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Preface
The newly revised fifth edition of our Building Java Programs textbook is
designed for use in a two-course introduction to computer science. We have
class-tested it with thousands of undergraduates, most of whom were not
computer science majors, in our CS1-CS2 sequence at the University of
Washington. These courses are experiencing record enrollments, and other
schools that have adopted our textbook report that students are succeeding
with our approach.

Introductory computer science courses are often seen as “killer” courses with
high failure rates. But as Douglas Adams says in The Hitchhiker’s Guide to
the Galaxy, “Don’t panic.” Students can master this material if they can learn it
gradually. Our textbook uses a layered approach to introduce new syntax and
concepts over multiple chapters.

Our textbook uses an “objects later” approach where programming

fundamentals and procedural decomposition are taught before diving into
object-oriented programming. We have championed this approach, which we
sometimes call “back to basics,” and have seen through years of experience
that a broad range of scientists, engineers, and others can learn how to
program in a procedural manner. Once we have built a solid foundation of
procedural techniques, we turn to object-oriented programming. By the end of
the course, students will have learned about both styles of programming.

The Java language is always evolving, and we have made it a point of focus
in recent editions on newer features that have been added in Java 8 through
10. In the fourth edition we added a new Chapter 19 on Java’s functional
programming features introduced in Java 8. In this edition we integrate the
JShell tool introduced in Java 9.

New to This Edition

The following are the major changes for our fifth edition:

JShell integration. Java 9 introduced JShell, a utility with an interactive

read-eval-print loop (REPL) that makes it easy to type Java expressions
and immediately see their results. We find JShell to be a valuable learning
tool that allows students to explore Java concepts without the overhead of
creating a complete program. We introduce JShell in Chapter 2 and
integrate JShell examples in each chapter throughout the text.
Improved Chapter 2 loop coverage. We have added new sections
and figures in Chapter 2 to help students understand loops and
create tables to find patterns in nested loops. This new content is based on
our interactions with our own students as they solve programming
problems with loops early in our courses.
Revamped case studies, examples, and other content. We have
rewritten or revised sections of various chapters based on student and
instructor feedback. We have also rewritten the Chapter 10 (ArrayLists)
case study with a new program focusing on elections and ranked choice
voting.
Updated collection syntax and idioms. Recent releases of Java have
introduced new syntax and features related to collections, such as the
“diamond operator;” collection interfaces such as , , and ;
and new collection methods. We have updated our collection Chapters
10 and 11 to discuss these new features, and we use the diamond
operator syntax with collections in the rest of the text.
 Expanded self-checks and programming exercises. With each new
edition we add new programming exercises to the end of each chapter.
There are roughly fifty total problems and exercises per chapter, all of
which have been class-tested with real students and have solutions
provided for instructors on our web site.
New programming projects. Some chapters have received new
programming projects, such as the Chapter 10 ranked choice ballot
project.

Features from Prior Editions

The following features have been retained from previous editions:

Focus on problem solving. Many textbooks focus on language details

when they introduce new constructs. We focus instead on problem solving.
What new problems can be solved with each construct? What pitfalls are
novices likely to encounter along the way? What are the most common
ways to use a new construct?
Emphasis on algorithmic thinking. Our procedural approach allows us
to emphasize algorithmic problem solving: breaking a large problem into
smaller problems, using pseudocode to refine an algorithm, and grappling
with the challenge of expressing a large program algorithmically.
Layered approach. Programming in Java involves many concepts that
are difficult to learn all at once. Teaching Java to a novice is like trying to
build a house of cards. Each new card has to be placed carefully. If the
process is rushed and you try to place too many cards at once, the entire
structure collapses. We teach new concepts gradually, layer by layer,
allowing students to expand their understanding at a manageable pace.
 Case studies. We end most chapters with a significant case study that
shows students how to develop a complex program in stages and how to
test it as it is being developed. This structure allows us to demonstrate
each new programming construct in a rich context that can’t be achieved
with short code examples. Several of the case studies were expanded and
improved in the second edition.
Utility as a CS1+CS2 textbook. In recent editions, we added chapters
that extend the coverage of the book to cover all of the topics from our
second course in computer science, making the book usable for a two-
course sequence. Chapters 12 –19 explore recursion, searching and
sorting, stacks and queues, collection implementation, linked lists, binary
trees, hash tables, heaps, and more. Chapter 12 also received a
section on recursive backtracking, a powerful technique for exploring a set
of possibilities for solving problems such as 8 Queens and Sudoku.

This year also marks the release of our new Building Python Programs
textbook, which brings our “back to basics” approach to the Python language.
In recent years Python has seen a surge in popularity in introductory computer
science classrooms. We have found that our materials and approach work as
well in Python as they do in Java, and we are pleased to offer the choice of
two languages to instructors and students.

Layers and Dependencies

Many introductory computer science books are language-oriented, but the
early chapters of our book are layered. For example, Java has many control
structures (including for-loops, while-loops, and if/else-statements), and many
books include all of these control structures in a single chapter. While that
might make sense to someone who already knows how to program, it can be
overwhelming for a novice who is learning how to program. We find that it is
much more effective to spread these control structures into different chapters
so that students learn one structure at a time rather than trying to learn them
all at once.

The following table shows how the layered approach works in the first six
chapters:

Chapter Control Data Programming Input/Output

Flow Techniques

1 methods literals procedural ,

decomposition

2 definite variables, local variables, class

loops ( ) expressions, , constants, pseudocode

3 return using objects parameters console input, 2D

values graphics (optional)

4 conditional pre/post conditions,

( ) throwing exceptions

5 indefinite assertions, robust

loops programs
( )

6 token/line-based file file I/O

processing

Chapters 1 –6 are designed to be worked through in order, with greater

flexibility of study then beginning in Chapter 7 . Chapter 6 may be
skipped, although the case study in Chapter 7 involves reading from a file,
a topic that is covered in Chapter 6 .

The following is a dependency chart for the book:

Supplements
http://www.buildingjavaprograms.com/

Answers to all self-check problems appear on our web site and are accessible
to anyone. Our web site has the following additional resources for students:

Online-only supplemental chapters, such as a chapter on creating

Graphical User Interfaces
Source code and data files for all case studies and other complete
program examples
The class used in the optional graphics Supplement 3G

Our web site has the following additional resources for teachers:

PowerPoint slides suitable for lectures

Solutions to exercises and programming projects, along with homework
specification documents for many projects
Sample exams and solution keys
Additional lab exercises and programming exercises with solution keys
Closed lab creation tools to produce lab handouts with the instructor's
choice of problems integrated with the textbook

To access instructor resources, contact us at

[email protected]. The same materials are also
available at http://www.pearsonhighered.com/cs-resources. To ask other
questions related to resources, contact your Pearson sales representative.
MyLab Programming
MyLab Programming is an online practice and assessment tool that helps
students fully grasp the logic, semantics, and syntax of programming. Through
practice exercises and immediate, personalized feedback, MyLab
Programming improves the programming competence of beginning students
who often struggle with basic concepts and paradigms of popular high-level
programming languages. A self-study and homework tool, the MyLab
Programming course consists of hundreds of small practice exercises
organized around the structure of this textbook. For students, the system
automatically detects errors in the logic and syntax of code submissions and
offers targeted hints that enable students to figure out what went wrong, and
why. For instructors, a comprehensive grade book tracks correct and incorrect
answers and stores the code inputted by students for review.

For a full demonstration, to see feedback from instructors and students, or to

adopt MyLab Programming for your course, visit the following web site:
www.pearson.com/mylab/programming

VideoNotes
We have recorded a series of instructional videos to accompany the textbook.
They are available at the following web site:
http://www.pearsonhighered.com/cs-resources

Roughly 3–4 videos are posted for each chapter. An icon in the margin of the
page indicates when a VideoNote is available for a given topic. In each video,
we spend 5–15 minutes walking through a particular concept or problem,
talking about the challenges and methods necessary to solve it. These videos
make a good supplement to the instruction given in lecture classes and in the
textbook. Your new copy of the textbook has an access code that will allow
you to view the videos.

Acknowledgments
First, we would like to thank the many colleagues, students, and teaching
assistants who have used and commented on early drafts of this text. We
could not have written this book without their input. Special thanks go to
Hélène Martin, who pored over early versions of our first edition chapters to
find errors and to identify rough patches that needed work. We would also like
to thank instructor Benson Limketkai for spending many hours performing a
technical proofread of the second edition.

Second, we would like to thank the talented pool of reviewers who guided us
in the process of creating this textbook:

Greg Anderson, Weber State University

Delroy A. Brinkerhoff, Weber State University
Ed Brunjes, Miramar Community College
Tom Capaul, Eastern Washington University
Tom Cortina, Carnegie Mellon University
Charles Dierbach, Towson University
H.E. Dunsmore, Purdue University
Michael Eckmann, Skidmore College
Mary Anne Egan, Siena College
Leonard J. Garrett, Temple University
Ahmad Ghafarian, North Georgia College & State University
Raj Gill, Anne Arundel Community College
Michael Hostetler, Park University
David Hovemeyer, York College of Pennsylvania
Chenglie Hu, Carroll College
Philip Isenhour, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Andree Jacobson, University of New Mexico
David C. Kamper, Sr., Northeastern Illinois University
Simon G.M. Koo, University of San Diego
Evan Korth, New York University
Joan Krone, Denison University
John H.E.F. Lasseter, Fairfield University
Eric Matson, Wright State University
Kathryn S. McKinley, University of Texas, Austin
Jerry Mead, Bucknell University
George Medelinskas, Northern Essex Community College
John Neitzke, Truman State University
Dale E. Parson, Kutztown University
Richard E. Pattis, Carnegie Mellon University
Frederick Pratter, Eastern Oregon University
Roger Priebe, University of Texas, Austin
Dehu Qi, Lamar University
John Rager, Amherst College
Amala V.S. Rajan, Middlesex University
Craig Reinhart, California Lutheran University
 Mike Scott, University of Texas, Austin
Alexa Sharp, Oberlin College
Tom Stokke, University of North Dakota
Leigh Ann Sudol, Fox Lane High School
Ronald F. Taylor, Wright State University
Andy Ray Terrel, University of Chicago
Scott Thede, DePauw University
Megan Thomas, California State University, Stanislaus
Dwight Tuinstra, SUNY Potsdam
Jeannie Turner, Sayre School
Tammy VanDeGrift, University of Portland
Thomas John VanDrunen, Wheaton College
Neal R. Wagner, University of Texas, San Antonio
Jiangping Wang, Webster University
Yang Wang, Missouri State University
Stephen Weiss, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Laurie Werner, Miami University
Dianna Xu, Bryn Mawr College
Carol Zander, University of Washington, Bothell

Finally, we would like to thank the great staff at Pearson who helped produce
the book. Michelle Brown, Jeff Holcomb, Maurene Goo, Patty Mahtani, Nancy
Kotary, and Kathleen Kenny did great work preparing the first edition. Our
copy editors and the staff of Aptara Corp, including Heather Sisan, Brian
Baker, Brendan Short, and Rachel Head, caught many errors and improved
the quality of the writing. Marilyn Lloyd and Chelsea Bell served well as
project manager and editorial assistant respectively on prior editions. For their
help with the third edition we would like to thank Kayla Smith-Tarbox,
Production Project Manager, and Jenah Blitz-Stoehr, Computer Science
Editorial Assistant. Mohinder Singh and the staff at Aptara, Inc., were also
very helpful in the final production of the third edition. For their great work on
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And the “Great Silent One,” as the French picturesquely describe the Army, began to talk
and to shout louder and louder still, enforcing its demands by threats, by arms, and by
shedding the blood of those who dared to resist its folly.
At the end of April the final draft of the “Declaration” was sent by Gutchkov to the Stavka
for approval. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and myself returned an emphatic
disapproval, in which we gave vent to all our moral sufferings and our grief for the dark
future of the Army. Our conclusion was that the “Declaration” “was the last nail driven into
the coffin which has been prepared for the Russian Army.” On May 1st Gutchkov resigned
from the War Ministry, as he did not wish “to share the responsibility for the heavy sin
which was committed against the Mother Country,” and in particular to sign the
“Declaration.”

The Stavka sent copies of the draft “Declaration” to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fronts
for reference, and they were called by General Alexeiev to Moghilev, in order to discuss the
fateful position. This historical Conference took place on May 2nd. The speeches, in which
the collapse of the Russian Army was described, were restrained and yet moving, as they
reflected deep sorrow and apprehension. Brussilov, in a low voice expressing sincere and
unfeigned pain, ended thus: “All this can yet be borne, and there still remains some hope
of saving the Army and leading it forward, provided the ‘Declaration’ is not issued. If it is,
there is no salvation, and I would not remain in office for a single day.” This last sentence
provoked a warm protest from General Stcherbatchov, who argued that no one should
resign, that, however arduous and hopeless the position may be, the leaders cannot
abandon the Army.... Somebody suggested that all the Commanders-in-Chief should
immediately proceed to Petrograd, and address to the Provisional Government a stern
warning and definite demands. The General who suggested this thought that such a
demonstration would produce a very strong impression and might arrest the progress of
destructive legislation. Others thought that it was a dangerous expedient and our last
trump card, and that, should the step prove ineffective, the High Command would be
definitely discredited. The suggestion, however, was accepted, and, on the 4th May, a
Conference took place of all the Commanders-in-Chief (with the exception of the
Caucasian Front), the Provisional Government, and the Executive Committee of the Soviet.
I am in possession of the record of that Conference, of which I give extensive extracts
below. The condition of the Army, such as it appeared to its leaders, in the course of
events, and without, therefore, any historical perspective, is therein described, as well as
the characteristics of the men who were then in power. The trend of the speeches made
by the Commander-in-Chief was the same as in the Stavka, but they were less emphatic
and less sincere. Brussilov smoothed over his accusations, lost his pathos, “warmly
greeted the Coalition Ministry,” and did not repeat his threat of resignation.
The Record.
General Alexeiev.—I consider it necessary to speak quite frankly. We are all united in
wishing for the good of our country. Our paths may differ, but we have a common goal of
ending the War in such a manner as to allow Russia to come out of it unbroken, albeit
tired and suffering. Only victory can give us the desired consummation. Only then will
creative work be possible. But victory must be achieved, and that is only possible if the
orders of the Commanding Officers are obeyed. If not, it is not an Army, but a mob. To sit
in the trenches does not mean to reach the end of the War. The enemy is transferring, in
great haste, division after division from our Front to the Franco-British Front, and we
continue to sit still. Meanwhile, the conditions are most favourable for our victory, but we
must advance in order to win it. Our Allies are losing faith in us. We must reckon with this
in the diplomatic sphere, and I particularly in the military one. It seemed as if the
Revolution would raise our spirits, would give us impetus, and therefore victory. In that,
unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. Not only is there no enthusiasm or impetus,
but the lowest instincts have come to the fore, such as self-preservation. The interests of
the Mother Country and its future are not being considered.... You will ask what has
happened to the authority, to principles, or even to physical compulsion? I am bound to
state that the reforms to which the Army has as yet failed to adapt itself have shaken it,
have undermined order and discipline. Discipline is the mainstay of the Army. If we follow
that path any further there will be a complete collapse.... The Commanders-in-Chief will
give you a series of facts describing the condition of the Armies. I will offer a conclusion
and will give expression to our desires and demands, which must be complied with.
General Brussilov.—I must first of all describe to you the present condition of the officers
and men. Cavalry, artillery and engineering troops have retained about 50 per cent. of
their cadres. But in the infantry, which is the mainstay of the Army, the position is entirely
different. Owing to enormous casualties in killed, wounded and prisoners, as well as many
deserters, some regiments have changed their cadres nine or ten times, so that only from
three to ten men remain of the original formation. Reinforcements are badly trained and
their discipline is still worse. Of the regular officers from two to four remain and in many
cases they are wounded. Other officers are youngsters commissioned after a short training
and enjoying no authority owing to their lack of experience. It is upon these new cadres
that the task has fallen to remodel the Army on a new basis, and that task has so far
proved beyond their capacity. Although we felt that a change was necessary and that it
had already come too late, the ground was nevertheless unprepared. The uneducated
soldier understood it as a deliverance from the officers’ yoke. The officers greeted the
change with enthusiasm. Had this not been so, the Revolution may not have probably
passed so smoothly. The result, however, was that freedom was only given to the men,
whereas the officers had to be content to play the part of pariahs of liberty. The
unconscious masses were intoxicated with liberty. Everyone knows that extensive rights
have been granted, but they do not know what these rights are, and nobody bothers
about duties. The position of the officers is very difficult. From 15 to 20 per cent. have
rapidly adapted themselves to the new conditions, because they believed that these
conditions were all to the good. Those of the officers who were trusted by the men did not
lose that trust. Some, however, became too familiar with the men, were too lenient and
even encouraged internal dissensions amongst the men. But the majority of the officers,
about 75 per cent., were unable to adapt themselves. They were offended, retired to the
background and do not know what to do now. We are trying to bring them into contact
with the soldiers once more, because we need the officers for continued fighting, and we
have no other cadres. Many of the officers have no political training, do not know how to
make speeches—and this, of course, handicaps the work of mutual understanding. It is
necessary to explain and to instil into the masses the idea that freedom has been granted
to everyone. I have known our soldiers for forty-five years, I love them and I will do my
best to bring them into close touch with the officers, but the Provisional Government, the
Duma and particularly the Soviet should also make every effort in order to assist in that
work which must be done as soon as possible in the interests of the country. It is also
necessary, owing to the peculiar fashion in which the illiterate masses have understood the
watchword “without annexations and indemnities.” One of the regiments has declared that
not only would it refuse to advance, but desired to leave the front and to go home. The
Committees opposed this tendency, but were told that they would be dismissed. I had a
lengthy argument with the regiment, and when I asked the men whether they agreed with
me, they begged leave to give me a written answer. A few minutes later they presented to
me a poster: “Peace at any price and down with the War.” In the course of a subsequent
talk I had with one of the men, he said to me: “If there are to be no annexations, why do
we want that hill top?” My reply was: “I also do not want the hill top, but we must beat
the enemy who is occupying it.” Finally, the men promised to hold on, but refused to
advance, arguing that “the enemy is good to us and has informed us that he will not
advance provided we do not move. It is important that we should go home to enjoy
freedom and the land. Why should we allow ourselves to be maimed?” Is it to be an
offensive or a defensive campaign? Success can be only obtained by an offensive. If we
conduct a passive defence the front is bound to be broken. If discipline is strong a break-
through may yet be remedied. But we must not forget that we have no well-disciplined
troops, that they are badly trained and that the officers have no authority. In these
circumstances an enemy success may easily become a catastrophe. The masses must,
therefore, be persuaded that we must advance instead of remaining on the defensive.
We thus have many shortcomings, but numerical superiority is still on our side. If the
enemy succeeds in breaking the French and the British, he will throw his entire weight
upon us and we will then be lost. We need a strong government upon which we could rely,
and we whole-heartedly greet the coalition government. The power of the State can only
be strong when it leans upon the Army, which represents the armed forces of the nation.
General Dragomirov.—The prevailing spirit in the Army is the desire of peace. Anyone
might be popular in the Army who would preach peace without annexations and would
advocate self-determination. The illiterate masses have understood the idea of “no
annexations” in a peculiar fashion. They do not understand the conditions of different
peoples, and they repeatedly ask the question: “Why do not the Allied democracies join in
our declarations?” The desire for peace is so strong that reinforcements refuse to accept
equipment and arms and say: “They are no good to us as we do not intend to fight.” Work
has come to a standstill and it is even necessary to see to it that trenches are not
dismantled and that roads are mended. In one of the best regiments we found, on the
sector which it had occupied, a red banner inscribed: “Peace at all costs.” The officer who
tore that banner had to flee for his life. During the night men from that regiment were
searching for the officer at Dvinsk, as he had been concealed by the Headquarters Staff.
The dreadful expression “Adherents of the old régime” caused the best officers to be cast
out of the Army. We all wanted a change, and yet many excellent officers, the pride of the
Army, had to join the Reserve simply because they tried to prevent the disruption of the
Army, but failed to adapt themselves to the new conditions. What is much more fatal is the
growth of slackness and of a lingering spirit. Egoism is reaching terrible proportions, and
each unit thinks only of its own welfare; endless deputations come to us daily, demanding
to be relieved, to remove Commanding Officers, to be re-equipped, etc. All these
deputations have to be addressed, and this hinders our work. Orders that used to be
implicitly obeyed now demand lengthy arguments; if a battery is moved to a different
sector, there is immediate discontent, and the men say: “You are weakening us—you are
traitors.” Owing to the weakness of the Baltic Fleet, we found it necessary to send an
Army Corps to the rear to meet the eventual landing of an enemy force, but we were
unable to do so, because the men said: “Our line is long enough as it is and if we lengthen
it still more we will be unable to hold the enemy.” Formerly we had no difficulty
whatsoever in regrouping the troops. In September, 1915, eleven Army Corps were
removed from the Western front, and this saved us from a defeat which might have
decided the fate of the War. At present such a thing would be impossible, as every unit
raises objections to the slightest move. It is very difficult to compel the men to do
anything in the interests of the Mother Country. Regiments refuse to relieve their
comrades in the firing line under various excuses—such as bad weather, or the fact that
not all their men had had their baths. On one occasion a unit refused to go to the front on
the plea that it had already been in the firing line at Easter time. We are compelled to ask
the Committees of various regiments to argue the matter out. Only a small minority of
officers is behaving in an undignified manner, trying to make themselves popular by
bowing to the instincts of the men. The system of elections has not been introduced in its
entirety, but many unpopular officers have been summarily dismissed as they were
accused of being adherents to the old régime; other Commanding Officers, who had been
considered incompetent and liable to dismissal, have been made to stay. It was quite
impossible not to grant the demands for their retention. With regard to excesses there
have been individual cases of shootings of officers.... Things cannot continue on these
lines. We want strong power. We have fought for the country. You have taken the ground
from under our feet. Will you kindly restore it? Our obligations are colossal, and we must
have the power in order to be able to lead to victory the millions of soldiers who are
entrusted to our care.
General Stcherbatchov.—The illiteracy of the soldiery is the main reason of all these
phenomena. It is not, of course, the fault of our people that it is illiterate. For this the old
régime is entirely responsible, as it looked upon education from the point of view of the
Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, we have to reckon with the fact that the masses do
not understand the gravity of our position, and that they misinterpret even such ideas as
may be considered reasonable.... If we do not wish Russia to collapse, we must continue
the struggle and we must advance. Otherwise we shall witness a grotesque sight. The
representatives of oppressed Russia fought heroically; but having overthrown the
government that was striving for peace with dishonour, the citizens of free Russia are
refusing to fight and to safeguard their liberties. This is grotesque, strange,
incomprehensible. But it is so. The reason is that discipline has gone and there is no faith
in the Commanding Officers. Mother Country, to most men, is an empty sound. These
conditions are most painful, but they are particularly painful on the Roumanian front,
where one has to reckon not only with military surroundings of specific difficulty, but also
with a very complex political atmosphere. Our people are used to plains, and the
mountainous nature of the theatre of war has a depressing effect upon the troops. We
often hear the complaint: “Do not keep us in these cursed mountains.” We have only one
railway line to rely upon for supplies, and have great difficulty in feeding the troops. This,
of course, enhances discontent. The fact that we are fighting on Roumanian territory is
interpreted as a fight “for Roumania,” which is also an unpopular idea. The attitude of the
local population is not always friendly, and the men come to the conclusion that they are
being refused assistance by those on whose behalf they are fighting. Friction thus arises
and deepens, because some of the Roumanians blame us for the defeats which they have
themselves suffered and owing to which they have lost most of their territory and of their
belongings. The Roumanian Government and the Allied representatives are well aware of
the ferment in our Army, and their attitude towards us is changing. I personally noticed
that a shadow has fallen between us, and that the former respect and faith in the prowess
of the Russian Army have vanished. I still enjoy great authority, but if the disruption of the
Army continues not only shall we lose our Allies but make enemies of them, and there
would then be a danger of peace being made at our expense. In 1914 we advanced across
the whole of Galicia. In 1915, in our retreat, we took at the South-Western front 100,000
prisoners. You may judge what that retreat was like and what was the spirit of the troops.
In the summer of 1916 we saved Italy from disaster. Is it possible that we may now
abandon the Allied cause and be false to our obligations? The Army is in a state of
disruption, but that can be remedied. Should we succeed, within a month and a half our
brave officers and men would advance again. History will wonder at the inadequate means
with which we achieved brilliant results in 1916. If you wish to raise the Russian Army and
to convert it into a strong organised body which will dictate the terms of peace, you must
help us. All is not lost yet, but only on condition that the Commanding Officers will regain
prestige and confidence. We hope that full powers in the Army will once again be vested in
the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who alone can manage the troops. We will obey the
will of the Provisional Government, but you must give us strong support.
General Gourko.—If you wish to continue the War till the desired end, you must restore
the power of the Army. We have received the draft of the “Declaration” (of the rights of
the soldier). Gutchkov would not sign it and has resigned. I am bound to say that if a
civilian has resigned and refused to sign that declaration—to us, the Army Chiefs, it is
inacceptable. It simply completely destroys everything that is left. I will recount to you an
episode which occurred while I was temporarily holding the office of Chief-of-Staff of the
Supreme C.-in-C.
On February 13th I had a long talk with the late Czar, trying to persuade him to grant a
responsible ministry. As a last trump card, I alluded to our international position, to the
attitude of our Allies and to the probable consequences of this measure. But my card was
already beaten. I will now endeavour to describe our international position. We have no
direct indication of the attitude of our Allies towards our intentions to give up the struggle.
We cannot, of course, force them to express their innermost thoughts. As in time of war,
one is often compelled to come to a decision “for the enemy,” I will now try to argue “for
the Allies.”
It was easy to begin the Revolution, but we have been submerged by its tidal wave. I trust
that common sense will help us to survive this. If not, if the Allies realise our impotence,
the principles of practical policy will force upon them the only issue—a separate peace.
That would not be on their part a breach of obligations, because we had promised to fight
together and have now come to a standstill. If one of the parties is fighting and the other
is sitting in the trenches, like a Chinese dragon, waiting for the result of the fight—you
must agree that the fighting side may begin to think of making separate peace. Such a
peace would, of course, be concluded at our expense. The Austrians and the Germans can
get nothing from our Allies: their finance is in a state of collapse and they have no natural
riches. Our finances are also in a state of collapse, but we have immense untouched
natural resources. Our Allies would, of course, come to such a decision only as a last
resort, because it would be not peace, but a lengthy armistice. Bred as they are upon the
ideals of the nineteenth century, the Germans, having enriched themselves at our
expense, would once again fall upon us and upon our late Allies. You may say that if this is
possible why should we not conclude a separate peace first. Here I will mention first of all
the moral aspect of the question. The obligation was undertaken by Russia, not merely by
the late autocrat. I was aware—long before you had heard of it—of the duplicity of the
Czar, who had concluded soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 an alliance with
the Emperor William, while the Franco-Russian Alliance was still in existence. The free
Russian people, responsible for its acts, cannot renounce its obligations. But setting aside
the moral aspect, there remains the material problem. If we open negotiations they
cannot remain secret, and our Allies would hear of it within two or three days. They would
also enter into a parley, and a kind of auction sale would begin. The Allies are, of course,
richer than ourselves, but on their side the struggle has not yet ended; besides, our
enemies could get much more at our expense. It is precisely from the international point
of view that we must prove our capacity for a continued struggle. I will not continue to
revolutionise the Army, because if I should we might find ourselves powerless not only to
advance but even to remain on the defensive. The latter is infinitely more difficult. In 1915
we retreated and orders were obeyed. You were entitled to expect this, because we had
trained the Army. The position has now been altered; you have created something new
and have deprived us of power. You can no longer hold us responsible, and the
responsibility must fall heavily upon your heads. You say that the Revolution is still
proceeding. Listen to us. We are better acquainted with the psychology of the troops, we
have gone with them through thick and thin. Stop the Revolution and give us, the military
Chiefs, a chance to do our duty and to bring Russia to such a condition in which you may
continue your work. Otherwise, we will hand over to you not Russia, but a field in which
our enemies will sow and reap, and Democracy itself will curse you. It will be Democracy
that will suffer if the Germans win. Democracy will be starving—while the peasants will
always manage to feed themselves on their own land. It was said of the old régime that it
“played into the hands of William.” Will it be possible to level the same accusation against
you? William is fortunate indeed, as both Monarchs and Democracies are playing into his
hands. The Army is on the eve of disruption. Our Mother Country is in danger and is
nearing a collapse. You must help. It is easy to destroy, and if you know how to destroy—
you should also know how to rebuild.
General Alexeiev.—The main points have been stated, and they are true. The Army is on
the brink of the abyss. Another step and it will fall into the abyss and will drag along
Russia and all her liberties, and there will be no return. Everyone is guilty, and the guilt
lies heavily upon all that has been done in that direction for the last two and a half
months. We have made every effort and are now devoting all our strength to the task of
restoring the Army. We trust that Mr. Kerensky will apply all his qualities of mind and
character and all his influence to that consummation, and will help us. But that is not
enough. Those who have been disrupting the Army must also help. Those who have
issued the Order No. 1 must issue a series of orders and comments. If the “Declaration” is
published, as Gutchkov said, the last flimsy foundations will fall into dust and the last hope
will be dashed. Be patient, there is time still. That which has been granted in the last two
and a half months has not as yet taken root. We have regulations defining rights and
duties. All the regulations that are issued nowadays only mention rights. You must do
away with the idea that peace will come by itself. Those who say “down with the War” are
traitors, and those who say “there should be no advance” are cowards. We still have men
with sincere convictions. Let them come to us not as passing stars, but let them live with
us and dispel the misunderstandings that have arisen. You have the Press. May it
encourage patriotism and demand that everyone do his duty.
Prince Lvov.—We have heard the Commanders-in-Chief, we understand all they have said
and will do our duty to our country till the end.
Tzeretelli.—There is no one here who has contributed to the disruption of the Army and
played into the hands of William. I have heard the accusation that the Soviet has
contributed to the disruption of the Army. And yet everyone agrees that the Soviet is the
only institution that enjoys authority at present. What would happen were there no Soviet?
Fortunately, Democracy has come to the rescue and we still have hope in salvation. What
can you do? There are only two paths for you to follow. One is to reject the policy of the
Soviets. But you would then have no source of power wherewith to hold the Army and to
lead it for the salvation of Russia. Your other path is the true path, which we have tried;
the path of unity with the desires and expectations of the people. If the Commanding
Officers have failed to make it quite clear that the whole strength of the Army for the
defence of the country lay in the advance, there is no magic wand capable of doing it. It is
alleged that the watchword “Without annexations or indemnities” has demoralised the
Army and the masses. It is quite likely that it has been misunderstood, but it should have
been explained that this was the ultimate aim; we cannot renounce that watchword. We
are aware that Russia is in danger, but her defence is a matter for the people as a whole.
The Power must be united and must enjoy the confidence of the people, but this can only
be achieved if the old policy is completely discarded. Unity can only be based on
confidence, which cannot be bought. The ideals of the Soviet are not those of separate
and small groups—they are the ideals of the country. To renounce them is to renounce the
country. You might, perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew the conditions in which
it was issued. We were confronted with an unorganised mob and we had to organise it.
The masses of the soldiery do not wish to go on with the War. They are wrong, and I
cannot believe that they are prompted by cowardice. It is the result of distrust. Discipline
should remain. But if the soldiers realise that you are not fighting against Democracy, they
will trust you. By this means the Army may yet be saved. By this means the authority of
the Soviet will be strengthened. There is only one way of salvation, the way of confidence
and of the Democratisation of the country and of the Army. It is by accepting those
principles that the Soviet has gained the confidence of the people and is now in a position
to carry out its ideas. As long as that is so, not all is lost. You must try to enhance the
confidence in the Soviet.
Skobelev.—We have not come here to listen to reproaches. We know what is going on in
the Army. The conditions which you have described are undoubtedly ominous. It will
depend upon the spirit of the Russian people whether the ultimate goal will be reached
and whether we shall come out of the present difficulty with honour. I consider it
necessary to explain the circumstances in which Order No. 1 was issued. In the troops
which had overthrown the old régime, the Commanding Officers had not joined the
mutineers; we were compelled to issue that Order so as to deprive these officers of
authority. We were anxious about the attitude of the front towards the Revolution and
about the instructions that were being given. We have proved to-day that our misgivings
were not unfounded. Let us speak the truth: the activities of the Commanding Staff have
prevented the Army, in these two and a half months, from understanding the Revolution.
We quite realise the difficulties of your position. But when you say that the Revolution
must be stayed, we are bound to reply that the Revolution cannot begin or end to order.
Revolution may take its normal course when the mental process of the Revolution spreads
all over the country, when it is understood by the 70 per cent. of illiterate people.
Far be it from us to demand that all Commanding Officers be elected. We agree with you
that we have power and have succeeded in attaining it. When you will understand the
aims of the Revolution and will help the people to understand our watchword, you will also
acquire the necessary power. The people must know what they are fighting for. You are
leading the Army for the defeat of the enemy, and you must explain that a strategical
advance is necessary in order that the watchwords that have been proclaimed may be
vindicated. We trust the new War Minister and hope that a revolutionary Minister will
continue our work and will hasten the mental process of the Revolution in the heads of
those who think too slowly.
The War Minister—Kerensky.—As Minister and Member of the Government, I must say that
we are trying to save the country and to restore the fighting capacity and activities of the
Russian Army. We assume responsibility, but we also assume the right to lead the Army
and to show it the path of future development. Nobody has been uttering reproaches
here. Everyone has described what he has lived through and has tried to define the causes
of events, but our aims and desires are the same. The Provisional Government recognises
that the Soviet has played a prominent part and admits its work of organisation—
otherwise I would not be War Minister. No one can level accusations at the Soviet. But no
one can accuse the Commanding Staffs either, because the officers have borne the brunt
of the Revolution quite as much as the rest of the Russian people. Everyone understands
the position. Now that my comrades are joining the Government, it will be easier to attain
our common aims. There is but one thing for us to do—to save our freedom. I will ask you
to proceed to your commands and to remember that the whole of Russia stands behind
you and behind the Army. It is our aim to give our country complete freedom. But this
cannot be done unless we show the world at large that we are strong in spirit.
General Gourko (replying to Skobelev and Tzeretelli).—We are discussing the matter from
different angles. Discipline is the fundamental condition of the existence of the Army. The
percentage of losses which a unit may suffer without losing its fighting capacity is the
measure of its endurance. I have spent eight months in the South African Republics and
have seen regiments of two different kinds: (1) Small, disciplined and (2) Volunteer,
undisciplined. The former continued to fight and did not lose their fighting power when
their losses amounted to 50 per cent. The latter, although they were volunteers who knew
what they were fighting for, left the ranks and fled from the battlefield after losing 10 per
cent. No force on earth could induce them to fight. That is the difference between
disciplined and undisciplined troops. We demand discipline. We do all we can to persuade.
But your authoritative voice must be heard. We must remember that if the enemy
advances, we shall fall to pieces like a pack of cards. If you will not cease to revolutionise
the Army—you must assume power yourselves.
Prince Lvov.—Our ends are the same and everyone will do his duty. I thank you for your
visit and for giving us your views.

The Conference came to a close. The Commanders-in-Chief rejoined their fronts, fully
conscious that the last card had been beaten. At the same time, the Soviet orators and the
Press started a campaign of abuse against Generals Alexeiev, Gourko and Dragomirov,
which rendered their resignations imperative. On the 9th of May, as I already mentioned,
Kerensky confirmed the “Declaration” while issuing an Order of the Day on the
inadmissibility of senior Commanding Officers relinquishing their posts “in order to shirk
responsibility.” What was the impression produced by that fateful Order?
Kerensky afterwards tried to adduce the excuse that the regulation was drafted before he
had assumed office and was approved of by the Executive Committee as well as by
“military authorities,” and that he had no reason to refuse to confirm it; in a word, that he
was compelled to do so. But I recall more than one of Kerensky’s speeches in which,
believing his course to be the right one, he prided himself on his courage in issuing a
Declaration “which Gutchkov had not dared to sign, and which had evoked the protests of
all the Commanding Officers.” On May 13th the Executive Committee of the Soviets
responded to the Declaration by an enthusiastic proclamation which dwelt mainly upon the
question of saluting. Poor, indeed, was the mind that inspired this verbiage: “Two months
we have waited for this day.... Now the soldier is by law a citizen.... Henceforward the
citizen soldier is free from the servile saluting, and will greet anyone he chooses as an
equal and free man.... In the Revolutionary Army discipline will live through popular
enthusiasm ... and not by means of compulsory saluting....” Such were the men who
undertook to reorganise the Army.
As a matter of fact, the majority of the Revolutionary Democracy of the Soviets were not
satisfied with the Declaration. They described it as “a new enslavement of the soldier,” and
a campaign was opened for further widening of these rights. Members of the Defencist
coalition demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered to challenge
the appointments of the Commanding Officers and to give them attestations, as well as
that freedom of speech should be granted on service. Their chief demand, however, was
for the exclusion of Paragraph 14 of the Declaration entitling the Commanding Officer to
use arms in the firing line against insubordination. I need hardly mention the disapproval
of the Left, “Defeatist” Section of the Soviet.
The Liberal Press utterly failed to appraise the importance of the Declaration and never
treated it seriously. The official organ of the Constitutional Democratic Party (Retch, May
11th) had an article which expressed great satisfaction that the Declaration “afforded
every soldier the chance of taking part in the political life of the country, definitely freed
him from the shackles of the old régime and led him from the stale atmosphere of the old
barracks into the fresh air of liberty.” It also said that “throughout the world all other
armies are remote from politics, whilst the Russian Army will be the first to enjoy the
fullness of political rights.” Even the Conservative paper (Novoc Vremia) said in a leading
article: “It is a memorable day; to-day the great Army of mighty Russia becomes truly the
Army of the Revolution.... Intercourse between warriors of all ranks will henceforward be
placed upon the common foundation of a sense of duty binding on every citizen,
irrespective of rank. And the Revolutionary Army of regenerated Russia will go forward to
the great ordeal of blood with faith in victory and in peace.” Difficult, indeed, was the task
of the Commanding Officers who were endeavouring to preserve the Army when they
found that the fundamental principles upon which the very existence of the Army
depended were misunderstood so grossly, even in circles which had heretofore been
considered as the mainstay of Russian statesmanship.
The Commanding Officers were still more disheartened, and the Army fell into the abyss
with ever-increasing rapidity.
 CHAPTER XXI.
The Press and Propaganda.
In the late World War, along with aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases and other marvels of
military technique, a new and powerful weapon came to the fore, viz: propaganda. Strictly
speaking, it was not altogether new, for as far back as 1826 Canning said, in the House of
Commons: “Should we ever have to take part in a war we shall gather under our flag all
the rebels, all those who, with or without cause, are discontented in the country that goes
against us.” But now this means of conflict attained an extraordinary development,
intensity and organisation, attacking the most morbid and sensitive points of national
psychology. Organised on a large scale, supplied with vast means, the propaganda organs
of Great Britain, France and America, especially those of Great Britain, carried on a terrible
warfare by word of mouth, in the Press, in the films and ... with gold, extending this
warfare over the territories of the enemy, the Allies and the neutrals, introducing it into all
spheres—military, political, moral and economic. The more so, that Germany especially
gave grounds enough for propaganda to have a plentiful supply of irrefragable, evidential
material at its disposal. It is difficult to enumerate, even in their general features alone,
that enormous arsenal of ideas which, step by step, drop by drop, deepened class
differences, undermined the power of the State, sapped the moral powers of the enemy
and their confidence in victory, disintegrated their alliance, roused the neutral powers
against them and finally raised the falling spirits of their allied peoples. Nevertheless, we
should not attach exceptional importance to this external moral pressure, as the leaders of
the German people are now doing, to justify themselves: Germany has suffered a political,
economic, military and moral defeat. It was only the interaction of all these factors that
determined the fatal issue of the struggle, which, towards its end, became a lingering
death-agony. One could only marvel at the vitality of the German people, which, by its
intellectual power and the stability of its political thought, held out so long, until at last, in
November, 1918, “a double death-blow, both at the front and in the rear,” laid it in the
dust. In connection with this, history will undoubtedly note a great analogy between the
parts played by the “Revolutionary Democracies” of Russia and of Germany in the
destinies of these peoples. After the débâcle the leader of the German Independent Social
Democrats acquainted the country with the great and systematic work which they had
carried on, from the beginning of 1918, for the breaking down of the German Army and
Navy, to the glory of the social revolution. In this work one is struck by the similarity of
method and modus operandi with those practised in Russia.
While unable to resist British and French propaganda, the Germans were very successful in
applying this means to their Eastern antagonist, the more so that: “Russia created her
own misfortunes,” said Ludendorff, “and the work which we carried on there was not too
hard.”
The results of the interaction of the skilful hand of Germany with the movements which
arose, less from the fact itself of the Revolution than from the individual character of the
Russian rebellion, exceeded the highest hopes of the Germans.
The work was carried on in three directions—political, military and social. In the first we
note the idea, quite clearly and definitely formulated and systematically carried out by the
German Government, of the dismemberment of Russia. Its realisation took shape in the
proclamation, on November 15, 1916, of the Kingdom of Poland[20] with a territory which
was to extend eastward “as far as possible”; in the creation of the States of Courland and
Lithuania—“independent,” but in union with Germany; in the sharing of the White Russian
provinces between Poland and Lithuania, and, finally, in the prolonged and very persistent
preparation of the secession of Little Russia, which took place later, in 1918. While the
former facts had a meaning only in principle, concerning, as they did, territories actually
occupied by the Germans and defined the character of the future “annexations,” the
attitude assumed by the Central Powers with respect to Little Russia exercised a direct
influence on the stability of our South-Western front, creating political complications in the
country and separatist tendencies in the Army. I shall return to this question later.
The German Headquarters included an excellently organised “press-bureau,” which,
besides influencing and directing the home Press, also guided German propaganda, which
penetrated mainly into Russia and France. Miliukov quotes a circular issued by the German
Foreign Office to all its representatives in neutral countries: “You are informed that on the
territory of the country to which you are accredited, special offices have been instituted for
the organisation of propaganda in the States, now fighting with the German coalition. The
propaganda will be engaged in exciting the social movement and, in connection with the
latter, strikes, revolutionary outbreaks, separatism, among the constituent parts of these
States, and civil war, as well as agitation in favour of disarmament and the cessation of the
present sanguinary slaughter. You are instructed to afford all possible protection and
support to the directors of the said propaganda offices.”
It is curious that, in the summer of 1917, the British Press took up arms against Sir George
Buchanan and the British Propaganda Ministry for their inertness in the matter of
influencing the Democracy of Russia and of fighting German propaganda in that country.
One of the papers pointed out that the British bureau of Russian propaganda had at its
head a novelist and literary beginners who had “as much idea of Russia as of Chinese
metaphysics.”
As for us, neither in our Government departments nor at the Stavka did we have any
organ whatever which was even in some degree reminiscent of the mighty Western
propaganda institutions. One of the sections of the Quartermaster-General’s department
had charge of technical questions, concerning relations with the Press, and was left
without importance, influence, or any active task. The Russian Army, well or badly, fought
in primitive ways, without ever having recourse to that “poisoning of the enemy’s spirit,”
which was so widely practised in the West. And it paid for this with superfluous torrents of
blood. But if opinions may differ regarding the morality of destructive propaganda, we
cannot but note our complete inertness and inactivity in another and perfectly pure
sphere. We did absolutely nothing to acquaint foreign public opinion with the exceptionally
important part played by Russia and the Russian Army in the World War, with the
enormous losses suffered and the sacrifices made by the Russian people, with those
constant majestic deeds of self-sacrifice, incomprehensible, perhaps, to the cold
understanding of our Western friends, which the Russian Army made whenever the Allied
front was within a hair’s-breadth of defeat.... Such a want of comprehension of the part
played by Russia I have met with almost everywhere, in wide social circles, long after the
conclusion of peace, in my wanderings over Europe.
The following small episode is a burlesque, but very characteristic instance of this. On a
banner presented to Marshal Foch “from American friends” are depicted the flags of all
countries, lands and colonies, which in one way or another came within the orbit of the
Entente; the Russian flag occupies the forty-sixth place, after Hayti and Uruguay and
immediately after San-Marino.
Is this ignorance or triviality?
We did nothing to lay a firm moral foundation for national unity during our occupation of
Galicia, did not draw public opinion to our side during the occupation of Roumania by the
Russian troops, did nothing to restrain the Bulgarian people from betraying the interests of
the Slavonic races. Finally, we took no advantage of the presence on Russian soil of an
enormous number of prisoners, to give them at least a correct idea of Russia.
The Stavka, firmly barricaded within the sphere of purely military questions connected
with the carrying out of the campaign, made no attempt to gain any influence over the
general course of political events, which agrees completely with the service idea of a
national army. But, at the same time, the Stavka distinctly avoided influencing the public
spirit of the country so as to lead this powerful factor to moral co-operation in the
struggle. There was no connection with the leading organs of the Press, which was
represented at the Stavka by men possessing neither weight nor influence.
When the thunderstorm of the Revolution broke and the political whirlwind swept up and
convulsed the Army, the Stavka could remain inert no longer. It had to respond. The more
so, that suddenly no source of moral power was to be found in Russia which might have
protected the Army. The Government, especially the War Office, rushed irresistibly down
the path of opportunism; the Soviets and the Socialist Press undermined the Army; the
Bourgeois Press now cried “videant consules ne quid Imperio detrimenti caparet,” now
naïvely rejoiced at the “democratisation and liberation” which were taking place. Even in
what might have been considered the competent spheres of the higher military
bureaucracy of Petrograd there reigned such a variety of views, as plunged the public
opinion of the country into perplexity and bewilderment.
It turned out, however, that for the conflict the Stavka possessed neither organisation nor
men, neither technique nor knowledge and experience. And, worst of all, the Stavka was
in some way or other shoved and thrown aside by the madly-careering chariot of life. Its
voice grew weaker and sank into silence.
The Old Army: a review. General Ivanov.
 The Revolutionary Army: a review. Kerensky.
The second Quartermaster-General—General Markov—had a serious
task before him—he had to create the necessary apparatus, to
establish communications with the important papers, to supply the
Stavka with a “megaphone” and raise the condition of the Army
Press, which was leading a wretched existence and which the army
organisations were trying to destroy. Markov took up the task
warmly, but failed to do anything serious, as he only remained in
office two months. Every step of the Stavka in this direction called
forth from the Revolutionary Democracy a disingenuous accusation
of counter-revolutionary action. And Liberal Bourgeois Moscow, to
which he turned for aid, in the form of intellectual and technical
assistance in his task, replied with eloquent promises, but did
absolutely nothing.
Thus the Stavka had no means at all, not only for actively combating
the disintegration of the Army, but for resisting German propaganda,
which was spreading rapidly.

Ludendorff says frankly and with a national egotism rising to a high

degree of cynicism: “I did not doubt that the débâcle of the Russian
Army and the Russian people was fraught with great danger for
Germany and Austria-Hungary.... In sending Lenin to Russia our
Government assumed an enormous responsibility! This journey was
justified from a military point of view; it was necessary that Russia
should fall. But our Government should have taken measures that
this should not happen to Germany.”[21]
Even now the boundless sufferings of the Russian people, now “out
of the ranks,” did not call forth a single word of pity or regret from
its moral corrupters....
With the beginning of the campaign, the Germans altered the
direction of their work with respect to Russia. Without breaking their
connections with the well-known reactionary circles at Court, in the
Government and in the Duma, using all means for influencing these
circles and all their motives—greed, ambition, German atavism, and
sometimes a peculiar understanding of patriotism—the Germans
entered at the same time into close fellowship with the Russian
Revolutionaries in the country, and especially abroad, amongst the
multitudinous emigrant colony. Directly or indirectly, all were drawn
into the service of the German Government—great agents in the
sphere of spying and recruiting, like Parvus (Helfand); provocateurs,
connected with the Russian Secret Police, like Blum; propaganda
agents—Oulianoff (Lenin), Bronstein (Trotsky), Apfelbaum
(Zinovieff), Lunacharsky, Ozolin, Katz (Kamkoff), and many others.
And in their wake went a whole group of shallow or unscrupulous
people, cast over the frontier and fanatically hating the régime which
had rejected them—hating it to the degree of forgetfulness of their
native land, or squaring accounts with this régime, acting sometimes
as blind tools in the hands of the German General Staff. What their
motives were, what their pay, how far they went—these are details;
what is important is that they sold Russia, serving those aims which
were set before them by our foe. They were all closely interlaced
with one another and with the agents of the German Secret Service,
forming with them one unbroken conspiracy.
The work began with a widespread Revolutionary and Separatist
(Ukrainian) propaganda among the prisoners of war. According to
Liebknecht, “the German Government not only helped this
propaganda, but carried it on itself.” These aims were served by the
Committee of Revolutionary Propaganda, founded in 1915 at The
Hague by the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in Austria by
the Copenhagen Institute (Parvus’s organisation), and a whole series
of papers of a Revolutionary and Defeatist character, partly published
at the expense of the German Staff, partly subsidised by it—the
Social Democrat (Geneva—Lenin’s paper), Nashe Slovo (Paris—
Trotsky’s paper), Na Tchoozhbeenie (Geneva—contributions from
Tchernoff, Katz and others), Russkii Viestnik, Rodnaya Retch,
Nedielia, and so forth. Similar to this was the activity—the spread of
Defeatist and Revolutionary literature, side by side with purely
charitable work—of the Committee of Intellectual Aid to Russian
Prisoners of War in Germany and Austria (Geneva), which was in
connection with official Moscow and received subsidies from it.
To define the character of these publications it is enough to quote
two or three phrases expressing the views of their inspirers. Lenin
said in the Social Democrat: “The least evil will be the defeat of the
Czarist monarchy, the most barbarous and reactionary of all
Governments.” Tchernoff, the future Minister of Agriculture, declared
in the Mysl that he had one Fatherland only—the International!
Along with literature the Germans invited Lenin’s and Tchernoff’s
collaborators, especially from the editorial staff of Na Tchoozhbeenie,
to lecture in the camps, while a German spy, Consul Von Pelche,
carried on a large campaign for the recruiting of agitators for
propaganda in the ranks of the Army—among the Russian emigrants
of conscript age and of Left Wing politics.
All this was but preparatory work. The Russian Revolution opened
boundless vistas for German propaganda. Along with honest people,
once persecuted, who had struggled for the good of the people,
there rushed into Russia all that revolutionary riff-raff which
absorbed the members of the Russian secret police, the international
informers and the rebels.
The Petrograd authorities feared most of all the accusation of want
of Democratic spirit. Miliukov, as Minister, stated repeatedly that “the
Government considers unconditionally possible the return to Russia
of all emigrants, regardless of their views on the War and
independently of their registration in the International Control
List.”[22] This Minister carried on a dispute with the British,
demanding the release of the Bolsheviks, Bronstein (Trotsky),
Zourabov and others, who had been arrested by the British.
Matters were more complicated in the case of Lenin and his
supporters. Despite the demands of the Russian Government, the
Allies would undoubtedly have refused to let them through.
Therefore, as Ludendorff acknowledges, the German Government
despatched Lenin and his companions (the first group consisted of
seventeen persons) to Russia, allowing them free transit through
Germany. This undertaking, which promised extraordinarily
important results, was richly financed with gold and credit through
the Stockholm (Ganetsky-Fuerstenberg) and Copenhagen (Parvus)
centres and through the Russian Siberian Bank. That gold which, as
Lenin expressed it, “does not smell.”
In October, 1917, Bourtsev published a list of 159 persons brought
through Germany to Russia by order of the German General Staff.
Nearly all of them, according to Bourtsev, “were revolutionaries who,
during the War, had carried on a defeatist campaign in Switzerland
and were now William’s voluntary or involuntary agents.” Many of
them at once assumed a prominent position in the Social Democratic
party, in the Soviet, the Committee[23] and the Bolshevik Press. The
names of Lenin, Tsederbaum (Martov), Lunacharsky, Natanson,
Riazanov, Apfelbaum (Zinoviev) and others soon became the most
fateful in Russian history.
On the day of Lenin’s arrival in Petrograd the German paper Die
Woche devoted an article to this event, in which he was called “a
true friend of the Russian people and an honourable antagonist.”
And the Cadet semi-official organ, the Retch, which afterwards
boldly and unwaveringly waged war against the Lenin party, greeted
his arrival with the words: “Such a generally acknowledged leader of
the Socialist party ought now to be in the arena, and his arrival in
Russia, whatever opinion may be held of his views, should be
welcomed.”
On April 3rd Lenin arrived in Petrograd, where he was received with
much state, and in a few days declared his theses, part of which
formed the fundamental themes of German propaganda: “Down with
war and all power to the Soviet!”
Lenin’s first actions seemed so absurd and so clearly anarchistic that
they called forth protests not only in the whole of the Liberal Press,
but also in the greater part of the Socialist Press.
But, little by little, the Left Wing of the Revolutionary Democracy,
reinforced by German agents, joined overtly and openly in the
propaganda of its chief, without meeting any decisive rebuff either
from the double-minded Soviet or the feeble Government. The great
wave of German and mutinous propaganda engulfed more and more
the Soviet, the Committee, the Revolutionary Press, and the ignorant
masses, and was reflected, consciously or unconsciously, even
among those who stood at the helm of the State.
From the very first Lenin’s organisation, as was said afterwards, in
July, in the report of the Procurator of the Petrograd High Court of
Justice, “aiming at assisting the States warring against Russia in
their hostile actions against her, entered into an agreement with the
agents of the said States to forward the disorganisation of the
Russian Army and the Russian rear, for which purpose it used the
financial means received from these States to organise a
propaganda among the population and the troops ... and also, for
the same purpose, organised in Petrograd, from July 3rd to 5th, an
armed insurrection against the Supreme Power existing in the State.”
The Stavka had long and vainly raised its voice of warning. General
Alexeiev had, both personally and in writing, called on the
Government to take measures against the Bolsheviks and the spies.
Several times I myself applied to the War Office, sending in, among
other things, evidential material concerning Rakovsky’s spying and
documents certifying the treason of Lenin, Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky
and others. The part played by the Union for the Liberation of the
Ukraine (of which, besides others, Melenevsky and V. Doroshenko
were members)[24] as an organisation of the Central Powers for
propaganda, spying and recruiting for “Setch Ukraine units,” was
beyond all doubt. In one of my letters (May 16th), based on the
examination of a Russian officer, Yermolenko, who had been a
prisoner of war and had accepted the part of a German agent for the
purpose of disclosing the organisation, the following picture was
revealed: “Yermolenko was transferred to our rear, on the front of
the Sixth Army, to agitate for a speedy conclusion of a separate
peace with Germany. Yermolenko accepted this commission at the
insistence of his comrades. Two officers of the German General Staff,
Schiditzky and Lubar, informed him that a similar agitation was being
carried on in Russia by the sectional president of the Union for the
Liberation of the Ukraine, A. Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky, and by Lenin,
as agents of the German General Staff. Lenin had been instructed to
seek to undermine by all means the confidence of the Russian
people in the Provisional Government. The money for this work was
received through one Svendson, an employee of the German
Embassy in Stockholm. These methods were practised before the
Revolution also. Our command turned its attention to the somewhat
too frequent appearance of “escaped prisoners.” Many of them
having surrendered to the enemy, passed through a definite course
of intelligence work, and having received substantial pay and
“papers,” were permitted to pass over to us through the line of
trenches.
Being altogether unable to decide what was a case of courage and
what of treachery, we nearly always sent all escaped prisoners from
the European to the Caucasian Front.
All the representations of the High Command as to the insufferable
situation of the Army, in the face of such vast treachery, remained
without result. Kerensky carried on free debates in the Soviet with
Lenin on the subject whether the country and the Army should be
broken down or not, basing his action on the view that he was the
“War Minister of the Revolution,” and that “freedom of opinion was
sacred to him, whencesoever it might proceed.” Tzeretelli warmly
defended Lenin: “I do not agree with Lenin and his agitation. But
what has been said by Deputy Shulgin is a slander against Lenin,
Never has Lenin called for actions which would infringe upon the
course of the Revolution. Lenin is carrying on an idealist
propaganda.”
This much-talked-of freedom of opinion extremely simplified the
work of German propaganda, giving rise to such an unheard-of
phenomenon as the open preaching in German, at public meetings
and in Kronstadt, of a separate peace and of distrust of the
Government, by an agent of Germany, the President of the
Zimmerwald and Kienthal Conference, Robert Grimm!...
What a state of moral prostration and loss of all national dignity,
consciousness, and patriotism is presented by the picture of
Tzeretelli and Skobelev “vouching” for the agent provocateur; of
Kerensky importuning the Government to grant Grimm the right of
entry into Russia; of Tereshtchenko permitting it, and of Russians
listening to Grimm’s speeches—without indignation, without
resentment.
During the Bolshevik insurrection of July the officials of the Ministry
of Justice, exasperated by the laxity of the leaders of the
Government, decided, with the knowledge of their Minister,
Pereverzev, to publish my letter to the Minister of War and other
documents, exposing Lenin’s treason to his country. The documents
being a statement signed by two Socialists, Alexinsky and Pankratov,
were given to the printers. The premature disclosure of this fact
called forth a passionate protest from Tchkheidze and Tzeretelli, and
terrible anger on the part of the Ministers Nekrassov and
Tereshtchenko. The Government forbade the publication of
information which sullied the good name of comrade Lenin, and had
recourse to reprisals against the officials of the Ministry of Justice.
However, the statement appeared in the Press. In its turn the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen’s and Soldiers’
Delegates exhibited a touching care, not only for the inviolability of
the Bolsheviks, but even for their honour, by issuing on July 5th a
special appeal calling on people “to refrain from the spreading of
accusations reflecting dishonour” on Lenin and “other political
workers” pending the investigation of the matter by a special
commission. This consideration was openly expressed in a resolution
passed by the Central Executive Committees (on July 8th), which,
while condemning the attempt of the Anarchist-Bolshevist elements
to overthrow the Government, expressed the fear that the
“inevitable” measures to which the Government and the military
authorities must have recourse ... would create a basis for the
demagogic agitation of the counter-Revolutionaries who, for the time
being, gathered round the flag of the Revolutionary régime, but who
might pave the way for a military Dictatorship.”
However, the exposure of the direct criminal participation of the
leaders of Bolshevism in acts of mutiny and treason may have
obliged the Government to begin repressions. Lenin and Apfelbaum
(Zinoviev) escaped to Finland, while Bronstein (Trotsky), Kozlovsky,
Raskolnikov, Remniov, and many others were arrested. Several
Anarchist-Bolshevist newspapers were suspended.
These repressions, however, were not of a serious character. Many
persons known to have been leaders in the mutiny were not charged
at all, and their work of destruction was continued with consistency
and energy.

While carrying the war into our country the Germans persistently
and methodically put into practice another watchword—peace at the
Front. Fraternisation had taken place earlier as well, before the
Revolution; but it was then due to the hopelessly wearisome life in
the trenches, to curiosity, to a simple feeling of humanity even
towards the enemy—a feeling exhibited by the Russian soldier more
than once on the battlefield of Borodino, in the bastions of
Sevastopol, and in the Balkan mountains. Fraternisation took place
rarely, was punished by the commanders, and had no dangerous
tendencies in it. But now the German General Staff organised it on a
large scale, systematically and along the whole Front, with the
participation of the higher Staff organs and the commanders, with a
detailed code of instructions, which included the observation of our
forces and positions, the demonstration of the impressive armament
and strength of their own positions, persuasion as to the
aimlessness of the War, the incitement of the Russian soldiers
against the Government and their commanders, in whose interest
exclusively this “sanguinary slaughter” was being continued. Masses
of the Defeatist literature manufactured in Germany were passed
over into our trenches, and at the same time agents of the Soviet
and the Committee travelled quite freely along the Front with similar
propaganda, with the organisation of “exhibition fraternisation,” and
with whole piles of Pravda, Trench Pravda, Social Democrat, and
other products of our native Socialist intellect and conscience—
organs which, in their forceful argumentation, left the Jesuitical
eloquence of their German brethren far behind. At the same time a
general meeting of simple “delegates from the Front” in Petrograd
was passing a resolution in favour of allowing fraternisation for the
purpose of revolutionary propaganda among the enemy’s ranks!
One cannot read without deep emotion of the feelings of Kornilov,
who, for the first time after the Revolution, in the beginning of May,
when in command of the Eighth Army, came into contact with this
fatal phenomenon in the life of our Front. They were written down
by Nezhintsev, at that time captain of the General Staff and later the
gallant commander of the Kornilov Regiment, who in 1918 fell in
action against the Bolsheviks at the storm of Ekaterinodar.
“When we had got well into the firing zone of the position,” writes
Nezhintsev, “the General (Kornilov) looked very gloomy. His words,
‘disgrace, treason,’ showed his estimate of the dead silence of the
position. Then he remarked:
“‘Do you feel all the nightmare horror of this silence? You
understand that we are watched by the enemy artillery observers
and that we are not fired at. Yes, the enemy are mocking us as
weaklings. Can it be that the Russian soldier is capable of informing
the enemy of my arrival at the position?’
“I was silent, but the sacred tears in the eyes of this hero touched
me deeply, and at this moment I vowed in my mind that I would die
for him and for our common Motherland. General Kornilov seemed to
feel this. He turned to me suddenly, pressed my hand, and turned
away, as if ashamed of his momentary weakness.
“The acquaintance of the new Commander with the infantry began
with the units in the Reserve, when formed in rank, holding a
meeting and replying to all appeals for the necessity of an advance
by pointing out how useless it was to continue a Bourgeois war,
carried on by ‘militarists.’ When, after two hours of fruitless
discussion, General Kornilov, worn out morally and physically,
proceeded to the trenches, he found a scene there which could
scarcely have been foreseen by any soldier of this age.
“We entered into a system of fortifications where the trench-lines of
both sides were separated or, more correctly, joined by lines of
barbed wire.... The appearance of General Kornilov was greeted ...
by a group of German officers, who gazed insolently on the
Commander of the Russian Army; behind them stood some Prussian
soldiers. The General took my field-glasses and, ascending the
parapet, began to examine the arena of the fights to come. When
someone expressed a fear that the Prussians might shoot the
Russian Commander, the latter replied:
“‘I would be immensely glad if they did; perhaps it might sober our
befogged soldiers and put an end to this shameful fraternisation.’
“At the positions of a neighbouring regiment the Commander of the
Army was greeted by the bravura march of a German Jaeger
regiment, to whose band our ‘fraternising’ soldiers were making their
way. With the remark, ‘This is treason!’ the General turned to an
officer standing next him, ordering the fraternisers from both sides
to be told that if this disgraceful scene did not cease at once he
would turn the guns loose on them. The disciplined Germans ceased
playing and returned to their own trenches, seemingly ashamed of
the abominable spectacle. But our soldiers—oh! they held meetings
for a long time, complaining of the way their ‘counter-Revolutionary
commanders oppressed their liberty.’”
In general I do not cherish feelings of revenge. Yet I regret
exceedingly that General Ludendorff left the German Army
prematurely, before its break-up, and did not experience directly in
its ranks those inexpressibly painful moral torments which we
Russian officers have suffered.

Before the battle in the Revolutionary Army: a meeting.

 Types of men in the Revolutionary Army.
Besides fraternisation, the enemy High Command practised, on an
extensive scale and with provocatory purpose, the dispatch of flags
of truce directly to the troops, or rather to the soldiers. Thus, about
the end of April on the Dvinsk Front there came with a flag of truce
a German officer, who was not received. He managed, however, to
address to the crowd of soldiers the words: “I have come to you
with offers of peace, and am empowered to speak even with the
Provisional Government, but your commanders do not wish for
peace.” These words were spread rapidly, and caused agitation
among the soldiers and even threats to desert the Front. Therefore
when, a few days later, in the same section, parliamentaires (a
brigade commander, two officers, and a bugler) made their
appearance again, they were taken to the Staff quarters of the Fifth
Army. It turned out, of course, that they had no authorisations, and
could not even state more or less definitely the object of their
coming, since “the sole object of the pseudo-parliamentaires
appearing on our Front,” says an order of the Commander-in-Chief,
“has been to observe our dispositions and our spirit, and, by a lying
exhibition of their pacific feelings, to incline our troops to an inaction
profitable to the Germans and ruinous to Russia and her freedom.”
Similar cases occurred on the Fronts of the Eighth, Ninth, and other
Armies.
It is characteristic that the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern
German Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, found it possible to take a
personal part in this course of provocation. In two radiograms,
bearing the systematic character of the customary proclamations
and intended for the soldiers and the Soviet, he stated that the High
Command was ready to meet half-way “the repeatedly expressed
desire of the Russian Soldiers’ Delegates to put an end to
bloodshed”; that “military operations between us (the Central
Powers) and Russia could be put an end to without Russia breaking
with her Allies”; that “if Russia wants to know the particulars of our
conditions, let her give up her demand for their publication....” And
he finishes with a threat: “Does the new Russian Government,
instigated by its Allies, wish to satisfy itself whether divisions of
heavy guns are still to be found on our Eastern Front?”
Earlier, when leaders did discreditable things to save their armies
and their countries, at least they were ashamed of it and kept
silence. Nowadays military traditions have undergone a radical
change.
To the credit of the Soviet it must be said that it took a proper view
of this provocationary invitation, saying in reply: “The Commander-
in-Chief of the German troops on the Eastern Front offers us ‘a
separate truce and secrecy of negotiations.’ But Russia knows that
the débâcle of the Allies will be the beginning of the débâcle of her
own Army, and the débâcle of the Revolutionary troops of Free
Russia would mean not only new common graves, but the failure of
the Revolution, the fall of Free Russia.”
From the very first days of the Revolution a marked change naturally
took place in the attitude of the Russian Press. It expressed itself on
the one hand in a certain differentiation of all the Bourgeois organs,
which assumed a Liberal-Conservative character, the tactics of which
were adopted by an inconsiderable part of the Socialist Press, of the
type of Plekhanov’s Yedinstvo; and on the other in the appearance of
an immense number of Socialist organs.
The organs of the Right Wing underwent a considerable evolution, a
characteristic indication of which was the unexpected declaration of
a well-known member of the Novoye Vremya staff, Mr. Menshikov:
“We must be grateful to destiny that the Monarchy, which for a
thousand years has betrayed the people, has at last betrayed itself
and put a cross on its own grave. To dig it up from under that cross
and start a great dispute about the candidates for the fallen throne
would be, in my opinion, a fatal mistake.” In the course of the first
few months the Right Press partly closed down—not without
pressure and violence on the part of the Soviets—partly it assumed a
pacific-Liberal attitude. It was only in September, 1917, that its tone
grew extremely violent in connection with the final exposure of the
weakness of the Government, the loss of all hope of a legal way out
of the “no thoroughfare” which had arisen, and the echoes of
Kornilov’s venture. The attacks of the extremist organs on the
Government passed into solid abuse of it.
Though differing in a greater or lesser degree in its understanding of
the social problems which the Revolution had to solve, though guilty,
perhaps, along with Russian society, of many mistakes, yet the
Russian Liberal Press showed an exceptional unanimity in the more
important questions of a constitutional and national character: full
power to the Provisional Government, Democratic reforms in the
spirit of the programme of March 2nd,[25] war until victory along
with the Allies, an All-Russia Constituent Assembly as the source of
the supreme power and of the constitution of the country. In yet
another respect has the Liberal Press left a good reputation behind it
in history: in the days of lofty popular enthusiasm, as in the days of
doubt, vacillation and general demoralisation, which distinguished
the Revolutionary period of 1917, no place was found in it, nor in the
Right Press either, for the distribution of German gold....
The appearance, on a large scale, of the new Socialist Press was
accompanied by a series of unfavourable circumstances. It had no
normal past, no traditions. Its prolonged life below the surface, the
exclusively destructive method of action adopted by it, its suspicious
and hostile attitude towards all authority, put a certain stamp on the
whole tendency of this Press, leaving too little place and attention
for creative work. The complete discord in thought, the
contradictions and vacillation which reigned both within the Soviet
and also among the party groups and within the parties, were
reflected in the Press, just as much as the elemental pressure from
below of irresistible, narrowly egotistic class demands; for neglect of
these demands gave rise to the threat, which was once expressed by
the “beauty and pride of the Revolution,” the Kronstadt sailors to
Tchernov, the Minister: “If you will not give us anything, Michael
Alexandrovitch will.” Finally, the Press was not uninfluenced by the
appearance in it of a number of such persons as brought into it an
atmosphere of uncleanness and perfidy. The papers were full of
names, which had emerged from the sphere of crime, of the Secret
Police and of international espionage. All these gentlemen—
Tchernomazov (a provocator in the Secret Police and director of the
pre-Revolutionary Pravda), Berthold (the same and also editor of the
Communist), Dekonsky, Malinovsky, Matislavsky, those colleagues of
Lenin and Gorky—Nahamkes, Stoutchka, Ouritsky, Gimmer
(Soukhanov), and a vast number of equally notorious names—
brought the Russian Press to a hitherto unknown degree of moral
degradation.
The difference was only a matter of scope. Some papers, akin to the
Soviet semi-official organ, the Izvestia of the Workmen’s and
Soldiers’ Delegates, undermined the country and the Army, while
others of the Pravda type (the organ of the Bolshevik Social
Democrats) broke them down.
At the same time as the Izvestia would call on its readers to support
the Provisional Government, while secretly ready to strike a blow at
it, the Pravda would declare that “the Government is counter-
Revolutionary, and therefore there can be no relations with it. The
task of the Revolutionary Democracy is to attain to the dictatorship
of the proletariat.” And Tchernov’s Socialist Revolutionary organ, the
Delo Naroda, would discover a neutral formula: all possible support
to the Coalition Government, but “there is not, and cannot be, any
unanimity in this question; more than that, there must not be, in the
interests of the double defence.”
At the same time as the Izvestia began to preach an advance, but
without a final victory, not abandoning, however, the intention of
“deciding over the heads of the Government and the ruling classes
the conditions on which the War might be stopped,” the Pravda
called for universal fraternisation, and the Socialist Revolutionary,
Zemlia i Volia, alternately grieved that Germany still wished for
conquest, or demanded a separate peace. Tchernov’s paper, which in
March had considered that, “should the enemy be victorious, there
would be an end to Russian freedom,” now, in May, saw in the
preaching of an advance “the limit of unblushing gambling on the
fate of the Fatherland, the limit of irresponsibility and demagogy.”
Gorky’s paper, Novaya Zhizn, speaking through Gimmer
(Soukhanov), rises to cynicism when it says: “When Kerensky gives
orders for Russian soil to be cleared of enemy troops, his demands
far exceed the limits of military technique. He calls for a political act,
one which has never been provided for by the Coalition Government.
For clearing the country by an advance signifies ‘complete victory’....”
Altogether the Novaya Zhizn supported German interests with
especial warmth, raising its voice in all cases when German interests
were threatened with danger, either on the part of the Allies or on
ours. And when the advance of the disorganised Army ended in
failure—in Tarnopol and Kalush—when Riga had fallen, the Left Press
started a bitter campaign against the Stavka and the commanding
personnel, and Tchernov’s paper, in connection with the proposed
reforms in the Army, cried hysterically: “Let the proletarians know
that it is proposed again to give them up to the iron embrace of
beggary, slavery and hunger.... Let the soldiers know that it is
proposed again to enslave them with the ‘discipline’ of their
commanders and to force them to shed their blood without end, so
long as the belief of the Allies in Russia’s ‘gallantry’ is restored.” The
most straightforward of all, however, was afterwards the Iskra, the
organ of the Menshevist Internationalists (Martov-Zederbaum),
which, on the day of the occupation of the island of Oesel by a
German landing-party, published an article entitled “Welcome to the
German Fleet!”
The Army had its own military Press. The organs of the Army staffs
and of those at the Front, which used to appear before the
Revolution, were of the nature of purely military bulletins. Beginning
with the Revolution, these organs, with their weak literary forces,
began to fight for the existence of the Army, conscientiously,
honestly, but not cleverly. Meeting with indifference or exasperation
on the part of the soldiers, who had already turned their backs on
the officers, and especially on the part of the Committee organs of
the “Revolutionary” movement, which existed side by side with
them, they began to weaken and die out, until at last, in the days of
August, an order from Kerensky closed them altogether; the
exclusive right of publishing Army newspapers was transferred to the
Army Committee and the Committees of the troops at the Front. The
same fate befell the News of the Active Army, the Stavka organ,
started by General Markov and left without support from the weighty
powers of the Press of the capital.
The Committee Press, widely spread among the troops at the
expense of the Government, reflected those moods of which I have
spoken earlier in the chapter on the Committees, ranging from
Constitutionalism to Anarchism, from complete victory to an
immediate conclusion of peace, without orders. It reflected—but in a
worse, more sorry form, as regards literary style and content—that
disharmony of thought and those tendencies towards extreme
theories which characterised the Socialist Press of the Capital. In this
respect, in accordance with the personnel of the Committees, and to
some extent with their proximity to Petrograd, the respective Fronts
differed somewhat from one another. The most moderate was the
South-Western Front, somewhat worse, the Western, while the
Northern Front was pronouncedly Bolshevist. Besides local talent,
the columns of the Committee Press were in many cases opened
wide to the resolutions not only of the extreme national parties, but
even of the German parties.
It would be incorrect, however, to speak of the immediate action of
the Press on the masses of the soldiers. It did not exist any more
than there were any popular newspapers which these masses could
understand. The Press exercised an influence principally on the
semi-educated elements in the ranks of the Army. This sphere
turned out to be nearer to the soldiers, and to it passed a certain
share of that authority which was enjoyed earlier by the officers.
Ideas gathered from the papers and refracted through the mental
prism of this class passed in a simplified form to the soldiery, the
vast majority of which unfortunately consisted of ignorant and
illiterate men. And among these masses all these conceptions,
stripped of cunningly-woven arguments, premises and grounds,
were transformed into wondrously simple and terrifically logical
conclusions.
In them dominated the straightforward negation: “Down!”
Down with the Bourgeois Government, down with the counter-
Revolutionary Commanders, down with the “sanguinary slaughter,”
down with everything of which they were sick, of which they were
wearied, all that in one way or another interfered with their animal
instincts and hampered “free will”—down with them all!
In such an elementary fashion did the Army at innumerable soldiers’
meetings settle all the political and social questions that were
agitating mankind.
The curtain has fallen. The Treaty of Versailles has for a time given
pause to the armed conflict in Central Europe. Evident to the end
that, having regained their strength, the nations may again take up
their arms, so as to burst the chains in which defeat has fettered
them.
The idea of the “world-peace,” which the Christian churches have
been preaching for twenty centuries, is buried for years to come.
To us, how childishly naïve now seem the efforts of the humanists of
the nineteenth century, who by prolonged, ardent propaganda
sought to soften the horrors of war and to introduce the limiting
norms of International Law! Yes, now, when we know that one may
not only infringe the neutrality of a peaceful, cultured country, but
give it to be ravaged and plundered; when we can sink peaceable
ships, with women and children on board, by means of submarines;
poison people with suffocating gases and tear their bodies with the
fragments of explosive bullets; when a whole country, a whole
nation, is quoted by cold, political calculation merely as a “Barrier”
against the invasion of armed force and pernicious ideas, and is
periodically either helped or betrayed in turn.
But the most terrible of all weapons ever invented by the mind of
man, the most shameful of all the methods permitted in the late
World War was the poisoning of the soul of a people!
Germany assigns the priority of this invention to Great Britain. Let
them settle this matter between themselves. But I see my native
land crushed, dying in the dark night of horror and insanity. And I
know her tormentors.
Two theses have arisen before mankind in all their grim power and
all their shameless nakedness:
All is permissible for the advantage of one’s country!
All is permissible for the triumph of one’s party, one’s class!
All, even the moral and physical ruin of an enemy country, even the
betrayal of one’s native land and the making on its living body of
social experiments, the failure of which threatens it with paralysis
and death.
Germany and Lenin unhesitatingly decided these questions in the
affirmative. The world has condemned them; but are all those who
speak of the matter so unanimous and sincere in their
condemnation? Have not these ideas left somewhat too deep traces
in the minds, not so much perhaps of the popular masses as of their
leaders? I, at least, am led to such a conclusion by all the present
soulless world policy of the Governments, especially towards Russia,
by all the present utterly selfish tactics of the class organisations.
This is terrible.
I believe that every people has the right to defend its existence,
sword in hand; I know that for many years to come war will be the
customary method of settling international disputes, and that
methods of warfare will be both honourable and, alas!
dishonourable. But there is a certain limit, beyond which even
baseness ceases to be simply baseness and becomes insanity. This
limit we have already reached. And if religion, science, literature,
philosophers, humanitarians, teachers of mankind do not arouse a
broad, idealistic movement against the Hottentot morality with which
we have been inoculated, the world will witness the decline of its
civilisation.
Before the battle in the Old Army: Prayers.
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