Story Proof the Science Behind the Startling Power of Story PDFDrive
Story Proof the Science Behind the Startling Power of Story PDFDrive
STORY PROOF
The Science Behind the Startling
Power of Story
KENDALL HAVEN
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Haven, Kendall F.
Story proof : the science behind the startling power of story / Kendall Haven.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-1-59158-546-6 (alk. paper)
1. Storytelling. 2. Brain—Growth. 3. Cognition in children. I. Title.
LB1042.H386 2007
372.670 7—dc22 2007017728
Copyright
C 2007 by Kendall Haven
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
CONTENTS
Bibliography 129
Index 149
INTRODUCTION: IT WAS A
DARK AND STORMY NIGHT
I once heard it said that life is like chess and that stories are like books of
famous chess games that serious players study so that they will be prepared if
they ever find themselves in similar straits. I thought it a clever and well-turned
phrase—stories form a roadmap for life—until I began the research for this
book. Then the profound truth of it struck me full force.
Results from a dozen prominent cognitive scientists and developmental psychol-
ogists have confirmed that human minds do rely on stories and on story architec-
ture as the primary roadmap for understanding, making sense of, remembering,
and planning our lives—as well as the countless experiences and narratives we
encounter along the way. Lives are like stories because we think in story terms,
make sense out of experiences in story terms, and plan our lives in story terms.
In our enlightened, literate, scientific, rational, advanced world, it is still story
structure that lies at the core of human mental functioning. In this age of binary
wizardry, ‘‘That reminds me of a story . . .’’ or ‘‘Once, back when the world was
young . . .’’ are still the royal road to meaning and comprehension. In this age of
cell phones, Blackberries, and airport cards, human minds are still hardwired to
think and perceive through stories.
Everyone loves a good story. An enthusiastic teller begins, ‘‘Once, long ago,
deep in a forest that clung to the topmost crags of a distant mountain . . . ’’ and
everyone within hearing sheds their own world and concerns to sink deliciously
into the world of the story. Certainly, it has always happened to me and to those
in audiences when I perform. I’ve always taken it for granted. That’s just the
way it is. Until I began to research this book and I had to consciously ponder
the question: why? Why are humans drawn to and entranced by a good story?
What’s the appeal? Certainly not all narratives possess that appeal, that allure.
Only a few enter our memories and linger there for years if not for decades.
Why is that? Just luck? I will argue that no, it is not.
In this book I want to lay out the evidence and build my case to prove that
stories are more effective and powerful than any other narrative structure. Said
viii INTRODUCTION
more specifically, I want to prove that stories are more efficient and effective
structural vehicles when used to motivate, or to teach and communicate factual,
conceptual, and tacit information (attitudes, beliefs, values, and cultural expecta-
tions). Stories belong as the bedrock of management, leadership, education, out-
reach, and general communication efforts.
But if I am to accomplish that, we must first agree on what several terms
actually mean: narrative and story. We bandy both terms around quite loosely.
Many allow them to slop back and forth interchangeably. Research on the value
of stories will have minimal meaning until we have settled on specific defini-
tions for what is and isn’t story; what is and isn’t narrative. If these key terms
don’t mean something specific, they don’t mean anything useful at all.
Yet we tend not to devote much thought to story. Many, hearing me talk
about this book, have responded, ‘‘Oh, you’re going to write a book about story-
telling.’’ No. Storytelling (orally telling a story to a live audience) is one—but
only one—means of communicating a story. Neither is this a book on the value
of story reading. That is another means of communicating a story. This is a book
about the thing, itself: about story. Once you understand and master stories,
many books can show you how stories may be used.
On a cab ride from JFK Airport into New York City a cabbie asked me what I
did. When I said that I tell stories, he said that he told stories, too. I asked if he
told in a local storytelling group. He said that he told stories while he drove. I
asked, ‘‘To your customers?’’ He said, no, his driving was his story.
The way he drove was—in his mind—a story, his storytelling. Is that what
you mean when you say, ‘‘Tell me a story’’? Orchestra conductors are often
described as storytellers by the way they conduct. Does a musical composer or a
conductor ‘‘tell stories’’ when they write music or lead an orchestra? Does an
artistic painter tell stories?
What is a story? What is not? The act of gathering and assessing evidence to
answer those questions will sharpen your understanding of this key word and,
thus, unlock much of its amazing power to your control. I want to show you
that the word—story—really has a specific meaning that is defined by specific
informational elements and that this structure produces a radically different
effect inside the human mind than do other narrative structures.
So, I must first prove that the power and effectiveness of stories comes from
these specific informational elements and show that they correspond to how the
mind processes narrative information. If so, these elements will define what we
really mean when we say ‘‘story.’’ For this I’ll rely heavily on research from the
cognitive sciences, neurological science, developmental psychology, and neural
net modeling. We will spend four chapters exploring the inner mysteries of
human minds and the wondrous ways in which they process arriving narrative
and experiential information.
This effort will expose the myths and misconception, the ambiguities and
confusion that abound surrounding the idea of story. It will also peel back the
layers of fog to expose the heart and structural framework of successful stories.
This book and its dual set of proofs (first, what a story really is, and second, a
story’s value for a variety of applications) will benefit anyone who needs to
effectively communicate, needs to find ways to more effectively motivate and to
create a sense of belonging and of community, or who seeks more effective and
efficient ways to teach factual, conceptual, and tacit information. That should
cover most of us. We all want to convince, to communicate, to teach, to get
INTRODUCTION ix
others to see and to share our own vision and images, to effectively reach
another human with our words. Stories are a universal expressway to accom-
plish each of these tasks.
Teachers, sales people, managers, lawyers, clergy, organizational leaders,
writers, scientists . . . the list of those who can more effectively do what they do
through story structure is virtually endless. Stories hold human attention. Stories
are understood. Stories ‘‘make sense’’ in a way other narratives do not—even
stories about the longings of a talking tree stump or about a little girl who
decides to commit felony breaking and entering to swipe a bowl of porridge
(oatmeal) from the house of the bear family. Stories get remembered and are
easily recalled.
This goes for fiction and nonfiction stories alike. It applies to the overall story
and to any key information contained within the story. This book will help those
to whom communication is important.
The good news is that story—as a specific narrative structure—is not difficult
to learn, master, or apply. Just the opposite. Most struggle to write effective nar-
ratives and struggle to deliver effective presentations. Understanding and using
story architecture makes these jobs easier and more effective.
It turns out that your mind was evolutionarily hardwired long before birth to
think in specific story terms. You know now, and have always known, this
structure. Your mind uses it every waking hour. However, your internal neural
story maps are not housed in the conscious mind. Rather they reside below that
level so that they can be automatically, subconsciously applied to incoming
information. It is well worth spending some time examining story structure in
order to dredge that structure up into your conscious thinking.
THANKS
I owe a great many deepest thanks to those who have supported the develop-
ment of this book. The combined library staffs of the Sonoma County Public
Library, Santa Rosa Junior College, and Sonoma State University did a won-
drous job of and yeoman’s work in locating and delivering the mountains of
references I required.
Sharon Coatney at Libraries Unlimited provided valuable guidance in the
early shaping and formation of this book. David Herring at NASA’s Goddard
Space Flight Center graciously supported my early efforts, talked through early
concepts with me, and provided the motive and incentive to undertake the
project. Roni Berg, the love of my life and litmus test of my writing, guided,
shaped, and organized this text into a flowing, comprehensible, and pleasing
whole. Her wisdom and insights are as evident on each page as are my own
thoughts and ideas.
Finally, I owe my deepest thanks and appreciation to the team of reviewers
who agreed to read and critique early drafts of this work. They have saved me
from numerous misstatements and embarrassing errors. So, great thanks and
deepest bows of appreciation to Dr. Parker Page, Dr. Kevin Feldman, Gay
Ducey, Dr. Craig Rooney, Dr. Flora Joy, Steven Kardoleff, Judge George Hernan-
dez, Dr. Nelson Kellogg, and Dr. Denny Bozman-Moss.
Finally, I want to thank you, the reader, for taking the time to ponder these
important ideas and to explore the potential and wonder of the simple things
we call stories. It will be well worth your while.
PART 1
STORY SMARTS
CHAPTER 1
history, news, values, cultural heritage, and attitudes were passed from
person to person and from generation to generation. Current research indi-
cates that stories even predate language (see Chapter 3). In the beginning
there were stories. Then came language to express story concepts. Then
came written language with its grammar and syntax. Only much later did
other narrative and expository forms emerge. Evolutionary biologists con-
firm that 100,000 years of reliance on stories have evolutionarily hardwired
a predisposition into human brains to think in story terms. We are pro-
grammed to prefer stories and to think in story structures.
¥ Every culture in the history of this planet has created stories: myths, fables,
legends, folk tales. Not all have developed codified laws. Not all have cre-
ated logical argument. Not all have created written language and exposi-
tion. All developed and used stories.
¥ Research by cognitive scientists has shown that ‘‘experiences not framed
into story form suffer loss in memory’’ (Mandler 1984, and Mandler and
Johnson 1977). We remember stories (and information in stories) better and
longer than the same information presented in any other narrative form.
¥ Canadian researchers found a strong positive correlation between early
storytelling activity and later math abilities. They suggested that time spent
on stories (telling, reading, and listening to stories) during preschool years
improves math skill upon entering school (O’Neill, Pearce, and Pick 2004).
That says that learning story structure develops logical and analytical think-
ing as well as language literacy!
¥ A senior official at the World Bank, Steven Denning, found that ‘‘time after
time, when faced with the task of persuading a group of managers or front-
line staff in a large organization to get enthusiastic about a major change,
storytelling was the only thing that worked’’ (Denning 2001).
¥ In a small, five-school test I personally conducted, one hour of instruction
on story structure raised writing assessment scores 0.86 (over 25 percent) on
state standardized writing assessments even though the assessment writing
assignment was to write a persuasive essay, not a story.
¥ In researching this book, I have reviewed over 350 research studies from fif-
teen separate fields of science. Incredibly, every one of those studies, as
well as every other study they cite—every one—agrees that stories are an
effective and efficient vehicle for teaching, for motivating, and for the gen-
eral communication of factual information, concepts, and tacit information.
Not one doubted or questioned the effectiveness of stories!
¥ Famed developmental psychologist, Jerome Bruner (2003) pointed out that
‘‘stories are surely not innocent: they always have a message.’’ He or she
who understands the internal structure of story controls the message. As
Lori Silverman (2006) says in her book introduction, ‘‘Those who learn . . .
and apply its [story’s] principles are those most likely to succeed.’’
It would seem that stories and their supporting evidence are universal. It’s an
intrinsically human thing to do. We rely on stories like we rely on air, water,
sleep, and food. Proving the value of story should feel like an exercise in prov-
ing the obvious—something everyone already knows.
However, the studies that will form the core of my proof have had little impact
to date, though most have been available for five years or more. Stories struggle
to infiltrate into the normal flow of education, of organization and corporate
OPENING ARGUMENTS: MORE THAN YOU IMAGINED 5
¥ Uncle Fred perches on a kitchen chair doing his impersonation of the presi-
dent while he makes up silly policy initiatives.
¥ Your grandmother quietly tells you about eight generations’ worth of fam-
ily history as she knits.
¥ You tell your spouse about your day.
¥ You tell a joke.
¥ You read an article in Time or Discover magazine.
¥ You read a stock report or a computer program instruction book.
¥ You read an essay your neighbor wants to submit to the Letters-to-the-
Editor section of the local paper.
¥ You read a recipe for venison stew.
¥ You read a short story in a collection of classic literature.
Are they all examples of stories? Which are and which aren’t? Why? Intui-
tively we know there are significant differences between some of these
6 STORY SMARTS
examples. But are there enough similarities for them all to be called stories? I
will argue that no, there are not. But that answer leads to a far greater question:
what is (and what is not) a story?
Surely, a conversationally delivered chronology of my accomplishments dur-
ing a day’s work won’t sway or influence anyone as Denning’s stories do. It
wouldn’t develop logical thinking and math skills as stories did in the Cana-
dian study. Analyzing my ho-hum daily narrative surely wouldn’t raise
student writing scores. Can my narrative be a story as much as those men-
tioned earlier?
One way to look at it would be to say that there exists more than one kind of
story. However, this approach always leads to confusion and muddies—rather
than clarifies—the meaning of the word, story.
Another way is to admit that not all things written in narrative form are sto-
ries. Some are. Some aren’t.
I strongly prefer this second view. There exist a number of specific narrative
forms in the ‘‘non-story’’ category that, unfortunately, don’t have an agreed-
upon moniker in the English language. But they still exist as ‘‘non-stories.’’ If
we eliminate everything in the non-story category, we should be able to locate
the source of the power and effectiveness of stories and to then define exactly
what a story really is.
Thus, I have divided the book into two parts.
Part 1 explores how human brains and minds process narrative information
and identifies the specific informational elements that trigger the creation of
meaning, that enhance memory, and that form the central structure of stories.
Pulitzer Prize winner Jon Franklin (1986) said, ‘‘He who would comprehend sto-
ries, no less than he who would understand universes or temples, must first
grasp the nature of their structure and component parts.’’ In describing that na-
ture, he said, ‘‘Just as all uniquely individual human beings have brains, hearts,
stomachs, and pancreases, all stories have a common set of attributes that are
arranged in a certain, specific way.’’
The power and effectiveness of stories come from these specific informational
elements that form the core architecture of stories and match the informational
demands of human neural story maps. In this narrower view of the word,
stories are more effective because it is easier for the mind to extract and under-
stand this essential information from something structured in story form.
Part 2 lays out hundreds of rigorous, research-based studies to prove the
value of stories for the following key uses of story:
One day it hit me. If I sat in that sandbox and read any of the reports I was
paid good money by the Department of Energy to produce, not one of these peo-
ple would slow down to listen. It wasn’t me or my voice that held them. It was
the story. I realized that stories exuded a magnetic attraction that other narrative
forms do not.
Stories have started feuds that have lasted for generations. Stories have
started wars, but they have also forged alliances. They have changed societal
and cultural attitudes, beliefs, and values, as well as swayed public opinion. Sto-
ries have redefined and refocused the political and social debate. They have
changed and continue to change the world—to define our world. Stories can be
amazingly powerful—frighteningly powerful.
We take stories for granted. We use them—in fact, mentally depend on them—
but rarely pause to pay any attention to this incredible narrative structure we so
casually wield. We don’t give stories their due. As comedian Rodney Danger-
field would put it, ‘‘Stories don’t get no respect.’’ But if we take a moment to
honor—and even to study—this amazing narrative form, we will find that it
rewards us with virtually unlimited communications control and power.
Last fall I led a one-day Girl Scout storytelling workshop. Fifteen fidgety,
unruly high-school girls and I were shut up in a classroom for twelve hours on
a glorious fall Saturday. They were borderline unmanageable—except when
someone was telling a story—me or one of them. It didn’t matter who the teller
was. It didn’t happen when someone talked. Only when someone broke into
what everyone else recognized as a story. Then they grew still, attentive, eager,
literally mesmerized. They couldn’t articulate what made one speech a story
and another not. But they all recognized and responded to that difference.
Why? How? Is there any information to take away from that one experience?
What about from 500 just like it? That’s my personal bank of such experiences
and I could easily call forth a hundred other storytellers with similar banks of
personal testimonials. But is even such a mass of consistent anecdotal support
admissible evidence? Over 4,000 people swear that they have actually seen the
Loch Ness monster. Does that mean Nessie exists? How much evidentiary
weight should their anecdotal sightings carry?
People are eager for stories. Not dissertations. Not lectures. Not informative
essays. For stories. No one lines up outside the library to be the first to check out
the latest doctoral dissertation. No, it’s stories we crave, even though the disserta-
tion may well have more beneficial information and more lasting value for our
lives. Such expository narratives feel like bitter medicine. Stories feel like candy.
Stories are also remembered better and longer than information delivered in
any other way. I still vividly remember stories read to me during kindergarten
and first grade and can still picture the setting and moment when I heard them.
I do not remember any factual or expository information fed to me during those
years. I don’t remember any essays. I don’t remember any textbook passages.
I remember the stories. I also remember many of the stories I wrote as a child,
but cannot recall even one of the many reports, essays, articles, and papers
I had to write during my grade school years.
In the spring of 1983 I performed at an elementary school in Yorba Linda,
California. I entered the main hallway and passed a second-grade girl heading
for the front door. She said, ‘‘I remember you. You told us stories last year.’’
(It had been thirteen months since my first appearance at the school.) She then
proceeded to tell me one of the stories I had told the previous year. And she got
OPENING ARGUMENTS: MORE THAN YOU IMAGINED 9
it all right. It was a twelve-minute, original story; one I had told only a few
times. She had heard the story only once in her life and her only instructions at
the time were to march into the multipurpose room, sit on the floor, and be
quiet. Still, thirteen months later and with no prompting, she dredged that
entire story back into her conscious mind and could accurately retell it. I have
had the same experience with both children and adults when the gap between
one-time hearing and accurate recall has been as long as eight years!
How many kinds of narrative information do you accurately and completely
remember after one hearing for more than a year? For almost a decade? There
was no information in the story the second grader heard that was important to
her life or education. Still she remembered it. Stories are routinely remembered.
Other narrative forms of information are not.
In the spring of 1924 the young German physicist Werner Heisenberg went on a
walking tour with the great Neils Bohr in Denmark, Bohr’s homeland. The follow-
ing is Heisenberg’s account of what Bohr said when they came to Kronberg Castle:
Isn’t it strange how this castle changes as soon as one imagines that Hamlet lived
here? As scientists we believe that a castle consists only of stones, and admire the
way the architect put them together. The stone, the green roof with its patina, the
wood carvings in the church, constitute the whole castle. None of this should be
changed by the fact that Hamlet lived here, and yet it is changed completely. Sud-
denly the walls and ramparts speak a different language. The courtyard becomes
an entire world, a dark corner reminds us of the darkness of the human soul.
A poem?
A directive?
A conversation?
Last summer?
A newspaper column?
A joke?
Are these all stories? Do they all make stories? Are some stories? Surely, they
do not all match what we mean when we say story! Is there overlap, then,
between story and these other narrative forms? What makes some articles sto-
ries and some not? What makes some jokes stories and some not? When is an
essay a story and when is it not? What is a story?
Do you think that the following people all refer to the same thing—even
though they all use the same word: story?
¥ An editor growls, ‘‘What’s the story?’’ to a cub reporter.
¥ A drama critic searches for a movie’s ‘‘dramatic story arc.’’
¥ A therapist asks a patient to recount a rambling series of life events.
¥ A second-grade teacher asking her students for a half-page story of a
dragon.
¥ A minister begins a recitation of a biblical parable.
¥ A father barks, ‘‘Don’t you tell me no stories!’’ to a son three hours late for
curfew.
¥ A grizzled detective flips open his notebook and licks his pencil stub as he
arrives at the crime scene and growls to the rookie cop who discovered the
body, ‘‘So, what’s the story?’’
¥ A food critic writes a book on the history and cultivation of the carrot.
¥ A man drifts across a crowded cocktail party, pauses next to a woman who
picks at the shrimp platter, and says, ‘‘So, what’s your story?’’
¥ A couple shares the events of the day over dinner.
¥ A daughter snuggled into bed pleads, ‘‘Tell me a story!’’ to her mother.
Do they all mean the same thing when they use the word story to describe
what they are doing? The answer, of course, is no. But what does that say for
your definition of what is and what is not a story? How do you separate the sto-
ries from the non-stories?
I’ve already used the word story many times in this book. Did it always con-
jure a clear, definite, and well-defined image into your mind? Probably it didn’t.
And that’s part of the problem. We typically don’t collectively or individually
demand a clear understanding of that word. Most are okay with a vague and
fuzzy image—until you want to use stories to accomplish your communication
goals. Then you need to be precise if you want to be successful.
Take a minute to write your definition down. Force yourself to find the spe-
cific wording that you think uniquely identifies a story and differentiates stories
from narratives that aren’t stories.
I have asked thousands of adults and students to define a story. The most of-
ten offered answer is that a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end.
True, but so what? What doesn’t have a beginning, a middle, and an end? A
sewer pipe has all three. So does a peanut butter and jelly sandwich. Both the
best and the worst prose ever drafted had a beginning, a middle, and an end.
SO, WHAT IS A STORY? 13
invented or carefully researched and validated. Story is the framework, not the
content hung on that scaffolding. Don’t let the Binary Association Myth cloud
your view of the potential or versatility of stories.
I quickly found that I was living in an age when storytelling was suspect. Scientists
derided it. Philosophers threatened to censor it. Logicians had difficulty in depict-
ing it. Management theorists generally ignored it. Academics equated storytelling
with the world of wholly fictional myth and fable. The antagonism toward story-
telling may have reached a peak in the twentieth century with the determined
SO, WHAT IS A STORY? 17
¥ Blythe et al. (2004) define story as: ‘‘The narrative accounts of events and
experiences, real or fictitious. They can be spoken or written, vary in length,
and depict past, present, or future events.’’
¥ Dalkir and Wiseman (2004): ‘‘Story may be defined as the telling of a hap-
pening or a connected series of happenings, whether true or fictitious.’’
¥ Booth (1979): ‘‘An implied author, who may differ from the narrator,
presents information about characters and events to a reader.’’
¥ Ricoeur (1984): ‘‘A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences
done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real or
imaginary.’’
But does that definition match the reality of what our hearts and minds say a
story is? Let’s test it.
Plot is the sequence of events. These dictionary definitions for story and plot
are virtually synonymous. But plot is only one part of a story. Certainly, plot
alone does not constitute a story. It won’t help to make our test story longer by
adding additional plot.
He walked down the street. He stepped up onto the sidewalk. He paused at the double doors
and then pushed his way into the store. He walked slowly down an aisle and waved a ner-
vous hello to the shop owner. He paused in front of the cans of cream corn and picked one
up. He sighed and then put it back on the shelf and left.
Now it’s longer. Now is it a story? It meets the dictionary’s definition. Does it
meet yours?
More importantly, was it satisfying? Do you care about this character and
these events? Did it answer your basic questions? Did it give you a sense of
completion, of resolution? No, of course not. But these are the qualities most
people in my test audiences and workshops say they want and expect from a
story.
‘‘Telling what happened’’ is akin to giving the plotting facts of an event. But,
as Taylor (1996) adroitly noted, ‘‘Facts, theories, and reason alone do not stand a
chance against a story because facts and reason ultimately depend on story for
context and relevance and meaning—and, thus, for their power. Objective data
always require interpretation and perspective in order to yield fact. Those
require story.’’ Thus, for example, facts supporting the theory of evolution will
never vanquish the story of creation.
To demonstrate, Taylor (1996) said, ‘‘Argue either case [of two opposing posi-
tions] with facts, statistics, and charts and we will nod politely as we nod off to
sleep. Argue either side of that case [government’s role in solving poverty] with
powerful stories of hungry children or freeloading welfare cheats and we will
storm the barricades.’’ No one ever marched on Washington because of the facts
on a flowchart. Facts and plot alone do not a story make.
How can we resolve this apparent discrepancy? The dictionary is defining
that all-encompassing, everything-is-a-story version of the word story. In that
sense of story, virtually everything is a story and story is virtually synonymous
with plot. A better way to view it is to say that there are many levels of story. ‘‘I
went to the store today but they were out of our favorite kind of spaghetti
sauce,’’ is a Level 1 story. It meets the all-inclusive dictionary definition but
doesn’t accomplish any of what we want our stories to accomplish.
If we view story—as we will in this book—in the narrower sense of what
many would call a good story or an effective story—that is, the Top Level of
story—and identify the elements and characteristics of these stories that create
their success, then we will have unlocked the secret to effective communications
and teaching through story.
The problem is one of vocabulary. A small irony: English, the largest lan-
guage on Earth, has a remarkable dearth of vocabulary words to describe narra-
tive structures of the language, itself. It is akin to the situation we would have if
we had only one word to describe precipitation. Someone stumbles in from
SO, WHAT IS A STORY? 19
outside and shakes off. You ask, ‘‘What’s going on out there?’’ Dripping streams
of water onto the floor she answers, ‘‘Precipitation.’’
It’s laughable because we demand far more precision in that answer. We have
easily fifty words to describe different velocities, densities, rates, volumes, and
temperatures of precipitation. Good stories and effective stories are stories. The
others are called stories only by default because we lack vocabulary labels to
individually describe and define them.
Far more important than this conundrum of English vocabulary and narrative
titles—although that does substantially add to the general confusion about what
is and is not a story—is the underlying concept. Narratives are not all alike. Real
and important differences exist between different types of narratives. Those nar-
ratives that I am calling stories possess specific characteristics that create their
unique effectiveness—characteristics not shared by other narrative structures.
Literary critic Northrop Frye (1957) observed, ‘‘We have no word for a work
of prose other than ‘story,’ so story does duty for everything, and thereby loses
its only real meaning as the name of a specific genre, or structure of narrative.’’
We have lots of words for specific subcategories of story—tale, fable, myth,
legend, fairy tale, folk tale, parable, por qua story, epic, snippet, humorous, tall
tale, farce. We have no other word than story for the subcategories of narrative.
I have read scholarly articles in which the author used four versions of the
word story (story, story, STORY, and STORY !) to describe different narrative
structures. She said that she did it because there were no commonly recognized
words other than story for her to use and yet the point of her research and writ-
ing was to differentiate the characteristics and use of several different styles
of story.
Fireman et al. (2003), in agreeing with Russell and Lucariello (1992), said,
‘‘Some of the best minds in literary scholarship and in cognitive and develop-
mental psychology have spent years attempting to get hold of the essential and
distinguishing characteristics of narrative.’’ Why has it been so hard to pin
down the seemingly elusive definition of story? Certainly it has not been for lack
of talent or effort. The names from narratology alone read like a who’s who
of narrative research—Levi-Strauss, Noam Chompsky, Vladimir Propp, Paul
Ricoeur, Topdovor, Bremend, and Roland Barthes.
It’s because they are trying to study and corral the all-inclusive dictionary
story, not the effective story that has a specific set of definable common
characteristics.
Ancient Egyptians thought so little of the brain that they made a practice of
scooping it out through the nose and throwing it away before mummifying the
body and placing ‘‘important’’ organs in elaborately decorated jars. Aristotle
believed that consciousness resided in the heart, not in the head. In 1662, philos-
opher Henry Moore scoffed that the brain showed ‘‘no more capacity for
thought than a cake of suet or a bowl of curds’’ (Pinker 2000).
How does this mound of gray Jell-O bring into being our understanding of a
question or of another’s action? How does it create our ability to answer or to
act appropriately in response? Through what mystical and sublime process does
electrochemical energy become hope, passion, fear, or understanding? The magic
unfolding of the brain and mind will lead us at every turn directly to story.
brain cells than a fruit fly has and ten times as many as most monkeys. Each cell
is linked by synapses to as many as 100,000 others. That means your brain has
created over 500 trillion (500,000,000,000,000) wiggling string-like fibers called
axons and dendrites that connect with other neurons at junctions called syn-
apses. These synapses are awash with neurotransmitters and hormones that mod-
ulate the transmission of electrochemical signals. Synapses constantly form and
dissolve, weakening and strengthening in response to new experiences.
The first brain cell, or neuron, is thought to have appeared in animals about
500 million years ago. The neuron marked a crucial leap in evolution, second
only to that of the DNA molecule (Kotulak 1999).
A typical brain neuron receives input from thousands of other cells, some of
which inhibit rather than encourage the neuron’s firing. The neuron may, in
turn, encourage or discourage firing by some of those same cells in complex
positive and negative feedback loops. Somehow, through this freeway maze of
links, loops, and electric traffic jams, we each manage to think, perceive, con-
sider, imagine, remember, react, and respond.
Burdick (2006) reported on some interesting research by Dr. David Engleman,
a neurobiologist at the University of Texas. Engleman’s research has shown that
the brain lives just a little bit in the past. A human brain collects a lot of infor-
mation and then pauses for a moment to organize it before releasing the pro-
cessed information to the conscious mind. ‘‘Now’’ actually happened a little
while (several milliseconds) ago.
To demonstrate this to yourself, tap your finger on a tabletop at arm’s length.
Light travels faster than sound. So the sight actually reached you a few millisec-
onds before the sound. However, your brain synchronized the two to make
them seem simultaneous. The same thing happens when you watch someone’s
lips move as they speak. During these microsecond pauses the brain/mind con-
structs a plausible story to make the incoming information make sense. Sensory
impressions enter the brain; stories exit to the conscious mind for interpretation
and action. A significant part of what the brain does for the conscious mind is
structure experience into story.
Brains, however, come at a high cost. They require enormous amounts of
energy, oxygen, protection, and thermal regulation. Plants don’t need brains.
They don’t need to think about their environmental and personal conditions or
consider alternative responses. They survive quite well relying on the molecular
reflex level. Animals cannot survive as well as plants and so need brains.
If you’d like to read more about brain structure I recommend Pinker (2000),
Kotulak (1999), Newquist (2004), Horgan (2004), or Kruglinski (2005).
Unconscious portions of our human brains process raw sensory input and
pass it to intermediate processing areas of the brain. These areas (also in the
unconscious portion of our brains) are the exact areas that are activated when
humans create stories (Pinker 2000; Newquist 2004; Kotulak 1999). The output
of these regions is fed to the conscious mind for consideration. In other words,
the brain converts raw experience into story form and then considers, ponders,
remembers, and acts on the self-created story, not the actual input experience!
Edelman and Tononi (2000) concluded, ‘‘These unconscious aspects of mental
activity play a fundamental role in shaping and directing our conscious experience.’’
BRAIN DEVELOPMENT
Shreeve (2005) provides a good summary of embryonic neural development.
A human embryo doesn’t just sit, being bored, and suck its thumb. It works
overtime developing a brain. Four weeks after conception a human embryo pro-
duces half a million neurons every minute. Over several weeks those neurons
migrate to the brain following genetic (evolutionary) cues to determine their
specific destination. (We’ll talk about those evolutionary cues in a minute.) Dur-
ing the first two trimesters, neurons begin to stretch tentacles out to each other,
establishing synapses at the rate of two million a second! Three months before
birth, a baby’s brain has more neurons than at any other time in its life.
Just weeks before birth, cutthroat competition begins. Groups of neurons
compete with each other like political parties before an election to recruit other
neurons into their expanding network of specific functions. Those that lose die
off in a Darwinian weeding process. Those that win survive as parts of function-
ing neural nets, already partly tuned to detect, receive, and comprehend the
world in a particular way. By a baby’s second day of life, all of its sensory
organs function (vision develops last), soaking up information to speed to the
developing brain. For the next eighteen months a baby’s brain is a learning
machine—learning for the sake and joy of learning—with no need for context or
relevancy for the incoming information.
The question is: What evolutionary cues and predispositions direct this vast
brain development? What neural nets survive the Darwinian competition?
The mass of humanity has learned to read and write only in the past few
hundred years. Logical, expository, and argumentative forms first emerged per-
haps 5,000 years ago. But humans have been telling stories for 100,000 years or
more. Evolutionary biologists tell us that 100,000 years of story dominance in
human interaction has rewired the human brain to be predisposed before birth
to think in, make sense in, and create meaning from, stories. For more on this
important concept see Nelson (2003), Donald (1991), Plotkin (1982), Tomasello
(1995), Bruner (1990), or Pinker (2000).
Many researchers have studied the reactions and mental processes of babies.
Their work has confirmed that, at birth, humans think in story terms. Bruner’s
(1990) long years of clinical studies have shown that we are born preprogrammed
to search for, and to create meaning from, story elements. Others who have
explored the link between babies’ neural processing and story structure include
Nelson (2003), Shreeve (2005), Newquist (2004), Pinker (1997, 2000), Tallal (1994),
Bransford and Brown (2000), and Huttenlocher and Dabholkar (1997).
Gopnik et al. (1999) summed up thirty years of his own research and that of
three other eminent developmental psychologists with, collectively, forty years
STARTING AT THE TOP: A NOD TO THE NOODLE 25
Crossley (2000) (following earlier work by Langellier and Peterson 1996 and
by McAdams 1993) said, ‘‘We are inculcated from a very early age to seeing
connections between events, people, and the world in a certain way through the
stories told in our families.’’
Bruner (1990) (and before him Fillmore in 1968 and 1977) stated that research
clearly shows that a young child is early and profoundly sensitive to goals,
motives, and the actions taken for their achievement (for example, ‘‘all gone,’’
‘‘uh-oh’’). That is, they are sensitive to understanding events through story
structure.
Because of this hardwiring and reinforcement, it’s stories, not other narrative
forms and structures that humans understand and use. As Bruner stated (1990),
‘‘Children produce and comprehend stories long before they are capable of han-
dling the most fundamental Piagetian logical proposition that can be put into
linguistic form.’’ We master stories first because they arrive already loaded into
the childhood brain. Other forms of expository narrative, logic, and critical
thinking must be taught and painstakingly learned.
Our species thinks, perceives, and acts according to story structure. The more
we do it, the more likely we are to do it in the future and the greater is the pre-
disposition for story thinking that we evolutionarily engineer into future genera-
tions. That is the story of human brains.
Seven guiding principles define the story information human minds require in
order to understand, to make sense of, and to create meaning from incoming
narrative and experiential information.
Brain is the hardware. Mind is the software. The mind is what you do with the
amazing wiring that constitutes the neural net of your noggin. Minds compare
new input to data (experiences, thoughts, interpretations) already stored in the
brain, interpret and understand the new information, and create meaning
from it.
Try this: Imagine a submarine. Imagine a group of people singing ‘‘Happy
Birthday.’’ Imagine your neighbor. These are all images based on your remem-
bered experiences. Now imagine the submarine painted yellow and your neigh-
bor looking out a porthole of that yellow submarine as it floats through the air
with a crowd of people standing on the deck singing ‘‘Happy Birthday.’’
This can’t be based on experience. You created this image. You imagined it.
And you likely imagined it as easily as (or even more easily than) you recalled
your actual experiences. What magic does the mind do to create images as easily
and vividly—as real—as real images from experience? How do chemicals, fibers,
electrical impulses, blood, and gooey tissue create and then hold onto these
images?
We will not explore all of the functions and processes of the mind. Our con-
cern is with stories. But how the mind processes, interprets, and acts on incom-
ing narrative information is the key to understanding the power of story.
The goal of the mind is to sift through the constant bombardment of inputs
and interpret and evaluate each so that it can decide: Should I pay attention? If
so, how does it relate to me? Within what context can I place this information?
What does it mean to me? Should I remember it?
30 STORY SMARTS
For our purposes, the key steps in this complex, speed-of-light neural process
are:
1. Interpretation and Evaluation. As we saw in the last chapter, this happens
before processed information is passed to the conscious mind for examina-
tion. This is where information is shaped into story. We need to see how
the mind does that and what story form it naturally uses. If you shape
your material into that specific story structure, then it will pass through to
the conscious mind with few, if any, internal alterations, additions, and
restructurings. Your story reaches the conscious mind, not some other story
created by the receiver’s own mind.
2. Decision Making. What criteria does the mind use to determine if incoming
story information is worthy of receiving attention and being remembered?
3. How does memory work? How is information filed into memory? How is
it recalled from memory? I’ll separate this topic into its own chapter
(Chapter 6).
Turner (1996) concluded, ‘‘Story [emphasis added] is a basic principle of
mind,’’ and ‘‘Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking is organ-
ized as stories.’’ Raw inputs—like lumps of Play-Doh—are shaped into story
form before evaluation by the conscious mind. Because the mind uses hard-
wired, fixed templates (neural maps) to guide this construction process, the
mind is willing to create any missing bits of key information in the raw input.
Why is it important to study the mind in order to understand narrative?
Applebee’s research (1978) concluded that any narrative ‘‘is a product of the in-
ternal workings of the mind, and must reflect the complex processes of that
mind more directly.’’ Applebee (1978) and Holland (1978) both showed that
each reader creates a unique reconstruction of the material that the text provides
based on that person’s internal story scripts. If we study the mind’s activity, we
will understand how to control the reconstruction each mind creates.
Much of this chapter is based on the work by a handful of giants in the fields
of developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, neural biology, and cogni-
tive sciences: Pinker, Bransford (see Bransford and Brown or Bransford and
Stein), Bruner, Schank, Turner, Egan, Applebee, Anderson, Kotulak, Crossley,
Lakoff and Johnson, and Fisher. I refer you to their excellent work for more gen-
eral treatises on mental functioning. I have had to cull through the broader
research by these scientists to locate the limited gems that pertain to the inter-
section of mind and story.
In the few years since the inception of cognitive sciences in the late 1970s,
neural scientists have made many startling and fascinating discoveries. Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) reported on research showing that most thought is uncon-
scious, operating below the level of the conscious mind. As an example, during
every second of a conversation you are:
¥ Accessing memories relevant to what is being said.
¥ Comprehending a stream of sound as language, and forming the sounds
into words and sentences.
¥ Assigning a structure to the sentences in accordance to grammatical
constructs.
¥ Assigning meaning to words and groups of words.
¥ Making semantic and pragmatic sense of the sentences as a whole.
NOGGIN KNOW-HOW: THE MIND IS WHAT THE BRAIN DOES 31
¥ Framing what is said in terms relevant to the conversation and the speaker.
¥ Performing inferences relevant to what is being discussed.
¥ Evaluating the conversation flow in terms of your own goals and objectives
for this conversation.
¥ Constructing mental images where relevant of conversation information.
¥ Filling in gaps in the discourse with stored experience and structural story
maps.
¥ Noticing and interpreting body language and comparing this interpretation
to your interpretation of the meaning of the language.
¥ Anticipating where the conversation is going.
¥ Planning what to say in response.
I stare at my closet on Friday morning and my little inner voice commences: Pais-
ley shirt or the canary one? Canary. That’s what you feel like. But you gotta dress
up on Monday. Canary shirt today means doing laundry this weekend. Paisley!
But wait. Aren’t you going to meet Sharon for a lunch meeting? Isn’t she the one
who joked about paisley before? Canary. No. Maybe I can use whatever snide jokes
she makes to my own advantage. Paisley! Wait. Do I care if I irritate Sharon?
Would I ever want to date her? No. Fine. Paisley it is.
That conversation would roar through your mind in a matter of seconds and
would likely be complicated by a half dozen additional variables that your
unconscious mind would stream into the story for comparison and evaluation.
And that is just one of hundreds of such internal conversations we each employ
every day. You typically will have 30 or 40 such internal conversations for every
one you share with another person (Baars 1997).
As another example of the new insights that arrive annually, Kotulak (1999)
reported on extensive research showing that ‘‘the ability to form abstract
thoughts is now seen as a consequence of the brain’s learning to read.’’ Abstract
thought and reading wouldn’t seem to be linked. However, cultures who do not
read do not use abstract thought. Once they do learn to read, they are capable
of, and use, abstract thought. Consider the following:
All bears in Yellowstone are black. Bernard is a bear in Yellowstone. What color is
Bernard the Bear?
Easy. Right? Bernard is black. It’s simple logic based on your ability to con-
duct abstract thought and deductive reasoning. However, when even the most
intelligent members of nonliterate societies are asked, they can’t answer. Typi-
cally they say, ‘‘I have never been to Yellowstone and I have never met Bernard
the Bear. How could I possibly know what color he is?’’ (This phenomenon was
also reported by Egan 1997, Bertelson and DeGelder 1988, and Scholes and
Willis 1991.)
Perry (1995), a Baylor College of Medicine neuropsychiatrist, said, ‘‘A thou-
sand years ago in medieval England most people did not think abstractly. How
32 STORY SMARTS
superstitious they were is not dissimilar from the way eight- and nine-year-old
children today view the world.’’ He also stated (and this encourages my hope to
someday learn telepathy and teleportation), ‘‘In the same way that we developed
certain abstract cognitive capability as a function of our ability to read, there is
every reason to believe that there are other untapped abstract capabilities of our
brains that are not being developed by our traditional education system.’’
No, the final chapter in the human mind owner’s manual has certainly not
yet been written. Luckily for us, those chapters that deal with processing narra-
tive are far more concrete and proven.
Did you assume that the ‘‘he’’ in sentence #1 is Fred? Did you try to connect
the first two sentences and wonder if Fred died because he went to the store or
while at the store? Did you presume that Fred went to the store to get some-
thing for Sharon to eat? Did you assume that Fred and Sharon were connected
and that she wept in part because Fred died? Did you deduce that the store Fred
went to was a grocery store?
These are all signs of the Magnificent Seven Concepts at work.
The Magnificent Seven are:
1. Play It Again, Sam
2. Order in the Court
3. Get My Meanin’?
4. Intent Drives the Car
5. Mad about What’s Missing
6. Every Story Is Somebody’s Story
7. Such a Struggle
understand events because we have relied on them in the past. We assume that
mental story maps that worked before will surely work again.
John quietly locked the door and pressed his back against it as he leered at the chil-
dren in the room.
The ship’s horn blasted three times as the last line was cast off the forward bollard
and the gap between ship and dock began to grow.
A glowing full moon, harsh as a spotlight, made him blink as he crept from the shad-
ows into its merciless gaze.
Three random sentences. There is no connection. But don’t you naturally want
to connect them, to make them fit together? Why was John leering? What’s on the
NOGGIN KNOW-HOW: THE MIND IS WHAT THE BRAIN DOES 35
ship that relates to John and the children? Them? The children’s protector? Who
stepped out into the moonlight? Was he hiding? From whom? Why did he creep?
Your mind naturally wants to impose order and linkage on any narrative.
Get My Meanin’?
Patrick Henry might have said, ‘‘Give me meaning, or . . .’’ Well, there is no
‘‘or.’’ Human minds demand meaning. To accommodate that demand, we
assume that narrative always has meaning and that all of the information fits to-
gether to reveal that meaning. We are willing to create what we need to create
in order to obtain the meaning of a narrative or situation. If we see no meaning,
we ignore the narrative.
Why is meaning so centrally important? Johnson’s research concluded that
‘‘every one of us is actively plotting our lives, both consciously and uncon-
sciously, by attempting to construct ourselves as significant characters within
what we regard as meaningful life stories. As soon as people secure the most
meager existence, they begin to worry about the meaning, value, and purpose of
their lives’’ (Johnson 1999). We demand meaning from narratives because we
seek it as a primary goal in our lives.
When we listen to a melody we do not consider individual notes as isolated
elements. Rather, each note is understood as part of a sequence as a whole. Each
note takes on meaning only in relation to the note that has preceded it and in
anticipation of that which will succeed it. Human minds do the same thing with
narrative. But instead of using melody to impose meaning, we use mental story
templates (maps). Individual experiences only assume meaning within the con-
text of a time-based, sequenced story.
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1986) studied strategies for pursuing meaning and
concluded that humans use story structure to fabricate meaning from narratives
and experiences. Hardcastle (2003) concluded from her study, ‘‘From the begin-
ning, children try to understand the world and self as meaning something by
creating stories with plot and temporal sequence.’’ Sperber and Wilson (1982)
concluded, ‘‘We characteristically assume that what somebody says must make
sense, and we will, when in doubt about what sense it makes, search for or
invent an interpretation to give it sense.’’
In his multidecade study of the concept of meaning, Bruner (1990) showed
that story elements are prelinguistic and are relied on from birth to extract
meaning from the events and actions of others. He also concluded that ‘‘stories
achieve their meanings by explicating deviations from the ordinary in a compre-
hensible form.’’
We think we understand normal behavior and have predetermined its mean-
ing. So we tend to pay no attention to such expected behavior and narrative.
However, we need story structure to explain deviations from those expected
norms and to extract appropriate meaning from those deviations. To accomplish
this monumental mental juggling feat, we use mental tools such as assumptions,
implications, inferences, and presuppositions.
What does this search for meaning look like in action? Here is a two-line con-
versation:
Person 1: ‘‘Where’s Jack?’’
Person 2: ‘‘Well . . . I didn’t want to have to tell you. But I saw a yellow VW parked
in front of Susan’s.’’
36 STORY SMARTS
Those two sentences introduce four characters: Persons #1 and #2, Jack, and
Susan. Read the sentences twice and you will typically begin to construct rela-
tionships between these four people and histories to those relationships in order
to ascribe meaning to the event presented in the two quotes. Jack could have
gone to Carol’s to study and his mother, Person #1, doesn’t want him to get
good grades and go to college. Carol’s may be a restaurant and Jack has gone
there to break his diet. The relationships you envisioned are your own fabrica-
tion, created by your own mind just to satisfy your own demand for meaning.
We assume it makes sense first, and figure out how to create or find that
meaning second.
¥ Johnson (1999) stated, ‘‘The myriad acts we perform each day . . . are done
for some purpose or other. Most of the time we pursue these purposes with
little or no conscious reflection or awareness. Still, we constantly direct our
energies toward realizing goals.’’
¥ Bower and Morrow (1990) observed, ‘‘Readers assume automatically that a
goal is viewed as causing actions that, in turn, lead to outcomes.’’
¥ Bruner (1990) stated, ‘‘People have beliefs and desires. Actions are based on
these desires and are logical attempts to fulfill desires.’’
¥ Neurophysicist R. Montague (2006) noted, ‘‘Remarkably, the single property
that all biological and mechanical computational systems require is goals.’’
¥ Pinker (1997) agreed that beliefs and goals drive behavior. But Pinker went
further, showing that, if we are to truly understand behavior, we must first
understand beliefs and goals.
An example: Sally smells smoke and leaves the building. Those are actions.
But a correct interpretation of the meaning of those actions depends on under-
standing her goals and motives. We can’t see into another’s mind and have to
make decisions based on available partial information. So we use ‘‘rules of
thumb,’’ stereotypes, and other techniques to fill in a ‘‘most probable’’ goal to
explain the behavior we see.
Sally left because she believes that smoke means danger and she wants to be
safe. Right? Maybe. But maybe she left because she set the fire and wants to
vamoose before she’s caught. Maybe she left because she is a known pyroma-
niac and fears arrest even though she didn’t set it. Maybe, though it is only the
smoke from her roommate’s pipe, she has a morbid fear of being burned, pan-
icked, and fled.
The same actions can have radically different meanings depending on the
goals and motives of the actor. Typically, however, we assume the most com-
mon, expected motive.
Pinker (1997) said it most succinctly. ‘‘Our minds explain human behavior by
their beliefs and desires because experience shows that people’s behavior, in
NOGGIN KNOW-HOW: THE MIND IS WHAT THE BRAIN DOES 37
fact, is driven by their beliefs and desires. We learn their beliefs and goals by
studying people’s behavior.’’
A classic example of how dependent we are on goal in order to interpret and
explain action was first created by Heider and Simmel (1964) and again by
Michotte (1963). Both created a movie. Here is the plot: A protagonist strives to
attain a goal. An antagonist interferes. Thanks to a helper, the protagonist finally
succeeds. This movie, however, stars three dots. One dot moves some distance up
an inclined line, back down, and up again, almost reaching the top. Another
abruptly collides with it, and the first dot moves back down. A third gently
touches our ‘‘main character’’ and moves together with it to the top of the incline.
Viewers see only the motion of these three dots. Still, all observers—all (and
this test has been given to three-year-olds and up)—see the first dot as trying to
reach the top, the second as hindering it, and the third as helping it to reach its
goal. Actions have no meaning without goals and motives.
This human goal dependency starts early. Bruner (1990) and Fillmore (1968
and 1977) clearly showed that a young child is early and profoundly sensitive to
goals, motives, and their achievement (for example, ‘‘all gone,’’ ‘‘uh-oh’’).
Research with twelve-month-olds shows that babies interpret cartoons of mov-
ing dots as if the dots were seeking goals with purpose and intent (Pinker 1997).
Further, this dependence on goal and intent is universal. Pinker (1997) stated,
‘‘Contrary to widespread belief that cultures can vary arbitrarily and without
limit, surveys of the ethnographic literature show that the peoples of the world
share an astonishingly detailed universal psychology.’’ He went on to show that
character and goal were central to the core stories of every known culture.
Science can’t even describe the actions of a gene without assuming goal and
motive. In his book The Selfish Gene (2006) Dawkins’s central thesis is that genes
achieve their goal by the way they build human brains to enjoy life, health, sex,
friends, relationships, and struggles.
Bransford and Stein (1993) showed that specified goals define a story and
define the appropriate actions and events that are relevant to that story. Con-
sider the impact of knowing a character’s goal on your ability to create meaning
and to remember. Read this list of seven simple sentences (Bransford and Stein
1993) once and try to remember them:
Cover the list. Do you remember which one purchased scissors? Which cut out
a coupon? Which one climbed steps? Which bought a padlock? Probably not. Now
reread the sentences with the addition of a stated or strongly implied goal for each.
The fat one bought the padlock to place on the refrigerator door.
The skinny one purchased the scissors to use when taking in her pants.
The toothless one plugged in the cord to the food blender.
38 STORY SMARTS
The barefoot one climbed the steps leading to the vat of grapes.
The bald one cut out the coupon for a hair restoration clinic.
The kind one opened the milk to give to a hungry child.
The poor one entered the museum to find shelter from the snowstorm.
Easier to remember? Of course. Because goal creates relevance and meaning
for an action. Also notice that, with the addition of a goal, your mind tends to
create a vivid picture of the scene and (usually) to extend the scene forward and
backward through time into a complete story. That is the effect of story intent.
Here is another example of the power of goal on readers (Bransford and Stein
1993). Read this paragraph:
Sally let loose a team of gophers. The plan backfired when a dog chased them
away. She then threw a party but the guests failed to bring their motorcycles. Fur-
thermore, her stereo system was not loud enough. Sally spent the next day looking
for a ‘‘Peeping Tom’’ but was unable to find one in the Yellow Pages. Obscene
phone calls gave her some hope until the number was changed. It was the installa-
tion of a blinking neon light across the street that finally did the trick. Sally framed
the ad from the classified section and now has it hanging on her wall.
Confusing, isn’t it? Note, however, that this is a plot, a series of actions or
events. It is also frustrating and meaningless. Plot alone cannot convey meaning.
However, if I add Sally’s goal and motive, you will easily make sense out of it.
Sally hates the woman who moved in next door (motive) and wants to drive her out
(goal).
Now reread the paragraph and see if your mind doesn’t conjure images and
sequences that make sense to you. Goal and motive provide structure, purpose,
and organization to a narrative. Intent lies at the core of human narrative
understanding.
that result in calculations that are used to check and correct the assumptions
and reduce future ambiguity (Pinker 1997).
Possible combinations of meanings based on these assumptions are pre-coded
and pre-connected in the brain before cognitive processing. Only the possible
meanings that are consistent with our assumptions and neural models and maps
are allowed in for cognitive consideration. That is, we only initially consider
meanings and interpretations that we expected to find, that we are predisposed
to find. We instantly assess based on preconceived stereotypes and other base
cues.
The other six concepts I describe in this chapter are, in fact, rules of thumb
created to deal efficiently with incomplete narrative and experiential informa-
tion. We don’t need to quiz a dozen spear-wielding strangers about their
individual intentions. We glance at their face and body posture and use character-
based story assumptions and stereotypes to quickly decide—stay or run.
Our system of filling in around incomplete information with what we most
expect is the basis of countless visual tricks and illusions. It is the foundation
of magic. You see what you expect to see and are fooled every time by what
you didn’t see because you never expected it and so never looked for or
observed it.
We assume that walls and floors are rectangles meeting at right angles and so
fall prey to carnival ‘‘shrinking room’’ illusions. We expect that, when a magician
shuffles a deck of cards, that the cards will change order in the deck. We expect
that, when a magician says he’s picking up the top card on a deck, and when it
looks like he’s doing what we’d do to pick up the top card, that, in fact, he has.
Presto! We’re amazed when it’s not and give credit to the magician rather than
blame our own sets of assumptions for dealing with incomplete information.
Another visual example is the oft-used Kanizsa triangle (Zeki 1993, 263). This
picture is a geometric diagram of solid bars, shaded rectangles, lines, and
angles. A triangular-shaped void in the middle is only partially outlined and
defined by the places where this space intersects and seems to overlay the bars,
shaded areas, and lines. Still, all viewers ‘‘see’’ the triangle that isn’t there
because we are used to working with incomplete information and filling in to
make the entire image make the best possible sense.
The same concept applies to narrative information. We assume cause-and-
effect relationships and we assume that actions are designed to achieve goals.
We assume rational character behavior. We use our neural story maps to define
what we expect based on even the scantiest information we are actually given.
Why? Because these assumptions normally work and because they allow us to
make instant decisions without waiting to gather more complete information.
Consider Goldilocks. The story never says why she ventured into the bears’
house. She heads for the kitchen and eats. So we guess that she must have been
hungry (as opposed to her being a compulsive glutton). She pokes around a bit,
so we assume she’s a curious kid (as opposed to a thief casing the premises).
She wanders upstairs to take a nap, so we assume she must be tired.
These are all assumptions we come to after the fact based on what she does.
Upon careful review, none of these makes much sense—especially since she is
traipsing through a house where one swipe from any paw of any resident could
kill her. Still, we launch happily into the story without knowing her intent
because we don’t mind working with incomplete information and believe that
we’ll figure it out soon enough.
40 STORY SMARTS
Incomplete information may be fine with the receiving mind, but it is a bane
for the writer or speaker. Each mind will fill in with its own version of goals,
motives, values, beliefs, attitudes, cause-and-effect relationships, etc. That is,
each mind will create and remember its own meaning from your material, not
your intended meaning. The more carefully you deliver the core information a
receiving mind needs, the less creative work that mind is forced to do, and the more
likely it is that your actual messages are received, considered, and remembered.
and the interaction of these two pivotal positions. Character is the focus of
story.
Taylor (1996) spent considerable time establishing the notion that we literally
need to watch characters face and make decisions and that these decisions—in
order to have any significance to the reader—require a goal that is important to
the character.
‘‘Whether a story is believable depends on the believability and reliability of
character’’ (Fisher 1987). Readers make this decision by applying the Magnifi-
cent Seven concepts to assess a character’s decisions and actions and deciding
what values, motives, and intents those actions represent. Readers view actions
(plot) to understand character (not the other way around). Beyond mere believ-
ability, Bower and Morrow (1990) showed that readers attribute competence
and noble motives to the character with whom they identify, especially when
that character faces significant conflicts and obstacles.
Supporting the concept of Mad about What’s Missing, Fisher (1987) showed
that readers search actions to determine character values and then assess the
character by comparing those values against their version of known archetypes
(town marshal, knight-errant, schoolmarm, greedy banker, etc.). Again, the
value of narrative actions is that they help readers evaluate characters.
In a 1986 experiment, Bruner read story passages to subjects and recorded the
subjects as they retold the story. Subject story versions were universally character-
based renditions of the story (not plot-based) and often dealt more heavily in
character feeling, thinking, and internal emotions than did the original. (‘‘They
each converted the story into a tale of character—character and circumstance’’
[Bruner 1986].) Plus, many of these ‘‘tell backs’’ added themselves as a character
in their telling, including their experience of hearing the story as a source of
viewpoint and perspective for their listeners.
This focus on character as the central organizing concept for narrative under-
standing begins early in life. While studying London school children, Applebee
(1978) concluded that children grasp that stories don’t have to be about real
things long (a year or more) before they accept that the characters in those
fictional stories might also be fictional.
Similarly, Egan (1997) showed that story abstractions (in Peter Rabbit, for
example) are meaningful to young children when the children can base their
understanding on the motives, intentions, hopes, and fears of characters that
seem familiar and real to children. Somebody has to venture into the bears’ house
and dig herself into deeper and deeper trouble as she gobbles breakfast and
smashes furniture so that readers can see the dangers of excessive spontaneous
curiosity. It doesn’t have to be Goldilocks. It could be anyone. But it has to be a
specific someone.
Not only do we demand that characters exist in narratives so that we have a
viewpoint through which to assess and evaluate story information and events,
we demand to know enough about these characters to be able to assess them as
a way to evaluate events and information. Narrative writing is all about
character.
Such a Struggle
Readers search for meaning not through successes and achievements, but
through conflict and struggle. Conflict is energy. It is tension. Conflict is the
42 STORY SMARTS
Mary desperately wanted—needed—some ice cream. So she walked into the kitchen
and got some. The End.
It’s just wrong. It’s not worth telling, hearing, or remembering. Such a story
is even offensive to many. It violates some core tenet of narrative structure. We
need it to be hard for Mary. We need for there to be no ready-made way for her
to get her ice cream and we need her to exert great effort and to face risk and
danger en route to her ice cream. We need her to struggle so that we will find
meaning and value through her struggle.
We don’t care about Mary, her ice cream, or her story until she struggles.
Struggle unlocks the key to successful story structure. You may want to commu-
nicate accomplishments and achievements, but it is the character’s struggles to
get there that give those accomplishments any meaning or relevance to the
reader, that give them meaning and value.
Zaltman (2003) reported on a study using an illustration of two running mon-
sters in a long, receding tunnel (originally drawn by Roger Shepard in 1990).
Both monsters are actually identical in every detail. One is placed in the fore-
ground, the other in the background—apparently farther back in the tunnel. The
second monster seems to be bigger because the perspective lines of the tunnel
make it appear to fill the tunnel. In the study, people viewed the illustration for
four seconds. All viewers then reported seeing a large monster with an angry
expression chasing a smaller one with a frightened expression who was trying to
get away. Even after people were told and shown that the monsters were identi-
cal, they still viewed the two monsters in the same way, insisting that one
looked angry and the other looked frightened. They still insisted that one was
struggling to escape and that one was struggling to catch. The illustration made
no sense without character purpose based on implied struggle. Study research-
ers concluded that essential story emotions and elements were more powerful
than facts. We need to see characters struggle to obtain or do something that is
important to them.
Children writers I work with habitually want life to be easy for the characters
they create. They tend to give their main characters super powers and then find
that they have no story to tell that isn’t boring for readers. Why? Life is too easy
for the character with the most power. So we only appreciate the king when he
seems racked by woes and wistfully wonders ‘‘what the simple folk do.’’ Even
the lordly king has to struggle if we readers are to care.
Think of the Lone Ranger. He sits in his hotel room polishing tarnish off of
his silver bullets when he hears a cry, ‘‘The bank’s being robbed!’’ In a flash our
beloved ranger has strapped on his gun belt and donned his mask and jangling
spurs. He races down the stairs and out onto the dust-blown street to find
hunched-over, eighty-eight-year-old Swedley Scramblebrain shuffling out of the
NOGGIN KNOW-HOW: THE MIND IS WHAT THE BRAIN DOES 43
1. You assume that there must be some organization, order, and connection
between the three sentences and search for possible sequencing that will
provide clues as to what that connection is.
2. With no obvious linkage between sentences, you activate your neural story
map to create enough information to garner meaning and to understand
the narrative. Why? Because it has worked well for you in the past. If, on
the other hand, you decide that these sentences are pointless and meaning-
less, you discount and ignore the narrative. People often do that when they
aren’t given sufficient story information with the data and technical
information.
3. You don’t mind that you are given grossly insufficient information in these
three sentences. Incomplete is good enough. You are willing to create the
missing elements and you assess what information you need.
4. You assume that the story is about Fred and Sharon (it has to be some-
body’s story) and assume that ‘‘he’’ in sentence #1 must be Fred—even
though English grammar rules tell you that ‘‘he’’ refers not to the follow-
ing noun, ‘‘Fred,’’ but to some unknown masculine noun listed some-
where above.
44 STORY SMARTS
MIND MECHANICS
Chapter 4 concepts lay the foundations for how the mind processes narrative in-
formation in its effort to create meaning, context, and relevance for the con-
scious mind. There are a series of specific techniques reported in the research
that the mind uses to enforce these concepts on incoming information. These
techniques further reveal the key pieces of information the mind seeks (or cre-
ates) for every narrative. We will use these core bits of narrative information to
develop a more coherent definition of story in Chapter 7.
These techniques are employed at the automatic, subconscious level. Our
minds rarely notice when we employ them individually or (more commonly) in
combination to complete the wondrous mental gymnastics required by the con-
scious mind. We only notice their combined output, the results of their activity
and of the story maps they use.
7. Binary Opposition
8. Blending
9. Language and Syntax Rules
10. Emotions Rule
11. Details
Eleven techniques is a lot to wade through when part of you wants to jump
straight to a better definition of story and then assess the research. But your time
here will be well rewarded in an improved understanding of the elements that
give stories their power and effectiveness and that will form the core of our
definition.
Assumptions
I used the word assume many times in the last chapter describing how human
minds employ the Magnificent Seven concepts. We make myriad mental assump-
tions and then treat them as reliable truth to ease and speed the processing of new
experiences. We take relationships and propositions for granted without man-
dating supporting evidence. That’s an assumption.
Here’s a quick demonstration of our tendency to make assumptions. Consider
these two sentences:
John felt lonely. He rang the neighbor’s doorbell.
1. We assume, and try to forcibly construct, a logical linkage between the two
sentences.
2. We assume that John wanted company (a goal) and that he believed that
company would relieve his feeling of loneliness (a motive).
3. We assume that he went next door and rang the bell in order to achieve
that goal (an action to achieve his goal).
4. We assume that he wanted someone to answer.
¥ Everyone thinks as I do. We assume that all rational humans process infor-
mation in the same manner and base their thinking on the same underlying
principles that govern our own thinking. They don’t consciously think our
thoughts, share our values, and draw our same conclusions. But they are
the same in that they base actions on their intent, use the same general con-
cepts to supply their conscious thinking, use their own values and beliefs
to govern their thought processes, and draw conclusions and meanings
based on others’ behavior.
¥ What people actually say is new and important. Through his studies of
how people interpret and respond to narratives, Bruner (1990) concluded,
‘‘What one does not utter is assumed to be presupposed or given. What one
does utter is assumed to be new’’ (emphasis added). For example, it would
not normally make sense for someone to say, ‘‘This room has walls.’’ That
is automatically assumed, a given—unless this were new and uncommon
information when, for example, you were in a tropical island village where
the huts are commonly built without walls.
In this way, we judge everything a character says to be (in their view)
new and significant information that will reveal character and provide key
story information to the reader.
¥ People act rationally according to accepted norms. We assume that people
act pretty much the way we do. School children learn these behavioral rules
beginning in kindergarten (for example, keep your hands to yourself; wait
your turn; don’t interrupt; don’t hit). Deviations from these extensive and
detailed cultural norms require explanation. Without explanation, we
assume these behaviors represent serious character flaws or are the result
of some antisocial goal.
We have, as a culture, taken this concept of normative behavior so far
that it also applies to defining alien intelligence. Science fiction author
David Alexander Smith (who created the first definition of alien intelli-
gence) said that, in order for an alien to be perceived as intelligent, ‘‘You
have to be able to observe the alien’s behavior and say, ‘I don’t understand
the rules by which the alien makes its decisions, but the alien is apparently
acting rationally by some set of rules’’’ (Smith 1982).
¥ People agree on appropriate setting-specific norms of behavior. Bruner
(1990) said, ‘‘We take for granted that people behave in a manner appropriate
to the setting in which they find themselves.’’ In the library, they will act library.
At a square dance they’ll act square dance. At work they’ll act office. When peo-
ple act in accordance with these situational norms, their behavior is taken for
granted, needs no further explanation, and merits no further attention.
¥ Temporal sequencing is appropriate and reliable. We assume that it is
appropriate and valuable to organize events according to temporal
sequence. Clandinin and Connelly (2000) observed, ‘‘We take for granted
that locating things in time is the correct way to think about them.’’ Ricoeur
(1984) concluded that ‘‘plot is events placed in time sequence with cause
and effect links established.’’ However, this is, at its core, an assumption.
48 STORY SMARTS
Some Arabic tribal cultures believe that things simply happen according to
the will of Allah and that temporal or other sequencing is irrelevant.
¥ Past explains the present and predicts the future. This assumption is a
subset of temporal sequencing. It is the justification for temporal sequenc-
ing. This assumption allows us to convert temporally sequenced events into
meaning and into predictions of future events.
¥ A person’s face reveals their beliefs, values, attitudes, and emotions. Lakoff
and Johnson (2003) said, ‘‘In our culture, we look at a person’s face—rather
than his posture or movements—to get our basic information about what a per-
son is like.’’ We assume that facial expressions are unrehearsed and not con-
sciously controlled and thus project a character’s true reactions and feelings.
When you detect a discrepancy between what someone says and the way
they say it—their facial expression and vocal tone—you will always believe
the expression and discount the words. Always. If someone curled their
lips, rolled their eyes, and sneered, ‘‘Oh, don’t you look nice today,’’ you
would never feel complimented even though the words were a compli-
ment. We believe the expression.
¥ Cause-and-effect sequencing defines how things really happen. Again
from Lakoff and Johnson (2003): ‘‘Causation is one of the concepts most of-
ten used by people to organize their physical and cultural realities.’’ Infants
first learn cause-and-effect relationships when they learn that they can
directly manipulate objects around them—pull off their blanket, throw their
bottle, drop their spoon (Piaget 1956).
Our willingness to make, and to rely on, assumptions keeps our minds from
getting stuck in information gaps, endlessly spinning our mental gears searching
for something that doesn’t exist.
Cheat Sheets
Neural researchers call them cheat sheets or neural maps. Narratological and
educational researchers call them neural schema, or just schema. The closest fit
for ordinary folk is ‘‘rules of thumb.’’
Pinker (1997) described them this way. ‘‘We mortals have to make fallible
guesses from fragmentary information. Each of our mental modules solves this
unsolvable conundrum by a leap of faith about how the world works. We
use prefabricated mental cheat sheets to guide the making of indispensable
assumptions—the only defense for which being that the assumptions worked
well enough in the world of our ancestors.’’
These neural cheat sheets take a few bits of fragmentary incoming information
(for example, a sound, a glimpse, a tone of voice, a quick scan of a new situation)
and, in two grand leaps, provide the mind enough information to make rational
decisions. First, cheat sheets identify the additional bits of information that the
mind will need. How do they know? Cheat sheets are accumulated banks of experi-
ence. They are lists of what was needed and what was successfully used in the past.
Second, cheat sheets activate banks of prior knowledge to identify the ‘‘best
guess’’ for each missing bit of information. It is an amazing magic trick. Cheat
sheets spin a few incoming signals into entire scenarios complete with character
profiles, intents, dangers, possible actions, and likely outcomes.
As Lakoff’s and Johnson’s (2003) research showed, this neural mapping is not
an abstract, metaphoric process. It is a physical process that creates real synaptic
MIND MECHANICS 49
structures (neural circuitry linkages and neural clusters called nodes) in the
brain. Each successful use of a cheat sheet gives that neural map impetus to
recruit new neurons into its net, to strengthen its linkages, to increase the likeli-
hood of its use in the future.
Cheat sheets serve a second purpose. Pinker (1997) reported on neural biol-
ogy findings that the brain can process only limited amounts of information at
any one time. So instead of taking the time to compute complete theorems, the
mind relies on crude rules of thumb and cheat sheets to speed processing. Cheat
sheets are a mental efficiency device.
Bruner (1986) described cheat sheets this way: ‘‘As our readers read, as they begin
to construct a virtual text of their own, it is as if they were embarking on a journey
without maps—and yet they possess a stock of maps that might fit this journey, or
might give hints, and besides, they know a lot about journeys and a lot about map
making.’’ He also said that humans’ primary vehicles for processing incoming
narrative or experiential information are our neural story maps (Bruner 1986).
Schank (1990) went so far as to conclude, ‘‘Scripts replace thinking. The think-
ing people do is to decide which script to apply.’’ Later he said that humans auto-
matically select story scripts to understand narrative and experiential information.
Stereotypes are a good example of a cheat sheet element. Character cheat
sheets assume that the more an individual resembles a stereotype, the more
likely he is to belong to that category and will exhibit the full set of stereotypical
behaviors and beliefs for that category. When Gunsmoke’s Marshal Dillon sees a
stranger wearing a black shirt, he becomes suspicious. If that stranger also sports
a black hat and twin, pearl-handled .45s, he fits the Gunsmoke stereotype for a
bad guy and the good marshal took action without waiting for proof positive.
Combining the research of many researchers here are the assumptions most
often cited as being part of human’s story cheat sheet or neural map. (See Pinker
1997, Bruner 1990, Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Schank 1990, Johnson 1996, Fisher
1987, Cooper 1997, and Polkinghorne 1988.)
¥ Time. We organize events chronologically and assume that this will reveal
order, connectedness, meaning. (Things don’t ‘‘just happen.’’)
¥ Cause and effect. We assume that events in the past cause events in the
present and that present events will cause events in the future.
¥ Goals. Goals, beliefs, and motive exist for all characters and for all of their
actions.
¥ Characters act. All characters act to fulfill their goals and desires. Charac-
ters’ actions reveal their beliefs and desires.
¥ Goal driven. All actions are driven by beliefs and goals. Actions are
designed to achieve goals in a manner consistent with beliefs.
¥ Only needed actions. Characters only act to fulfill goals they have not yet
achieved and then only act if they believe an action is required to achieve a goal.
¥ Future actions. A character’s future actions can be predicted by knowing
their past actions and their beliefs and desires.
Consider this paragraph from Cooper (1997) as an example of neural cheat
sheets in action.
Andrew was having a great time at his party. He was playing games and opening
presents. When it came time to blow out the candles on the cake, he blew and blew
but they would not go out. As soon as he thought he had blown out the candles,
they would light again.
50 STORY SMARTS
Notice that, even though events and actions are never explained, you have no
trouble following, picturing, and understanding them. From the opening sen-
tences, we assume this is a birthday party. The provided information fits with
prior experiential knowledge our party cheat sheets dredge out of memory
about birthday parties. From these same banks of knowledge, we know about
cake and candle birthday rituals. From the last two sentences, our story maps fill
in character emotions, motives, goals, beliefs, and probable ages. We can imag-
ine who put the trick candles on the cake and why. We know why Andrew tried
so diligently to blow out the candles. We imagine all other party goers laughing,
know why they laughed and how they felt. We can fill in the entire sequence of
a typical party and know that ice cream is nearby even though not mentioned.
However, individuals from a culture that did not put candles on a cake to
represent age, or that did not have trick candles, or that did not give presents to
the birthday celebrant, would be totally lost and unable to understand this para-
graph since their story maps could not overlay these events into their expected
norms of behavior and activity.
Both Polkinghorne (1988) and Culler (1981) offered the following to demon-
strate the central role of cause and effect in our story maps.
The king died. The queen died.
The king died and then the queen died from laughing too hard.
This version includes cause-and-effect linkage. Now your story maps can be
activated and you no longer accept the statement as a simple fact. You begin to
wonder about the character and personality of the king and queen and about
their relationship. (Did she laugh so hard because her husband died? Is that how
she really felt about him? Had he banned laughter from the kingdom while he
lived and now she was at last free to indulge?) You begin to make assumptions
about character beliefs, desires, and past actions. These wonderings and
assumptions are signals that your neural story map has been activated and is
trying to locate or create the essential information to expand this fragment of in-
formation as a complete story. That’s what cheat sheets do.
Cheat sheets are powerful, efficient, and are standard operating procedure for
human minds. But they also limit the range of information readers seek and
consider. Once you understand this human reliance on neural story maps and
learn their key elements, you can consistently provide the essential elements that
control how readers select and apply cheat sheets to use with your narrative.
Expectations
We expect things to be as we expect them to be. Bruner (1990), a leading
researcher in this field, said, ‘‘We take for granted that people behave in a
MIND MECHANICS 51
Our central nervous system seems to have evolved in a way that specializes our
senses to deal differently with expected and with unexpected versions of the world.
Unexpected versions (unexpected in that they violate the neural maps or ‘‘models
of the world’’ stored in the brain) most often alert the cerebral cortex through dis-
charges of impulses in the so-called ascending reticular system, a tangled skein of
fibers that runs in parallel with orderly sensory nerves, both working their way
upstream to the upper brain.
. . . will always take the form of a story and include reasons (intention, motive,
viewpoints) to make the extraordinary make sense and, within its own context,
seem ordinary. . . . All such stories seem to be designed to give the exceptional
behavior meaning in a manner that implicates both the intentional state of the pro-
tagonist (a belief or desire) and some canonical element in the culture. The function
of the story is to find an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a
deviation from a canonical cultural pattern.
Expectations and surprise are tightly linked. Bruner (1986) showed that ‘‘sur-
prise is a response to a violated presupposition.’’ In his 2003 book, Bruner revis-
ited this concept and concluded that ‘‘story making is our medium for coming
to terms with the surprises and oddities of the human condition. Stories provide
context and structure to render the unexpected less surprising and more
understandable.’’
Bruner (1990) reported that research shows that very young children focus on
the effort to establish and record canonical behavior (expected normative behav-
ior) and to explain deviations from this expected norm. For example, infants
perk up, stop sucking pacifiers, stare longer, or look surprised when something
happens that they did not expect. Expectations begin at birth and define our
view of the world.
As an example of how expectations direct our attention through a story, con-
sider this shipping record:
A three-masted sailing ship, the Fair Wind, sailed on September 13, 1849, from Hali-
fax, Nova Scotia, with a complement of forty-eight sailors and a full load of lumber.
It never reached San Francisco, California, its destination.
52 STORY SMARTS
There is no real interest for readers here. All provided information falls
within the range of our normal expectations. Change the cargo to include the
final treasure trove of Captain Kidd, who hid it along the coast of Canada before
he was hanged. This is of slightly greater interest because it is less expected but
still seems reasonable. Change the cargo again to 300 women being shipped
around to California as mail-order brides in the California gold fields. Now it’s
surprising—even startling. Why? It violates all of your expectations.
The ship sailed uneventfully. No interest there. Change it so that the ship
vanished in a blink less than one-quarter of a mile from the San Francisco docks
as over 500 people stood and watched. Again, this is interesting because it vio-
lates your expectations.
In both cases, you require some explanations. You want to know the story in
order to make sense out of this violation of your expectations. Breaking expecta-
tions creates interest, but also requires explanation.
Inference
We regularly infer one thing based on how we interpret another. Infer sug-
gests the arriving at a decision or opinion by reasoning from known facts or evi-
dence. You begin with your banks of prior knowledge and then consciously
infer from them to some new situation. Inference differs from assumption in
that an assumption is taken for granted and not necessarily based on reasoning
and logical deduction.
Inferences allow us to create connections within a narrative by consciously
associating information in the story domain with our blocks of prior knowledge
in order to make reasoned predictions. Crossley (2000) said, ‘‘When we ask,
‘What does this mean?’ we are asking how something is related or connected to
something or someone else. It is the connections or relationships (real or
inferred) among events that constitute their meaning.’’ Inferences allow readers
to increase their number of relevant connections to a text and thus increase its
personal meaning.
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) have conducted extensive research on the concept
of information transfer from one mental domain to another. They concluded,
‘‘Do we systematically use inference patterns from one conceptual domain to
reason about another conceptual domain? The empirically established answer is
absolutely ‘yes.’’’
You see a black rock against a field of white snow and glance up to see if
there is a small, dark cloud that could be shading the rock. Seeing a clear blue
sky, you infer even lighting across the entire field and conclude that the rock is,
in fact, black.
Bruner (1986) went to extensive lengths to demonstrate that readers use infer-
ence and presupposition (all based on past experience and existing scripts) to
make sense out of narrative. Consider this now familiar example:
Person 1: ‘‘Where’s Jack?’’
Person 2: ‘‘Well . . . I didn’t want to have to tell you. But I saw a yellow VW parked
in front of Susan’s.’’
To make sense of this passage, you study person #2’s line and make two
inferences that form the foundation of whatever relationships and scenario you
imagine to explain the situation. First, you infer that Person #2’s reluctance to
MIND MECHANICS 53
speak means that the presence of a yellow VW outside Susan’s will be inter-
preted as bad news by person #1. Second, you infer that the location of the yel-
low VW reveals (or at least strongly implies) Jack’s location. With these two
reasoned inferences in hand, you are free to make additional assumptions that
explain the relationships and complete your quest to create plausible meaning.
Pattern Matching
Anderson (1993) studied mental function by building and adjusting computer
neural nets to match the production of human minds. He determined that pat-
tern matching is a key ‘‘reality check’’ by the mind and defined the term this
way: ‘‘Pattern matching refers to the process of determining if a production’s
conditions (narrative input or the result of some mental assessment) match the
contents of working memory.’’
The mind constructs a story domain (image of the place, events, situations,
and characters) based on provided information and then compares this domain
to other real and fictional domains stored in memory. Readers and listeners will
not accept the new story domain if it seems to violate established physics, rules,
expectations, and plausibility without suitable explanation. Typically, readers
react to such violations by being pulled out of the story.
If, in a story, an eight-year-old boy walked unchallenged onto a top-secret,
heavily guarded research lab, most readers would react by saying, ‘‘No way! He
couldn’t do that.’’ Those readers are pulled out of the story and, worse, tend to
automatically discount other story information.
In some versions of an American folk tale, Lazy Jack (sometimes titled, ‘‘Obe-
dient Jack’’), Jack’s mother beats him each time he comes home. It pulled me
out of the story. It seemed wrong to me. The only way I could match her behav-
ior to any known pattern was to say that she was an abusive mother and I
should call child protective services. But that’s not what the story is supposed to
be about. It’s supposed to be a funny, upbeat story. In order to tell the story, I
had to change her behavior to match patterns that were acceptable to me for a
loving and supportive (although certainly frustrated) mother.
Familiarity with, and greater experience with, the patterns and form of story
make it easier to read and understand information in story form. Cooper (1997)
studied this and concluded, ‘‘Students generally have more difficulty reading
expository texts than story texts because they have had less experience with
them and because these texts tend not to follow clear-cut, established patterns.’’
The common structural patterns of a story (even if unconscious) are fixed and
established in every person’s mind. Using this pattern enhances meaning by
increasing the number of inferential connections that readers can make by
matching new story domains into existing story patterns.
Prior Knowledge
Cooper (1997), consistent with other researchers, defines it this way: ‘‘Prior
knowledge is the sum of a person’s previous learning and development and the
experiences that precede a learning situation, story, etc.’’
There are two general types of prior knowledge: topical and structural. Topi-
cal prior knowledge includes all of the banks of information we each have
stored in memory about specific topics, characters, situations, places, events,
and experiences. It’s everthing you have learned and know from the value of p
54 STORY SMARTS
to fifteen decimal places to how to bake a souffle to the address of the houses
you used to live in.
Structural prior knowledge refers to knowledge of the structures we use to
convey information from lists to movies, to songs, to all forms of narrative.
Pinker (2000), Cooper (1997), Bransford and Stein (1993), Durkin (1981), and
many others concur that knowledge of story architecture is the most used of all
of these structural banks.
We employ topical prior knowledge to identify plausible meaning from
poorly worded or unclear sentences.
Dr. Tackett gave a talk on the moon.
We know, topically, that there are no humans on the moon. So grammatically
we now know that ‘‘on’’ means not location but ‘‘about.’’
Cooper (1997), Anderson and Pearson (1984), Adams and Bertram (1980),
Barr et al. (1991) have all clearly stated that research over the past two decades
has established that the process of constructing meaning through reading, writ-
ing, speaking, and listening is based on the prior knowledge that individuals
bring to the situation.
Here is an example (this from Bransford and Stein 1993) of the extent to
which previous knowledge affects your ability to create meaning from, and
remember, text. Consider the following sentences:
Before you read any further, cover the sentences and see how many you can
remember. Who build the boat? Who flew the kite? You understand the sentences,
but have no context or relevance for them and so you don’t remember them.
Now let’s shift only the character identity to invoke culturally available prior
knowledge to aid you in creating meaning and memory. I will change only the
names of the seven people.
You probably laughed when you read this revised list. Of course you can
remember these seven sentences. You already knew each one. And that’s the point.
As soon as a sentence linked to banks of your prior knowledge, it became relevant
to you and you had a context within which to understand and remember it.
MIND MECHANICS 55
Here is another example (from Bransford and Stein 1993) of how we humans
use topical and structural prior knowledge to create meaning.
A thirsty ant went to the river. He was carried away by the rush of the stream and
was about to drown. A dove, sitting in a tree overhanging the water, plucked a leaf
and let it fall. The leaf fell into the stream close to the ant and the ant climbed onto
it. The ant floated safely to the bank. Shortly after, a bird catcher came and laid a
trap in the tree. The ant bit and stung him on the foot. In pain, the bird catcher
threw down his trap. The noise made the dove fly away.
Here is how most humans put prior knowledge to work in that paragraph.
First we activate topical (biological and environmental) knowledge. You know
that the ant walked to the river and the dove flew to the tree. You know that a
tree is tall with sturdy branches that could support the dove. You understand
that the ant could drown (in contrast to a fish) and that the dove plucked the leaf
with its beak. You know that gravity made the leaf fall and that leaves will float.
Once you understand the biology and ecology of the event, you activate story
structural knowledge in the form of neural story maps and try to fill in missing
information to create meaning. Most people assume that the dove plucked the
leaf on purpose to save the ant, that the bird catcher planned to capture the
dove, and that the ant bit the bird catcher to repay the dove. You create goals
for each character and cause-and-effect relationships between events to create
meaning.
Now compare your easy interpretation of that paragraph with this one (also
from Bransford and Stein 1993)
Pete argued that data gathered from a NASA voyage to Venus called into question
current theories about the formation of our solar system. Part of his talk empha-
sized the importance of mass spectrometers. He then discussed the isotopes of ar-
gon 36 and argon 38 and noted that they were of higher density than expected. He
also cited the high values of neon found in the atmosphere. He has a paper that is
already written, but he was aware of the need for further investigation as well.
Most people struggle to understand, and to create meaning from, this para-
graph. Why? There are no banks of topical prior knowledge to use to under-
stand the basic relationships and statements. Because no character information
(for example, goals, reactions, or feelings) is given, you can’t use story structure
to gain insight into unfamiliar topical areas.
Interestingly, I have used this example paragraph at NASA workshops.
There, everyone had huge banks of prior topical knowledge. They not only
understood the information, but tried to figure out which satellite was being ref-
erenced and who Pete must be and what papers he would have written on the
topic. They were quite disappointed when I admitted that, as best I knew, Pete
was a fictional character and the paragraph was created by a developmental
psychologist in 1993 for demonstration purposes.
Prior knowledge is a central key to understanding and to the creation of
meaning. It will have a prominent presence in Chapter 9 as we review research
that links story to comprehension and to memory. The more banks of prior
knowledge activated by an incoming narrative, the greater the reader involve-
ment and relevance. When the topic (subject) of a narrative is unfamiliar, famil-
iar story structure becomes a valuable form of prior knowledge to activate in
order to guide the reader toward creating meaning and memory.
56 STORY SMARTS
Binary Opposition
The concept of binary opposition was mentioned back in Chapter 2. It will
come up again in Chapter 9 when I present research results. Of all researchers,
Egan (1997) and Levi-Strauss (1978) have most thoroughly analyzed binary
opposition.
Egan (1997) showed that all concepts, situations, and characters are first
presented in binary terms such as hot/cold, big/little, rich/poor, tall/short,
clever/dumb, patient/impatient, beautiful/ugly, culture/nature, public/
private, active/passive, and obedient/disobedient. Forming binary oppositions
is a primary tool in our sense-making ability.
His research showed that young children (by the age of four) understand
abstract concepts (for example, freedom/oppression, security/fear, knowledge/
ignorance, or independence/disobedience) when placed in binary opposition
within the context of stories (Peter Rabbit, Hansel and Gretel, Pinocchio, Star
Wars). However, they are unable to understand them through logic argument or
rote memorization (Egan 1997).
Paley (1990, 1984) showed how children use binary opposition and story
structure to make sense of their experiences. Levi-Strauss (1978) thoroughly
demonstrated that binary structure is basic to all myths and that the exposure to
such a structure is the key to their proper interpretation. Polkinghorne (1988)
showed that meaning comes from constructing opposing relationships among
things such as same as (or not), similar to (or not), an instance of (or not), stands
for (or not), part of (or not), and caused by (or not).
Egan (1997) developed the idea that human understanding comes from devel-
oping binary opposites and then creating terms that mediate the space between
these two extremes. Thus, hot and cold establish a space within which we can
understand temperature. But the understanding comes through terms that medi-
ate between the binary opposites (warm, cool, tepid, scalding, freezing). The
concept even applies to binary opposites that are discrete and have no mediat-
ing categories (for example, animal/human). Humans then tend to spin fantasy
story worlds wherein the technique of mediation can play unconfined by reality
to produce mythic half-human, half-beasts.
Binary opposition is also the basis for our understanding of abstract concepts
(good/evil, fair/unfair, loyalty/selfishness). ‘‘If abstractions like oppression,
resentment, justice, fairness, revenge, revolt, and their relationships, were not in
place by age four, the typical child would be unable to understand the story of
Robin Hood, Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, or even Peter Rabbit’’ (Egan 1997).
Binary opposition is an essential tool of meaning. New concepts (both con-
crete and abstract) are more readily understood when presented in binary oppo-
sition. Egan (1997), Levi-Strauss (1978), Paley (1984 and 1990), Polkinghorne
(1988), Crossley (2000), and others have shown that story structure enhances
presentation of, and understanding of, binary opposites.
Blending
Blending is the process of overlaying one set of mental knowledge or images
(called a domain) onto another. You hear someone talk about his struggle to get
to work through the snow and, in your mind, you overlay your own experiences
on top of his to create meaning by comparing the two. Parable, proverb, meta-
phor, analogy, and simile are all forms of blending. Some researchers call this
MIND MECHANICS 57
Metaphor
A metaphor ascribes characteristics of some known concept (mental domain)
onto an unknown or unknowable concept in order to better understand the lat-
ter. The terms and characteristics from the first domain take on new meaning
for the target domain within the space and context of a metaphor.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) said it this way: ‘‘Because so many of the concepts
that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our expe-
rience (emotions, time, ideas, value, peace, etc.) we need to understand them by
means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms (spatial orientation,
journey, objects, etc.).’’
What do metaphors look like? Examples include: he was a shooting star; you are
my sunshine; I am a rock; I am an island; life is just a bowl of cherries; war is hell.
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) showed that ‘‘our conceptual system (how we
understand the world and create meaning) is largely metaphorical.’’ They also
stated, ‘‘Primarily on the basis of linguistic evidence, we have found that human
thought processes are largely metaphorical.’’
There exists ‘‘a huge body of empirical evidence gained from many different
methods of inquiry that reveals and confirms the central role of metaphor in
abstract thought’’ (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). In the same book, they stated,
Argument is war.
Argument is a dance.
Argument is a fight.
Argument is a gift of energy and idea.
The metaphor you choose defines your viewpoint, expectations, strategy, and
actions. It defines how you create meaning and how you view and understand
the world.
How do you view love?
Love Is War: Love conquers all. All you need is love. Love is you and me
against the world. Are you on my side or not?
Love Is Madness: I’m crazy about her. I’m head over heels in love. I’m drunk
on love.
Love Is a Collaborative Work of Art: Let’s build our love.
The order of the vocabulary triggers grammar rules to identify story elements
in the readers’ mind. Meaning comes from using grammar rules to establish a
62 STORY SMARTS
main character, action, and object. From these you imply possible intents of the
character and can then envision the situation and event surrounding the utter-
ance of the sentence.
To further demonstrate the readers’ need to create sentence meaning through
story elements, Chomsky (1991) had a computer search books in print to find
words that never followed each other in a sentence. He strung these words into
a sentence:
Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
Now we have no idea which bird was singing—just because I switched the
two articles and now violate our syntax conventions.
As a final demonstration, consider how inserting the word even into the sen-
tence ‘‘John will marry Elise’’ at different places radically shifts your interpreta-
tion of the sentence’s meaning and how you interpret John’s intent, attitude,
and feelings as well as your evaluation of Elise. These changes do not come
from the literal meaning of the sentence, but from the banks of experience you
activate when you interpret the sentence using you neural story map.
John will marry Elise.
Even John will marry Elise
John will even marry Elise.
John will marry even Elise.
Emotions Rule
This mental tool needs little explanation. We automatically scan a person’s
face, body, posture, gestures, and actions to interpret their emotional state. From
this information we decide if their emotions are what we consider appropriate
for the setting and situation. If they are, we pay them no more mind. If not, our
conscious attention is drawn to that person and we seek an explanation.
Pinker (1997) called humans ‘‘feeling machines’’ and spends considerable
time describing the integration of feelings into interpretation and meaning as
well as the influence of feelings on cognitive understanding and meaning.
‘‘Humans seek meaning through feelings’’ (Pinker 1997).
MIND MECHANICS 63
Details
The idea of details, and of their importance in narrative presentations, is cer-
tainly neither new nor unexpected. By second grade, every student has heard
teachers plead for more details in his or her writing. The cry becomes a univer-
sal teacher’s writing mantra, ‘‘More details. . . . More details.’’
We humans are good at noting, recording, remembering, and recalling sen-
sory details. I perform an hour-long story in which a side character appears
twice—once near the beginning and once (49 minutes later) at the end. On sev-
eral tellings, I have mentioned his black hair when he first appears and casually
noted his brown hair at story’s end. It always gets a reaction. A murmur rum-
bles through the audience. Something is wrong.
There is no reason for them to remember this character or his hair. Neither is
important to the story. Yet, they do. We automatically remember the details.
They are precious and critically important to us.
Think of any past (childhood) event. What pops back into your conscious mind?
Mostly sensory details such as what things looked like, sounded like, or felt like.
We tell our stories from remembered sensory details. We use observed sensory
details to make a variety of important decisions about situations, people, and places.
Turner studied mental mapping processes associated with parables and con-
cluded that ‘‘specifics (details) of source and target stories allow the mind to
overlay and create cross-identity.’’ Details create the blended space through
which the mind creates understanding. ‘‘It is not possible to blend two stories
without some counterpart connections of the details between them (source and
target) to guide the blending’’ (Turner 1996).
Tannen (1999) studied the nature and effect of details on listener/reader per-
ceptions and ability to retain content information. She concluded: ‘‘Details create
the images that serve multiple purposes. First they set the scene. Second they
provide a sense of authenticity. Third, they facilitate memory.’’ Details create
mental reality. In Tannen’s words, ‘‘Details create mental images, making possi-
ble both understanding and involvement.’’
Sylvia Plath (quoted in Hughes and McCullough 1984) advised that one
should write about the common, everyday details of life, because that is where
64 STORY SMARTS
the magic begins. ‘‘Write about the cow, Mrs. Spaulding’s heavy eyelids, the
smell of vanilla flavoring in a brown bottle. That is where the magic mountains
(involvement, understanding, and memory in her terms) begin.’’
How do simple details accomplish this massive task? Tannen concluded,
‘‘Story merges abstract information with common sensory details to create con-
text and relevance for the abstract. An example from Tannen (1999):
‘‘I wish you were here to see the sweet peas coming up.’’
The first half is abstract and not engaging. It is conceptual information. The
second half is pure sensory detail and engages the reader’s attention, emotions,
and mental imaging process.
We’ve all heard of details, but what, exactly are they? From the dictionary:
Detail: n.: Any of the small parts that go to make up something as of a pic-
ture, statue, setting, building, etc. (from Webster’s College Dictionary)
The purpose of details is to provide the specific references that create mental
images and allow the receiver to overlay their own maps and banks of experi-
ence over the new material by matching detail points.
Context is: ‘‘The parts surrounding a specific word or passage that determine
its exact meaning; the whole situation, background, or environment rele-
vant to a particular event, person, creation, etc.’’
Relevance is: ‘‘Bearing upon or pertinent to the matter or person at hand;
implying close relationship with and importance to the matter under
consideration.’’
In a practical sense, context identifies the banks of prior knowledge you can
use to make inferences, to blend with the new information, etc. Relevance
describes how this new information relates to you, personally. Learning that the
moon is dusty and that moon dust is both corrosive and jagged with the poten-
tial to grind like pumice might be interesting to you. You have a context for in-
formation about the moon and can integrate it into your existing bank of
knowledge. However, that information does not relate to your life. It has no
relevance—unless you are an astronaut slated for the next moon mission. Then
this information is vitally relevant. Context and relevance trigger the conscious
mind to pay attention and to remember.
Bransford and Brown (2000) showed that
the research shows clearly that ‘‘usable knowledge’’ is not the same as a mere list of
disconnected facts. Experts’ knowledge is ‘‘conditionalized’’ to specify the context in
which it is applicable and its relevance to the topic and individual; it supports under-
standing and transfer (to other contexts) rather than only the ability to remember.
MIND MECHANICS 65
Learners of all ages are more motivated when they can see the usefulness
(relevance) of what they learn and its impact on their own lives (McCombs
1996, Pintrich and Schunk 1996, Bransford and Stein 1993). Knowledge that is
not provided within a contextual framework is often ‘‘inert’’ because it is not
activated, even though it is relevant. The same is true for contextual information
that is not relevant (Glaser 1992, Bransford and Brown 2000).
While assessing the continuing effectiveness and popularity of classic chil-
dren’s stories (Cinderella, Sleeping Beauty, Pinocchio, etc.), Crossley (2000)
showed that ‘‘stories provide the context and relevance for conceptual informa-
tion.’’ Crossley concluded (as had Howard 1991, Priest 1996, and McLeod 1997
before her) that story structure creates context and personal relevance within
which a child can ‘‘play out conflicts of good and evil.’’
Approaching the topic from a more mechanistic perspective, Schank showed
that if a person has index labels in memory (similar to the labels on file folders
in a desk drawer) and past experiences filed under those labels, then new expe-
riences they read about are deemed ‘‘relevant.’’ The person pays attention and
remembers the new information. If the person lacks appropriate index labels, or
if no experiences are filed under those labels, then the new narrative is deemed
meaningless and uninteresting. ‘‘The determination of relevance determines the
suitability of something to enter into memory’’ (Schank 1990).
‘‘In the most general sense, the contemporary view of learning is that people
construct new knowledge and understanding within the context of what they al-
ready know and believe and do it only when they can see how the new informa-
tion is relevant to them’’ (Cobb 1994). Our elaborate mental system of neural
story maps, story frameworks, concepts, and techniques exists to create these
two demands of the conscious mind if it is going to pay attention: context and
relevance.
CHAPTER 6
Information is remembered better and longer, and recalled more readily and
accurately when it is remembered within the context of a story.
extensive evidence to show that: Experiences not framed into story suffer loss in
memory. Story structure enhances memory and improves our memory of content
information.
Zaltman (2003) concluded, ‘‘Storytelling is central to memory.’’ Similarly,
Carey (2007) stated, ‘‘Numerous studies show that people tend to remember
facts more accurately if they encounter then in a story rather than in a list [or
other narrative forms].’’ Zaltman (2003) also said, ‘‘Storytelling is not something
we just happen to do. It is something we virtually have to do if we want to
remember anything. The stories we create are the memories we have.’’
Concurring with this idea, Bruner (1987) concluded, ‘‘I believe that the ways of
telling and the ways of conceptualizing a story that go with them become so habit-
ual that they finally become recipes for structuring experience itself, for laying down
routes into memory.’’ While assessing why stories are easier to remember, Schank
(1990) concluded, ‘‘A story, remembered as a story, is a unit that can be easily
found, easily recalled and told, and be made useful for a variety of purposes.’’
Smith (2003) split memory into fact-based memory and story-based memory
and showed that story-based memory creates intent, form, structure, sequenc-
ing, coherence, and meaning. ‘‘The stories we tell time and again are identical to
the memory we have of the events that the story relates.’’ The mind creates sto-
ries from events and then remembers the created stories believing that they are
identical with the original event.
Compounding this phenomenon, Schacter (1995) showed that ‘‘the output of
human memory differs—often substantially—from the input.’’ He concluded
that ‘‘remembering can fail not only because information is forgotten over time,
but also because it is changed and distorted during memory and recall.’’
Neimark (2004) described research by psychologist Henry Roediger of Wash-
ington University in St. Louis. Roediger stated, ‘‘People never capture anything
literally. Whenever you encode an experience you filter it through your own
awareness.’’
Moreover, memory automatically brings with it an interpretation that alters
the factual presentation of the memory because we view past events from our
present perspective and with our present knowledge (Freeman 2003). For exam-
ple, the memory, ‘‘And that was the last time I saw her, the last words she ever
spoke,’’ takes on far greater significance not because of the historic event, itself,
but because of our present knowledge of its significance. Present knowledge
always alters the past.
Would you remember the Alamo if the Mexican army had decided not to
attack and had drifted on, leaving the defenders to fend for themselves? Would
you remember that Crockett and Bowie were there if none of the men had died?
Would you remember Bowie if his knife design hadn’t survived him to become
well-known now?
Other work reported by Neimark (2004) and by Schank (1990) confirms that,
each time you tell a remembered story event, you create additional sensory
detail and then cannot distinguish between original (true) detail and the newly
created (false) detail. You then remember it all as if it were all true, original
detail. Schank theorized that this is why personal stories grow and drift over
time with repeated telling.
Gopnik et al. (1999) studied what patients recalled from past events and con-
cluded, ‘‘When we remember our past, we recapture not just the physical details
of what happened, but what we felt about what happened.’’
70 STORY SMARTS
Tannen also focused her studies on the effects of details on memory. ‘‘Images
created by sensory details, I am suggesting, are more convincing and more mem-
orable than abstract propositions’’ (Tannen 1999). We remember details (including
those we created) and we remember the emotions we felt during an event.
Neimark (2004) reported that Harvard Professor Richard McNally believes he
can prove that people routinely make up memories. Neimark stated, ‘‘His
research suggests that all memories—even false ones—are not just accessories of
experience. Memory is experience.’’
Neimark (2004) also reported on work by Dr. Kathy Pezdek, psychologist at
University of California, Irvine, who has been able to implant false memories
into people in lab studies (for example, that they were lost in the mall as a child,
that they hugged Bugs Bunny at Disneyland—there is no Bugs Bunny at Disney-
land). These false memories were as real to subjects as actual memories.
What we remember is what breaks expectations and is relevant in some way.
Then we remember the gist. We remember the sensory details of an event and
how we felt. But what we remember is not explicitly what happened. We
remember the stories we mentally create about what happened, augmented by
details we inadvertently create, and altered by the process of remembering and
recalling and by repeated telling. Ultimately, what we remember are our own
mental story creations.
(1990) went further, saying, ‘‘The major processes of memory are the creation,
indexing, storage, and retrieval of stories.’’ He also stated, ‘‘We have great diffi-
culty remembering abstract concepts and data. However, we can easily remem-
ber a good story. . . . Stories provide tools, context, relevance, and elements
readers need in order to understand, remember and index the beliefs, concepts
and information in the story’’ (Schank 1990).
In an interesting twist on memory studies, Foer (2006) studied the memory
systems competitive memory champions use to remember new strings of ran-
dom information. The most common scheme involves creating a character,
action, and object for each thing to be remembered (the order of cards in a deck,
for example) and then stringing those prememorized images along a temporal
pathway (plot). Those are all common elements of stories. Memory champions
remember by creating a story that provides context and relevance for meaning-
less information.
Details
A neurocomputer modeler, Anderson (1993), reverse-engineered human
memory retrieval. He found two overriding factors that determine the ease of
retrieval: the perceived relevance of the information at the time it was commit-
ted to memory, and the density of attached sensory details. He also found that
the more often you recall something out of memory, the easier it is to do so
again in the future.
Squire (1997) and Schacter (1997) both studied the different features of learning
that contribute to the durability or fragility of memory. While comparing people’s
memories for words with their memories for pictures of the same objects, both
showed consistently significantly superior memory for the picture due, primarily,
to the greater density of sensory details associated with the picture.
Foer (2006) concluded his study by saying that successful rememberers regu-
larly ‘‘link the thing they want to remember to colors, familiar names, events,
visual images, and then string individual items along familiar paths in order to
associate more of their already established sensory images with a new bit of
information to remember.’’ They tie new information to existing remembered
details to facilitate memory of the new information.
the visual processing systems than did the images alone. Emotions create the
mental associations (activity) that facilitate memory.
course, does not come for free. It means that a quick cost-benefit analysis is in
order. The benefits of story—as we have and will continue to see—are remark-
able. But that narrative advantage comes at a price. You must be able and will-
ing to mold your material into story form and to develop and present the
essential informational elements that form the core architecture of stories. Stories
require more verbiage, more time, and more developmental effort.
If you can, terrific! The rewards of story are yours. But there are many
instances where it is either not feasible or not appropriate to create and present
stories. Not everything either can be or should be delivered in story form. But it
is always worth checking. When you can, the benefits are staggering.
CHAPTER 7
The key elements of human mental processing provide a more accurate and
meaningful definition of what we really mean when we say ‘‘story.’’
Fireman et al. (2003) concluded that ‘‘good’’ stories are coherent, organized,
meaningful, and compelling. Schank (1990) said that ‘‘stories should be compel-
ling, concise, and easy to remember.’’ Those are characteristics we seek. Our defi-
nition of story should guide creators toward stories that deliver those effects.
Pinker (1997) put it succinctly. ‘‘It is irrational to insist that story structure
remains unexplained after all of the manifestations of it have been explained
and accounted for.’’
By reviewing the mental activities presented during the past four chapters,
we will identify those key narrative elements that direct the mental gymnastics
readers and listeners employ to create context, relevance, and meaning from
incoming text. These same elements define a story for the human mind and will
be the elements we use to create a more rational and definitive (and certainly
more useful) definition of story than that offered by most dictionaries.
Search Chapters 3 through 6 and you will find a surprisingly short list of
these core elements. I find five around which all others revolve. These are the
five narrative elements researcher after researcher has identified as critical to the
processes of creating understanding, interpretation, meaning, context, and
relevance.
All five must be presented (or created) in order for the mind to relate to,
understand, and decide to pay attention to, an incoming narrative. These then
are the informational elements that uniquely define a story.
1. Character. You need a viewpoint character to see who is doing the action
and to gauge relevancy by assessing this character. To do that, you need
perspective, viewpoint, and sufficient detail about the character to interpret
76 STORY SMARTS
DO RESEARCHERS AGREE?
Before I combine these essential elements into a concise definition, do other
researchers agree with the elements I have identified and the approach I have
presented here?
Dalkir and Wiseman (2004) stated, ‘‘All stories are narratives. But not all nar-
ratives are effective stories.’’ Stories are a specific subset of the more general
narrative characterized by specific structural elements.
Bruner (2003) concluded, ‘‘Everyone will agree that it (a story) requires a cast
of characters who are free agents with minds of their own. These characters
must have recognizable expectations about the ordinary state of the world—the
story’s world. The story begins when there is a breach in the expected state of
things. Something goes awry. Otherwise there is nothing to tell about. And
finally there is an outcome, some sort of resolution.’’
THAT REMINDS ME OF A STORY: A BETTER DEFINITION 77
He lists characters, goals (intentions), problems and conflicts that cause some-
thing to go awry, struggles, and resolution. But central among these elements is
character. ‘‘Every story is somebody’s story. Every story is about a character’’
(Bruner 1990). And about that character’s intentions, he said, ‘‘There is wide-
spread agreement that stories are about the vicissitudes of human intention’’
(Bruner 1987).
Turner (1996) broke an overall story (his term is STORY!) into a series of min-
iscule, ‘‘small spatial events.’’ (He calls these ‘‘stories.’’) To Turner, a story consists
of just an agent (character or object) and an action. ‘‘The ball rolled,’’ is a story. So
are each of the following sentences. ‘‘She stooped to pick it up. Her arm swung.
Her hand released the ball. The window shattered.’’
Turner (1996) developed the notion that conversion of such a series of atom-
level stories into a composite STORY! requires the addition of intention to bind
individual atoms into a coherent and cohesive chain molecule of a story. As an
example, here is an action (a story):
Mother pours milk into a glass.
To convert this to a STORY!, Turner says that we must add intent (goal and a
motive to explain why that goal is important), conflicts for ‘‘Mother’’ to struggle
against, and a point of resolution. As an example Turner offered:
Mother has been crippled by a stroke, her left side partially paralyzed. She fights to
regain the use of her left hand and arm, feeling that her independence and dignity
depend on being able to use that hand to fulfill her normal motherly functions. But
her left arm is frightfully weak, her grip alarmingly uncertain. The milk carton she
used to pour into glasses each day for her children is painfully heavy and slippery.
It slips and falls; she spills; she misses the glass; she overfills it, sending a white
flood across the counter and dribbling onto the floor. Through tears of embarrass-
ment and frustration, she is determined to pour a simple glass of milk for her son.
She has to. She struggles to will her arm to make one more try.. . .
Note that Burke claims that goals must exist before trouble (problems and con-
flicts) can arise. Trouble, for Burke, must be resolved in order to reach a goal,
but solving trouble, itself, is rarely the main goal of a successful story.
Egan (1997) researched one specific defining aspect of a story—the ending.
Agreeing with Kermode (1966), Egan (1997) concluded, ‘‘The crucial feature of
stories is that they end. In life we are always ‘in the midst’ and so cannot deter-
mine and ascribe meaning to events.’’ Egan’s research also showed that ‘‘we
know we have reached the end of a story when we know how to feel about the
events that make it up.’’
He introduces an important point here. Egan showed that meaning requires a
character-based perspective point that includes knowledge of a story’s end.
Value comes from applying that meaning to our real lives that so rarely have
definitive ending points. Readers know that they’ve reached the end when the
goal of the main character is resolved—one way or the other. Readers know
how to feel about the story by seeing how the main character feels after resolving
his or her goal.
Bransford and Stein (1993) tried to approach story understanding by focusing
on the nature and purpose of story problems. ‘‘A problem exists when there is a
discrepancy between the initial state and a desired goal state, and when there is
no ready-made solution for the problem solver.’’ Several important concepts are
woven into this statement. First, stories have a desired goal state different from
the initial condition. Second, the character cannot have ready access to his or
her goal. Third, the story must force this character to struggle (face risk and dan-
ger as they attempt to solve problems and conflicts) in an attempt to reach his
or her goal.
Johnson (1999) studied the structure of stories deemed ‘‘successful’’ by his
test audiences and concluded that story is differentiated from a mere event
(something that happened)—as Yale psychologist and historian Ricoeur (1984)
said—by the presence of seven features:
ordering (a plot) they will create meaning and understanding in the reader
(Johnson 1999, Ricoeur 1984).
Finally, Denning (2001) used trial-and-error methods to devise stories that
would be successful in changing attitudes and policies in a large international
agency (the World Bank). He concluded that ‘‘stories that were successful for
me had certain characteristics. They were told from the perspective of a single
protagonist who was in a predicament that was prototypical of the organiza-
tion’s business.. . . The story had a degree of strangeness or incongruity for the
listeners so that it captured their attention and stimulated their imaginations.
Yet at the same time, the story was plausible, even eerily familiar.’’ Thus, Den-
ning found the same core elements not through rigorous research, but from the
vantage point of a trial-and-error practitioner.
These examples represent the thinking and conclusions of many other
researchers. Prominent examples that I omitted from this chapter include Snow-
den (2000), Prince (1987), Bal (1985), Barthes (1982), Bruner (1990), Ambruster
et al. (1987), Polkinghorne (1988), Frye (1957), Fisher (1987), Rubin and Greenberg
(2003), Shank and Abelson (1995), Knitch and Van Dijk (1975), and Steffen (1977),
among others.
WHAT IS A STORY?
The wording of this new and improved definition is mine. However, every
term in it is supported by extensive evidence presented in the past four chap-
ters. It is consistent with results from the researchers mentioned above. It is fully
consistent with documented activity of the mind.
It would be easier if we had a separate word to use to avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, we don’t. So I will use the word story for my definition even
while acknowledging that many you encounter will use the same word in the
more general and less accurate sense presented in the dictionary in which story
and narrative are virtually synonymous.
A Better Definition: What we really mean by the word, STORY:
STORY PROOF
CHAPTER 8
It’s time to examine the evidence to support the value of and use of story. In
addition to mounds of quantitative and qualitative research, I have collected an-
ecdotal experiences from over 1,300 practitioners (950 teachers, 100 librarians,
110 storytellers, and the rest split between youth and community program direc-
tors, writers, clergy, businessmen, organizational leaders, and clinicians). It is
worth repeating: every bit of this mass of anecdotal data concludes that stories
and storytelling are powerful, beneficial, and effective. None—not one—
reported a negative experience.
What does this anecdotal evidence look like? I mentioned several such per-
sonal anecdotes in Chapter 1. Here are six others, typical in scope and specificity
to many of those I have collected.
them to listen ‘‘with both their cognitive and emotional minds.’’ His story
encourages participants to share personal information outside the strict context
of their jobs. It makes each participant relevant to others and creates a new level
of context through which they can work with each other.
Kahan says that ‘‘first of all, this type of community storytelling invites the
whole person into the workplace conversation—tacit knowledge and all.’’ A
well-chosen story creates relevance and context for a different aspect of the par-
ticipants than just job title and position. ‘‘Second, the end product of this type of
storytelling interaction is people working better together’’ (Kahan 2001a).
Illinois storyteller Dan Keding created a warrior story whose last line is: ‘‘My
grandmother always said, ’You can never hate someone once you’ve heard their
stories.’’’ Kahan has demonstrated the truth of this statement in the high-stress
world of knowledge management seminars.
It’s time to set personal experience aside and examine analytical research.
The studies I present here and their quantitative and qualitative evidence are
impressive and convincing. They are powerful, valid, and rigorous. Most have
been published through major universities or in peer-reviewed journals. The
individuals I reference are all established, respected researchers in their fields.
You should read and understand this research based on the definition of story
presented in Chapter 7. I chose the research studies in this chapter because I
was relatively sure that their use of story matched the principles of my defini-
tion. I believe that, in all cases, these researchers and their results take story in
the way we have come to mean it in this book. The reader should overlay these
results onto the neural and cognitive research presented in Chapters 3 through
6. The current chapter focuses on research based on the application of story. Yet
it meshes well with previous research based on neural function. Combined, they
provide a complete and compelling view of the power and potential of stories.
I have grouped the research into eight relevant themes, organized by their
effect on the receiver (for example, develop a sense of community and identity
in the receiver, or improve narrative comprehension skills in the receiver). These are:
1. comprehension,
2. logical thinking and general (cross-curriculum) learning,
3. creating meaning from narrative,
4. motivation to learn (and to pay attention),
5. building a sense of community and involvement,
6. literacy and language mastery,
90 STORY PROOF
7. writing, and
8. memory.
While each is individually significant, their cumulative significance
is, I believe, overwhelming.
For our purposes, the specific scientific field of individual research-
ers does not matter. Studies from the field of education merge with
studies from organizational management and clinical psychology—if
they address the same effect in the receiver of the story. That, after
all, is the purpose of using stories: to have a desired impact on the
receiver.
sense out of, what they read. Story structure facilitates both compre-
hension and enjoyment.
In Cooper’s study (1997) student comprehension scores were
50 percent higher for information presented in story form than for
similar information presented in any of the expository forms he stud-
ied. The Texas Education Agency (2002) and the National Reading
Panel (2000) also noted significantly higher comprehension scores for
material delivered in story form over material delivered in the vari-
ous expository forms. Data from Smiley et al. (1977) showed that both
first-grade and middle-school poor readers, while they struggled with
both mechanical decoding and content comprehension for all texts,
performed markedly better (comparable to ‘‘good’’ readers) when
tested on their comprehension of stories.
1983 and Armbruster et al. 1987). But middle-grade children have sig-
nificant difficulty forming and understanding structures for exposi-
tory text (Brown and Day 1983, Taylor 1986). Story structure study
facilitated this task (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983, Taylor 1986). These
four studies all concluded that training in story structure improved
comprehension of expository text as well as narrative. Supporting this
concept, Bruner (1990) concluded, ‘‘Children produce and compre-
hend stories long before they are capable of handling the most funda-
mental Piagetian logical proposition that can be put into linguistic
form.’’
In his previously cited study, Pressley (2001) said, ‘‘A large num- Correctly
ber of experiments conducted in the late 1980s and 1990s showed that interpreting text
structure guides
readers do not automatically relate new factual information to their encoding, recall, and
own prior knowledge. In many cases, more is needed for prior reproduction of the
knowledge to be beneficial to reading comprehension.’’ One of two essential points of
techniques he recommended was to make students more familiar any text.
with the form and structure of story. In their study of this technique,
Brown et al. (1996) concluded, ‘‘The authors were impressed that
when researchers used this comprehension strategy with primary-
level students, the children benefited greatly from it.’’
The National Reading Panel (2000) reviewed 481 research studies
on comprehension and chose 205 for detailed assessment. This list
included seventeen that addressed story structure instruction. They
concluded, ‘‘This learning gives the reader knowledge and proce-
dures for deeper understanding of narratives and allows the reader
to construct more coherent memory representations of what occurred
in the text.’’
Egan identified six elements that define how children learn new
material. All six are primary characteristics of story structure and
have been confirmed by many other famed researchers and practi-
tioners including Levi-Strauss (1978), Brown (1991), Turner (1996),
Winner (1988), Quine (1989), Paley (1990 and 2002), Opie and Opie
(1985), Lakoff and Johnson (2003), and Pinker (1997).
Egan (1997) states, ‘‘Narrative (stories) are accessible to the literate
and illiterate alike, to the logico-mathematically sophisticated and
unsophisticated. We might well develop a respect for narrative as
everybody’s rock-bottom capacity, but also as a universal gift, to be
shared with others.’’ He concludes by stating, ‘‘Once we recognize
story structure as a prominent feature of human understanding, then
we are led to reconceive the curriculum as the set of great stories we
have to tell children and recognize elementary school teachers as the
storytellers of our culture.’’
Brown (1991) showed that ‘‘young children universally understand
and delight in fantasy stories. They are clearly able to integrate nature
and culture in that story space and readily accept clothed and talking
rabbits without expecting story elements to translate back into their
real world.’’ Through the fantasy ‘‘reality’’ of story, children learn
and understand complex concepts they cannot grasp through logical,
factual, or argumentative presentations.
Egan (1997) states that ‘‘oral cultures discovered long ago that Story structure
ideas and values put into rhythmic story form were more easily proved equally more
effective for teaching
remembered and more accurately acted upon.’’ This contention has
theorems, facts,
been supported by extensive studies, and reviews of studies, by other concepts, and tacit
researchers such as Paley (2002, 1984, 1990), Opie and Opie (1985), information all
Tannen (1999), or Sutton-Smith (1981). Rhythm is a communications across the
concept completely compatible with story, but not with other com- curriculum and the
spectrum of human
mon expository forms.
communications.
Chafe (1982, 1985) compared effective learning from conversational
storytelling and formal academic papers and found that material pre-
sented in story structure (providing a central role for character, goal-
directed activity, and a greater density of sensory details) was learned
more efficiently and effectively than the same information presented
through traditional academic writing. Tannen (1999) conducted a
similar study and produced identical results. So did Ochs (1979) and
Scollon and Scollon (1984).
In each of these studies, researchers assessed the effect of convert-
ing information into story structure without regard for, or limit to,
the specific type of information being taught. Story structure proved
equally more effective for teaching theorems, facts, concepts, and tacit
information all across the curriculum and the spectrum of human
communications.
Chafe, Tannen, and Scollon and Scollon all noted that readers are
drawn to and become involved with narrative presented in a specific
form and are turned off by narrative presented in specific other
forms. The former corresponds to effective story structure; the latter
to typical expository and academic styles. Tannen expressed it well.
‘‘Short stories combine the ‘involvement’ that Chafe finds typical of
102 STORY PROOF
understand, use, and control the stories that define their beliefs, atti-
tudes, decisions, and actions?
function.’’ Spicer’s work led her to the conclusion that ‘‘if you can’t
see the story; you won’t learn the content and its meaning.’’
In a more broadly focused study of narrative, Howard (1991)
claimed that ‘‘when we think, we do so by fitting story themes to the
experience we wish to understand. . . . A life becomes meaningful
when one sees himself or herself as an actor within the context of a
story.’’
Swatton (1999) cited numerous studies to support her contention
that ‘‘stories communicate meaning,’’ and that ‘‘healing stories create
meaning within the context of struggle.’’ She concluded that ‘‘we can-
not change ourselves until we change our stories.’’
Hastings et al. (2005) conducted a statistical analysis of story
themes and content for grieving stories. Setting aside the details of
this content analysis, the broader point was that all of the patients
that were studied organized thoughts automatically along story ele-
mental lines when asked to identify any aspect of meaning. For these
patients, meaning came from and through story structure. Ryden
(2005) conducted a similar, but qualitative analysis of bereavement
stories and reached an identical conclusion on the role and function
of story.
Drew (2005), in supporting earlier work by Somers (1994), stated,
‘‘People make sense of what has happened and is happening . . . by
attempting to assemble or to integrate these happenings into narra-
tives (stories).’’ Babrow et al. (2005) concluded, ‘‘Stories provide a
way to make sense of experience. Stories provide particularly impor-
tant ways of understanding when unexpected, unpleasant, or uncer-
tain experiences challenge what had previously been taken for
granted.’’
All of the cited Harter et al. (2005) cited literally hundreds of other studies in their
studies confirm the assessment of stories and concluded that all of the cited studies con-
cognitive value and
meaning
firm the cognitive value and meaning enhancement of stories. The
enhancement of authors described stories as ‘‘occasions for the act of knowledge and
stories. meaning sharing.’’
In the most comprehensive and critical review of organizational
myths to that date, Bowles (1989) examined the relationship between
myth and meaning in work organizations. His conclusion: meaning is
now sought by many people through their work and work organiza-
tion and is defined by the organization’s dominant stories and myths.
Behind Boyce’s (1996) narrative study of how stories develop and
affect (even control) life and work, Boyce showed the more basic
truth that stories (story structure and form) are the most basic form
used to filter, internalize, make sense of, and evaluate new experi-
ences and information both for individuals and for organizations. In
all the studies and organizational examples Boyce studied, the
researchers had to place collected data within the context and struc-
ture of a story in order to create meaning and to make sense of organ-
izational communications.
Boyce (1996), Nusbaum (1982), and Boje (2001) arrived at identical
conclusions. ‘‘Meaning and sense-making come for viewing organiza-
tional communications in the form and structure of corporate stories
WE’VE REACHED THE RESEARCH RESULTS 107
Stories naturally create context and relevance more readily than other
narrative forms.
Pressley (2001) and Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) came to a simi- ‘‘Good readers are
aware of why they are
lar conclusion. ‘‘Good readers are aware of why they are reading a
reading a text.’’
text’’ (Pressley 2001).
So did Short and Ryan (1984): ‘‘If readers lack awareness of the
purposes and goals of reading, then they should not be expected to
employ successful strategic attempts to meet the demands of the
task.’’ Brown (1980), Paris et al. (2000), and Smiley et al. (1977)
reached similar conclusions from their research.
Shuman (2006) reported on her research that has linked story with
the creation of empathy in readers. (She defines empathy as people’s
understanding, through narrative, of experiences they do not share
and characters they do not know.)
Using the well-known ‘‘Welcome to Holland’’ story with parents
of disabled children, Shuman (2006) was able to show that parable
and allegory uniquely create empathy. ‘‘Parable says things that can-
not be said or are not said’’ and ‘‘Parable and allegory can create sen-
timental identification with goal, struggles, and emotions of the story
character’’ (Shuman 2006). Her clinical work confirmed that empathy
changed patient attitudes and motivated them to learn and adapt.
Approaching learning motivation from the reverse perspective,
Howard (1991) tried to assess why people resist reading, and are less
able to remember, scientific journal articles. ‘‘The scientific style (of
writing structure) is the inferior in many ways because of the enor-
mous number of limitations by which it is encumbered.’’ Chief
among the limitations he identified were a lack of character develop-
ment, the use of passive voice, distant third-person perspective, and
the omission of key character-related information (goal, motive,
struggle). He concluded that these limitations prevented personal
involvement by most readers and made it far more difficult for them
to create personal context and relevance. As a result, all but those
who truly needed the information were unmotivated to read.
Case Studies
Most of the available research amounts to compilations of trial-
and-error anecdotal studies. Formal research techniques using control
groups and ‘‘double blind’’ protocols are not possible within the
high-pressure, demanding, results-oriented, bottom-line world of
business management. However, the consistency of the case study
findings (often including comparative analysis within a single organi-
zation before and after using story-based approaches) provides a
clear statement of the effective role of story within organizational
leadership and management.
One of the first to eloquently espouse the value of storytelling to
corporate management was Armstrong (1999) with his book Manag-
ing by Storying Around: A New Method of Leadership. Through his per-
sonal story and storytelling experiments with his own employees he
found that structuring his themes and messages in story form signifi-
cantly increased worker involvement, sense of commitment, owner-
ship of corporate values and mission, and sense of belonging—of
‘‘family.’’ He also found that storytelling was far more effective at
successfully motivating employees to buy into corporate values, poli-
cies, and attitude.
Denning (2001) found similar results in his story experiments at
the World Bank.
Analytical Studies
Other, more rigorous studies have compared the workings of a
variety of organizations to assess the effective role of stories within
structured organizations. Snowden studied internal corporate com-
munication and found that the more central and important a concept
was to the organization, the more it tended to form and grow organi- The primary
cally into story. ‘‘In organizations: stories are uniquely effective as functions of stories
research tools, managerial tools, internal and external communica- are to provide
tions tools, organizational analysis tools, motivation and identity motivation, a sense
tools’’ (Snowden 2000). of belonging, a
personal
Wilkins and Martin (1979), Gabriel (2000), Weick and Browning commitment to the
(1986), Stone (1996), Bowles (1989), and others have studied the use organization, and a
of stories for organizational management and all have concluded that feeling of community.
112 STORY PROOF
Weick and Browning (1986) and Stone (1996) concluded that story-
telling brings people together in a common perspective and stretches
everyone’s ability to empathize with others. These researchers con-
firmed the power of story to motivate readers and listeners to pay
attention and to internalize and adopt the content being communi-
cated. Gabriel (2000) arrived at an identical conclusion.
Stories increased Bowles (1989), in agreeing with earlier work by Sievers (1986),
team success and
team identification.
showed that stories increased team success and team identification.
Wilkins and Martin (1979) identified three functions stories served
most effectively in organizations: generating commitment (behavioral
and attitudinal), making sense of the organization, and managerial
control. ‘‘Stories serve these vital functions in an organization more
effectively than other communications devices.’’
Similar importance for, and value in, story has been identified in
clinical therapy research. Examples of this research were included in
previous sections. As an additional example, Harter et al. (2005) cites
forty studies of the use of story (narrative) in the field of clinical ther-
apy. Many of these studies, themselves, included reviews of other
studies and most provided quantitative evaluation of the effective-
ness of story. Harter reported that all of the studies they examined
assert that narratives were successful and effective in structuring and
framing therapy (‘‘ . . . stories were particularly valuable as mundane
and extraordinary ritual symbolic forms, as sites for action and
agency, and as occasions for the act of knowledge sharing’’).
Harter et al. (2005) further stated that ‘‘narrative as representation
has long been respected as an optimal vehicle for teaching pre-
established truths. . . . Understanding the epistemological and onto-
logical power of narrative is a vital direction for health communication
researchers to pursue.’’
success stems from story’s unique ability to motivate readers and lis-
teners to pay greater attention while they read and listen and to
involve story receivers with the characters and struggles of a story.
Stories create a common perspective and context that makes content
information personal and relevant.
In this way, stories connect each receiver to others, form bonds,
create common identity and purpose, and encourage people to adopt
the values, ideas, perspectives, and attitudes of story characters.
These elements, in turn, build a feeling of involvement and a sense of
community.
If you want your messages adopted by, and internalized into,
those in your organizations, find or create an effective story (or a
series of stories) to share with them that incorporates your core infor-
mation into the characters and struggles of the story. Encourage
employees to share their own stories and experiences. Build a set of
common stories that reflect the values, attitudes, struggles, beliefs,
and accomplishments of the community you want to create. Let these
stories create the personal involvement that will cause each individ-
ual to personally adopt the community.
The increase can be Results are awkward to numerically compare because one state
primarily attributed used a four-point scoring rubric, two used five-point schemes, and
to the effect of a
story structure
one used a six-point system for scoring proficiency tests. Still, aver-
workshop on writing aged across all students, the Friday test scored almost a full point
proficiency. (0.86) above the Monday score. All that happened in between those
two tests was a workshop on story structure. In one case (New
Mexico) two other fifth-grade classes at the school took the Monday
practice test but did not receive the mid-week workshop. Their scores
on Friday were only 0.11 (averaged) better than their Monday scores
meaning that the 0.86 increase can be primarily attributed to the
effect of story structure workshop on writing proficiency.
Additionally, I have conducted writing workshops with over
220,000 students in forty-two states over the past twelve years. Each
of those workshops focuses on the specific informational elements
that define effective story structure. I have rarely been able to person-
ally conduct post-workshop student interviews following these
sessions. But I have interviewed many teachers (165), school adminis-
trators (11), and parents (46) of students who have attended these
workshops to assess two things: did the workshop successfully
increase student knowledge of story structure, and did it affect the
general quality of student writing.
Through the consistency of the qualitative responses I received dur-
ing these interviews, I have determined that even one-hour story struc-
ture workshops have a lasting, noticeable impact on the quality and
effectiveness of student narrative writing for most students as well as
a large impact on their enthusiasm for and willingness to spend school
and home time writing. The noticed change was consistently greatest
for students rated below the midpoint of their class in writing profi-
ciency. Students included in this sample stretch from second grade up
to high school. ‘‘Since your workshop, we have seen profound writing
improvements’’ (from a letter written to me by the school librarian and
writing coach of a South Carolina private, college-prep high school).
Note that the improvements qualitatively described by teachers,
administrators, and parents include marked improvements in exposi-
tory writing even though the workshops I conducted focused exclu-
sively on story structure. Learning the specific elements that define
story architecture improved students’ ability to write both story and
expository narratives.
Even one-hour story Egan (1997) quoted Spencer, the famed originator of the educa-
structure workshops tional recapitulation theory: ‘‘If there be an order in which the human
have a lasting,
noticeable impact on
race has mastered its various kinds of knowledge, there will arise in
the quality and every child an aptitude to acquire these kinds of knowledge in the
effectiveness of same order. Education should be a repetition of civilization in minia-
student narrative ture’’ (Spencer 1898). Egan made this reference when he found that
writing. his own data supported the notion that students most effectively
learned language and math skills in the same order described by
Spencer.
Five-year-olds learn to organize thought into language and to write
as ancient civilizations did. They learn math processes in the same
order that civilization did—count, then add and subtract, then
WE’VE REACHED THE RESEARCH RESULTS 117
multiply and divide, etc. Egan’s work, then, matches my own conclu-
sion that learning to effectively write stories is a valuable precursor
to learning to write other expository forms since stories developed
tens-of-thousands of years before expository forms.
My work on student writing also suggests that writing may be
considered an effective part of reading and reading comprehension
programs. Time and effort spent learning to write stories develop
many of the same language skills essential to effective reading.
Cooper (1997), Pearson and Dole (1987), Tierney and Shanahan
(1991), Shanahan (1990) all come to the same conclusion. From their
in-class research, collectively, they list five major reasons to teach
reading and writing together.
cake. Help your students master cake baking and then they’ll be
ready to play with the options of different styles of frosting.
Writing is a creative process. But the activity of writing and the ac-
tivity of creating what will be written are separate activities. Create
first and write second. Creation guides writing. Successful narrative
creation depends on a knowledge of story structure. Teach that struc-
ture and develop writing plans that spring from that structure to de-
velop consistently successful writing communicators.
A FINAL SUMMATION
Research overwhelming, convincingly, and without opposition
provides the evidence I sought. Are stories a more efficient and effec-
tive vehicle for communicating factual, conceptual, emotional, and
tacit information and a more effective teaching vehicle? Not only yes,
but absolutely, yes!
In this chapter I have referenced over 120 credible studies (repre-
senting an analysis of more than 800 other research studies and
reports). There are many additional studies I reviewed in preparing
this book that I could have included had it not felt like brutal overkill.
This great mass of evidentiary support establishes the value of story
to education, to science outreach, to organizations, to therapy, to
ministry—to any communication effort.
Let’s sum up the value of story and story structure with the words
of Morris Chang, Director of Education for the Tainan region of Tai-
wan. In a 2006 speech, he said, ‘‘Research shows that people are
genetically coded to have a close relationship with stories.’’ He con-
cluded, ‘‘Living in a highly competitive environment places great
pressure on the efficiency and effectiveness of every moment spent at
school. I am convinced that stories hold a solution. They teach valu-
able language skills, teach facts and concepts, and are finally some-
thing fun for our students to do’’ (Chang 2006).
What more could we ask of a single, natural, and flexible teaching
and learning tool?
CHAPTER 10
What do you remember best from the first nine chapters of this book? I bet you
remember most vividly story examples and story demonstrations and remember
just the gist of key information I presented in narrative form. See? We remember
stories best. And that’s the ultimate story proof. When I used story (even story
fragments) to make a point, you remembered it. Stories work.
The most important message from, and greatest value of, this book is a true
understanding of the nature and structure of stories. Once you are armed with
that knowledge, the research on successful applications of story (Chapters 8 and
9) will have both accurate meaning and value.
Through nine chapters we’ve seen why our human brains and minds are
stuck with this specific mode of thinking and processing. We’ve seen how suc-
cessful stories are even when used sloppily. We’ve seen neurologically why sto-
ries are so effective.
There is little left to say. You’ve seen the breadth and depth of the evidence.
If any question remains, it is: what do you do with it? Here are a few final
thoughts on story application by way of summarizing the information in this
book. There are many books available that focus on the application of story for
different venues. The real point of this book has been to establish the value of,
and the need for, using those reference works.
Story is an incredibly versatile and malleable form. Within the confines and
mandates of story architecture lie infinite variety and flexibility. You can shape
a story for any audience to fit into any niche, culture, language, or genre. You
can present the essential story information in any order and from any perspec-
tive. You can overtly state this information or craftily imply it through the
124 STORY PROOF
actions of central characters. Stories can be fiction or nonfiction. They can be se-
rious, farcical, or designed for any other mood and purpose. And they can still
all be stories!
However, a caveat. Not every narrative needs to be or should be a story.
Because of their relationship to the thought processes of the human mind, sto-
ries hold a unique effectiveness and power. But that power does not come for
free. Stories require that you develop and present character, that you identify
and present intent, and that the presentation focuses on a character’s struggles
to overcome obstacles and reach the stated (or implied) goal. There is story infor-
mation that you must gather and develop in addition to content information.
Presenting information in story form also requires more words than present-
ing the same content information in summary narrative form. Character infor-
mation and sensory details must be added. Where fixed word limits exist, this
can be a significant problem. There are times and situations when it is neither
possible nor appropriate to adhere to story mandates. In those cases, don’t try to
force your material to look like a story. Some situations call for simple factual
statements; some for direct summaries of achievements and results. There are
often situations when word or time limits preclude adequate character
development.
It is always worth considering the use of story structure. When you can,
mighty rewards await. When you can’t—for whatever reason—don’t. Story is
not the only narrative structure, and there are times when it is not the most
appropriate choice.
GENERAL ADVICE
Humans are truly homo narratus, story animals. We learn from and through
stories. All stories teach in that receivers’ remember and learn from stories.
Whether used for formal or informal teaching and to convey attitudes, humor,
facts, concepts, values, or any other kind of information, stories teach. They are
uniquely effective and efficient at it because they mimic the internal processing
of human minds.
From Cooper (1997): ‘‘Schema theory contends that individuals understand
what they read only as it relates to what they already know.’’ Every human
knows about characters and story structure. You can bridge to new content
knowledge by relying on existing ‘‘text-specific knowledge’’ as opposed to
‘‘topic-specific knowledge’’ (terms from Paris et al. 1991). Cobb (1994) agreed:
‘‘In the most general sense, the contemporary view of learning is that people
construct new knowledge and understanding based on what they already know
and believe.’’
Bransford and Brown (2000) showed that ‘‘it is essential to develop a sense
of when what has been learned can be used.’’ They also stated that ‘‘new infor-
mation has shifted the focus of effective learning from diligent drill to a focus
on students’ understanding and application of knowledge’’ (Bransford and
Brown 2000). Application requires context and relevance that are provided by
story.
McCombs (1996) and Pintrich and Schunk (1996) both showed that learners
of all ages are more motivated when they can see the usefulness (relevance) of
what they learn and its impact on their own lives and on others. In story terms
this simply means to create context and relevance in order to make new
THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING: PUTTING STORIES TO WORK FOR YOU 125
information useful. Glaser (1992) went further when he said that ‘‘knowledge
that is not provided within a contextual framework is often ‘inert’ because it is
not activated, even though it is relevant.’’
Stories create four things needed for effective learning of any kind: meaning,
context, relevance, and empathy. Story is the structure that allows information
(data, concepts, values) to bridge from the abstract external world into the
human internal world.
Bruner (2003) offered the following advice on story to storywriters: ‘‘Plots
need obstacles and goals; obstacles make people reconsider.’’ Writers and story-
tellers may not understand the theory or reasons behind such advice. But they
naturally gravitate toward what works—what achieves the desired reaction and
response from audiences. As Fisher (1987) concluded, ‘‘Readers judge first and
foremost by story elements and not on logical arguments and information con-
tained therein.’’
element—the creation of, nature of, look of, purpose of, and effect of each. Give
story-writing prompts and have students spend most of their writing time writ-
ing stories. Along the way, they will naturally understand and master the com-
mon derivative forms (persuasive, informative, etc.).
Refocus writing assignments and prompts away from plot questions toward
character-based prompts. This will reinforce their growing awareness of the
character base and character dependency of effective narrative writing.
Help students develop the habit of creating core narrative elements orally
before writing. Help students and school families break prevalent myths and
misconceptions about stories.
However, as Bransford and Brown (2000) remind us, ‘‘It is essential to de-
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content and themes of shared stories are directly applicable to the daily life of
organization members and that opportunities are established to share stories
that team members develop.
Why spend company time creating story structures within the organization?
As Bruner’s experiments established, ‘‘Give subjects (readers) a reason for
embedding their judgment in a story, and they will ignore Bayesian (most logi-
cally and likely) probabilities’’ (Bruner 1986).
The question is not, ‘‘Will stories emerge in my organization to control mem-
ber outlook and attitude?’’ They will. The pertinent questions are: Who will cre-
ate and control these stories? And how will these core stories be created?
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
Connectedness, element of springboard Fiction, 15; advice for educators, 125; final
stories, 102 comfort and warning, 128
Consciousness, 22 Filling in gaps, in unconscious thought, 31
Constant ambiguities, 38–39 Framing what is said, unconscious
Constructing mental images, in thought, 31
unconscious thought, 31 Franklin, Jon, 6
Context: definition, 64; memory and, 72; Frontal lobes, 23
in story structure, 7; for students, 125 Frye, Northrop, 19
Conversation flow: anticipation, 31;
evaluation in unconscious thought, 31 Gardner, John, 40
Corporate lecturer, anecdotal evidence Glutamate, 67
about stories, 84–85 Goal, 36–38
Corporate management, stories in, 4–5 Goal achievement, activating assumption,
Corporate staff development, anecdotal 46
evidence about stories, 85 Governmental agencies, stories in, 5
Cross-curriculum learning, story structure Grammar, 4
effects, 98–104
Cultural heritage, 4 Hardware (brain), 29
Hardwiring, story scripts in human
Dalkir, K., 11 brains, 26
Decision making, 30 High-school biology teacher, anecdotal
Dendrites, 22 evidence about stories, 84
Denning, Steven, World Bank, 4 High-school music teacher, anecdotal
Details, 63–64; memory of, 71; as a evidence about stories, 83–84
narrative element, 76; use of stories History, 4
to provide, 93–94 Hormones, 22
Developmental psychology, 7, 30
Dictionary definition, 17–19 Imagination, 13
Dinesen, Isak, 10 Implications, 35–36
Domain blending, 56–60 Incomplete, 38–40
Index labels, memory of events and, 72
Education, 7; stories in, 4–5 Inferences, 35–36, 52–53
Educators, advice on story structure, Informational elements, 6, 15
125–26 Information processing, activating
El-Youssef, 40 assumption, 47
Embryonic neural development, 24–25 Information theory, 7
Emotional connection, 13 Instant decisions, 38
Emotions, 62–63; memory of emotional Intent, 36–38; as a narrative element, 76
events, 71–72 Internal conversations, 31
Engleman, David, 22 Interpretation, 29; evaluation and, 30
Entertainment, 16 Involvement, 13
Ephron, Nora, 14
Evaluation, interpretation and, 30 King, Stephen, 40
Evolutionary biology, 4, 30 Knowledge management (KM), 11;
Evolutionary cues, brain development, anecdotal evidence from corporate
24–25 lecturer, 84–85
Expectations, 50–52
Experiences, 29, 33–34 Language: control in the brain, 23;
Expository argument, 3 mastering of, 7; story predating of, 4;
story structure improves mastery of,
Facial expressions, activating assumption, 113–15; syntax rules and, 60–62;
48 written, 4
Fact-based memory, 69 Leaders, advice on story structure,
Feedback loop, human mind, 33 126–27
INDEX 151
Learning: enthusiasm created by stories, Neural maps, 6, 30, 48; experience, 33–34
108–9; story structure effects, 98–104 Neural net modeling, 7; interpret incoming
Lieberman, Syd, 40 sensory input, 27; mimic of human
Literacy: story structure and, 113–15; mental function, 32
storytelling and Neurons, 22
Logic, 3 Neurotransmitters, 22, 67
Logical thinking: story structure effects, New and important information, activating
98–104; storytelling and, 4, 6 assumption, 47
News, 4
Magnificent Seven concepts, 32–43 NMDA signal boxes, 67
Making sense, activating assumption, 46 Nonfiction, 15; advice for educators, 125;
Math ability, storytelling and, 4 final comfort and warning, 128
Meaning, 35–36, 38; creating in the Non-stories, 6; versus story, 12
classroom, 104–5; creating outside the
classroom, 105–7; enhancement by story Oral stories, 3–4
and story structure, 104–8 Order and common structure: activating
Medical science, 7 assumption, 46; in narrative, 34–35
Memorable stories, for students, 125 Outreach communicators, advice on story
Memory, 4, 30; attaching index labels to structure, 127–28
event, 72; context and relevance, 72;
details, 71; enhancement by story Parable, 57
structure, 118–22; events that have Partial information, 38–40
emotional impact, 71–72; information in Pattern matching, 53
story form, 70–71; mechanics, 67–68; Performing inferences, unconscious
process of remembering, 68–70; story thought, 31
and, 7; story structure effects, 69; Persuasion, 3
variability of recall, 70 PKC, 68
Mental model, 34–35 Planning what to say, in unconscious
Mental tools, 45–64 thought, 31
Metaphor, 58–60 Plot, 17
Middle-school librarian, anecdotal Precommitment, 10
evidence about stories, 85 Predicting the future, activating
Mills, Gordon, 9 assumption, 48
Mind: mechanics, 45–65; owners manual Predisposition: assumptions, 39; brain
for, 32–43 development, 24–25; natural hardwiring,
Motivation: creation by stories, 108–9; 26; thinking in story terms, 4; what it
story and, 6–7 means for us, 27
Motive, 36–38 Presuppositions, 35–36
Primary grade storytelling program,
Narrative: definition, 9, 79–80; magnificent anecdotal evidence about stories, 85
seven mental concepts, 46–64 Prior knowledge, 53–55; story structure
Narrative architecture, 9 facilitation of, 119–20; use of story,
Narrative elements, 75–76; researchers, 92–93
76–79 Processes (activities), 9
Narrative information, 6; character central Proverb, 58
to, 39; how the mind processes, 29; order
and common structure in, 34–35 Rational character behavior, assumption,
Narrative structure, 9 39
Narrative therapy, 7, 105 Raw sensory input, 24, 30
NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, Reading: link to abstract thought, 31; skill
Earth Science, 3 development in comprehension, 91
Neural biology, 7, 30; embryonic Reading comprehension: research, 90–98;
development, 24–25 story structure and, 6
Neural linguistics, 7 Redemptive stories, 80
152 INDEX
The only West Point graduate and only senior oceanographer to become a pro-
fessional storyteller, KENDALL HAVEN has performed for over 4 million. He
has won numerous awards for his storywriting and his storytelling and has
conducted storywriting workshops for 45,000 teachers and librarians and
250,000 students.
Haven has authored five audio tapes and 28 books including three award-
winning books on story: Write Right and Get It Write on writing, and Super
Simple Storytelling, on doing, using, and teaching storytelling. Through this work
Haven has become a nationally recognized expert on the architecture of narra-
tives and on teaching creative and expository writing.
Haven served on the National Storytelling Association’s Board of Directors
and founded the International Whole Language Umbrella’s Storytelling Interest
Group. He has served as co-director for five western storytelling festivals,
including two student storytelling showcase festivals.
He lives with his wife in the rolling vineyards in rural Northern California.