Construction defined

 the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law, where that intention rendered doubtfully reason of ambiguity in its
language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
 is drawing of warranted conclusions beyond direct expression of the text expressions
which are in spirit though not within the text.
 xxx inevitably, there enters the construction of statutes the play of JUDICIAL JUDGMENT
within the limits of the relevant legislative materials
 it involves the EXERCISE OF CHOICE BY THE JUDICIARY

Construction and interpretation distinguished

• They are so alike in practical results and so are used interchangeably; synonymous.

Construction Interpretation

- process of drawing warranted - art of finding the true

conclusions not always meaning and sense of any form

included in direct expressions, of words

or determining the application

of words to facts in litigation

The Spirit of Laws (Montesquieu): There is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers. Were it joined the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then legislator. Were it joined to the
executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence off an oppressor.
DEFINITION
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966. | En Banc – Justice Castro
CALTEXT (PHILIPPINES), INC. petitioner-appellee,
[APPEAL from a declaratory judgment of the Manila Court of First Instance..]
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL, respondent-appellant.

Facts:

In 1960, Caltex (Philippines), Inc. initiated a promotional scheme called the “Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest” to increase patronage for its oil products. The contest required participants to
estimate the number of liters dispensed by a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station over a
specified period. Participation was open to all motor vehicle owners and licensed drivers without any
fee or purchase requirement.

Caltex sought clearance from postal authorities to use the mails for publicizing the contest,
citing sections 1954(a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Acting Postmaster
General denied this request, arguing that the contest violated anti-lottery laws.

Caltex filed for declaratory relief, and the trial court ruled in their favor, stating that the
contest did not violate Postal Law. The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” violates Postal Law under sections 1954(a), 1982, and
1983 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Caltex (Philippines), Inc., affirming that their “Caltex Hooded
Pump Contest” did not violate anti-lottery provisions as it did not involve consideration.

Notes:

Statutes; Construction defined.—Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning 'and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case
is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

In the present case, the question of whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within
the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law inescapably requires an inquiry into the
intended meaning of the words used therein. This is as much a question of construction or
interpretation as any other.

Statutory Construction and Interpretation:

Definition of Lottery: A lottery is defined by three elements: prize, chance, and consideration.
Consideration Element: The Court emphasized that for an activity to be classified as a lottery under
statutory law, it must involve consideration—meaning participants must pay a fee or make a
purchase to participate.

The true test is whether the participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not
whether those conducting- the enterprise receives something of value in return for the distribution
of the price. The standpoint of the contestant, not of the sponsor, is all that matters

Interpretation of Gift Enterprise: The term “gift enterprise” was interpreted alongside “lottery.” Both
require consideration to be prohibited under postal regulations.

Gratuitous Distribution: Since no fee or purchase was required for participation in the contest, it was
deemed a gratuitous distribution of property by chance rather than a lottery or gift enterprise.

Application of Statutory Provisions:

Section 1954(a): This section prohibits mailing materials related to lotteries or schemes involving
chance if they require consideration.

Sections 1982 and 1983: These sections empower postal authorities to return mail related to
fraudulent schemes or lotteries involving consideration.

Court’s Interpretation: The Court interpreted these provisions strictly according to their language and
legislative intent, concluding that since no consideration was involved in Caltex’s contest, it did not
fall within the prohibitions outlined in these sections.

With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis—which Opinion 217aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar
as the element of chance is concerned.—it is only logical that the term under a construction should
be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so alsomust the term "gift
enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent
to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift. enterprise" therein included.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that since the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” lacked an element of
consideration, it could not be classified as a lottery or gift enterprise under statutory law. Therefore,
Caltex was entitled to use the mails for publicizing its contest without violating Postal Law.
PURPOSE OF CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-26100 Februry 28, 1969. | En Banc – Justice Sanchez
CITY OF BAGUlO, REFORESTATION ADMINISTRATION,
FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, SR., FRANCISCO G. JOAQUIN, JR., and TERESITA J. BUCHHOLZ petitioners,
[APPEAL from a declaratory judgment of the Manila Court of First Instance..]
vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
BELONG LUTES, and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Facts:
The case is about the land dispute where the respondent Lutes invoked to reopen cadastral
proceedings of the said parcel of land per Republic Act 931(AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE FILING IN
THE PROPER COURT, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, OF CERTAIN CLAIMS OF TITLE TO PARCELS OF
LAND THAT HAVE BEEN DECLARED PUBLIC LAND, BY VIRTUE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED
WITHIN THE FORTY YEARS NEXT PRECEDING THE APPROVAL OF THIS);
Petitioners attack the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Baguio to reopen cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. Private petitioner's specifically question the ruling of the Court
of Appeals that they have no personality to oppose reopening. The three-pronged contentions of all
the petitioners are:
(1) the reopening petition was filed outside the 40-year period next preceding the approval of
Republic Act 931
(2) said petition was not published; and
(3) private petitioners, as lessees of the public land in question, have court standing under Republic
Act 931.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts ruling are according to the intent of the Republic Act 931.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners (City of Baguio and Reforestation
Administration), reversing the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
On the 1st contention, Supreme Court ruled that the action of respondent is within the 40-year
period counting from November 13, 1922

On the 2nd contention, the Supreme Court ruled that the power of cadastral court to reopen case is
not jurisdictionally tainted by want of publication.

On the 3rd contention, the court ruled that the petitioners have court standing. This is where the
“purpose of construction” comes into play. The jurisprudence referred to by the respondents differ
from the case at bar as the petitioners have the court standing to intervene the action filed by Lutes.
Per R.A. 931 those lands about to be declared or already declared land of the public domain are the
ones in scope by virtue of judicial proceedings. Meaning that it is only with respect to said parcels of
land as not have been leased by the government, among others. The petitioners have proved that
they are legitimate lessees of the land hence the cadastral court should rule on the validity of private
petitioners’ lease on its mertis.

Same; Same; Statutory construction; Object of interpretation. —

The true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body,
to the end that it may be enforced. In varying language, “the purpose of all rules or maxims” in
interpretation “is to discover the true intention of the law.” (82 C.J.S. 526) They are only valuable
when they subserve this purpose.” In fact, “the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof”. A statute “should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregard. as as
far as necessary, the letter of the law.” By this, the Supreme Court does not “correct the act of the
Legislature, but rather x x x carry out and give due course to” its true in-tent.
WHEN CONSTRUCTION IS RESORTED TO
G.R. No 170735 December 17, 2007. | Third Division – Justice Chico-Nazario
IMMACULADA L. GARCIA, petitioners,
[APPEAL from a declaratory judgment of the Manila Court of First Instance..]
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION LEGAL AND COLLECTION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

Facts:
The case is about the claim of employees of Impact Corporation on their compensation
benefits consisting of unpaid wages, 13 th month pay and non-remittance of loan and amortization
and SSS premiums which amounted to total of 2.98M pesos on the spread of August 1980 to
December 1984. On the dispute, both SSS and Court of Appeals ruled that Garcia, being the
remaining director/officer of Impact Corporation is being held liable to remit the amount of 2.98M.
The petitioner claimed the following as defense:

1. Petitioner avers that under the aforesaid provision, the liability does not include liability for
the unremitted SSS premium contributions.
2. Petitioner also challenges the finding of the Court of Appeals that under Section 28(f) of the
Social Security Law, a mere director or officer of an employer corporation, and not
necessarily a "managing" director or officer, can be held liable for the unpaid SSS premium
contributions.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts ruling are valid in accordance with the provisions of Social Security
Law?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals with Finality and ordered the
petitioner to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions.

On the 1st claim of the petitioner, the court’s reasoning is that – it cannot be made to accept an
interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

Under Section 22(a), every employer is required to deduct and remit such contributions penalty refers
to the 3% penalty that automatically attaches to the delayed SSS premium contributions. The spirit
rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in
statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a
careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the law, must be made.
Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred that the persons liable are absolved
from paying the unremitted premium contributions.

Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, it is incumbent upon the judge to apply
them regardless of personal belief or predilections - when the law is unambiguous and
unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the language of
a statute is vague and ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. An interpretation thereof
is necessary in instances where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice. A law is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by
reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses. The fact that a law admits of
different interpretations is the best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous. In the instant case,
petitioner interprets Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law as applicable only to penalties and not
to the liability of the employer for the unremitted premium contributions. Respondents present a
more logical interpretation that is consistent with the provisions as a whole and with the
legislative intent behind the Social Security Law.

On the 2nd claim:

Petitioner invokes the rule in statutory construction called ejusdem generic; that is, where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning,
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. According to
petitioner, to be held liable under Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law, one must be the
“managing head,” “managing director,” or “managing partner.” This Court though finds no need to
resort to statutory construction. Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law imposes penalty on: (1) the
managing head; (2) directors; or (3)partners, for offenses committed by a juridical person The said
provision does not qualify that the director or partner should likewise be a “managing director” or
“managing partner.” The law is clear and unambiguous.

The sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries. This Court will not turn a blind
eye on the perpetration of injustice. This Court cannot and will not allow itself to be made an
instrument nor be privy to any attempt at the perpetration of injustice.

Following the doctrine laid down in Laguna Transportation Co., Inc. v. Social Security System,38 this
Court rules that although a corporation once formed is conferred a juridical personality separate and
distinct from the persons comprising it, it is but a legal fiction introduced for purposes of
convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. The concept cannot be extended to a point beyond
its reasons and policy, and when invoked in support of an end subversive of this policy, will be
disregarded by the courts.

Notes:

Labor Law; Labor Standards; Social Legislation; Social Security Law; Statutory Construction; A
simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable—it is a rule in statutory construction that every part
of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment; The liability imposed as contemplated under Section 28(f) of the Social Security
Law does not preclude the liability of the enumerated corporate officers for the unremitted premium
contributions.—Petitioner’s argument is ridiculous. The interpretation petitioner would like us to
adopt finds no support in law or in jurisprudence. While the Court of Appeals Decision provided that
Section 28(f) refers to the liabilities pertaining to penalty for the non-remittance of SSS employee
contributions, holding that it is distinct from the amount of the supposed SSS remittances, petitioner
mistakenly concluded that Section 28(f)is applicable only to penalties and not to the liability of the
employer for the unremitted premium contributions. Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is
untenable. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The liability
imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Law does not
preclude the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant to Section 28(f) is Section 22 of the same
law.

Same; Same; Same; The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a provision
of law—it is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and scope of a
term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of the
law, must be made.—Under Section 22(a), every employer is required to deduct and remit such
contributions penalty refers to the 3% penalty that automatically attaches to the delayed SSS
premium contributions. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines construction of a
provision of law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that in interpreting the meaning and
scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the
intendment of the law, must be made. Nowhere in the provision or in the Decision can it be inferred
that the persons liable are absolved from paying the unremitted premium contributions.

EXECUTIVE CONSTRUCTION

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 150947, 15 July 2003

Facts

The conflict started with Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 27-2003 issued on
November 7, 2003, classifying wheat for tariff purposes based on the importer or consignee, country
of origin, and port of discharge.

This classification led to differing tariff rates: 3% for food grade wheat and 7% for feed grade
wheat.

Hypermix Feeds Corporation, expecting this regulation to apply to its imported Chinese
milling wheat, filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief on December 19, 2003, with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

The respondent claimed that CMO 27-2003 was issued without public participation, prior
notice, and proper publication, and that it violated the equal protection clause by treating non-flour
millers differently from flour millers.

The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 19, 2004, and later ruled in
favor of Hypermix, declaring CMO 27-2003 invalid and of no force and effect.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC's decision, leading the Commissioner of Customs
to file a Petition for Review with the Supreme Court.

Issue
Whether or not CMO 27-2003 complied with procedural requirements for a statute to
becomes effective?

Ruling
A significant aspect of statutory construction in this case involved examining whether CMO 27-2003
complied with procedural requirements set forth in the Revised Administrative Code. The Supreme
Court highlighted that administrative rule must adhere to specific procedures, including public
participation, notice, and publication before they can be enforced against affected parties. The
failure to follow these procedures rendered CMO 27-2003 invalid.

[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx
● In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are designed to
provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
● Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries: (i) whether the
rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is reasonable; and
(iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its
judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of
administrative judgment, has committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to
judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into
the correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and
substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule.

● When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to
those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.20
● Likewise, in Tañada v. Tuvera,21 we held:

● The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

● Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa – and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records – no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees.
Victorias Milling Co. Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627

Facts:
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22, effective November 1,
1958. This circular required employers to include all bonuses, overtime pay, and the cash value of
other forms of remuneration in the computation of employee premiums for the Social Security
System, with a cap of P500 per month.

Petitioner, Victorias Milling Company, protested this circular, arguing it contradicted a prior circular
(Circular No. 7, October 7, 1957) which excluded bonuses and overtime pay from the computation.
They challenged the validity of Circular No. 22 on the grounds that it lacked the President’s approval
and publication in the Official Gazette, and disputed its authority.

The Social Security Commission responded that Circular No. 22 was merely an interpretation of the
amended statute, not a new rule or regulation requiring presidential approval or Official Gazette
publication. Unsatisfied, Victorias Milling Company appealed to the Court.

Issue: Whether Circular No. 22 of the Social Security Commission constitutes a rule or regulation that
requires the President's approval and publication in the Official Gazette, or whether it is merely an
administrative interpretation of the law.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Circular No. 22 was an administrative interpretation rather
than a rule or regulation requiring presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette.

Same; Interpretation of terms or words; Rule when a term or word is specifically

defined in a statute.—While the rule is that terms or words are to be interpreted in
accordance with their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term
or word is specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be
adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular
phrase or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for
some other purpose.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION: BASIS, EXTENT, LIMITATIONS

Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)

Facts:
Background: Justice Pastor M. Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo contested the collection of
income tax on their salaries as judicial officers for the years 1950 and 1951. They sought a refund
of taxes collected, arguing that taxing their salaries constituted a diminution of their
compensation, which they claimed was prohibited by the Constitution.

Legal Provisions: Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 9): Judges' salaries shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office.

Republic Act No. 590, Section 13: Declares that no salary received by any public officer,
including judicial officers, is exempt from income tax, and payment of such tax is not considered a
diminution of compensation.

Lower Court Decision: The Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that Section 13 of Republic Act No.
590 was unconstitutional. It ordered the refund of taxes collected from the salaries of Justice
Endencia and Justice Jugo.

Issues:
1. Whether Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590, which allows income tax on judicial salaries and
declares such taxation not to be a diminution of compensation, is unconstitutional.
2. Whether the collection of income tax on judicial salaries is a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against diminishing judicial compensation.

Ruling:
Statutory Construction and Separation of Powers: The Court reaffirmed its ruling in Perfecto
v. Meer that taxation of judicial salaries is a diminution of such salaries, which violates the
Constitution.
The Court found that Section 13 of Republic Act No. 590, enacted to counteract the Perfecto
ruling, was an invalid attempt by the Legislature to override judicial interpretation of the
Constitution. The Legislature cannot

1.ConstitutionalLaw; Taxation; Interpretation of Laws, a Judicial FUnction.—The Legislature cannot

lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial
officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.
"Defining and interpreting the law isa judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or
restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution."(Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44 N.W.,
2nd, 341, 342; see also 11Am. Jur., 714-715 and 905.) The act of interpreting the Constitution or any
part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and
jurisdiction of the Judiciary,

2.Id.; Separation of Powers—Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative

departmentis assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with
the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the
laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or
not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent
portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Marcos v. Manglapus
GR 88211, 177 SCRA 669 [Sept 15, 1989]

Facts. Only about 3 years after Pres. Aquino replaced Marcos, the latter, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But Pres. Aquino, considering the dire
consequences of his return to the nation at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar his and his family’s return. The Marcoses now seek to enjoin the
implementation of the Pres. Aquino’s decision, invoking their constitutionally guaranteed liberty of
abode and right to travel.

Issue. Is the President granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines?

Held.
Yes. It would not be accurate to state that “executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Although the Constitution
imposes limitations of the exercise of specific powers126 of the President, it maintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.
Executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. More particularly, this case
calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. The President is also tasked
with xxx ensuring domestic tranquility xxx. The demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines xxx must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing
in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. There exists factual basis for the President’s
decision. The Court cannot xxx pretend the country is not besieged from within xxx. xxx the catalytic
effect of the return of the Marcoses xxx may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break
the camel’s back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and
capriciously xxx in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return. The Court voted 8-7.

Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of executive power means a grant of all
executive powers.—The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three
great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], “the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.” [At 157]. Thus, the 1987constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines” [Art. VI,Sec. 1], “[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines” [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and “[t]he judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1].
These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to
limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil.
626,(1910)] pointed out “a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a
grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government.” [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial
power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is
vested in one official—the President.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION – REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., et al., Petitioners, -versus- ANTITERRORISM

COUNCIL, et al., Respondents
G.R. No. 178552, EN BANC, October 05, 2010, J. Carpio-Morales

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It
is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid. Statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant. Thus,
absent an actual or imminent charge against the petitioner, a vagueness analysis of the assailed
statute is legally impermissible. In this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with
violation of the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.

FACTS: Petitioners herein challenge the constitutionality of the Human Security Act of 2007. They
assailed the said law for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime
of terrorism under the said law in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Respondents,
through the OSG, countered that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no
application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA
9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

ISSUE:
Whether the vagueness doctrine is an applicable ground to assail a penal statute.

RULING:
Yes, but only in an as-applied challenge. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution because it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid. In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated only “as applied” to a particular defendant. This means that in determining the
constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. Absent an actual or
imminent charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed statute is legally
impermissible. Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have not been charged with violation of
the assailed law, the vagueness doctrine is not applicable.

MEMORIZE!!!
Judicial Review; Requisites.—In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz.:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota (cause) of the case.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Facial Challenges; Criminal Law; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of
vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane; A statute or act
suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application; The overbreadth
doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject
to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms.—The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking
relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge
against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation
(under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights). To be sure, the
doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute
or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As
distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL
RUIZ BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C.
BOLASTIG, Petitioners, -versus- GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-
CHIEF, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 171396, EN BANC, May 03, 2006, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."

President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not
written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17,
Article XII, a provision on the State's extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility
and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not
written, as in the case of Sanlakas. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-
out power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Moot and Academic Questions; The “moot and academic” principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case; Courts will
decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.—A
moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally,
courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss

it on ground of mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not
render the present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP1017 was
operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are
PP1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are
the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that “an
unconstitutional act is not a law,

it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation,

inoperative.” The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case.

MEMORIZE!!!
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION – EFFECT OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 95832, August 10, 1992

• Background: Peralta was appointed as a Trade-Specialist II at the Department of Trade and

Industry (DTI) on September 25, 1989. His appointment was marked as "Reinstatement/Permanent."
Prior to this, he worked at the Philippine Cotton Corporation, a government-owned corporation
under the Department of Agriculture.
• Issue: On December 8, 1989, Peralta received his salary for the period from September 25 to
October 31, 1989. DTI deducted his salary for his absences on September 29 and October 20, which
included weekends and a holiday.
• Petitioner's Claim: Peralta questioned the legality of deducting salary for Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays if he had no leave credits, arguing that such deductions were not supported
by any specific statutory provisions and constituted deprivation of property without due process.

Issue:
Is the Civil Service Commission's policy of deducting salary for intervening non-working days
(Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) if an employee was absent without pay on the immediately
preceding working day valid?

Ruling:
**1. Statutory and Administrative Framework:
• The CSC policy in question was based on a 1965 memorandum which stated that if an
employee was on leave without pay on a Friday or a day before a holiday, the subsequent Saturday,
Sunday, or holiday would also be considered as leave without pay.
• This policy was reiterated in the Handbook of Information on the Philippine Civil Service and
was further discussed in the Primer on the Civil Service.
**2. Court’s Analysis:
• Legislative Intent: The Court examined the legislative intent behind the Civil Service Act of
1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the subsequent amendment R.A. No. 2625, which granted leave with full
pay excluding non-working days. The law aimed to exclude when employees were not required to
work.

• Administrative Interpretation: While administrative agencies like the CSC can issue rules
and interpretations, such interpretations must align with the legislative intent. The Court found that
the CSC’s policy contravened the purpose of R.A. No. 2625, which did not distinguish between
employees with and without leave credits.
•
**3. Judicial Ruling:
• The Court ruled that the CSC’s policy of deducting salary for non-working days following
absences without pay was inconsistent with the legislative intent of R.A. No. 2625. The law intended
to protect employees from unfair deductions for non-working days and did not create distinctions
based on the availability of leave credits.
• Validity of Policy: The policy adopted by the CSC was declared invalid. The Court
emphasized that such a policy, if applied, would lead to unjust outcomes and was inconsistent with
the spirit of the statute.

**4. Implications and Relief:

• Restitution: The Court directed that Peralta be reimbursed for the salary deductions
unlawfully made based on the invalid policy.
• Future Cases: The Court recognized the potential financial burden of retrospective
application but mandated that deductions made after April 26, 1991, in contravention of the new
CSC policy should be restored.

**5. Conclusion:
• The petition was granted. The CSC Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797 were declared null
and void. The CSC was directed to ensure that Peralta and similarly affected employees were
compensated for the unlawful salary deductions.

Key Takeaways:
• Statutory interpretation must align with the legislative intent and the overall purpose of the
law.
• Administrative rules must not conflict with legislative mandates and should be interpreted
to avoid unjust outcomes.
• Effective and equitable remedies should be provided for the enforcement of valid legal
rights.
• The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation
as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, G.R. No. 187485, 8 October
2013
Key Facts:
San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque) argues that the Supreme Court's ruling from February
12, 2013, should be applied prospectively only due to the reliance on past administrative practices.
Taganito Mining Corporation (Taganito) contends that its tax refund claim was improperly rejected
due to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which was issued by a Deputy Commissioner and not by the CIR.
Philex Mining Corporation (Philex Mining) is indirectly affected by these issues as it deals with
similar tax refund claims and procedural matters.
Issues:
1. Application of the Doctrine of Operative Fact: Should the doctrine be applied to mitigate
the impact of the Court's decision on taxpayers who relied on previous administrative practices or
rulings?
2. Authority of the CIR and Delegation of Power: Was BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 valid despite
being issued by a Deputy Commissioner?

Ruling:
1. Doctrine of Operative Fact: The Supreme Court reiterates that the doctrine of operative fact
allows for the recognition of the effects of a void law or administrative act that occurred before its
invalidation. This doctrine is invoked to ensure fairness when the public has relied in good faith on
an administrative act or ruling. However, the Court clarifies that the doctrine applies only when
there is an invalidated rule or ruling. In this case, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was a formal ruling that
allowed simultaneous filing of claims, but it was eventually overturned. Thus, the doctrine of
operative fact was applied to recognize the validity of claims processed under the Ruling between its
issuance and its reversal.
2. Statutory Construction: The Court emphasizes that statutory provisions regarding tax
refunds are clear and mandatory. Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) specifies
a 120+30 day period for filing claims and appeals. Taxpayers must adhere strictly to these deadlines.
San Roque’s claim was rejected because it did not comply with these mandatory periods.
3. Authority to Issue Rulings: The Court upholds the validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03
despite it being issued by a Deputy Commissioner. Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code grants the CIR the
power to interpret tax laws, but Section 7 allows for delegation of this power. Thus, a ruling by a
Deputy Commissioner can be valid if the delegation is within the bounds of statutory authority.

Conclusion:
• San Roque’s Motion for Reconsideration: Denied. The Supreme Court held that San
Roque's claim for refund was improperly filed due to non-compliance with the mandatory 120+30
day periods. The doctrine of operative fact applied only to the period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-
03 was in effect.
• Taganito’s Claim: Upheld. The validity of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was affirmed despite
being issued by a Deputy Commissioner, aligning with the delegation provisions in the Tax Code.
• Philex Mining’s Position: Not directly addressed but implicated in similar tax refund and
procedural issues.

Significance: This decision underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory deadlines in
tax refund claims and clarifies the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact. It also reinforces
the validity of administrative rulings issued within delegated authority, even if issued by officials
other than the CIR.

Taxation; Tax Refund; Tax Credit; Waiting Period; It is indisputable that compliance with the 120-day
waiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at60 days only,
was part of the provisions of the first Value-Added Tax(VAT) law, Executive Order No. 273, which
took effect on 1 January1988. The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective 1January 1998
under RA 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997.—Clearly, San Roque failed to comply with the 120-day
waiting period, the time expressly given by law to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or
deny San Roque’s application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance with the
120-daywaiting period is mandatory and jurisdictional. The waiting period, originally fixed at 60
days only, was part of the provisions of the first VAT law, Executive Order No. 273, which took effect
on 1January 1988. The waiting period was extended to 120 days effective1 January 1998 under RA
8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997.Thus, the waiting period has been in our statute books for
more than fifteen (15) years before San Roque filed its judicial claim. Failure to comply with the
120-day waiting period violates a mandatory provision of law. It violates the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and renders the petition premature and thus without a cause of action,
with the effect that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over the taxpayer’s petition. Philippine
jurisprudence is replete with cases upholding and reiterating these doctrinal principles.