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Seeing and Saying
ii

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Seeing and Saying

T H E L A N G U A G E O F P E R C E P T I O N A N D T H E R E P R E S E N TAT I O N A L

VIEW OF EXPERIENCE

Berit Brogaard

1
iv

1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Brogaard, Berit, author.
Title: Seeing and saying : the language of perception and the representational
view of experience / Berit Brogaard.
Other titles: Seeing and saying
Description: New York City : Oxford University Press, 2018. |
Series: Philosophy of mind series
Identifiers: LCCN 2017051735 (print) | LCCN 2018002209 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190495268 (updf ) | ISBN 9780190495275 (online content) |
ISBN 9780190880187 (epub) | ISBN 9780190495251 (hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Perception (Philosophy) | Visual perception. | Phenomenology. |
Experience. | Representation. | Language and languages—Philosophy.
Classification: LCC B828.45 (ebook) | LCC B828.45 .B76 2018 (print) | DDC 121/.34—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017051735

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Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America
This book is dedicated to my beloved, kind-hearted, exceedingly intelligent and beautiful
daughter Rebecca. Without you I would be no one.
vi
Contents

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction 1

1. The Semantics of ‘Appear’ Words 11

Epistemic versus Phenomenal Uses of ‘Seem’ 12
‘Seem’ as a Subject-Raising Verb 27
Why the Semantics of ‘Seem’ Does Not Lend Support to Adverbialism 32
‘Seem’ as a Contextually Flexible Expression 36
Semantic and Logical Properties of ‘Seem’ 38
‘Look’ as a Subject-Raising Verb 42
Objections to the Phenomenal Use of ‘Look’ 45
Signpost 46

2. Looks and Seemings 47

Martin on Phenomenal Looks 47
Epistemic versus Phenomenal Seemings 51
Phenomenal Looks and Seemings Are Representational 56
Phenomenal Seeming versus Visual Experience? 60
Signpost 77

3. The Representational View of Experience 78

Visual Experience Is Representational 78
Illusions 85
Visual Experience Is Fundamentally Representational 87
Signpost 93

vii
viii

viii Contents
4. Arguments Against the Representational View 95
The Generality Problem 96
Johnston’s Illusions 102
Pink Glows 106
Travis’s Argument Against the Representational View 109
Dual Looks 113
Cognitive Penetration 117
Perceptual Principles 120
Signpost 121

5. Other Arguments from ‘Look’ 123

Chisholm’s Argument for the Theory of Appearing 123
Jackson’s Argument for the Sense-Datum Theory 126
Siegel’s Argument for the Weak Content View 128
Schellenberg’s Argument for the Representational View 130
Glüer’s New Theory of Appearing 133
Signpost 134

6. Seeing Things 135

The Semantics of ‘See’ 136
Visuo-Epistemic Uses of ‘See’ 140
‘See’ as an Intensional Transitive 142
The Puzzle of Objectual Seeing 146
Functional Features of Seeing 147
Signpost 149

7. Beyond Seeing 151

‘Sound’ 151
‘Smell’ and ‘Taste’ 157
‘Feel’ 159
Hearing Things 175
Signpost 179

Conclusion 180

Bibliography 185
Index 201
Acknowledgments

Over the years many people have contributed in one way or another to the life of
this book. For personal enrichment, I am grateful to my lovely and beautiful daugh-
ter Rebecca, the rest of my Danish family, and close friends. For emotional support,
I am also indebted to my two cats, Bertrand Russell and Roderick Chisholm, as well
as my dog, William James (a.k.a. Nemo). For theoretical input, I am grateful to two
anonymous reviewers for Oxford University Press, as well as Murat Aydede, Brendan
Balcerak Jackson, Magdalena Balcerak Jackson, Katalin Balog, Sarah Beach, John
Bengson, Sven Bernecker, David Bourget, Bill Brewer, Alessandra Buccella, Otávio
Bueno, Alex Byrne, Herman Cappelen, David J. Chalmers, Sin yee Chan, Bartek
Chomanski, Elijah Chudnoff, Jonathan Cohen, Christian Coseru, Terence Cuneo,
Louis deRosset, Fabian Dorsch, Kenny Easwaran, Simon Evnine, Ed Erwin, Nathaly
Garcia, Dimitria E. Gatzia, Jared Hanson-Park, John Hawthorne, Benj Hellie,
David Hilbert, Risto Hilpinen, Adam Hosein, Michael Huemer, Jonathan Jenkins
Ichikawa, Bob Kentridge, Dan Kervick, Amy Kind, Mark Lance, Casey Landers,
Peter Lasersohn, Janet Levin, Hannes Leitgeb, Don Loeb, Azenet Lopez, Peter
Lewis, Peter Ludlow, Fiona Macpherson, Pete Mandik, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Mike
Martin, Kevin McCain, Angela Mendelovici, Chris Mole, Mark Moyer, Anders Nes,
Alastair Norcross, David Papineau, Josh Parsons, Robert Pasnau, Gualtiero Piccinini,
Lewis Powell, Jim Pryor, Brian Rabern, Madelaine Ransom, Amber Ross, David
M. Rosenthal, Susanna Schellenberg, Susan Schneider, Bennett Schwartz, Stewart
Shapiro, Ori Simchen, Harvey Siegel, Susanna Siegel, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
Michael Slote, Nick Stang, Jim Stone, Amie Thomasson, Michael Tooley, Chris
Tucker, Michael Tye, Adam Wager, Sebastian Watzl, Ralph Wedgwood, Matt Weiner,

ix
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x

x Acknowledgments
Josh Weisberg, Alan White, Eric Wiland, Kenneth Williford, and Wayne Wu,
in addition to audiences at Brown University, Carnegie Mellon University,
Columbia University, Duke University, Keio University-Tokyo, Munich Center
for Mathematical Philosophy, New York University, Southern Danish University,
Stanford University, Texas Christian University, University of British Columbia,
University of Colorado-Boulder, University of Copenhagen, University of Miami,
University of Missouri-Columbia, University of Missouri-St. Louis, University
of Oslo, University of Southern California, University of Syracuse; University of
Texas-Austin, University of Vermont, and Washington University-St. Louis. Special
thanks go to my wonderful editors Peter Ohlin and David Chalmers for their
patience, super-helpful feedback, and critical comments on the manuscript. I am
forever grateful and indebted to my (now deceased) uncle Jørgen Dalberg-Larsen,
my Ph.D. supervisor Barry Smith, and my postdoc supervisor David Chalmers for
inspiring me to follow in their footsteps as philosophers and for the many hours
we have spent talking about philosophical issues. I am a better person and thinker
because of them.
Parts of the material contained herein have appeared previously as:

B. Brogaard, “Vision for Action and the Contents of Perception,” Journal of Philosophy 109, no. 10
(October 2012): 569–587.
B. Brogaard, “What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel,” Philosophers Imprint 12,
no. 11 ( June 2012).
B. Brogaard, “Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?,” Philosophical Studies 162, no. 1
(2013): 35–42.
B. Brogaard, “Does Perception Have Content?,” in Brogaard, B (ed.), Does Perception Have
Content? (2014): 1–35.
IN T RO D UC T I ON

When I look at the coffee table in front of me, I see a blue coffee mug. Blue on
the outside. White on the inside. It’s large for a mug. And it’s nearly full of freshly
made coffee. It’s a fact that I see all those aspects of the scene in front of me, but it
remains a question of ferocious debate whether the visual experience that makes up
my seeing is a perceptual relation between me and the coffee mug and its attributes,
or a mental state that has a content that represents the mug and its features. If visual
experience involves a “perceptual” relation to an external, mind-independent object,
it is unlike familiar mental states such as belief and desire states, which are widely
considered to be relations to contents, or propositions. Visual experience, on this
view, involves a relation that is not unlike the distance relation that obtains between
my couch and my television. Like the relation between my couch and my television,
the perceptual relation is unmediated by sense-data or contents, and extends some
distance through space. If visual experience is representational, by contrast, it is more
similar in its ontological structure to belief states than to the complex of my couch,
my television, and the distance relation obtaining between them.
This book is an extended defense of the view that visual experience in creatures
like us is fundamentally representational (for other advocates of this view, see,
e.g., Lycan, 1987, 1996; Tye, 1995, 2000; Dretske, 1995; Crane, 2001; Chalmers,
2004a; Byrne, 2009; Siegel, 2010; Bourget, 2010b; Schellenberg, 2014). When

1
2

2 Introduction
I say ‘fundamentally’ I mean that the representational feature of visual experience
is required to explain its phenomenal, functional, or epistemic properties. In non-
deviant cases—that is, cases of accurate perception—visual experience represents
things and features in the perceiver’s environment. In deviant cases—that is, cases
of misperception—visual experience represents things that would have been present
in the perceiver’s environment and features that would have been instantiated if the
perceiver and the environment had both been normal.
In the recent literature on the philosophy of perception there has been a lot of
focus on whether visual experience has content (see, e.g., Siegel, 2010; Brogaard,
2014). This seems to be a fairly new trend. Not so long ago the question would not
even have been considered. Perhaps it would not have seemed intelligible. But things
have changed, and there are now a considerable number of articles, theses, and books
aimed at answering it, positively or negatively. What are the factors responsible for
this topic’s becoming a “live” one? Why is it only now receiving so much attention?1
I believe the answer to this question is largely historical. On the face of it,
traditional debates about perception were typically concerned with a different
question— viz. that of whether we perceive the external world directly or indirectly.
In Perception: A Representative Theory (1977), for example, Frank Jackson argues
that when we see things in the environment, we see them in virtue of perceiving
something else. The things that we perceive without having to perceive something
else are sense-data, which, to a first approximation, are replicas of an external object.
Jackson thought that sense-data are something we literally perceive and the only
things we are directly perceptually aware of.
Though the debate about whether we perceive the external world directly or
by virtue of perceiving something else is orthogonal to the debate about whether
perceptual experience has content, it may be argued that the two debates concern
some of the same issues. As we will see below, particular ways of understanding
perceptual content may, at least at first glance, appear to imply that if perception
has content, then the content is an intermediary between the perceiver and the
external world, and the perceiver experiences the world by being acquainted with
the content. Things are not quite as simple as this, of course. But it does raise the
following question: If the debates about the directness of perception and perceptual
content are intermingled, what has caused the relatively sudden interest in whether
perceptual experience has content?
The notion of perceptual content is not new, of course. In Perception: A
Representative Theory, for example, Jackson (1977: 40) casually refers to perceptual

1
Thanks to the anonymous reader for Oxford University Press reviewing my volume Does Perception Have
Content? for encouraging me to consider these issues and questions.
 Introduction 3
content, but his endeavors are not aimed at answering the question of whether
perception has content. I believe the recent considerable interest in the question
may have been a result of the rise of cognitive science and its focus on the idea of a
representational state of the mind. It seems that the debates in cognitive science have
sparked analogous debates in the philosophy of perception about what it means to
say that perceptual experience has content and whether perceptual experience has
content in the first place.
The interest in the question, of course, also has to do with the different phenomenal,
functional, and epistemic roles that experience is thought to play depending on
whether or not it has content. Many philosophers have argued against the view that
experience has content, on the grounds that such a view cannot adequately address
the skeptical challenge (McDowell, 1982; Millar, 2008) or explain the transparency
of visual experience (Moore, 1903; Jackson, 1977: ch. 1; Shoemaker, 1994; Sturgeon,
2000: 9; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002; Kind, 2003).2
Despite the considerable interest in whether experience has content, the important
debate, however, turns out not to be specifically about content. The reason for this is
that many thinkers agree there is a minimal sense in which experience has content,
regardless of what one’s other commitments are. For example, if the accuracy
conditions of visual experience are treated as the content of the experience in a
minimal sense, then some of the most hardcore opponents of representational views
of perception, such as naïve realists who treat illusions as inaccurate experiences, can
nonetheless still agree that perception has content.
The naïve realist holds that visual experience obtains in virtue of the perceiver
standing in a perceptual relation to an object (Hinton, 1973; Snowdon, 1980–81;
McDowell, 1982,; Putnam, 1999, Martin, 2002; Campbell, 2002; Travis, 2004;
Langsam, 1997; Johnston, 2004; Neta, 2008; Fish, 2009a, b). When the perceiver
does not stand in this sort of relation, because she is hallucinating, the inaccurate
appearance the perceiver is subject to is not a perceptual experience. Some naïve
realists treat illusions as perceptual experiences, albeit experiences that are inaccurate

2
Transparency captures the idea that when we try to introspect, it seems that we look right through the experience
only to find external objects and their properties (Moore, 1903; Jackson, 1977: ch. 1; Shoemaker, 1994; Sturgeon,
2000: 9; Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000, 2002; Kind, 2003). Moore put it succinctly as follows:

The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to
vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue,
all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. (1903: 41, in 1993 reprint).

Moore’s point is that in visual experience it is as if the external scene is simply presented to us. If we try to
access features that are internal to experience, it seems as though we access the external object and its attributes.
Arguments from transparency, if successful, primarily go against views that treat experience as having phenomenal
features that cannot be reduced to features in the perceiver’s external environment.
4

4 Introduction
(e.g., Langsam, 1997; Snowdon, 1980–81; Johnston, 2004; Brewer, 2011), whereas
others treat them as a different kind of mental state (e.g., Martin, 2002).3 Naïve
realists in the second category deny that experience can be meaningfully said to
be accurate or inaccurate. Experience simply does not have accuracy conditions. If
the perceiver does not stand in a perceptual relation to entities in the perceiver’s
environment, or the relation does not track what is out there, then the perceiver does
not truly experience anything but, rather, is in some other mental state. For example,
she might be imagining or believing that her environment is a way that it is not.
Naïve realists in the first category tend to agree with thinkers in the second category
about the perceptual relation:4 if the perceiver does not stand in a perceptual relation
to a mind-independent object, then the perceiver is not undergoing a perceptual
experience. However, the folks in the first category treat cases of illusions as genuine
perceptual experiences, albeit experiences that have gone wrong. These thinkers thus
take experiences to have accuracy conditions.
A popular account of illusions provided by naïve realists in the first category states
that while the perceiver stands in a perceptual relation to a mind-independent object
in the case of illusions, the object is not as it seems to be. It seems to have a property it
doesn’t have (Brewer, 2011:108). On this view, experiences are accurate (or veridical)
just when the perceiver stands in a perceptual relation to an object o, and it is not the
case that o seems to have a property that it does not have.
This version of naïve realism can shed some light on why the question of whether
visual experience has content isn’t the question at the center of debate. If, for example,
we take contents to simply be accuracy conditions, then the naïve realist who treats
illusions as inaccurate perceptual experiences could attribute the following content

3
Disjunctivism is typically construed as the view that good (veridical perception) and bad cases of perception
(hallucinations and sometimes also illusions) have different kinds of entities among their essential constituents.
On Hinton’s way of defining disjunctivism, good and bad cases of perception have no common factor (1967,
1973). This claim, that good and bad cases of perception have no common factor, should not be taken to
mean that good and bad cases can always be distinguished subjectively. Rather, it is probably best treated as
a claim to the effect that good and bad cases are fundamentally different kinds of mental states. For example,
one could hold that in cases of veridical perception, perception is a relation between a subject and a mind-
independent object, whereas hallucinations are sensory experiences with representational content. Or, one
could hold that veridical perception cases are cases of direct acquaintance with a mind-independent object,
whereas hallucination cases are belief-like states. Martin (2002: 404; 2004: 43, 54, 60) defines disjunctivism in
terms of the notion of a fundamental kind. Veridical perception cases and hallucination cases are of different
fundamental kinds. McDowell (1982), Snowdon (1980–1981), and Martin (2006) hold that good and bad cases
of experience are both cases in which it looks to one as if things are a certain way (or something cognate).
Irrespective of the differences, perhaps fundamental, between good and bad cases of experience, they are the
same in this respect.
4
Johnston (2004) rejects disjunctivism and offers a different account of hallucinations. Smith (2002) defends
a naïve realist position that allows for direct acquaintance with an object in both good and bad cases of
 Introduction 5
to a perceiver S’s perceptual experience of o: it is not the case that o seems to have a
property it does not have. Whether the experience is accurate or not, the perceiver
stands in a perceptual relation to a mind-independent object. If, however, this con-
tent is true, the experience is accurate. If it is false, then the external object has a
property it does not have, and the experience is inaccurate. But this kind of content
clearly is rather insignificant. It does not entail that experience is representational,
let alone fundamentally representational (Brewer, 2011). This, of course, is as it
should be, as the naïve realist holds that perceptual experience consists in being
perceptually related to a mind-independent object, not in being perceptually related
to a content.
There are other ways in which experiences can be said to have content in a minimal
and uninteresting sense. As Susanna Schellenberg (2014) argues, a naïve realist could
treat perceptual experience as a perceptual relation to a mind-independent object
and yet allow us to speak of a ‘content of experience’ that is merely associated with
the experience, perhaps by being the content of a belief based on the experience or
by being the content of a sentence that is used to describe how things seem to the
subject. As she puts it:

Every experience can be associated with (propositional) content in the sense

that sentences can be articulated that describe how the environment seems
to the subject, without the content expressed being a proper part of the
experience. (201)

As Schellenberg argues, any account of experience should be willing to accept that

we can at least partially describe how the environment seems to the perceiver. So, the
question of whether experience has minimal content in this sense does not settle the
dispute between advocates and opponents of representational views of experience.
Minimal or weak content, therefore, is not a characteristic that can help us dis-
tinguish between naïve realism and representational views of perception. Nor is
the question of whether visual experience has weak content one that should be of
particular interest to philosophers or scientists. No interesting scientific issues turn
on whether visual experience has content in the weak sense.
Being fundamentally representational, by contrast, is a mark of representational
views but not of non-representational views, such as naïve realism. Moreover, the
question of whether visual experience is representational is an issue that matters
to whether we can provide an adequate solution to the skeptical challenge to the
common belief that we can have knowledge through perception (see, e.g., Brogaard,
2016a) and whether we can account for the role of perception in action and the
transparency of visual experience.
6

6 Introduction
As just noted, the question of whether visual experience is representational is
also a question of interest to people in the cognitive sciences. The question plays an
important role in the debate between traditional cognitive science, on the one hand,
and enactivism and embodied cognitive science, on the other. Traditional cognitive
scientists regard representational mental states as central to the computational theory
of mind. A core question is that of which states are made up by the computation
and storage of mental representations—the information-bearing structures of the
mind or brain (Fodor, 1975, 1987; Newell & Simon, 1976; Kosslyn, 1980; Marr, 1982;
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Dretske, 1995). Enactivism and other forms of embodied cogni-
tive theories deny that perceptual and cognitive states are representational, or at the
very least that their representational feature is essential to them (Noë, 2004; Shapiro,
2011). For example, in Action in Perception, Alva Noë argues that perception is not a
process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity of the body as a whole, an exercise
of sensorimotor know-how. As he puts it, ‘the basis of perception, on our enactive,
sensorimotor approach, is implicit practical knowledge of the ways movement
gives rise to changes in stimulation’ (2004, 8). According to Noë, the skillful activ-
ity involved in the exercise of sensorimotor know-how is not representational. The
representational theory of experience I am defending in this book is thus more in
line with traditional cognitive science than with the newer enactivist theories. My
envisaged opponent here is not the enactivist but, rather, the naïve realist, who
holds that visual experience is a perceptual relation between a perceiver and a mind-
independent physical object. However, as enactivists deny that perceptual states are
representational states, the conclusions argued for in this book imply a refutation of
enactivism.
The majority of my arguments ultimately rest on the semantics of ‘seem’, ‘look’, and
‘see’, as well as the nature of the mental states expressed by perceptual reports that make
use of these verbs. Here are some examples of sentences used to report on seemings:

(1)
(a) Premise (1) seems right.
(b) Her skin seemed very pale.
(c) She seemed more amused than shocked.
(d) It seems that Hurricane Sandy is not the scariest of them all.
(e) This election seems a lot like the election in 2000.
(f ) The Dewey school seems to have the best educational philosophy.
(h) I always thought she seemed like a lazy pillow princess.

‘Seem’ serves many different roles in ordinary language. 1(a) is most naturally used to
express a belief or partial belief, whereas 1(b) is most naturally used to express a visual
 Introduction 7
seeming or experience. Unlike 1(b), 1(e) has a comparative structure. It compares
two elections in terms of how they seem. Identifying which reports are reports of
features of visual experience is one of the aims of this book.
Considerations of how we talk and think about our experiences, I argue, can help
us establish that our experiences are representational, not simply by having weak
content but also by having a representational phenomenology. Establishing this does
not show that experience is fundamentally representational, but it does nonetheless
undermine most relational views of experience.
A common complaint against this sort of approach is that language cannot in
general be thought to provide insight into the nature of the world. Language is not a
guide to metaphysics. I think this sort of complaint is widely exaggerated. As Brendan
Balcerak Jackson has argued, there are several reasons one might suspect a strong
link between language and metaphysics (Balcerak Jackson, 2016). Take the concept
of ground, which has received a lot of attention in recent years (Schaffer, 2009; Fine,
2012a, b). First, a theory of ground captures relations of metaphysical determina-
tion among facts in a given domain. That is, it captures what holds in virtue of what.
For example, consciousness may obtain in virtue of certain brain states obtaining.
According to Balcerak Jackson, theories of ground should respect patterns of structural
entailment. For example, if Kermit boiled the water partially constitutes the ground of a
particular truth, then the water boiled also partially constitutes the ground of that truth.
The inference from Kermit boiled the water to the water boiled is valid in terms of the
compositional structures of the sentences involved, according to our best composi-
tional semantics. So, features of what can constitute a ground depend on compositional
semantics.
Second, theories of ground should respect the theories of natural semantics. So,
setting aside context-sensitive expressions, we should expect what is known as ‘the
disquotational principle’ to hold. The disquotational principle says, for instance, that
‘Brutus stabbed Caesar’ is true iff Brutus stabbed Caesar. Initial appearances to the con-
trary, this principle has implications for the link between language and metaphysics.
Consider the claim that a linguistic theory of ‘know-how’ does not shed light on the
nature of knowledge-how. This claim can be refuted using a simple argument. Let us
suppose that our best linguistic theory of ‘know-how’ states that ‘S knows how to A’
is true iff for some way w, ‘S knows that w is a way to A’ (Stanley & Williamson, 2001;
Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Bengson & Moffett, 2007). We can then offer the
following argument in favor of semantic involvement in metaphysics:

1. ‘S knows how to A’ is true iff there is a way w such that S knows that w is a
way to A.
2. ‘S knows how to A’ is true iff S knows how to A.
8

8 Introduction
Conclusion: S knows how to A iff there is a way w such that S knows that w is a
way to A.

This sort of argument illustrates that our theories of the nature of reality do indeed
depend on semantic theories of language (Balcerak Jackson, 2016).
A similar argument can be provided to demonstrate that our best theories of
‘looks’ have implications for the nature of the underlying mental states. As I will
argue, ‘look’ functions semantically as a subject-raising verb. This means that ‘o looks
F’ is true iff it looks as if o is F. Now, consider the following argument:

1. ‘o looks F’ is true iff it looks as if o is F.

2. ‘o looks F’ is true iff o looks F.
Conclusion: o looks F iff it looks as if o is F.

The semantics of ‘look’ thus has direct implications for the nature of looks. As we
will see, if ‘look’ is a subject-raising verb, then looks are not observational features of
objects, as Martin (2010) argues, but mental states. There are thus strong reasons to
think that the semantics of ‘looks’ provides insight into the nature of looks.
Even if (against all odds) there is no good reason to think that language can
provide insight into the nature of the world in general, the language we use to speak
of seemings, looks, and seeings, I argue, can be a reliable guide to the nature of those
mental states.
As just noted, the arguments that rest on the semantics of ‘seem’, ‘look’, and
‘appear’, as well as the mental states underlying our talk of seemings, looks, and
appearances, only establish that experience is representational. Although this con-
clusion is stronger than the very weak claim that experience has content, it does not
establish that experience is fundamentally representational. My main argument for
the view that our visual experiences are fundamentally representational proceeds by
showing that a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenology of visual experience
requires that the phenomenology be representational. A perceptual relation
sometimes obtains between the subject and a mind-independent physical object in
cases of visual perception, but this relation does not suffice to explain the differences
in the phenomenology of experience in individuals with different developmental
or evolutionary histories. Consider two individuals with visual systems operating
according to different perceptual principles, perhaps because of radically different
developmental paths in early childhood. The two perceivers might make different
adjustments for variations in illumination. That would potentially lead to different
phenomenal seemings associated with the same object instantiating the same
visually perceptible property instances. We need not suppose that either of the two
experiences is illusory, as adjustments for differences in illumination are made by us
 Introduction 9
all the time, and it is not always clear which adjustments can be properly said to be the
correct ones. In a case like this, we cannot appeal to the perceptual relation between
the perceiver and a mind-independent physical object of perception to explain the
difference in the phenomenology of the two individuals’ experiences. Both perceivers
stand in a non-deviant causal relation to the external object of perception. As I will
argue, cases like this show that the phenomenology of experience is not exhausted
by the external object and its perceptible properties instances. This counts against
naïve realism when understood as the view that visual experience is constituted by a
perceptual relation between a subject and a mind-independent physical object.
Faced with these difficulties, the naïve realist might attempt to construe the perceptual
relation as a relation between a phenomenal seeming and a mind-independent physical
object. But, as I will argue on the basis of the language of perception, it is beyond
doubt that phenomenal seemings are representational. So, if the naïve realist takes
phenomenal seemings to be constitutive of experience, then experience turns out to
be fundamentally representational. There are indeed thinkers who hold that visual
experience is fundamentally a matter of (i) representing the environment in a certain way
and (ii) being perceptually related to objects in the environment (see, e.g., Schellenberg,
2014; Logue, 2014), but it is not the view normally endorsed by naïve realists (see, e.g.,
Brewer, 2011), and it entails that a form of the representational view is correct.
The structure of this book is as follows. The first three chapters consist of a defense
of the premises of my main arguments. My main arguments run as follows:

Phenomenal Seemings Are Representational

1. ‘Look’ is a hyperintensional mental-state operator.
2. Hyperintensional mental-state operators operate on representational
content.
3. So, ‘look’ operates on representational content.
4. If ‘look’ operates on representational content, then looks are
representational states.
Conclusion: Looks are representational states.

Reflection Argument
1. True phenomenal ‘look’-reports reflect representational phenomenal
properties of experience.
2. If (1), then visual experience is representational.
Conclusion: Visual experience is representational.

Visual Experiences Are Fundamentally Representational

1. Phenomenal looks are needed to explain the phenomenology of visual
experience.
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moved to the next place. They could also be left standing where the
country people could use them while the court was away. Indeed,
such structures would seem to be the ancestors of our own
prefabricated houses.

The winter of 1519 was a bitter one. When the cold fog spread over
the valley shrouding the bare trees it chilled the big, white-washed
rooms of Cloux. The wind blew down from the north sending blasts
down the chimneys and scattering ashes and sparks. Leonardo,
huddled against the huge fireplace with its roof projecting into the
room, pulled his black cloak lined in soft leather around him and
reminded himself to include it in his will for Mathurine, the faithful
domestic who cooked for him and took care of his house.

The aged Leonardo, who had observed and analyzed so much of

man and nature, knew now that his own days were numbered.
When the first, pale sunlight of March shone through the small
leaded-glass windows of his house, he applied to the king for
permission to make out his own will. French law demanded that the
property of any foreigner dying in France went to the Crown. The
permission was granted, and on April 23, 1519, Guillaume Boureau,
the Royal Notary of Amboise was summoned with witnesses.

To his half-brothers in Florence Leonardo left his property at 157

Fiesole and four hundred ducats. To his faithful friend and
companion, Francesco de’ Melzi, nobleman of Milan, Leonardo willed
his notes, drawings, and paintings. Battista was given the income
that Louis XII had granted Leonardo from the tolls of the canal at
San Cristoforo near Milan. Mathurine was granted the “good black
cloth, trimmed with leather” and two ducats. Moreover, Leonardo
outlined in detail the plans for his own funeral, right down to the use
of ten pounds of candles.

Too weak now to stand any more, Leonardo was confined to his big
four-poster bed with the canopy. From it he could see the tracery of
the Chapel of Saint-Hubert against the pale, foreign sky through the
little window in the corner. The vicar of the church of Saint-Denis
was called, with two priests and two Franciscan friars, and Leonardo
received the last sacraments at his bedside.

An entry in his notes reads, “While I thought I was learning to live, I

have been learning how to die.” But death was not easy for him.
With tears rolling down his sunken cheeks for “his wasted life,” he
died on May 2, 1519—fighting even this final interruption to all his
work.

King Francis I, who was at St. Germain-en-Laye with his 158

court, wept when the news was brought to him. Francesco
de’ Melzi was so overcome with grief that he waited until June
before writing to the half-brothers of Leonardo of the Master’s death.
He wrote, in part, “He was to me the best of fathers, and it is
impossible for me to express the grief that his death has caused me.
Until the day when my body is laid under the ground, I shall
experience perpetual sorrow, and not without reason, for he daily
showed me the most devoted and warmest affection.”

And in a closing paragraph Francesco added these words: “His loss is

a grief to everyone, for it is not in the power of nature to reproduce
another such man.”

159
 14
Mankind’s Debt to Leonardo

When Leonardo died his notebooks began their separate journeys

into obscurity. They traveled to different lands and became parts of
widely disparate collections. It has only been within the last fifty
years that efforts were made to bring them all together between the
covers of one volume—a dream that Leonardo himself entertained
but never realized. As the manuscripts and drawings were brought
to light, translated and published, the extraordinary scope of
Leonardo’s scientific explorations was revealed.

Mathematician, anatomist, botanist, astronomer and 160

geologist form only part of the long list of his
accomplishments and give the clue to the man who considered all
the natural world within his province of study. Because of the
universality of Leonardo’s scientific thought he has been frequently
mentioned as the forerunner of such men as Galileo Galilei, Sir Isaac
Newton, James Watt, Francis Bacon and William Harvey. Although
Leonardo cannot be credited with the actual discoveries that these
men made, his methods of investigation pointed the way down the
paths that they would follow.

The key to Leonardo’s methods lies in a quotation from his notes on

vision. He wrote of vision as saper vedere—“to know how to see”—
and he referred to the eye as “the window of the soul.” Again and
again, he stressed the importance of observation and personal
experience. Although he himself was well read, he emphasized that
“science comes by observation not by authority.” His supreme talent
for drawing underlines his credo and is inseparable from his science.
What he saw in the natural world about him needed investigating.
The results of these investigations were transformed into drawings
as the most certain method for passing this knowledge along to
others. The best example of this attitude is represented by his
anatomical studies. To merely draw the living figure in front of him
was not sufficient—it was imperative to know what he was drawing.
He turned to the dissecting room and after intensive study produced
some of the finest anatomical drawings in the world—and among the
easiest for others to understand.

What Walter Pater wrote of the Renaissance—“in many 161

things great rather by what it designed or aspired to than by
what it actually achieved”—could be a summation of Leonardo’s own
lifetime of effort in science. He labored to bring mankind from the
morass of medieval superstitions onto the firm ground of natural
facts. With an insatiable curiosity Leonardo attempted the impossible
task of encompassing all knowledge. Thus he established his right to
immortality—for it was an attempt that shone like a beacon in a
world dark with ignorance.

162
 Significant Dates in Leonardo’s Life

1452 April 15. Birth of Leonardo.

1467 Commences apprenticeship with Verrochio in Florence.
1478 Commissioned for altarpiece in the Palace of the Signoria.
1481 Commissioned to paint an altarpiece for Convent of San
Donato.
1482- Leonardo leaves Florence for the court of Ludovico Sforza
83(?) in Milan.
1483 Begins equestrian monument of Francesco Sforza for
Ludovico.
1484- Plague in Milan.
86
1490 April 23. Recommences equestrian monument and starts
book on light and shade.
1496 Meets with Fra Luca Pacioli, professor of mathematics.
1498 The Last Supper completed.
1499 Apr. Land awarded to Leonardo near Porta Vercellina. Oct.
French occupy Milan. Dec. Leonardo leaves Milan with
Pacioli.
1500 Leonardo arrives in Mantua. Travels to Venice and returns
to Florence.
1502 In the service of Cesare Borgia.
1503 Returns to Florence, commences work on a canal to sea.
1504 Begins the painting of battle of Anghiari. Father dies.
Attempt at flight (?).
1506 May. Leaves Florence for Milan at summons of Charles
d’Amboise, French military governor.
1507 Sept. Goes to Florence to settle father’s will.
1508 July. Returns to Milan.
1511 Works with Marc Antonio della Torre on anatomical
research.
1512 French lose Milan.
1513 Leonardo leaves Milan for Rome. Serves Giuliano de’ Medici,
brother of Pope Leo X.
1516 Leonardo leaves Rome for France to serve King Francis I.
1519 May 2. Death of Leonardo.
164
 Index

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
V W X Y Z

A
Abbaco, Benedetto dell’, 5
Adda river, 124
“Adoration of the Magi,” 29, 30
Adriatic, the, 62, 93
“Air conditioner,” 69
Air, study of, 65, 66, 99
“Alarm clock,” 57
Albert of Saxony, 81
Alessandria, fortress of, 83
Alfonso of Calabria, 38
Alps, the, 37, 67
Amadeo, Antonio, 58
Amadori, Albiera di Giovanni, 2
Amadori, Alessandro, 3, 111
Amboise, see Chateau d’Amboise
Amontons, 134
Anatomy, human, 52, 53, 107, 109, 119, 125-127, 138
Anchiano, 2
Anemometer, 65, 66
Anemoscope, 65
Anghiari, battle of, 103, 110, 113
Aquadello, 124
Aquila, Battista dell’, 139
Arabs, the, 54
Archimedes, 41, 67, 81, 134
Architecture, 50, 58
Argyropoulos, John, 17
Aristotle, 17, 23, 42, 48, 81, 89
Arithmetic, 77
Arithmetico, Benedetto, 16
Armored vehicle, 39, 40
Arno river, 25, 31, 96, 100-106, 109
Arrezzo, 93
Ascanio, Cardinal, 83
Astronomy, 80-82, 104, 105
Atlantic Ocean, 19
“Automobile,” 32, 33
Autopsies, 107
Avicenna, 53

B
Bacon, Francis, 160
Bacon, Roger, 120
Badia, the, 7
Battista, 155, 157
Bayzid II, 94
Beatis, Antonio de’, 151
Bianca Maria, 64
Bible, the, 62, 104, 141
Birds, flight of, 24, 65, 66, 76, 99, 119
Black Death, see Bubonic plague
Blois, 152
Bologna, 144
Bombard, 26
Bombs, 39
Borgia, Cesare, 82, 86-97, 102, 139
Borgias, the, 102
Botticelli, Sandro, 33
Boureau, Guillaume, 156
Bramante, 68, 131
Bridge building, 95
Bubonic plague, 45-47
Buonarroti, Michelangelo, see Michelangelo

C
“Camera obscura,” 55
Campo Morto, battle of, 38
Cannon, 26, 33, 41 165
Caravaggio, siege of, 124
Cardano, Girolamo, 113
Carles, Geffroy, 115, 116
Carpentry, 135, 136
Cassano, castle of, 124
Castel’ Sant’ Angelo, 130
Caterina, 2
Cellini, Benvenuto, 100
Centrifugal pump, 121, 122
Cesena, 94
Chambord, castle of, 152
Charles d’Amboise, 94, 114-117, 121, 124, 127, 139
Chateau d’Amboise, 147-156
Cher river, 152
Christ, 30, 74, 77, 78
Church of the Annunciation of the Servite Order of Monks, 90
Church, the, 18, 48, 53, 63, 104, 145
Cioni, Andrea di Michele di Francesco de’, see Verrochio, Andrea del
City Planning, 44, 45, 47
City-states, 9, 10
Civitavecchia, 143, 144
Cloux, Manoir de, 148, 154, 156
Coins, minting of, 47
Collections, 4
Columbus, Christopher, 19
Constantinople, 95
Corte, Bernardino da, 83
Corte Vecchia, 56
Coulomb, A. C., 17, 134
Council of Eighty, 109
Council of Florence, 23, 106
Councilors and Tribunal of Venice, 89
Credi, Lorenzo di, 13
Cusanus, Cardinal, 42

D
Dams, 101
Danti, Giovanni Battista, 96, 97
d’Aragona, Cardinal Luigi, 151
Darwin, 105
d’Auvergne, Madelaine, 153
David, statue of, 106
De Ludo Geometrico, 134
d’Este, Beatrice, 60, 61, 69, 86
d’Este, Isabella, 86, 87, 91
Diocletian, Emperor, 135
Diseases, 109
Dissection, 53, 126, 145
Diver’s suit, 89
Drawing, see Painting
Drum, mechanical, 61
Dynamics, 140

E
Earth, the, 104, 105
Eclipse of the sun, 48
Einstein, 153
Equilibrium, 141
Euclid, 54, 91
Eye, the, 54, 55

F
Ferdinand, King of Naples, 25, 27
Ferrara, 70
Ferrari, Ambrogio, 42
Fiesole, 111, 113, 156
Flemish painters, 15
Flight,
of arrow, 82, 83
of birds, 24, 65, 66, 76, 99, 119
problems of, 70, 71, 75, 76, 96-100, 111-113
Florence, 7-19, 25-27, 32, 38, 53, 68, 93-96, 100-103
Flying machine, 70, 71, 75, 76, 112
Foix, Gaston de, 127
Forts, 88
Forum of the Caesars, 134
Four elements, 48
France, 67-69, 78, 82-84, 94, 114-120, 125, 127, 128, 139, 142-145,
152
Francis I, 143-145, 148-157
Fraternity of the Immaculate Conception, 43, 44, 47
Friction, 140, 141

G
Galen, 52, 53
Galileo, Galilei, 134, 141, 160
Genoa, 143
Geocentric theory, see Ptolemaic theory
Geography, 18, 19
Geology, 103, 104
Geometry, 91, 134
Georg, 131, 133, 140, 143, 145
Geotropism, 79
Germany, 47, 69 166
Ghirlandaio, Domenico di Tommaso del, 33
Giocondo, Francesco del, 98
Giovanni “the Piper,” 100
Gonzaga, Francesco, 86
Gothic tradition, 50
Gravity, 140, 141
Greeks, the, 69
Guido, 23
Guild, 19

H
Hadrian, Emperor, 130
Harvey, William, 126, 160
Heavens, observation of, 80
Heliocentric theory, 48, 81
Heliotropism, 79
Highmore, 53
Hippocrates, 52
Holy Roman Empire, 9
Hooke, Robert, 141
Horse, anatomy of the, 41
Hydraulic pump, 74, 122, 123
Hydraulics, 14
Hydrodynamics, 141
Hygrometer, 30, 31

I
Imola, 95, 96
Inclination gauge, 66, 67
India, 18
Introduction to Perspective, or the Function of the Eye, 58
Inventions, 25-27, 38-40
Irradiation, 55
Irrigation, 101
Isabella of Aragon, 51
Isonzo river, 88
Istanbul, see Constantinople

J
Johannes, 133, 143, 145
Judas, 74, 77, 78

K
King Charles VIII, 67-69, 78, 82, 120, 148

L
Lake Como, 125
Lamps, 59
Lanfredini, Francesca, 2, 7
“Last Supper,” 30, 72, 74, 77, 92, 99, 138
League of Cambria, 124
Leghorn, 100
Leibig, 41
Leonardo da Vinci,
and the Church, 18, 48, 104, 145
birth of, 2
death of, 157
early years of, 1-8
illness of, 142, 150
moves to Florence, 10
notebooks of, 25, 29, 140, 152, 159, 160
Levite, 118
Light and Shade, 54
Lighting, 59
Lilienthal, Otto, 100
Livoli river, 139
Loches, 92
Loire river, 147, 149, 152
Lombardy, 37, 62, 78, 82, 83, 121,148
Louis XII (of Orleans), 78, 82, 92, 94, 114, 116, 119, 124, 142, 157
Louvre, the, 44
Lucullus, 130
Lyons, 152
Lyre, silver, 34, 35

M
Machiavelli, Niccolò, 96, 100, 102, 106, 109
Machine gun, 27
Machinery, improvement of, 16
Madonna Lisa, see Mona Lisa
Malaria, 139
Mandeville, Sir John, 103
Manenti, 88
Mantua, 84, 86, 87
Mapmaking, 19, 93, 95, 96, 100, 101
Martelli, Piero, 118
Martini, Francesco di Giorgio, 58
Martino river, 139
Mathurine, 156, 157
Maximilian I, 64
Medici, Giovanni de’, 130
Medici, Giuliano de’, 21, 130, 132, 138-146
Medici, Lorenzo de’, 16, 21, 26, 27, 29, 35, 39, 127, 130, 132, 146,
153
Medici, Piero de’, 10, 16
Medicis, the, 10, 21, 23, 26, 27, 33, 34, 68, 130, 131, 140, 142, 146
Melzi, Francesco de’, 117, 128, 130, 140, 142, 145, 150, 155, 167
157, 158
Michelangelo, 106, 107, 113, 131, 137, 144, 145
Middle Ages, 81, 104
Migliorotti, Atalante, 35-38, 87
Milan, 9, 33-48, 60, 64, 68, 78, 82, 83, 85, 95, 114-128, 143, 144
Milan cathedral, 50
Military,
defenses, 88, 89
machines, 25-27, 33, 38-40
Millstones, 75
Mitre valve, 123
Mirrors, 133
“Mona Lisa,” 99, 103
Monferrato, 62
Monte Albano, 1, 2, 5
Monte Cecero, 113
Montorfano, 72
Muscles, 109, 119
Music, 34, 35

N
Naples, 9, 27, 68, 69
Needle sharpener, 75
Netherlands, the, 95
Newton, Isaac, 24, 56, 123, 141, 160
Newton’s First Law of Motion, 123
Newton’s law of gravitation, 83
Notes, 14
Novara, battle of, 92

O
Odometer, 69
Oggionno, Marco d’, 58
Orient, the, 89
Ornithopter, 111, 112

P
Pacioli, Fra Luca, 76, 77, 80, 84, 86-91, 133
Padua, 125
Painting, 4-7, 29-32, 43, 44, 71, 72, 91, 99, 105, 110, 112
Palatine hill, 135
Palazzo della Signoria, 12, 21-25, 103
Palazzo Vecchio, 12
Parachute, 71
Paris, 44
Parma, 138
Pater, Walter, 161
Pavia, 51, 58, 125
Pazzi conspiracy, 21, 23, 25
Pazzi, Francesco de’, 23
Pera, 95
“Periscope,” the, 89
Perugia, 96
Perugino, Pietro, 13, 33, 107
Pesaro, 93
Peschiera, 124
Pharisee, 118
Philiberta, 142
Phyllotaxis, 79
Physics, 17
Piazzetta, the, 87
Pincio hill, 130
Piombino, 93, 139, 154
Pisa, 25, 100-102, 110
Pitti Palace, 31
Plague, see Bubonic plague
Plants, study of, 79, 80
Platonic school, 54
Pliny, 23
Plutarch, 81
Pollaiuolo, 53
Ponte Vecchio, 31
Pontine marshes, 139, 154
Pope Alexander VI, 82, 92, 102
Pope Innocent VIII, 63
Pope Julius II, 124, 127, 128, 130, 131
Pope Leo X, 130-132, 139, 142-146, 153
Pope Sixtus IV, 21, 33
Porta del Popolo, 129
Porta Romana, 29
Porta Vercellina, 79, 115
Porto Cesanatico, 94
Portugal, 26
Predis, Bernardino de, 47
Predis, Giovanni Ambrogio de, 43, 44, 47, 56
Ptolemaic theory, 48
Ptolemy, 23, 54, 103

Q
Queen Claude, 152
 R
Raphael, 107, 131, 137
Ravenna, battle of, 127
Red Book of the Painters of Florence, 19
Reflection, law of, 56 168
Renaissance, 89, 104, 125, 161
Riario, Girolamo, 21, 38
Rimini, 93
Rome, 9, 33, 47, 69, 128-146
Romorantin, 150, 152
Rosate, Ambrogio da, 63
Rumford, 56
Rustici, Giovanni, 118

S
“St. Anne with the Virgin and Child,” 91, 92
St. Augustine, 42
Saint-Denis church, 157
St. Germain-en-Laye, 157
Saint-Hubert, chapel of, 153, 157
St. John, 118, 154
St. John the Baptist, 151
St. Luke, 19
St. Mary of the Virgin, 96
St. Peter’s, church of, 131
Salai, 86, 115
Salviati, Francesco, 21
San Bernardo, chapel of, 23
San Cristoforo, 157
San Donato a Scopeto, 29
San Lorenzo, 144, 145
San Marco, Little Square of, 87
Sanseverino, Galeazzo da, 82, 83
Sant’ Onofrio, hospital, 107
Santa Croce, church of, 107
Santa Maria delle Grazie, 71, 78
Santa Maria Novella, 107
Sanzio, Raffaello, see Raphael
Savoy, 142
Scarlione, Bartolommeo degli, 43
Sculpture, 41, 49, 52-54, 58-64, 118
Sforza, Duke Gian Galeazzo, 51, 56, 68, 120
Sforza, Francesco, 41, 47, 49, 61, 64
Sforza, Francesco (child), 68
Sforza, Ludovico, 33-47, 51, 52, 56, 57, 60-72, 76-79, 82-84, 92,
115, 117, 120, 138, 146, 154
Sforza monument, 49-59, 61, 64, 120
Sforzas, the, 40, 56, 57, 71, 79, 83, 117, 120, 154
Shells, 62, 63
Signoria, the, 96, 100-106, 110, 114, 116
Sistine Chapel, 33, 132, 137
Soderini, Piero, 103, 106, 109, 114-116
Sologne, 154
Spain, 18, 69, 127, 139, 142, 143
Statics, 140
Steam, 41
Strabo, 23, 103, 104
Swiss, 127, 128, 143

T
Ticino gate, 44
Torre, Marcantonio della, 125, 128
Toscanelli, Paolo del Pozzo, 18, 19, 42, 93
Touraine, 92
Trivulzio, Marshal Gian Giacomo, 120, 121, 125, 128, 143
Turks, the, 87-90, 94
Tuscany, 93
Tyrrhenian coast, 143

U
Uffizi Gallery, 25, 32
University of Padua, 125
University of Pavia, 63
Urbino, 93

V
Valentinois, Duke of, see Borgia, Cesare
Valois, Marguerite de, 150
Vatican, the, 47, 130-145
Venice, 9, 69, 87-89, 124, 125, 127
Verrochio, Andrea del, 7, 12-19, 23, 118
Via Ghibellina, 90
Vigevano, 68, 75
Vinci, 2, 13
Vinci, da, Giuliano, 117
Vinci, da, Piero, 2-7, 10, 12, 90, 106, 117
“Virgin of the Rocks,” 44
Vitellozzo, 93
Vitruvius, 77

W
Water, study of, 67, 101, 102, 121, 122
Watt, James, 160
Witelo, 58

Y
Yugoslavia, 88
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