Open book exam, will be given sample question.

Antitrust = competition law,

Competiton (good) opposite - “Market power” (bad)
Pro-competitive conduct va anti-competitive conduct
*cartels (agreements) we’ll cover monopoly by a single firm later. Companies agree not
to compete. Agree one decision, for instance all coffee shops agree to sell a coffee in one
price.
2 ways conduct can be anti-competitive; “collusion” and “exclusion”.
Economic – supply and demand, markets.
“antitrust injury” vs business arm caused by legit (=legal) competition.
Us vs andres
Several corporations that manufactured lysine made an agreement (contract)
Increasing income of the product makers.
The most famous cartel is opec
Origins of anitirust law (I)
Industrial and financial innovations led to the creation of giant firms. A dominant seller
or conspiring group of sellers in a market can exercise power over –
 Consumers (by charging high prices or making worse products)
 Suppliers (by insisting on paying law prices)
 Competitor firms (by driving them out of business)
 Governments (by making demands based on their ability to create jobs, pay taxes,
make political contributions)
First antitrust law is in the usa “monopolization” and agreements “in restraint
(cheklash) of trade” Sherman antitrust, 1890.
Contemporary economic theory of competition
If there is only one one seller, they can charge as much as they want.
Thus competition among sellers is good because it pressures them reduce prices (by
reducing costs) and improve products.
Economists call this “efficient” meaning
-sellers will charge the price that covers their costs and the produce enough coffee that
everyone willing to pay that price can get some
-the resources spent on producing and buying coffe are minimized, freeing up
resources to be used for other purposes.
Market power (the opposite of competiton)
Market power is the power to resist competitive pressure: enables a firm or cartel of
firms to charge consumers higher prices
Antitrust 2nd
If the price will be low, antitrust will grow up. A market AT law consists of
- A set of goods or services available.
Market power is that the ability of seller to resist competitive pressure in that
market.
- Classic economic theory says markets should be, so law and policy disfavor
market power.
A more narrowly defined market is more likely to be anticompetitive and vice
versa,
- The market for hot drinks in northern ca is more competitive than the market for
to-go coffe drinks in downtown Davis.
“market” to-go coffe in davis
“supply function” total number of cups sellers will supply based on their cost of
production per cup
After getting started, each additional cup costs more and more to produce.
Two kinds of anticompetitive effects
An antitrust case must formulate and prove a theory of how defendant’s conduct had
an anticompetitive effect on prices. There are 2 recognied types of effect.
Collusive – (direct) effect
in a normal market, no one firm has market power and firms operating in that market
should compete. Not all of them are collusive effects, they may have exlusive effects
(I think as a mixed)
Two or more firms may obtain market power by acting together to directly raise
prices by agreement. (cartel)
Their joint market power enables them to resist the competitive market forces
governing price or output.
Exclusionary effect (indirect)
One firm alone, or two or more firms together, interfere with a competitir’s ability to
compete in order to obtain or defend market power
For ex, a dominant firm pressures its suppliers not to supply a competitor.
This conduct reduces competition in the relevant market.
This indirectly raises prices or reduces output.
Non-economic (political) purposes of competition law.
Limit the concentration of power and wealth in big corps
Big=bad
Encourage entrepreneurship
Encourage independent/local ownership.
Quality of life, service and variety.
If the conduct reduces prices, it is okay.
 22nd January, 2025
Antitrust injury
Statutes = nizom
Monopolization – had already monopoly, Sherman act 2,
Being a cartel is legal, not being a monopoly cartel is not legal.
Anticompetitive mergers(birlashma) and acquisitions: clayton act 7
Congress – Sherman act, clayton act.
Judiciary – case law
Executive – (DOJ) department of justice. (FTC) Federal trade commission.
DOJ and FTC work together sometimes, especially for mergers
Most states have similar statutory and institutional istructures.

Every plaintiff must allege (and prove) that defendant breached a legal duty
The breach caused harm to plaintiff
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/179/1073/546653/
indirectly effect,
Proving anticompetitive effects
How can be proved defendant’s conduct had collusive or exclusionary effect?
Data analysis – data is hard to gather and analyze
Hard for courts to evaluate
*legal presumptions (taxmin). Small evidence,
Collusion effect for ex. Lysine case
• Their joint market power enables them to resist the competitive market forces
governing price/output
– I.e., there are not enough non-cartel competitors to undercut the cartel and
lower the market price
Exclusionary effect One firm alone, or two or more firms together, interfere(s) with a
competitor’s ability to compete in order to obtain or defend market power.
• For example, a dominant firm(s) pressures its suppliers not to supply a competitor.
(JTC)
• This conduct reduces competition in the relevant market, which can help the
dominant firm obtain (or defend) market power.
Contributing to market power indirectly contributes to raising prices or reducing output.
29th January, 2025.
Price-fixing – is an agreement (written, verbal, or inferred from conduct) among
competitors to raise, lower, maintain, or stabilize prices or price levels. Generally, the
antitrust laws require that each company establish prices and other competitive terms on
its own, without agreeing with a competitor.

In law, per se is a Latin phrase that means "by itself" or "in itself". It's used to describe
something that is illegal or problematic in and of itself, regardless of the circumstances.

Rule of Reason:
Naked restraints: agreements intented to fix price, restrict output, divide markets o group
boycott.
• Historically, a “naked restraint” was called a per se (“by itself”)
unreasonable restraint of trade: “The law does not permit an inquiry
(so’rov) into their reasonableness.”
Broadcast Music Inc. CBS Case result it is not restraint of trade.
Concerted – kelishilgan.
It is not mandatory being member of BMI or ASCAP. Performers can sell individually.
And also individually price their performances.
ASCAP and BMI’s rights are nonexclusive (huquqlar faqat ular uchun emas.)
Catalano beer CASE – it is fixing price, credit. Not offering, just crediting.
Summary, Petitioners allege that, beginning in early 1967, respondent [beer] wholesalers
secretly agreed, in order to eliminate competition among themselves, that as of December
1967 they would sell to retailers only if payment were made in advance or upon delivery.
Prior to the agreement, the wholesalers had extended credit without interest up to the 30-
and 42-day limits permitted by state law. According to the petition, prior to the agreement
wholesalers had competed with each other with respect to trade credit, and the credit
terms for individual retailers had varied substantially. After entering into the agreement,
respondents uniformly refused to extend any credit at all.
The Court of Appeals decided that the credit-fixing agreement should not be
characterized as a form of price fixing. The court suggested that such an agreement might
actually enhance competition in two ways: (1) “by removing a barrier perceived by some
sellers to market entry,” and (2) “by the increased visibility of price made possible by the
agreement to eliminate credit.” * * *
In dissent, Judge Blumenfeld expressed the opinion that an agreement to eliminate credit
was a form of price fixing. * * *
He reasoned that the
Palmer v BRG CASE - There is a market division,
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/405/596/ Topco case
3rd February 2025.
Irrebuttable Presumption - Rad etish mumkin bo'lmagan taxmin
Concerted – kelishilgan
Collusive – til biriktirish.
Monopsony - a market situation in which there is only one buyer.
Deceptive – aldamchi
“Rent-seeking” – making more profit
• Every contract that restrains trade (SA § 1 text)
• No. . . every contract that unreasonably restrains trade:
– Some types of contracts are always unreasonable per se (Socony)
• Not really! BMI upheld; SCTLA and NCAA considered justifications
for price-fixing/boycotts
– Other types of contracts need a “full-blown” factual inquiry (so’rov)
• Well, not all; intensity of inquiry depends on the case
10th Feb 2025
Mountain medical
– That is, harm to consumer welfare: price ↑, output ↓
Gov/ π’s required prima facie case depends on how obvious the effect is (spectrum):
– “Per se:” Familiar, “naked” type of agreement w/o plausible efficiency
justification => presumption of effect (Catalano)
– “Quick look”: “suspiciously like” a naked restraint + plausible justification
+ some evidence of effect: direct or indirect (econ theory+ facts)=>
rebuttable presumption (BMI, Regents, Indiana Dentists)
– “Full blown”: anticomp effects are “far from intuitively obvious” => no
presumption; must prove market, market power, & effect]
Per se - Some familiar kinds of agreement—naked price fixing, output restriction, (group
boycott)—are just obviously anticompetitive, there is no any other discussion, whether
it effected to antitrust or not, it would be illegal
struck down – urdi
forbidding the market access, lower cost, is per se illegal,

• Δ could achieve it by less anticompetitive means

• Lower ct. in Alston: NCAA could prohibit salaries, but could not restrict
education-related benefits
• [Or “balancing”? Evidence of anticomp harm outweighs evidence of pro-comp
justification. Pre-Alston cases said this, but Alston didn’t.]
12nd Feb 2025
Chapter 3 concerted action – kelishilgan harakat.
Tacit agreements - Mere “Conscious Parallelism” (imitation) is OK
– “Parallelism Plus” may be illegal collusion
• The “plus” factors are circumstantial evidence of collusion
“Facilitating Practices”
– E.g., Trade association rules (CA Dental, Engineers), information sharing
(Foley, Blomkest), standardization of products and price structures

o These obstacles traditionally made economists (and courts) doubt the existence of
large-scale concerted action (cartels).
1. Reaching consensus: Setting a cartel price (or output restriction)
• Requires communication and “agreement”
• What is the best price to charge?
• How to allocate the profits?
2. Maintaining discipline: Cannot make enforceable Ks (can’t sue cheaters)
• Members have incentive to “cheat:” charge a little less than cartel
price, grab more volume
– Cheating can be hard to detect
– Cheating is hard to detect if prices are private or complex, or
demand fluctuations hard to see.
• Ironically, price wars are the best way to punish, but mutually
destructive
• Fear of govt + Plea deals=> informants (Matt Damon)
• Excess firm capacity, vertical integration: more incentive to cheat
• Inelastic demand=> large profits from collusion=> less incentive to
cheat
3. New Entry: The artificially high cartel price attracts new entrants, who will
undercut
Mitigate - yumshatish

Showing how a cartel could overcome cartel problems in the situation at issue can help
make a circumstantial case for concerted action.
• Smaller number of competitors
– Including potential competitors (barriers to entry)
• Simple method of market division
• Product simplicity and uniformity
– Easier to set cartel price, detect cheating
– Small, consistent (not “lumpy”) transactions
• Information availability
– Price lists
• Excess capacity across the industry
 – Can be used to punish cheaters
Nobody should have much more power – main aim of the antitrust
18th Feb, 2025.
• Two elements of a SA § 1 violation:
– contract, combination...or conspiracy [collusion, concerted action,
agreement]
• “Mere parallelism” aka “Tacit collusion” is NOT illegal collusion
• Sometimes the concerted action is obvious
• Ch. 3: “Parallelism Plus:” a PF case of agreement may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence
– that [unreasonably] restrains trade [anticompetitive effect].
• Ch. 2: “Structured RoR:” PF case of unreasonable anticompetitive
effect may be inferred from circumstantial evidence

• Market leaders in text messaging services all charged the same per-text
price (“PPU”). Class action suit alleged this was due to a price-fixing
agreement.
• Δs moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim because it alleged only
circumstantial evidence of an agreement. Court denies the motion.
• Pleading standard: Claim must be “plausible:” more than merely possible.
Twombly
• Extended beyond AT in Iqbal (U.S. 2009)
• Circumstantial evidence can prove a § 1 agreement, and thus may make out
a plausible claim.
• π’s allegations suggesting text industry is conducive to concerted
action:
– Industry Structure: Four firms had 90% share of mkt
– Facilitating Practices: Could communicate price info via
Association
and
• π’ (plaintiff)s allegations suggesting tending to exclude mere
parallelism:
– All 4 firms increased prices despite steeply falling costs.
– All firms quickly switched to simple, uniform pricing, then
increased prices by 1/3
Cartel is difficult to prove their collusion, “implausible”
Allegation – da’vo
• After 3 years of discovery, Δs moved for summary judgment.
• To survive SJ, π’s burden of production is higher than the pleading
standard: evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility” that Δs acted
independently
• (This could be circumstantial evidence)
 • πs have not met their burden: their evidence is consistent with an
agreement, but is “equally consistent” with independent action (mere
parallelism).
• Email: Direct evidence of agreement?
• Market structure
• Trade association: Opportunity to communicate re price. No
evidence information exchange.
• “Sleeper” counterargument “text messaging II 7th circuit”

• Factors tending to distinguish Agreement from mere parallelism

– Communication -
– Complex parallel conduct
– Conduct lacking efficiency justification
• Factors suggesting market is susceptible to coordination (muvofiqlashtirishga
moyil)
– Industry features/market structure
– Past history of coordination
– Rational motive to collude
– Evidence that defendants’ have market power
– Facilitating practices (amaliyotlarni osonlashtirish)
– Actions contrary (aksincha) to individual self-interest(shaxsiy manfaat)
If entrance to the market is easy, it is not possible to cartelizing,
Concerted action – kelishilgan harakat
19th Feb, 2025
1. Collusive effect – direct effect on price or output
- Firms who together have market power act in concert to increase their price or
restrict their output. Lysine, Target, SCTLA.
2. Exclusionary effect – indirect effect on price or output
- Firms in concert or a single firm unilaterally, acts anticompatitavely to cause rival
firm’s price or output. Lorain journal
2 or more firms agreeing to do this violates SA 1 (jtc case, conspiring to cut off new
firm’s access to asphalt supply)
Conspire = collude
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other.
Committing monopoly “monopoly conduct” (MC)
Conduct that interferes with others business “anticompetitive”, rather than improving
your own.
False negatives: firms get away with anticomp conduct
False positives: comp conduct is punished/discouraged
Using monopoly power – not to compete.
24th Feb 2025
enduring influence – doimiy ta’sir
Economic price theory – in “normal” market, firms are price “takers” (setting price) they
cannot choose the price they charge: it is determined by competition.
“market power” – is the abnormal disruption of this normal equilibrium by one firm or
cartel dominates supply such that that it become a price “giver” who dictates the price.
Illegal “monopolization” is the use of monopoly conduct with
• specific intent to obtain or maintain monopoly power: that is, market
power in a single firm; and
• a reasonable probability of succeeding
Monopoly Conduct: Conduct with exclusionary effect. A.k.a. “raising rivals’ costs”
Restricting access to supply (JTC)
Restricting access to customers (Lorain journal, WEOL) – using monopoly power to
maintain it.
• Despite this fundamental similarity, however, the doctrines have differences
– §1: Must prove firms agreed to do something with likelihood of Unrsbl
Anticomp Effect (which requires mkt power)
• Effect may be direct (collusive) OR indirect (exclusionary)
– §2: Must prove intend & likelihood of obtaining/maintaining Monopoly
Power (mkt power) by using monopoly conduct
• Merely having, or even using, MP is not illegal without monopoly
conduct
• Monopoly conduct includes only indirect (exclusionary) conduct
• Exclusionary conduct requires mkt power
The starbucks is not market.
26th Feb 2025.
Exclusionary conduct
Monopolization conduct – doing sth unfair or improper way. (what is unfair or
improper?)
If you have a monopoly power you can do monopoly conduct, monopoly conduct – that
has anticompetitive effect bc of your Monopoly power
Monopoly conduct – refusal to deal with rivals: Kodak sold parts only to OEM buyers or
Kodak repair shop customers.
OEM equipment is equipment or parts made by an Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM) and sold by another company.
• Terminating the relationship could cause § 2 trouble
– Rivals will say the firm terminated only to cause RRC
– One way for firm to rebut is to articulate business reasons for the
termination. Firm should articulate and document them contemporaneously.
• Kodak was making money from selling parts to ISOs. Hard to see
why Kodak would stop selling them other than to make it hard for ISOs to compete with
Kodak
3rd March 2025
Case, us v Microsoft
Gaining market power with its internet explorer. 2001
Monopoly conduct – protecting monopoly, raising rival’s costs, observing rivals.
Microsoft defended its market power illegally by excluding Netscape (RRC)
A very large market share is circumstantial evidence of Market power.
Substitutes – o’rinbosarlar.
Proving Monopoly POwer
Microsoft argued court should have required more direct proof of market power bc
market share/definition are always changing
Court disagrees: - circumstantial evidence is an accepted type of proof in every area of
law.
Market is not that dynamic, precisely bc windows is entrenched (mustahkamlangan.)
• Excluding Netscape’s browser from Windows desktop was monopoly
conduct/RRC:
– Microsoft had MP in the PC OS mkt
– M acquired its MP by legit competitive means, and N was not in the PC OS
market
– BUT M was defending its MP by preventing browsers like N from
developing into competitors
– Examples of M’s conduct:
• Integration of its Internet Explorer browser into Windows OS
• Windows licenses restricted OEMs’ ability to alter Explorer setup
• These aren’t inherently illegal, but were changes that lacked
competitive justification, implying intended anticomp effect. Cf.
Kodak
– Was it likely that M’s conduct maintained its MP? We can never know
what would’ve happened but for the conduct

10th March 2025

• Conduct by a single firm (SA §2)or by multiple firms in concert (SA §1)
• Intended to obtain or protect market power
• By restricting the output of competitors
• Typically done by raising rivals’ costs
– E.g., by “non-price conduct”: cutting off access to inputs or customers
– E.g., by “predatory pricing”: lowering price to drive rivals out of business
(then charging supra-competitive prices to recoup the losses and make
monopoly/cartel profits)
 • A cartel might do this to punish a “maverick” who charges less than
cartel price
• If Predatory Pricing includes “price discrimination,” it also violates
Robinson Patman Act/Clayton Act § 13(a))
• Harm to consumer welfare: Reducing competition indirectly raises
price/ reduces output
Predatory pricing - is a business strategy where a company sells products below cost to
drive competitors out of business. The goal is to later raise prices and recoup losses
(a) Price; selection of customers

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce (tijorat bilan shug’ullanadigan
shaxs), in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly,
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality….

where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce,
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of
them:

Provided, That nothing herein (bu yerda) contained shall prevent differentials which
make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities are to such
purchasers sold or delivered

Four primary theories: to detect Predatory Pricing

• Cost-based: Charging a price below cost of production should be sufficient
circumstantial evidence of PP
• Prior to Brown Williamson, most courts interpreted Utah Pie (US
1967) to say this
• Recoupment (qaytarib olish) Same as above, but only if market has
structural features (such as barriers to entry) that would make it possible for
the predator(s) to charge more than competitive price once rivals are
eliminated.
• Brown Williamson adopted this stricter test and disavowed(rad
etilgan) the cost-based test
• Per Se Lawful: Predatory pricing is difficult and rare bc of the threat of
entry. Thus making it illegal is likely to harm consumers through false
positives.
 • Game Theory: Use game theory to analyze incumbent’s response to entry.
[In some cases, even price > cost could exclude rivals. Brown &
Williamson rejected this]
Legal TEST for predatory pricing
• Most courts had interpreted Utah Pie (US 1967) to say a AT violation can be
found merely by
a. intent to harm competition, or
b. charging a price below cost
• However, B&W Court says
a. SA § 2 requires a “dangerous probability” of monopolization; and
b. RP Act requires a “reasonable possibility” of substantial injury to
competition. Need more proof.
• Thus, it is not enough for Δ to intend to harm competition; court must also
consider intent to gain market power and likelihood of succeeding
Legal TEST for predatory pricing 2
• Cost-based test is not enough
– If Δ is reckless or dumb enough to charge below cost without a decent
chance of surviving the price war and charging supra-competitive prices,
the only effect of Δ’s conduct will be savings for consumers
• STEP 2. Recoupment Test
– Thus π must also show that Δ had…
• Under § 2: a “dangerous probability”
• Under RPA: a “reasonable prospect”
– …of recouping its “investment”
• (i.e., making back the losses it absorbed by charging less than cost)
• The standard theory of PP says a predator can do this by charging
supra-competitive prices after its rivals have been eliminated
12th March 2025
• N was a wholesale co-op. Its retailer members bought stationery and got a
discount in the form of an annual rebate.
• Pacific, an N member, was a “dual distributor”: both a retailer and a (competing)
wholesaler.
• When Pacific violated a co-op rule, NWS expelled it. P could no longer get co-op
discounts.
• Pacific sued, calling this “Concerted Refusal to Deal” a per se violation of SA § 1
(like a group boycott).
• Not “illegal per se:” Unlike a cartel, a closed purchasing co-op is not a “familiar”
kind of anticomp agreement. (recall BMI)
• Unlike a group boycott (Trial Lawyers), the co-op doesn’t raise consumer
prices.
• Expelling P from co-op is not obviously anticompetitive: Many non-
member stationers were doing fine.
• Thus, to make out its prima facie case, P needs some evidence of anticomp effect
(ct will not presume it from the nature of the agreement)
• Is P being denied access to supplies (RRC)?
• Will N will get mkt power by expelling P?
Pacific’s lawsuit is not enough for anticompetitive conduct. Because it was a
member, and was expelled by Nw Stationaries.
17th March 2025
“No firm shall acquire
• the whole or any part of the stock or assets of another firm where
• the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
• lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.”
• Broader prohibition than SA § 1 or § 2
– “MAY” “lessen competition”/“tend to create monop”
– Not “anticompetitive”/“monopolization”
– “lessen competition” is less harm than “mkt power”
• Horizontal
– If Firm 1 acquires control or assets of a competitor firm, it will necessarily
reduce the number of competitors.
• That could make it easier for the remaining competitors to engage in
collusive conduct.
• It could even enable Firm 1 to obtain a monopoly
– DOJ and FTC have tended to focus on horizontal mergers.
• Vertical
– If Firm 1 acquires control or assets of an “upstream” (supplier) firm, it may
become able to reduce competition via exclusion: denying competitors
access to inputs or customers (RRC)
– DOJ and FTC have rarely challenged vertical mergers in the past.
• Conglomerate
– If Firm 1 acquires control or assets of a firm in an unrelated industry,
competition is unlikely to be affected.
• As we’ve seen re other kinds of conduct, a merger with anticompetitive effects
may have procompetitive effects (“efficiency”) as well
31st march 2025
Market is a product or group of products.

It looks like you are asking about the HypoMon test in the context of antitrust law. Could you
clarify what you mean by "HypoMon"? Are you referring to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test
(HMT) used in antitrust analysis?

If so, here's an explanation:

Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HMT) in Antitrust Law

The Hypothetical Monopolist Test (HypoMon Test) is used in antitrust law to define the
relevant market when analyzing mergers and monopolistic practices. It helps determine
whether a company has market power by assessing whether a hypothetical monopolist could
impose a Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP)—typically
around 5-10%—without losing too many customers.

Steps of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test:

1. Start with a proposed market (e.g., a specific product or service).

2. Ask whether a monopolist in that market could profitably raise prices by a small
amount (SSNIP).
3. If enough consumers would switch to alternatives, making the price increase
unprofitable, the market is too narrow, and the test expands to include more substitutes.
4. This process continues until a market is found where a hypothetical monopolist could
raise prices profitably—this is the relevant market for antitrust analysis.

Why Is the HypoMon Test Important?

 Used by regulators like the DOJ and FTC in the U.S. to assess mergers and anti-
competitive behavior.
 Helps define market boundaries to determine if a company has too much power over
pricing.
 Prevents companies from artificially narrowing the market to avoid scrutiny.

Would you like a real-world example of how this test is applied?

4o

Вы сказали:

o'zbekcha tushuntir
ChatGPT сказал:

Gipotezik Monopolist Testi (HypoMon Test) va Antimonopoliya Qonunchiligi

Gipotezik Monopolist Testi (HMT – Hypothetical Monopolist Test) – bu antimonopoliya

qonunchiligi doirasida bozor chegaralarini aniqlash uchun ishlatiladigan usul. Uning asosiy
maqsadi – biror mahsulot yoki xizmat bozorida raqobat yetarlicha bormi yoki
monopoliyaga olib keladigan xavf bormi – shuni aniqlash.

Test qanday ishlaydi?

1. Dastlab biror mahsulot yoki xizmat bozori tanlanadi (masalan, gazlangan ichimliklar
bozori).
2. Faraz qilamizki, shu bozorda bitta monopolist kompaniya bor va u narxlarni 5-10%
ga oshirsa, xaridorlar hali ham shu mahsulotni sotib oladimi?
3. Agar xaridorlar narx oshgani uchun boshqa mahsulotga o‘tib ketsa, demak, bozordagi
raqobat yetarli va bu bozor tor hisoblanadi.
4. Aksincha, agar iste’molchilar hali ham shu mahsulotni sotib olishda davom etsa, demak,
monopolist o‘z narxlarini mustaqil ravishda belgilashi mumkin va bozor chegarasi
aniqlangan bo‘ladi.

Nega bu test muhim?

 AQSh Adliya Vazirligi (DOJ) va Federal Savdo Komissiyasi (FTC) tomonidan

monopoliya va birlashmalarni baholash uchun qo‘llaniladi.
 Korxonalar haddan tashqari kuchli bo‘lib, bozorda narxlarni sun’iy ravishda oshirmasligi
uchun ishlatiladi.
 Yirik kompaniyalar sun’iy ravishda bozorni toraytirib, monopoliyaga oid qonunlardan
qochmasligi uchun qo‘llanadi.

Masalan, Coca-Cola va Pepsi birlashmoqchi bo‘lsa, hukumat Gipotezik Monopolist Testi

orqali tekshiradi: agar bu birlashma natijasida bozorda raqobatchilar qolmay, narxlar
mustaqil oshirilishi mumkin bo‘lsa, demak, bu monopoliyaga olib kelishi mumkin va
ruxsat berilmaydi.