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Java Concepts, 5th Edition

Chapter 1 Introduction

CHAPTER GOALS
• To understand the activity of programming

• To learn about the architecture of computers

• To learn about machine code and high-level programming languages

• To become familiar with your computing environment and your compiler

• To compile and run your first Java program

• To recognize syntax and logic errors

The purpose of this chapter is to familiarize you with the concept of programming. It
reviews the architecture of a computer and discusses the difference between machine
code and high-level programming languages. Finally, you will see how to compile
and run your first Java program, and how to diagnose errors that may occur when a
program is compiled or executed.
2
1.1 What Is Programming?
You have probably used a computer for work or fun. Many people use computers for
everyday tasks such as balancing a checkbook or writing a term paper. Computers are
good for such tasks. They can handle repetitive chores, such as totaling up numbers or
placing words on a page, without getting bored or exhausted. Computers also make
good game machines because they can play sequences of sounds and pictures,
involving the human user in the process.

The flexibility of a computer is quite an amazing phenomenon. The same machine can
balance your checkbook, print your term paper, and play a game. In contrast, other
machines carry out a much narrower range of tasks—a car drives and a toaster toasts.

To achieve this flexibility, the computer must be programmed to perform each task. A
computer itself is a machine that stores data (numbers, words, pictures), interacts with
devices (the monitor screen, the sound system, the printer), and executes programs.
Chapter 1 Introduction Page 1 of 43
Java Concepts, 5th Edition
Programs are sequences of instructions and decisions that the computer carries out to
achieve a task. One program balances checkbooks; a different program, perhaps
designed and constructed by a different company, processes words; and a third
program, probably from yet another company, plays a game.

A computer must be programmed to perform tasks. Different tasks require different

programs.

Today's computer programs are so sophisticated that it is hard to believe that they are
all composed of extremely primitive operations.

A computer program executes a sequence of very basic operations in rapid

succession.
2
3
A typical operation may be one of the following:

• Put a red dot onto this screen position.

• Send the letter A to the printer.

• Get a number from this location in memory.

• Add up two numbers.

• If this value is negative, continue the program at that instruction.

A computer program tells a computer, in minute detail, the sequence of steps that are
needed to complete a task. A program contains a huge number of simple operations,
and the computer executes them at great speed. The computer has no intelligence—it
simply executes instruction sequences that have been prepared in advance.

A computer program contains the instruction sequences for all tasks that it can
execute.

To use a computer, no knowledge of programming is required. When you write a term

paper with a word processor, that software package has been programmed by the
manufacturer and is ready for you to use. That is only to be expected—you can drive a
car without being a mechanic and toast bread without being an electrician.

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 2 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

A primary purpose of this book is to teach you how to design and implement computer
programs. You will learn how to formulate instructions for all tasks that your programs
need to execute.

Keep in mind that programming a sophisticated computer game or word processor

requires a team of many highly skilled programmers, graphic artists, and other
professionals. Your first programming efforts will be more mundane. The concepts
and skills you learn in this book form an important foundation, but you should not
expect to immediately produce professional software. A typical college program in
computer science or software engineering takes four years to complete; this book is
intended as an introductory course in such a program.

Many students find that there is an immense thrill even in simple programming tasks.
It is an amazing experience to see the computer carry out a task precisely and quickly
that would take you hours of drudgery.

SELF CHECK
1. What is required to play a music CD on a computer?

2. Why is a CD player less flexible than a computer?

3. Can a computer program develop the initiative to execute tasks in a better

way than its programmers envisioned?

1.2 The Anatomy of a Computer

To understand the programming process, you need to have a rudimentary
understanding of the building blocks that make up a computer. This section will
describe a personal computer. Larger computers have faster, larger, or more powerful
components, but they have fundamentally the same design. 3

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 3 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition
3
4
Figure 1

Central Processing Unit

At the heart of the computer lies the central processing unit (CPU) (see Figure 1). It
consists of a single chip (integrated circuit) or a small number of chips. A computer
chip is a component with a plastic or metal housing, metal connectors, and inside
wiring made principally from silicon. For a CPU chip, the inside wiring is enormously
complicated. For example, the Pentium 4 chip (a popular CPU for personal computers
at the time of this writing) contains over 50 million structural elements called
transistors—the elements that enable electrical signals to control other electrical
signals, making automatic computing possible. The CPU locates and executes the
program instructions; it carries out arithmetic operations such as addition, subtraction,
multiplication, and division; and it fetches data from storage and input/output devices
and sends data back.

At the heart of the computer lies the central processing unit (CPU).

The computer keeps data and programs in storage. There are two kinds of storage.
Primary storage, also called random-access memory (RAM) or simply memory, is fast
but expensive; it is made from memory chips (see Figure 2). Primary storage has two
disadvantages. It is comparatively expensive, and it loses all its data when the power is
turned off. Secondary storage, usually a hard disk (see Figure 3), provides less

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 4 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition
expensive storage that persists without electricity. A hard disk consists of rotating
platters, which are coated with a magnetic material, and read/write heads, which can
detect and change the patterns of varying magnetic flux on the platters. This is
essentially the same recording and playback process that is used in audio or video
tapes.

Data and programs are stored in primary storage (memory) and secondary storage
(such as a hard disk).

Some computers are self-contained units, whereas others are interconnected through
networks. Home computers are usually intermittently connected to the Internet via a
dialup or broadband connection. The computers in your computer lab are probably
permanently connected to a local area network. Through the network cabling, the 4
computer can read programs from central storage locations or send data to other 5
computers. For the user of a networked computer, it may not even be obvious which
data reside on the computer itself and which are transmitted through the network.

Figure 2

A Memory Module with Memory Chips

Most computers have removable storage devices that can access data or programs on
media such as floppy disks, tapes, or compact discs (CDs).
Chapter 1 Introduction Page 5 of 43
Java Concepts, 5th Edition

Figure 3

A Hard Disk.
5

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 6 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition
5
6
Figure 4

A Motherboard

To interact with a human user, a computer requires other peripheral devices. The
computer transmits information to the user through a display screen, loudspeakers, and
printers. The user can enter information and directions to the computer by using a
keyboard or a pointing device such as a mouse.

The CPU, the RAM, and the electronics controlling the hard disk and other devices are
interconnected through a set of electrical lines called a bus. Data travel along the bus
from the system memory and peripheral devices to the CPU and back. Figure 4 shows
a motherboard, which contains the CPU, the RAM, and connectors to peripheral
devices.

Figure 5 gives a schematic overview of the architecture of a computer. Program

instructions and data (such as text, numbers, audio, or video) are stored on the hard
disk, on a CD, or on a network. When a program is started, it is brought into memory
where it can be read by the CPU. The CPU reads the program one instruction at a time.
As directed by these instructions, the CPU reads data, modifies it, and writes it back to
RAM or to secondary storage. Some program instructions will cause the CPU to

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 7 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition
interact with the devices that control the display screen or the speaker. Because these
actions happen many times over and at great speed, the human user will perceive
images and sound. Similarly, the CPU can send instructions to a printer to mark the
paper with patterns of closely spaced dots, which a human recognizes as text
characters and pictures. Some program instructions read user input from the keyboard
or mouse. The program analyzes the nature of these inputs and then executes the next
appropriate instructions.

The CPU reads machine instructions from memory. The instructions direct it to
communicate with memory, secondary storage, and peripheral devices.
6
7
Figure 5

Schematic Diagram of a Computer

SELF CHECK
4. Where is a program stored when it is not currently running?

5. Which part of the computer carries out arithmetic operations, such as

addition and multiplication?

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 8 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

RANDOM FACT 1.1: The ENIAC and the Dawn of

Computing
The ENIAC (electronic numerical integrator and computer) was the first usable
electronic computer. It was designed by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly at the
University of Pennsylvania and was completed in 1946. Instead of transistors,
which were not invented until two years after it was built, the ENIAC contained
about 18,000 vacuum tubes in many cabinets housed in a large room (see The
ENIAC figure). Vacuum tubes burned out at the rate of several tubes per day. An
attendant with a shopping cart full of tubes constantly made the rounds and replaced
defective ones. The computer was programmed by connecting wires on panels.
Each wiring configuration would set up the computer for a particular problem. To
have the computer work on a different problem, the wires had to be replugged.

Work on the ENIAC was supported by the U.S. Navy, which was interested in
computations of ballistic tables that would give the trajectory of a projectile,
depending on the wind resistance, initial velocity, and atmospheric conditions. To 7
compute the trajectories, one must find the numerical solutions of certain 8
differential equations; hence the name “numerical integrator”. Before machines like
ENIAC were developed, humans did this kind of work, and until the 1950s the
word “computer” referred to these people. The ENIAC was later used for peaceful
purposes, such as the tabulation of U.S. census data.

The ENIAC

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 9 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

1.3 Translating Human-Readable Programs to Machine

Code
On the most basic level, computer instructions are extremely primitive. The processor
executes machine instructions. CPUs from different vendors, such as the Intel Pentium
or the Sun SPARC, have different sets of machine instructions. To enable Java
applications to run on multiple CPUs without modification, Java programs contain
machine instructions for a so-called “Java virtual machine” (JVM), an idealized CPU
that is simulated by a program run on the actual CPU. The difference between actual
and virtual machine instructions is not important—all you need to know is that
machine instructions are very simple, are encoded as numbers and stored in memory,
and can be executed very quickly.

Generally, machine code depends on the CPU type. However, the instruction set of
the Java virtual machine (JVM) can be executed on many CPUs.
8
9
A typical sequence of machine instructions is

1. Load the contents of memory location 40.

2. Load the value 100.

3. If the first value is greater than the second value, continue with the instruction
that is stored in memory location 240.

Actually, machine instructions are encoded as numbers so that they can be stored in
memory. On the Java virtual machine, this sequence of instruction is encoded as the
sequence of numbers
21 40
16 100
163 240

When the virtual machine fetches this sequence of numbers, it decodes them and
executes the associated sequence of commands.

How can you communicate the command sequence to the computer? The most direct
method is to place the actual numbers into the computer memory. This is, in fact, how

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 10 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition
the very earliest computers worked. However, a long program is composed of
thousands of individual commands, and it is tedious and error-prone to look up the
numeric codes for all commands and manually place the codes into memory. As we
said before, computers are really good at automating tedious and error-prone activities,
and it did not take long for computer programmers to realize that computers could be
harnessed to help in the programming process.

Because machine instructions are encoded as numbers, it is difficult to write

programs in machine code.

In the mid-1950s, high-level programming languages began to appear. In these

languages, the programmer expresses the idea behind the task that needs to be
performed, and a special computer program, called a compiler, translates the
high-level description into machine instructions for a particular processor.

High-level languages allow you to describe tasks at a higher conceptual level than
machine code.

For example, in Java, the high-level programming language that you will use in this
book, you might give the following instruction:
if (intRate > 100)
System.out.println("Interest rate error");

This means, “If the interest rate is over 100, display an error message”. It is then the
job of the compiler program to look at the sequence of characters if (intRate >
100) and translate that into
21 40 16 100 163 240 . . .

Compilers are quite sophisticated programs. They translate logical statements, such as
the if statement, into sequences of computations, tests, and jumps. They assign
memory locations for variables—items of information identified by symbolic names—
like intRate. In this course, we will generally take the existence of a compiler for
granted. If you decide to become a professional computer scientist, you may well learn
more about compiler-writing techniques later in your studies.

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 11 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

A compiler translates programs written in a high-level language into machine code.

9
10
SELF CHECK
6. What is the code for the Java virtual machine instruction “Load the
contents of memory location 100”?

7. Does a person who uses a computer for office work ever run a compiler?

1.4 The Java Programming Language

In 1991, a group led by James Gosling and Patrick Naughton at Sun Microsystems
designed a programming language that they code-named “Green” for use in consumer
devices, such as intelligent television “set-top” boxes. The language was designed to
be simple and architecture neutral, so that it could be executed on a variety of
hardware. No customer was ever found for this technology.

Java was originally designed for programming consumer devices, but it was first
successfully used to write Internet applets.

Gosling recounts that in 1994 the team realized, “We could write a really cool
browser. It was one of the few things in the client/server mainstream that needed some
of the weird things we'd done: architecture neutral, real-time, reliable, secure”. Java
was introduced to an enthusiastic crowd at the SunWorld exhibition in 1995.

Since then, Java has grown at a phenomenal rate. Programmers have embraced the
language because it is simpler than its closest rival, C++. In addition, Java has a rich
library that makes it possible to write portable programs that can bypass proprietary
operating systems—a feature that was eagerly sought by those who wanted to be
independent of those proprietary systems and was bitterly fought by their vendors. A
“micro edition” and an “enterprise edition” of the Java library make Java programmers
at home on hardware ranging from smart cards and cell phones to the largest Internet
servers.

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 12 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

Java was designed to be safe and portable, benefiting both Internet users and
students.

Because Java was designed for the Internet, it has two attributes that make it very
suitable for beginners: safety and portability. If you visit a web page that contains Java
code (so-called applets—see Figure 6 for an example), the code automatically starts
running. It is important that you can trust that applets are inherently safe. If an applet
could do something evil, such as damaging data or reading personal information on
your computer, then you would be in real danger every time you browsed the Web—
an unscrupulous designer might put up a web page containing dangerous code that
would execute on your machine as soon as you visited the page. The Java language has
an assortment of security features that guarantees that no evil applets can run on your
computer. As an added benefit, these features also help you to learn the language
faster. The Java virtual machine can catch many kinds of beginners' mistakes and
report them accurately. (In contrast, many beginners' mistakes in the C++ language
merely produce programs that act in random and confusing ways.) The other benefit of
Java is portability. The same Java program will run, without change, on Windows,
UNIX, Linux, or the Macintosh. This too is a requirement for applets. When you visit 10
a web page, the web server that serves up the page contents has no idea what computer 11
you are using to browse the Web. It simply returns you the portable code that was
generated by the Java compiler. The virtual machine on your computer executes that
portable code. Again, there is a benefit for the student. You do not have to learn how
to write programs for different operating systems.

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 13 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

Figure 6

An Applet for Visualizing Molecules ([1])

At this time, Java is firmly established as one of the most important languages for
general-purpose programming as well as for computer science instruction. However,
although Java is a good language for beginners, it is not perfect, for three reasons.

Because Java was not specifically designed for students, no thought was given to
making it really simple to write basic programs. A certain amount of technical
machinery is necessary in Java to write even the simplest programs. This is not a
problem for professional programmers, but it is a drawback for beginning students. As
you learn how to program in Java, there will be times when you will be asked to be
satisfied with a preliminary explanation and wait for complete details in a later chapter.

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 14 of 43

Java Concepts, 5th Edition

Java was revised and extended many times during its life—see Table 1. In this book,
we assume that you have Java version 5 or later.

Finally, you cannot hope to learn all of Java in one semester. The Java language itself 11
is relatively simple, but Java contains a vast set of library packages that are required to 12
write useful programs. There are packages for graphics, user interface design,
cryptography, networking, sound, database storage, and many other purposes. Even
expert Java programmers cannot hope to know the contents of all of the packages—
they just use those that they need for particular projects.

Java has a very large library. Focus on learning those parts of the library that you
need for your programming projects.

Using this book, you should expect to learn a good deal about the Java language and
about the most important packages. Keep in mind that the central goal of this book is
not to make you memorize Java minutiae, but to teach you how to think about
programming.

Table 1 Java Versions

Version Year Important New Features
1.0 1996
1.1 1997 Inner classes
1.2 1998 Swing, Collections
1.3 2000 Performance enhancements
1.4 2002 Assertions, XML
5 2004 Generic classes, enhanced for loop, auto-boxing,
enumerations
6 2006 Library improvements

SELF CHECK
8. What are the two most important benefits of the Java language?

9. How long does it take to learn the entire Java library?

Chapter 1 Introduction Page 15 of 43

Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
The Project Gutenberg eBook of War and the
Arme Blanche
 This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
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are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
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Title: War and the Arme Blanche

Author: Erskine Childers

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WAR AND THE

ARME BLANCHE ***
 Transcriber’s Note:
Footnotes have been collected at the end of each
chapter, and are linked for ease of reference.
Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been
corrected. Please see the transcriber’s note at the end of
this text for details regarding the handling of any textual
issues encountered during its preparation.
Any corrections are indicated using an underline
highlight. Placing the cursor over the correction will
produce the original text in a tooltip popup.
 WAR AND THE ARME BLANCHE

WAR AND THE ARME

BLANCHE
BY

ERSKINE CHILDERS
EDITOR OF VOL. V. OF “THE TIMES HISTORY OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA”
AUTHOR OF “THE RIDDLE OF THE SANDS”

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THE RIGHT HON.

FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G.

LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD
1910

[All rights reserved]

 CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

INTRODUCTION BY FIELD-MARSHAL EARL v

ROBERTS

I. THE ISSUE AND ITS IMPORTANCE 1

II. THE THREEFOLD PROBLEM 21
I. THE PHYSICAL PROBLEM 21
II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM 35
III. THE PROBLEM OF TRAINING 40
III. BRITISH AND BOER MOUNTED TROOPS 46
IV. ELANDSLAAGTE 61
V. FROM ELANDSLAAGTE TO THE BLACK WEEK 70
VI. COLESBERG AND KIMBERLEY 85
VII. PAARDEBERG AND POPLAR GROVE 113
VIII. THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH 150
IX. BLOEMFONTEIN TO KOMATI POORT 168
X. THE GUERILLA WAR 210
XI. MOUNTED CHARGES IN SOUTH AFRICA 239
XII. A PECULIAR WAR? 261
XIII. BERNHARDI AND "CAVALRY TRAINING" 292
XIV. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 327
XV. REFORM 354
I. STUDY 354
II. NOMENCLATURE 356
III. ARMAMENT OF CAVALRY 357
IV. MOUNTED INFANTRY 366
V. YEOMANRY 368
VI. IMPERIAL MOUNTED TROOPS 370
VII. CONCLUSION 371
INDEX 373
 INTRODUCTION

BY
FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS, V.C., K.G.

I have read with the greatest interest Mr. Childers’s illuminating

book “War and the Arme Blanche.” My opinion of the subject with
which it deals is already so well known throughout the army that I
need not labour to say how entirely I agree with the author’s main
thesis; indeed, anyone who will take the trouble to read “Cavalry
Training” (1904), will see that I anticipated the arguments which he
has so ably developed. This being so, it is not surprising that I
should view the regulations laid down in “Cavalry Training” (1907),
with some concern.
Let us consider briefly what the history of this question—the
comparative value of steel weapons and firearms for Cavalry in war
—is. Until within the last few years our Lancer regiments depended
entirely on the lance and sword, while other Cavalry regiments
depended almost entirely on the sword.[1] This was inevitable
because of the inaccuracy and short range of the smooth-bore
carbine. Tentative changes were made when rifled arms were
adopted, but it is only within the last thirty years that Lancer
regiments have had any firearm given to them save a pistol.[2] With
such an equipment and such traditions it was perhaps but natural
that the training of Cavalry should have been almost exclusively
devoted to shock tactics and the use of the arme blanche.
But why now, with a different equipment, should Cavalry still be
trained on the old tradition, and their rifles reside in buckets
attached to the horse, only to be used on certain exceptional
occasions to “supplement the sword or lance”? (“Cavalry Training,”
sec. 142.)
The late Colonel Henderson, in his essay on the tactical
employment of Cavalry, “Science of War,” chapter iii., page 51,
pointed out that, notwithstanding the introduction of gunpowder, the
Cavalry was the arm that had undergone the least change. He went
on to say that “shock-tactics, the charge, and the hand-to-hand
encounter are still the one ideal of Cavalry action; and the power of
manœuvring in great masses, maintaining an absolute uniformity of
pace and formation, and moving at the highest speed with
accurately dressed ranks, is the criterion of excellence.” He added:
“to such an extent has this teaching been carried out, that the
efficiency of the individual, especially in those duties which are
performed by single men or small parties, cannot fairly be said to
have received due attention.”
After explaining how Cromwell’s troopers “were taught the value
of co-operation,” and how “Cromwell built up his Cavalry on a
foundation of high individual efficiency,” he goes on to show that,
“as time went on and armies became larger, and skill at arms, as a
national characteristic, rarer, drill, discipline, manœuvre in mass, and
a high degree of mobility came to outweigh all other considerations;
and when the necessity of arming the nations brought about short
service, the training of the individual, in any other branch of his
business than that of riding boot-to-boot and of rendering instant
obedience to the word or signal of his superior, fell more and more
into abeyance. Shock-tactics filled the entire bill, and the Cavalry of
Europe, admirably trained to manœuvre and attack, whether by the
squadron of 150 sabres, or the division of 3,000 or 4,000, was
practically unfitted for any other duty. The climax of incompetency
may be said to have been reached during the cycle of European
warfare, which began with the Crimea, and ended with the Russo-
Turkish conflict of 1877–78. The old spirit of dash and daring under
fire was still conspicuous, discipline and mobility were never higher.
The regiments manœuvred with admirable precision at the highest
speed, and never had great masses of horsemen been more easily
controlled. And yet, in the whole history of war, it may be doubted
whether the record of the Cavalry was ever more meagre.”
Referring specially to the German Cavalry during the war of 1870–
71, Henderson says: “The troopers knew nothing whatever of
fighting on foot—their movements were impeded by their
equipment--and a few Francs-tireurs, armed with the chassepot,
were enough to paralyze a whole brigade.... In fact, to the student
who follows out the operations of the Cavalry of 1870–71 step by
step, and who bears in mind its deficiencies in armament and
training, it will appear very doubtful whether a strong body of
mounted riflemen of the same type as the Boers, or better still, of
Sheridan’s or Stuart’s Cavalry in the last years of the War of
Secession, would not have held the German horsemen at bay from
the first moment they crossed the frontier.”
“Had the successes gained by shock-tactics been very numerous,
it might possibly be argued that the sacrifice of efficiency in
detached and dismounted duties, as well as the training of the
individual, was fully justified. What are the facts?” After enumerating
the successes gained by shock-tactics from the days of the Crimea
onwards, when anything larger than a regiment was engaged,
Henderson adds: “Such is the record: one great tactical success
gained at Custozza: a retreating army saved from annihilation at
Königgrätz,[3] and five minor successes which may or may not have
influenced the ultimate issue. Not one single instance of an effective
and sustained pursuit; not one single instance—except Custozza,
and there the Infantry was armed with muzzle-loaders—of a charge
decisive of the battle; not one single instance of Infantry being
scattered and cut down in panic flight; not one single instance of a
force larger than a brigade intervening at a critical moment. And
how many failures? How often were the Cavalry dashed vainly in
reckless gallantry against the hail of a thin line of rifles! How often
were great masses held back inactive, without drawing a sabre or
firing a shot, while the battle was decided by the Infantry and the
guns! How few the enterprises against the enemy’s communications!
How few men killed or disabled, even when Cavalry met Cavalry in
the mêlée! Can it be said in face of these facts that the devotion to
shock-tactics, the constant practice in massed movements, the
discouragement of individualism, both in leaders and men, was
repaid by results? Does it not rather appear that there was some
factor present on the modern battle-field which prevented the
Cavalry, trained to a pitch hitherto unknown, from reaping the same
harvest as the horsemen of previous eras? Was not the attempt to
apply the same principles to the battle of the breech-loader and the
rifled cannon, as had been applied successfully to the battles of the
smooth-bore, a mistake from beginning to end; and should not the
Cavalry, confronted by new and revolutionary conditions, have
sought new means of giving full effect to the mobility which makes it
formidable?”[4]
Since Colonel Henderson, no one has dealt so exhaustively and so
logically with this aspect of Cavalry in war as Mr. Childers. He has
gone thoroughly into the achievements of our Cavalry in South
Africa. It has been said that this war was abnormal, but are not all
wars abnormal? As, however, it was the first war in which magazine
rifles were made use of, and as the weapon used in future wars is
certain to be even more effective, on account of the lower trajectory
and automatic mechanism about to be introduced, shall we not be
very unwise if we do not profit by the lessons we were taught at
such a heavy cost during that war?
These, then, are Mr. Childers’s conclusions in reviewing the period
from the beginning of the campaign up to March, 1900:
"Widening our horizon to include the whole area of the war at this
period, we perceive that Cavalry theory, so far as it was based on
the arme blanche, had collapsed. The only and not especially
remarkable achievement of that weapon is the pursuit at
Elandslaagte on the second day of hostilities. Everywhere else we
have seen it directly or indirectly crippling the Cavalry, and the
greater the numbers employed and the larger the measure of
independence permitted, the more unmistakable is the weakness.
When the Cavalry succeed strategically, as in the ride to Kimberley
and back to Paardeberg, they succeed in spite of disabilities
traceable to arme blanche doctrine. When they succeed tactically, as
in the Colesberg operations, and in containing Cronje’s force on the
eve of Paardeberg, they succeed through the carbine, in spite of its
inferiority as a weapon of precision. In tactical offence, the
paramount raison d’être of the arme blanche, they fail, and in
reconnaissance they fail."
With every word of this I agree, and it must be remembered that
my judgment is based upon personal and first-hand knowledge. Why
did our Cavalry fail? Because they did not know, because they had
never been required to know, how to use the principal and most
useful weapon with which they were armed. Because they did not
understand, because they had never been asked to understand, that
their rôle should consist in attacking the enemy “exactly like the
Infantry,[5] and to shoot their way up to him.”[6]
In this matter of shooting their way up to their enemy, Cavalry
possess great advantages owing to their mobility. General French’s
admirable movement at Klip Drift was essentially a rapid advance of
fighting men carried out at extended intervals. It was a rapid
advance of warriors who possessed the ability, by means of horses
and rifles (not swords or lances), to place their enemy hors de
combat. It was an ideal Cavalry operation, but it was not a “Cavalry
charge,” as this term is generally understood, and the arme blanche
had nothing to say to it.
In the preface to “Cavalry Training” (1904), I laid down that such
an operation was sound in principle. I went farther—I encouraged it
—and there is no doubt that on many occasions such an advance
will have a far greater effect than a methodical advance on foot. But,
such an advance must be essentially a rapid advance of fighting men
armed with rifles, and the threat lies in the power of the rifle.
In the same Preface I pointed out that the rifle, which “will chiefly
be required when dismounted, must be carried on the person of the
soldier himself.” The necessity for this was brought very prominently
to my notice during the fight in the Chardeh Valley, near Kabul, on
December 11, 1879. On that occasion more than forty carbines were
lost by the 9th Lancers, two weak squadrons of which regiment,
numbering only 213 men, took part in the engagement. Partly owing
to the rough nature of the ground, and partly to the enemy’s fire,
several horses fell, and before the men could disengage the carbines
from the buckets the Afghans were upon them. Without their
firearms the dismounted Cavalry were quite helpless, and it was a
sorry spectacle to behold these men, with their swords dangling
between their legs and impeding their movements, while they vainly
endeavoured to defend themselves with their lances. This incident
confirmed the experience I had gained in the Mutiny as to the
necessity for the firearm being attached to the man instead of to the
horse, and I at once issued orders for this change to be made, and
for the sword—which is only required to be used when the soldier is
mounted—to be carried on the saddle.
The strongest opposition to these alterations was made by Cavalry
officers in this country, and it was not until 1891—twelve years after
it had been adopted in Afghanistan—that sanction was accorded to
the men’s swords being carried on the saddles. Eleven years more
had to pass before officers were authorized (Army Order, June 1,
1902) to have their swords similarly carried. But the rifle is still being
carried on the horse, and, if this arrangement is not changed, the
result will certainly be that, if a man gets upset and separated from
his horse in a fight, he will have neither sword nor rifle with which to
defend himself. This is not the case in India, where the rifle,
supported by a small bucket, is attached to the man, so that when
he dismounts the rifle goes with him.[7]
I trust that thirty years will not again be allowed to elapse before
we take to heart and act upon the main lesson to be learned from
the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars, and in a lesser degree from
every war that has taken place since the introduction of breech-
loading arms. That lesson is, that knee to knee, close order charging
is practically a thing of the past. There may be, there probably will
be, mounted attacks, preferably in open order, against Cavalry
caught unawares, or against broken Infantry. But, after reading Mr.
Childers’s book, backed by my own practical experience, I am driven
to the conclusion that the only possible logical deduction from the
history of late wars is, that all attacks can now be carried out far
more effectually with the rifle than with the sword.
At the same time I do not go so far as the author in thinking that
the sword should be done away with altogether. It is desirable that
Cavalry soldiers, equally with their comrades in the Infantry, should
have a steel weapon of some kind for use in the assault by night, in
a mist, or on other occasions when a fire-fight might be impossible
or inadvisable. Instead, however, of the present sword, the Cavalry
soldier would be more suitably equipped with a sword-bayonet for
fixing on the rifle when fighting on foot—something like that with
which our rifle regiments were formerly armed—but made with a
substantial handle, large enough to be firmly gripped, so that in the
event of its being required it could be used on horseback as well as
on foot. This sword-bayonet must, of course, be attached to the
man.
The two essentials of Cavalry in the present day are mobility and
the power to use the rifle with effect. Unless Cavalry is mobile it is
practically useless, as is proved over and over again in the pages of
this book. It is by saving their horses in every possible way, and by
skill in the use of the rifle, that Cavalry soldiers can hope to carry out
properly the many important functions required of them in advance
of, at a distance from, and in conjunction with, the main army.
Further, as the rifle is the weapon which will enable Cavalry to be of
the most real value in co-operating with the other arms on the actual
field of battle, Cavalry soldiers must not only be good shots, but they
must be taught how to fight as Infantry.
Owing to the enormous increase in recent years in the numbers
which now constitute a modern army, the strategical area in which
Cavalry will have to operate must inevitably be of considerable
extent. Owing also to the increased size of armies on the actual
battle-field, and to the extended formations necessitated by the
long-reaching effect of modern weapons, the strain upon the Cavalry
horses is infinitely greater than in former days, and unless men are
taught to take every possible care of their horses, Cavalry will be
unable to co-operate with the other arms when their services are
most urgently needed—perhaps at a critical period of the fight—or to
follow up and harass a retreating enemy.
It is impossible to over-estimate the value of Cavalry—trained as I
should wish to see them trained—under the existing conditions of
war. It is Cavalry that carries out the preliminary operations. It is
frequently due to the information gained by Cavalry that a
commander is enabled to make, or alter, his plan of action. It may
often happen that Cavalry may help to decide the issue of a battle.
It is by Cavalry that the fruits of a successful action are most
completely reaped. And it is to the Cavalry that the army will look to
save a retreat being turned into a rout or a disaster.
It is for these reasons, and because Cavalry is so frequently
required to act alone, and often in quite small parties, at a
considerable distance from the main force, that all ranks need the
most careful training. The men should be intelligent and trustworthy;
they require to have their wits about them even in a greater degree
than other soldiers, for a single Cavalry soldier may at times have
great responsibility thrown upon him. The officers should possess all
the qualities of good sportsmen. They should be fine riders, careful
horse-masters, have a keen eye for country, and be thoroughly well
educated.[8]
In some recently written books on Cavalry great stress is laid on
the necessity for inculcating the “true Cavalry spirit,” and on the idea
that “shock action alone gives decisive results.” I cannot call to mind
one single instance during the last half-century—ever since, indeed,
arms of precision have been brought into use—when shock action
alone has produced decisive results, and I doubt whether shock
action, or, in other words, the arme blanche alone, will ever again be
able to bring about such results against a highly trained enemy
armed with magazine rifles. I confess I cannot follow the train of
thought which insists upon Cavalry requiring a “spirit” for “shock
action,” and a spirit different, it is presumed, to the soldierly spirit
which it is essential for the other arms to possess if they are to
behave with resolution and courage on the field of battle.
It is this soldierly spirit, which can only be produced by discipline
and thorough training, that animates the Engineers to carry out the
extremely dangerous duty of blowing open the gates of a walled city.
It is this soldierly spirit that enables the Artillery to continue serving
their guns until the last man of the party is shot down. It is the same
soldierly spirit that enables the Infantry soldier to stand the strain of
lying out in the open, possibly for hours, under a burning sun or in
drenching rain, unable to move hand or foot without being shot at, a
strain to which the order to charge the enemy’s position comes as a
distinct and welcome relief. And it is the same soldierly spirit which
sustains the Cavalry soldier when employed on the important and
hazardous duties of scouting and reconnoitring, in the carrying out
of which he so often finds himself alone or with quite a small party.
The “charge” doubtless requires “dash,” but no special “Cavalry
spirit”; the excitement of galloping at full speed, in company with a
number of his comrades, is of itself sufficient to carry the Cavalry
soldier forward.
I certainly would not venture to speak so decidedly on a matter,
which has given rise to so much controversy of late years, did I not
feel that I am justified in expressing an opinion from the fact that I
have taken part in Cavalry combats, and have frequently had
occasion to scout and reconnoitre with two, three, or perhaps half a
dozen Cavalry soldiers, at a time when capture by the enemy meant
certain death. And I have no hesitation in saying that scouting and
reconnoitring try the nerves far more seriously than charging the
enemy.
In conclusion, I would ask you, my brother officers, in whatever
part of the Empire you may be serving, whether in the mounted or
dismounted branches, whether in the Cavalry, Yeomanry, Mounted
Infantry, or Colonial Mounted Corps, whether in the Artillery,
Engineers, or Infantry, to read this book with an unbiassed mind,
and not to be put off by the opening chapters, or to throw the book
on one side with some such remark as, “This is written by a civilian,
and what can he know of the subject?” Remember that most of our
finest military histories have been written by civilians. I would ask
you to study the facts for yourselves, weigh the arguments, follow
the deductions, note the conclusions, and then do one of two things.
Either traverse the facts, refute the deductions, and upset the
conclusions, or admit the facts, agree to the arguments,
acknowledge the deductions, and accept the conclusions.
WAR AND THE ARME BLANCHE
 CHAPTER I
THE ISSUE AND ITS IMPORTANCE

My central purpose in this volume is to submit to searching

criticism the armament of Cavalry. That armament now consists of a
rifle and a sword in all regiments, with the addition of a lance in the
case of Lancers. I shall argue that the steel weapons ought either to
be discarded or denied all influence on tactics, and a pure type of
mounted rifleman substituted for the existing hybrid type. I shall
contrast the characteristics and achievements of this pure type with
the characteristics and achievements of the hybrid type. I shall
argue that a right decision in the case of Cavalry carries with it
indirect consequences of the most far-reaching importance in regard
to the efficient training of all our other mounted troops, regular or
volunteer, home or colonial—troops which belong almost entirely to
the pure type, but on whose training the mere existence of a hybrid
type, with a theory of tactics derived from the steel, reacts
unfavourably.
I cannot do better than begin by quoting two passages from page
187 of the latest edition of “Cavalry Training” (1907). They constitute
an epitome of the case I wish to combat, and I challenge almost
every proposition, express or implied, contained in them. The first
runs as follows:
“From the foregoing it will be seen that thorough efficiency in the
use of the rifle and in dismounted tactics is an absolute necessity. At
the same time the essence of the Cavalry spirit lies in holding the
balance correctly between fire-power and shock action, and while
training troops for the former, they must not be allowed to lose
confidence in the latter.”
 Beginning with the first sentence, I challenge two assumptions
implied in it: first, that “thorough efficiency in the use of the rifle and
in dismounted tactics” (by hypothesis an absolute necessity) is
compatible with thorough efficiency in shock action, also, by
hypothesis, a necessity; second, that thorough efficiency with the
rifle is confined to what the compilers of the drill-book call
“dismounted tactics.” Passing to the second sentence of the same
quotation, I challenge the definition of the “essence of the Cavalry
spirit” there laid down. This definition is borrowed word for word
from a German book, originally written before the Boer War and
republished in 1902, when the war was ending, by an officer—the
distinguished General Bernhardi—who founded his conclusions not
on experience but on report, and addressed those conclusions to the
German Cavalry, whose tactics, training, and organization by his own
admission were, and seemingly are still, so dangerously antiquated
in the direction of excessive reliance on the steel as to present no
parallel to our own Cavalry. I challenge the Cavalry spirit so defined
because it is a hybrid spirit, impossible to instil and impossible to
translate into “balanced” action, even if the steel deserved, as it
does not deserve, to be “balanced” against the rifle. I challenge the
definition still further, because it is not even an honest definition.
Affecting to strike a just balance between the claims of the rifle and
the steel, it does not represent the facts of existing Cavalry theory
and practice in this country. Though borrowed from a German
authority, it is even less to be relied on as representing the facts of
German theory and practice, nor does it correspond to the general
tenor of the very handbook—"Cavalry Training"—in which it appears.
Those facts and that tenor find their really honest and truthful
expression in the second quotation, which runs as follows:
“It must be accepted as a principle that the rifle, effective as it is,
cannot replace the effect produced by the speed of the horse, the
magnetism of the charge, and the terror of cold steel.”
I challenge both the form and the essence of the statement: its
form because the words imply that “the speed of the horse and the
magnetism of the charge” are exclusively connected with the use of
the cold steel; its essence because the principle laid down is
fundamentally unsound.
I want to induce all thinking men, whether professional soldiers or
not, who take an interest in our military progress, to submit this
theory of the arme blanche once and for all to drastic investigation,
in the light of history—especially of South African history and
Manchurian history—in the light of physical principles, and in the
light of future Imperial needs. Above all, I want them to examine the
case made for the theory by Cavalry men themselves, and to judge
if that case rests upon an intelligent interpretation of new and
valuable experience, or, rather, upon a stubborn adherence to an old
tradition whose teaching they have indeed been forced to modify,
but have not had the good sense to abandon. The principles laid
down by professional men for the use of their own arm must of
course exact the greatest respect, but they are not sacrosanct, and
if they are found to rest on demonstrably false premisses they
deserve to be discarded.
Of all military questions this question of the arme blanche and the
rifle is one around which general or outside criticism may most
appropriately centre. It is not merely a Cavalry question; it cannot be
disposed of by reference to the British regular Cavalry as it exists to-
day. The training of all mounted troops, regular or volunteer, home
or colonial, however armed and trained, depends on clear notions as
to the relative value of the two classes of weapon. As an example of
what I mean, I suggest that it is shallow and unscientific to present
the Yeomanry with the “Cavalry Training” handbook as a whole, and
to inform them in a sort of postscript of three perfunctory pages that
they should be “so trained as to be capable of performing all the
duties allotted to Cavalry, except those connected with shock action.”
According to the interpretation of the words “duties connected with
shock action,” the injunction might mean anything or nothing. No
clear interpretation of the words could be derived from the
handbook itself. The Yeoman might turn for light to the Mounted
Infantry Regulations, and ask if, in its opening words, he was “an
Infantry soldier ...” governed “in his tactical employment by the
principles of Infantry training,” and, if not, in exactly what sense and
for what reasons he was supposed to differ from the Mounted
Infantryman; but he would ask in vain. In the end, he often
concludes from the fact that he is “Cavalry,” that he is in peril for
lack of a sword, and appeals for the sword when he has barely
mastered the rudiments of the rifle. The Mounted Infantryman, who
has been first an Infantry soldier, nourished on “Infantry Training,”
may well wonder why that manual encouraged him not to fear
Cavalry, while directly he obtains a horse he is warned to fear the
steel.
These are examples of confusion of thought at home. What of
Greater Britain? A critical time has arrived in our Imperial history.
There is an universal sense of the necessity of closer union for
Imperial defence. An Imperial General Staff has been initiated which
is to “standardize” organization and training. One of its functions
ought to be to formulate some clear, rational principles for the
employment of mounted troops. We know we can get large numbers
of these troops. From first to last in the Boer War we obtained
upwards of 70,000 men outside Great Britain. We could obtain many
in another great war, and make far more valuable use of them; if
time and thought were to be given to their organization and training,
with a special view to service in an Imperial Army. Inspiration in the
first instance will naturally come from the home country. What are
we going to ask of these troops, who, be it remembered, are
designed to form an integral part of an Imperial Army, ready, without
the confusion, waste, and inefficiency due to an improvised system,
to take their place in the field for the performance of definite,
specific duties? We shall hardly, it is to be presumed, recommend
shock action with the steel weapon to men who have not even the
sentimental tradition of shock action, much less any practical belief
in its efficacy. In what light, then, is shock action to be presented to
them? What is to be their rôle? Are they, like the Yeomanry, to be
informed that they are unfit to perform an undefined range of duties
for which shock action alone is a qualification, or are they to be held
competent to act as “Cavalry,” while the Yeomanry cannot claim that
privilege? Again, are they, like the Mounted Infantry, to regard
themselves on the one hand as “Infantry soldiers” mounted upon
horses, and, on the other, as competent to perform regularly the
duties of “Divisional Cavalry”? Or are they to be called Mounted
Riflemen, a name officially unknown in England? And, if so, in what
precise and positive way do Mounted Riflemen differ from Yeomanry,
Mounted Infantry, and Cavalry? These questions must be answered,
and they must be answered to the satisfaction of practical men
whose ideas of war have been moulded by the South African War,
where shock action, as they know very well, fell into complete
disuse, where all classes of mounted troops, home and colonial,
performed according to their varying degrees of ability, the same
functions, and where the rifle was the only weapon which counted.
This question of weapons for horsemen must be fairly and
squarely faced. It is a national and Imperial question, upon which
every shade of opinion, volunteer or regular, should be consulted,
and a verdict formed on the evidence, historical and technical. Part
only of the rich and varied experience gained upon this question in
South Africa was gained by Cavalrymen. Gunners, Sappers, and
Infantrymen, to say nothing of volunteer officers of every
description, led mounted troops with distinction. The most brilliant
Boer leading came from lawyers and farmers. The point is largely
one for common sense, applied to known and recent facts, and
everybody who takes any interest in military matters, whether he
bears arms or not, can and ought to form an intelligent judgment on
it.
But at present the situation is far from satisfactory, and, unless the
controversy can be brought to a head in time, seems likely to grow
more and more unsatisfactory. General public interest in the details
of the South African War languished even before it was ended. After
the war was over the tendency was to banish a tedious and
unpleasant subject from memory. That, probably, is only a phase,
yet a phase which may be dangerously overprolonged. The citizen
army which fought in South Africa side by side with the regular
forces has disappeared. A great number of its individual members
still bear arms as volunteers, but most of the organizations raised for
war purposes have perished as such, and with them many of the
sound, young traditions which were derived from war experience. A
new generation is slowly coming into being, permeated, indeed, by
growing enthusiasm for military service, but not particularly
interested in the war, and taught on the highest authority to regard
it as abnormal. In the regular forces a somewhat similar tendency
has been inevitable; the causes which led to a general concentration
of thought on mounted problems have disappeared. The war once
over, the army naturally fell back into its normal organization. Men
temporarily called to become leaders of horse from branches outside
the Cavalry and regular Mounted Infantry returned to their former
vocations and became reabsorbed in their old interests.
A great current of vital and original thought was irrevocably
diverted. The ideas, no doubt, have lived on and thrived sporadically.
At this moment there is probably much opinion in the army at large
which is unfavourable to the official Cavalry view of the arme
blanche, but the opposition is neither authoritative nor effectively
articulate. In the natural course of things the regular Cavalry—a
force centuries old and vested with immemorial traditions, the
premier mounted force of the Empire—has reasserted its sway over
theory and practice. Shock action, consigned to complete oblivion in
South Africa and to equally complete oblivion in Manchuria, still
holds the first place in the training of the Cavalry soldier. The
reaction has been gradual but sure. In 1903, a year after our war,
the lance, by official order, was relegated to the realm of “ceremony”
and “recreation,” and the sword was expressly subordinated to the
firearm, which became the soldier’s “principal weapon.” Then the
sword regained that place, and finally the lance returned to use as a
combatant weapon in conjunction with the sword. It is true that the
rifle has been substituted for the carbine, and that “thorough
efficiency in the use of the rifle” is enjoined as an “absolute
necessity”; but, as I have pointed out, the spirit of the regulations
suggests primary reliance on the steel as the main source of
enterprise and dash. I lay stress on the spirit, for in the endeavour
to make the best of both worlds, and to picture a perfect hybrid
type, capable of doing all that first-class mounted riflemen can do,
and all that first-class shock soldiers can do, the letter of the
instructions for the employment of Cavalry in the field is often
inexcusably evasive and ambiguous.
But if there were any doubt about the essential meaning, the
published writings of Cavalry authorities like General Sir John
French, when combating the advocates of the rifle, would dispel that
doubt. At such times, the principle of balance is forgotten, and the
ineradicable belief in the supreme efficacy of the steel is laid bare.
Does this belief rest on a sound basis? I want to show that it does
not. It is a formidable task; how formidable, the mere mention of
the name of General French will show. Deservedly he commands
widespread respect and confidence, not only as the most
distinguished British Cavalry officer now living, but as a soldier of
high general ability. To a vast number of minds his verdict on any
military point would be decisive. In South Africa he was the
incarnation of the soldierly virtues. His name is bound up with some
of the best work done by the Cavalry during that war, so that any
critic of the arme blanche who founds his criticism on that war, finds
himself continually confronted by the seemingly unanswerable
argument that our ablest Cavalry officer believes in the arme
blanche, and our ablest Cavalry officer, himself endowed with long
war experience, must be right. I ask the reader to reserve his
judgment. No one who has not studied in a critical spirit this
question of weapons for horsemen can realize the incalculable
influence of purely sentimental conservatism upon even the ablest
Cavalry soldiers. The whole history of the subject has been one of
indifference to, or reaction from, war experience, with the result that
every great war from the middle of the nineteenth century to the
recent war in the Far East, with the solitary exception of the
American Civil War, has produced a confession of comparative failure
in the Cavalries employed, even from the Cavalry leaders
themselves. General French himself would, I believe, be the first to
admit that in South Africa he owed little or nothing to the arme
blanche, and everything to the rifle. His case is that that war was
abnormal. The arme blanche, indeed, is a religion in itself,
comparable only to the religion of sails and wood which, in the
affections of the old school of sailors—able sailors—long outlived the
introduction of ironclads. This kind of conservatism must be
analyzed, and, if need be, discounted, before we can arrive at the
truth.
The published opinions of Sir John French may fairly be taken to
represent the best, and in a sense the official, case for the steel
weapon. In 1909 a new edition was issued in this country of Von
Bernhardi’s “Cavalry in Future Wars,” the work from which the
compilers of “Cavalry Training” have taken their definition of the
hybrid “Cavalry spirit,” and much more beside. It is admirably
translated by Mr. Goldman, who wrote “With French in South Africa,”
after accompanying General French in the field during an important
part of the South African campaign, who founded the Cavalry
Magazine, and who may be regarded as the principal lay advocate of
the arme blanche. Bernhardi’s book is preceded by an introduction
from the pen of General French himself. This introduction takes the
form of an enthusiastic and absolutely unqualified eulogy of
everything contained in the German publication, whose author is
described as having, “with remarkable perspicacity and telling
conviction, dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
demanding a Cavalry soldier’s study and thought.”
Nor is the book only praised for its intrinsic merits. It is avowedly
put forward as a conclusive answer to the English critics of shock
manœuvre with the arme blanche—critics whom General French, in
the earlier part of his introduction, takes special pains to answer
with additional arguments of his own. Mr. Goldman, whose views
may be presumed to have received the approval of General French,
adds a preface, in which he pursues the same object. Here, then, we
have a volume which correctly represents in a compact and
convenient form the best professional opinion on this question. I
propose to refer to it incidentally, and at a later stage to submit it to
closer analysis; but I urge my readers to read the book for
themselves, only taking care to remember who Bernhardi was, when
he wrote, why he wrote, and for whom he wrote. I venture to think
that they will pronounce the representation of his volume as the last
word of wisdom for British Cavalrymen, and as the supreme
vindication of the arme blanche, an almost incredible phenomenon
in a strange controversy. They will find it, indeed, profoundly
suggestive and interesting, but unconsciously destructive of the very
doctrines which its English sponsors believe it to uphold. A more
genuine representation of Continental thought may be found in a
book entitled “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War,” by the Austrian
authority, Count Wrangel, to which I shall also refer.
In submitting theory to the test of facts, I propose to concentrate
attention on the modern evidence, and by “modern” I mean
evidence since the introduction of the smokeless long-range
magazine rifle. Of the two great wars since that era, those in South
Africa and Manchuria, I shall deal principally with the former. For
Englishmen, bent on discovering from their own national experience
the best weapons and tactics for mounted men of their own race, as
distinguished from foreign races, the South African facts are the only
modern facts strictly relevant to the inquiry. Aside from savage
warfare, and disregarding the first Boer War as too brief and
inconclusive to afford reliable evidence, we have to go back in our
search for earlier experience as far as the Crimean War, when the
firearm was a plaything as compared with the modern rifle. In the
realm of foreign experience, there has been a great deal of
controversy, much of it painfully sterile, on Cavalry work in the
Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Franco-German War of 1870, and
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Here, too, the firearm, though
considerably improved, was primitive compared with the Mauser or
the Lee-Enfield rifles. Nor, in spite of the illuminating examples
furnished by the American Civil War, had anything approaching the
type we now know as mounted riflemen been initiated by the
Continental soldiers. There was no means of testing the value of this
type, because it simply did not exist. Cavalry training and
manœuvres were still those of the Napoleonic era. The firearm
carried by the Cavalry was inferior even to that carried by the
Infantry, and scarcely an attempt was made to inculcate any
effectual use of it. Hence the comparative impotence of the
Cavalries.
The American Civil War of 1862–65, for Englishmen especially,
stands in a class by itself.[9] The men engaged in it were men of
Anglo-Saxon race, untrammelled by prejudices and traditions,
working out mounted problems by the light of common sense. The
firearm, poor weapon as it was, judged by our modern standard,
became the most valuable part of Cavalry equipment, and the most
fruitful source of dash and enterprise. Sheridan’s Cavalry were said
by Stuart, who was the best possible judge, to have fought better on
foot than the Federal Infantry. The great Cavalry raids in which the
war abounded, and of which the European wars which followed were
conspicuously barren, depended absolutely for their success, as all
such enterprises always must depend, on aggressive fire-efficiency.
Fire from the saddle was constantly used by Morgan, Forrest, and
other leaders. Infantry on both sides learnt to despise the sword,
though for inter-Cavalry combats that weapon, owing to the
imperfections of the firearm, remained a trusted auxiliary. Our
modern rifle would have certainly produced the pure type of
mounted rifleman which South Africa produced in both sets of
belligerents. The example had no effect upon Continental tactics, a
blind imitation of which has always been the besetting sin of our
own Cavalry school. Thirty-four years later, when the rifle had
enormously increased in power, we pitted ourselves against the born
shots and hunters of the veld with as little regard for the Cavalry
lessons of the American Civil War as though it had never been
fought.
Lastly, we have the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. That, as I
shall show, seals the doom of the arme blanche, and crowns the
case for the mounted rifleman. But it is a foreign war, and not,
therefore, so peculiarly applicable to ourselves as the Boer War,
whose lessons, nevertheless, it drives home. I propose to discuss it
at a later stage, and will only remark now that even the most ardent
advocates of the sword and lance have to admit that those weapons
played no part in the war, while, on the other hand, neither Cavalry,
not even the Japanese, approached the standard of fire-action
attained in the course of our own war.
One more general word about the history of the subject prior to
1899. A vast amount has been written upon it. There is much
common ground. Nobody denies that the relative important of shock
manœuvre with the steel weapon has steadily declined for a century.
It is generally admitted that the examples of successful shock action
in the European wars of the sixties and seventies were relatively
very few, and the performances of the Cavalries relatively poor to
those of other arms. While persisting in the argument that, had
certain conditions been fulfilled, Cavalry work, including shock work,
might have been more distinguished, advocates of the steel now
generally admit that even then the neglect of fire-action was the
main cause of ill-success. Upon this point no one could speak more
strongly than Bernhardi. But if there is much common agreement,
we must make our minds absolutely clear as to the nature of this
agreement. A great part of the controversy has raged round a
comparatively narrow point: whether masses of Cavalry can any
longer charge Infantry, and, if so, what are the limitations to the
success of such a charge. It is agreed that since 1870 limitations are
many and severe; but the settlement of that point leaves the major
issue untouched. The opportunities of the steel weapon may have
diminished, but to the Cavalry school this weapon remains the
weapon par excellence for the Cavalry, the indispensably decisive
factor in inter-Cavalry combats, which are to take the form of shock
duels, and the main inspiration for all the wide and important range
of duties belonging to the arm. No historian has studied more
profoundly, nor written more brilliantly upon, the development of
mounted tactics than the late Colonel Henderson. He was deeply
versed in the Civil War, and preached to deaf ears the great
possibilities even of an imperfect firearm in the hands of Cavalry. In
a masterly analysis of the mounted actions of the European wars
from 1866 to 1878,[10] he pointed out the comparative failure of
shock, and the magnificent opportunities which would have been
open to any body of mounted troops as skilled in fire-tactics as
Stuart’s Confederates. He even goes so far as to say that “a few
commandos of Boers could have reduced to utter impotence the
whole French Cavalry.” Yet, at the end of his inquiry, just when he
seems to have proved to an impartial reader that the day of the
steel weapon is over and the undivided reign of the rifle begun, he
falters. There is a strange logical hiatus. Then the old dogma proves
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