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Solution Manual for Essentials of
Psychology Concepts and Applications,
4th Edition

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Written in a friendly style, this brief introductory book makes the study of
psychology accessible and engaging to readers with little background in the
subject. Nevid's comprehensive learning system-derived from research on
memory, learning, and textbook pedagogy-is featured throughout. This
learning model incorporates what the author calls the "Four E's of Effective
Learning"-Engaging Interest, Encoding Information, Elaborating Meaning,
and Evaluating Progress. ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGY: CONCEPTS
AND APPLICATIONS, 4th Edition, provides a broad view of psychology as
well as applications of the knowledge gained from contemporary research
to the problems and challenges we face in today's world.

About the Author

Dr. Jeffrey Nevid is Professor of Psychology at St. John's University in New York. A
Fellow of the American Psychological Association, Society for the Teaching of
Psychology (Division 2), he has conducted research in many areas, including health
psychology, clinical and community psychology, personality assessment, social
psychology, gender and human sexuality, adolescent development and the teaching of
psychology. He also is actively involved in conducting research on pedagogical
advances to help students succeed in their courses. In addition to over 200 research
publications and professional presentations, Dr. Nevid is the author or co-author of more
than a dozen textbooks and other books in psychology and related fields, many in
multiple editions. His research publications have appeared in such journals as HEALTH
PSYCHOLOGY, JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT, JOURNAL OF
CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY, JOURNAL OF COMMUNITY
PSYCHOLOGY, JOURNAL OF YOUTH AND ADOLESCENCE, BEHAVIOR THERAPY,
PSYCHOLOGY AND MARKETING, PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, TEACHING OF
PSYCHOLOGY, SEX ROLES and JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. Dr. Nevid
also served on the editorial boards of the journals HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY, TEACHING
OF PSYCHOLOGY and PSYCHOLOGY AND MARKETING and as associate editor of
the JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY. He received his
doctorate from the State University of New York at Albany and completed a postdoctoral
fellowship in evaluation research at Northwestern University.
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
schism under another point of view, than that in which I have been
taught to contemplate it by St. Paul in his Epistles to the Corinthians.
Let me add a few words on a diversity of doctrine closely
connected with this: the opinions of Doctors Mant and D'Oyly as
opposed to those of the (so called) Evangelical clergy. "The Church
of England" (says Wall)[152] "does not require assent and consent"
to either opinion "in order to lay communion." But I will suppose the
person a minister: but minister of a Church which has expressly
disclaimed all pretence to infallibility; a Church which in the
construction of its Liturgy and Articles is known to have worded
certain passages for the purpose of rendering them subscribable by
both A and Z—that is, the opposite parties as to the points in
controversy. I suppose this person's convictions those of Z, and that
out of five passages there are three, the more natural and obvious
sense of which is in his favour; and two of which, though not
absolutely precluding a different sense, yet the more probable
interpretation is in favour of A, that is, of those who do not consider
the Baptism of an Infant as prospective, but hold it to be an opus
operans et in præsenti. Then I say, that if such a person regards
these two sentences or single passages as obliging or warranting
him to abandon the flock entrusted to his charge, and either to join
such, as are the avowed Enemies of the Church on the double
ground of its particular Constitution and of its being an
Establishment, or to set up a separate Church for himself—I cannot
avoid the conclusion, that either his conscience is morbidly sensitive
in one speck to the exhaustion of the sensibility in a far larger
portion; or that he must have discovered some mode, beyond the
reach of my conjectural powers, of interpreting the Scriptures
enumerated in the following excerpt from the popular tract before
cited, in which the writer expresses an opinion, to which I assent
with my whole heart: namely,
"That all Christians in the world that hold the same fundamentals
ought to make one Church, though differing in lesser opinions; and
that the sin, the mischief, and danger to the souls of men, that
divide into those many sects and parties among us, does (for the
most of them) consist not so much in the opinions themselves, as in
their dividing and separating for them. And in support of this tenet, I
will refer you to some plain places of Scripture, which if you please
now to peruse, I will be silent the while. See what our Saviour
himself says, John x. 16. John xvii. 11. And what the primitive
Christians practised, Acts ii. 46, and iv. 32. And what St. Paul says,
1 Cor. i. 10 11 12, and 2 3 4; also the whole 12th chapter: Eph. ii.
18, &c. to the end. Where the Jewish and Gentile Christians are
showed to be one body, one household, one temple fitly framed
together: and yet these were of different opinions in several matters.
—Likewise chap. iii. 6, iv. 1-13. Phil. ii. 1 2, where he uses the most
solemn adjurations to this purpose. But I would more especially
recommend to you the reading of Gal. v. 20 21. Phil. iii. 15, 16, the
14th chapter to the Romans, and part of the 15th, to verse 7, and
also Rom. xv. 17.
"Are not these passages plain, full, and earnest? Do you find any
of the controverted points to be determined by Scripture in words
nigh so plain or pathetic?"
Marginal Note written (in 1816) by the Author in his own copy of Wall's work.

This and the two following pages are excellent. If I addressed the ministers
recently seceded, I would first prove from Scripture and Reason the justness of
their doctrines concerning Baptism and Conversion. 2. I would show, that even in
respect of the Prayer-book, Homilies, &c. of the Church of England, taken as a
whole, their opponents were comparatively as ill off as themselves, if not worse. 3.
That the few mistakes or inconvenient phrases of the Baptismal Service did not
impose on the conscience the necessity of resigning the pastoral office. 4. That
even if they did, this would by no means justify schism from Lay-membership: or
else there could be no schism except from an immaculate and infallible Church.
Now, as our Articles have declared that no Church is or ever was such, it would
follow that there is no such sin as that of Schism—that is, that St. Paul wrote
falsely or idly. 5. That the escape through the channel of Dissent is from the
frying-pan to the fire—or, to use a less worn and vulgar simile, the escape of a
leech from a glass-jar of water into the naked and open air. But never, never,
would I in one breath allow my Church to be fallible, and in the next contend for
her absolute freedom from all error—never confine inspiration and perfect truth to
the Scriptures, and then scold for the perfect truth of each and every word in the
Prayer-book. Enough for me, if in my heart of hearts, free from all fear of man and
all lust of preferment, I believe (as I do) the Church of England to be the most
Apostolic Church; that its doctrines and ceremonies contain nothing dangerous to
Righteousness or Salvation; and that the imperfections in its Liturgy are spots
indeed, but spots on the sun, which impede neither its light nor its heat, so as to
prevent the good seed from growing in a good soil and producing fruits of
Redemption.[154]
* * * The author had written and intended to insert a similar exposition on the
Eucharist. But as the leading view has been given in the Comment on Redemption,
its length induces him to defer it, together with the Articles on Faith and the
philosophy of Prayer, to a small supplementary volume.[155]

[147] By certain Biblical philologists of the Teutonic school (men

distinguished by learning, but still more characteristically by
hardihood in conjecture, and who suppose the Gospels to have
undergone several successive revisions and enlargements by, or
under the authority of, the sacred historians) these words are
contended to have been, in the first delivery, the common
commencement of all the Gospels κατα σαρκα (that is, according
to the flesh), in distinction from St. John's or the Gospel κατα
πνευμα (that is, according to the Spirit).
[148] See Comment to Aphorism VIII., par. 3.—Ed.
[149] That every the least permissible form and ordinance,
which at different times it might be expedient for the Church to
enact, are pre-enacted in the New Testament; and that whatever
is not to be found there, ought to be allowed no where—this has
been asserted. But that it has been proved, or that the tenet is
not to be placed among the revulsionary results of the Scripture-
slighting Will-worship of the Romish Church; it will be more
sincere to say, I disbelieve, than that I doubt. It was chiefly, if
not exclusively, in reference to the extravagances built on this
tenet, that the great Selden ventured to declare, that the words,
Scrutamini Scripturas, had set the world in an uproar.
Extremes appear to generate each other; but if we look steadily,
there will most often be found some common error, that
produces both as its positive and negative poles. Thus
superstitions go by pairs, like the two Hungarian sisters, always
quarrelling and inveterately averse, but yet joined at the trunk.
[150] More than this I do not consider as necessary for the
argument. And as to Robinson's assertions in his History of
Baptism, that infant Baptism did not commence till the time of
Cyprian, who condemning it as a general practice, allowed it in
particular cases by a dispensation of charity; and that it did not
actually become the ordinary rule of the Church, till Augustine in
the fever of his Anti-Pelagian dispute had introduced the
Calvinistic interpretation of Original Sin, and the dire state of
Infants dying unbaptized—I am so far from acceding to them,
that I reject the whole statement as rash, and not only
unwarranted by the authorities he cites, but unanswerably
confuted by Baxter, Wall, and many other learned Pædo-baptists
before and since the publication of his work. I confine myself to
the assertion—not that Infant Baptism was not; but—that there
exist no sufficient proofs that it was the practice of the Apostolic
age.
[151] Let me be permitted to repeat and apply the note in a
former page. Superstition may be defined as superstantium
(cujusmodi sunt ceremoniæ et signa externa quæ, nisi in
significando nihili sunt et pæne nihil) substantiatio.
[152] Conference between Two Men that had Doubts about
Infant Baptism. By W. Wall, Author of the History of Infant
Baptism, and Vicar of Shoreham in Kent. A very sensible little
tract, and written in an excellent spirit: but it failed, I confess, in
satisfying my mind as to the existence of any decisive proofs or
documents of Infant Baptism having been an Apostolic usage, or
specially intended in any part of the New Testament: though
deducible generally from many passages, and in perfect
accordance with the spirit of the whole.
A mighty wrestler in the cause of Spiritual Religion and Gospel
morality, in whom more than in any other contemporary I seem
to see the spirit of Luther revived, expressed to me his doubts
whether we have a right to deny that an infant is capable of a
spiritual influence. To such a man I could not feel justified in
returning an answer ex tempore, or without having first
submitted my convictions to a fresh revisal. I owe him, however,
a deliberate answer; and take this opportunity of discharging the
debt.
The objection supposes and assumes the very point which is
denied, or at least disputed—namely, that Infant Baptism is
specially injoined in the Scriptures. If an express passage to this
purport had existed in the New Testament—the other passages,
which evidently imply a spiritual operation under the condition of
a preceding spiritual act on the part of the person baptized,
remaining as now—then indeed, as the only way of removing the
apparent contradiction, it might be allowable to call on the Anti-
pædobaptist to prove the negative—namely, that an infant a
week old is not a subject capable or susceptible of spiritual
agency. And, vice versa, should it be made known to us, that
infants are not without reflection and self-consciousness—then,
doubtless, we should be entitled to infer that they were capable
of a spiritual operation, and consequently of that which is
signified in the baptismal rite administered to adults. But what
does this prove for those, who (as D. D. Mant and D'Oyly) not
only cannot show, but who do not themselves profess to believe,
the self-consciousness of a new-born babe, but who rest the
defence of Infant Baptism on the assertion, that God was pleased
to affix the performance of this rite to his offer of Salvation, as
the indispensable, though arbitrary, condition of the infant's
salvability?—As Kings in former ages, when they conferred lands
in perpetuity, would sometimes, as the condition of the tenure,
exact from the beneficiary a hawk, or some trifling ceremony, as
the putting on or off of their sandals, or whatever else royal
caprice or the whim of the moment might suggest. But you,
honoured Irving, are as little disposed, as myself, to favour such
doctrine!
Friend, pure of heart and fervent! we have
learnt
A different lore! We may not thus profane
The Idea and Name of Him whose absolute
Will
Is Reason—Truth Supreme!—Essential Order!
[153]

[153] For a further opinion upon Edward Irving see note at pp.
153-4 of the 1839 edition of Coleridge's 'Church and State.'—Ed.
[154] Here the editor of the 1843 edition was able to give two
pages of additional matter by the author, tending, as Coleridge
said, to the "clearing up" of "the chapter on Baptism," and the
proving "the substantial accordance of my scheme with that of
our Church." The addition is from Coleridge's MS. Note-books,
and bears date May 8, 1828.—Ed.
[155] This note appeared in the early editions only. The
"supplementary volume" was never published, though the "Essay
on Faith," at p. 425, v. 4, of Coleridge's "Remains" (1838), and
"Notes on the Book of Common Prayer" (p. 5, v. 3, the same),
may be the parts here mentioned as written to appear in it. We
republish these two fragments at the end of the present volume,
pp. 341 and 350.—Ed.
 CONCLUSION.
I am not so ignorant of the temper and tendency of the age in
which I live, as either to be unprepared for the sort of remarks
which the literal interpretation of the Evangelist will call forth, or to
attempt an answer to them. Visionary ravings, obsolete whimsies,
transcendental trash, and the like, I leave to pass at the price
current among those who are willing to receive abusive phrases as
substitutes for argument. Should any suborner of anonymous
criticism have engaged some literary bravo or buffoon beforehand,
to vilify this work, as in former instances, I would give a friendly hint
to the operative critic that he may compile an excellent article for the
occasion, and with very little trouble, out of Warburton's tract on
Grace and the Spirit, and the Preface to the same. There is,
however, one objection which will so often be heard from men,
whose talents and reputed moderation must give a weight to their
words, that I owe it both to my own character and to the interests of
my readers, not to leave it unnoticed. The charge will probably be
worded in this way:—There is nothing new in all this! (as if novelty
were any merit in questions of Revealed Religion!) It is Mysticism, all
taken out of William Law, after he had lost his senses, poor man! in
brooding over the visions of a delirious German cobbler, Jacob
Behmen.
Of poor Jacob Behmen I have delivered my sentiments at large in
another work. Those who have condescended to look into his
writings must know, that his characteristic errors are; first, the
mistaking the accidents and peculiarities of his own over-wrought
mind for realities and modes of thinking common to all minds: and
secondly, the confusion of nature, that is, the active powers
communicated to matter, with God the Creator. And if the same
persons have done more than merely looked into the present
volume, they must have seen, that to eradicate, and, if possible, to
preclude both the one and the other stands prominent among its
avowed objects.[156]
Of William Law's works I am acquainted with the "Serious Call;"
and besides this I remember to have read a small tract on Prayer, if I
mistake not, as I easily may, it being at least six-and-twenty
years[157] since I saw it. He may in this or in other tracts have
quoted the same passages from the fourth Gospel as I have done.
But surely this affords no presumption that my conclusions are the
same with his; still less, that they are drawn from the same
premisses: and least of all, that they were adopted from his writings.
Whether Law has used the phrase, assimilation by faith, I know not;
but I know that I should expose myself to a just charge of an idle
parade of my reading, if I recapitulated the tenth part of the
authors, ancient, and modern, Romish and Reformed, from Law to
Clemens Alexandrinus and Irenæus, in whose works the same
phrase occurs in the same sense. And after all, on such a subject
how worse than childish is the whole dispute!
Is the fourth Gospel authentic? And is the interpretation I have
given, true or false? These are the only questions which a wise man
would put, or a Christian be anxious to answer. I not only believe it
to be the true sense of the texts; but I assert that it is the only true,
rational, and even tolerable sense. And this position alone I conceive
myself interested in defending. I have studied with an open and
fearless spirit the attempts of sundry learned critics of the Continent,
to invalidate the authenticity of this Gospel, before and since
Eichhorn's Vindication. The result has been a clearer assurance and
(as far as this was possible) a yet deeper conviction of the
genuineness of all the writings, which the Church has attributed to
this Apostle. That those, who have formed an opposite conclusion,
should object to the use of expressions which they had ranked
among the most obvious marks of spuriousness, follows as a matter
of course. But that men, who with a clear and cloudless assent
receive the sixth chapter of this Gospel as a faithful, nay, inspired
record of an actual discourse, should take offence at the repetition
of words which the Redeemer himself, in the perfect foreknowledge
that they would confirm the disbelieving, alienate the unsteadfast,
and transcend the present capacity even of his own Elect, had
chosen as the most appropriate; and which, after the most decisive
proofs, that they were misinterpreted by the greater number of his
hearers, and not understood by any, he nevertheless repeated with
stronger emphasis and without comment as the only appropriate
symbols of the great truth he was declaring, and to realize which
εγενετο σαρξ;[158] —that in their own discourses these men should
hang back from all express reference to these words, as if they were
afraid or ashamed of them, though the earliest recorded ceremonies
and liturgical forms of the primitive Church are absolutely
inexplicable, except in connexion with this discourse, and with the
mysterious and spiritual, not allegorical and merely ethical, import of
the same; and though this import is solemnly and in the most
unequivocal terms asserted and taught by their own Church, even in
her Catechism, or compendium of doctrines necessary for all her
members;—this I may, perhaps, understand; but this I am not able
to vindicate or excuse.
There is, however, one opprobrious phrase which it may be
profitable for my younger readers that I should explain, namely,
Mysticism. And for this purpose I will quote a sentence or two from a
Dialogue which, had my prescribed limits permitted, I should have
attached to the present work; but which with an Essay on the
Church, as instituted by Christ, and as an establishment of the State,
and a series of letters on the right and the superstitious use and
estimation of the Bible, will appear in a small volume by themselves,
should the reception given to the present volume encourage or
permit the publication.[159]

MYSTICS AND MYSTICISM.

 Antinöus.—"What do you call Mysticism? And do you use the word
in a good or a bad sense?"
Nöus.—"In the latter only; as far, at least, as we are now
concerned with it. When a man refers to inward feelings and
experiences, of which mankind at large are not conscious, as
evidences of the truth of any opinion—such a man I call a Mystic:
and the grounding of any theory or belief on accidents and
anomalies of individual sensations or fancies, and the use of peculiar
terms invented, or perverted from their ordinary significations, for
the purpose of expressing these idiosyncrasies and pretended facts
of interior consciousness, I name Mysticism. Where the error
consists simply in the Mystic's attaching to these anomalies of his
individual temperament the character of reality, and in receiving
them as permanent truths, having a subsistence in the Divine Mind,
though revealed to himself alone; but entertains this persuasion
without demanding or expecting the same faith in his neighbours—I
should regard it as a species of enthusiasm, always indeed to be
deprecated, but yet capable of co-existing with many excellent
qualities both of head and heart. But when the Mystic by ambition or
still meaner passions, or (as sometimes is the case) by an uneasy
and self-doubting state of mind which seeks confirmation in outward
sympathy, is led to impose his faith, as a duty, on mankind
generally: and when with such views he asserts that the same
experiences would be vouchsafed, the same truths revealed, to
every man but for his secret wickedness and unholy will—such a
Mystic is a Fanatic, and in certain states of the public mind a
dangerous member of society. And most so in those ages and
countries in which Fanatics of elder standing are allowed to
persecute the fresh competitor. For under these predicaments,
Mysticism, though originating in the singularities of an individual
nature, and therefore essentially anomalous, is nevertheless highly
contagious. It is apt to collect a swarm and cluster circum fana,
around the new fane: and therefore merits the name of Fanaticism,
or as the Germans say, Schwärmerey, that is, swarm-making."
 We will return to the harmless species—the enthusiastic Mystics;—
a species that may again be subdivided into two ranks. And it will
not be other than germane to the subject, if I endeavour to describe
them in a sort of allegory, or parable. Let us imagine a poor pilgrim
benighted in a wilderness or desert, and pursuing his way in the
starless dark with a lantern in his hand. Chance or his happy genius
leads him to an Oasis or natural Garden, such as in the creations of
my youthful fancy I supposed Enos[160] the Child of Cain to have
found. And here, hungry and thirsty, the way-wearied man rests at a
fountain; and the taper of his lantern throws its light on an over-
shadowing tree, a boss of snow-white blossoms, through which the
green and growing fruits peeped, and the ripe golden fruitage
glowed. Deep, vivid, and faithful are the impressions, which the
lovely Imagery comprised within the scanty circle of light, makes and
leaves on his memory! But scarcely has he eaten of the fruits and
drunk of the fountain, ere scared by the roar and howl from the
desart he hurries forward: and as he passes with hasty steps
through grove and glade, shadows and imperfect beholdings and
vivid fragments of things distinctly seen blend with the past and
present shapings of his brain. Fancy modifies sight. His dreams
transfer their forms to real objects; and these lend a substance and
an outness to his dreams. Apparitions greet him; and when at a
distance from this enchanted land, and on a different track, the
dawn of day discloses to him a caravan, a troop of his fellow-men,
his memory, which is itself half fancy, is interpolated afresh by every
attempt to recall, connect, and piece out his recollections. His
narration is received as a madman's tale. He shrinks from the rude
laugh and contemptuous sneer, and retires into himself. Yet the
craving for sympathy, strong in proportion to the intensity of his
convictions, impels him to unbosom himself to abstract auditors; and
the poor Quietist becomes a Penman, and, all too poorly stocked for
the writer's trade, he borrows his phrases and figures from the only
writings to which he has had access, the sacred books of his religion.
And thus I shadow out the enthusiast Mystic of the first sort; at the
head of which stands the illuminated Teutonic theosopher and
shoemaker, honest Jacob Behmen, born near Gorlitz, in Upper
Lusatia, in the 17th of our Elizabeth's reign, and who died in the
22nd of her successor's.
To delineate a Mystic of the second and higher order, we need
only endow our pilgrim with equal gifts of nature, but these
developed and displayed by all the aids and arts of education and
favourable fortune. He is on his way to the Mecca of his ancestral
and national faith, with a well-guarded and numerous procession of
merchants and fellow-pilgrims, on the established track. At the close
of day the caravan has halted: the full moon rises on the desert: and
he strays forth alone, out of sight but to no unsafe distance; and
chance leads him too, to the same oasis or Islet of Verdure on the
Sea of Sand. He wanders at leisure in its maze of beauty and
sweetness, and thrids his way through the odorous and flowering
thickets into open spots of greenery, and discovers statues and
memorial characters, grottos, and refreshing caves. But the
moonshine, the imaginative poesy of nature, spreads its soft
shadowy charm over all, conceals distances, and magnifies heights,
and modifies relations: and fills up vacuities with its own whiteness,
counterfeiting substance; and where the dense shadows lie, makes
solidity imitate hollowness; and gives to all objects a tender visionary
hue and softening. Interpret the moonlight and the shadows as the
peculiar genius and sensibility of the individual's own spirit: and here
you have the other sort: a Mystic, an Enthusiast of a nobler breed—a
Fenelon. But the residentiary, or the frequent visitor of the favoured
spot, who has scanned its beauties by steady day-light, and
mastered its true proportions and lineaments, he will discover that
both pilgrims have indeed been there. He will know, that the
delightful dream, which the latter tells, is a dream of truth; and that
even in the bewildered tale of the former there is truth mingled with
the dream.
 But the Source, the Spring-head, of the Charges which I
anticipate, lies deep. Materialism, conscious and avowed Materialism,
is in ill repute: and a confessed Materialist therefore a rare character.
But if the faith be ascertained by the fruits: if the predominant,
though most often unsuspected, persuasion is to be learnt from the
influences, under which the thoughts and affections of the man
move and take their direction; I must reverse the position. Only not
all are Materialists. Except a few individuals, and those for the most
part of a single sect: every one, who calls himself a Christian, holds
himself to have a soul as well as a body. He distinguishes mind from
matter, the subject of his consciousness from the objects of the
same. The former is his mind: and he says, it is immaterial. But
though subject and substance are words of kindred roots, nay, little
less than equivalent terms, yet nevertheless it is exclusively to
sensible objects, to bodies, to modifications of matter, that he
habitually attaches the attributes of reality, of substance. Real and
tangible, substantial and material, are synonyms for him. He never
indeed asks himself, what he means by Mind? But if he did, and
tasked himself to return an honest answer—as to what, at least, he
had hitherto meant by it—he would find, that he had described it by
negatives, as the opposite of bodies, for example, as a somewhat
opposed to solidity, to visibility, and the like, as if you could abstract
the capacity of a vessel, and conceive of it as a somewhat by itself,
and then give to the emptiness the properties of containing, holding,
being entered, and so forth. In short, though the proposition would
perhaps be angrily denied in words, yet in fact he thinks of his mind,
as a property, or accident of a something else, that he calls a soul or
spirit: though the very same difficulties must recur, the moment he
should attempt to establish the difference. For either this soul or
spirit is nothing but a thinner body, a finer mass of matter: or the
attribute of self-subsistency vanishes from the soul on the same
grounds, on which it is refused to the mind.
I am persuaded, however, that the dogmatism of the Corpuscular
School, though it still exerts an influence on men's notions and
phrases, has received a mortal blow from the increasingly dynamic
spirit of the physical sciences now highest in public estimation. And
it may safely be predicted that the results will extend beyond the
intention of those, who are gradually effecting this revolution. It is
not chemistry alone that will be indebted to the genius of Davy,
Oersted, and their compeers: and not as the founder of physiology
and philosophic anatomy alone, will mankind love and revere the
name of John Hunter. These men have not only taught, they have
compelled us to admit, that the immediate objects of our senses, or
rather the grounds of the visibility and tangibility of all objects of
sense, bear the same relation and similar proportion to the
intelligible object—that is, to the object which we actually mean
when we say, "It is such or such a thing," or "I have seen this or
that,"—as the paper, ink, and differently combined straight and
curved lines of an edition of Homer bear to what we understand by
the words Iliad and Odyssey. Nay, nothing would be more easy than
so to construct the paper, ink, painted capitals, and the like, of a
printed disquisition on the eye, or the muscles and cellular texture
(the flesh) of the human body, as to bring together every one of the
sensible and ponderable stuffs or elements, that are sensuously
perceived in the eye itself, or in the flesh itself. Carbon and nitrogen,
oxygen and hydrogen, sulphur, phosphorus, and one or two metals
and metallic bases, constitute the whole. It cannot be these,
therefore, that we mean by an eye, by our body. But perhaps it may
be a particular combination of these? But here comes a question: In
this term do you or do you not include the principle, the operating
cause, of the combination? If not, then detach this eye from the
body. Look steadily at it—as it might lie on the marble slab of a
dissecting room. Say it were the eye of a murderer, a Bellingham: or
the eye of a murdered patriot, a Sidney!—Behold it, handle it, with
its various accompaniments or constituent parts, of tendon,
ligament, membrane, blood-vessel, gland, humours; its nerves of
sense, of sensation, and of motion. Alas! all these names like that of
the organ itself, are so many Anachronisms, figures of speech to
express that which has been: as when the Guide points with his
finger to a heap of stones, and tells the traveller, "That is Babylon, or
Persepolis."—Is this cold jelly the light of the body? Is this the
Micranthropos in the marvellous microcosm? Is this what you mean
when you well define the eye as the telescope and the mirror of the
soul, the seat and agent of an almost magical power?
Pursue the same inquisition with every other part of the body,
whether integral or simply ingredient; and let a Berzelius or a
Hatchett be your interpreter, and demonstrate to you what it is that
in each actually meets your senses. And when you have heard the
scanty catalogue, ask yourself if these are indeed the living flesh,
the blood of life? Or not far rather—I speak of what, as a man of
common sense, you really do, not what, as a philosopher, you ought
to believe—is it not, I say, far rather the distinct and individualized
agency that by the given combinations utters and bespeaks its
presence? Justly and with strictest propriety of language may I say,
speaks. It is to the coarseness of our senses, or rather to the defect
and limitation of our percipient faculty, that the visible object
appears the same even for a moment. The characters, which I am
now shaping on this paper, abide. Not only the forms remain the
same, but the particles of the colouring stuff are fixed, and, for an
indefinite period at least, remain the same. But the particles that
constitute the size, the visibility of an organic structure[162] are in
perpetual flux. They are to the combining and constitutive power as
the pulses of air to the voice of a discourser; or of one who sings a
roundelay. The same words may be repeated; but in each second of
time the articulated air hath passed away, and each act of
articulation appropriates and gives momentary form to a new and
other portion. As the column of blue smoke from a cottage chimney
in the breathless summer noon, or the steadfast-seeming cloud on
the edge-point of a hill in the driving air-current, which momently
condensed and recomposed is the common phantom of a thousand
successors;—such is the flesh, which our bodily eyes transmit to us;
which our palates taste; which our hands touch.
 But perhaps the material particles possess this combining power
by inherent reciprocal attractions, repulsions, and elective affinities;
and are themselves the joint artists of their own combinations? I will
not reply, though well I might, that this would be to solve one
problem by another, and merely to shift the mystery. It will be
sufficient to remind the thoughtful querist, that ever herein consists
the essential difference, the contra-distinction, of an organ from a
machine; that not only the characteristic shape is evolved from the
invisible central power, but the material mass itself is acquired by
assimilation. The germinal power of the plant transmutes the fixed
air and the elementary base of water into grass or leaves; and on
these the organific principle in the ox or the elephant exercises an
alchemy still more stupendous. As the unseen agency weaves its
magic eddies, the foliage becomes indifferently the bone and its
marrow, the pulpy brain, or the solid ivory. That what you see is
blood, is flesh, is itself the work, or shall I say, the translucence, of
the invisible Energy, which soon surrenders or abandons them to
inferior powers (for there is no pause nor chasm in the activities of
Nature), which repeat a similar metamorphosis according to their
kind;—these are not fancies, conjectures, or even hypotheses, but
facts; to deny which is impossible, not to reflect on which is
ignominious. And we need only reflect on them with a calm and
silent spirit to learn the utter emptiness and unmeaningness of the
vaunted Mechanico-corpuscular Philosophy, with both its twins,
Materialism on the one hand, and Idealism, rightlier named
Subjective Idolism, on the other: the one obtruding on us a World of
Spectres and Apparitions; the other a mazy Dream!
Let the Mechanic or Corpuscular Scheme, which in its
absoluteness and strict consistency was first introduced by Des
Cartes, be judged by the results. By its fruits shall it be known.
In order to submit the various phenomena of moving bodies to
geometrical construction, we are under the necessity of abstracting
from corporeal substance all its positive properties, and obliged to
consider bodies as differing from equal portions of space[163] only by
figure and mobility. And as a fiction of science, it would be difficult to
overvalue this invention. It possesses the same merits in relation to
Geometry that the atomic theory has in relation to algebraic
calculus. But in contempt of common sense, and in direct opposition
to the express declarations of the inspired historian (Genesis i.) and
to the tone and spirit of the Scriptures throughout, Des Cartes
propounded it as truth of fact: and instead of a World created and
filled with productive forces by the Almighty Fiat, left a lifeless
Machine whirled about by the dust of its own Grinding: as if Death
could come from the living Fountain of Life; Nothingness and
Phantom from the Plenitude of Reality! the Absoluteness of Creative
Will!
Holy! Holy! Holy! let me be deemed mad by all men, if such be thy
ordinance: but, O! from such madness save and preserve me, my
God!
When, however, after a short interval, the genius of Kepler,
expanded and organized in the soul of Newton, and there (if I may
hazard so bold an expression) refining itself into an almost celestial
clearness, had expelled the Cartesian vortices;[164] then the
necessity of an active power, of positive forces present in the
material universe, forced itself on the conviction. For as a Law
without a Law-giver is a mere abstraction; so a Law without an
Agent to realize it, a Constitution without an abiding Executive, is, in
fact, not a Law but an Idea. In the profound emblem of the great
tragic poet, it is the powerless Prometheus fixed on a barren Rock.
And what was the result? How was this necessity provided for? God
himself—my hand trembles as I write! Rather, then, let me employ
the word, which the religious feeling, in its perplexity suggested as
the substitute—the Deity itself was declared to be the real agent, the
actual gravitating power! The law and the law-giver were identified.
God (says Dr. Priestley) not only does, but is every thing. Jupiter est
quodcunque vides. And thus a system, which commenced by
excluding all life and immanent activity from the visible universe and
evacuating the natural world of all nature, ended by substituting the
Deity, and reducing the Creator to a mere anima mundi: a scheme
that has no advantage over Spinosism but its inconsistency, which
does indeed make it suit a certain Order of intellects, who, like the
pleuronectæ (or flat fish) in ichthyology which have both eyes on the
same side, never see but half of a subject at one time, and
forgetting the one before they get to the other are sure not to detect
any inconsistency between them.
And what has been the consequence? An increasing unwillingness
to contemplate the Supreme Being in his personal attributes: and
thence a distaste to all the peculiar doctrines of the Christian Faith,
the Trinity, the Incarnation of the Son of God, and Redemption. The
young and ardent, ever too apt to mistake the inward triumph in the
detection of error for a positive love of truth, are among the first and
most frequent victims to this epidemic fastidium. Alas! even the
sincerest seekers after light are not safe from the contagion. Some
have I known, constitutionally religious—I speak feelingly; for I
speak of that which for a brief period was my own state—who under
this unhealthful influence have been so estranged from the heavenly
Father, the Living God, as even to shrink from the personal pronouns
as applied to the Deity. But many do I know, and yearly meet with,
in whom a false and sickly taste co-operates with the prevailing
fashion: many, who find the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, far
too real, too substantial; who feel it more in harmony with their
indefinite sensations
To worship Nature in the hill and valley,
Not knowing what they love:—
and (to use the language, but not the sense or purpose of the great
poet of our age) would fain substitute for the Jehovah of their Bible
A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
 And the round ocean and the living air;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things!

Wordsworth.
And this from having been educated to understand the Divine
Omnipresence in any sense rather than the alone safe and legitimate
one, the presence of all things to God!
Be it, however, that the number of such men is comparatively
small! And be it (as in fact it often is) but a brief stage, a transitional
state, in the process of intellectual Growth! Yet among a numerous
and increasing class of the higher and middle ranks, there is an
inward withdrawing from the Life and Personal Being of God, a
turning of the thoughts exclusively to the so-called physical
attributes, to the Omnipresence in the counterfeit form of ubiquity,
to the Immensity, the Infinity, the Immutability;—the attributes of
space with a notion of Power as their substratum, a Fate, in short,
not a Moral Creator and Governor! Let intelligence be imagined, and
wherein does the conception of God differ essentially from that of
Gravitation (conceived as the cause of Gravity) in the understanding
of those, who represent the Deity not only as a necessary but as a
necessitated Being; those, for whom justice is but a scheme of
general laws; and holiness, and the divine hatred of sin, yea and sin
itself, are words without meaning or accommodations to a rude and
barbarous race? Hence, I more than fear, the prevailing taste for
books of Natural Theology, Physico-Theology, Demonstrations of God
from Nature, Evidences of Christianity, and the like. Evidences of
Christianity! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it;
rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need only the
express declaration of Christ himself: No man cometh to me, unless
the Father leadeth him. Whatever more is desirable—I speak now
with reference to Christians generally, and not to professed students
of theology—may, in my judgment, be far more safely and profitably
taught, without controversy or the supposition of infidel antagonists,
in the form of Ecclesiastical history.
The last fruit of the mechanico-corpuscular philosophy, say rather
of the mode and direction of feeling and thinking produced by it on
the educated class of society; or that result, which as more
immediately connected with my present theme I have reserved for
the last—is the habit of attaching all our conceptions and feelings,
and of applying all the words and phrases expressing reality, to the
objects of the senses: more accurately speaking, to the images and
sensations by which their presence is made known to us. Now I do
not hesitate to assert, that it was one of the great purposes of
Christianity, and included in the process of our Redemption, to rouse
and emancipate the soul from this debasing slavery to the outward
senses, to awaken the mind to the true criteria of reality, namely,
Permanence, Power, Will manifested in Act, and Truth operating as
Life. My words, said Christ, are spirit: and they (that is, the spiritual
powers expressed by them) are truth; that is, very Being. For this
end our Lord, who came from heaven to take captivity captive,
chose the words and names, that designate the familiar yet most
important objects of sense, the nearest and most concerning things
and incidents of corporeal nature:—Water, Flesh, Blood, Birth, Bread!
But he used them in senses, that could not without absurdity be
supposed to respect the mere phænomena, water, flesh, and the
like, in senses that by no possibility could apply to the colour, figure,
specific mode of touch or taste produced on ourselves, and by which
we are made aware of the presence of the things, and understand
them—res, quæ sub apparitionibus istis statuendæ sunt. And this
awful recalling of the drowsed soul from the dreams and phantom
world of sensuality to actual reality,—how has it been evaded! These
words, that were Spirit! these Mysteries, which even the Apostles
must wait for the Paraclete, in order to comprehend,—these spiritual
things which can only be spiritually discerned,—were mere
metaphors, figures of speech, oriental hyperboles! "All this means
only Morality!" Ah! how far nearer to the truth would these men
have been, had they said that Morality means all this!
The effect, however, has been most injurious to the best interests
of our Universities, to our incomparably constituted Church, and
even to our national character. The few who have read my two Lay
Sermons are no strangers to my opinions on this head; and in my
Treatise on the Church and Churches, I shall, if Providence
vouchsafe, submit them to the Public, with their grounds and historic
evidences in a more systematic form.
I have, I am aware, in this present work furnished occasion for a
charge of having expressed myself with slight and irreverence of
celebrated Names, especially of the late Dr. Paley. O, if I were fond
and ambitious of literary honour, of public applause, how well
content should I be to excite but one third of the admiration which,
in my inmost being, I feel for the head and heart of Paley! And how
gladly would I surrender all hope of contemporary praise, could I
even approach to the incomparable grace, propriety, and persuasive
facility of his writings! But on this very account I believe myself
bound in conscience to throw the whole force of my intellect in the
way of this triumphal car, on which the tutelary genius of modern
Idolatry is borne, even at the risk of being crushed under the
wheels! I have at this moment before my eyes the eighteenth of his
Posthumous Discourses: the amount of which is briefly this,—that all
the words and passages in the New Testament which express and
contain the peculiar doctrines of Christianity, the paramount objects
of the Christian Revelation, all those which speak so strongly of the
value, benefit, and efficacy, of the death of Christ, assuredly mean
something; but what they mean, nobody, it seems can tell! But
doubtless we shall discover it, and be convinced that there is a
substantial sense belonging to these words—in a future state! Is
there an enigma, or an absurdity, in the Koran or the Vedas which
might not be defended on the same pretence? A similar impression,
I confess, was left on my mind by Dr. Magee's statement or
exposition (ad normam Grotianam) of the doctrine of Redemption;
and deeply did it disappoint the high expectations, sadly did it chill
the fervid sympathy, which his introductory chapter, his manly and
masterly disquisition on the sacrificial rites of Paganism, had raised
in my mind.
And yet I cannot read the pages of Paley, here referred to, aloud,
without the liveliest sense, how plausible and popular they will
sound to the great majority of readers. Thousands of sober, and in
their way pious, Christians, will echo the words, together with
Magee's kindred interpretation of the death of Christ, and adopt the
doctrine for their Make-faith; and why? It is feeble. And whatever is
feeble is always plausible: for it favours mental indolence. It is
feeble: and feebleness, in the disguise of confessing and
condescending strength, is always popular. It flatters the reader by
removing the apprehended distance between him and the superior
author; and it flatters him still more by enabling him to transfer to
himself, and to appropriate, this superiority; and thus to make his
very weakness the mark and evidence of his strength. Ay, quoth the
rational Christian—or with a sighing, self-soothing sound between an
Ay and an Ah!—I am content to think, with the great Dr. Paley, and
the learned Archbishop of Dublin——
Man of Sense! Dr. Paley was a great man, and Dr. Magee is a
learned and exemplary prelate; but You do not think at all!
With regard to the convictions avowed and enforced in my own
Work, I will continue my address to the man of sense in the words
of an old philosopher:—Tu vero crassis auribus et obstinato corde
respuis quæ forsitan vere perhibeantur. Minus hercule calles,
pravissimis opinionibus ea putari mendacia, quæ vel auditu nova, vel
visu rudia, vel certe supra captum cogitationis (extemporaneæ tuæ)
ardua videantur: quæ si paulo accuratius exploraris, non modo
compertu evidentia, sed etiam factu facilia, senties.[165]
 In compliance with the suggestion of a judicious friend, the
celebrated conclusion of the fourth Book of Paley's Moral and
Political Philosophy, referred to in p. 230 of this volume, is here
transprinted for the convenience of the reader:—
"Had Jesus Christ delivered no other declaration than the following
—'The hour is coming, in the which all that are in the grave shall
hear his voice, and shall come forth: they that have done good, unto
the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the
resurrection of damnation:'—he had pronounced a message of
inestimable importance, and well worthy of that splendid apparatus
of prophecy and miracles with which his mission was introduced and
attested: a message in which the wisest of mankind would rejoice to
find an answer to their doubts, and rest to their inquiries.—It is idle
to say, that a future state had been discovered already:—it had been
discovered as the Copernican system was;—it was one guess among
many. He alone discovers, who proves; and no man can prove this
point, but the teacher who testifies by miracles that his doctrine
comes from God."
Pædianus says of Virgil,—Usque adeo expers invidiæ, ut siquid
erudite dictum inspiceret alterius, non minus gauderet ac si suum
esset. My own heart assures me, that this is less than the truth: that
Virgil would have read a beautiful passage in the work of another
with a higher and purer delight than in a work of his own, because
free from the apprehension of his judgment being warped by self-
love, and without that repressive modesty akin to shame, which in a
delicate mind holds in check a man's own secret thoughts and
feelings, when they respect himself. The cordial admiration with
which I peruse the preceding passage, as a master-piece of
composition, would, could I convey it, serve as a measure of the
vital importance I attach to the convictions which impelled me to
animadvert on the same passage as doctrine.
[156] See Preliminary to Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion, &c.—
Ed.
[157] So in first edition, 1825.—Ed.
[158] Of which our he was made flesh, is an inadequate
translation.—The Church of England in this as in other doctrinal
points, has preserved the golden mean between the superstitious
reverence of the Romanists, and the avowed contempt of the
Sectarians, for the writings of the Fathers, and the authority and
unimpeached traditions of the Church during the first three or
four centuries. And how, consistently with this honourable
characteristic of our Church, a minister of the same could, on the
Sacramentary scheme now in fashion, return even a plausible
answer to Arnauld's great work on Transubstantiation (not
without reason the boast of the Romish Church), exceeds my
powers of conjecture.
[159] These were the afterwards published 'On the Church and
State, according to the Idea of Each,' 1830, and 'Confessions of
an Inquiring Spirit,' 1840. The latter we republish in the present
volume; see p. 285.—Ed.
[160] Will the reader forgive me if I attempt at once to illustrate
and relieve the subject by annexing the first stanza of the poem
composed in the same year in which I wrote the Ancient Mariner
and the first book of Christabel?
"Encinctur'd with a twine of leaves,
That leafy twine his only dress!
A lovely boy was plucking fruits
In a moonlight wilderness.[161]
The moon was bright, the air was free,
And fruits and flowers together grew
On many a shrub and many a tree:
And all put on a gentle hue,
Hanging in the shadowy air
 Like a picture rich and rare.
It was a climate where, they say,
The night is more belov'd than day.
But who that beauteous boy beguil'd,
That beauteous boy to linger here?
Alone, by night, a little child,
In place so silent and so wild—
Has he no friend, no loving mother near?"
Wanderings of Cain.
[161] "By moonlight, in a wilderness."—'Poetical Works,' edit.
1863.—Ed.
[162] See p. 40.—Ed.
[163] Such is the conception of body in Des Cartes' own
system, body is every where confounded with matter, and might
in the Cartesian sense be defined, Space or Extension, with the
attribute of Visibility. As Des Cartes at the same time zealously
asserted the existence of intelligential beings, the reality and
independent Self-subsidence of the soul, Berkeleyanism or
Spinosism was the immediate and necessary consequence.
Assume a plurality of self-subsisting souls, and we have
Berkeleyanism; assume one only (unam et unicam substantiam),
and you have Spinosism, that is, the assertion of one infinite self-
subsistent, with the two attributes of thinking and appearing.
Cogitatio infinita sine centro, et omniformis apparitio. How far the
Newtonian vis inertiæ (interpreted any otherwise than as an
arbitrary term = x y z, to represent the unknown but necessary
supplement or integration of the Cartesian notion of body) has
patched up the flaw, I leave for more competent judges to
decide. But should any one of my Readers feel an interest in the
speculative principles of Natural Philosophy, and should be
master of the German language, I warmly recommend for his
perusal the earliest known publication of the great founder of the
Critical Philosophy (written in the twenty-second year of his
age!), on the then eager controversy between the Leibnitzian
and the French and English Mathematicians, respecting the living
forces—Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen
Kräfte: 1747—in which Kant demonstrates the right reasoning to
be with the latter; but the Truth of Fact, the evidence of
Experience, with the former; and gives the explanation, namely:
Body, or Corporeal Nature, is something else and more than
geometrical extension, even with the addition of a vis inertiæ.
And Leibnitz, with the Bernouillis, erred in the attempt to
demonstrate geometrically a problem not susceptible of
geometrical construction.—The tract, with the succeeding
Himmels-system, may with propriety be placed, after the
Principia of Newton, among the striking instances of early
Genius; and as the first product of the Dynamic Philosophy in the
Physical Sciences, from the time, at least, of Giordano Bruno,
whom the idolaters burnt for an Atheist, at Rome, in the year
1600. See the 'Friend,' pp. 151-55. [Or pp. 69 70, Bohn's edition.
—Ed.]
[164] For Newton's own doubtfully suggested ether, or most
subtle fluid, as the ground and immediate Agent in the
phenomena of universal gravitation, was either not adopted or
soon abandoned by his disciples; not only as introducing, against
his own canons of right reasoning, an ens imaginarium into
physical science, a suffiction in the place of a legitimate
supposition; but because the substance (assuming it to exist)
must itself form part of the problem, it was meant to solve.
Meantime Leibnitz's pre-established harmony, which originated in
Spinosa, found no acceptance; and, lastly, the notion of a
corpuscular substance, with properties put into it, like a
pincushion hidden by the pins, could pass with the unthinking
only for any thing more than a confession of ignorance, or
technical terms expressing a hiatus of scientific insight.
[165] Apul. Metam. 1.—H. N. C.
 APPENDIX A.
a synoptical summary of the scheme of the argument to prove the diversity

in kind[166] of the reason and the understanding. see p. 143.

The Position to be proved is the difference in kind of the
Understanding from the Reason.
The Axiom, on which the Proof rests, is: Subjects, which require
essentially different General Definitions, differ in kind and not merely
in degree. For difference in degree forms the ground of specific
definitions, but not of generic or general.
Now Reason is considered either in relation to the Will and Moral
Being, when it is termed the[167] Practical Reason = A: or relatively,
to the intellective and Sciential Faculties, when it is termed Theoretic
or Speculative Reason = a. In order therefore to be compared with
the Reason; the Understanding must in like manner be distinguished
into the Understanding as a Principle of Action, in which relation I
call it the Adaptive Power, or the faculty of selecting and adapting
Means and Medial of proximate ends = B: and the Understanding, as
a mode and faculty of thought, when it is called Reflection = b.
Accordingly, I give the General Definitions of these four: that is, I
describe each severally by its essential characters: and I find, that
the definition of A differs toto genere from that of B, and the
definition of a from that of b.
Now subjects that require essentially different definitions do
themselves differ in kind. But Understanding and Reason require
essentially different definitions. Therefore Understanding and Reason
differ in kind.

[166] This summary did not appear in the first edition.—Ed.

[167] N. B. The Practical Reason alone is Reason in the full and
substantive sense. It is reason in its own sphere of perfect
freedom; as the source of IDEAS, which Ideas, in their
conversion to the responsible Will, become Ultimate Ends. On the
other hand, Theoretic Reason, as the ground of the Universal and
Absolute in all logical conclusion is rather the Light of Reason in
the Understanding, and known to be such by its contrast with the
contingency and particularity which characterize all the proper
and indigenous growths of the Understanding.
 APPENDIX B.
ON INSTINCT:

By Professor J. H. Green.

[This is the discourse an early report of which was the foundation of Coleridge's
remarks upon instinct, &c., which appear at pp. 160-164. It was first added as an
Appendix to the "Aids to Reflection," in the edition of 1843; being extracted from
an Appendix to Professor Green's "Vital Dynamics"[168] 1840, where it appears at
pp. 88-96. It was then given without the Professor's introductory words, which we
now add.—Ed.]
The following remarks on the import of instinct are those to which
Coleridge refers in the "Aids to Reflection" (p. 177, last edition[169])
as in accordance with his view of the understanding, differing in
degree from instinct, and in kind from reason; and whatever merit
they possess must have been derived from his instructive
conversation. They are here inserted in the hope that they may
interest the reader in connexion both with the passages of the
preceding discourse, and with the writings of Coleridge on this
important subject.
What is Instinct? As I am not quite of Bonnet's opinion "that
philosophers will in vain torment themselves to define instinct, until
they have spent some time in the head of the animal without
actually being that animal," I shall endeavour to explain the use of
the term. I shall not think it necessary to controvert the opinions
which have been offered on this subject, whether the ancient
doctrine of Descartes, who supposed that animals were mere
machines; or the modern one of Lamarck, who attributes instincts to
habits impressed upon the organs of animals, by the constant efflux
of the nervous fluid to these organs, to which it has been
determined in their efforts to perform certain actions, to which their
necessities have given birth. And it will be here premature to offer
any refutation of the opinions of those who contend for the identity
of this faculty with reason, and maintain that all the actions of
animals are the result of invention and experience;—an opinion
maintained with considerable plausibility by Dr. Darwin.
Perhaps the most ready and certain mode of coming to a
conclusion in this intricate enquiry will be by the apparently
circuitous route of determining first, what we do not mean by the
word. Now we certainly do not mean, in the use of the term, any act
of the vital power in the production or maintenance of an organ:
nobody thinks of saying that the teeth grow by instinct, or that when
the muscles are increased in vigour and size in consequence of
exercise, it is from such a cause or principle. Neither do we attribute
instinct to the direct functions of the organs in providing for the
continuance and sustentation of the whole co-organized body. No
one talks of the liver secreting bile, or of the heart acting for the
propulsion of the blood, by instinct. Some, indeed, have maintained
that breathing, even voiding the excrement and urine, are instinctive
operations; but surely these, as well as the former, are automatic, or
at least are the necessary result of the organization of the parts in
and by which the actions are produced. These instances seem to be,
if I may so say, below instinct. But again, we do not attribute instinct
to any actions preceded by a will conscious of its whole purpose,
calculating its effects, and predetermining its consequences, nor to
any exercise of the intellectual powers, of which the whole scope,
aim, and end are intellectual. In other terms, no man, who values
his words, will talk of the instinct of a Howard, or of the instinctive
operations of a Newton or Leibnitz, in those sublime efforts, which
ennoble and cast a lustre, not less on the individuals than on the
whole human race.
To what kind or mode of action shall we then look for the
legitimate application of the term? In answer to this query, we may,
I think, without fear of the consequences, put the following cases as
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