon makes a much graver accusation against Ney, viz. that he sent no
messenger at all, and that the allied cavalry were discovered by an officer named
Girbault on Masséna’s staff.

[178] For an account of this curious affair see Fririon, Noël (who was with Loison
at the moment), Pelet, and Marbot. The latter (as always) gives the most
picturesque and probably the least trustworthy account. He forgets to mention
that Fonte Cuberta was occupied by Loison’s 4,500 infantry, and writes as if a
squadron of hussars had retired before Masséna’s escort of 50 men. According to
him the Marshal’s night-retreat was much disturbed by the misadventures of his
mistress (Renique’s sister), whose horse repeatedly fell in the dark and rolled over
her, to his intense anxiety. Masséna’s dispatch says only, ‘Le duc d’Elchingen
abandonna la position de Condeixa plus tôt que je ne le croyais. Le poste de
Fonte Cuberta était découvert, et l’artillerie qui s’y trouvait compromise. J’ai
gagné avec elle la grande route par une marche de flanc, à portée de canon de la
ligne ennemie, par un beau clair de lune.’

[179] ‘Le Maréchal Masséna crut voir dans ce mouvement opéré à son insu
l’intention de le faire tomber, lui et son état-major, entre les mains de l’ennemi. Le
Général Fririon chercha à lui faire entendre qu’il devait attribuer ce fait à un oubli
plutôt qu’à un sentiment de malveillance. Mais il lui fut impossible de le
persuader. “Cette conduite est inexcusable,” lui dit Masséna; “le mouvement
rétrograde de ces deux divisions était exécuté clandestinement; c’est un acte que
rien ne peut justifier.”’ (Fririon, pp. 150-1.)

[180] For all this see Soriano da Luz, iii. pp. 360-1.

[181] According to Delagrave he got the news neither from Ney nor from an
aide-de-camp of his own whom he had left with the 6th Corps to transmit
information, but from an emissary of Masséna named Girod, who thought of him
when the proper authorities failed to do so.

[182] Called the Deuça by Napier and other writers—an erroneous contraction of
Rio de Eça.

[183] Late Champlemond’s, heavily engaged against Reynier at Bussaco.

[184] viz. Ashworth’s (late A. Campbell’s), Spry’s, Madden’s (late Eben’s), and
Harvey’s, of which the third had only one regiment engaged at Bussaco, and the
others had been on parts of the line not attacked by the French.

[185] I walked round Casal Novo on September 28, 1910. It is a very small
place, under a low undulation of the high-lying plateau which the road crosses.

[186] There is a good account of the combat of Casal Novo in William Napier’s
History, iii. 119-20, and a still more striking one in his biography, pp. 55-7,
containing some distressing anecdotes. He was severely wounded, as was also his
brother George Napier of the 52nd, whose narrative is quite as interesting as
William’s. It is he who describes Erskine’s reckless action best—informed by
Colonel Ross that the French were still in Casal Novo ‘he kept blustering and
swearing it was all nonsense—that the captains of the pickets knew nothing
about the matter, and that there was not a man in the village. Just as he spoke
the dense fog began to clear, and bang came a shot from a twelve-pounder,
which struck the head of our column and made a lane through it, killing and
wounding many. Then came a regular cannonade, but the wise Sir William was
sure it was but a single gun and a picket supporting it, and desired Colonel Ross
to send my company against its flank,’ &c. Costello of the 95th has also left a very
good and lively narrative of the day’s work.

[187] The losses of the 14th (Casal Novo) and the 15th (Foz do Arouce) have
unfortunately got mixed in Martinien’s invaluable casualty lists, most of them
being credited to the 14th, with the wrong heading ‘Condeixa’—which appears to
mean Casal Novo. In some regiments the dates and names have not got wrong,
e. g. we know that on the 14th the 27th regiment had 3 officers wounded, and 3
more at Foz do Arouce on the following day. But e. g. in the 39th Ligne Colonel
Lamour is down as ‘blessé le 14 mars à Condeixa,’ while he was certainly
wounded at Foz do Arouce on the 15th, where he was also taken prisoner. The
total of officers recorded as hit in the 6th Corps on the 14th-15th is 22, of whom
10 were certainly casualties of the 14th. This must surely imply more than 55 in
all, killed and wounded. At the low rate of 10 men per officer it would give 100—
at the normal rate of 20 per officer it would be 200. But the last is probably too
high. It was on this day that Marbot had his famous encounter with a rifle officer
(officier de chasseurs à pied) and two hussars, of whom (according to his
narrative) he slew the first and wounded the other two. It cannot be disputed
that he had a fight, for he is down as wounded in the official lists. But he
certainly did not kill a rifle officer. The only light division officer slain that day was
Lieutenant Gifford, who was killed by a ball in the head at Casal Novo. It is also to
be noted that there are no cavalry casualties in the return of March 14, or indeed
since Redinha. Marbot’s supposed victims thus disappear!

[188] For details see the diary of Ney’s aide-de-camp Sprünglin (p. 470). It is
astounding to find Masséna in his dispatch of March 19 to Berthier stating that
between Miranda de Corvo and Foz do Arouce ‘nos équipages et nos malades ne
cessaient pas de filer, et rien absolument n’est resté en arrière.’

[189] ‘The most disgusting sight was the asses floundering in the mud, some
with throats half cut, the rest barbarously houghed. What the object of this was I
never could guess. The poor brutes could have been of no use to us, for they
could not have travelled another league. Their meagre appearance, with
backbones and hips protruding through their skin, and their mangled limbs,
produced a feeling of disgust and commiseration.’ (Grattan, p. 58.)
‘It was pitiable to see the poor creatures in this state, yet there was something
ludicrous in the position which many had taken when thus cruelly lamed. They
were sitting in groups upon their hinder ends, staring in each other’s faces, as if
in deep consultation on some important subject.’ (Donaldson of the 94th, p. 106.)

[190] Napier calls the village Foz de Aronce, and this spelling of it (probably
caused by an uncorrected printer’s error) has been perpetuated by every English
writer on the War. Yet Wellington has it rightly spelt with the ‘u’ in his dispatch
(vii. p. 370) as ‘Foz de Arouce.’ Masséna, in his, calls it Foz d’Arunce, which is
incorrect. Delagrave, Fririon, and other French narrators follow him, sometimes
with the variants Aronce or Arounce. There is no doubt that the name is spelt
with a ‘u,’ and always has been, by the Portuguese.

[191] All Marchand’s division and a brigade of Mermet’s (25th Léger and 27th
Ligne) remained behind. Only Labassée’s brigade of Mermet’s division crossed the
water, with Loison’s division.
[192] I studied the ground at Foz do Arouce on September 28, 1910. The bridge
is only four and a half yards broad, and 107 long. It was approached in 1811 by
the road in a sharp turn, which has now been straightened out, so was far more
difficult to cross than it is now. The gap between the hills in which the village lies
is about 200 yards broad. The heights on the French left are much higher than
those on their right.

[193] It was found in the river at low water and sent to London. The loss is
mentioned in George Simmons’s diary under March 16. Wellington sent it home in
July. (Dispatches, viii. p. 78.)

[194] So both Masséna’s dispatch, and Fririon, who was present with the brigade
of which the 69th formed part. Marbot is wrong in saying that it was the 27th. All
the narratives on the French side are very confused, and differ widely.

[195] Sprünglin says 400, Masséna, in his dispatch to Berthier, under 200,
Marbot 150, Victoires et Conquêtes 400. Sprünglin, as Ney’s aide-de-camp, had
the best chance of knowing. But Martinien’s lists, in which I can only find ten or
twelve casualties among officers, suggest a smaller total, roughly perhaps 250.

[196] See Dispatches, vii. p. 366.

[197] There is a bitter letter from Pack of March 21st in his Memoirs concerning
the ‘bad commissariat and worse medical establishment of an inefficient and
penniless government which no officer can serve with pleasure or advantage,’
which quite bears out Wellington, Dispatches, vii. p. 371.

[198] Wellington had called Beresford up to him on May 9th, and the latter was
present at Pombal and Redinha. He rode hastily back to pick up his forces, which
were to form the Army of Estremadura, on the 16th and reached Thomar on the
17th March.

[199] Masséna to Berthier, from Maceira, March 19: ‘D’après les rapports, le
général Hill [he means Beresford, who had been in charge of Hill’s former
command since December] se portait avec sa division et un gros détachement de
Portugais à travers les montagnes du haut Zézère, se dirigeant sur la rive gauche
du Mondégo. Dès ce moment j’ai abandonné l’espoir de garder cette rive sans
risquer une bataille.’ ... ‘Dans l’état actuel des choses et d’après les mouvements
que l’ennemi peut faire sur mes flancs, par le Mondégo ou par les montagnes de
Guarda, où s’est dirigé le corps de Hill, il est nécessaire de rapprocher l’armée de
notre base d’opérations’ [i. e. to retreat into Spain].

[200] Wellington to Beresford. (Dispatches, vii. 375-6.)

[201] ‘Rien ne nous empêchait,’ says Masséna’s biographer Koch, ‘de passer à
gué le Mondégo, et de nous rendre maîtres de la Sierra de Alcoba, d’où nous
menacerions Coïmbre et toute la contrée comprise entre le Mondégo, le Duero et
la mer.’ But there was a hindrance—or rather three hindrances—the Mondego was
not fordable at the moment, and what was more important, the starving army
could not have lived on the country-side north of the Mondego. Moreover the
passage of the Mondego with a lively enemy at his heels would have been too
dangerous for Masséna, who had already refused to accept such conditions on
the day of Condeixa.

[202] From Masséna’s dispatch to Berthier, March 19.

[203] Diary of George Simmons of the 95th, p. 146.

[204] Napier says, ‘by an ingenious raft contrived by the staff-corps’ (iii. 126),
but Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons and Simmons speak of a wooden
bridge.

[205] So the diary of Captain Stothert of the 3rd Guards, p. 250. He puts the
crossing later in the afternoon than the French sources, but the whole 1st
Division was across by dark. Several French critics (e. g. Delagrave) blame
Reynier for not stopping the small force that first crossed.

[206] These movements are best given in Fririon’s diary: Sprünglin gives some
help for the 6th Corps.

[207] Tomkinson’s diary, p. 87.

[208] Dispatches, vii. p. 375.

[209] Simmons’s diary, p. 148.

[210] Masséna to Berthier, from Maceira, March 19th.

[211] Fririon’s Campagne de Portugal, p. 176.

[212] According to Fririon’s diary the H.A. guns arrived in time to shell the rear
battalion and kill one officer.

[213] Tomkinson, p. 87: ‘Every one talked loudly of Slade’s conduct through the
day.’

[214] Simmons of the 95th, diary, p. 148.

[215] Tomkinson’s diary, p. 88.

[216] Ney remained quiet at Cortiço and Carapichina this day, but was only ten
miles from Celorico, and so may be considered as part of the same body as the
8th Corps.

[217] Noël, Souvenirs militaires, p. 141.

[218] Grattan’s With the Connaught Rangers, 1809-13, p. 58.

[219] The student must he specially warned against Fririon’s figures for French
losses. Though he was Masséna’s aide-de-camp, and wrote a quasi-official
account of the whole retreat, his numbers are wholly untrustworthy. He states (p.
149) that the 6th Corps only lost 179 killed and wounded between March 1 and
March 15. The actual losses were Pombal, 63; Redinha, 227; Casal Novo, at least
55; Foz do Arouce, at least 250 = 600. Similarly he states the loss at Sabugal at
250; the official casualty list sent in to the Marshal gives a total of 750. Fririon,
from his position, must have seen, or at least could have seen, these figures.

[220] Dispatch to Berthier, from Maceira, of that date.

[221] Pelet’s Appendice sur la Guerre d’Espagne in Victoires et Conquêtes, 21, p.

336.

[222] Captured at Vittoria, they were long after given to Belfast University.

[223] All these interesting figures come from the diary of Colonel Noël,
commanding the artillery of Clausel’s division; see his memoirs, pp. 137 and 146.

[224] See p. 80.

[225] The three letters are all printed in full in Fririon’s Memoir, and the second
of them in Belmas’s Pièces justificatives, p. 507.

[226] Ney’s aide-de-camp Sprünglin says in his diary (p. 474) that Ney hesitated
for some time before rejecting the idea of a coup de main against Masséna,
which was hotly urged upon him, and opines that it would have been successful
and most popular with the army.

[227] Foy to Masséna, April 8, 1811: ‘J’ai dit à Sa Majesté que vous paraissiez
être dans l’intention de porter votre quartier général à Guarda, mais que (ne
pouvant pas vivre dans cette position) vous seriez probablement obligé de
descendre jusqu’à Alcantara. Cette position a paru à l’Empereur propre à protéger
également le midi et le nord de l’Espagne.’
Some parts of this interview of Foy with Napoleon, related in his usual vivid
style, are too good to omit. ‘Did Masséna really intend to force the passage of the
Tagus? He did? Well then, he would have destroyed his army if he had tried. But I
was not worried about it; I knew he would never try to cross. Would Masséna
pass the Tagus, he who in the Isle of Lobau [Wagram campaign of 1809] would
not try to pass a mere brook! The moment you told me that he had returned from
in front of Torres Vedras I knew that he would come back, and refuse to risk a
general engagement.... Wellington is a cleverer man than Masséna: he kept his
eye fixed on Claparéde’s division; if Claparéde had been brought forward, the
English would have expected to be attacked, would have gone back into their
Lines.... Portugal is too far off—I can’t go there myself. The business would take
six months, and in that six months everything would be hung up in Europe,’ &c.
See Foy’s Vie Militaire, pp. 139-40.

[228] Fririon, Campagne de Portugal, p. 175.

[229] For all this see Koch’s Vie de Masséna, pp. 413-20.

[230] This was a gross exaggeration, as it turned out that there was forty days’
food in hand. Masséna accused Drouet of drawing on the rations for his own 9th
Corps to an inexcusable extent.

[231] Masséna to Berthier, March 31, from Alfayates.

[232] When Reynier marched from Coria to Guarda in September 1810, he had
been obliged to make the vast circle Coria-Alfayates-Sabugal-Guarda, in order to
avoid the miserable mountain roads.

[233] Both dispatches are dated from Santa Marinha, March 25th.

[234] Pack’s Portuguese were so exhausted and sickly that they were left behind
for a rest, and to wait for more food, at Mangualde on the upper Mondego.

[235] ‘General Slade had been in Celorico the whole of yesterday,’ complains
Tomkinson of the 16th, ‘and yet had not the least idea where the French had
retired to.’ Diary, p. 89.

[236] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, March 27, from Gouvea.

[237] Napier (iii. 129) is wrong in saying that the movement was ‘Supported by
the 1st, 5th, and 7th Divisions.’ These only reached Celorico that day, and were
fifteen miles from the field. See Diary of Stothert of the Guards, p. 232. Napier
was misled by the vague wording of Wellington’s dispatch to Lord Liverpool (vii.
425), from which it might be supposed that these divisions were up.

[238] The 3rd Division arrived some time before the 6th and the Light were in
actual touch with the enemy.
 Picton writes about this: ‘Masséna with full 20,000 men was on the heights,
and in the city of Guarda, when I made my appearance at 9 in the morning, with
three British and two Portuguese regiments.... He ought immediately to have
attacked me, but allowed me to remain within 400 yards of his main body for
about two hours, before the other columns came up. But of course their
movements were alarming him, and decided him not to hazard an attack, the
failure of which would have probably brought on the total discomfiture of his
army.’ Letter in Robinson’s Life of Picton, vol. ii. pp. 3, 4.

[239] See Tomkinson’s Diary, p. 90.

[240] Wellington to Beresford, from Celorico, March 30: ‘Yesterday we

manœuvred the French out of Guarda. Masséna was there, some say with his
whole army, I think certainly with two corps: not a shot was fired.’ (Dispatches,
vii. 412.) Same day to Charles Stuart: ‘They were much stronger than we: I had
only three divisions on the hill.’ (Dispatches, vii. 418.)

[241] Napier’s statements (iii. 129) are quite borne out by Tomkinson’s Diary: ‘In
the rear of Pega is an open plain of two miles which the enemy had to pass: as
usual we looked at them for half an hour: then the guns were ordered up, and in
place of firing at the main body could only get within range of their pickets ... we
continued to follow, and, although they had no cavalry, our general was afraid to
go into the plain to get the guns in range of the infantry: they of course got clear
off.’ (Diary, p. 91.)

[242] As late as May 1 the regimental statistics show that the 3rd Dragoons had
only 139 available horses, sick or sound, and the 10th Dragoons only 233, They
had started the campaign with 563 and 535 respectively.

[243] We cannot say ‘four British battalions,’ for two of them were foreign corps,
the Chasseurs Britanniques and the Brunswick Oels Light Infantry. The two line
regiments were the 51st and 85th.

[244] 7th and 19th Line and 2nd Caçadores, forming Collins’s brigade.

[245] viz. 2/88th for 3rd Division, 2/52nd for Light Division, 1/36th for the 6th
Division.

[246] Including Pack’s whole brigade.

[247] Details may be verified in Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, xiii. p.

611.
[248] Wellington’s orders were to cross 2 miles at least above Sabugal. The
actual crossing was only 1¼ miles above.

[249] This fact comes from a MS. note by Sir John Bell of the 52nd, in my
possession. He writes: ‘Just as the 2nd Brigade changed its direction, the General,
being at some distance, sent an order for it not to engage. But the staff officer
who carried it, and Drummond, seeing how matters stood, took the liberty of
forgetting the message, so that Beckwith should have the full benefit of the
support at hand. No question was ever asked as to the non-delivery of the order.’

[250] This statement is made by Tomkinson in his diary on April 3, p. 94.

[251] Many details in this narrative of the combat of Sabugal will be found to
differ from those given in earlier histories. I have been relying for the French
movements largely on the life of General Merle, the officer who was in charge of
most of the fighting, and had the best chance of giving a correct story.
[Braquehay’s Le Général Merle, pp. 160-1.]

[252] See the tables of the French and British losses in Appendix No. VI. Fririon,
as chief of the staff, must have seen and passed the French return giving 750
casualties, yet in his narrative allows for only 250, saying, ‘On a beaucoup
exagéré les pertes: les chiffres que nous donnons sont très exacts.’ This is only
one example of his habit of falsifying figures, in which he rivalled Masséna and
Soult.

[253] In the Diary of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons there is a curious
note as to the capture of a ‘caravan’ or large coach belonging to the head-quarter
staff, and more especially to Masséna’s Portuguese adviser, the Marquis d’Alorna,
on April 7th. Sixty-five infantry were captured by the regiment on the same day.

[254] See letters to Beresford of April 6th and to Charles Stuart of April 8th, in
Dispatches, vii. pp. 430-5.

[255] Napier (iii. 135) says that the French lost 300 men, which contrasts
strangely with the official numbers given by the French. Probably Drouet gave
only the actual loss in action, while the British accounts speak of all the stragglers
taken that day as if they had been captured in the fight. The 16th certainly got 65
prisoners from a convoy guard.

[256] Wellington, Dispatches, vii. p. 448.

[257] But, as he wrote to Beresford on April 14, ‘I was not very sanguine of the
results of the blockade of that place, and had indeed determined not to make it in
any strength: and now it is useless to keep anybody on the other side of the
Agueda save for food and observation.’ (Dispatches, vii. 457.)

[258] For the state of semi-blockade in which Sanchez had kept Ciudad Rodrigo,
see the Memoirs of the Duchess of Abrantes (vii. pp. 275-7), who was
beleaguered there while her husband was in Portugal. For the hunts organized
against him by Thiébault, see the latter’s Memoirs, iv. 449-51, &c. Sanchez
intercepted numbers of dispatches which were of great use to Wellington, as they
kept him informed of the state of the French in northern Spain.

[259] See vol. iii, Appendix, p. 543.

[260] When Foy went back from Thomar on March 5 to Rodrigo his escort was
taken from the 9th Corps, not from the Army of Portugal, so does not count. See
Pièces Justificatives, No. 45, in Foy’s Vie Militaire, p. 357.

[261] See pp. 167-8 of vol. iii.

[262] Dispatch printed in Fririon, p. 157.

[263] See above, pp. 24-5.

[264] Bessières to Berthier, printed in the Appendix to Belmas, vol. i. p. 562.

[265] See below, p. 225. Divisions Souham and Caffarelli.

[266] Bessières soon after his arrival put a garrison in Santoña, between
Santander and Bilbao.

[267] See vol. iii. pp. 486-7.

[268] Correspondance, no. 17,785, 8th June, 1811.

[269] Since the disaster at Puebla de Senabria (vol. iii. p. 270) Serras had drawn
in his left flank and abandoned the Galician foot-hills.

[270] The King in all his dispatches seems to understate his own force. He
sometimes calls it only 15,000 men. But a muster roll of the Army of the Centre,
which I have copied from the Archives de la Guerre, for February 15, 1811, shows
a total of 20,000, viz. Dessolles, 3,300, German Division, 5,200, Spaniards, 4,200,
Lahoussaye, 2,500, Treillard’s Light Cavalry, 1,400, Artillery Train, Sappers, &c.,
1,500, Royal Guards, 2,000 of all arms. In addition there were 5,000 drafts for
Soult detained in New Castile, but about to start for Seville.

[271] Which had only seven battalions, the rest being with Soult in Andalusia.
[272] Composed of two cavalry regiments of Marisy’s brigade, three German
battalions from La Mancha, and two French battalions.

[273] Napoleon in a dispatch of 22 March (Correspondance, xxi. 496) blames

Lahoussaye for not stopping in northern Estremadura, in touch with Soult.

[274] See Miot de Melito’s Mémoires, iii. 153-6.

[275] See vol. iii. pp. 506-7.

[276] See Miot’s Mémoires, iii. 160, for the discouraging results of this embassy.

[277] All this from the letter of the Queen of Spain, detailing her interview with
the Duc de Cadore, who sent for her in the Emperor’s name on January 15, 1811,
and administered this bitter message to her, for her husband’s benefit. See the
letter given in Miot’s Mémoires, iii. 171-2. Cf. Napoleon’s dispatch to Laforest,
ambassador at Madrid, Correspondance, 17,111.

[278] Miot’s Mémoires, iii. 176.

[279] Napoleon to Berthier, from Caen, May 27. Correspondance, no. 17,752.

[280] See Miot de Melito’s Mémoires, iii. 197-8, and compare it with the actual
terms of Napoleon’s concession given in his letter to Berthier quoted above.

[281] All from the Caen memorandum for Berthier quoted above.

[282] For dispatches concerning this, and notes as to the troops and ships to be
employed, see Correspondance, 17,824, 17,875, &c. The project seems to have
been seriously thought over, the Emperor wrongly believing that England was
stripped of regular troops.

[283] ‘Le Portugal est trop loin: je ne peux pas y aller; il faudrait six mois.
Pendant six mois tout est suspendu: l’Europe est sans direction: les Russes
peuvent se déclarer, les Anglais débarquer au nord. En vérité, quand on voit la
différence qu’un homme met aux événements, il est impossible de ne pas avoir
de l’amour propre.’ 30th March, 1811. Napoleon’s interview with Foy, reported by
the latter in Vie Militaire du Général Foy, p. 140.

[284] For a similar hint of danger in 1809, see above, vol. i. pp. 560-61.

[285] Sometimes on absolutely false information, due to the Emperor’s vast

distance from the theatre of war leading him to make hypotheses which had been
falsified, because of the mistaken premises on which he grounded them. For
example, on March 30, 1811, he told Berthier that Masséna’s head quarters were
at Coimbra, and that a detachment of his army occupied Oporto, and these ‘news’
were to be sent on to Soult (Correspondance, 17,531). On that day Masséna was
already behind the Coa on his retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo.

[286] Compare the dispatches of March 30, where it is demonstrated that Soult
has nothing to fear for Badajoz, because Wellington cannot detach more than
15,000 men against it, and that of December 12, where it is demonstrated that
Soult having 80,000 men should be ashamed of himself for allowing the ‘affront’
of Arroyo dos Molinos to be put upon him by Hill and 6,000 British.

[287] ‘Il ne faut pas se diviser: il faut réunir ses forces, présenter des masses
imposantes: toutes les troupes qu’on laisse en arrière courent le risque d’être
battues en détail, ou forcées d’abandonner les postes,’ &c. Napoleon to Soult,
Correspondance, December 6, 1811.

[288] Napoleon to Berthier; orders for Bessières and Marmont of May 26, 1811.

[289] See Correspondance, 17,784, Napoleon to Clarke, 8th June, 1811. The
divisions were composed as follows:—
Souham. 1st Line (4 batts.) and 62nd Line (4 batts.), from Turin and
Marseilles; 23rd Léger (2 batts.), from Auxonne; 101st Line (4 batts.), from Turin
and Spezzia. About 7,000 men.
Caffarelli. 5th Léger (2 batts.), from Cherbourg; 3rd and 105th Line (each 2
batts.), from Rennes; 10th Léger (4 batts.), from Rennes; 52nd Line (2 batts.),
from Toulon. About 6,000 men.
Reille. 81st Line (2 batts. at Pampeluna, 1 from Genoa); 10th Line and 20th
Line (4 batts. each), already at Pampeluna; 60th Line (4 batts.), from Toulon.
About 7,500 men.
Italian Division. 1st Line (4 batts.); 7th Line (4 batts.). About 4,000 men.

[290] Correspondance, no. 16,910, of September 10, 1810.

[291] See vol. iii. p. 494.

[292] See vol. iii. p. 503.

[293] Napier’s ‘Tenaxas’ and Belmas’s ‘Tenailles’ = ‘the Pinchers.’

[294] The strength of the garrison raises a conflict of authorities. The Spanish
official figures are those given above, which are followed by Schepeler and
Arteche. But Suchet says that he captured 9,461 prisoners, including the
wounded in the hospitals, and that several hundred men more had perished
before the surrender. He gives a muster roll of the garrison purporting to bear out
his figures (Mémoires, i. p. 359), which Belmas copies. Since Suchet’s Spanish
totals are often more than doubtful (cf. vol. iii. p. 304) I accept the figures given
by his adversaries. The December figures of the Spanish Army of Catalonia show
13,040 men in all distributed in garrisons, including those of Tarragona, Tortosa,
Seu de Urgel, Cardona, and smaller places. I think that 7,000 for Tortosa is
probable.

[295] See vol. ii. p. 6.

[296] This narrative of the fall of Tortosa is mainly derived from the sources
given by Arteche, especially Yriarte’s narrative, and from Schepeler and Vacani.
These in some details differ from Suchet’s story repeated by Belmas, though
there is no fundamental discrepancy. But it is clear that Alacha was even more to
blame than the French versions would give us to understand.

[297] Vacani, iv. 420-1.

[298] The figures of 400 killed and wounded given by Belmas seem very low,
but are borne out by the invaluable lists in Martinien, who shows that only some
thirty officers were killed or wounded at Tortosa, of whom twelve belonged to the
engineers, artillery, and sappers. Thirty officers hit imply (at the usual rate of one
to twenty men) 600 casualties, but it is very possible that there were no more
than 400 and odd, for the engineer officers, of whom six were killed or hurt, ran
special risks.

[299] For all this see Wimpffen’s reports printed in the Appendix to Suchet’s
Mémoires, i. 359.

[300] His name was really Orsatelli, but he always appears in the reports as
Eugenio.

[301] Vacani says only 266 (v. 26), including 3 officers killed and 13 wounded,
but Martinien’s lists show 3 officers killed and 24 wounded; it is impossible that
27 officers should be hit and only 239 men—the proportion of 1 to 9 is incredible,
and the loss must have been more like 600. Schepeler and the Spaniards put it at
1,200, which is too high.

[302] See vol. iii. p. 24.

[303] See below, sect. xxviii. chap. i.

[304] Suchet, Mémoires, i. 266.

[305] The eleven battalions of Girard’s division, and from Gazan’s the 100th of
the Line, and a battalion of the 21st Léger put in garrison at Badajoz.
[306] 26th Dragoons, 2nd and 10th Hussars, 21st Chasseurs à cheval, 4th
Chasseurs Espagnols. Only the 10th Hussars and the 21st Chasseurs belonged to
the 5th Corps.

[307] Nothing could be done in Estremadura without the 2nd Division, and
D’Urban’s diary shows that the orders for the 2nd Division to march into the
Alemtejo were only given on the 12th. Beresford’s chief of the staff notes on that
day, ‘Orders to General Stewart [commanding 2nd Division] to fix his head
quarters at Tramagal, to move the 13th to Crato or Carragueira [both in the
Alemtejo south from Abrantes], and to let the troops remain as at present—
unless it should become necessary to concentrate for the protection of the Bridge
of Tancos.’ This shows that Wellington’s statement to Lord Liverpool on March
14th (Dispatches, vii. 360) that ‘troops had marched from Thomar on the 9th,
and that part of Sir William Beresford’s division, which had not passed the Tagus,
was put in motion, and that their head had arrived within three marches of Elvas,’
can apply at most to Hamilton’s Portuguese.

[308] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, March 14. Dispatches, vii. 360-1.

[309] See p. 60 above.

[310] Cole actually reached Portalegre on the 22nd, so could have been in front
of Badajoz on the 24th.

[311] Wellington to Beresford, March 18th (Dispatches, vii. 372), ‘You had better
lose no time in moving up to Portalegre, and attack Soult, if you can, at Campo
Mayor. I will come to you if I can, but if I cannot do not wait for me. Get Castaños
to join you from Estremos with any Spanish troops he can bring. You must be two
days marching from Portalegre to Campo Mayor, I believe.’

[312] Wellington to Beresford, March 20 (Dispatches, vii. 374-5); some details

added from D’Urban’s diary, which do not appear in this dispatch.

[313] All these details are from D’Urban’s Journal.

[314] The consumption of the Estremos magazines by Mendizabal’s men will be

found mentioned in the pamphlet (written under Beresford’s direction) called
‘Strictures on Napier’s Peninsular War’ [London, 1832]. ‘When the Marshal
(Beresford) put his corps in motion from the Tagus he was informed that the
British Commissary in the Alemtejo had from 200,000 to 300,000 rations in store
for his use. But this officer had also been ordered to supply the Spanish division
lately in that province, and (most incautiously) issued for its service whatever its
commander required. Owing to this inadvertence on the part of the Commissary
(whose name, I think, was Thompson), when Marshal Beresford arrived the store
was absolutely empty’ [p. 61]. His name was Thompson, and he was immediately
superseded by Wellington’s order (Dispatches, vii. 426).
[315] Soriano da Luz, iii. pp. 531-2.

[316] Colonel Dickson met Talaya only two days after the surrender and had an
interesting interview with him. See Dickson’s Journal, i. p. 366. He can find no
praise high enough for the old engineer officer. D’Urban also speaks of him in
most appreciative terms.

[317] There is great difficulty in making out what were the French cavalry
regiments, but Martinien’s lists show losses in the 26th Dragoons (eight officers)
and 2nd Hussars, and Long speaks positively of the 10th Hussars as present also.

[318] D’Urban, reconnoitring with one, was sighted and chased a little way by
French hussars. See C. E. Long’s vindication of his uncle, General Long’s Military
Reputation [London, 1832], pp. 74-5.

[319] Belmas says that it had started déjà, and must be right: while Lapéne,
who thinks that it was loaded up and sent off after the alarm, fails to account for
its being six miles along the road when surprised. Heavy guns travel slowly.
Beresford corroborates Belmas.

[320] This is Long’s account of the orders given by Beresford (p. 75 of the
Vindication of the Military Reputation of the late General Long, by C. E. Long), in
a letter from the general to General Le Marchant. This agrees pretty well with
Beresford’s version of the facts, and is no doubt correct.

[321] A squadron was absent with Colborne’s column and another troop on
distant reconnaissance work, and the regiment was not much over 200 sabres.

[322] Napier’s story that they charged through each other, formed up front to
rear, and then charged each other again is strongly denied by Beresford as ‘purely
supposititious’ (Strictures, pp. 152-3), and not confirmed by Long or any other
eye-witness.

[323] See vol. i. p. 119.

[324] Belmas, iii. p. 557.

[325] So, at least, I gather from Long’s narrative: he says that ‘he sent an order
for the advance of De Grey’s brigade’ (p. 34), and in another place (p. 53), that ‘it
was only necessary to charge and throw into confusion the cavalry at their (the
French) head and rear, and the object was accomplished.’ The object is defined as
the ‘annihilation’ of the French column, which Long thinks would have
surrendered.
[326] This regiment lost one officer and ten men killed, and thirty-two wounded,
beside some prisoners, in the abortive advance. The French statement that the
2nd Hussars made ‘de belles charges’ is therefore evidently justified. But it was
the flanking infantry fire which demoralized the Portuguese (Long’s Vindication, p.
49).

[327] By all accounts this was Baron Trip, a Dutch émigré officer, who was
serving on Beresford’s staff. The statement was very astounding, even incredible,
considering that the country was open and undulating. But it was almost equally
incredible that the 13th and 7th Portuguese should have pursued the French
dragoons completely out of sight, six miles away, without leaving a man behind.

[328] Colonel Gabriel, a staff officer of the 2nd Division, says that Colborne’s
brigade was only 500 yards in rear of the heavy dragoons, and the French still in
sight when Beresford ordered the final halt. See Long’s Vindication, p. 65.

[329] Except three wounded in the 3rd Dragoon Guards in skirmishes with the
hussars of the French rearguard.

[330] One killed, six wounded, one prisoner. For names see Martinien’s lists and
supplement thereto.

[331] Belmas says 175, but this is too low.

[332] Wellington to Beresford, from Celorico, March 28 (Dispatches, vii. 412). By

an odd error Wellington wrote the 1st Portuguese, but it was the 7th which joined
in the hunt.

[333] Napier censures Beresford for not crossing at Merida, thirty miles east of
Badajoz. But (1) Wellington’s orders directed him to use Jerumenha; (2) to march
to Merida would have been to pass across the front of an enemy who had a
bridge-head at Badajoz, from which he could push out detachments to cut the
line of communication, Campo Mayor to Merida; (3) Elvas was the only possible
base, and the only place where magazines could be safely formed, or munitions,
siege artillery, &c., procured; (4) the road Campo Mayor-Merida was very bad; (5)
Merida was within reach of the French Army of the Centre, which had
detachments at Truxillo and Almaraz.

[334] These notes as to Beresford’s difficulties are taken partly from the Journal
of his chief of the staff, D’Urban, partly from the latter’s detailed report on the
Estremaduran campaign, published in 1832, but written in 1811, partly from the
Strictures on Napier’s History, vol. iii, written under Beresford’s eye. The latter
might be considered suspicious if they were not completely borne out by the two
former, as well as by Wellington’s Dispatches, vii. 414, 426, 432.
[335] This must have been Wellington’s Celorico dispatch of March 30, saying
that ‘between chevalets (trestles), boats, Spanish and English pontoons, and a
ford, I should hope that the Guadiana may be passed in safety’ (Dispatches, vii.
414.)

[336] D’Urban’s Narrative, p. 10.

[337] Beresford maintained that troops on the right bank could be protected by
the fire of the guns of Jerumenha, which is in a lofty position, commanding the
Spanish shore. But they would have been of little use if the French had attacked
at night. (Strictures on Napier, p. 177.)

[338] Correspondance, xxi. 146: ‘Vous voyez que ce que j’avais prévu est arrivé,
qu’on a eu la simplicité de laisser du monde dans Olivenza, et de faire prendre là
300 hommes,’ &c. This was alluding to an earlier order to Soult not to make small
detachments, and to blow up Olivenza.

[339] Ninety-eight sick attended by sixteen surgeons were comprised in the

surrender on April 15th.

[340] This is Lapéne’s view, who says that the 400 gallant men were knowingly
sacrificed in this hope: ‘L’intérêt de l’armée a demandé le sacrifice’ (p. 146).

[341] Dickson’s Journals, recently published by Major Leslie, R.A., are the first
and most important source in which to study the two early British sieges of
Badajoz, as well as the smaller matter of Olivenza. I am using them perpetually
all through the following pages.

[342] This date is that given by D’Urban’s Journal.

[343] Dispatches, vii. 407. From Gouvea, March 27.

[344] Dickson, in his Journal, p. 448, specially mentions this curious fact, and
notes the name of Philip III and the dates 1620, 1636, 1646, 1652 on some of
the guns he used.

[345] These were the companies of Bredin, Baynes, Raynsford, and Glubb; see
vol. iii. p. 559.

[346] Dickson, Journal, pp. 405, 448.

[347] Long says that the 13th took about 150 prisoners (Vindication, p. 104),
but the French accounts do not acknowledge anything like such loss.
[348] D’Urban visited Ballasteros’s camp on the 14th and settled with him all the
details of a joint march against Maransin (whom they wrongly supposed to be
d’Aremberg, not knowing that the latter had returned to Seville with the cavalry).
‘If d’Aremberg takes the bait, and follows Ballasteros, he must be lost altogether;
even if he halts at Xeres we ought to get hold of him,’ writes D’Urban in his diary.
But Maransin fled on the morning of the 15th.

[349] D’Urban’s diary under the 17th April.

[350] Dispatches, vii. 491-2.

[351] Not to be confused with another Burguillos on the Guadalquivir, north of

Seville.

[352] Hoghton’s brigade of the 2nd Division, Myers’s and Harvey’s brigades of
the 4th Division, Campbell’s brigade of Hamilton’s Portuguese division.

[353] So D’Urban’s diary under May 11th. The loss was over 400 men, of whom
207 were in the 40th, 118 in the 27th, 75 in the 97th, and 38 in the 17th
Portuguese. The French lost about 200 men only.

[354] 3/27th, 1/40th, and 97th Foot.

[355] Wellington to Beresford, April 14th: ‘Sir William Erskine did not send a
detachment across the Agueda in time, as I had desired him, and the
consequence is that the French got their convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo yesterday
morning.... It is useless now to keep anybody on the other side of the Agueda.’
Dispatches, vii. 467.

[356] Tomkinson’s (16th Light Dragoons) Diary, April 10th-11th (p. 98).

[357] 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Hussars K.G.L.

[358] See above, p. 199.

[359] Sometimes called Pamplona’s brigade in Wellington’s dispatches of this

date, Colonel Pamplona having been in temporary command during Ashworth’s
absence.

[360] Barbaçena’s Portuguese on the lower Coa, below Almeida: the British 1st
Royals and 16th Light Dragoons on the upper Coa.

[361] The very interesting dispatch in which Wellington’s forecast is stated is

that to Castaños of April 15, written in French. ‘En pensant à ce qu’ils doivent
faire dans leurs circonstances actuelles, je trouve que (1) ou ils feront l’invasion
de la Galice avec le corps de Bessières, pendant que Masséna donnera du repos à
ses troupes, dans les cantonnements occupés jusqu’à présent par Bessières: (2)
ou ils se joindront, pour tomber sur mon corps sur la frontière de la Castille—ce
qui n’est pas très vraisemblable: (3) ou ils ne feront rien jusqu’à ce que les
troupes de Masséna soyent reposées et remises en état, quand ils rassembleront
une grande armée dans l’Estrémadure.’ Dispatches, vii. p. 470.

[362] Bessières to Berthier, from Valladolid, June 6, 1811.

[363] It is possible that there is some diplomatic intention in the stress laid by
Wellington on the likelihood of a French invasion of Galicia. He was writing to
Castaños, and it was his object to get that general to stir up the Galicians. Hence,
perhaps, he exaggerated a possibility which was not so strong as he stated.

[364] Memorandum for Berthier (Correspondance, 17,531), dated March 30. ‘Le
quartier général de l’armée de Portugal reste à Coïmbre. Oporto est occupé par
un détachement.... Le Prince d’Essling tiendra à Coïmbre, menaçant Lisbonne, qui
sera attaquée après la récolte.’ At this moment Masséna’s army was just reaching
the Spanish frontier, in its final retreat from Guarda!

[365] Correspondance, 17,591. ‘Vous ferez connaître au Prince d’Essling ... qu’il
doit presser l’armament d’Almeida.... Il doit prendre des mesures pour couvrir
Almeida et Ciudad Rodrigo, et d’un autre côté pour se mettre en communication
avec Madrid et Séville.’

[366] Correspondance, 17,701.

[367] This we learn from Marmont’s letter to Berthier dated May 14, in which he
says that the dispatch reached him only on May 10, and that its contents were
unexpected. (Marmont’s Mémoires, iv. p. 78.)

[368] Correspondance, 17,591.

[369] ‘Le désir que l’armée a manifesté depuis longtemps d’aller se reposer ne
me laisse aucun doute qu’il serait dangereux d’attendre l’ennemi pour recevoir
bataille ou pour la lui donner.’

[370] All this, of course, is from the Great Memorandum of March 30, which
Berthier was to communicate to all the chiefs of the Peninsular armies.

[371] For all this see section xxvi. pp. 279-81, on Beresford’s campaign in
Estremadura.

[372] See above, p. 294.

[373] That he did not purpose to be longer away is shown by the fact that he
was already at Portalegre, on his return journey from Elvas, when Spencer’s final
warning that Masséna was on the move reached him. Dispatches, vii. 50.

[374] See the three dispatches to Spencer on pp. 464-6, 473-4, and 475 of
Dispatches, vii, dated respectively April 14, April 16, and April 17, 1811.

[375] For details see the Journal of George Simmons of the 95th (A British
Rifleman), pp. 164-5.

[376] Wrongly dated April 20 by Sprünglin in his generally accurate diary (p.
477).

[377] Thiébault’s Mémoires, vol. iv. p. 448.

[378] The 6th Corps incorporated one battalion each of the 6th Léger, 25th
Léger, and the 27th Ligne from Conroux’s division, and one each of the 39th,
59th, 69th, 76th from Claparéde’s. The 2nd Corps got a battalion of the 17th
Léger only, besides drafts. Solignac’s division, nominally 6,110 bayonets, was
short of two battalions (from the 15th and 65th), or 850 men, left in garrison at
Ciudad Rodrigo. In the same garrison had been left the whole Régiment de
Prusse (500 men), besides drafts. The junction of the isolated battalions from
Drouet’s corps took place on April 27. (Fririon, p. 198.)

[379] It had sunk on May 1 from an original strength of 6,800 men to 3,073.

[380] For strange doings of this eccentric brigadier at Salamanca during the
winter, see Thiébault, vol. iv. pp. 435-7.

[381] These figures, differing much from those supplied by Koch, are worked out
from the return of May 1 in the Paris Archives Nationales. The total of cavalry
mounted and available seems to have been 3,007, including Fournier. See tables
in Appendix XIX.

[382] Masséna to Berthier, April 30, 1811, from Ciudad Rodrigo. The returns
show that on May 1 twelve batteries had been left behind with no horses at all, in
order that the five remaining might take the field with 425 horses.

[383] Masséna to Berthier, April 17th, from Salamanca.

[384] So Marbot, ii. 457. If Marbot’s talents as a raconteur make his authority
doubtful, we may point out that Thiébault, the governor of Salamanca, tells much
the same story in his Mémoires, iv. p. 478.

[385] Berthier to Bessières, May 19, 1811.

[386] Infantry. 2nd Corps, 10,292; 6th Corps, 16,816; 8th Corps (1 division),
4,714; 9th Corps, 10,304; total, 42,126. Cavalry. Masséna’s own, 3,007;
Bessières, 1,665; Artillery, Sappers, Train, &c., 1,400; total, 48,198. Masséna
would only acknowledge 35,000 men, and put Wellington’s force (which was, as
we shall see, 37,000 men) at about 50,000. If Wellington had possessed 50,000
men, Fuentes de Oñoro would have been a very different sort of battle.

[387] Masséna’s arrival was known, through deserters, the day after it occurred.
Diary of Simmons of the 95th, p. 166.

[388] Complaints on this score fill up great parts of Wellington’s letters of the
30th April and 1st May (Dispatches, vii. 511-12, 516-17). They seem slightly to
overstate the deficiency, compared with morning states of May 1; but this comes
from his persistent habit of counting only rank and file, omitting officers and
sergeants. When he says that the total infantry (including Pack) was only 11,000,
while it works out to over 12,000 when that detached brigade is counted, we
must remember that he is not reckoning anything but rank and file. Wellington
attributes most of the loss to (1) slackness at the depositos (dépôts) in
forwarding drafts, (2) maladministration of the hospitals, (3) insufficient food at
the front for those brigades still fed by the Portuguese government, and not taken
on to the British establishment.

[389] Not to speak of the bridge of Sabugal, six miles above the Ponte Sequeiro
and hopelessly out on the flank.

[390] viz. the light companies of 17 British and 4 Portuguese battalions, plus 4
companies of the 5/60th, 1 of the 3/95th, and 2 extra light companies of the
K.G.L. attached to Löwe’s brigade.

[391] Both Napier (iii. p. 150) and Tomkinson (p. 100) say that the British
cavalry, nominally 1,520 sabres, had only about 1,000 in line that day, owing to
details, orderlies, &c., absent from the ranks. This is probably an over-great
deduction.

[392] See tables at end, Appendix IX. 1st Division, 7,565 men; 3rd Division,
5,480 men; 7th Division, 4,600 men; Light Division, 3,815 men; Ashworth’s
Portuguese, 2,539 men, or 23,999.

[393] The statement made by several French authors that Masséna did not order
Ferey to attack Fuentes on the 3rd, and that Loison and Ferey acted without
orders, is directly contradicted by the Marshal’s own dispatch, in which he takes
all responsibility: ‘J’espérais enlever Fuentes et m’y maintenir; je le fis attaquer, et
il fut bientôt occupé.’
[394] But some in Marchand’s, which must have been fairly heavily engaged,
judging from the casualty list of officers in Martinien.

[395] For an excellent account of the first day’s fighting in Fuentes village, see
the diary of ‘J. S.’ of the 71st in Constable’s Memorials of the late War, i. 87-9.
The regiment charged right up the French slope after recovering the place, and
was attacked ineffectually by cavalry. Marbot (ii. p. 459) has a story that the
second attack of the French would have succeeded if the Hanoverian Legion, in
its red coats, had not been fired into from the rear in mistake by the 66th Ligne,
which took them for British.

[396] Masséna, in his dispatch describing the battle, says that on the morning of
the 4th the Allies made a serious attempt to turn Ferey out of the houses beyond
the brook which he occupied. But we have no trace of any regular fighting in any
of the British narratives; there was certainly some bickering across the brook, but
apparently nothing more.

[397] See his Orders for the day, in Appendix XIII.

[398] 85th and 2nd Caçadores.

[399] 51st and 85th, the other regiments being foreign (Chasseurs Britanniques
and Brunswick Oels) or Portuguese.

[400] Its position, from this point of view, might be compared to that of
Pakenham and the 3rd Division at Salamanca.

[401] The accusation against Montbrun, made by Napier and several French
writers, of having waited for two hours after dawn, and then of having suffered
himself to be delayed for another hour by the pursuit of a mere Spanish irregular
band, is clearly groundless. We have the diaries of two officers of the squadrons
of the 14th (Major Brotherton and Cornet F. Hall) who prove that the attack was
made in the dusk of early dawn. ‘Just at daybreak,’ says the former, ‘I requested
Don Julian to show me where his pickets were placed. He pointed out to me what
he said was one of them, but I observed to him that in the dusk of morning it
looked too large for a picket. The sun rising rapidly dispelled the fog, and the
illusion at the same time, for Don Julian’s picket proved to be a whole French
regiment dismounted. They now mounted immediately and advanced against us.’
(See the Diary in Hamilton’s History of the 14th Hussars.)

[402] Captain Belli, who had joined the regiment from England only the night
before. A sergeant and six men were killed in trying to rescue him. See
Tomkinson’s diary, p. 101. This officer of the 16th accuses Major Meyer of the
Hussars of having lost the right moment for a charge by indecision. But the K.G.L.
narratives (see Schwertfeger) show that Meyer fought hard, and was an
enterprising officer.

[403] 1st Division in four brigades on the right; then Ashworth; then the 3rd
Division next to Fuentes village.

[404] Along which the modern railway line is conducted from Villar Formoso to
Ciudad Rodrigo. Fuentes de Oñoro station is a mile from the village, and only a
few hundred yards from the Portuguese customs-station of Villar Formoso.

[405] 51st Foot, Chasseurs Britanniques, the incomplete battalion of Brunswick

Oels (short of two companies detached), and the 7th and 19th Portuguese,
commanded on this day by Doyle, colonel of the 19th.

[406] Unpublished Diary of Hall of the 14th Light Dragoons.

[407] See Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, pp. 13-14.

[408] The 51st lost 6 men; Brunswick Oels, 18; Chasseurs Britanniques, 58; 7th
Portuguese, 8 men; 19th, 2 men—of these 92 only 19 were prisoners, so that it is
clear that the French cavalry never got in among them, or cut them up in the
style described by Pelet, Fournier, Fririon, or Masséna himself. When a body of
4,000 infantry attacked by cavalry has only 90 casualties, we know that no part of
it can have been ridden over or seriously broken.

[409] Leach (of the 95th), Life of an Old Soldier, p. 214.

[410] By some error Napier says the 8th Corps, but the only division of that
corps present (Solignac) was in reserve far off.

[411] Napier, iii. 152.

[412] See Brotherton’s Memoir, in Hamilton’s History of the 14th Light Dragoons,
pp. 84-5: ‘At Fuentes d’Oñoro we had a very fine fellow, Captain Knipe, killed
through his gallant obstinacy, if I may so call it. We had, the night before, been
discussing the best mode for cavalry to attack batteries in the open field. He
maintained, contrary to us all, that they ought to be charged in front, instead of
by gaining their flank and avoiding their fire. The experiment next day was fatal
to him. He had the opportunity of charging a French battery, which he did by
attacking immediately in front. Their discharge of round shot he got through with
little loss, but they most rapidly reloaded with grape, and his party got a close
and murderous discharge, which almost entirely destroyed it—he himself
receiving a grape shot through the body.’ As Montbrun had not got up his guns
during the first cavalry charges, this must have been during Craufurd’s fight.
[413] Napier makes two serious errors—he represents Ramsay as having a
whole battery, instead of two guns only: and he underrates the assistance given
by the cavalry, which is detailed in Brotherton’s memoir, as well as in the
regimental history of the Royals (p. 118).

[414] The account of this in Wellington’s dispatch is hopelessly obscure, because

instead of writing ‘the pickets of the 1st Division under Lieut.-Col. Hill,’ he wrote
by a slip of the pen ‘the regiments of the 1st Division under Lieut.-Col. Hill.’ Hill of
course (being a regimental major though a titular Lieut.-Colonel, after the Guards
system) did not command whole regiments, as Wellington’s words imply, but
simply the skirmishing line of pickets. The facts are made quite clear by Stepney
of the Coldstreams and Stothert’s diary (who calls them ‘the pickets of the
Guards’), Grattan (who calls them ‘the advance,’ or ‘the light troops of the 1st
Division’), and Hall’s unpublished diary, which gives the whole story in a nutshell:
‘The enemy made a dart at the pickets of the 1st Division, with the expectation of
sweeping off the line before our cavalry could support them. They succeeded in
part, by coming up unexpectedly, but when they were perceived the men, by
collecting into knots (or ‘hiving’ as they called it) repulsed them with the bayonet.
A troop of the 14th Light Dragoons and some of the Royals were ordered out to
the skirmish and suffered some loss.’
It is this incident which General Fournier, who led the charge, transforms in his
dispatch (in the Archives de la Guerre) into the breaking two squares of the Light
Division and taking General Craufurd prisoner—a wild story. Fririon makes the
charge capture ‘300 Hussars of the English Royal Guard!’ Both say that three
battalions of the Guards laid down their arms.

[415] Deducting the regiments in Fuentes de Oñoro (71st and 79th) the 1st
Division lost about 400 men in the whole day, of whom probably 100 in this petty
disaster.

[416] One was repelled by the 42nd, which met it in line.

[417] Of this episode, only hinted at by Fririon, and not mentioned at all by
Masséna in his official dispatch, we have a vivid description in Marbot, which
might be doubted if it were not borne out by hints in Napier and Thiébault and by
the direct statement of Marshal Jourdan in his memoirs. If Lepic had charged, it is
hard to see what effect he could have produced, for all Peninsular experience
went to prove that infantry in battle order on a good position could not be broken
by cavalry, however daring. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were well established on
their ground, with a steep slope below them, and could not have been moved.
Lepic’s refusal to charge, however, always takes a prominent part in the
description of Fuentes de Oñoro by French writers, not eye-witnesses, who are
anxious to prove that Wellington ought to have lost the battle.
[418] To Lord Liverpool, 8th May. Dispatches, vii. p. 531.

[419] 2/24th and 1/79th from Nightingale’s brigade, and the 1/71st from
Howard’s, in all 1,850 bayonets, leaving the remainder of the 1st Division with
5,700 bayonets, the 3rd Division with 5,400, and Ashworth with 2,500 as the
main line holding the plateau, with 3,700 of Craufurd’s Light Division in reserve.

[420] Masséna’s dispatch, see Appendix, no. XIII. Drouet is therefore wrongly
blamed by French critics who say that he attacked an hour or two late—he had to
wait to see the turning movement in successful progress.

[421] British narratives persistently state that infantry of the Imperial Guard
fought in Fuentes village. But it is absolutely certain that there were none of
those troops with Masséna’s army. The explanation lies in the fact that the
grenadier company in a French regiment wore bearskins, and that a mass of
grenadier companies therefore could easily be mistaken for Guards. All 71st and
79th diaries speak of fighting with ‘the Imperial Guards’ for this reason.

[422] Masséna’s dispatch speaks only of Claparéde’s division as being put in, but
as Martinien’s lists show, Conroux must have been still more heavily engaged, for
his division lost 31 officers killed and wounded, Claparéde’s only 25. Moreover, it
was one of Conroux’s battalions (9th Léger) with which the 88th were engaged
mainly, and this battalion alone lost 8 officers. About three battalions of each
division remained in reserve and had few or no casualties, viz. the 64th, 88th,
95th, 96th, 100th, 103rd of the Line.

[423] Grattan of the 88th; see his Adventures, &c., pp. 66-7.

[424] This again from Grattan, who tells how his colonel, Wallace of Bussaco
fame, said that he would rather have to retake Fuentes than to cover a retreat to
the Coa.

[425] It is unfortunately impossible to disentangle the losses of the various

battalions of the 9th Corps, as there is no regimental return, but only a corps
return of its losses available. But some aid is given by Martinien’s invaluable Liste
des officiers tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l’Empire, which shows that
the battalions that suffered most were the 4/9th Léger with 8 officers hurt out of
21 present, the 4/63rd Ligne with 7 out of 19, the 4/24th Ligne and 4/28th Léger,
each with 6 out of 17, and the 4/16th Léger with 6 out of 16. These, clearly, were
the units that were most engaged. Some belonged to Conroux’s, some to
Claparéde’s division.

[426] Six guns of the cavalry, fourteen of the 6th Corps, four of the 8th Corps.
[427] Bull’s horse artillery troop, Thompson’s and Lawson’s companies, and
three Portuguese batteries, those of Sequeira, Rosado, and Preto.

[428] Fririon notes that they suffered more than was necessary from being in
dense masses (p. 207). These two divisions had on the 3rd and 5th May 14
officers killed and 38 wounded, according to Martinien’s lists. As the total loss of
the corps on both days was 59 officers and nearly 900 men, and we have to allow
for Ferey’s loss of 400 men in Fuentes village, it seems that Marchand and
Mermet must have lost at least as many more.

[429] Masséna to Napoleon, Fuentes de Oñoro, May 7: the main battle-report.

[430] Save the few voltigeur companies from Mermet sent down to skirmish with
the 95th rifles in the ravine of the Turon, as mentioned just above.

[431] Pelet, Appendice sur la Guerre d’Espagne, p. 341.

[432] Masséna’s orders (Archives de la Guerre) were that Reynier ‘fera pour
seconder l’attaque de l’armée une démonstration générale sur la ligne, et suivra
l’ennemi dans tous ses mouvements—c’est-à-dire que si les forces qu’il a devant
lui se porteraient au secours du gros de l’armée ennemie, qui est dans la direction
de Fuentes d’Oñoro, il les suivrait dans sa marche, pour les prendre par la
gauche.’

[433] See Rogerson’s regimental history of the 53rd, p. 58.

[434] The 8th Caçadores, according to Wellington’s dispatch, partly crossed the
ravine and fought on the other side. Note that he calls them the ‘2nd battalion
Lusitanian Legion,’ though that had now ceased to be their official designation.

[435] Marchand’s division shows in Martinien’s lists surprisingly heavy casualties,

considering that it was but partially engaged on the 3rd in support of Ferey, and
on the 5th was only actively employed in storming Pozo Bello. It had 13 officers
killed and 31 wounded, which ought to imply at least 600 or 700 casualties
among the rank and file. Apparently there was a disproportionate loss in officers,
as the whole casualties of the 6th Corps on May 5 were only 944 men, of whom
at least 400 were in Ferey’s division.

[436] Only 9 hurt in the 43rd, 21 in the 52nd, 13 in the Rifles, 24 in the two
Caçador battalions. And many of these were undoubtedly lost in skirmishing, not
in the retreat in squares.

[437] The blockade of Almeida and the siege of Badajoz by Beresford.

[438] Dispatches, vii. 515.

[439] See p. 298 above.

[440] Both by Napier, iii. 152, and by Fririon, p. 207.

[441] See his dispatch in the Appendix to Belmas, i. p. 539.

[442] Moreover, Marchand’s leading brigade, that of Maucune, must have been
in great disorder, after having driven the British advanced guard out of the woods
and the village, and would need time to re-form.

[443] Pelet thinks that ‘l’excessive supériorité du général anglais lui donnait le
moyen de tout entreprendre. Il s’est montré, dans cette campagne, et même
ailleurs, fort étranger à la stratégie comme à la tactique.’ He concludes that
Wellington with his superior numbers should have attacked the French centre or
Reynier! He was ‘plus fort des deux cinquièmes que les Français.’ (Appendice sur
la Guerre d’Espagne, pp. 340-2.) Fririon states as an incontestable fact that the
French cavalry was inferior to the English in numbers (Journal historique de la
Campagne de Portugal, p. 207). Marbot, on the other hand, thinks that
Wellington was over rash in fighting at all on such a position (Mémoires, ii. 460),
coming to much the same conclusion as Napier. Belmas’s arguments, like those of
Pelet, are all vitiated by his giving Wellington 45,000 men—9,000 more than he
actually possessed. Delagrave thinks, like Pelet, that Wellington showed ‘timidity
which passed into cowardice.’ Yet he allows that Masséna had 41,000 infantry and
cavalry, without counting gunners or sappers, and Wellington only 40,000 (p.
239).

[444] Wellington says (to Lord Liverpool, May 15): ‘Sir W. Erskine was dining
with Sir Brent Spencer at head quarters, and received his orders about 4 o’clock.
He says that he sent them off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which was stationed
between Aldea de Obispo and Barba del Puerco.... The 4th regiment, it is said,
did not receive their orders before midnight, and, though they had only 2½ miles
to march, missed the road, and did not arrive at Barba del Puerco till after the
French.’ (Dispatches, vii. 566.) Tomkinson’s contemporary comment on this is (pp.
102-3 of his diary): ‘The order reached Sir W. Erskine’s quarters about 2 p.m.: he
put it in his pocket, and did not dispatch the letter to Colonel Bevan before
midnight, and to cover himself, when required to explain by Lord Wellington, said
that the 4th unfortunately missed its way, which was not the case.’ Many years
later (1836) in his Conversations with Lord Stanhope (which see, p. 89)
Wellington said that he believed Bevan had his orders ‘about four or five in the
afternoon, but the people about him said “Oh! you need not march till daybreak,”
and so by his fault the French got to Barba del Puerco.’ Napier (History, iii. p.
156) says plainly that ‘Erskine sent no order to the 4th regiment.’ Colonel Bevan
always maintained that he got nothing from Erskine till nearly midnight.
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