Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.

2002, Vol. 82, No. 3, 314 –327 0022-3514/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.82.3.314

The Inaction Effect in the Psychology of Regret

Marcel Zeelenberg Kees van den Bos

Tilburg University Utrecht University

Eric van Dijk Rik Pieters

Leiden University Tilburg University

Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to
act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that
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decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these
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prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated
information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent,
people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous
research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the
authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment,
demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.

Sometimes when confronted with a bad decision outcome, peo- 1995; Zeelenberg, Van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998; Zeelenberg,
ple blame themselves and realize that if only they had acted Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000), Gilovich and Medvec (1995)
differently, this outcome would have been better. This unpleasant nominated this as “the clearest and most frequently replicated
feeling, experienced when people look back on bad decisions, is finding” (p. 380) in this domain. In the remainder of this article we
the emotion of regret. Regret is a common experience, well known refer to this phenomenon as the action effect.1
to most, if not all, of us. A study of verbal expressions of emotions In the present article we try to enhance the understanding of the
in everyday conversation revealed that regret was the second most psychology of regret by focusing on the antecedents of the action
frequently named emotion (only love was mentioned more fre- effect. Previous regret research has largely ignored the fact that
quently; Shimanoff, 1984). But regret is not only experienced decisions are often made in response to outcomes, experiences, or
often; it also has serious behavioral implications, stemming from events that occurred earlier. We find this unfortunate because the
both the anticipation and the experience of this emotion (for presence of these prior outcomes, experiences, or events may be
reviews, see Landman, 1993; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, In- very typical in everyday life and may have considerable impact on
man, & Pieters, 2001). Given its frequent occurrence and its the regret experienced over current decision outcomes. In what
potentially strong implications for our day-to-day behavior, it is follows, we reason that when prior outcomes are negative, people
important to develop our insights into the psychology of regret. may feel inclined to take action to improve future outcomes, which
One of the central issues in current regret research concerns the may make action more normal than inaction. As a consequence of
question of whether people regret the actions they have taken more this hypothesized psychological process, people may regret inac-
than the actions they have foregone (i.e., inactions). Because of the tion more than action, an effect that we label the inaction effect.
large number of studies showing that outcomes achieved through It is important to note the differences between our approach and
action lead to more regret than do the same outcomes achieved that of Gilovich and Medvec (1994, 1995). Gilovich and Medvec
through inaction (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Connolly, Ordóñez, also found instances in which inactions were regretted more than
& Coughlan, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995; Gilovich, actions. However, these authors studied the temporal pattern of
Medvec, & Chen, 1995; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman & regret and showed the existence of an inaction effect for long-term
Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Miller & Taylor, 1995; N’gbala & regrets: When looking back, people experience most regret over
Branscombe, 1997; Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000; Ritov & Baron, the paths not taken. Hence, Gilovich and Medvec argued that, over
time, a number of psychological processes decrease the regret of
actions taken and bolster the regret of actions forgone. Kahneman
Marcel Zeelenberg, Department of Economic and Social Psychology,
Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands; Kees van den Bos, Depart-
1
ment of Social and Organizational Psychology, Utrecht University, This research finding has also been referred to as emotional amplifi-
Utrecht, the Netherlands; Eric van Dijk, Department of Social and Orga- cation (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), the actor effect (Landman, 1987), and
nizational Psychology, Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands; Rik omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1990). Note that not all research on
Pieters, Department of Marketing, Tilburg University. action/inaction differences focuses on emotional reactions following out-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marcel comes. The term omission bias has also been used to refer to action/
Zeelenberg, Department of Economic and Social Psychology, Tilburg inaction differences in morality and intention (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994;
University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000-LE Tilburg, the Netherlands. E-mail: Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1992, 1995; Spranca, Minsk,
[email protected] & Baron, 1991).

314
 THE INACTION EFFECT 315

(1995) argued that the short-term and long-term regrets that Gilo- Furthermore, we argue that when prior outcomes call for action,
vich and Medvec investigated were actually two different types of inaction is more abnormal than action.
regret: hot regret, which is the direct emotional reaction to the
outcome, and wistful regret, which is the less intense emotion The Impact of Prior Outcomes
“associated with pleasantly sad fantasies of what might have been”
(p. 391). In a recent publication, Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman The current interpretation of the action effect is that actions are
(1998) agreed on the existence of hot and wistful regret, thereby often more abnormal than inactions are. As we have already noted,
restating the fact that, ceteris paribus, actions produce more hot however, we feel that there may be many situations that clearly call
regrets than do inactions. Our present studies show the contrary. for action. In fact, the supposition that actions are more abnormal
That is, we show that in some situations inactions lead to more hot than inactions seems to be contradicted by game-theoretical re-
regret than do actions. In doing so, our research stays close to search showing that people often base their decisions on a simple
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) original action effect research win stay–lose change heuristic (e.g., Macy, 1995). Likewise, re-
and its follow-ups. First, however, we have to introduce the action search in consumer psychology often shows that people only take
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effect, because this effect is the starting point of our investigation. action when a prior experience was negative. For example, in their
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study on brand switching, Tellis and Geath (1990) demonstrated

The Action Effect that consumers primarily switch brands after a negative experi-
ence; after positive or neutral experiences consumers tend to
We can most easily illustrate the action effect by citing Kahne- remain inactive and stick to their chosen brand. Furthermore,
man and Tversky’s (1982) first demonstration of it. These authors indirect support for this reasoning comes from the colloquial
confronted participants with the following scenario: expressions that one should never change a winning team and that
if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. These sayings suggest that one’s
Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year he considered decision to take action or not might be based on earlier outcomes.
switching to stock in company B, but he decided against it. He now
The sayings also imply that action should follow a negative prior
finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had
outcome or event: Fix it when it is broken, and change a losing
switched to the stock of company B. George owned shares in company
B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A. He now team.
finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept Taken together, the above leads us to propose that negative prior
his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret? (p. 173) outcomes can induce a tendency to act and, consequently, make
action more normal than inaction. If so, this would imply that in
A large majority of the participants indicated more regret for the case in which negative prior outcomes demand action to be
George, who acted, than for Paul, who decided not to act. Kahne- taken, an inaction effect should be found; that is, actions foregone
man and Tversky (1982) explained their finding by arguing that are regretted more than actions taken. Thus, if after experiencing a
actions result in more regret because inactions are more normal negative outcome, one does not take action to prevent further
than action. That is, they argued that it is easier to undo the losses, one would feel intense regret if these losses do occur (e.g.,
outcome by mentally mutating an abnormal cause (i.e., action) into asking oneself, “Why didn’t I do anything?”). However, if one did
a normal cause (i.e., inaction) than the reverse, and because affec- take action to prevent further losses but was unsuccessful, the
tive reactions to outcomes are enhanced when actual outcomes can regret will be less intense (e.g., saying to oneself, “At least I
easily be imagined otherwise, actions result in stronger regret than tried!”).
inactions do. It would be important for our understanding of the psychology
With this example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) convincingly of regret if we could provide supportive evidence for this line of
illustrated their reasoning that the normality of an outcome has reasoning. As we argue above, everyday decisions are rarely made
consequences for the affective reaction to that outcome. However, in isolation. The above-mentioned examples also suggest that
consequently, researchers may have overgeneralized the implica- people’s emotional reactions to the outcomes of these decisions
tions of this demonstration, interpreting it as if it shows that action may be influenced by prior outcomes, which might have implica-
always produces more regret than inaction. In contrast, we pursue tions for the action/inaction differences found in previous research.
and extend the original line of reasoning proposed by Kahneman We are not aware of any research investigating the influence of
and Tversky. That is, by showing the existence of an inaction prior outcomes on regret following current actions and inactions.
effect, we aim to extend their ideas to situations in which prior
outcomes are known. This is important because these situations are Regret and Responsibility
omnipresent and may resemble everyday life more than do situa-
tions in which there are no prior outcomes whatsoever. Moreover, An important element in our reasoning is that people feel more
by adopting a social–psychological perspective on the action ef- responsible for abnormal outcomes and that responsibility for
fect, we aim to show that inactions may not always be more normal current outcomes is one of the primary causes of regret. According
than actions but sometimes are more abnormal than actions. to regret theory (e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), regret
Thus, a question we address in the present article is whether is a counterfactual emotion that stems from a comparison between
actions are as abnormal as is suggested by the robustness of the what is and what might have been. However, not every “might
action effect (see also N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997). We argue have been” is supposed to produce regret. Regret is assumed to
they are not. We reason that actions are only abnormal when there originate from comparisons between a factual outcome and an
are no strong reasons to act, as is the case in situations studied thus outcome that might have been had one chosen another action.
far, such as in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) original scenario. Because one could have prevented the occurrence of the negative
 316 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERS

outcome by choosing something different, regret is related to a Overview of the Present Studies
sense of responsibility for the outcome. Sugden (1985) was among
the first to make this link explicit. In his view, regret stems both In this article we test these ideas in a series of experiments that
from realizing that an alternative course of action would have been include all the important features present in Kahneman and Tver-
better and from blaming oneself for the original decision. More- sky’s (1982) original scenario: “The consequences [of action and
over, according to Sugden, regret arising from self-recrimination inaction] are precisely known and precisely matched, the regretted
or self-blame is most pronounced when one’s decision was unrea- outcome is recent, and the emotion may be fairly intense” (cf.
sonable, inexplicable, or indefensible. This can be interpreted as Kahneman, 1995, p. 389). Furthermore, we investigate our predic-
another way of saying that regret is more extreme the more tions using scenarios from a domain that is appealing to our
abnormal the decision was. participant population, namely, soccer coach decisions.2
The role of responsibility in regret was supported in a recent set Experiment 1 investigates the occurrence of the inaction effect;
of experiments (see, Connolly et al., 1997; Ordóñez & Connolly, that is, whether inaction promotes more regret than does action in
2000; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000). In these the case of negative prior outcomes. The hypothesized mediating
role of responsibility in action and inaction effect is tested for in
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experiments, using a scenario methodology similar to one used in

Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, we explore the boundary condi-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

action effect research, researchers manipulated responsibility to

investigate its effects on regret. The conclusion of these experi- tions under which our analysis of the inaction effect does not hold.
ments was that although regret in rare cases may be experienced in Although our main interest is to demonstrate the inaction effect in
absence of responsibility, the typical regret experience clearly regret, it may be useful to investigate the action/inaction effect in
involves a feeling of responsibility. This is consistent with Frijda, related emotions, such as disappointment. Differential effects on
Kuipers, and Ter Schure (1989), who found that regret is closely different emotions call for a need to be specific in theoretical as
related to the appraisal of self-agency. This link between regret and well as measurement issues (cf. DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, &
responsibility may help to explain why Gilovich and Medvec Rucker, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, &
(1994, Study 4), in a study of everyday regrets, found so few Manstead, 1998). Therefore, Experiment 4 investigates whether
regrets concerning negative outcomes that had been imposed on the inaction effect is specific for regret or also generalizes to other
people. These researchers asked people to recall their biggest emotions, such as disappointment.
regrets. Less than 5% of these regrets involved outcomes caused
by circumstances beyond the regretter’s control. Experiment 1: The Inaction Effect
The action effect seems to be congruent with the postulated
relation between responsibility and regret. Earlier research showed Experiment 1 tests whether an inaction effect occurs when prior
that people who cause harm by acting are judged to be more outcomes were negative. To achieve this, we manipulated out-
immoral and more personally responsible than are people who comes that occurred before the regretted decision by having par-
cause the same harm by not acting (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca, ticipants read a scenario in which soccer coaches either won or lost
Minsk, & Baron, 1991). It has also been shown that actions, a match prior to the current one. The experiment also included a
compared with inactions, are more salient, are more often used to control condition in which prior outcomes were absent and in
infer one’s own and others’ attitude, and are perceived to be more which the findings of previous studies should be replicated (show-
informative (Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982). Together, these re- ing an action effect). In the prior-outcome-positive condition, an
search findings suggest that the relation between a decision maker action effect should also be found. This may be seen as an instance
and a decision outcome is stronger for actions than for inactions of the never change a winning team heuristic. Hence, when in
because of the salience of the decision maker as a causal agent in response to a positive prior outcome a decision maker decides to
the case of action. As Kahneman and Miller (1986) put it, “The take action and this action produces a negative outcome, the regret
findings that acts of commission produce greater regret than acts of should be especially painful. This may result in an even larger
omission . . . is in accord with formulations that distinguish omis- action effect. In contrast, we also predicted that the prior-outcome-
sion from commission in attributions of causality and responsibil- negative condition would result in an inaction effect. After a
ity” (p. 145). negative outcome, one should try to prevent the same thing from
In summary, we argue for a mediating role of responsibility in happening again by taking some sort of action. The regret one feels
action and inaction effects, and we propose that people experience when the action results in another negative outcome should be less
regret over negative outcomes for which they feel responsible. severe than the regret one feels when such a repeated negative
More specifically, we propose that people feel responsible for outcome stems from inaction.
outcomes that stem from actions taken when there were no strong
reasons to act. Hence, if these actions result in bad outcomes, Method
regret is amplified. However, we also argue that negative prior
outcomes can provide reasons for action, which in terms of norm One hundred sixty-five students (of whom 54 were men and 111 were
theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) women) at Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands, participated vol-
untarily and were paid for their participation. They were randomly assigned
could be interpreted as showing that actions can sometimes be
to one of three conditions (prior outcome: positive, absent, or negative). All
more abnormal than inactions. In these cases, people feel more
responsible for negative outcomes when they are produced by a
failure to act than when they are produced by an action. Conse- 2
Soccer is by far the most popular sport in the Netherlands. Important
quently, in these cases, peoples’ regret following inaction is games are broadcast nationwide on television and attract the attention of
amplified. the majority of potential viewers.
 THE INACTION EFFECT 317

participants were presented with a scenario that described two coaches, Table 1
Steenland and Straathof, each in charge of a different soccer team. Partic- Participants Reporting More Regret for Action
ipants in the prior-outcome-negative condition read the following scenario: or Inaction (Experiments 1, 2, and 4)
Steenland and Straathof are both coach of a soccer team. Steenland is Prior outcome
the coach of Blue-Black, and Straathof is the coach of E.D.O. Both
coaches lost the prior game with a score of 4 – 0. This Sunday Positive Negative
Steenland decides to do something: He fields three new players. Experiment and condition (won) Absent (lost)
Straathof decides not to change his team. This time both teams lose
with 3– 0. Who feels more regret, coach Steenland or coach Straathof? Experiment 1
Action (Coach Steenland) 50 41 18
In the prior-outcome-positive condition, participants learned that both Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 14 37
teams had won their previous match with a score of 4 – 0. In the prior- Experiment 2
outcome-absent condition, no information about prior outcomes was given. Action (Coach Steenland) 24 19 4
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 1 6 21
Experiment 4
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Results Action (Coach Steenland) 44 41 18

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Inaction (Coach Straathof) 6 9 32

The results are presented in Table 1.3 As a replication of earlier Overall
research, an action effect was found for the prior-outcome-absent Action (Coach Steenland)
% 91 78 31
condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 13.26, p ⬍ .05. Participants indicated n 118 101 40
that Coach Steenland (action) would feel more regret than Coach Inaction (Coach Straathof)
Straathof (inaction) would. This effect was also present in the % 9 22 69
prior-outcome-positive condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 36.82, p ⬍ .05, n 12 29 90
and a direct comparison of these conditions showed that the effect
was even more pronounced than in the prior-outcome-absent con-
dition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 110) ⫽ 4.07, p ⬍ .05. In the prior-outcome-
negative condition, however, the effect was reversed. Participants also asked participants to indicate on 7-point scales the intensity of
reported that Coach Straathof (inaction) would feel more regret regret for both the active and the passive actor. These two new
than would Coach Steenland (action), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 55) ⫽ 6.56, p ⬍ questions enable us to investigate the relation between responsi-
.05. This condition differed significantly from the other two, ␹2s(1, bility and regret using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach.
Ns ⫽ 110) ⬎ 19, ps ⬍ .05. More specifically, we expected that the effects of action/inaction
and prior outcomes on regret would be mediated by perceptions of
Discussion responsibility.

The results clearly show the action effect when prior outcomes Method
were unknown or positive. However, as predicted, the action effect
did not occur when prior outcomes were negative. In fact, in this Seventy-five students (44 women, 31 men) at Leiden University partic-
case the pattern reversed: The regret data show evidence for an ipated voluntarily and were paid for their participation. The design, mate-
inaction effect. This corroborates our line of thought that prior rials, and procedure were similar to those in Experiment 1. After reading
the scenario, participants were asked the following questions in the order
negative outcomes may provide a reason to act and thus make
described here. They were first asked questions concerning perceived
actions more normal and inactions more abnormal. As a conse- responsibility for the outcomes: “To what extent is Steenland [Straathof]
quence, decisions not to act that are followed by a negative responsible for the defeat?” Both questions could be answered on 7-point
outcome result in more regret than do decisions to act that lead to scales, with higher scores indicating more responsibility for the outcome
identical outcomes. (1 ⫽ very little, 7 ⫽ very much). Participants were also asked to indicate
the level of regret for both actors by means of the following question:
Experiment 2: On the Role of Responsibility “How much would Steenland [Straathof] regret his decision?” These
questions were to be answered on 7-point scales, with higher scores
As we mentioned in the introduction, a central element of our indicating more regret (1 ⫽ very little, 7 ⫽ very much). Finally, they were
line of reasoning is that the action effect is related to perceived asked the dichotomous question “Who feels more regret (Steenland or
responsibility for the outcome. In Experiment 1, however, we did Straathof)?”
not assess perceptions of responsibility. This information about
perceived responsibility would provide insight into the process Results
that, as we assumed, underlies our findings. We developed Exper-
Responsibility. The responsibility data (see Table 2) were sub-
iment 2 for this purpose.
mitted to a 3 (prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative) ⫻ 2
In Experiment 2 we aim to make the following extensions. First,
(decision: action vs. inaction) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
we included a measure of perceived responsibility to test whether
decision as a within-subject factor. This analysis yielded only a
the manipulation of action/inaction and prior outcome indeed
influenced the responsibility for the outcome. Second, in addition
to the regret questions used in Experiment 1 (the dichotomous 3
To facilitate the comparison of the different experiments, Table 1 also
question about who feels more regret, the active or passive actor— reports the replications of the results of Experiment 1 in Experiments 2
similar to the question used by Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), we and 4.
 318 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERS

Table 2 inaction effect was found in the prior-outcome-negative condition,

Mean Levels of Responsibility and Regret in Experiment 2 ␹2(1, N ⫽ 25) ⫽ 11.56, p ⬍ .05. In a direct comparison, the results
differed significantly from those in the other two conditions, ␹2s(1,
Prior outcome Ns ⫽ 50) ⬎ 18.00, ps ⬍ .05.
Positive Negative Relating responsibility to regret: Mediation analysis. A cen-
(won) Absent (lost) tral argument of the present article is that the amplification of
regret is due to differences in perceived responsibility. When
Variable and condition M SD M SD M SD people feel highly responsible for an outcome, this should result in
Responsibility amplified regret. We have argued that prior outcomes can influ-
Action (Coach Steenland) 4.6a 1.4 4.0a 1.4 3.2b 1.3 ence whether people feel more responsible for outcomes caused by
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 2.9b 1.2 4.0a 1.6 5.2a 1.0 action or by inaction. In other words, effects on perceived respon-
Regret sibility mediate the effects of prior outcomes on the action effect
Action (Coach Steenland) 5.2a 1.2 4.9a 1.1 2.9b 1.3
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 3.3b 1.3 4.0a 1.6 4.8a 1.6
and inaction effect. The data presented so far are consistent with
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this view, but we have not yet provided an adequate test of this
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Note. Entries are mean ratings measured on 7-point scales, with higher idea.
scores indicating more responsibility and more regret. Means within col- To test for mediation, we estimated a series of regression models
umns that do not share a common subscript differ at p ⬍ .05.
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). The predictor variable in the models
was the prior outcome manipulation. We effect coded this variable
as follows: If the prior outcome was negative its value was ⫺1, if
significant Prior Outcome ⫻ Decision interaction, F(2, 72) ⫽ it was absent its value was 0, and if it was positive its value was 1.
29.65, p ⬍ .05. In this way, the effect-coded predictor ranged from inducing action
Comparisions of the relevant means showed that prior-outcome- (after a negative prior outcome), through a neutral point (when a
positive participants indicated that the active coach was judged as prior outcome was absent), to inducing inaction (after a positive
being more responsible than the passive coach, F(1, 72) ⫽ 38.72, prior outcome).4 The hypothesized mediator was the difference in
p ⬍ .05. In the prior-outcome-absent condition, they were judged responsibility for the active and inactive coach (a positive value
equally responsible, F(1, 72) ⬍ 1. As predicted, in the prior- indicating more responsibility for the active coach). The difference
outcome-negative condition, the active coach was judged to be less in regret for the active and inactive coach (a positive value indi-
responsible than the inactive coach F(1, 72) ⫽ 52.02, p ⬍ .05. cating more regret for the active coach) served as the dependent
These results show that manipulations of decision and prior out- variable. To examine the degree of mediation, we first regressed
comes influenced perceived responsibility for the current the mediator on the predictor variable (Model 1), then regressed
outcomes. the dependent variable on the predictor variable (Model 2), then
Regret. Participants were asked to indicate the levels of regret regressed the dependent variable on the mediator (Model 3), and
for both the active and the passive coach. The results, presented in finally regressed the dependent variable on both the predictor
Table 2, show the same pattern as the responsibility data addressed variable and the mediator (Model 4). The degree to which the
above. A 3 (prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative) ⫻ influence of prior outcome on regret is reduced when one accounts
(decision: action vs. inaction) ANOVA, with decision as a within- for the influence of responsibility expresses the degree of media-
subject factor, revealed a significant main effect for prior outcome, tion by responsibility. In case of mediation, the influence of prior
F(2, 72) ⫽ 3.20, p ⬍ .05, and a Prior Outcome ⫻ Decision outcomes dropped significantly, and in case of full mediation, the
interaction effect, F(2, 72) ⫽ 21.32, p ⬍ .05. Comparisons of the effect of prior outcomes became nonsignificant.
relevant means showed that prior-outcome-positive participants
The results of these regression models are depicted in Figure 1.
indicated more regret for the active coach than for the passive
The numerical values in this figure are standardized regression
coach, F(1, 72) ⫽ 20.04, p ⬍ .05 (the action effect). This pattern
weights. Responsibility clearly mediated the influence of prior
was also present for prior-outcome-absent participants, F(1,
outcomes on regret. Specifically, (a) prior outcomes predicted
72) ⫽ 3.84, p ⫽ .054. The inaction effect was found for prior-
responsibility, FModel 1(1, 73) ⫽ 59.95, regression weight ⫽ 0.67,
outcome-negative participants, who indicated that the passive
p ⬍ .05; (b) prior outcomes predicted regret, FModel 2(1,
coach would feel more regret than the active coach, F(1,
73) ⫽ 39.25, regression weight ⫽ 0.59, p ⬍ .05; (c) responsibility
72) ⫽ 20.04, p ⬍ .05.
predicted regret, F Model 3 (1, 73) ⫽ 136.83, regression
Participants’ answers to the dichotomous question concerning
weight ⫽ 0.81, p ⬍ .05; and (d) prior outcomes had no predictive
who felt most regret are presented in Table 1. These data should,
power when we controlled for responsibility, F Model 4 (2,
of course, be interpreted with caution, as they were collected after
72) ⫽ 68.80, regression weight between parentheses ⫽ ⫺0.09, ns.
the continuous regret measure. Nevertheless, the results are virtu-
In further support of our predictions, a regression model in which
ally identical to those obtained in Experiment 1 and to the contin-
prior opponent predicted regret could be improved significantly by
uous measure in the present experiment. The action effect was
adding responsibility, FModel 4 ⫺ 2(1, 72) ⫽ 64.31, p ⬍ .05,
found in the prior-outcome-absent condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 25) ⫽ 6.7,
p ⬍ .05, and in the prior-outcome-positive condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽
25) ⫽ 21.16, p ⬍ .05. A direct comparison showed that the action 4
Analyses in which only the prior-outcome-negative and the prior-
effect was slightly more pronounced in the prior-outcome-positive outcome-positive conditions or the prior-outcome-negative and prior-
condition, p ⬍ .05 (N ⫽ 50, one-sided Fisher exact probability outcome-absent conditions were included showed similar patterns of
test). More interesting, however, is the fact that the predicted results.
 THE INACTION EFFECT 319

that rank high in the national Premier League (namely Feyenoord-

Rotterdam and PSV-Eindhoven). Each team plays several games.
Steenland and Straathof are both coach of an amateur team that
participates in the tournament. Steenland is the coach of Blue-Black
and Straathof is the coach of E.D.O. The teams of both coaches have
played the previous game against one of the two professional teams.
Both the team of Steenland and the team of Straathof lost the previous
game against the professional teams with a large margin.
Figure 1. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret in Ex-
periment 2. Data are standardized regression weights. *p ⬍ .05. In the next game, the teams of both coaches play against one of the
other local amateur teams. Steenland, the coach of Blue-Black, de-
cides to do something. He fields three different players. Straathof, the
coach of E.D.O., decides not to change his team. Both teams lose this
whereas a model in which responsibility predicted regret could not game.
be improved by adding prior opponent, FModel 4 ⫺ 3(1, 72) ⬍ 1.
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This clearly shows the mediation of responsibility between prior The scenario in the amateur opponent condition was exactly the same,
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

except that the opponents in the first game were two amateur teams instead
outcomes and regret.
of two professional teams. After reading the scenario, participants were
asked to indicate “Who feels more responsible for this outcome?” and
Discussion “Who experiences most regret for this outcome?” in both cases followed by
response alternatives: Coach Steenland (who changed his team) or Coach
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the effects of prior
Straathof (who left his team intact).
outcomes on regret following action and inaction and to relate
these effects to perceived responsibility for that particular out-
come. We found the action effect in the conditions in which prior Results
outcomes were absent or positive. However, replicating the find-
ings of Experiment 1, we found the inaction effect when prior The results are depicted in Table 3. This table is set up so that
outcomes were negative. These findings are in accordance with an the results for regret and responsibility can be easily read out, as
explanation of the action effect in terms of perceptions of respon- well as the relation between these two variables. Therefore, this
sibility, as also shown by the reported mediation analysis. table shows per condition (i.e., previous opponent: professional
team vs. amateur team) a 2 ⫻ 2 table with the participants’
responses to the questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who
Experiment 3: Prior Outcomes Exert an Influence Only feels more regret?” The four cells of each 2 ⫻ 2 table represent the
When They Are Informative four different combinations of the answers to the two questions.
We have argued that the inaction effect occurs because prior That is, when a participant answered that action would result in
outcomes may call for action and that this is mostly the case when more responsibility and also in more regret, he or she ended up in
they are negative. In some instances, however, even negative prior the upper left cell of the 2 ⫻ 2 table. However, when he or she
outcomes may not be particularly informative. That is, sometimes answered that action would result in more responsibility but inac-
prior outcomes do not signal a bad decision, and, hence, there is no tion would result in more regret, he or she ended up in the lower
need to take action. Then, action is not more normal than inaction. left cell, and so on. The column totals of the 2 ⫻ 2 table represent
For example, when, in our soccer coach paradigm, an amateur the number of people who indicated action and inaction to the
soccer team has lost a game against a professional soccer team, question “Who is more responsible?” and the row totals represent
there may be less need for the coach of the amateur team to the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” We first
question the strength of his team than after losing to another describe the findings for responsibility and regret that are shown in
amateur team. Following this reasoning, the coach might be in- these row and column totals.
clined to change the team after losing to another (essentially The results for responsibility were as expected. In the amateur
equally strong) amateur team but not after having lost from a much opponent condition, the inactive coach was held more responsible
stronger professional team. Hence, the inaction effect—more re- for the defeat by 42 out of the 50 participants, ␹2(1, N ⫽
gret after not having changed one’s team—should occur after the 50) ⫽ 23.12, p ⬍ .05, which replicates the inaction effect. In the
team loses to an equally strong amateur team but should not occur professional opponent condition, the inactive and active coaches
after the team loses to a much stronger professional team. This were equally often held most responsible for the defeat (22 par-
hypothesis is examined in Experiment 3. ticipants indicated that action would be associated with more
responsibility, whereas 28 participants indicated that inaction
Method would be associated with more responsibility), ␹2(1, N ⫽
50) ⫽ 0.32, ns. A direct comparison between the two conditions
One hundred students (48 men, 52 women) at Tilburg University, was also significant, ␹2(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 9.33, p ⬍ .05.
Tilburg, the Netherlands, participated voluntarily and were randomly as- The results for regret show a pattern similar to that for respon-
signed to one of the two conditions (professional opponent vs. amateur sibility. We expected to replicate the inaction effect in the amateur
opponent). Participants in the professional opponent condition read the
opponent condition, because there the prior defeat is meaningful,
following scenario:
but not in the professional opponent condition, because there the
The soccer club “Vliestroom Boys” organizes a soccer tournament prior defeat carries little information. The inaction effect was
with six local amateur soccer teams and two professional soccer teams clearly replicated in the amateur opponent condition. The majority
 320 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERS

Table 3
Participants’ Answers to the Questions Concerning Who Felt Most Regret and Responsibility
for Both Previous Opponent Conditions (Experiment 3)

Previous opponent

Amateur team Professional team

Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible?

Who feels more regret? Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total

Action (Coach Steenland) 3 9 12 18 5 23

Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 33 38 4 23 27
Total 8 42 22 28
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Note. This table shows per condition (i.e., previous opponent: professional team vs. amateur team) a 2 ⫻ 2
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

table with the participants’ responses to questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who feels more regret?” Per
condition, the column totals of the 2 ⫻ 2 table show the answers to the question “Who is more responsible?”
and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” (Thus, in the previous opponent
amateur team condition, 8 participants indicated that action would result in more responsibility, whereas 42
participants indicated that inaction would result in more responsibility; and 12 participants indicated that action
would result in more regret, whereas 38 participants indicated that inaction would result in more regret.) The
entries in the 2 ⫻ 2 tables show how the participants’ responses to the question concerning responsibility and
regret are related. For example, the 3 in the upper left corner represents the 3 participants in the previous
opponent amateur team condition who indicated that action (i.e., Coach Steenland, who took action) would result
in more responsibility and more regret. The entry 5 (directly below the entry 3) represents the 5 participants in
this condition who also indicated that action would result in more responsibility, while they indicated at the same
time that inaction (i.e., Coach Straathof, who did not take action) would result in more regret.

of participants believed that inaction results in more regret (38 encing more regret: the coach representing action (coded 0) or the
indicated inaction; 12 indicated action), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 13.52, coach representing inaction (coded 1). First, the mediator was
p ⬍ .05. As expected, no statistically significant difference be- regressed on the predictor variable, next the dependent variable
tween action and inaction was found in the professional opponent was regressed on the predictor variable, and finally the dependent
condition (23 participants indicated action; 27 indicated inaction), variable was regressed on both the predictor variable and the
␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 0.32, ns. It is important to note that a direct mediator. The degree to which the influence of the prior opponent
comparison between the two conditions was also significant, ␹2(1, on regret was reduced when we accounted for the influence of
N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 5.32, p ⬍ .05. responsibility expresses the degree of mediation by responsibility.
We now turn to the four cells of the 2 ⫻ 2 tables that are shown The results of these regression models are depicted in Figure 2.
in Table 3. These cells show how the participants’ responses to the The numerical values in this figure and below are logit regression
questions concerning responsibility and regret are related. For weights. Responsibility clearly mediates the influence of prior
example, the 3 in the upper left cell represents the 3 participants in outcomes on regret. Specifically, (a) prior opponent predicted
the amateur team opponent condition who indicated that action responsibility, ␹ 2Model 1(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 9.61, regression
(i.e., Coach Steenland, who took action) would result both in more weight ⫽ 1.42, p ⬍ .05; (b) prior opponent predicted regret,
responsibility and in more regret. The 5 in the lower left cell ␹ 2Model 2(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 5.39, regression weight ⫽ 0.99, p ⬍ .05;
represents the 5 participants in this condition who also indicated (c) responsibility predicted regret, ␹ 2Model 3(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 22.78,
that action would result in more responsibility; however, these regression weight ⫽ 2.23, p ⬍ .05; and (d) prior opponent had no
participants indicated that inaction (i.e., Coach Straathof, who did predictive power when controlling for responsibility, ␹ 2Model 4(1,
not take action) would result in more regret. The fact that most N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 23.78, regression weight between parentheses ⫽ 0.50,
observations are either in the upper left cell or in the lower right ns. In further support of our predictions, a logit regression model
cell demonstrates the strong relation between regret and responsi- in which prior opponent predicted regret could be improved sig-
bility. That is, when more responsibility is attributed to inaction (or
action), more regret is also attributed to inaction (or action). The
precise relation between these two variables is addressed in the
next section.
We performed mediation analysis similar to the one performed
for Experiment 2. Because all variables were binary, we estimated
a set of logit regression models (Long, 1997). The predictor
variable in the models was the previous opponent: professional
team (coded 0) or amateur team (coded 1). The hypothesized
mediator was who was feeling more responsible for the defeat: the Figure 2. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret in Ex-
coach representing action (coded 0) or the coach representing periment 3: when prior outcomes are uninformative. Data are logit
inaction (coded 1). The dependent variable was who was experi- weights. *p ⬍ .05.
 THE INACTION EFFECT 321

nificantly by adding responsibility, ␹ 2Model 4 ⫺ 2(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ affect. Indeed, on first sight, these emotions have a lot in common.
18.39, p ⬍ .05, whereas a model in which responsibility pre- They have both been called counterfactual emotions, both have
dicted regret could not be improved by adding prior opponent, negative valence, both are common experiences, and both are the
␹ Model
2
4 ⫺ 3(1, N ⫽ 100) ⫽ 1.00, ns. This again shows the medi- result of decisions with unfortunate outcomes (Landman, 1993;
ation of responsibility between prior outcomes and regret. Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1987; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson,
1997; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998;
Discussion Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 2000). On the
basis of these similarities, one might be tempted to expect similar
These results support our reasoning that if an amateur team loses results for regret and disappointment.
to a professional team, the loss provides little information about However, we emphasize that regret and disappointment are not
the amateur team’s ability, and hence there is no normal course of identical emotions and that the relation between prior outcomes
action (changing the team or not). But if an amateur team loses to and action/inaction effects may be different for both types of
another amateur team, this provides information that one should emotions. Previous research revealed that disappointment and re-
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change the team to prevent future losses against other amateur gret do differ with regard to the experiential content (Zeelenberg,
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teams. The results again strongly support that it is not action or Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998), the way they are
inaction per se that determines the regret that people experience. evoked (Van Dijk, Van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg,
Regret is an emotion that is functional in mastering skills and Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998), and the different behavioral con-
learning and in attaining a better grasp over decisions. It is espe- sequences these two emotions may produce (Zeelenberg & Pieters,
cially salient in situations in which people should have known 1999). As Landman (1993) has argued, “an essential difference is
better, and not so much when this is not the case. Moreover, the disappointment’s, and not regret’s, dependence on expectations
impact of prior outcomes on regret is mediated by the responsi- (estimated probabilities) of various outcomes” (p. 47; see also Van
bility for the decision. Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). Experiments 1–3 of the current article
inform us about the effects of manipulations of action/inaction and
Experiment 4: Comparing Action/Inaction Effects for prior outcomes on regret. What can we expect for disappointment?
Regret and Disappointment Instead of predicting that these manipulations have similar effects
on regret and disappointment, we predicted marked differences.
In the previous experiments, we focused on effects of action/ Because disappointment results from outcomes that fall below
inaction on regret. In the present experiment, we extend our focus expectations, it is important, we argue, to consider the effects of
and incorporate other emotional reactions to decision outcomes. prior outcomes on expectations. We propose that manipulations of
We believe that this is an important experiment because in re- prior outcomes and action/inaction interact to affect expectations
search on effects of action/inaction on emotional reactions, the and, consequently, ratings of disappointment. For our soccer coach
dependent variable frequently is not regret but a more general and paradigm, we therefore predicted that participants in the prior-
nonspecific measure of negative affect. For example, both outcome-negative condition would report more disappointment
Gleicher et al. (1990) and Zeelenberg, Van der Pligt, and De Vries after action than after inaction. After all, when a prior game was
(2000) confronted participants with action/inaction scenarios and lost, expectations of winning the next game will not be high.
measured general affective reactions. Gleicher et al. asked partic- Taking action to prevent further losses, however, may increase
ipants to indicate “who feels worse” (p. 289), and Zeelenberg et al. expectations, which causes disappointment following a loss to be
asked participants to indicate on an 11-point scale how bad (⫺5) more intense than it would be in the case of inaction. In a similar
or good (5) the active and the passive actor felt. More important, vein, we predicted expectations in the prior-outcome-positive con-
however, in studies directly aimed at regret, the measurement of dition to be influenced by the outcome of the prior game. After
the dependent variables has also been quite general. For example, having won the prior game, expectations of winning the next game
Landman (1987, see p. 530) reported having asked participants to should be high. Taking action, changing the winning team, should
indicate “who feels worse.” More recently, Connolly et al. (1997) decrease expectations. Losing the next game should then result in
investigated regret following action and inaction using an assess- less disappointment compared with losing the game following
ment of happiness with the obtained outcome on an 11-point scale inaction. Because the prior-outcome-absent condition did not con-
ranging from ⫺5 (very unhappy) to 5 (very happy). tain information about the prior game on which expectations could
We question whether these indirect measures teach us some- be based, we had no a priori prediction about whether in this
thing about the psychology of regret. Put differently, when inter- condition action or inaction would result in more disappointment.
ested in regret, can we learn something by measuring related Thus, the primary goal of this experiment, apart from replicating
affective states? Recent research on the causes and consequences the main findings of Experiments 1–3, is to demonstrate that it is
of specific emotions shows that one cannot simply assume that important to be specific about the emotion under investigation. As
different emotions respond in the same way to identical manipu- we have detailed above, we believe it is crucial to ask for specific
lations, and, hence, this research stresses the need for emotion- ratings of that particular emotion, as action/inaction manipulations
specific theorizing (DeSteno et al., 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; may result in completely opposite effects for different emotions.
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998).
It seems worthwhile in this respect to differentiate between
Method
regret and disappointment, two important emotions people may
experience after action/inaction decisions that go awry. Like re- One hundred fifty students at Tilburg University (87 men, 63 women)
gret, disappointment can be described as a feeling of negative participated voluntarily and were paid for their participation. They were
 322 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERS

randomly assigned to one of three conditions (prior outcome: positive vs. 50) ⫽ 3.92, p ⬍ .05, which is consistent with the inaction effect.
absent vs. negative). Participants first read the part of the scenario that The results in this condition differed significantly from those
introduced the two soccer teams and the results they obtained during the obtained in the other two conditions, ␹2s(1, Ns ⫽ 100) ⬎ 16, ps ⬍
last game (the prior outcome), after which they read about the decisions of
.05.
both soccer coaches for action and inaction. Then they were asked the
following question to investigate the effects of action/inaction on their
The results for regret mimic the findings of the earlier experi-
expectations: “Which coach has the highest expectation of winning the ments (see also Table 1) and are in line with those for responsi-
game of this Sunday?” After participants answered this question, they read bility. The action effect was found in the prior-outcome-absent
on a subsequent page that both teams lost the Sunday game. Subsequently, condition. Participants indicated that Coach Steenland (action)
they were asked, “Which coach feels more responsible for this outcome?” would feel more regret than would Coach Straathof (inaction; 41
“Who feels more regret?” and “Who feels more disappointment?” chose action vs. 9 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 20.48, p ⬍ .05.
This effect was slightly more pronounced (but not significantly so)
Results and Discussion in the prior-outcome-positive condition (44 chose action vs. 6
The results are depicted in Table 4. This table is set up similarly chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 28.88, p ⬍ .05. In the prior-
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to Table 3, so that the results for regret and responsibility, and the outcome-negative condition, however, the effect was reversed.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

results for disappointment and expectations, can be seen separately Participants reported that the inactive coach would feel more regret
(in the row and column totals) as well as the relation between these than active coach (18 chose action vs. 32 chose inaction), ␹2(1,
variables (in the cells of the different 2 ⫻ 2 tables). N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 3.92, p ⬍ .05. This condition again differed signifi-
Responsibility and regret. The upper panel of Table 4 displays cantly from the other two, ␹2s(1, Ns ⫽ 100) ⬎ 21.00, ps ⬍ .05.
the results for regret and the hypothesized mediator responsibility. Expectations and disappointment. The lower panel of Table 4
The results for responsibility were as expected. The active coach displays the results for disappointment and the hypothesized me-
was judged as more responsible in the prior-outcome-absent con- diator expectations. The results for expectations are in line with
dition (38 chose action vs. 12 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ our predictions. We reasoned that, overall, the expectations would
50) ⫽ 13.52, p ⬍ .05, and in the prior-outcome-positive condition be low in the prior-outcome-negative condition, as the teams lost
(48 chose action vs. 2 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 42.32, p ⬍ the prior match. Changing the team (i.e., action) was expected to
.05. A comparison of these two conditions showed that this effect elevate expectations. Indeed, participants in this condition indi-
was more pronounced in the latter condition, ␹2(1, N ⫽ cated that the expectations for the active coach would be higher
100) ⫽ 8.31, p ⬍ .05. It is important to note that in the prior- (39 chose action vs. 11 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 15.68,
outcome-negative condition the effect was reversed, such that the p ⬍ .05. We also reasoned that, overall, the expectations would be
inactive coach was judged to be more responsible than the active high following a prior victory (i.e., in the prior-outcome-positive
coach (18 chose action vs. 32 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ condition) and that these would be decreased by taking action,

Table 4
Participants’ Answers to the Questions Concerning Regret and Responsibility (Top Half) and Disappointment and Expectations
(Bottom Half) for Each of the Three Prior Outcome Conditions (Experiment 4)

Prior outcome

Positive Absent Negative

Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible?

Who feels more regret? Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total

Action (Coach Steenland) 44 0 44 34 7 41 12 6 18

Inaction (Coach Straathof) 4 2 6 4 5 9 6 26 32
Total 48 2 38 12 18 32

Who had higher expectations? Who had higher expectations? Who had higher expectations?

Who feels more disappointment? Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total

Action (Coach Steenland) 7 13 20 15 14 29 31 6 37

Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 25 30 2 19 21 8 5 13
Total 12 38 17 33 39 11

Note. This table shows per condition (i.e., prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative) a 2 ⫻ 2 table within the top half the participants’ responses
to questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who feels more regret?” and in the bottom half the participants’ responses to questions “Who had higher
expectations?” and “Who feels more disappointment?” In the top half, the column totals of each 2 ⫻ 2 table show the answers to the question “Who is
more responsible?” and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” The entries in the 2 ⫻ 2 tables in the top half show how
the participants’ responses to the question concerning responsibility and regret are related. In the bottom half, the column totals show the answer to the
question “Who had higher expectations?” and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more disappointment?” The entries in the 2 ⫻ 2
tables in the bottom half show how the participants’ responses to the question concerning expectations and disappointment are related.
 THE INACTION EFFECT 323

resulting in lower expectations following action. This is what we findings, a logit regression model in which responsibility predicted
found (12 chose action vs. 38 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ regret could be improved by adding the prior outcome variable,
50) ⫽ 13.52, p ⬍ .05. We had no predictions for the prior- ␹ 2Model 4 ⫺ 2(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 7.21, p ⬍ .05, whereas a model in
outcome-absent condition. The results show that participants indi- which the prior outcome variable predicted regret could be im-
cated higher expectations following inaction (17 chose action proved to a much larger extent by adding responsibility, ␹ 2Model 4 ⫺ 3
vs. 33 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 5.12, p ⬍ .05. (1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 22.75, p ⬍ .05. This shows the, in this case partial,
The results for disappointment were as expected and, hence, mediation of responsibility between prior outcomes and regret.
very different from the results for regret. In the prior-outcome- The results for disappointment are reported next. As we antic-
positive condition, participants indicated more disappointment fol- ipated, expectations mediated the influence of prior outcome on
lowing inaction, albeit not significantly so (20 chose action vs. 30 disappointment. The results show that (a) prior outcomes predicted
chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 2.00, ns. Participants in the expectations, ␹ Model
2
1 (1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 31.09, regression
prior-outcome-negative condition indicated more disappointment weight ⫽ 1.22, p ⬍ .05; (b) prior outcomes predicted disappoint-
following action (37 chose action vs. 13 chose inaction), ␹2(1, N ⫽ ment, ␹ 2Model 2(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 12.07, regression weight ⫽ 0.73,
50) ⫽ 11.52, p ⬍ .05. Note that for these two conditions the effects p ⬍ .05; (c) expectations predicted disappointment, ␹ 2Model 3(1,
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are completely opposite to what was found for regret. Participants N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 22.41, regression weight ⫽ 1.66, p ⬍ .05; and (d) the
in the prior-outcome-absent condition indicated more disappoint- influence of prior outcomes on disappointment was insignificant
ment following action than following inaction, but this difference when expectations were accounted for, ␹ 2Model 4(2, N ⫽ 150) ⫽
was not significant (29 chose action vs. 21 chose inaction), ␹2(1, 25.17, regression weight ⫽ 0.40, ns. In further support of our
N ⫽ 50) ⫽ 1.28, ns. predictions, a logit regression model in which the prior outcome
Relating responsibility to regret and expectations to disappoint- variable predicted disappointment could be improved significantly
ment: Mediation analysis. Next, we examined the mediation by adding expectations, ␹ 2Model 4 ⫺ 2(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 13.01, p ⬍
effect of responsibility on regret and of expectations on disappoint- .05, whereas a model in which expectations predicted disappoint-
ment (see Figure 3), again by estimating sets of logit regression ment could not be improved by adding the prior outcome variable,
models (Long, 1997). The predictor variable in the models was the ␹ 2Model 4 ⫺ 2(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 2.76, ns. This shows the mediation of
prior outcome manipulation. As in Experiment 2, this variable was expectations between prior outcomes and disappointment.
effect coded: If the prior outcome was negative its value was ⫺1, The case for the influence of responsibility on regret (but not on
if it was absent its value was 0, and if it was positive its value disappointment) and for expectations on disappointment (but not
was 1. on regret) was strengthened in two final logit regression analyses.
The results for regret are reported first (logit regression weights In the first analysis, regret was predicted from the prior outcome
and p values). As expected, responsibility mediated the influence variable and responsibility as well as from expectations. As ex-
of prior outcome on regret. Specifically, the analyses showed that pected, the responsibility variable was significant in this analysis,
(a) prior outcomes predicted responsibility, ␹ Model 2
1 (1, N ⫽ model-␹2(3, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 56.92, regression weight ⫽ 2.24, p ⬍ .05,
150) ⫽ 47.59, regression weight ⫽ 1.82, p ⬍ .05; (b) prior but the expectations variable was not (regression weight ⫽ 0.19,
outcomes predicted regret, ␹ 2Model 2(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 34.03, regres- p ⬎ .5). In the second analysis, disappointment was predicted from
sion weight ⫽ 1.43, p ⬍ .05; (c) responsibility predicted regret, the prior outcome variable and expectations as well as from
␹ 2Model 3(1, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 49.57, regression weight ⫽ 2.79, p ⬍ .05; responsibility. As we anticipated, the expectations variable was
(d) the influence of prior outcomes on regret was reduced by significant in this analysis, model-␹2(3, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 25.21, re-
almost half when responsibility was accounted for, although it still gression weight ⫽ 1.38, p ⬍ .05, but the responsibility variable
remained significant, ␹ 2Model 4(2, N ⫽ 150) ⫽ 56.78, regression was not (regression weight ⫽ ⫺0.10, p ⬎ .5).
weight ⫽ 0.84, p ⬍ .05. In further correspondence with these This experiment reveals, as do the previous ones, that the effects
of action/inaction on counterfactual emotions are very much con-
tingent on what is known about prior outcomes. More important,
the present experiment also shows that the effects of action/
inaction may be very different for regret and disappointment. This
noteworthy finding corroborates both our view that it is important
to be specific in theoretical and operational terms about the emo-
tion under investigation and our claims about the restricted gen-
eralizability of the action effect.

General Discussion
The data presented in this article show that the action effect is
not as robust as has been suggested by the overwhelming amount
of replications reported in previous articles. The main difference
between previous studies on the action effect and our current
approach is that previous studies tended to concentrate on isolated
Figure 3. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret and decisions, whereas we studied sequences of decisions. From a
expectations on disappointment in Experiment 4. Data are logit weights. theoretical standpoint, the notion of sequential decisions has gen-
*
p ⬍ .05. erated new insights on the occurrence of action effects. In partic-
 324 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERS

ular, our results suggest that, depending on the valence of prior in which it is the person’s job to act. Fire fighters, for example, are
outcomes, inaction may result in more regret than action; that is, a supposed to act in case of a fire and try to prevent bad things from
reversal of “the clearest and most frequently replicated finding” happening. When they fail to act in these situations, they probably
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1995, p. 380) in the regret domain. From a experience more regret and receive greater blame than do those
practical standpoint, one could argue that our current approach who acted ineffectively. In other words, our current focus on the
more closely resembles reality, in which decisions are rarely made effects of prior outcomes is subordinate to the higher principle of
in isolation. Instead, decisions usually follow on previous out- normality.
comes and decisions.
We regard it as telling that these findings are derived from Scenario-Based Versus Real-Life Regrets
experiments that, with the exception of the notion of prior out- The existence of an inaction effect and its interpretation in terms
comes, stay very close in methodology to the original work by of perceived responsibility might also offer an explanation for
Kahneman and Tversky (1982; cf. Kahneman, 1995). That is, Gilovich and Medvec’s (1994, Study 5) failure to replicate the
participants were confronted with a scenario in which two persons action/inaction finding for short-term real-life regrets. Gilovich
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arrive at the same negative outcome. One person arrives at this and Medvec asked respondents to recall their single most regret-
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outcome after a decision to act, and the other person arrives at the table action and inaction from the past week. Respondents indi-
same outcome through a decision not to act. cated that they regretted recent actions as often as recent inactions.
It is not only in terms of methodology that our current research In a recent extension of this study, Feldman, Miyamoto, and Loftus
builds on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) pioneering work. (1999) asked participants about the intensity of both action and
Throughout the article, we relate our insights to the notion of inaction regrets, and they also found that in real life these are
normality in the sense that, like Kahneman and Tversky, we equally intense. These findings thus contradict the earlier studies
postulate that regret after abnormal decisions may be more ex- showing the action effect. Why is it that the most frequently
treme than after normal decisions. The innovative part of our replicated finding in scenario studies was not replicated in surveys
approach is that we reason that normality of action and inaction of real-life regrets?
may be dependent on prior outcomes. In the current article, we The answer might be related to the discrepancy between
manipulated normality of actions and inactions by having partic- scenario-based and real-life regrets (see also Feldman et al., 1999).
ipants read information about prior outcomes. This manipulation As we argue in this article, regret stems from the realization that an
was inspired in part by research on the “win stay–lose change” alternative course of action would have been better and from
heuristic and on consumer brand switching, which suggests that feelings of responsibility for the current outcome. Thus, regret
people mainly act when prior outcomes are negative (e.g., Macy, arising from self-recrimination or self-blame is most pronounced
1995; Tellis & Geath, 1990). In the present experiments, the prior when the decision was unreasonable, inexplicable, or indefensible
outcome was the outcome of the soccer game a team played the (cf. Sugden, 1985). In the typical scenario study, participants learn
previous week. Consistent with predictions, we found that when about choices other people make and the outcomes associated with
the prior game was won or when there was no information about these actions without learning about the possible reasons why
the prior game, participants reported that the coach who acted these people opt for action or inaction. In the Gilovich and Medvec
would feel more regret than would the coach who did not act. (1994) and Feldman et al. (1999) surveys, respondents focused on
When the prior game was lost, participants indicated that the coach their own real-life regrets. These respondents probably knew why
who acted would feel less regret than would the coach who did not they had chosen the regretted action or inaction and could probably
act. The active coach at least tried to prevent further losses, explain these choices. Hence, there is no a priori reason to expect
whereas the inactive coach did nothing. that the decisions not to act in these real-life samples were more
The finding that people regret negative outcomes that were explicable and defensible and thus associated with less responsi-
caused by inactions more than they regret equally negative out- bility than the decisions to act. This might explain why actions and
comes caused by actions when these outcomes were preceded by inactions were equally regretted.
another negative outcome is consistent with an explanation of the Thus, the findings of Gilovich and Medvec (1994) and of
action effect in terms of perceived responsibility. More support for Feldman et al. (1999) can easily be accounted for in our reasoning.
this explanation was found in Experiments 2– 4, in which analyses Of course, whether this explanation is valid cannot be determined
show mediation for perceived responsibility in the case of regret. on the basis of our data, and this is not the main focus of our
Other findings from these experiments are also consistent with this investigation. Our main aim is to demonstrate the potential effects
reasoning. of prior outcomes on experienced regret and, more generally, to
It is appropriate to note that although we focus exclusively on draw attention to the potential benefits of studying regret effects in
the effects of prior outcomes, our point is actually much broader.5 a chain of events and decisions. By taking this into account and
Our manipulations of past outcomes are merely a vehicle to putting this notion at the heart of theorizing, one not only stays
influence the normality of the actions that could produce regret. As closer to the way decisions are embedded in reality but, as the
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Kahneman and Miller (1986) current results indicate, one may also generate new and challeng-
argued, it is the normality of these behaviors that amplify the ing findings.
regret. We aim to show that in cases in which action is called for,
unfortunate failures to act produce more regret. Action can be
called for by negative prior outcomes, as we currently argue, but 5
We thank an anonymous reviewer for stimulating us to address the
also by other factors, such as the social roles of some professions more general implications of our theorizing.
 THE INACTION EFFECT 325

A second discrepancy between scenario-based and real-life re- phase. This implies that experiences of regret may strongly affect
grets is the fact that participants in scenario studies do not actually people’s behaviors. In the future, researchers may want to examine
experience regret but rather make predictions about what others, more closely the role of regret experiences in goal striving and
given a particular set of circumstances, might experience. Hence, goal-directed behavior. For instance, it seems valuable to gain
given this projective nature of our findings, we have to be cautious insight into the effects of regret on self-protective behaviors. There
in drawing conclusions about actual regret experiences and their is evidence for beneficial effects of anticipated regret on self-
behavioral implications. We have reasons to believe, however, that protection (Richard, Van der Pligt & De Vries, 1996; Josephs,
the current findings provide valuable insights into the psychology Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992), but it is not yet clear whether and
of regret. First, even when one has serious doubts about the how the experience of the emotion itself, rather than its anticipa-
correspondence between these imagined regrets and actual expe- tion, may influence behaviors.
rienced regrets, one has to acknowledge that our data provide How does this relate to action and inaction regrets? It is
insights into what people anticipate regretting later on (cf. Con- interesting that research on inaction inertia (Tykocinski & Pitt-
nolly et al., 1997). These anticipated regrets have been shown to man, 1998) suggests that regrets over inaction may reduce the
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

impact behavioral choice (for reviews, see Mellers, 2000; Zeelen- likelihood that one acts on a subsequent opportunity that is still
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

berg, 1999). Second, many of the regret research findings, most of attractive but less attractive than the one missed earlier. How-
which are cited in this article, have been replicated using a whole ever, we argue that the opposite may happen when the new
range of methodologies, including scenario studies and recalled opportunity is more attractive than the missed one. In that case,
life experiences. In what follows, we assume sufficient correspon- the regret experienced over the failure to act may promote
dence between scenario-based regret and real-life regrets to spec- action to be taken on the new opportunity. Similarly, action
ulate about the implications of our findings for the dynamics of regrets may cause one to act more prudently in the future and,
regret. hence, their effect can be seen as inhibiting behavior, but
research on consumer regrets has shown that the experience of
Regret in the Action Sequence regret promotes switching behavior (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2001). Future
Our findings thus suggest that it is worthwhile to shift attention research should investigate the conditions under which action
to situations in which actions are not made in isolation but instead and inaction regrets are mobilizing or paralyzing.
are embedded in an action sequence. When one thinks further However, to return to the concept that motivates the research we
along this line, the findings also draw attention to possible effects report here, compared with previous studies, the findings of the
of experienced regret on subsequent behavior. present article tell us something that is fundamental with regard to
Although there is a large, emerging stream of research on the the psychology of regret. The present findings show that prior
antecedents and consequences of anticipated regret in decision decision outcomes influence people’s attributions of feelings of
making, few studies have examined the more dynamic aspects of regret following action and inaction. What is especially interesting
regret (cf. Zeelenberg et al., 2001). For example, what is the about the current findings is that they suggest that negative prior
influence of the experience of regret on subsequent decisions, how decision outcomes can promote action tendencies and, hence, may
can it moderate intention– choice relationships, and, more gener- make people regret inaction more than action. In this way, the
ally, what is regret’s role in causing behavior? In a review of the present article explores the inaction effect in the psychology of
role of feelings in the action sequence, Schwartz and Bohner regret.
(1996, p. 128) concluded that empirical research is mostly related
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Zeelenberg, M., Van Dijk, W. W., Manstead, A. S. R., & Van der Pligt, J. Accepted July 26, 2001 䡲
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