The Anti-Money Laundering Act was passed "to protect and preserve the integrity and

confidentiality of bank accounts and to ensure that the Philippines shall not be used as a money
laundering site for the proceeds of any unlawful activity."59

Section 7 of the law creates the Anti-Money Laundering Council, which is mandated "to require
and receive covered transaction reports from covered institutions[,]" as well as "to issue
orders ... to determine the true identity of the owner of any monetary instrument or property
subject of a covered transaction report ... on the basis of substantial evidence, ... involving, or
related to, directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the proceeds of an unlawful
activity[.]"60

A covered transaction refers to "a single, series, or combination of transactions involving a total
amount in excess of [P4,000,000.00 or an equivalent amount in foreign currency" which has no
credible purpose, origin, or underlying trade obligation or contract.61

Covered transactions also include: (1) transactions in cash or other equivalent monetary
instrument exceeding P500,000.00; (2) transaction with or involving jewelry or precious stone
dealers in cash or other equivalent monetary instrument exceeding P1,000,000.00; and (3)
casino cash transaction exceeding P5,000,000.00 or its equivalent are also deemed covered
transactions.62

On the other hand, suspicious transactions are transactions with covered institutions, regardless
of the amounts involved, where any of the following circumstances exists:

1. there is no underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose or economic justification;

2. the client is not properly identified;

3. the amount involved is not commensurate with the business or financial capacity of the
client;

4. taking into account all known circumstances, it may be perceived that the client's transaction
is structured in order to avoid being the subject of reporting requirements under the Act;

5. any circumstance relating to the transaction which is observed to deviate from the profile of
the client and/or the client's past transactions with the covered institution;

6. the transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act that is
about to be, is being or has been committed; or

7. any transaction that is similar or analogous to any of the foregoing.63

### Title: Republic of the Philippines vs. The Sandiganbayan and Office of the Ombudsman
Facts:
The case revolves around a subpoena directed at the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)
by the Sandiganbayan, requesting the disclosure of bank records related to a criminal case,
*People v. P/Dir. General Jesus Versoza*, in which former First Gentleman Jose Miguel T.
Arroyo was charged with plunder due to the anomalous purchase of helicopters by the
Philippine National Police from Lionair, Inc. Lionair’s president testified that Arroyo was the
real owner of the helicopters. The AMLC moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that the
requested information was confidential under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (RA 9160).
However, the Sandiganbayan denied this motion and its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, leading the AMLC to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
### Issues:
1. Whether the AMLC, being a non-covered institution under the Anti-Money Laundering Act,
is prohibited by law to disclose confidential bank records.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the AMLC’s
Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration.
3. Whether the required information was adequately described in the subpoena for the
disclosures to be compelled.
4. Whether Lionair’s written permission allows the disclosure of its transaction reports.
### Court’s Decision:
The Supreme Court dismissed the AMLC’s petition for certiorari, affirming the
Sandiganbayan’s resoluions. The Court clarified that the AMLC, not being a covered
institution under RA 9160, is not prohibited from disclosing covered or suspicious transaction
reports. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s subpoena satisfied the
requirements of definiteness, and Lionair, Inc.’s written permission sufficed for the disclosure
of its transaction reports.
### Doctrine:
The Anti-Money Laundering Council, not being a covered institution under the Anti-Money
Laundering Act, is not prohibited from disclosing covered or suspicious transaction reports.
Moreover, a subpoena duces tecum requesting such disclosures satisfies the requirements of
definiteness if it reasonably describes the documents demanded, and the account owner’s
written permission allows for such disclosure, exempting the case from the bank secrecy
G.R. Nos. 232724-27. February 15, 2021 (Case Brief / Digest)

Facts: Lingad v. People of the Philippines GR No. 224945, October 11, 2022
Background of Employment and Access
 Petitioner Girlie J. Lingad was employed at the Olongapo City Branch of United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) from January 1, 1994 until April 19, 2004.
 She held positions as a marketing associate and branch marketing officer trainee,
which provided her with access to sensitive bank systems including a dedicated
User ID ("oloma01") and Teller ID (2840).
Anomalous Transactions and Initial Discovery
 Prior to her departure, Lingad processed four anomalous transactions involving
unauthorized account terminations and fund withdrawals from clients’ accounts.
 The transactions included pretermination of money market placements and
unauthorized withdrawals that subsequently were used to credit funds into
fictitious client accounts and to fund maturing placements.
 The Anti-Money Laundering Council’s fact-finding investigation, prompted by
UCPB, discovered these irregularities soon after Lingad went on unauthorized
leave and eventually left for the United States.
Specific Details of the Transactions
 The first anomalous transaction involved a money market placement belonging
to William Chieng and pretermination of accounts under the name of Vittsi G.
Tanjuakio with manager’s check endorsements showing discrepancies such as
missing payment slips and unexplained credits.
 Subsequent anomalous transactions continued to exhibit unauthorized
withdrawals, preterminations, and fund transfers using Lingad’s Teller and User
IDs—including transactions on November 4, 2002; April 9, 2003; and multiple
transactions in August and December 2003.
 Detailed amounts were recorded, involving sums ranging from a few million
pesos to a total overall damage to UCPB of over Php22 million, while the alleged
proceeds from qualifying theft reached approximately Php83 million.
Filing of Charges and Trial Proceedings
 An Information was filed on October 5, 2006 charging Lingad with violation of
Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering Act), with
allegations citing qualified theft as the predicate unlawful activity.
 Upon extradition from the United States, Lingad entered her plea of not guilty.
 Trial proceedings ensued wherein the prosecution presented documentary
evidence (manager’s checks, computer transaction logs marked with her IDs,
withdrawal records, etc.) and witness testimonies that indicated her involvement
in the unauthorized transactions.
Evidence and Prosecution’s Case
 Documents and digital records unequivocally linked the anomalous transactions
to Lingad’s unique Teller and User IDs, thereby establishing her role in processing
the irregular withdrawals.
 The prosecution contended that through these transactions she converted
proceeds from qualified theft—an offense explicitly linked to the proceeds of an
unlawful activity—into funds that appeared to come from legitimate sources,
thus committing money laundering.
 The evidence included the absence of client payment slips, irregularities in
account terminations, and discrepancies in the issuance of receipts and
manager’s checks.
Defense Claims and Counterarguments
 Lingad claimed she did not recall processing the transactions or that they might
have been executed by an unauthorized person utilizing her credentials.
 She argued that all of her transactions were subject to supervision and approval
by bank officers, and that her limited authority and the requirement for co-
signatures under normal procedures should exonerate her.
 Additionally, her defense pointed to the absence of any internal audit findings or
infractions against her prior to her unauthorized leave, suggesting she was
potentially being used as a scapegoat.
Lower Court Decisions and Sentencing
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found overwhelming evidence of Lingad’s
involvement, convicting her for money laundering based on her processing of the
anomalous transactions.
 On August 8, 2013, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict, and later, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed this decision in decisions rendered on December 11, 2015,
and subsequent resolutions on June 2, 2016.
  The sentencing imposed was indeterminate imprisonment (seven to thirteen
years), a fine of Php34,099,195.85, and other accessory penalties, with orders
noting that she had served the maximum penalty and was due for release unless
detained on other grounds.
Clarification of Legal Framework and Subsequent Orders
 The appellate rulings reiterated that the money laundering offense, as defined
under Section 4(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, did not require proof of
the perpetrator’s direct participation in the predicate crime (qualified theft), but
only that the proceeds from such crime had been transacted.
 The legal debates centered on the independent prosecution of the money
laundering offense vis-à-vis the underlying unlawful activity, a point underscored
by both statutory amendments and international best practices.
 Ultimately, the en banc decision denied Lingad’s petition for review on certiorari,
affirming her conviction and order of release given the completion of her
maximum sentence.
Issue:
Sufficiency of Evidence
 Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Lingad
processed the anomalous transactions using her personal credentials.
 Whether the documentary evidence (manager’s checks, digital logs, and absence
of client signatures) conclusively linked the transactions to her.
Element of Unlawful Activity
 Whether it was established that the proceeds transacted derived from an
unlawful activity, specifically qualified theft, as required under the AMLA.
 Whether the prosecution needed to prove all elements of the predicate crime
beyond a reasonable doubt or only the unlawfulness of the proceeds.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2015 Decision and June 2, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36600 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Girlie J.
Lingad is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 9194. She is correctly
sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years as minimum to
thirteen (13) years as maximum, to pay a fine of P34,099,195.85, to suffer all the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs.
Facts:
Background and Initiation of the Incident
 In February 2016, news emerged regarding the hacking of Bangladesh Bank’s
account at the New York Fed.
 US$81,000,000.00 was unlawfully transferred within the Philippine banking
system as a result of unauthorized SWIFT payment instructions.
 Bangladesh Bank Governor Atiur Rahman formally sought assistance from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Governor Amando M. Tetangco, Jr., alleging that
fraudulent transactions benefitted Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC).
Discovery and Flow of Funds
 An Incident Report disclosed that four beneficiaries, with designated amounts,
received the fraudulent transfers from RCBC.
 Subsequent investigations revealed that the funds from the RCBC accounts were
consolidated into an account of a certain William So Go and later transferred to
PhilRem Service Corporation (PhilRem).
 Under instructions from Go, PhilRem distributed the proceeds:
 US$29,000,000.00 was credited to Bloomberry Resorts and Hotels, Inc.’s (BRHI)
BDO account (Account No. 6280225150).
 Additional transfers were made to other entities, though the focus remained on
the BRHI account related to the alleged illicit fund flow.
Legal and Procedural Actions Initiated by the AMLC
 Based on probable cause, the AMLC, representing the Republic of the
Philippines, initiated proceedings by filing a verified ex parte petition.
 The petition sought the issuance of a freeze order on BRHI’s subject account,
pursuant to provisions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) and related
amendments.
 The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a freeze order on March 15, 2016, effective for
30 days, after determining that there existed a prima facie ground to suspect the
account was connected to unlawful activities.
Subsequent Motions and Developments
 On March 17, 2016, the AMLC secured a favorable CA Resolution for a bank
inquiry to gather additional information on transactions involving the subject
account.
  The Senate Committee on Accountability’s findings corroborated the tracing of
P1,365,000,000.00 (equivalent to US$29,000,000.00) to funds sourced from the
hacked Bangladesh Bank account.
 BRHI defended itself by contending that:
 The subject account was used regularly for casino operations, handling large
deposits for junket operators and premium customers at Solaire Resort and
Casino.
 There was no predisposition to suspect the funds as illicit at the time of deposit,
as the money was used as front money to purchase non-negotiable chips in the
normal course of business.
 Subsequent to these events, BRHI filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Freeze Order,
while the AMLC filed an Urgent Motion for an Additional Period of Freeze Order.
CA Resolution and Controversial Findings
 On April 15, 2016, the CA issued a Resolution granting BRHI’s motion to lift the
freeze order, directing BDO to unfreeze the subject account.
 The CA’s decision emphasized that:
 The AMLC failed to conclusively demonstrate that the funds in the account were
procured through unlawful activities.
 The funds were already integrated into BRHI’s corporate operations, having been
converted into non-negotiable chips and used in normal casino transactions.
 The AMLC, aggrieved by the CA Resolution, subsequently filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, seeking either a Temporary Restraining Order or a Status
Quo Ante Order.
 Additional submissions were filed by all parties, including representations from
BDO and further briefing by the AMLC, which reiterated that the trail of funds
unmistakably linked to the hacked Bangladesh Bank transactions.
Issue:
 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in lifting the freeze order earlier issued against
BRHI’s BDO account.
 Whether the alleged chain of fund transfers and commingling sufficiently established
that the subject account was involved in proceeds derived from an unlawful activity
under AMLA.
Ruling:
a Freeze Order may not be issued indefinitely, lest the same be characterized as a violation of
the person's right to due process and to be presumed innocent of a charge. In this case, the
Freeze Order was issued by the CA on March 15, 2016. Even assuming that the CA erred in
failing to issue an extension of the Freeze Order, nevertheless, a period of more than six months
has already elapsed. If we grant the petition now, it has been more than four years from the
issuance of the Freeze Order.
We cannot order the re-freezing of the subject account for to do so would be to put BRHI in an
unfair situation where its bank account is being frozen for a transaction that has happened four
years ago and where it was not yet proven that it indeed participated in money laundering
activities.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court dated May 19, 2016 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

The remedies of freeze order and order of bank inquiry are extraordinary, issued only upon a
finding of probable cause that the accounts sought to be frozen or inquired into are related to
any of the predicate crimes under the Anti-Money Laundering Act. The burden of proving
probable cause always rests with the Anti-Money Laundering Council, never with the account
owners.

Facts: Republic of the Philippines v. Ongpin, GR No. 207078, June 20, 2022
Background and Statutory Framework
 The case arises under the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) and its several
amendments, which provide the remedies of freeze orders and bank inquiry
orders to preserve funds allegedly derived from unlawful activities.
 Section 10 of the AMLA, as amended over time (notably by R.A. No. 10167,
10365, and 10927), empowers the Court of Appeals to issue ex parte freeze
orders for an initial period of 20 days—with possible extension up to six months
—upon a showing of probable cause that a deposit, monetary instrument, or
property is linked to a predicate offense.
Transactions and Alleged Irregularities
 The dispute centers on controversial banking and credit transactions involving
several parties.
  Deltaventure Resources, Inc., a stock corporation beneficially owned by Roberto
V. Ongpin, applied for credit lines from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) to finance the purchase of Philex Mining Corporation shares.
 Subsequent loan applications (one for P150,000,000.00 and another for
P510,000,000.00) were secured through collateral such as shares pledged from
related companies (including Goldenmedia Corporation and others).
 The transactions raised issues regarding the adequacy of credit investigations and
whether the loans were approved on a “behest” basis rather than sound
business judgment.
 Allegations emerged that the DBP’s sale of its Philex shares at a negotiable price
resulted in a loss of potential gains and that the proceeds from these
transactions—claimed to be illicit—may have funneled into various bank
accounts.
Initiation of Freeze Order and Banking Proceedings
 The Republic, through the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), filed an ex
parte petition seeking the immediate freezing of 179 bank accounts allegedly
linked to the transactions involving Deltaventure and related companies.
 On December 6, 2012, the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Freeze Order
for a period of 20 days, directing several major banks to immediately freeze the
subject accounts.
 The AMLC subsequently filed an ex parte application for a bank inquiry to access
detailed records of the frozen accounts and later moved to extend the freeze
order for six months in view of the complex, numerous accounts and ongoing
investigation.
 Respondents—including Roberto V. Ongpin, Josephine A. Manalo, Ma. Lourdes A.
Torres, and various associated corporate entities, as well as former DBP officers—
filed motions to lift the freeze order, arguing that there was no connection
between the allegedly tainted funds and the transactions in question.
 Multiple post-issuance hearings were conducted. While some accounts were
unfrozen during the proceedings, the Freeze Order was ultimately extended and
only one account (Boerstar Corporation’s Bank of Commerce Account No.
900000028241) was determined by the Court of Appeals to be probably
connected to an unlawful activity.
Procedural Posture and Contested Arguments
 The respondent parties contended that the AMLC failed to establish a direct link
between most of the frozen accounts and the predicate crimes, noting that many
of the accounts had minimal balances, were closed, or exhibited transactions
that did not exceed thresholds indicating suspicious activity.
  Disputes also arose regarding:
 Whether extending the freeze order beyond the original 20-day period effectively
denied the individual motions to lift the order.
 Whether the proceedings for the freeze order and the bank inquiry should be
heard jointly or separately.
 The allocation of the burden of evidence between the AMLC (to establish
probable cause) and the account holders (to show funds are derived from
legitimate sources).
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals initially issued a freeze order but later lifted it for most accounts except
one. The Supreme Court denied the AMLC's petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision
to lift the freeze order on most accounts.

Facts: Republic of the Philippines v. Bolante, GR No. 186717, 17 April 2017

Background and Parties
 Two separate petitions were filed on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC).
 G.R. No. 186717 is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, with an
urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.
 G.R. No. 190357 is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) resolution and order denying an inquiry into the accounts.
 Respondents include various individuals (e.g., Jocelyn I. Bolante, Samuel S.
Bombeo, Ariel C. Panganiban, among others) and corporate entities (e.g.,
MOLUGAN FOUNDATION, NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
etc.).
The Fertilizer Fund Scam Context
 Suspicious Transaction Reports
 In April 2005, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted reports to the AMLC
regarding suspicious transactions involving accounts of LIVECOR, Molugan
Foundation, and Assembly of Gracious Samaritans (AGS).
 Over a period, significant sums were transferred between these entities (e.g., a
total of P172.6 million from LIVECOR to Molugan over 15 months and
simultaneous transfers involving AGS), raising red flags due to lack of trade or
economic justification and the small capital of the foundations involved.
  Involvement of Key Individuals
 Samuel S. Bombeo, as the sole signatory in Molugan’s account, and Ariel
Panganiban, who held a similar role in AGS, were central to the alleged
transactions.
 Former Undersecretary Jocelyn I. Bolante, who was concurrently appointed
Acting Chairman of LIVECOR, was implicated in the misuse of the fertilizer fund.
Senate Inquiry and Evidence Submitted
 Senate Committee Report No. 54 detailed extensive irregularities in the release
of P728 million meant for farm inputs under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani
Program.
 The report highlighted overpricing, procurement violations, and
mismanagement, and linked Bolante’s involvement at high levels to the
irregularities in fund transfers.
 Additional evidence, including an Audit Report by the Commission on Audit
(COA) and testimonies, was presented, though not all evidence was conclusive.
AMLC’s Investigative and Legal Measures
 AMLC Actions and Resolutions
 AMLC issued Resolution No. 75, finding probable cause that the suspicious bank
transactions were connected to the fertilizer fund scam.
 It then authorized the filing of petitions for both bank inquiry and freeze orders,
initially targeting six accounts (AMLC SP Case No. 06-003) and later expanding
the investigation to 70 accounts via Resolution No. 90.
 Judicial Proceedings
 Pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Republic v. Eugenio, which required
notice to account holders before issuing bank inquiry orders, AMLC shifted its
approach to seek a freeze order (Resolution No. 40).
 The Court of Appeals (CA) issued a freeze order in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 and
subsequently extended its effectivity, while also facing a second petition, CA-G.R.
AMLC No. 00024, filed to extend the freeze order.
 RTC Proceedings and Subsequent Motions
 Concurrent with the appellate cases, an ex parte application was filed before the
RTC (AMLC Case No. 07-001) for an order permitting an inquiry into 70 bank
accounts.
  The RTC, after conducting hearings and assessing presented evidence (including
the Senate Report and COA Audit), found no probable cause and denied the
inquiry order.
 The RTC later denied a motion for reconsideration, prompting the filing of G.R.
No. 190357.
Chronology and Interplay of Cases
 AMLC’s petitions evolved with multiple resolutions and freeze orders in response
to emerging evidence—including the matter of forum shopping between the two
CA petitions.
 The filing of petitions in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014 and CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024
raised issues of duplicative litigation over the same set of facts and causes of
action.
 Legislative amendments, notably the further amendment of Section 11 of R.A.
9160 via R.A. 10167, later expanded the AMLC’s authority to seek ex parte bank
inquiry orders under modified due process standards.
Ruling:
AMLC investigated LIVECOR, Molugan, and AGS for suspicious transactions linked to the fertilizer
fund scam. Supreme Court ruled no probable cause for bank inquiry, citing insufficient evidence
and forum shopping by the Republic

Case Summary (G.R. No. 216914)

Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Anti-Money Laundering Act
The petitioners, Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices, challenge the
constitutionality of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
(AMLA), specifically regarding the authority of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) to
file an ex-parte application for inquiry into bank deposits without notifying the affected parties.
The context of this challenge arises from investigations into the alleged disproportionate wealth
of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and his family, which led to inquiries into their bank
accounts.
 Petitioners argue that the AMLA violates due process and privacy rights.
 The inquiry into bank accounts was initiated without notice to the law firm, raising
concerns about constitutional protections.
Background of the Inquiry
In 2015, media reports highlighted the alleged wealth of Vice President Binay, prompting
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate. The AMLC sought to examine
the bank accounts of Binay and his family, including those of the law firm associated with them.
The law firm, upon learning of the inquiry through media, requested confirmation from the
Court of Appeals regarding the existence of any petitions filed by the AMLC.
 The law firm expressed concern over media reports regarding the inquiry into their
accounts.
 They sought clarification from the Court of Appeals but were denied information due to
confidentiality rules.
Court of Appeals' Response
The Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals responded to the law firm’s inquiry, stating that
the nature of the petition was confidential and that the court was prohibited from disclosing
any information regarding the application. This response highlighted the strict confidentiality
surrounding the AMLC's inquiries.
 The Court of Appeals emphasized the confidentiality of the inquiry process.
 The law firm was informed that even court staff were unaware of the specific accounts
involved.
Subsequent Developments and Legal Action
Following the Court of Appeals' order granting the AMLC's application to examine the bank
accounts, the law firm filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the AMLA's
provisions were unconstitutional. They contended that the law allowed for examinations
without notice, violating due process and privacy rights.
 The law firm claimed a lack of adequate legal remedies to protect their rights.
 They raised multiple grounds for their petition, including violations of due process and
attorney-client privilege.
Arguments from the AMLC
In response, the AMLC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the
inquiry process was constitutional and did not violate due process or privacy rights. They
asserted that the ex-parte application was investigative rather than adjudicative and that the
law included safeguards to protect the rights of individuals.
 The AMLC maintained that the inquiry was based on probable cause.
 They argued that the law provided necessary limitations and safeguards for the inquiry
process.
Court's Analysis of Due Process
The court examined the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA, focusing on the due
process implications of ex-parte inquiries. The court noted that due process encompasses both
substantive and procedural aspects, requiring a balance between individual rights and the
state's interest in investigating unlawful activities.
  The court recognized the importance of probable cause in issuing bank inquiry orders.
 It emphasized that the inquiry does not involve physical seizure of property, thus not
constituting a violation of substantive due process.

Ruling:
A law firm challenges the constitutionality of Section 11 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act,
alleging violations of due process, privacy, and attorney-client privilege, but the Supreme Court
upholds the provision, ruling it necessary for effective anti-money laundering investigations.
The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for examination of Vice President
Jejomar Binay's bank accounts.